Appendix I
Original German
Anhang.I.Ueber die Mishelligkeit zwischen der Moral und der Politik, in Absicht auf den ewigen Frieden.
Die Moral ist schon an sich selbst eine Praxis in objectiver Bedeutung, als Inbegriff von unbedingt gebietenden Gesetzen, nach denen wir handeln sollen, und es ist offenbare Ungereimtheit, nachdem man diesem Pflichtbegriff seine Autorität zugestanden hat, noch sagen zu wollen, daß man es doch nicht könne. Denn alsdann fällt dieser Begriff aus der Moral von selbst weg (ultra posse nemo obligatur); mithin kann es keinen Streit der Politik, als ausübender Rechtslehre, mit der Moral, als einer solchen, aber theoretischen (mithin keinen Streit der Praxis mit der Theorie) geben: man müßte denn unter der letzteren eine allgemeine Klugheitslehre, d. i. eine Theorie der Maximen verstehen, zu seinen auf Vortheil berechneten Absichten die tauglichsten Mittel zu wählen, d. i. läugnen, daß es überhaupt eine Moral gebe.
Die Politik sagt: „Seyd klug wie die Schlangen;“ die Moral setzt (als einschränkende Bedingung) hinzu: „und ohne Falsch, wie die Tauben.“ Wenn beydes nicht in einem Gebote zusammen bestehen kann, so ist wirklich ein Streit der Politik mit der Moral; soll aber doch durchaus beydes vereinigt seyn, so ist der Begriff vom Gegentheil absurd, und die Frage, wie jener Streit auszugleichen sey, läßt sich gar nicht einmal als Aufgabe hinstellen. Obgleich der Satz: Ehrlichkeit ist die beste Politik, eine Theorie enthält, der die Praxis, leider! sehr häufig widerspricht: so ist doch der gleichfalls theoretische: Ehrlichkeit ist besser denn alle Politik, über allen Einwurf unendlich erhaben, ja die unumgängliche Bedingung der letzteren. Der Grenzgott der Moral weicht nicht dem Jupiter (dem Grenzgott der Gewalt); denn dieser steht noch unter dem Schicksal, d. i. die Vernunft ist nicht erleuchtet genug, die Reihe der vorherbestimmenden Ursachen zu übersehen, die den glücklichen oder schlimmen Erfolg aus dem Thun und Lassen der Menschen, nach dem Mechanism der Natur, mit Sicherheit vorher verkündigen (obgleich ihn dem Wunsche gemäß hoffen) lassen. Was man aber zu thun habe, um im Gleise der Pflicht (nach Regeln der Weisheit) zu bleiben, dazu und hiemit zum Endzweck leuchtet sie uns überall hell genug vor.
Nun gründet aber der Praktiker (dem die Moral bloße Theorie ist) seine trostlose Absprechung unserer gutmüthigen Hoffnung (selbst bey eingeräumtem Sollen und Können) eigentlich darauf: daß er aus der Natur des Menschen vorher zu sehen vorgiebt, er werde dasjenige nie wollen, was erfordert wird, um jenen zum ewigen Frieden hinführenden Zweck zu Stande zu bringen. — Freylich ist das Wollen aller einzelnen Menschen, in einer gesetzlichen Verfassung nach Freyheitsprincipien zu leben (die distributive Einheit des Willens Aller), zu diesem Zweck nicht hinreichend, sondern daß Alle zusammen diesen Zustand wollen (die collective Einheit des vereinigten Willens), diese Auflösung einer schweren Aufgabe, wird noch dazu erfordert, damit ein Ganzes der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft werde, und, da also über diese Verschiedenheit des particularen Wollens Aller, noch eine vereinigende Ursache desselben hinzukommen muß, um einen gemeinschaftlichen Willen herauszubringen, welches Keiner von Allen vermag: so ist in der Ausführung jener Idee (in der Praxis) auf keinen andern Anfang des rechtlichen Zustandes zu rechnen, als den durch Gewalt, auf deren Zwang nachher das öffentliche Recht gegründet wird; welches dann freylich (da man ohnedem des Gesetzgebers moralische Gesinnung hiebey wenig in Anschlag bringen kann, er werde, nach geschehener Vereinigung der wüsten Menge in ein Volk, diesem es nur überlassen, eine rechtliche Verfassung durch ihren gemeinsamen Willen zu Stande zu bringen) große Abweichungen von jener Idee (der Theorie) in der wirklichen Erfahrung schon zum voraus erwarten läßt.
Da heißt es dann: wer einmal die Gewalt in Händen hat, wird sich vom Volk nicht Gesetze vorschreiben lassen. Ein Staat, der einmal im Besitz ist, unter keinen äußeren Gesetzen zu stehen, wird sich in Ansehung der Art, wie er gegen andere Staaten sein Recht suchen soll, nicht von ihrem Richterstuhl abhängig machen, und selbst ein Welttheil, wenn er sich einem andern, der ihm übrigens nicht im Wege ist, überlegen fühlt, wird das Mittel der Verstärkung seiner Macht, durch Beraubung oder gar Beherrschung desselben, nicht unbenutzt lassen; und so zerrinnen nun alle Plane der Theorie, für das Staats-, Völker- und Weltbürgerrecht, in sachleere unausführbare Ideale, dagegen eine Praxis, die auf empirische Principien der menschlichen Natur gegründet ist, welche es nicht für zu niedrig hält, aus der Art, wie es in der Welt zugeht, Belehrung für ihre Maximen zu ziehen, einen sicheren Grund für ihr Gebäude der Staatsklugheit zu finden allein hoffen könnte.
Freylich, wenn es keine Freyheit und darauf gegründetes moralisches Gesetz giebt, sondern alles, was geschieht oder geschehen kann, bloßer Mechanism der Natur ist, so ist Politik (als Kunst, diesen zur Regierung der Menschen zu benutzen) die ganze praktische Weisheit, und der Rechtsbegriff ein sachleerer Gedanke. Findet man diesen aber doch unumgänglich nöthig, mit der Politik zu verbinden, ja ihn gar zur einschränkenden Bedingung der letztern zu erheben, so muß die Vereinbarkeit beyder eingeräumt werden. Ich kann mir nun zwar einen moralischen Politiker, d. i. einen, der die Principien der Staatsklugheit so nimmt, daß sie mit der Moral zusammen bestehen können, aber nicht einen politischen Moralisten denken, der sich eine Moral so schmiedet, wie es der Vortheil des Staatsmanns sich zuträglich findet.
Der moralische Politiker wird es sich zum Grundsatz machen: wenn einmal Gebrechen in der Staatsverfassung oder im Staatenverhältniß angetroffen werden, die man nicht hat verhüten können, so sey es Pflicht, vornehmlich für Staatsoberhäupter, dahin bedacht zu seyn, wie sie, sobald wie möglich, gebessert, und dem Naturrecht, so wie es in der Idee der Vernunft uns zum Muster vor Augen steht, angemessen gemacht werden könne: sollte es auch ihrer Selbstsucht Aufopferungen kosten. Da nun die Zerreißung eines Bandes der Staats- oder Weltbürgerlichen Vereinigung, ehe noch eine bessere Verfassung an die Stelle derselben zu treten in Bereitschaft ist, aller, hierin mit der Moral einhelligen, Staatsklugheit zuwider ist, so wäre es zwar ungereimt, zu fordern, jenes Gebrechen müsse sofort und mit Ungestüm abgeändert werden; aber daß wenigstens die Maxime der Nothwendigkeit einer solchen Abänderung dem Machthabenden innigst beywohne, um in beständiger Annäherung zu dem Zwecke (der nach Rechtsgesetzen besten Verfassung) zu bleiben, das kann doch von ihm gefordert werden. Ein Staat kann sich auch schon republikanisch regieren, wenn er gleich noch, der vorliegenden Constitution nach, despotische Herrschermacht besitzt: bis allmählig das Volk des Einflusses der bloßen Idee der Autorität des Gesetzes (gleich als ob es physische Gewalt besäße) fähig wird, und sonach zur eigenen Gesetzgebung (welche ursprünglich auf Recht gegründet ist) tüchtig befunden wird. Wenn auch durch den Ungestüm einer von der schlechten Verfassung erzeugten Revolution unrechtmäßigerweise eine gesetzmäßigere errungen wäre, so würde es doch auch alsdann nicht mehr für erlaubt gehalten werden müssen, das Volk wieder auf die alte zurück zu führen, obgleich während derselben jeder, der sich damit gewaltthätig oder arglistig bemengt, mit Recht den Strafen des Aufrührers unterworfen seyn würde. Was aber das äußere Staatenverhältniß betrifft, so kann von einem Staat nicht verlangt werden, daß er seine, obgleich despotische, Verfassung (die aber doch die stärkere in Beziehung auf äußere Feinde ist) ablegen solle, so lange er Gefahr läuft, von andern Staaten so fort verschlungen zu werden; mithin muß bey seinem Vorsatz doch auch die Verzögerung der Ausführung bis zu besserer Zeitgelegenheit erlaubt seyn14.
Es mag also immer seyn: daß die despotisirende (in der Ausübung fehlende) Moralisten wider die Staatsklugheit (durch übereilt genommene oder angepriesene Maaßregeln) mannichfaltig verstoßen, so muß sie doch die Erfahrung, bey diesem ihrem Verstoß wider die Natur, nach und nach in ein besseres Gleis bringen; statt dessen die moralisirende Politiker, durch Beschönigung rechtswidriger Staatsprincipien, unter dem Vorwande einer des Guten, nach der Idee, wie sie die Vernunft vorschreibt, nicht fähigen menschlichen Natur, so viel an ihnen ist, das Besserwerden unmöglich machen, und die Rechtsverletzung verewigen.
Statt der Praxis, deren sich diese staatskluge Männer rühmen, gehen sie mit Praktiken um, indem sie bloß darauf bedacht sind, dadurch, daß sie der jetzt herrschenden Gewalt zum Munde reden (um ihren Privatvortheil nicht zu verfehlen), das Volk, und, wo möglich, die ganze Welt Preis zu geben; nach der Art ächter Juristen (vom Handwerk, nicht von der Gesetzgebung), wenn sie sich bis zur Politik versteigen. Denn da dieser ihr Geschäfte nicht ist, über Gesetzgebung selbst zu vernünfteln, sondern die gegenwärtige Gebote des Landrechts zu vollziehen, so muß ihnen jede, jetzt vorhandene, gesetzliche Verfassung, und, wenn diese höhern Orts abgeändert wird, die nun folgende, immer die beste seyn; wo dann alles so in seiner gehörigen mechanischen Ordnung ist. Wenn aber diese Geschicklichkeit, für alle Sättel gerecht zu seyn, ihnen den Wahn einflößt, auch über Principien einer Staatsverfassung überhaupt nach Rechtsbegriffen (mithin a priori, nicht empirisch) urtheilen zu können: wenn sie darauf groß thun, Menschen zu kennen (welches freylich zu erwarten ist, weil sie mit vielen zu thun haben), ohne doch den Menschen, und was aus ihm gemacht werden kann, zu kennen (wozu ein höherer Standpunkt der Anthropologischen Beobachtung erfordert wird), mit diesen Begriffen aber versehen, ans Staats- und Völkerrecht, wie es die Vernunft vorschreibt, gehen: so können sie diesen Ueberschritt nicht anders, als mit dem Geist der Chicane thun, indem sie ihr gewohntes Verfahren (eines Mechanisms nach despotisch gegebenen Zwangsgesetzen) auch da befolgen, wo die Begriffe der Vernunft einen nur nach Freyheitsprincipien gesetzmäßigen Zwang begründet wissen wollen, durch welchen allererst eine zu Recht beständige Staatsverfassung möglich ist; welche Aufgabe der vorgebliche Praktiker, mit Vorbeygehung jener Idee, empirisch, aus Erfahrung, wie die bisher noch am besten bestandene, mehrentheils aber rechtswidrige, Staatsverfassungen eingerichtet waren, lösen zu können glaubt. — Die Maximen, deren er sich hiezu bedient (ob er sie zwar nicht laut werden läßt), laufen ohngefähr auf folgende sophistische Maximen hinaus.
1 Fac et excusa. Ergreife die günstige Gelegenheit zur eigenmächtigen Besitznehmung (entweder eines Rechts des Staats über sein Volk, oder über ein anderes benachbarte); die Rechtfertigung wird sich weit leichter und zierlicher nach der That vortragen, und die Gewalt beschönigen lassen (vornehmlich im ersten Fall, wo die obere Gewalt im Innern so fort auch die gesetzgebende Obrigkeit ist, der man gehorchen muß, ohne darüber zu vernünfteln); als wenn man zuvor auf überzeugende Gründe sinnen, und die Gegengründe darüber noch erst abwarten wollte. Diese Dreustigkeit selbst giebt einen gewissen Anschein von innerer Ueberzeugung der Rechtmäßigkeit der That, und der Gott bonus euentus ist nachher der beste Rechtsvertreter.
2 Si fecisti nega. Was du selbst verbrochen hast, z. B. um dein Volk zur Verzweiflung, und so zum Aufruhr zu bringen, das läugne ab, daß es deine Schuld sey; sondern behaupte, daß es die der Widerspenstigkeit der Unterthanen, oder auch, bey deiner Bemächtigung eines benachbarten Volks, die Schuld der Natur des Menschen sey, der, wenn er dem Andern nicht mit Gewalt zuvorkommt, sicher darauf rechnen kann, daß dieser ihm zuvorkommen und sich seiner bemächtigen werde.
3 Diuide et impera. Das ist: sind gewisse privilegirte Häupter in deinem Volk, welche dich bloß zu ihrem Oberhaupt (primus inter pares) gewählt haben, so veruneinige jene unter einander, und entzweye sie mit dem Volk: stehe nun dem letztern, unter Vorspiegelung größerer Freyheit, bey, so wird alles von deinem unbedingten Willen abhängen. Oder sind es äußere Staaten, so ist Erregung der Mishelligkeit unter ihnen ein ziemlich sicheres Mittel, unter dem Schein des Beystandes des Schwächeren, einen nach dem andern dir zu unterwerfen.
Durch diese politische Maximen wird nun zwar niemand hintergangen; denn sie sind insgesamt schon allgemein bekannt; auch ist es mit ihnen nicht der Fall sich zu schämen, als ob die Ungerechtigkeit gar zu offenbar in die Augen leuchtete. Denn, weil sich große Mächte nie vor dem Urtheil des gemeinen Haufens, sondern nur eine vor der andern schämen, was aber jene Grundsätze betrifft, nicht das Offenbarwerden, sondern nur das Mislingen derselben sie beschämt machen kann (denn in Ansehung der Moralität der Maximen kommen sie alle unter einander überein), so bleibt ihnen immer die politische Ehre übrig, auf die sie sicher rechnen können, nämlich die der Vergrößerung ihrer Macht, auf welchem Wege sie auch erworben seyn mag15.
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Aus allen diesen Schlangenwendungen einer unmoralischen Klugheitslehre, den Friedenszustand unter Menschen, aus dem kriegerischen des Naturzustandes herauszubringen, erhellet wenigstens so viel: daß die Menschen, eben so wenig in ihren Privatverhältnissen, als in ihren öffentlichen, dem Rechtsbegriff entgehen können, und sich nicht getrauen, die Politik öffentlich bloß auf Handgriffe der Klugheit zu gründen, mithin dem Begriffe eines öffentlichen Rechts allen Gehorsam aufzukündigen (welches vornehmlich in dem des Völkerrechts auffallend ist), sondern ihm an sich alle gebührende Ehre wiederfahren lassen, wenn sie auch hundert Ausflüchte und Bemäntelungen aussinnen sollten, um ihm in der Praxis auszuweichen, und der verschmitzten Gewalt die Autorität anzudichten, der Ursprung und der Verband alles Rechts zu seyn. — Um dieser Sophisterey (wenn gleich nicht der durch sie beschönigten Ungerechtigkeit) ein Ende zu machen, und die falsche Vertreter der Mächtigen der Erde zum Geständnisse zu bringen, daß es nicht das Recht, sondern die Gewalt sey, der sie zum Vortheil sprechen, von welcher sie, gleich als ob sie selbst hiebey was zu befehlen hätten, den Ton annehmen, wird es gut seyn, das Blendwerk aufzudecken, womit man sich und andere hintergeht, das oberste Princip, von dem die Absicht auf den ewigen Frieden ausgeht, ausfindig zu machen und zu zeigen: daß alles das Böse, was ihm im Wege ist, davon herrühre: daß der politische Moralist da anfängt, wo der moralische Politiker billigerweise endigt, und, indem er so die Grundsätze dem Zweck unterordnet (d. i. die Pferde hinter den Wagen spannt), seine eigene Absicht vereitelt, die Politik mit der Moral in Einverständniß zu bringen.
Um die praktische Philosophie mit sich selbst einig zu machen, ist nöthig, zuförderst die Frage zu entscheiden: ob in Aufgaben der praktischen Vernunft vom materialen Prinzip derselben, dem Zweck (als Gegenstand der Willkühr) der Anfang gemacht werden müsse, oder vom formalen, d. i. demjenigen (bloß auf Freyheit im äußern Verhältniß gestellten), darnach es heißt: handle so, daß du wollen kannst, deine Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden (der Zweck mag seyn welcher er wolle).
Ohne alle Zweifel muß das letztere Princip vorangehen: denn es hat, als Rechtsprincip, unbedingte Nothwendigkeit, statt dessen das erstere, nur unter Voraussetzung empirischer Bedingungen des vorgesetzten Zwecks, nämlich der Ausführung desselben, nöthigend ist, und, wenn dieser Zweck (z. B. der ewige Friede) auch Pflicht wäre, so müßte doch diese selbst aus dem formalen Princip der Maximen äußerlich zu handeln abgeleitet worden seyn. — Nun ist das erstere Princip, das des politischen Moralisten (das Problem des Staats-, Völker- und Weltbürgerrechts), eine bloße Kunstaufgabe (problema technicum), das zweyte dagegen, als Princip des moralischen Politikers, welchem es eine sittliche Aufgabe (problxma morale) ist, im Verfahren von dem anderen himmelweit unterschieden, um den ewigen Frieden, den man nun nicht bloß als physisches Gut, sondern auch als einen aus Pflichtanerkennung hervorgehenden Zustand wünscht, herbeyzuführen.
Zur Auflösung des ersten, nämlich des Staats-Klugheitsproblems, wird viel Kenntnis der Natur erfordert, um ihren Mechanism zu dem gedachten Zweck zu benutzen, und doch ist alle diese ungewiß in Ansehung ihres Resultats, den ewigen Frieden betreffend; man mag nun die eine oder die andere der drey Abtheilungen des öffentlichen Rechts nehmen. Ob das Volk im Gehorsam und zugleich im Flor besser durch Strenge, oder Lockspeise der Eitelkeit, ob durch Obergewalt eines Einzigen, oder durch Vereinigung mehrerer Häupter, vielleicht auch bloß durch einen Dienstadel, oder durch Volksgewalt, im Innern, und zwar auf lange Zeit, gehalten werden könne, ist ungewiß. Man hat von allen Regierungsarten (die einzige ächt-republikanische, die aber nur einem moralischen Politiker in den Sinn kommen kann, ausgenommen) Beyspiele des Gegentheils in der Geschichte. — Noch ungewisser ist ein auf Statute nach Ministerialplanen vorgeblich errichtetes Völkerrecht, welches in der That nur ein Wort ohne Sache ist, und auf Verträgen beruht, die in demselben Akt ihrer Beschließung zugleich den geheimen Vorbehalt ihrer Uebertretung enthalten. — Dagegen dringt sich die Auflösung des zweyten, nämlich des Staatsweisheitsproblems, so zu sagen, von selbst auf, ist jedermann einleuchtend, und macht alle Künsteley zu Schanden, führt dabey gerade zum Zweck; doch mit der Erinnerung der Klugheit, ihn nicht übereilterweise mit Gewalt herbey zu ziehen, sondern sich ihm, nach Beschaffenheit der günstigen Umstände, unabläßig zu nähern.
Da heißt es denn: „trachtet allererst nach dem Reiche der reinen praktischen Vernunft und nach seiner Gerechtigkeit, so wird euch euer Zweck (die Wohlthat des ewigen Friedens) von selbst zufallen.“ Denn das hat die Moral Eigenthümliches an sich, und zwar in Ansehung ihrer Grundsätze des öffentlichen Rechts, (mithin in Beziehung auf eine a priori erkennbare Politik), daß, je weniger sie das Verhalten von dem vorgesetzten Zweck, dem beabsichtigten, es sey physischem oder sittlichem Vortheil, abhängig macht, desto mehr sie dennoch zu diesem im Allgemeinen zusammenstimmt; welches daher kömmt, weil es gerade der a priori gegebene allgemeine Wille (in einem Volk, oder im Verhältnis verschiedener Völker unter einander) ist, der allein, was unter Menschen Rechtens ist, bestimmt; diese Vereinigung des Willens Aller aber, wenn nur in der Ausübung consequent verfahren wird, auch nach dem Mechanism der Natur, zugleich die Ursache seyn kann, die abgezweckte Wirkung hervorzubringen, und dem Rechtsbegriffe Effekt zu verschaffen. — So ist es z. B. ein Grundsatz der moralischen Politik: daß sich ein Volk zu einem Staat nach den alleinigen Rechtsbegriffen der Freyheit und Gleichheit vereinigen solle, und dieses Princip ist nicht auf Klugheit, sondern auf Pflicht gegründet. Nun mögen dagegen politische Moralisten noch so viel über den Naturmechanism einer in Gesellschaft tretenden Menschenmenge, welcher jene Grundsätze entkräftete, und ihre Absicht vereiteln werde, vernünfteln, oder auch durch Beyspiele schlecht organisirter Verfassungen alter und neuer Zeiten (z. B. von Demokratien ohne Repräsentationssystem) ihre Behauptung dagegen zu beweisen suchen, so verdienen sie kein Gehör; vornehmlich, da eine solche verderbliche Theorie das Uebel wohl gar selbst bewirkt, was sie vorhersagt, nach welcher der Mensch mit den übrigen lebenden Maschinen in eine Classe geworfen wird, denen nur noch das Bewußtseyn, daß sie nicht freye Wesen sind, beywohnen dürfte, um sie in ihrem eigenen Urtheil zu den elendesten unter allen Weltwesen zu machen.
Der zwar etwas renomistisch klingende, sprüchwörtlich in Umlauf gekommene, aber wahre Satz: fiat iustitia, pereat mundus, das heißt zu deutsch: „es herrsche Gerechtigkeit, die Schelme in der Welt mögen auch insgesammt darüber zu Grunde gehen,“ ist ein wackerer, alle durch Arglist oder Gewalt vorgezeichnete krumme Wege abschneidender Rechtsgrundsatz; nur daß er nicht mißverstanden, und etwa als Erlaubnis, sein eigenes Recht mit der größten Strenge zu benutzen (welches der ethischen Pflicht widerstreiten würde), sondern als Verbindlichkeit der Machthabenden, niemanden sein Recht aus Ungunst oder Mitleiden gegen Andere zu weigern oder zu schmälern, verstanden wird; wozu vorzüglich eine nach reinen Rechtsprincipien eingerichtete innere Verfassung des Staats, dann aber auch die der Vereinigung desselben mit andern benachbarten oder auch entfernten Staaten zu einer (einem allgemeinen Staat analogischen) gesetzlichen Ausgleichung ihrer Streitigkeiten erfordert wird. — Dieser Satz will nichts anders sagen, als: die politische Maximen müssen nicht von der, aus ihrer Befolgung zu erwartenden, Wohlfahrt und Glückseligkeit eines jeden Staats, also nicht vom Zweck, den sich ein jeder derselben zum Gegenstande macht (vom Wollen), als dem obersten (aber empirischen) Princip der Staatsweisheit, sondern von dem reinen Begriff der Rechtspflicht (vom Sollen, dessen Princip a priori durch reine Vernunft gegeben ist) ausgehen, die physische Folgen daraus mögen auch seyn, welche sie wollen. Die Welt wird keinesweges dadurch untergehen, daß der bösen Menschen weniger wird. Das moralisch Böse hat die von seiner Natur unabtrennliche Eigenschaft, daß es in seinen Absichten (vornehmlich in Verhältnis gegen andere Gleichgesinnete) sich selbst zuwider und zerstöhrend ist, und so dem (moralischen) Princip des Guten, wenn gleich durch langsame Fortschritte, Platz macht.
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Es giebt also objectiv (in der Theorie) gar keinen Streit zwischen der Moral und der Politik. Dagegen subjectiv (in dem selbstsüchtigen Hange der Menschen, der aber, weil er nicht auf Vernunftmaximen gegründet ist, noch nicht Praxis genannt werden muß), wird und mag er immer bleiben, weil er zum Wetzstein der Tugend dient, deren wahrer Muth (nach dem Grundsatze: tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito) in gegenwärtigem Falle nicht sowohl darin besteht, den Uebeln und Aufopferungen mit festem Vorsatz sich entgegenzusetzen, welche hiebey übernommen werden müssen, sondern dem weit gefährlichern lügenhaften und verrätherischen, aber doch vernünftelnden, die Schwäche der menschlichen Natur zur Rechtfertigung aller Uebertretung vorspiegelnden bösen Princip in uns selbst, in die Augen zu sehen und seine Arglist zu besiegen.
In der That kann der politische Moralist sagen: Regent und Volk, oder Volk und Volk thun einander nicht Unrecht, wenn sie einander gewaltthätig oder hinterlistig befehden, ob sie zwar überhaupt darin Unrecht thun, daß sie dem Rechtsbegriffe, der allein den Frieden auf ewig begründen könnte, alle Achtung versagen. Denn weil der eine seine Pflicht gegen den andern übertritt, der gerade eben so rechtswidrig gegen jenen gesinnt ist, so geschieht ihnen beyderseits ganz recht, wenn sie sich unter einander aufreiben, doch so, daß von dieser Race immer noch genug übrig bleibt, um dieses Spiel bis zu den entferntesten Zeiten nicht aufhören zu lassen, damit eine späte Nachkommenschaft an ihnen dereinst ein warnendes Beyspiel nehme. Die Vorsehung im Laufe der Welt ist hiebey gerechtfertigt; denn das moralische Princip im Menschen erlöscht nie, die, pragmatisch, zur Ausführung der rechtlichen Ideen nach jenem Princip tüchtige Vernunft wächst noch dazu beständig durch immer fortschreitende Cultur, mit ihr aber auch die Schuld jener Uebertretungen. Die Schöpfung allein: daß nämlich ein solcher Schlag von verderbten Wesen überhaupt hat auf Erden seyn sollen, scheint durch keine Theodicee gerechtfertigt werden zu können (wenn wir annehmen, daß es mit dem Menschengeschlechte nie besser bestellt seyn werde noch könne); aber dieser Standpunkt der Beurtheilung ist für uns viel zu hoch, als daß wir unsere Begriffe (von Weisheit) der obersten uns unerforschlichen Macht in theoretischer Absicht unterlegen könnten. — Zu solchen verzweifelten Folgerungen werden wir unvermeidlich hingetrieben, wenn wir nicht annehmen, die reine Rechtsprincipien haben objective Realität, d. i. sie lassen sich ausführen; und darnach müsse auch von Seiten des Volks im Staate, und weiterhin von Seiten der Staaten gegen einander, gehandelt werden; die empirische Politik mag auch dagegen einwenden, was sie wolle. Die wahre Politik kann also keinen Schritt thun, ohne vorher der Moral gehuldigt zu haben, und ob zwar Politik für sich selbst eine schwere Kunst ist, so ist doch Vereinigung derselben mit der Moral gar keine Kunst; denn diese haut den Knoten entzwey, den jene nicht aufzulösen vermag, sobald beyde einander widerstreiten. — Das Recht dem Menschen muß heilig gehalten werden, der herrschenden Gewalt mag es auch noch so große Aufopferung kosten. Man kann hier nicht halbiren, und das Mittelding eines pragmatisch-bedingten Rechts (zwischen Recht und Nutzen) aussinnen, sondern alle Politik muß ihre Kniee vor dem erstern beugen, kann aber dafür hoffen, ob zwar langsam, zu der Stufe zu gelangen, wo sie beharrlich glänzen wird.
14 Dies sind Erlaubnißgesetze der Vernunft, den Stand eines mit Ungerechtigkeit behafteten öffentlichen Rechts noch so lange beharren zu lassen, bis zur völligen Umwälzung alles entweder von selbst gereift, oder durch friedliche Mittel der Reife nahe gebracht worden; weil doch irgend eine rechtliche, obzwar nur in geringem Grade rechtmäßige, Verfassung besser ist als gar keine, welches letztere Schicksal (der Anarchie) eine übereilte Reform treffen würde. — Die Staatsweisheit wird sich also in dem Zustande, worin die Dinge jetzt sind, Reformen, dem Ideal des öffentlichen Rechts angemessen, zur Pflicht machen: Revolutionen aber, wo sie die Natur von selbst herbey führt, nicht zur Beschönigung einer noch größeren Unterdrückung, sondern als Ruf der Natur benutzen, eine auf Freyheitsprincipien gegründete gesetzliche Verfassung, als die einzige dauerhafte, durch gründliche Reform zu Stande zu bringen.
15 Wenn gleich eine gewisse in der menschlichen Natur gewurzelte Bösartigkeit von Menschen, die in einem Staat zusammen leben, noch bezweifelt, und, statt ihrer, der Mangel einer noch nicht weit genug fortgeschrittenen Cultur (die Rohigkeit) zur Ursache der gesetzwidrigen Erscheinungen ihrer Denkungsart mit einigem Scheine angeführet werden möchte, so fällt sie doch, im äußeren Verhältniß der Staaten gegen einander, ganz unverdeckt und unwidersprechlich in die Augen. Im Innern jedes Staats ist sie durch den Zwang der bürgerlichen Gesetze verschleyert, weil der Neigung zur wechselseitigen Gewaltthätigkeit der Bürger eine größere Gewalt, nämlich die der Regierung, mächtig entgegenwirkt, und so nicht allein dem Ganzen einen moralischen Anstrich (causae non causae) giebt, sondern auch dadurch, daß dem Ausbruch gesetzwidriger Neigungen ein Riegel vorgeschoben wird, die Entwickelung der moralischen Anlage, zur unmittelbaren Achtung fürs Recht, wirklich viel Erleichterung bekommt. — Denn ein jeder glaubt nun von sich, daß er wohl den Rechtsbegriff heilig halten und treu befolgen würde, wenn er sich nur von jedem andern eines Gleichen gewärtigen könnte; welches letztere ihm die Regierung zum Theil sichert; wodurch dann ein großer Schritt zur Moralität (obgleich noch nicht moralischer Schritt) gethan wird, diesem Pflichtbegriff auch um sein selbst willen, ohne Rücksicht auf Erwiederung, anhänglich zu seyn. — Da ein jeder aber, bey seiner guten Meynung von sich selber, doch die böse Gesinnung bey allen anderen voraussetzt, so sprechen sie einander wechselseitig ihr Urtheil: daß sie alle, was das Factum betrifft, wenig taugen (woher es komme, da es doch der Natur des Menschen, als eines freyen Wesens, nicht Schuld gegeben werden kann, mag unerörtert bleiben). Da aber doch auch die Achtung für den Rechtsbegriff, deren der Mensch sich schlechterdings nicht entschlagen kann, die Theorie des Vermögens, ihm angemessen zu werden, auf das feyerlichste sanctionirt, so sieht ein jeder, daß er seinerseits jenem gemäß handeln müsse, Andere mögen es halten, wie sie wollen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted translation directly from Kant's complete German text of the expanded 1796 edition, including both supplements, both appendices and his notes. Source: Internet Archive, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek copy.
Appendix.
I.
On the discord between morality and politics, with regard to perpetual peace.
Morality is in itself already a practice in the objective sense, as the sum of unconditionally commanding laws according to which we ought to act, and it is manifest absurdity, once one has granted this concept of duty its authority, still to want to say that one nonetheless cannot. For in that case this concept drops out of morality of itself (ultra posse nemo obligatur); consequently there can be no conflict of politics, as applied doctrine of right, with morality, as such a doctrine but a theoretical one (and so no conflict of practice with theory), unless one were to understand by the latter a general doctrine of prudence, that is, a theory of maxims for choosing the means best suited to one's aims calculated for advantage, that is, to deny that there is any morality at all.
Politics says: “Be prudent as serpents”; morality adds (as a limiting condition): “and without guile, like doves.” If both cannot subsist together in a single command, there is indeed a conflict between politics and morality; but if the two are nonetheless to be absolutely united, the concept of the opposite is absurd, and the question how that conflict is to be resolved cannot even be posed as a problem. Although the proposition Honesty is the best policy contains a theory which practice, alas! very often contradicts, the equally theoretical proposition Honesty is better than all policy is infinitely exalted above every objection, indeed is the indispensable condition of policy. The boundary god of morality does not yield to Jupiter (the boundary god of force); for the latter still stands under fate, that is, reason is not enlightened enough to survey the series of predetermining causes that would let us foretell with certainty, according to the mechanism of nature, the happy or evil outcome of what human beings do and leave undone (though we may hope for it in accordance with our wish). But what one has to do in order to remain on the track of duty (according to rules of wisdom), for that, and thereby for the final end, reason lights our way clearly enough everywhere.
Now the practical man (for whom morality is mere theory) really grounds his bleak denial of our good-natured hope (even with ought and can granted) on this: that he professes to foresee from human nature that human beings will never want what is required to bring about that end which leads to perpetual peace. True, the willing of each individual human being to live in a lawful constitution according to principles of freedom (the distributive unity of the will of all) is not sufficient for this end; rather, that all together will this condition (the collective unity of the united will), this solution of a difficult problem, is required in addition, so that a whole of civil society may come about. And since, accordingly, a uniting cause must be added to this diversity of the particular willing of all, in order to produce a common will, which none of them is able to do, no other beginning of the rightful condition is to be counted on, in the execution of that idea (in practice), than one by force, on whose compulsion public right is afterward founded; which, to be sure (since one can in any case reckon little here on the moral disposition of the lawgiver, that once the lawless multitude has been united into a people he will leave it to the people to bring about a rightful constitution through their common will), allows great departures from that idea (the theory) in actual experience to be expected in advance.
Then it is said: whoever has once got power into his hands will not let the people prescribe laws to him. A state that is once in possession of the position of standing under no external laws will not, in regard to the manner in which it is to seek its right against other states, make itself dependent on their tribunal; and even a continent, when it feels itself superior to another that is otherwise not in its way, will not leave unused the means of strengthening its power by plundering or even subjugating it; and so all the plans of theory for the right of the state, the right of nations, and cosmopolitan right dissolve into insubstantial, unrealizable ideals, whereas a practice founded on empirical principles of human nature, which does not think it too low to draw instruction for its maxims from the way things go in the world, could alone hope to find a secure foundation for its edifice of political prudence.
To be sure, if there is no freedom and no moral law founded upon it, but everything that happens or can happen is mere mechanism of nature, then politics (as the art of using this mechanism for the government of human beings) is the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right an insubstantial thought. But if one finds it indispensably necessary to connect this concept with politics, indeed even to raise it to the limiting condition of the latter, then the compatibility of the two must be conceded. Now I can indeed conceive of a moral politician, that is, one who takes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can subsist together with morality, but not of a political moralist, who forges for himself such a morality as the statesman's advantage finds conducive to itself.
The moral politician will make it his principle that, if defects are once found in the constitution of the state or in the relations among states that could not be prevented, it is a duty, above all for heads of state, to take thought how they can be remedied as soon as possible and brought into conformity with natural right, as it stands before our eyes as a model in the idea of reason, even if this should cost their selfishness sacrifices. Now since the severing of a bond of civic or cosmopolitan union, before a better constitution is ready to take its place, is contrary to all political prudence, which on this point agrees with morality, it would indeed be absurd to demand that such a defect be changed at once and impetuously; but that the maxim of the necessity of such a change should at least dwell most intimately in the holder of power, so as to remain in constant approach to the end (the best constitution according to laws of right), that can surely be demanded of him. A state can already govern itself in a republican manner even while it still possesses, according to its present constitution, despotic sovereign power, until the people gradually becomes capable of the influence of the mere idea of the authority of law (just as if it possessed physical force), and is accordingly found fit for its own legislation (which is originally founded on right). Even if, through the impetuosity of a revolution produced by the bad constitution, a more lawful one had been won illegitimately, it would nonetheless have to be held no longer permissible to lead the people back to the old one, although during the revolution anyone who meddled in it by violence or by cunning would justly be subject to the penalties of an insurgent. As for the external relation of states, however, a state cannot be required to lay aside its constitution, despotic though it is (which is nonetheless the stronger one in relation to external enemies), so long as it runs the risk of being swallowed up at once by other states; consequently, in its resolve too, delay of the execution until a more favorable occasion must be permitted.14
Granted, then, that despotizing moralists (erring in execution) offend in many ways against political prudence (through measures hastily taken or commended); experience must nonetheless bring them gradually onto a better track, in this offense of theirs against nature; whereas the moralizing politicians, by glossing over principles of state contrary to right, under the pretext of a human nature not capable of the good in accordance with the idea as reason prescribes it, as far as in them lies make impossible any improvement, and perpetuate the violation of right.
Instead of the practice of which these men of political prudence boast, they deal in practices, being intent solely on this: that, by telling the power now ruling what it wishes to hear (so as not to miss their private advantage), they sacrifice the people and, if possible, the whole world; after the manner of genuine jurists (of the trade, not of legislation) when they venture up into politics. For since their business is not to quibble about legislation itself but to carry out the present commands of the law of the land, every lawful constitution now in existence, and, when this is altered from above, the one that then follows, must always be the best to them; so that everything is thus in its proper mechanical order. But if this skill of fitting every saddle instills in them the delusion that they can also judge of the principles of a constitution of the state in general according to concepts of right (hence a priori, not empirically): if they make much of knowing human beings (which is indeed to be expected, since they have to do with many), without nevertheless knowing the human being, and what can be made of him (for which a higher standpoint of anthropological observation is required), but, provided with these concepts, approach the right of the state and the right of nations as reason prescribes them: then they can make this crossing over in no other way than in the spirit of chicanery, since they follow their customary procedure (that of a mechanism according to despotically given laws of compulsion) even where the concepts of reason would have a coercion established that is lawful only according to principles of freedom, through which alone a constitution of the state enduring in accordance with right is possible; a problem which the supposed practical man, passing by that idea, believes he can solve empirically, from experience, from how the constitutions that have so far lasted best, though for the most part contrary to right, were arranged. The maxims of which he makes use for this (though he does not let them be heard aloud) come roughly to the following sophistical maxims.
1 Fac et excusa. Seize the favorable opportunity for an unauthorized taking of possession (either of a right of the state over its own people, or over another, neighboring one); the justification will be far easier and more graceful to present after the deed, and will serve to gloss over the force (above all in the first case, where the supreme power within is at once also the legislating authority which one must obey without quibbling about it), than if one wanted first to devise convincing grounds and then to await the counter-grounds against them. This very audacity gives a certain appearance of inner conviction of the rightfulness of the deed, and the god bonus euentus is afterward the best advocate.
2 Si fecisti nega. What you have yourself done wrong, for example to drive your people to despair and so to rebellion, deny that it is your fault; but assert that it is the fault of the subjects' recalcitrance, or else, in your seizure of a neighboring people, the fault of human nature, since a human being who does not forestall the other by force can reckon with certainty that the other will forestall him and seize him.
3 Diuide et impera. That is: if there are certain privileged heads in your people who have chosen you merely as their chief (primus inter pares), then set them at variance with one another and divide them from the people; now stand by the latter, under the pretense of greater freedom, and everything will depend on your unconditional will. Or if it is a matter of external states, then the stirring up of discord among them is a fairly sure means of subjecting one after another to yourself, under the semblance of assisting the weaker.
By these political maxims, to be sure, no one is deceived; for they are one and all already generally known; nor are they a cause for shame, as if the injustice shone all too plainly into the eyes. For since great powers are never ashamed before the judgment of the common crowd, but only one before another, and since, as concerns those principles, it is not their coming to light but only their failure that can make them ashamed (for with regard to the morality of the maxims they all agree with one another), there always remains to them the political honor on which they can surely count, namely that of the enlargement of their power, by whatever path it may have been acquired.15
* * *
From all these serpentine windings of an immoral doctrine of prudence for bringing the condition of peace among human beings out of the warlike condition of the state of nature, this much at least is clear: that human beings can escape the concept of right neither in their private relations nor in their public ones, and do not dare to found politics openly on mere devices of prudence, and thus to renounce all obedience to the concept of a public right (which is especially striking in that of the right of nations), but accord it in itself all due honor, even if they should devise a hundred evasions and cloaks to elude it in practice, and impute to wily force the authority of being the origin and bond of all right. To put an end to this sophistry (though not to the injustice it glosses over), and to bring the false representatives of the mighty of the earth to the confession that it is not right but force in whose favor they speak, and from which they take their tone, as if they themselves had anything to command in the matter, it will be well to uncover the illusion by which one deceives oneself and others, to discover the supreme principle from which the aim at perpetual peace proceeds, and to show that all the evil which stands in its way derives from this: that the political moralist begins where the moral politician properly ends, and, by thus subordinating the principles to the end (that is, harnessing the horses behind the wagon), defeats his own purpose of bringing politics into accord with morality.
To bring practical philosophy into agreement with itself, it is necessary first to decide the question whether in problems of practical reason the beginning must be made from its material principle, the end (as object of choice), or from the formal one, that is, from the one (founded merely on freedom in external relations) according to which it is said: act so that you can will that your maxim should become a universal law (whatever the end may be).
Without any doubt the latter principle must come first: for as a principle of right it has unconditional necessity, whereas the former is compelling only on the presupposition of empirical conditions of the end proposed, namely of its execution, and, even if this end (for example perpetual peace) were also a duty, this duty itself would still have to have been derived from the formal principle of maxims for acting externally. Now the former principle, that of the political moralist (the problem of the right of the state, the right of nations, and cosmopolitan right), is a mere technical problem (problema technicum), the second, on the other hand, as the principle of the moral politician, for whom it is a moral problem (problema morale), is worlds apart from the other in procedure, when perpetual peace is to be brought about, which one now wishes not merely as a physical good but also as a condition proceeding from the recognition of duty.
For the solution of the first, namely the problem of political prudence, much knowledge of nature is required, in order to use its mechanism for the end in view, and yet all of this is uncertain as to its result concerning perpetual peace, whichever of the three divisions of public right one takes. Whether the people can be kept, in obedience and at the same time in prosperity, better by severity or by the bait of vanity, by the supreme power of a single person or by the union of several heads, perhaps even merely by a nobility of service, or by the power of the people, internally, and indeed for a long time, is uncertain. Of all forms of government (excepting the one genuinely republican, which can occur only to a moral politician) there are examples of the opposite in history. Still more uncertain is a right of nations ostensibly erected upon statutes according to ministerial plans, which is in fact only a word without a thing, and rests on treaties that in the very act of their conclusion contain at the same time the secret reservation of their violation. The solution of the second, on the other hand, namely of the problem of political wisdom, presses itself upon us, so to speak, of its own accord, is evident to everyone, puts all artifice to shame, and leads straight to the end; yet with the reminder of prudence not to draw it on in haste by force, but to approach it unceasingly, as favorable circumstances permit.
Here, then, it is said: “Seek first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its justice, and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will fall to you of itself.” For morality has this peculiarity, and indeed in regard to its principles of public right (hence in relation to a politics knowable a priori), that the less it makes conduct dependent on the end proposed, the intended advantage, whether physical or moral, the more it nonetheless agrees with this in general; which comes about because it is precisely the general will, given a priori (in a people, or in the relation of different peoples to one another), that alone determines what is right among human beings; and this union of the will of all, if only one proceeds consistently in the exercise, can at the same time, according to the mechanism of nature as well, be the cause of producing the effect aimed at and of giving effect to the concept of right. So it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people should unite into a state solely according to the concepts of right of freedom and equality, and this principle is founded not on prudence but on duty. Let political moralists now quibble as much as they like about the natural mechanism of a multitude of human beings entering society, which would invalidate those principles and frustrate their aim, or seek to prove their contrary assertion by examples of badly organized constitutions of ancient and modern times (for example, of democracies without a representative system): they deserve no hearing, above all since such a pernicious theory itself brings about, perhaps, the very evil that it predicts, a theory according to which the human being is thrown into one class with the other living machines, to which only the consciousness that they are not free beings would still have to be added to make them, in their own judgment, the most wretched of all creatures in the world.
The proposition, which sounds somewhat swaggering, has come into proverbial currency, yet is true: fiat iustitia, pereat mundus, that is, in German: “let justice reign, even if all the rogues in the world should perish on that account,” is a stalwart principle of right, one that cuts off all crooked paths marked out by cunning or force; only it must not be misunderstood, and perhaps taken as a permission to use one's own right with the greatest strictness (which would conflict with ethical duty), but understood as an obligation of those in power not to refuse or diminish anyone's right out of disfavor or compassion toward others; for which there is required above all an internal constitution of the state set up according to pure principles of right, but then also that of its union with other states, neighboring or even distant, for a lawful settlement of their disputes (analogous to a universal state). This proposition means nothing other than this: political maxims must proceed not from the welfare and happiness to be expected from their observance in each state, hence not from the end which each of them makes the object of its aim (from willing), as the supreme (but empirical) principle of political wisdom, but from the pure concept of the duty of right (from the ought, whose principle is given a priori by pure reason), whatever the physical consequences may be. The world will by no means perish through there being fewer evil human beings. The morally evil has the property, inseparable from its nature, that in its aims (above all in relation to others of like mind) it is contrary to itself and self-destructive, and so makes way for the (moral) principle of the good, though by slow progress.
* **
There is therefore objectively (in theory) no conflict at all between morality and politics. Subjectively, on the other hand (in the self-seeking propensity of human beings, which, however, because it is not founded on maxims of reason, need not yet be called practice), it will and may always remain, because it serves as the whetstone of virtue, whose true courage (according to the principle tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito) in the present case consists not so much in resolutely setting oneself against the evils and sacrifices that must be undertaken here, as in looking squarely in the face the far more dangerous lying and treacherous, yet quibbling, evil principle within ourselves, which feigns the weakness of human nature as a justification for every transgression, and in conquering its cunning.
In fact the political moralist can say: ruler and people, or people and people, do one another no wrong when they fight one another violently or insidiously, although in general they do wrong in denying all respect to the concept of right, which alone could found peace forever. For since the one transgresses his duty toward the other, who is disposed in precisely the same unlawful way toward him, it serves them both quite right when they wear one another down, yet in such a way that enough of this stock always remains to keep this game from ceasing down to the most remote times, so that a late posterity may some day take a warning example from them. Providence in the course of the world is hereby justified; for the moral principle in the human being never goes out, and reason, competent pragmatically to carry out the ideas of right according to that principle, grows besides constantly through ever-advancing culture, but with it also the guilt of those transgressions. Creation alone: namely, that such a stamp of corrupt beings should have been on earth at all, seems capable of being justified by no theodicy (if we assume that things will never be nor can be better with the human race); but this standpoint of judgment is far too high for us to be able to apply our concepts (of wisdom) to the supreme power, unfathomable to us, for theoretical purposes. To such desperate conclusions we are inevitably driven if we do not assume that the pure principles of right have objective reality, that is, that they can be carried out; and that action must accordingly be taken, on the part of the people in the state, and further on the part of states toward one another, whatever empirical politics may object to the contrary. True politics, therefore, cannot take a single step without first having paid homage to morality, and although politics in itself is a difficult art, its union with morality is no art at all; for the latter cuts in two the knot that the former is unable to untie, as soon as the two conflict with one another. The right of the human being must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice it may cost the ruling power. One cannot halve matters here and devise the middle thing of a pragmatically conditioned right (between right and utility), but all politics must bend its knee before the former, and can hope in return, though slowly, to reach the stage where it will shine enduringly.
14 These are permissive laws of reason, permitting the condition of a public right afflicted with injustice to persist until, toward complete upheaval, everything has either ripened of itself or been brought near to ripeness by peaceful means; for some rightful constitution, even if legitimate only to a slight degree, is still better than none at all, which latter fate (anarchy) would befall a hasty reform. Political wisdom will therefore, in the condition in which things now are, make reforms conforming to the ideal of public right a duty; but revolutions, where nature brings them about of itself, it will use not to gloss over a still greater oppression, but as a call of nature to establish through thorough reform a lawful constitution founded on principles of freedom, as the only enduring one.
15 Even if a certain wickedness rooted in human nature may still be doubted among human beings who live together in a state, and in its place the lack of a culture not yet advanced far enough (rawness) may, with some plausibility, be adduced as the cause of the lawless appearances of their way of thinking, it is nonetheless, in the external relation of states to one another, entirely undisguised and incontestably plain to the eye. In the interior of every state it is veiled by the compulsion of civil laws, because a greater force, namely that of the government, powerfully counteracts the inclination of the citizens to mutual violence, and so not only gives the whole a moral coat of paint (causae non causae), but also, by putting a bolt on the outbreak of lawless inclinations, really eases to a great degree the development of the moral predisposition toward immediate respect for right. For each now believes of himself that he would indeed hold the concept of right sacred and follow it faithfully, if only he could expect the same from every other; which latter the government in part secures to him; by which a great step toward morality (though not yet a moral step) is taken, to be attached to this concept of duty even for its own sake, without regard to reciprocation. But since each, with his good opinion of himself, nevertheless presupposes an evil disposition in all the others, they pass upon one another the mutual judgment that, as far as the fact is concerned, they are all worth little (how this comes about, since it cannot after all be laid to the charge of the nature of the human being as a free being, may remain unexamined). But since respect for the concept of right, of which the human being absolutely cannot rid himself, also most solemnly sanctions the theory of the capacity to become adequate to it, each sees that he for his part must act in accordance with it, let others do as they will.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted translation directly from the complete German 1796 edition, including its supplements, appendices and author's notes.
Appendix.I.On the disagreement between morality and politics with a view to perpetual peace.
Morality is already in itself a practice in the objective sense: it is the sum of laws that command unconditionally, laws according to which we ought to act. Once one has granted this concept of duty its authority, it is plainly absurd still to say that one cannot do it. For then the concept drops out of morality by itself (ultra posse nemo obligatur). So there can be no conflict of politics, as an applied doctrine of right, with morality as such, which is a theoretical doctrine (and so no conflict of practice with theory), unless by the latter one means a general doctrine of prudence, that is, a theory of the maxims for choosing the most useful means to one's aims as calculated for advantage, which would be to deny that there is any morality at all.
Politics says: “Be wise as serpents”; morality adds, as a limiting condition: “and without guile, as doves.” If the two cannot stand together in one command, then there really is a conflict of politics with morality. But if both are to be united through and through, the concept of the opposite is absurd, and the question how that conflict is to be reconciled cannot even be set up as a task. The proposition that honesty is the best policy contains a theory that practice, unfortunately, very often contradicts. Yet the equally theoretical proposition that honesty is better than all policy is infinitely above every objection, and indeed it is the indispensable condition of policy. The god of the border of morality does not yield to Jupiter, the god of the border of power. For Jupiter still stands under fate: that is, reason is not enlightened enough to survey the series of predetermining causes that would let it predict with certainty, by the mechanism of nature, the happy or bad outcome of human action and omission (though it may let us hope for that outcome as we wish). But as to what one has to do in order to stay in the track of duty, according to rules of wisdom, and so as to reach the final end, reason lights the way brightly enough everywhere.
But the practical man, to whom morality is mere theory, grounds his comfortless rejection of our good-hearted hope (even when ought and can are conceded) on this: he claims to foresee from human nature that people will never want what is required to bring about the end that leads to perpetual peace.—To be sure, the willing of every single human being to live in a lawful constitution according to principles of freedom (the distributive unity of the will of all) is not sufficient for this end. What is further required is that all together will this condition (the collective unity of the united will), and that is the solution of a hard task, so that a whole civil society may come about. And since, over and above this variety of the particular willing of all, a unifying cause of that willing must be added to bring out a common will, which none of them all can do, there is in the execution of that idea, in practice, no other beginning of the lawful condition to be counted on than force, on whose compulsion public right is afterwards founded. This then, since one can hardly count on the lawgiver's moral disposition here, and since after the wild crowd has been united into a people he leaves it to that people to bring about a lawful constitution through their common will, lets us expect in advance great deviations from that idea (the theory) in actual experience.
Then it is said: whoever once has power in his hands will not let the people prescribe laws to him. A state that is once in possession of not standing under any external laws will not make itself dependent on their tribunal as regards the way in which it is to seek its right against other states. And even a continent, if it feels itself superior to another that does not otherwise stand in its way, will not leave the means of strengthening its power unused, by robbing that other or even by ruling it. And so all the plans of theory for the right of the state, of nations and of world citizenship melt away into empty, unexecutable ideals, whereas a practice grounded on empirical principles of human nature, which does not think it beneath itself to draw instruction for its maxims from the way things go in the world, might alone hope to find a secure foundation for its building of statecraft.
To be sure, if there is no freedom and no moral law grounded on it, and everything that happens or can happen is mere mechanism of nature, then politics, as the art of using that mechanism to govern human beings, is the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right is an empty thought. But if one finds it indispensable to unite that concept with politics, indeed to raise it to the limiting condition of politics, then the compatibility of the two must be conceded. Now I can indeed think a moral politician, that is, one who takes the principles of statecraft in such a way that they can stand together with morality, but not a political moralist, who forges himself a morality as suits the advantage of the statesman.
The moral politician will make it his principle: if defects are met with in the state constitution or in the relation between states, defects that one could not prevent, then it is a duty, above all for heads of state, to see to it that they be improved as soon as possible and made appropriate to natural right as it stands before our eyes as a model in the idea of reason, even if this should cost sacrifices of their self-interest. Now since tearing apart a bond of the union of states or of world citizens, before a better constitution is ready to take its place, is contrary to all statecraft that is at one with morality here, it would indeed be absurd to demand that those defects be changed at once and with violence. But that at least the maxim of the necessity of such a change should dwell most inwardly in the holder of power, so that he remains in constant approach to the end, the best constitution according to laws of right, that can be demanded of him. A state can already govern itself in a republican way even when, by the constitution before it, it still possesses despotic ruling power, until gradually the people becomes capable of the influence of the mere idea of the authority of law (as though that idea possessed physical force), and so is found fit for its own legislation, which is originally grounded on right. And even if, by the violence of a revolution produced by a bad constitution, a more lawful one had been won unlawfully, it would still not be permitted afterwards to lead the people back to the old one, although during the revolution everyone who meddled in it by force or cunning would rightly be subject to the punishments of a rebel. But as regards the external relation between states, no state can be required to lay aside its constitution, even a despotic one (which is yet the stronger in relation to external enemies), so long as it runs the risk of being swallowed at once by other states. Hence, with its resolve, a postponement of the execution until a better opportunity must also be permitted14.
So let it always be the case that the moralists who play the despot, and fail in the execution, offend in many ways against statecraft by measures taken or praised too hastily; experience will nevertheless bring them by and by onto a better track, in spite of this offense against nature. Whereas the moralizing politicians, by glossing over unlawful principles of the state, under the pretext of a human nature that is supposedly not capable of the good as reason prescribes it, make improvement impossible as far as in them lies, and perpetuate the violation of right.
In place of the practice these state-wise men boast of, they deal in practices. They are concerned only to deliver the people, and if possible the whole world, to the power that currently rules, by speaking to its taste so as not to miss their private advantage. This is the way of genuine jurists, of the craft rather than of legislation, when they climb up to politics. For since their business is not to reason about legislation itself but to carry out the present commands of the law of the land, every legal constitution that exists at the time, and, when that is changed by higher authority, the one that follows it, must always be the best for them. Then everything is in its proper mechanical order. But if this skill of being just right for every saddle gives them the delusion that they can also judge the principles of a state constitution in general according to concepts of right (hence a priori, not empirically), if they make much of knowing human beings (which is indeed to be expected, since they deal with many), without knowing the human being and what can be made of him (which requires a higher standpoint of anthropological observation), and with these concepts then approach the right of states and of nations as reason prescribes it: then they cannot make this step except in the spirit of chicanery. They follow their usual procedure, that of a mechanism according to despotically given coercive laws, even there where the concepts of reason want a coercion that is lawful only according to principles of freedom, and by which alone a state constitution that stands firm in right becomes possible. This task the supposed practical man believes he can solve empirically, from experience, by setting up the state constitutions that have so far held up best, though for the most part unlawfully, while passing over that idea.—The maxims he uses for this, though he does not let them be heard, come down roughly to the following sophistical maxims.
1 Fac et excusa. Seize the favorable opportunity for taking possession on your own authority, whether of a right of the state over its people or over a neighboring people. The justification can be presented far more easily and elegantly after the deed, and the force glossed over, especially in the first case, where the higher power within is at the same time the legislative authority, which one must obey without reasoning about it. This is easier than to think out convincing grounds beforehand and then wait for the counter-grounds. This very boldness gives a certain appearance of inner conviction of the lawfulness of the deed, and the god bonus euentus is afterwards the best advocate of right.
2 Si fecisti nega. What you yourself have done wrong, for instance to drive your people to despair and so to revolt, deny that it is your fault. Claim instead that it is the fault of the disobedience of the subjects, or, when you have taken possession of a neighboring people, the fault of human nature, which, if it does not forestall the other by force, can surely count on the other forestalling it and taking possession of it.
3 Diuide et impera. That is: if there are certain privileged heads in your people who chose you merely as their head (primus inter pares), then set them at variance among themselves and set them against the people. Then stand by the people, with the promise of greater freedom, and everything will depend on your unconditional will. Or, if they are external states, then stirring up disagreement among them is a fairly sure means of subjecting them to yourself one after another, under the appearance of supporting the weaker one.
By these political maxims no one is deceived, for they are all already generally known. Nor is there any reason to be ashamed of them, as though the injustice were too plainly visible. For great powers are never ashamed before the judgment of the common crowd, only one before another; and as regards those principles, it is not their becoming known but only their failure that can make them ashamed (since in regard to the morality of maxims they all agree among themselves). So political honor always remains to them, and on that they can surely count: the honor of increasing their power, by whatever path it may have been acquired15.
* * *
Out of all these serpentine turnings of an immoral doctrine of prudence, which seeks to bring the condition of peace among human beings out of the warlike condition of nature, at least this much is clear: human beings can no more escape the concept of right in their public relations than in their private ones, and they do not dare to base politics publicly on mere tricks of prudence. They do not dare to renounce all obedience to the concept of a public right (which is most striking in the right of nations), but let all due honor be done to it, even if they should think up a hundred evasions and disguises in order to avoid it in practice, and to ascribe to cunning force the authority of being the origin and bond of all right.—In order to put an end to this sophistry (though not to the injustice it glosses over), and to bring the false representatives of the mighty of the earth to admit that it is not right but force in whose favor they speak, and from which they take their tone as though they had something to command in the matter, it will be good to uncover the illusion with which people deceive themselves and others, to find the supreme principle from which the aim of perpetual peace proceeds, and to show that all the evil that stands in its way comes from this: that the political moralist begins where the moral politician rightly ends, and, by thus subordinating the principles to the end (that is, hitching the horses behind the wagon), defeats his own aim of bringing politics into agreement with morality.
To make practical philosophy at one with itself, it is necessary first to decide this question: in the tasks of practical reason, must the beginning be made from the material principle, the end (as object of choice), or from the formal principle, that is, the one that rests solely on freedom in the external relation, and that runs: act so that you can will your maxim to become a universal law (let the end be whatever it may)?
Without any doubt the latter principle must come first, for as a principle of right it has unconditional necessity. The former, by contrast, is necessitating only under the presupposition of empirical conditions of the proposed end, namely its execution; and even if that end (for instance perpetual peace) were a duty, that duty itself would still have to be derived from the formal principle of maxims of external action.—Now the first principle, that of the political moralist (the problem of the right of the state, of nations and of world citizenship), is a mere task of art (problema technicum). The second, by contrast, as the principle of the moral politician, for whom it is a moral task (problxma morale), is as different as heaven from earth in its procedure. It seeks to bring about perpetual peace, which one then wishes not merely as a physical good but as a condition arising from the recognition of duty.
For the solution of the first, namely the problem of statecraft, much knowledge of nature is required, in order to use its mechanism for the intended end, and yet all of this is uncertain as regards its result, perpetual peace, whichever of the three divisions of public right one takes. Whether a people is better kept in obedience and at the same time in flourishing condition by severity or by the bait of vanity, by the supreme power of one man or by the union of several heads, perhaps also merely by an order of service nobility or by the power of the people, and that within, and over a long time, is uncertain. Of all kinds of government (except the only truly republican one, which can come into the mind only of a moral politician) history has examples of the opposite.—Still more uncertain is a right of nations supposedly set up by statutes after ministerial plans, which in truth is only a word without a thing, and rests on treaties that in the very act of their conclusion contain the secret reservation of their transgression.—By contrast the solution of the second, namely the problem of state wisdom, presses itself on one, so to speak, of itself. It is evident to everyone, puts all artifice to shame, and yet leads straight to the end, though with the reminder of prudence not to bring it about too hastily by force, but to approach it unceasingly according to the circumstances that favor it.
Then it is said: “First seek the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and your end (the benefit of perpetual peace) will fall to you of itself.” For this is peculiar to morality, and indeed as regards its principles of public right (and so in relation to a politics knowable a priori): the less it makes conduct depend on the proposed end, the intended advantage, whether physical or moral, the more it nevertheless agrees with that end in general. This comes about because it is precisely the general will given a priori (in a people, or in the relation of different peoples to one another) that alone determines what is right among human beings. And this union of the will of all, if only one proceeds consistently in the execution, can also, by the mechanism of nature, be the cause that produces the intended effect and gives the concept of right effect.—Thus, for example, it is a principle of moral politics that a people should unite into a state according to the sole concepts of right of freedom and equality, and this principle is grounded not on prudence but on duty. Now let political moralists reason as much as they like against this, about the natural mechanism of a crowd of human beings entering into society, which would supposedly weaken those principles and defeat their aim, or let them try to prove their assertion by examples of badly organized constitutions of old and new times (for instance democracies without a system of representation): they deserve no hearing. This is especially so because such a pernicious theory itself brings about the evil it predicts, and by it the human being is thrown into one class with the other living machines, which would only need the consciousness of not being free beings to make them, in their own judgment, the most miserable of all beings in the world.
The proposition that sounds somewhat boastful, and has come into circulation as a proverb, but is true, is this: fiat iustitia, pereat mundus, in German: “let justice rule, even if all the scoundrels in the world should perish with it.” It is a sturdy principle of right that cuts off all the crooked paths marked out by cunning or force. Only it must not be misunderstood, as though it allowed one to pursue one's own right with the greatest severity (which would conflict with ethical duty). It is to be understood as the obligation of those in power not to refuse or diminish anyone's right out of disfavour or pity for others. For this there is required above all an internal constitution of the state set up according to pure principles of right, and then also the union of that state with other neighboring or even distant states in a lawful settlement of their disputes, analogous to a universal state.—This proposition means nothing else than this: political maxims must not start from the welfare and happiness of each state to be expected from following them, hence not from the end that each state makes its object (from willing), as the supreme but empirical principle of state wisdom, but from the pure concept of the duty of right (from the ought, whose principle is given a priori by pure reason), whatever physical consequences may follow. The world will by no means perish because there are fewer bad people in it. Moral evil has the property inseparable from its nature that in its aims (especially in relation to others of the same mind) it is contrary to itself and destructive, and so makes room for the moral principle of the good, even if by slow steps.
* **
Objectively, then, in theory, there is no conflict at all between morality and politics. Subjectively, however, in the selfish inclination of human beings (which, because it is not grounded on maxims of reason, need not yet be called practice), the conflict will and may always remain, because it serves as a whetstone for virtue. The true courage of virtue (according to the principle: tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito) consists in the present case not so much in opposing with firm resolve the evils and sacrifices that must be taken on here, as in looking in the eye the far more dangerous, lying and treacherous, yet reasoning evil principle in ourselves, which holds up the weakness of human nature to justify every transgression, and in defeating its cunning.
In fact the political moralist can say: ruler and people, or people and people, do one another no wrong when they attack each other by force or by cunning, although they do wrong in general by refusing all respect to the concept of right, which alone could establish peace for ever. For since the one transgresses his duty toward the other, and the other is just as unlawfully disposed toward him, both are treated quite rightly when they wear each other down, though in such a way that enough of this race always remains to keep the game going into the most distant times, so that a late posterity may one day take a warning example from them. Providence in the course of the world is justified in this. For the moral principle in the human being never dies out, and the reason that is pragmatically fit to carry out the ideas of right according to that principle grows constantly through ever advancing culture, and with it the guilt of those transgressions. The creation alone, namely that such a breed of corrupt beings should have been on earth at all, seems incapable of justification by any theodicy (if we assume that it will never be, and can never be, better with the human race). But this standpoint of judgment is far too high for us to put our concepts of wisdom under the supreme power, which is inscrutable to us, in a theoretical aim.—We are inevitably driven to such desperate conclusions unless we assume that the pure principles of right have objective reality, that is, that they can be carried out, and that accordingly the people within the state, and further the states toward one another, must act on them, whatever empirical politics may object.
True politics, then, cannot take a single step without first having paid homage to morality. And although politics is in itself a hard art, its union with morality is no art at all, for morality cuts in two the knot that politics cannot untie as soon as the two conflict.—The right of human beings must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice it may cost the ruling power. Here one cannot halve matters and think out a middle thing of a pragmatically conditioned right, between right and utility. All politics must bend its knee before the former, and may then hope, though slowly, to reach the level where it will shine steadfastly.
14 These are laws of permission of reason, allowing the condition of a public right tainted with injustice to persist until everything has either ripened of itself toward a complete transformation, or been brought near to ripeness by peaceful means. For some lawful constitution, even one only slightly in accordance with right, is better than none at all, and the latter fate, anarchy, would befall a hasty reform.—State wisdom will therefore, in the condition in which things now are, make reforms conformable to the ideal of public right a duty. But revolutions, where nature itself brings them about, it will use not to gloss over an even greater oppression, but as a call of nature to bring about, by thorough reform, a lawful constitution grounded on principles of freedom, as the only durable one.
15 Even if a certain malice rooted in human nature among human beings living together in a state is still doubted, and instead of it the lack of a culture not yet far enough advanced (rawness) is cited with some appearance of reason as the cause of the unlawful appearances of their way of thinking, in the external relation of states to one another it strikes the eye entirely unveiled and irrefutably. Within each state it is veiled by the compulsion of civil laws, because a greater power, that of the government, works mightily against the citizens' inclination to mutual violence. In this way the government gives the whole not only a moral appearance (causae non causae), but, by putting a bolt before the outbreak of unlawful inclinations, really makes the development of the moral disposition, toward immediate respect for right, much easier.—For each person now believes of himself that he would surely hold the concept of right sacred and follow it faithfully, if only he could expect the same from everyone else, and the government secures that in part for him. Thereby a great step toward morality is taken (though not yet a moral step): to cling to this concept of duty also for its own sake, without regard to reciprocation.—But since each person, with his good opinion of himself, nevertheless presupposes the evil disposition in all others, they pass judgment on one another: that they are all, as regards the fact, of little worth (where this comes from, since it cannot be blamed on the nature of the human being as a free being, may be left undiscussed). But since respect for the concept of right, which the human being absolutely cannot shed, most solemnly sanctions the theory of the capacity to become conformable to it, each person sees that he for his part must act in accordance with it, let others do as they please.
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Appendix I is part of Toward Perpetual Peace by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 9 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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