Appendix II
Original German
II.Von der Einhelligkeit der Politik mit der Moral nach dem transscendentalen Begriffe des öffentlichen Rechts.
Wenn ich von aller Materie des öffentlichen Rechts (nach den verschiedenen empirisch-gegebenen Verhältnissen der Menschen im Staat oder auch der Staaten unter einander), so wie es sich die Rechtslehrer gewöhnlich denken, abstrahire, so bleibt mir noch die Form der Publicität übrig, deren Möglichkeit ein jeder Rechtsanspruch in sich enthält, weil ohne jene es keine Gerechtigkeit (die nur als öffentlich kundbar gedacht werden kann), mithin auch kein Recht, das nur von ihr ertheilt wird, geben würde.
Diese Fähigkeit der Publicität muß jeder Rechtsanspruch haben, und sie kann also, da es sich ganz leicht beurtheilen läßt, ob sie in einem vorkommenden Falle statt finde, d. i. ob sie sich mit den Grundsätzen des Handelnden vereinigen lasse oder nicht, ein leicht zu brauchendes, a priori in der Vernunft anzutreffendes Criterium abgeben, im letzteren Fall die Falschheit (Rechtswidrigkeit) des gedachten Anspruchs (praetensio iuris), gleichsam durch ein Experiment der reinen Vernunft, so fort zu erkennen.
Nach einer solchen Abstraction von allem Empirischen, was der Begriff des Staats- und Völkerrechts enthält (dergleichen das Bösartige der menschlichen Natur ist, welches den Zwang nothwendig macht), kann man folgenden Satz die transscendentale Formel des öffentlichen Rechts nennen:
„Alle auf das Recht anderer Menschen bezogene Handlungen, deren Maxime sich nicht mit der Publicität verträgt, sind unrecht“
Dieses Princip ist nicht bloß als ethisch (zur Tugendlehre gehörig), sondern auch als juridisch (das Recht der Menschen angehend) zu betrachten. Denn eine Maxime, die ich nicht darf laut werden lassen, ohne dadurch meine eigene Absicht zugleich zu vereiteln, die durchaus verheimlicht werden muß, wenn sie gelingen soll, und zu der ich mich nicht öffentlich bekennen kann, ohne daß dadurch unausbleiblich der Widerstand Aller gegen meinen Vorsatz gereizt werde, kann diese nothwendige und allgemeine, mithin a priori einzusehende, Gegenbearbeitung Aller gegen mich nirgend wovon anders, als von der Ungerechtigkeit her haben, womit sie jedermann bedroht. — Es ist ferner bloß negativ, d. i. es dient nur, um, vermittelst desselben, was gegen Andere nicht recht ist, zu erkennen. — Es ist gleich einem Axiom unerweißlich-gewiß und überdem leicht anzuwenden, wie aus folgenden Beyspielen des öffentlichen Rechts zu ersehen ist.
1 Was das Staatsrecht (ius ciuitatis), nämlich das innere betrifft: so kommt in ihm die Frage vor, welche Viele für schwer zu beantworten halten, und die das transscendentale Princip der Publicität ganz leicht auflöset: „ist Aufruhr ein rechtmäßiges Mittel für ein Volk, die drückende Gewalt eines so genannten Tyrannen (non titulo sed exercitio talis) abzuwerfen?“ Die Rechte des Volks sind gekränkt, und ihm (dem Tyrannen) geschieht kein Unrecht durch die Entthronung; daran ist kein Zweifel. Nichts desto weniger ist es doch von den Unterthanen im höchsten Grade unrecht, auf diese Art ihr Recht zu suchen, und sie können eben so wenig über Ungerechtigkeit klagen, wenn sie in diesem Streit unterlägen und nachher deshalb die härteste Strafe ausstehen müßten.
Hier kann nun Vieles für und dawider vernünftelt werden, wenn man es durch eine dogmatische Deduction der Rechtsgründe ausmachen will; allein das transscendentale Princip der Publicität des öffentlichen Rechts kann sich diese Weitläuftigkeit erspahren. Nach demselben frägt sich vor Errichtung des bürgerlichen Vertrags das Volk selbst, ob es sich wohl getraue, die Maxime des Vorsatzes einer gelegentlichen Empörung öffentlich bekannt zu machen. Man sieht leicht ein, daß, wenn man es bey der Stiftung einer Staatsverfassung zur Bedingung machen wollte, in gewissen vorkommenden Fällen gegen das Oberhaupt Gewalt auszuüben, so müßte das Volk sich einer rechtmäßigen Macht über jenes anmaßen. Alsdann wäre jenes aber nicht das Oberhaupt, oder, wenn beydes zur Bedingung der Staatserrichtung gemacht würde, so würde gar keine möglich seyn, welches doch die Absicht des Volks war. Das Unrecht des Aufruhrs leuchtet also dadurch ein, daß die Maxime desselben dadurch, daß man sich öffentlich dazu bekennte, seine eigene Absicht unmöglich machen würde. Man müßte sie also nothwendig verheimlichen. — Das letztere wäre aber von Seiten des Staatsoberhaupts eben nicht nothwendig. Er kann frey heraussagen, daß er jeden Aufruhr mit dem Tode der Rädelsführer bestrafen werde, diese mögen auch immer glauben, er habe seinerseits das Fundamentalgesetz zuerst übertreten; denn wenn er sich bewußt ist, die unwiderstehliche Obergewalt zu besitzen (welches auch in jeder bürgerlichen Verfassung so angenommen werden muß, weil der, welcher nicht Macht genug hat, einen jeden im Volk gegen den andern zu schützen, auch nicht das Recht hat, ihm zu befehlen), so darf er nicht sorgen, durch die Bekanntwerdung seiner Maxime seine eigene Absicht zu vereiteln, womit auch ganz wohl zusammenhängt, daß, wenn der Aufruhr dem Volk gelänge, jenes Oberhaupt in die Stelle des Unterthans zurücktreten, eben sowohl keinen Wiedererlangungsaufruhr beginnen, aber auch nicht zu befürchten haben müßte, wegen seiner vormaligen Staatsführung zur Rechenschaft gezogen zu werden.
2 Was das Völkerrecht betrifft. — Nur unter Voraussetzung irgend eines rechtlichen Zustandes (d. i. derjenigen äußeren Bedingung, unter der dem Menschen ein Recht wirklich zu Theil werden kann), kann von einem Völkerrecht die Rede seyn; weil es, als ein öffentliches Recht, die Publication eines, jedem das Seine bestimmenden, allgemeinen Willens schon in seinem Begriffe enthält, und dieser status iuridicus muß aus irgend einem Vertrage hervorgehen, der nicht eben (gleich dem, woraus ein Staat entspringt,) auf Zwangsgesetze gegründet seyn darf, sondern allenfalls auch der einer fortwährend-freyen Association seyn kann, wie der oben erwähnte der Föderalität verschiedener Staaten. Denn ohne irgend einen rechtlichen Zustand, der die verschiedene (physische oder moralische) Personen thätig verknüpft, mithin im Naturstande, kann es kein anderes als bloß ein Privatrecht geben. — Hier tritt nun auch ein Streit der Politik mit der Moral (diese als Rechtslehre betrachtet) ein, wo dann jenes Criterium der Publicität der Maximen gleichfalls seine leichte Anwendung findet, doch nur so: daß der Vertrag die Staaten nur in der Absicht verbindet, unter einander und zusammen gegen andere Staaten sich im Frieden zu erhalten, keinesweges aber um Erwerbungen zu machen. — Da treten nun folgende Fälle der Antinomie zwischen Politik und Moral ein, womit zugleich die Lösung derselben verbunden wird.
a) „Wenn einer dieser Staaten dem andern etwas versprochen hat: es sey Hülfleistung, oder Abtretung gewisser Länder, oder Subsidien u. d. gl., frägt sich, ob er sich in einem Fall, an dem des Staats Heil hängt, vom Worthalten dadurch los machen kann, daß er sich in einer doppelten Person betrachtet wissen will, erstlich als Souverän, da er Niemanden in seinem Staat verantwortlich ist; dann aber wiederum bloß als oberster Staatsbeamte, der dem Staat Rechenschaft geben müsse: da denn der Schluß dahin ausfällt, daß, wozu er sich in der ersteren Qualität verbindlich gemacht hat, davon werde er in der zweyten losgesprochen.“ — Wenn nun aber ein Staat (oder dessen Oberhaupt) diese seine Maxime laut werden ließe, so würde natürlicherweise entweder ein jeder Andere ihn fliehen, oder sich mit Anderen vereinigen, um seinen Anmaßungen zu widerstehen, welches beweiset, daß Politik mit aller ihrer Schlauigkeit auf diesen Fuß (der Offenheit) ihren Zweck selber vereiteln, mithin jene Maxime unrecht seyn müßte.
b) „Wenn eine bis zur furchtbaren Größe (potentia tremenda) angewachsene benachbarte Macht Besorgnis erregt: kann man annehmen, sie werde, weil sie kann, auch unterdrücken wollen, und giebt das der Mindermächtigen ein Recht zum (vereinigten) Angriffe derselben, auch ohne vorhergegangene Beleidigung?“ — Ein Staat, der seine Maxime hier bejahend verlautbaren wollte, würde das Uebel nur noch gewisser und schneller herbeyführen. Denn die größere Macht würde der kleineren zuvorkommen, und, was die Vereinigung der letzteren betrifft, so ist das nur ein schwacher Rohrstab gegen den, der das diuide et impera zu benutzen weiß. — Diese Maxime der Staatsklugheit, öffentlich erklärt, vereitelt also nothwendig ihre eigene Absicht, und ist folglich ungerecht.
c) „Wenn ein kleinerer Staat durch seine Lage den Zusammenhang eines größeren trennt, der diesem doch zu seiner Erhaltung nöthig ist, ist dieser nicht berechtigt, jenen sich zu unterwerfen und mit dem seinigen zu vereinigen?“ — Man sieht leicht, daß der größere eine solche Maxime ja nicht vorher müsse laut werden lassen; denn, entweder die kleinern Staaten würden sich frühzeitig vereinigen, oder andere Mächtige würden um diese Beute streiten, mithin macht sie sich durch ihre Offenheit selbst unthunlich; ein Zeichen, daß sie ungerecht ist und es auch in sehr hohem Grade seyn kann; denn ein klein Object der Ungerechtigkeit hindert nicht, daß die daran bewiesene Ungerechtigkeit sehr groß sey.
3 Was das Weltbürgerrecht betrifft, so übergehe ich es hier mit Stillschweigen; weil, wegen der Analogie desselben mit dem Völkerrecht, die Maximen desselben leicht anzugeben und zu würdigen sind.
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Man hat hier nun zwar an dem Princip der Unverträglichkeit der Maximen des Völkerrechts mit der Publicität, ein gutes Kennzeichen der Nichtübereinstimmung der Politik mit der Moral (als Rechtslehre). Nun bedarf man aber auch belehrt zu werden, welches denn die Bedingung ist, unter der ihre Maximen mit dem Recht der Völker übereinstimmen? Denn es läßt sich nicht umgekehrt schließen: daß, welche Maximen die Publicität vertragen, dieselbe darum auch gerecht sind; weil, wer die entschiedene Obermacht hat, seiner Maximen nicht heel haben darf. — Die Bedingung der Möglichkeit eines Völkerrechts überhaupt ist: daß zuvörderst ein rechtlicher Zustand existire. Denn ohne diesen giebts kein öffentliches Recht, sondern alles Recht, was man sich außer demselben denken mag (im Naturzustande), ist bloß Privatrecht. Nun haben wir oben gesehen: daß ein föderativer Zustand der Staaten, welcher bloß die Entfernung des Krieges zur Absicht hat, der einzige, mit der Freyheit derselben vereinbare, rechtliche Zustand sey. Also ist die Zusammenstimmung der Politik mit der Moral nur in einem föderativen Verein (der also nach Rechtsprincipien a priori gegeben und nothwendig ist) möglich, und alle Staatsklugheit hat zur rechtlichen Basis die Stiftung des ersteren, in ihrem größt-möglichen Umfange, ohne welchen Zweck alle ihre Klügeley Unweisheit und verschleyerte Ungerechtigkeit ist. — Diese Afterpolitik hat nun ihre Casuistik, trotz der besten Jesuiterschule — die reservatio mentalis; in Abfassung öffentlicher Verträge, mit solchen Ausdrücken, die man gelegentlich zu seinem Vortheil auslegen kann, wie man will (z. B. den Unterschied des status quo de fait und de droit); — den Probabilismus: böse Absichten an Anderen zu erklügeln, oder auch Wahrscheinlichkeiten ihres möglichen Uebergewichts zum Rechtsgrunde der Untergrabung anderer friedlicher Staaten zu machen; — Endlich das peccatum philosophicum (peccatillum, bagatelle). Das Verschlingen eines kleinen Staats, wenn dadurch ein viel größerer, zum vermeyntlich größern Weltbesten, gewinnt, für eine leicht-verzeihliche Kleinigkeit zu halten16.
Den Vorschub hiezu giebt die Zweyzüngigkeit der Politik in Ansehung der Moral, einen oder den andern Zweig derselben zu ihrer Absicht zu benutzen. — Beydes, die Menschenliebe und die Achtung fürs Recht der Menschen, ist Pflicht; jene aber nur bedingte, diese dagegen unbedingte, schlechthin gebietende Pflicht, welche nicht übertreten zu haben derjenige zuerst völlig versichert seyn muß, der sich dem süßen Gefühl des Wohlthuns überlassen will. Mit der Moral im ersteren Sinne (als Ethik) ist die Politik leicht einverstanden, um das Recht der Menschen ihren Oberen Preis zu geben: Aber mit der in der zweyten Bedeutung (als Rechtslehre), vor der sie ihre Knie beugen müßte, findet sie es rathsam, sich gar nicht auf Vertrag einzulassen, ihr lieber alle Realität abzustreiten, und alle Pflichten auf lauter Wohlwollen auszudeuten; welche Hinterlist einer lichtscheuen Politik doch von der Philosophie durch die Publicität jener ihrer Maximen leicht vereitelt werden würde, wenn jene es nur wagen wollte, dem Philosophen die Publicität der seinigen angedeihen zu lassen.
In dieser Absicht schlage ich ein anderes transscendentales und bejahendes Princip des öffentlichen Rechts vor, dessen Formel diese seyn würde:
„Alle Maximen, die der Publicität bedürfen (um ihren Zweck nicht zu verfehlen), stimmen mit Recht und Politik vereinigt zusammen.“
Denn, wenn sie nur durch die Publicität ihren Zweck erreichen können, so müssen sie dem allgemeinen Zweck des Publicums (der Glückseligkeit) gemäs seyn, womit zusammen zu stimmen (es mit seinem Zustande zufrieden zu machen), die eigentliche Aufgabe der Politik ist. Wenn aber dieser Zweck nur durch die Publicität, d. i. durch die Entfernung alles Mistrauens gegen die Maximen derselben, erreichbar seyn soll, so müssen diese auch mit dem Recht des Publicums in Eintracht stehen; denn in diesem Allein ist die Vereinigung der Zwecke Aller möglich. — Die weitere Ausführung und Erörterung dieses Princips muß ich für eine andere Gelegenheit aussetzen; nur daß es eine transscendentale Formel sey, ist aus der Entfernung aller empirischen Bedingungen (der Glückseligkeitslehre), als der Materie des Gesetzes und der bloßen Rücksicht auf die Form der allgemeinen Gesetzmäßigkeit zu ersehen.
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Wenn es Pflicht, wenn zugleich gegründete Hofnung da ist, den Zustand eines öffentlichen Rechts, obgleich nur in einer ins Unendliche fortschreitenden Annäherung wirklich zu machen, so ist der ewige Friede, der auf die bisher fälschlich so genannte Friedensschlüsse (eigentlich Waffenstillstände) folgt, keine leere Idee, sondern eine Aufgabe, die nach und nach aufgelöst, ihrem Ziele (weil die Zeiten, in denen gleiche Fortschritte geschehen, hoffentlich immer kürzer werden) beständig näher kommt.
16 Die Belege zu solchen Maximen kann man in des Herrn Hofr. Garve Abhandlung: „über die Verbindung der Moral mit der Politik, 1788,“ antreffen. Dieser würdige Gelehrte gesteht gleich zu Anfange, eine genugthuende Antwort auf diese Frage nicht geben zu können. Aber sie dennoch gut zu heißen, ob zwar mit dem Geständnis, die dagegen sich regende Einwürfe nicht völlig heben zu können, scheint doch eine größere Nachgiebigkeit gegen die zu seyn, die sehr geneigt sind, sie zu misbrauchen, als wohl rathsam seyn möchte, einzuräumen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted translation directly from Kant's complete German text of the expanded 1796 edition, including both supplements, both appendices and his notes. Source: Internet Archive, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek copy.
II.On the agreement between politics and morality according to the transcendental concept of public right.
If I abstract from all the matter of public right (according to the various empirically given relations of human beings within a state, or also of states to one another), as the teachers of right commonly conceive it, there still remains to me the form of publicity, whose possibility every claim of right contains in itself. For without that form there would be no justice (which can be thought only as publicly knowable), and hence no right either, since it is justice alone that confers right.
Every claim of right must have this capacity for publicity. And since it is quite easy to judge whether it obtains in a given case—that is, whether it can be united with the principles of the agent or not—it can furnish an easily used criterion, to be met with a priori in reason, for recognizing at once, in the latter case, the falsity (illegality) of the claim in question (praetensio iuris), as it were by an experiment of pure reason.
After such an abstraction from everything empirical that the concept of the right of the state and of the right of nations contains (such as the malevolence of human nature, which makes coercion necessary), one may call the following proposition the transcendental formula of public right:
“All actions relating to the right of other human beings, whose maxim is incompatible with publicity, are wrong.”
This principle is to be considered not merely as ethical (belonging to the doctrine of virtue), but also as juridical (concerned with the right of human beings). For a maxim that I may not let be known without thereby at once defeating my own intention, a maxim that must by all means be kept secret if it is to succeed, and to which I cannot publicly confess without the resistance of all being inevitably provoked against my purpose: such a necessary and universal, and hence a priori knowable, counterworking of all against me can have its source nowhere but in the injustice with which it threatens everyone.—It is further merely negative, that is, it serves only to recognize, by its means, what is not right against others.—It is, like an axiom, unprovably certain, and besides easy to apply, as may be seen from the following examples of public right.
1 As regards the right of the state (ius ciuitatis), namely the internal right: the question arises here which many hold hard to answer, and which the transcendental principle of publicity resolves quite easily: “Is rebellion a lawful means for a people to throw off the oppressive power of a so-called tyrant (non titulo sed exercitio talis)?” The rights of the people are injured, and no injustice is done to the tyrant by his dethronement; of this there is no doubt. Nevertheless it is in the highest degree wrong in the subjects to seek their right in this way, and they can complain just as little of injustice if they succumb in this struggle and must afterwards endure the harshest punishment on that account.
Here much can now be reasoned for and against, if one will settle the matter by a dogmatic deduction of the grounds of right; but the transcendental principle of the publicity of public right can spare itself this tediousness. According to that principle, before the institution of the civil contract the people themselves ask whether they could well trust themselves to make publicly known the maxim of the intention to rebel on some occasion. One easily sees that, if the founding of a state constitution were to make it a condition to exercise force against the head in certain given cases, the people would thereby arrogate to themselves a lawful power over him. But then he would not be the head; or, if both were made conditions of the founding of a state, no state at all would be possible, which was nevertheless the people's aim. The wrongfulness of rebellion is therefore evident from this, that the maxim of it, by the very fact of publicly confessing to it, would make its own aim impossible. One would therefore necessarily have to keep it secret.—The latter, however, is by no means necessary on the part of the head of the state. He may freely declare that he will punish every rebellion with the death of the ringleaders, even though these may always believe that he was the first to transgress the fundamental law on his side; for if he is conscious of possessing the irresistible supreme power (which must also be assumed in every civil constitution, since whoever lacks power enough to protect every member of the people against every other has also no right to command him), then he need not fear to defeat his own aim by making his maxim known. With this it also agrees very well that, if the rebellion succeeded for the people, that head would step back into the place of a subject, and would then just as little dare to begin a rebellion to regain his position, nor yet have to fear being called to account for his former conduct of the state.
2 As regards the right of nations.—Only under the presupposition of some lawful condition (that is, that external condition under which a right can actually befall a human being) can there be any talk of a right of nations; because, as a public right, it already contains in its concept the publication of a general will determining for each what is his, and this status iuridicus must proceed from some contract that need not indeed be founded on coercive laws (like the one from which a state arises), but can also be that of a permanently free association, such as the federal union of various states mentioned above. For without some lawful condition that actively connects the various (physical or moral) persons, hence in the state of nature, there can be no other than merely a private right.—Here too there now occurs a conflict of politics with morality (considered as a doctrine of right), where that criterion of the publicity of maxims likewise finds its easy application, though only thus: that the contract unites states only with the intention of preserving themselves in peace among one another and together against other states, by no means in order to make acquisitions.—The following cases of the antinomy between politics and morality now occur, together with their solution.
a) “If one of these states has promised another something—whether assistance, or the cession of certain lands, or subsidies and the like—the question is whether, in a case on which the state's salvation depends, it can release itself from keeping its word by wanting to be regarded in a double person: first as sovereign, in which capacity it is responsible to no one within the state, then again merely as the supreme state official, who must give an account to the state. The conclusion then turns out to be that what he bound himself to in the first capacity is remitted to him in the second.”—But if a state (or its head) let this maxim of his be known, then naturally either every other would flee from him, or would unite with others to withstand his presumptions, which proves that politics with all its cunning on this footing (that of openness) would defeat its own aim, and that the maxim must therefore be wrong.
b) “If a neighboring power grown to fearful size (potentia tremenda) excites anxiety: may one assume that, because it can, it will also want to oppress, and does this give the less powerful a right to attack it (in union with others), even without any preceding injury?”—A state that wanted to proclaim this maxim of its own affirmatively would only bring the evil about more certainly and more swiftly. For the greater power would anticipate the smaller one; and as for the union of the latter, that is only a weak reed against one who knows how to use diuide et impera.—This maxim of political prudence, publicly declared, therefore necessarily defeats its own aim, and is consequently unjust.
c) “If a smaller state by its situation separates the connection of a larger one, which the latter nevertheless needs for its preservation, is the larger not entitled to subject the former and unite it with its own?”—One easily sees that the larger must by no means let such a maxim be known beforehand; for either the smaller states would unite early, or other powerful states would fight over this booty, and thus it makes itself impracticable by its openness: a sign that it is unjust, and can be so in a very high degree; for a small object of injustice does not prevent the injustice shown in it from being very great.
3 As regards cosmopolitan right, I pass over it here in silence, because, on account of its analogy with the right of nations, its maxims are easy to state and to appraise.
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One now has here, in the principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of the right of nations with publicity, a good mark of the disagreement of politics with morality (as a doctrine of right). But now one also needs to be instructed as to the condition under which their maxims agree with the right of nations. For one cannot infer conversely that the maxims which endure publicity are therefore also just, because whoever has the decided superior power need not keep his maxims secret.—The condition of the possibility of a right of nations in general is that first a lawful condition exist. For without that there is no public right; rather all right that one may think outside it (in the state of nature) is merely private right. Now we have seen above that a federal condition of states, which has merely the removal of war as its aim, is the only lawful condition compatible with their freedom. The agreement of politics with morality is therefore possible only in a federal union (which is thus given a priori according to principles of right and is necessary), and all political prudence has as its lawful basis the institution of that union in its greatest possible extent; without which end all its cleverness is unwisdom and veiled injustice.—This pseudo-politics now has its casuistry as good as that of the best school of the Jesuits: the reservatio mentalis, in drawing up public contracts, with such expressions as one can interpret in one's own favor as one pleases (for instance the distinction between the status quo de fait and de droit);—probabilism: to reason out evil intentions in others, or to make the probabilities of their possible preponderance a ground of right for undermining other peaceful states;—finally the peccatum philosophicum (peccatillum, bagatelle): to hold the swallowing of a small state, if a much larger one thereby gains, to the supposedly greater world good, for an easily forgivable trifle16.
The promotion of this is given by the double tongue of politics with regard to morality, using one or the other branch of it for its purpose.—Both, love of human beings and respect for the right of human beings, are duty; the former, however, only a conditional duty, the latter an unconditional, absolutely commanding duty, and whoever wants to abandon himself to the sweet feeling of beneficence must first be fully assured that he has not transgressed it. With morality in the former sense (as ethics) politics is easily agreed, so as to surrender the right of human beings to its superiors: but with morality in the second meaning (as doctrine of right), before which it would have to bend its knees, it finds it advisable not to enter into any contract at all, but rather to deny it all reality, and to interpret all duties as mere benevolence. And this insidiousness of a politics that shuns the light would easily be defeated by philosophy through the publicity of those maxims of politics, if politics would only dare to let the philosopher enjoy the publicity of his own.
With this aim I propose another transcendental and affirmative principle of public right, whose formula would be this:
“All maxims that need publicity (in order not to fail of their aim) agree with right and politics united.”
For if they can attain their aim only through publicity, they must be in accordance with the general aim of the public (happiness), and it is the proper task of politics to agree with that aim, that is, to make the public content with its condition. But if this aim is to be attainable only through publicity, that is, through the removal of all mistrust against those maxims, then these must also stand in concord with the right of the public; for in this alone is the union of the aims of all possible.—The further elaboration and discussion of this principle I must reserve for another occasion; only that it is a transcendental formula is to be seen from the removal of all empirical conditions (the doctrine of happiness) as the matter of the law, and from the mere regard to the form of universal lawfulness.
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If it is a duty, and if at the same time there is well-grounded hope, actually to bring about the condition of a public right, though only in an approximation advancing to infinity, then perpetual peace, which follows those peace treaties so falsely so called (actually armistices), is no empty idea, but a task that is solved gradually and steadily approaches its goal (since the times in which equal progress occurs will, it is to be hoped, always become shorter).
16 Evidence of such maxims may be met with in Hofrat Garve's treatise “On the connection of morality with politics, 1788.” This worthy scholar admits at the very beginning that he cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question. But to approve of it nevertheless, though with the admission that he cannot entirely remove the objections stirring against it, seems to concede more to those who are very inclined to misuse it than may well be advisable.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted translation directly from the complete German 1796 edition, including its supplements, appendices and author's notes.
II.On the agreement of politics with morality, according to the transcendental concept of public right.
If I set aside all the content of public right (the various empirically given relations of people within a state, or of states with one another), as jurists usually think of it, I am still left with the form of publicity. Every claim of right contains the possibility of that form, because without it there would be no justice (which can only be thought of as publicly knowable), and so no right either, since right is granted only by justice.
Every claim of right must have this capacity for publicity. It is very easy to judge whether the capacity is present in a case at hand, that is, whether the claim can be reconciled with the principles of the person acting or not. So it can serve as a criterion that is easy to use and is found a priori in reason, one that lets us recognize at once, in the latter case, as if by an experiment of pure reason, the falseness (the contradiction to right) of the claim in question (praetensio iuris).
If we set aside everything empirical contained in the concept of the right of the state and of the right of nations (the wickedness of human nature, for example, which makes coercion necessary), we can call the following proposition the transcendental formula of public right:
“All actions that bear on the right of other people, whose maxim is not compatible with publicity, are wrong.”
This principle must be regarded not merely as ethical (belonging to the doctrine of virtue) but also as juridical (concerning the right of human beings). For take a maxim that I cannot say aloud without at the same time defeating my own purpose, that absolutely must be kept secret if it is to succeed, and that I cannot declare publicly without inevitably provoking everyone's resistance to my plan. The opposition that everyone is bound to mount against me, universal and necessary and therefore knowable a priori, can have no source other than the injustice with which that maxim threatens everyone.—The principle is further merely negative, that is, it serves only to recognize, by means of it, what is not right toward others.—It is like an axiom, certain though it cannot be proved, and it is also easy to apply, as the following examples from public right show.
1 As far as the right of the state (ius ciuitatis), namely the internal kind, is concerned: a question arises in it that many consider hard to answer and that the transcendental principle of publicity resolves very easily: “Is rebellion a lawful means for a people to throw off the oppressive power of a so-called tyrant (non titulo sed exercitio talis)?” The rights of the people have been violated, and no wrong is done to him (the tyrant) by his dethronement; there is no doubt about that. Nonetheless it is wrong in the highest degree for the subjects to seek their right in this way. They could no more complain of injustice if they lost in this struggle and then had to endure the harshest punishment for it.
Here a great deal can be argued with sophistry for and against, if one wants to settle the matter by a dogmatic deduction of the grounds of right. The transcendental principle of the publicity of public right can spare itself this long-windedness. By that principle, the people ask themselves, before the civil contract is made, whether they would dare to make known publicly the maxim of resolving to rebel on occasion. It is easy to see that if, in founding a constitution, one wanted to make it a condition that force may be used against the head of state in certain cases that might arise, the people would have to claim for themselves a lawful power over the head of state. But then there would be no head of state. Or, if both were made conditions of founding the state, no state would be possible at all, which was nonetheless the people's intention. The wrong of rebellion is therefore plain from this: if one declared it publicly, the maxim of rebellion would make its own purpose impossible. So it would necessarily have to be kept secret.—The head of state, however, has no such need. The head of state can say openly that every uprising will be punished with the death of the ringleaders, even if the ringleaders believe, as they may, that the head of state was the first to break the fundamental law. For if the head of state is aware of possessing irresistible supreme power (which must be assumed in every civil constitution, because someone who does not have power enough to protect each person among the people against the others also has no right to command them), there is no need to worry that making the maxim known will defeat the head's own purpose. It fits well with this that if the rebellion succeeded, that head of state would have to step back into the position of a subject. The former head would equally have to refrain from starting a rebellion to regain power, but would also have nothing to fear in the way of being called to account for the earlier conduct of the state.
2 As far as the right of nations is concerned.—The right of nations can be spoken of only on the assumption of some lawful condition (that is, the external condition under which a person can actually be given a right). For as a public right it already contains in its concept the publication of a general will that assigns to each what is theirs. This status iuridicus must arise from some contract. The contract need not (like the one from which a state arises) be founded on coercive laws; if need be it can also be the contract of a continually free association, such as the federation of different states mentioned above. For without some lawful condition that actively connects different persons (physical or moral), and so in the state of nature, there can be no right other than merely private right.—Here a conflict of politics with morality (taken as the doctrine of right) also arises, and the criterion of the publicity of maxims again finds easy application, but only in this way: the contract binds the states only for the purpose of keeping themselves at peace with one another and together against other states, and by no means to make acquisitions.—The following cases of antinomy between politics and morality now arise, and the solution of each comes with it.
a) “If one of these states has promised the other something, whether assistance, or the cession of certain territories, or subsidies and the like, the question is whether, in a case on which the welfare of the state depends, it can release itself from keeping its word by wanting to be regarded as two persons: first as sovereign, answerable to no one in its state, and then again merely as the highest state official, who must give an account to the state. The conclusion then comes out that whatever it bound itself to in the first capacity, it is released from in the second.”—But if a state (or its head) were to say this maxim of its own aloud, then naturally either everyone else would avoid it, or would unite with others to resist its presumptions. This proves that politics, for all its cunning, would defeat its own purpose on these terms (of openness), and so that maxim must be wrong.
b) “If a neighboring power that has grown to a fearsome size (potentia tremenda) arouses concern, can one assume that because it can oppress, it also wants to? And does that give the less powerful a right to attack it (jointly), even without any prior offense?”—A state that wanted to announce its maxim here in the affirmative would bring about the evil only more certainly and more quickly. For the greater power would get ahead of the smaller ones, and as for the union of the smaller ones, that is only a frail staff of reed against someone who knows how to use diuide et impera.—This maxim of statecraft, declared publicly, therefore necessarily defeats its own purpose, and is consequently unjust.
c) “If a smaller state, by its position, breaks the continuity of a larger one, which the larger one nevertheless needs for its preservation, is the larger one not entitled to subjugate the smaller and merge it with its own?”—It is easy to see that the larger state must on no account say such a maxim aloud beforehand. For either the smaller states would unite early, or other powerful states would fight over this prey, and so the maxim makes itself unworkable through its openness. That is a sign that it is unjust, and can be so to a very high degree. For the smallness of the object of injustice does not prevent the injustice shown toward it from being very great.
3 As far as the right of world citizenship is concerned, I pass over it here in silence, because, owing to its analogy with the right of nations, its maxims are easy to state and to assess.
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In the principle that the maxims of the right of nations are incompatible with publicity, we do have a good mark of the disagreement of politics with morality (as the doctrine of right). But we also need to be taught what the condition is under which their maxims agree with the right of nations. For one cannot conclude the reverse: that maxims which tolerate publicity are therefore also just. Someone who has decisive superior power need not hide their maxims.—The condition for the possibility of a right of nations at all is that a lawful condition first exists. For without it there is no public right; all right that one may imagine outside it (in the state of nature) is merely private right. Now we saw above that a federal condition of states, whose only purpose is to remove war, is the only rightful condition compatible with their freedom. So the agreement of politics with morality is possible only in a federal union (which is therefore given a priori according to principles of right, and is necessary). The lawful basis of all statecraft is the founding of this federal union, to the greatest possible extent. Without this aim, all of statecraft's scheming is folly and veiled injustice.—This sham politics has its own casuistry, which can hold its own against the best Jesuit school: the reservatio mentalis, in drafting public treaties, with terms that one can interpret on occasion to one's own advantage, as one likes (for example, the difference between the status quo de fait and de droit);—probabilism: contriving evil intentions in others, or making the probabilities of their possible superiority the legal ground for undermining other peaceful states;—and finally the peccatum philosophicum (peccatillum, bagatelle): regarding the swallowing of a small state, if a much larger one gains by it for the supposedly greater good of the world, as an easily forgivable trifle16.
This practice is encouraged by the double tongue of politics toward morality, which uses one branch of it or the other for its purposes.—Both love of humanity and respect for the right of human beings are duties; but the first is only a conditional duty, the second an unconditional duty that commands absolutely. Whoever wants to give themselves over to the sweet feeling of doing good must first be fully assured of not having violated the second. Politics readily agrees with morality in the first sense (as ethics), in order to give up the right of human beings to their superiors. But with morality in the second sense (as the doctrine of right), before which it would have to bend its knee, politics finds it advisable to make no contract with it at all, to deny it all reality, and to reinterpret all duties as mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily foil this trickery of a politics that shuns the light, through the publicity of politics's maxims, if politics would only dare to grant publicity to the philosopher's own maxims.
To this end I propose another transcendental and affirmative principle of public right, whose formula would be this:
“All maxims that need publicity (in order not to miss their purpose) agree with right and politics united.”
For if they can reach their purpose only through publicity, they must conform to the general purpose of the public (happiness), and the proper task of politics is to agree with that purpose (to make the public content with its condition). But if this purpose is to be attainable only through publicity, that is, through the removal of all distrust of politics's maxims, then these maxims must also stand in harmony with the right of the public; for only in that right is the union of everyone's purposes possible.—I must put off the fuller development and discussion of this principle to another occasion. That it is a transcendental formula can be seen from this: all empirical conditions (those of the doctrine of happiness), which are the content of the law, are removed, and only the form of universal lawfulness is considered.
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If it is a duty, and at the same time there is well-founded hope, to make the condition of a public right real, even if only in an approximation that advances without end, then perpetual peace, which follows the so-called peace treaties made until now (falsely so called; they are really truces), is no empty idea but a task. Solved little by little, it comes steadily closer to its goal (since the periods in which equal progress is made will, one hopes, grow ever shorter).
16 The evidence for such maxims can be found in the essay by Court Councillor Garve: “On the connection of morality with politics, 1788.” This worthy scholar admits right at the start that he cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question. But to approve them nonetheless, even with the admission that he cannot fully remove the objections stirring against them, seems to be a greater indulgence toward those who are very inclined to abuse them than it would probably be advisable to grant.
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Appendix II is part of Toward Perpetual Peace by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 10 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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