First definitive article
Original German
Erster Definitivartikel zum ewigen Frieden.
Die bürgerliche Verfassung in jedem Staate soll republikanisch seyn.
Die erstlich nach Principien der Freyheit der Glieder einer Gesellschaft (als Menschen); zweytens nach Grundsätzen der Abhängigkeit aller von einer einzigen gemeinsamen Gesetzgebung (als Unterthanen); und drittens, die nach dem Gesetz der Gleichheit derselben (als Staatsbürger) gestiftete Verfassung — die einzige, welche aus der Idee des ursprünglichen Vertrags hervorgeht, auf der alle rechtliche Gesetzgebung eines Volks gegründet seyn muß — ist die republikanische4. Diese ist also, was das Recht betrifft, an sich selbst diejenige, welche allen Arten der bürgerlichen Constitution ursprünglich zum Grunde liegt; und nun ist nur die Frage: ob sie auch die einzige ist, die zum ewigen Frieden hinführen kann?
Nun hat aber die republikanische Verfassung, außer der Lauterkeit ihres Ursprungs, aus dem reinen Quell des Rechtsbegriffs entsprungen zu seyn, noch die Aussicht in die gewünschte Folge, nämlich den ewigen Frieden; wovon der Grund dieser ist. — Wenn (wie es in dieser Verfassung nicht anders seyn kann) die Beystimmung der Staatsbürger dazu erfordert wird, um zu beschließen, „ob Krieg seyn solle, oder nicht,“ so ist nichts natürlicher, als daß, da sie alle Drangsale des Krieges über sich selbst beschließen müßten (als da sind: selbst zu fechten; die Kosten des Krieges aus ihrer eigenen Haabe herzugeben; die Verwüstung, die er hinter sich läßt, kümmerlich zu verbessern; zum Uebermaße des Uebels endlich noch eine, den Frieden selbst verbitternde, nie (wegen naher immer neuer Kriege) zu tilgende Schuldenlast selbst zu übernehmen), sie sich sehr bedenken werden, ein so schlimmes Spiel anzufangen: Da hingegen in einer Verfassung, wo der Unterthan nicht Staatsbürger, die also nicht republikanisch ist, es die unbedenklichste Sache von der Welt ist, weil das Oberhaupt nicht Staatsgenosse, sondern Staatseigenthümer ist, an seinen Tafeln, Jagden, Lustschlössern, Hoffesten u. d. gl. durch den Krieg nicht das Mindeste einbüßt, diesen also wie eine Art von Lustparthie aus unbedeutenden Ursachen beschließen, und der Anständigkeit wegen dem dazu allezeit fertigen diplomatischen Corps die Rechtfertigung desselben gleichgültig überlassen kann.
Damit man die republikanische Verfassung nicht (wie gemeiniglich geschieht) mit der demokratischen verwechsele, muß Folgendes bemerkt werden. Die Formen eines Staats (ciuitas) können entweder nach dem Unterschiede der Personen, welche die oberste Staatsgewalt inne haben, oder nach der Regierungsart des Volks durch sein Oberhaupt, er mag seyn welcher er wolle, eingetheilt werden; die erste heißt eigentlich die Form der Beherrschung (forma imperii), und es sind nur drey derselben möglich, wo nämlich entweder nur Einer, oder Einige unter sich verbunden, oder Alle zusammen, welche die bürgerliche Gesellschaft ausmachen, die Herrschergewalt besitzen (Autokratie, Aristokratie und Demokratie, Fürstengewalt, Adelsgewalt und Volksgewalt). Die zweyte ist die Form der Regierung (forma regiminis), und betrifft die auf die Constitution (den Akt des allgemeinen Willens, wodurch die Menge ein Volk wird) gegründete Art, wie der Staat von seiner Machtvollkommenheit Gebrauch macht: und ist in dieser Beziehung entweder republikanisch oder despotisch. Der Republikanism ist das Staatsprincip der Absonderung der ausführenden Gewalt (der Regierung) von der Gesetzgebenden; der Despotism ist das der eigenmächtigen Vollziehung des Staats von Gesetzen, die er selbst gegeben hat, mithin der öffentliche Wille, sofern er von dem Regenten als sein Privatwille gehandhabt wird. — Unter den drey Staatsformen ist die der Demokratie, im eigentlichen Verstande des Worts, nothwendig ein Despotism, weil sie eine exekutive Gewalt gründet, da alle über und allenfalls auch wider Einen (der also nicht mit einstimmt), mithin Alle, die doch nicht Alle sind, beschließen; welches ein Widerspruch des allgemeinen Willens mit sich selbst und mit der Freyheit ist.
Alle Regierungsform nämlich, die nicht repräsentativ ist, ist eigentlich eine Unform, weil der Gesetzgeber in einer und derselben Person zugleich Vollstrecker seines Willens (so wenig, wie das Allgemeine des Obersatzes in einem Vernunftschlusse zugleich die Subsumtion des Besondern unter jenem im Untersatze) seyn kann, und, wenn gleich die zwey andern Staatsverfassungen so fern immer fehlerhaft sind, daß sie einer solchen Regierungsart Raum geben, so ist es bey ihnen doch wenigstens möglich, daß sie eine dem Geiste eines repräsentativen Systems gemäße Regierungsart annähmen, wie etwa Friedrich II. wenigstens sagte: er sey bloß der oberste Diener des Staats5, da hingegen die demokratische es unmöglich macht, weil Alles da Herr seyn will. — Man kann daher sagen: je kleiner das Personale der Staatsgewalt (die Zahl der Herrscher), je größer dagegen die Repräsentation derselben, desto mehr stimmt die Staatsverfassung zur Möglichkeit des Republikanism, und sie kann hoffen, durch allmähliche Reformen sich dazu endlich zu erheben. Aus diesem Grunde ist es in der Aristokratie schon schwerer, als in der Monarchie, in der Demokratie aber unmöglich anders, als durch gewaltsame Revolution zu dieser einzigen vollkommen rechtlichen Verfassung zu gelangen. Es ist aber an der Regierungsart6 dem Volk ohne alle Vergleichung mehr gelegen, als an der Staatsform (wiewohl auch auf dieser ihre mehrere oder mindere Angemessenheit zu jenem Zwecke sehr viel ankommt). Zu jener aber, wenn sie dem Rechtsbegriffe gemäß seyn soll, gehört das repräsentative System, in welchem allein eine republikanische Regierungsart möglich, ohne welches sie (die Verfassung mag seyn welche sie wolle) despotisch und gewaltthätig ist. — Keine der alten so genannten Republiken hat dieses gekannt, und sie mußten sich darüber auch schlechterdings in den Despotism auflösen, der unter der Obergewalt eines Einzigen noch der erträglichste unter allen ist.
4 Rechtliche (mithin äußere) Freyheit kann nicht, wie man wohl zu thun pflegt, durch die Befugniß definirt werden: „alles zu thun, was man will, wenn man nur Keinem Unrecht thut.“ Denn was heißt Befugniß? Die Möglichkeit einer Handlung, so fern man dadurch Keinem Unrecht thut. Also würde die Erklärung so lauten: „Freyheit ist die Möglichkeit der Handlungen, dadurch man keinem Unrecht thut (man mag auch thun, was man will), wenn man nur Keinem Unrecht thut:“ folglich ist es leere Tautologie. — Vielmehr ist meine äußere (rechtliche) Freyheit so zu erklären: sie ist die Befugniß, keinen äußeren Gesetzen zu gehorchen, als zu denen ich meine Beystimmung habe geben können. — Eben so ist äußere (rechtliche) Gleichheit in einem Staate dasjenige Verhältniß der Staatsbürger, nach welchem Keiner den andern wozu rechtlich verbinden kann, ohne daß er sich zugleich dem Gesetz unterwirft, von diesem wechselseitig auf dieselbe Art auch verbunden werden zu können. (Vom Princip der rechtlichen Abhängigkeit, da dieses schon in dem Begriffe einer Staatsverfassung überhaupt liegt, bedarf es keiner Erklärung). — Die Gültigkeit dieser angebohrnen, zur Menschheit nothwendig gehörenden und unveräußerlichen Rechte wird durch das Princip der rechtlichen Verhältnisse des Menschen selbst zu höheren Wesen (wenn er sich solche denkt) bestätigt und erhoben, indem er sich nach eben denselben Grundsätzen auch als Staatsbürger einer übersinnlichen Welt vorstellt. — Denn, was meine Freyheit betrifft, so habe ich, selbst in Ansehung der göttlichen, von mir durch bloße Vernunft erkennbaren Gesetze, keine Verbindlichkeit, als nur so fern ich dazu selber habe meine Beystimmung geben können (denn durchs Freyheitsgesetz meiner eigenen Vernunft mache ich mir allererst einen Begriff vom göttlichen Willen). Was in Ansehung des erhabensten Weltwesens außer Gott, welches ich mir etwa denken möchte (einen großen Aeon), das Princip der Gleichheit betrifft, so ist kein Grund da, warum ich, wenn ich in meinem Posten meine Pflicht thue, wie jener Aeon es in dem seinigen, mir bloß die Pflicht zu gehorchen, jenem aber das Recht zu befehlen zukommen solle. — Daß dieses Princip der Gleichheit nicht (so wie das der Freyheit) auch auf das Verhältnis zu Gott paßt, davon ist der Grund dieser, weil dieses Wesen das einzige ist, bey dem der Pflichtbegriff aufhört.
Was aber das Recht der Gleichheit aller Staatsbürger, als Unterthanen, betrifft, so kommt es in Beantwortung der Frage von der Zuläßigkeit des Erbadels allein darauf an: „ob der vom Staat zugestandene Rang (eines Unterthans vor dem andern) vor dem Verdienst, oder dieses vor jenem vorhergehen müsse.“ — Nun ist offenbar: daß, wenn der Rang mit der Geburt verbunden wird, es ganz ungewiß ist, ob das Verdienst (Amtsgeschicklichkeit und Amtstreue) auch folgen werde; mithin ist es eben so viel, als ob er ohne alles Verdienst dem Begünstigten zugestanden würde (Befehlshaber zu seyn); welches der allgemeine Volkswille in einem ursprünglichen Vertrage, (der doch das Princip aller Rechte ist) nie beschließen wird. Denn ein Edelmann ist darum nicht so fort ein edler Mann. — Was den Amtsadel (wie man den Rang einer höheren Magistratur nennen könnte, und den man sich durch Verdienste erwerben muß) betrifft, so klebt der Rang da nicht, als Eigenthum, an der Person, sondern am Posten, und die Gleichheit wird dadurch nicht verletzt; weil, wenn jene ihr Amt niederlegt, sie zugleich den Rang ablegt, und unter das Volk zurücktritt. —
5 Man hat die hohe Benennungen, die einem Beherrscher oft beygelegt werden (die eines göttlichen Gesalbten, eines Verwesers des göttlichen Willens auf Erden und Stellvertreters desselben), als grobe, schwindlich machende Schmeicheleyen oft getadelt; aber mich dünkt, ohne Grund. — Weit gefehlt, daß sie den Landesherrn sollten hochmüthig machen, so müssen sie ihn vielmehr in seiner Seele demüthigen, wenn er Verstand hat (welches man doch voraussetzen muß), und es bedenkt, daß er ein Amt übernommen habe, was für einen Menschen zu groß ist, nämlich das Heiligste, was Gott auf Erden hat, das Recht der Menschen zu verwalten, und diesem Augapfel Gottes irgend worinn zu nahe getreten zu seyn, jederzeit in Besorgnis stehen muß.
6 Mallet dü Pan rühmt in seiner Genietönenden, aber hohlen und sachleeren Sprache: nach vieljähriger Erfahrung endlich zur Ueberzeugung von der Wahrheit des bekannten Spruchs des Pope gelangt zu seyn: „laß über die beste Regierung Narren streiten; die bestgeführte ist die beste.“ Wenn das soviel sagen soll: die am besten geführte Regierung ist am besten geführt, so hat er, nach Schwifts Ausdruck, eine Nuß aufgebissen, die ihn mit einer Made belohnte; soll es aber bedeuten, sie sey auch die beste Regierungsart, d. i. Staatsverfassung, so ist es grundfalsch; denn Exempel von guten Regierungen beweisen nichts für die Regierungsart. — Wer hat wohl besser regiert als ein Titus und Markus Aurelius, und doch hinterließ der eine einen Domitian, der andere einen Commodus zu Nachfolgern; welches bey einer guten Staatsverfassung nicht hätte geschehen können, da ihre Untauglichkeit zu diesem Posten früh genug bekannt war, und die Macht des Beherrschers auch hinreichend war, um sie auszuschließen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted translation directly from Kant's complete German text of the expanded 1796 edition, including both supplements, both appendices and his notes. Source: Internet Archive, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek copy.
First definitive article for perpetual peace.
The civil constitution of every state shall be republican.
A constitution established, first, on principles of the freedom of the members of a society as human beings; second, on principles of the dependence of all upon a single common legislation as subjects; and third, on the law of their equality as citizens, is the republican constitution.4 It alone proceeds from the idea of the original contract, on which all rightful legislation of a people must be founded. In respect of right, it is therefore in itself the constitution originally underlying every kind of civil constitution. The only question now is whether it is also the only one that can lead to perpetual peace.
Besides the purity of its origin in the pure source of the concept of right, the republican constitution also offers the prospect of the desired result, perpetual peace. The reason is this. If the consent of the citizens is required to decide “whether there shall be war or not,” as it must be under this constitution, nothing is more natural than that they will think very carefully before embarking on so disastrous a game. They would have to decree all the hardships of war upon themselves: fighting in person, paying its costs from their own property, painfully repairing the devastation it leaves behind, and finally, to complete the burden of evils, taking on a load of debt that embitters peace itself and can never be paid off because new wars are always imminent. By contrast, in a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, deciding on war is the most untroubling matter in the world. The head of state is not a fellow member of the state but its owner; war costs him nothing of his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces, court festivities, and the like. He may therefore resolve upon it as a kind of pleasure outing, for the most trivial reasons, and indifferently leave its justification, for propriety's sake, to the diplomatic corps that is always ready to provide one.
To avoid confusing the republican constitution with the democratic, as commonly happens, the following distinction must be observed. The forms of a state (ciuitas) can be divided either according to the persons who hold supreme state power or according to the manner of government exercised over the people by their head, whoever that may be. The first is properly called the form of sovereignty (forma imperii). Only three are possible: either one, some united together, or all who compose civil society possess ruling power—autocracy, aristocracy, and democracy: the power of a prince, of the nobility, and of the people. The second is the form of government (forma regiminis). It concerns the way the state exercises its plenary power on the basis of its constitution—the act of the general will by which a multitude becomes a people. In this respect it is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the political principle that separates executive power, the government, from legislative power. Despotism is the state's arbitrary execution of laws it has itself given: the public will, in other words, insofar as the ruler handles it as his private will. Of the three forms of state, democracy, in the strict sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which all decide about, and if necessary against, one who does not agree. Thus all, who are nevertheless not all, decide—a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom.
Every form of government that is not representative is, properly speaking, a malformed constitution. For the legislator cannot in one and the same person also be the executor of his will, any more than the universal proposition of a syllogism's major premise can also be the subsumption of the particular under it in the minor premise. Although the other two constitutions of state are always defective insofar as they leave room for such a manner of government, it is at least possible for them to adopt one consistent with the spirit of a representative system. Frederick II, for example, at least said that he was merely the highest servant of the state.5 A democratic constitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible, because everyone there wishes to be master. We may therefore say: the smaller the personnel of state power—the number of rulers—and the greater its representation, the more the constitution accords with the possibility of republicanism and can hope eventually to rise to it through gradual reforms. For this reason it is already harder in an aristocracy than in a monarchy to attain this sole perfectly rightful constitution, while in a democracy it is impossible except through violent revolution. Yet the manner of government6 matters incomparably more to the people than the form of state, although the latter's greater or lesser suitability to that end also matters a great deal. If the former is to accord with the concept of right, it requires the representative system, in which alone a republican manner of government is possible. Without that system, whatever the constitution may be, government is despotic and violent. None of the ancient so-called republics knew this system, and they therefore necessarily dissolved into despotism, which is still most bearable under the supreme power of a single ruler.
4 Rightful, and therefore external, freedom cannot be defined, as is often done, as the authorization “to do whatever one wishes, provided one wrongs no one.” For what does authorization mean? The possibility of an action insofar as one thereby wrongs no one. The definition would therefore run: “Freedom is the possibility of actions by which one wrongs no one—one may do whatever one wishes—provided one wrongs no one.” This is an empty tautology. Rather, my external, rightful freedom must be defined as the authorization to obey no external laws except those to which I could have given my consent. Similarly, external, rightful equality within a state is the relation among citizens in which no one can legally bind another to anything without at the same time submitting to the law under which that other could reciprocally bind him in the same way. The principle of rightful dependence needs no explanation, since it already lies in the very concept of a constitution of state. The validity of these innate, inalienable rights, which necessarily belong to humanity, is confirmed and elevated by the principle governing a human being's rightful relations even to higher beings, if he conceives of such beings. For he represents himself as a citizen of a supersensible world under those very same principles. As regards my freedom, I am bound even by divine laws knowable to me through reason alone only insofar as I could myself have consented to them; for it is through the law of freedom of my own reason that I first form a concept of the divine will. As regards the principle of equality in relation to the loftiest being in the world apart from God that I might conceive—a great Aeon—there is no reason why, if I perform my duty in my station as that Aeon does in his, I should have only the duty to obey while he has the right to command. The reason this principle of equality, unlike that of freedom, does not also apply to the relation to God is that God is the only being to whom the concept of duty does not apply.
As for the right of equality of all citizens as subjects, the question whether hereditary nobility is permissible turns entirely on this: “Must the rank granted by the state to one subject over another precede merit, or must merit precede rank?” Now it is plain that if rank is attached to birth, it is wholly uncertain whether merit—competence and fidelity in office—will follow. It is therefore just as if the favored person were granted the right to command without any merit at all. The general will of the people would never decree this in an original contract, which is the principle of all rights. For a nobleman is not on that account immediately a noble man. As for official nobility, as the rank of a higher magistracy might be called, which must be earned by merit, rank does not attach to the person as property, but to the office. Equality is not thereby violated, because when the person lays down the office, he also lays down the rank and returns to the people.
5 The lofty titles often bestowed upon a ruler—God's anointed, administrator of the divine will on earth, and its representative—have often been censured as crude flattery that makes the head swim. But this seems to me to be without reason. Far from making a sovereign arrogant, they must rather humble him in his soul, if he has understanding, as we must presume, and reflects that he has undertaken an office too great for a human being: administering the holiest thing God possesses on earth, the right of human beings. He must always fear that he may in some respect have encroached upon this apple of God's eye.
6 Mallet du Pan, with a show of genius in his hollow, insubstantial language, boasts that after many years of experience he has finally become convinced of the truth of Pope's familiar saying: “Let fools dispute which government is best; the best conducted is the best.” If this means that the government best conducted is best conducted, he has, in Swift's phrase, cracked a nut that rewarded him with a maggot. If it means, however, that it is also the best manner of government—that is, the best constitution of state—it is fundamentally false. Examples of good governments prove nothing about the manner of government. Who ever governed better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius? Yet one left Domitian and the other Commodus as successors. This could not have happened under a good constitution of state, since their unfitness for the office was known early enough, and the ruler's power was also sufficient to exclude them.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted translation directly from the complete German 1796 edition, including its supplements, appendices and author's notes.
First definitive article for perpetual peace.
The civil constitution of every state must be republican.
A constitution is republican4 when it is established on these principles: first, the freedom of society's members as human beings; second, everyone's dependence on a single shared system of legislation as subjects; and third, their equality as citizens. This is the only constitution that follows from the idea of the original contract, on which all of a people's rightful legislation must be based. In matters of right, then, it is in itself the original basis of every kind of civil constitution. The only question now is whether it is also the only constitution that can lead to perpetual peace.
The republican constitution has a pure origin: it comes from the pure source of the concept of right. Beyond this, it also offers the prospect of the result we want—perpetual peace. Here is why. If the citizens' agreement is required to decide “whether there should be war or not”—as it must be under this constitution—nothing is more natural than that they will think very carefully before starting such a harmful game. They would be deciding to bring all the hardships of war on themselves. They would have to fight in person, pay the costs of war from their own possessions, and struggle to repair the destruction it leaves behind. To make matters worse, they would finally have to take on a burden of debt themselves. This would spoil even the peace, and could never be paid off, because more wars would always be close at hand. Under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, deciding on war is the easiest thing in the world. The head of state is not a fellow member of the state but its owner. War does not cost him the slightest loss in his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces, court festivities, and the like. He can therefore decide on it for trivial reasons, as if it were a pleasure outing. For the sake of appearances, he can leave its justification to the diplomatic corps, which is always ready for the task, without giving it another thought.
To avoid confusing a republican constitution with a democratic one, as people generally do, we need to make the following distinction. The forms of a state (ciuitas) can be classified in two ways. One concerns which persons hold supreme state power. The other concerns the way the people are governed by their head of state, whoever that may be. The first is properly called the form of rule (forma imperii). Only three forms are possible. Either one person, some people joined together, or everyone who makes up civil society holds the ruling power. These are autocracy, aristocracy, and democracy: rule by a prince, rule by the nobility, and rule by the people. The second classification is the form of government (forma regiminis). It concerns how the state uses its full power on the basis of its constitution—the act of the general will that turns a multitude into a people. In this respect, government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the principle that separates the executive power, the government, from the legislative power. Despotism is the principle by which the state carries out, on its own authority, laws that it has made itself. In other words, the ruler handles the public will as his private will. Of the three forms of state, democracy, in the strict sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism. It establishes an executive power in which everyone decides about one person, and if necessary against that person, who therefore does not agree. Thus everyone decides, yet they are not everyone. This puts the general will in conflict with itself and with freedom.
Any form of government that is not representative is really a misshapen form. The lawmaker cannot also be the person who carries out that same will. In a logical argument, the general rule in the major premise likewise cannot also be the act of placing a particular case under that rule in the minor premise. The other two constitutions are always defective insofar as they leave room for a nonrepresentative form of government. Still, they at least allow the possibility of adopting a way of governing that follows the spirit of a representative system. For example, Frederick II at least said that he was merely the state's highest servant5. A democratic constitution, by contrast, makes this impossible, because everyone there wants to be the ruler. So we can say this: The fewer people hold state power—the smaller the number of rulers—and the greater their representation, the closer the constitution comes to making republicanism possible. It can then hope to reach republicanism eventually through gradual reforms. For this reason, reaching this sole fully rightful constitution is harder under aristocracy than under monarchy. Under democracy, it is impossible without violent revolution. But the way of governing6 matters incomparably more to the people than the form of state. Even so, much also depends on how well or poorly the form of state suits that goal. If the way of governing is to fit the concept of right, it must include a representative system. Only that system makes republican government possible. Without it, whatever the constitution may be, government is despotic and violent. None of the ancient so-called republics knew this system. As a result, they inevitably had to fall apart into despotism. Of all forms of despotism, the one under a single supreme ruler is still the most bearable.
4 Legal (and therefore external) freedom cannot be defined, as people often define it, as the permission “to do whatever you want, as long as you do no one any wrong.” For what does permission mean? The possibility of an action insofar as it does no one any wrong. So the definition would run: “Freedom is the possibility of actions through which you do no one any wrong (whatever you may do), as long as you do no one any wrong.” This is an empty repetition. Instead, my external (legal) freedom should be defined as follows: It is the permission not to obey any external laws except those to which I could have given my consent. Similarly, external (legal) equality within a state is a relation among citizens in which no one can place another under a legal obligation without also submitting to a law under which they can be placed under the same kind of obligation by the other in return. (The principle of legal dependence needs no explanation, since it is already included in the concept of a state constitution as such.) These rights are inborn, necessarily belong to humanity, and cannot be given up. Their validity is confirmed and raised still higher by the principle of human beings' legal relations even to higher beings, if they conceive of such beings. For human beings picture themselves as citizens of a world beyond the senses under these very same principles. As for my freedom, even divine laws that I can know through reason alone impose no obligation on me except insofar as I could have given my consent to them myself. For only through my own reason's law of freedom do I first form a concept of the divine will. Now consider the principle of equality in relation to the highest being in the world apart from God that I might imagine—a great Aeon. Suppose I do my duty in my position, just as that Aeon does in its own. There is then no reason why I should have only a duty to obey, while it has a right to command. The reason this principle of equality, unlike the principle of freedom, does not also apply to our relation to God is that God is the only being to whom the concept of duty does not apply.
As for the right to equality of all citizens as subjects, the question of whether hereditary nobility is permissible depends on this alone: “Must the rank granted by the state to one subject above another come before merit, or must merit come before rank?” Clearly, if rank is tied to birth, it is entirely uncertain whether merit—ability and faithfulness in office—will follow. This amounts to granting the favored person a rank, the position of commander, without any merit at all. The general will of the people would never decide on this in an original contract, which is, after all, the principle of all rights. Being a nobleman does not automatically make someone a noble man. As for nobility of office—as we might call the rank of a higher magistrate, which must be earned through merit—the rank does not belong to the person as property. It belongs to the position. This does not violate equality. When the person leaves office, they also give up the rank and return to the people.
5 The lofty titles often given to a ruler—God's anointed, administrator of the divine will on earth, and God's representative—have often been criticized as crude flattery that makes his head spin. But I think this criticism is unfounded. Far from making the ruler arrogant, these titles must humble him in his own soul, if he has any understanding, as we must assume he does. He must consider that he has taken on an office too great for a human being: to administer the holiest thing God has on earth, human rights. He must always fear that he may have harmed in some way this apple of God's eye.
6 In language that sounds brilliant but is hollow and empty of substance, Mallet du Pan boasts that many years of experience have finally convinced him of the truth of Pope's familiar saying: “Let fools argue about the best government; the best-run is the best.” If this means that the best-run government is the best-run, then, to use Swift's expression, he has cracked a nut that rewarded him with a maggot. But if it means that this is also the best way of governing, that is, the best state constitution, it is completely false. Examples of good governments prove nothing about the way of governing. Who has governed better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius? Yet one left Domitian as his successor, and the other Commodus. This could not have happened under a good state constitution. Their unfitness for the position was known early enough, and the ruler also had enough power to exclude them.
About this section
First definitive article is part of Toward Perpetual Peace by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 4 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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