Second definitive article
Original German
Zweyter Definitivartikel zum ewigen Frieden.
Das Völkerrecht soll auf einen Föderalism freyer Staaten gegründet seyn.
Völker, als Staaten, können wie einzelne Menschen beurtheilt werden, die sich in ihrem Naturzustande (d. i. in der Unabhängigkeit von äußern Gesetzen) schon durch ihr Nebeneinanderseyn lädiren, und deren jeder, um seiner Sicherheit willen, von dem andern fordern kann und soll, mit ihm in eine, der bürgerlichen ähnliche, Verfassung zu treten, wo jedem sein Recht gesichert werden kann. Dies wäre ein Völkerbund, der aber gleichwohl kein Völkerstaat seyn müßte. Darinn aber wäre ein Widerspruch; weil ein jeder Staat das Verhältnis eines Oberen (Gesetzgebenden) zu einem Unteren (gehorchenden, nämlich dem Volk) enthält, viele Völker aber in einem Staat nur ein Volk ausmachen würden, welches (da wir hier das Recht der Völker gegen einander zu erwägen haben, so fern sie so viel verschiedene Staaten ausmachen, und nicht in einem Staat zusammenschmelzen sollen) der Voraussetzung widerspricht.
Gleichwie wir nun die Anhänglichkeit der Wilden an ihre gesetzlose Freyheit, sich lieber unaufhörlich zu balgen, als sich einem gesetzlichen, von ihnen selbst zu constituirenden, Zwange zu unterwerfen, mithin die tolle Freyheit der vernünftigen vorzuziehen, mit tiefer Verachtung ansehen, und als Rohigkeit, Ungeschliffenheit, und viehische Abwürdigung der Menschheit betrachten, so, sollte man denken, müßten gesittete Völker (jedes für sich zu einem Staat vereinigt) eilen, aus einem so verworfenen Zustande je eher desto lieber herauszukommen: Statt dessen aber setzt vielmehr jeder Staat seine Majestät (denn Volksmajestät ist ein ungereimter Ausdruck) gerade darin, gar keinem äußeren gesetzlichen Zwange unterworfen zu seyn, und der Glanz seines Oberhaupts besteht darin, daß ihm, ohne daß er sich eben selbst in Gefahr setzen darf, viele Tausende zu Gebot stehen, sich für eine Sache, die sie nichts angeht, aufopfern zu lassen7, und der Unterschied der europäischen Wilden von den amerikanischen besteht hauptsächlich darin, daß, da manche Stämme der letzteren von ihren Feinden gänzlich sind gegessen worden, die ersteren ihre Ueberwundene besser zu benutzen wissen, als sie zu verspeisen, und lieber die Zahl ihrer Unterthanen, mithin auch die Menge der Werkzeuge zu noch ausgebreiteteren Kriegen durch sie zu vermehren wissen.
Bey der Bösartigkeit der menschlichen Natur, die sich im freyen Verhältnis der Völker unverholen blicken läßt (indessen daß sie im bürgerlich-gesetzlichen Zustande durch den Zwang der Regierung sich sehr verschleyert), ist es doch zu verwundern, daß das Wort Recht aus der Kriegspolitik noch nicht als pedantisch ganz hat verwiesen werden können, und sich noch kein Staat erkühnet hat, sich für die letztere Meynung öffentlich zu erklären; denn noch werden Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattell u. a. m. (lauter leidige Tröster), obgleich ihr Codex, philosophisch oder diplomatisch abgefaßt, nicht die mindeste gesetzliche Kraft hat, oder auch nur haben kann (weil Staaten als solche nicht unter einem gemeinschaftlichen äußeren Zwange stehen), immer treuherzig zur Rechtfertigung eines Kriegsangriffs angeführt, ohne daß es ein Beyspiel giebt, daß jemals ein Staat durch mit Zeugnissen so wichtiger Männer bewaffnete Argumente wäre bewogen worden, von seinem Vorhaben abzustehen. — Diese Huldigung, die jeder Staat dem Rechtsbegriffe (wenigstens den Worten nach) leistet, beweist doch, daß eine noch größere, ob zwar zur Zeit schlummernde, moralische Anlage im Menschen anzutreffen sey, über das böse Princip in ihm (was er nicht ableugnen kann) doch einmal Meister zu werden, und dies auch von andern zu hoffen; denn sonst würde das Wort Recht den Staaten, die sich einander befehden wollen, nie in den Mund kommen, es sey denn, bloß um seinen Spott damit zu treiben, wie jener gallische Fürst es erklärte: „Es ist der Vorzug, den die Natur dem Stärkern über den Schwächern gegeben hat, daß dieser ihm gehorchen soll.“
Da die Art, wie Staaten ihr Recht verfolgen, nie, wie bey einem äußern Gerichtshofe, der Proceß, sondern nur der Krieg seyn kann, durch diesen aber und seinen günstigen Ausschlag, den Sieg, das Recht nicht entschieden wird, und durch den Friedensvertrag zwar wohl dem diesmaligen Kriege, aber nicht dem Kriegszustande (immer zu einem neuen Vorwand zu finden) ein Ende gemacht wird (den man auch nicht geradezu für ungerecht erklären kann, weil in diesem Zustande jeder in seiner eigenen Sache Richter ist), gleichwohl aber von Staaten, nach dem Völkerrecht, nicht eben das gelten kann, was von Menschen im gesetzlosen Zustande nach dem Naturrecht gilt, „aus diesem Zustande herausgehen zu sollen“ (weil sie, als Staaten, innerlich schon eine rechtliche Verfassung haben, und also dem Zwange anderer, sie nach ihren Rechtsbegriffen unter eine erweiterte gesetzliche Verfassung zu bringen, entwachsen sind), indessen daß doch die Vernunft vom Throne der höchsten moralisch gesetzgebenden Gewalt herab, den Krieg als als Rechtsgang schlechterdings verdammt, den Friedenszustand dagegen zur unmittelbaren Pflicht macht, welcher doch, ohne einen Vertrag der Völker unter sich, nicht gestiftet oder gesichert werden kann: — so muß es einen Bund von besonderer Art geben, den man den Friedensbund (foedus pacificum) nennen kann, der vom Friedensvertrag (pactum pacis) darin unterschieden seyn würde, daß dieser bloß einen Krieg, jener aber alle Kriege auf immer zu endigen suchte. Dieser Bund geht auf keinen Erwerb irgend einer Macht des Staats, sondern lediglich auf Erhaltung und Sicherung der Freyheit eines Staats, für sich selbst und zugleich anderer verbündeten Staaten, ohne daß diese doch sich deshalb (wie Menschen im Naturzustande) öffentlichen Gesetzen, und einem Zwange unter denselben, unterwerfen dürfen. — Die Ausführbarkeit (objective Realität) dieser Idee der Föderalität, die sich allmählig über alle Staaten erstrecken soll, und so zum ewigen Frieden hinführt, läßt sich darstellen. Denn wenn das Glück es so fügt: daß ein mächtiges und aufgeklärtes Volk sich zu einer Republik (die ihrer Natur nach zum ewigen Frieden geneigt seyn muß) bilden kann, so giebt diese einen Mittelpunkt der föderativen Vereinigung für andere Staaten ab, um sich an sie anzuschließen, und so den Freyheitszustand der Staaten, gemäß der Idee des Völkerrechts, zu sichern, und sich durch mehrere Verbindungen dieser Art nach und nach immer weiter auszubreiten.
Daß ein Volk sagt: „es soll unter uns kein Krieg seyn; denn wir wollen uns in einen Staat formiren, d. i. uns selbst eine oberste gesetzgebende, regierende und richtende Gewalt setzen, die unsere Streitigkeiten friedlich ausgleicht“ — das läßt sich verstehen. — — Wenn aber dieser Staat sagt: „es soll kein Krieg zwischen mir und andern Staaten seyn, obgleich ich keine oberste gesetzgebende Gewalt erkenne, die mir mein, und der ich ihr Recht sichere,“ so ist es gar nicht zu verstehen, worauf ich dann das Vertrauen zu meinem Rechte gründen wolle, wenn es nicht das Surrogat des bürgerlichen Gesellschaftbundes, nämlich der freye Föderalism ist, den die Vernunft mit dem Begriffe des Völkerrechts nothwendig verbinden muß, wenn überall etwas dabey zu denken übrig bleiben soll.
Bey dem Begriffe des Völkerrechts, als eines Rechts zum Kriege, läßt sich eigentlich gar nichts denken (weil es ein Recht seyn soll, nicht nach allgemein gültigen äußern, die Freyheit jedes Einzelnen einschränkenden Gesetzen, sondern nach einseitigen Maximen durch Gewalt, was Recht sey, zu bestimmen), es müßte denn darunter verstanden werden: daß Menschen, die so gesinnet sind, ganz recht geschieht, wenn sie sich unter einander aufreiben, und also den ewigen Frieden in dem weiten Grabe finden, das alle Gräuel der Gewaltthätigkeit sammt ihren Urhebern bedeckt. — Für Staaten, im Verhältnisse unter einander, kann es nach der Vernunft keine andere Art geben, aus dem gesetzlosen Zustande, der lauter Krieg enthält, herauszukommen, als daß sie, eben so wie einzelne Menschen, ihre wilde (gesetzlose) Freyheit aufgeben, sich zu öffentlichen Zwangsgesetzen bequemen, und so einen (freylich immer wachsenden) Völkerstaat (ciuitas gentium), der zuletzt alle Völker der Erde befassen würde, bilden. Da sie dieses aber nach ihrer Idee vom Völkerrecht durchaus nicht wollen, mithin, was in thesi richtig ist, in hypothesi verwerfen, so kann an die Stelle der positiven Idee einer Weltrepublik (wenn nicht alles verlohren werden soll) nur das negative Surrogat eines den Krieg abwehrenden, bestehenden, und sich immer ausbreitenden Bundes, den Strom der rechtscheuenden, feindseligen Neigung aufhalten, doch mit beständiger Gefahr ihres Ausbruchs (Furor impius intus-fremit horridus ore cruento. Virgil.)8.
7 So gab ein bulgarischer Fürst dem griechischen Kayser, der gutmüthigerweise seinen Streit mit ihm durch einen Zweykampf ausmachen wollte, zur Antwort: „Ein Schmidt, der Zangen hat, wird das glühende Eisen aus den Kohlen nicht mit seinen Händen herauslangen.“
8 Nach einem beendigten Kriege, beym Friedensschlusse, möchte es wohl für ein Volk nicht unschicklich seyn, daß nach dem Dankfeste ein Bußtag ausgeschrieben würde, den Himmel, in Namen des Staats, um Gnade für die große Versündigung anzurufen, die das menschliche Geschlecht sich noch immer zu Schulden kommen läßt, sich keiner gesetzlichen Verfassung, im Verhältnis auf andere Völker, fügen zu wollen, sondern stolz auf seine Unabhängigkeit lieber das barbarische Mittel des Krieges (wodurch doch das, was gesucht wird, nämlich das Recht eines jeden Staats nicht ausgemacht wird) zu gebrauchen. — Die Dankfeste während dem Kriege über einen erfochtenen Sieg, die Hymnen, die (auf gut israelitisch) dem Herrn der Heerschaaren gesungen werden, stehen mit der moralischen Idee des Vaters der Menschen in nicht minder starkem Contrast; weil sie außer der Gleichgültigkeit wegen der Art, wie Völker ihr gegenseitiges Recht suchen (die traurig genug ist), noch eine Freude hineinbringen, recht viel Menschen, oder ihr Glück zernichtet zu haben.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted translation directly from Kant's complete German text of the expanded 1796 edition, including both supplements, both appendices and his notes. Source: Internet Archive, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek copy.
Second definitive article for perpetual peace.
The right of nations shall be founded on a federalism of free states.
Peoples, considered as states, can be judged like individual human beings who, in their natural condition—that is, in independence from external laws—injure one another merely by existing side by side. Each, for the sake of its security, can and ought to require the other to enter with it into a constitution resembling a civil one, in which each can be assured of its right. This would be a league of peoples, which would not, however, have to be a state of peoples. The latter would involve a contradiction. Every state contains the relation of a superior, the legislator, to an inferior, the obedient subject, namely the people; but many peoples within one state would constitute only one people. That contradicts the presupposition here, since we are considering the right of peoples toward one another insofar as they constitute so many different states and are not to be fused into a single state.
We regard with profound contempt the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom: their preference for incessant fighting over submission to a lawful constraint they would themselves establish, and thus for a mad freedom over a rational one. We consider it barbarism, uncouthness, and a bestial degradation of humanity. One would therefore think that civilized peoples, each united in a state of its own, would hasten to escape so debased a condition as soon as possible. Instead, every state locates its majesty precisely in being subject to no external lawful constraint at all—for the majesty of a people is an absurd expression. Its ruler's splendor consists in having many thousands at his command who can be made to sacrifice themselves for a cause that does not concern them, without his needing to place himself in danger.7 The chief difference between European savages and American ones is that, whereas some tribes of the latter have been entirely eaten by their enemies, the former know better how to use their vanquished than to devour them: they prefer to increase the number of their subjects and thereby the number of instruments for still more extensive wars.
Given the wickedness of human nature, which shows itself undisguised in the free relations among peoples, though the government's constraint greatly conceals it in the civil, lawful condition, it is nevertheless remarkable that the word right has not yet been wholly banished from the politics of war as pedantic, and that no state has yet dared publicly to declare itself for that view. Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and others—all sorry comforters—are still candidly cited to justify a military attack, although their code, whether composed philosophically or diplomatically, has not the slightest legal force and cannot have any, since states as such are not subject to a common external constraint. Yet there is no example of a state ever being moved to abandon its purpose by arguments armed with the testimony of such important men. The homage every state pays to the concept of right, at least in words, nevertheless proves that a still greater moral capacity lies within the human being, though it now slumbers: a capacity eventually to master the evil principle within him, which he cannot deny, and to hope the same of others. Otherwise the word right would never enter the mouths of states wishing to make war on one another, except merely to mock it, as that Gallic ruler declared: “It is the advantage nature has given the stronger over the weaker that the latter should obey him.”
States can pursue their right only through war, never through a lawsuit before an external court; yet war and its favorable outcome, victory, do not decide what is right. A peace treaty may end the present war, but not the condition of war, for which a new pretext can always be found. Nor can this condition simply be declared unjust, since in it everyone is judge in his own cause. Nevertheless, what natural right requires of human beings in a lawless condition—“that they ought to leave this condition”—cannot apply in quite the same way to states under the right of nations. As states, they already possess an internal rightful constitution and have thus outgrown the coercion of others who would bring them, according to their own concepts of right, under a wider lawful constitution. Yet reason, speaking from the throne of supreme moral legislative authority, unconditionally condemns war as a legal procedure and makes the condition of peace an immediate duty. Since that condition cannot be established or secured without a compact among peoples, there must be a league of a special kind, which may be called a league of peace (foedus pacificum). It would differ from a peace treaty (pactum pacis) in this: the treaty seeks to end only one war, while the league seeks to end all wars forever. This league aims at acquiring no power belonging to a state, but solely at preserving and securing the freedom of a state for itself and at the same time for its allied states. These states need not therefore submit, as human beings in the state of nature must, to public laws and coercion under them. The feasibility, or objective reality, of this idea of federation, which is gradually to extend over all states and thereby lead to perpetual peace, can be shown. If fortune so ordains that a powerful and enlightened people can form itself into a republic, which by its nature must incline toward perpetual peace, that republic provides a center of federal association for other states to join. It can thus secure the condition of freedom among states in accordance with the idea of the right of nations, and gradually extend further through additional associations of this kind.
When a people says, “There shall be no war among us, for we intend to form ourselves into a state—that is, to establish over ourselves a supreme legislative, governing, and judicial power that settles our disputes peacefully,” this is intelligible. But when this state says, “There shall be no war between me and other states, although I recognize no supreme legislative authority that secures my right to me, and whose right I secure to it,” it is quite unintelligible what could then ground my confidence in my right, unless it is the substitute for the civil social compact: free federalism. Reason must necessarily connect this with the concept of the right of nations if anything at all is to remain thinkable in that concept.
Strictly speaking, nothing can be thought in the concept of the right of nations as a right to war. It would mean a right to determine what is right by force, according to unilateral maxims rather than universally valid external laws restricting the freedom of each individual. The only possible meaning would be that human beings who think in this way are treated quite rightly when they wear one another down and thus find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence together with their authors. For states in their relations with one another, reason can offer no way out of the lawless condition of sheer war except that they, like individual human beings, abandon their savage, lawless freedom, accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and form a state of peoples (ciuitas gentium), necessarily always growing, that would ultimately embrace every people on earth. Yet according to their idea of the right of nations they will not have this at all: they reject in application what is right in principle. If all is not to be lost, therefore, only the negative substitute of an enduring and ever-expanding league that wards off war can take the place of the positive idea of a world republic and check the stream of hostile inclinations that shun right—though always with the danger that they will break out (“Impious Fury rages within, ghastly and bloody-mouthed.” Virgil.).8
7 Thus a Bulgarian prince answered a Greek emperor who good-naturedly wished to settle their dispute by single combat: “A smith who has tongs will not pull the glowing iron out of the coals with his hands.”
8 After a war has ended, at the conclusion of peace, it might not be unfitting for a people to proclaim a day of repentance after its thanksgiving celebration, invoking heaven in the name of the state for forgiveness of the great sin of which the human race still makes itself guilty: its refusal to submit to a lawful constitution in relation to other peoples, preferring, in its pride in independence, the barbarous means of war, which does not decide the very thing sought, namely each state's right. Thanksgiving celebrations during a war for a victory won, and hymns sung, in good Israelite fashion, to the Lord of Hosts, stand in no less sharp a contrast with the moral idea of the Father of human beings. Besides indifference to the manner in which peoples seek their mutual right, which is sad enough, they introduce delight at having destroyed a great many human beings or their happiness.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted translation directly from the complete German 1796 edition, including its supplements, appendices and author's notes.
Second definitive article for perpetual peace.
International law must be based on a federation of free states.
Peoples, as states, can be judged in the same way as individual human beings. In their natural condition—that is, independent of external laws—they harm one another simply by existing side by side. For its own security, each can and should demand that the others join it in an arrangement like a civil constitution, where everyone's rights can be secured. This would be a league of nations, but not necessarily a state made up of nations. Such a state would involve a contradiction. Every state involves a relationship between a superior who makes laws and an inferior who obeys them, namely, the people. But many peoples within one state would form just one people. That contradicts our starting point. We are considering the rights of peoples in relation to one another, as so many separate states, not as peoples that are to merge into one state.
We look with deep contempt at the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom. They would rather fight endlessly than submit to legal restraints that they themselves would establish. They prefer a mad freedom to a rational one. We see this as crudeness, lack of refinement, and a degradation of humanity to the level of animals. So we might expect civilized peoples, each united in a state of its own, to hurry out of such a degraded condition as soon as possible. Instead, every state places its majesty precisely in being subject to no external legal restraint at all. For “the majesty of the people” is an absurd expression. The glory of its ruler consists in having many thousands at his command who can be made to sacrifice themselves for a cause that does not concern them, without his having to put himself in danger.7 The main difference between European and American savages is this: some tribes of the latter have been completely eaten by their enemies. The former know how to make better use of those they defeat than to eat them. They prefer to use them to increase the number of their subjects, and so the number of tools available for still more widespread wars.
Human nature's wickedness shows itself openly in the unrestricted relations between peoples. Within a state governed by law, the government's restraints largely conceal it. Given this wickedness, it is surprising that the word right has not yet been completely dismissed from the politics of war as pedantic, and that no state has yet dared to declare itself publicly in favor of that view. Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and others—all of them miserable comforters—are still faithfully cited to justify an attack. Yet their code, whether written in philosophical or diplomatic terms, does not have, and cannot have, the slightest legal force. States as such are not subject to a common external power of enforcement. Nor is there any example of a state ever being persuaded to abandon its plans by arguments backed by the testimony of such important men. Still, every state's respect for the concept of right, at least in words, proves something. Human beings have an even greater moral capacity, though it is dormant for now, eventually to master the evil principle within them, which they cannot deny, and to hope that others will do the same. Otherwise, the word right would never pass the lips of states that want to fight one another, unless only to mock it. As that Gallic prince put it: “Nature has given the stronger this advantage over the weaker: the weaker must obey him.”
States can pursue their rights only through war, never through a lawsuit as they could before an external court. But war and its favorable outcome, victory, do not decide what is right. A peace treaty ends the current war, but not the state of war, for which a new pretext can always be found. Nor can this condition simply be declared unjust, since in it everyone judges their own case. Yet what natural law says of human beings in a lawless condition—that “they ought to leave this condition”—does not apply in quite the same way to states under the right of nations. As states, they already have a lawful constitution internally. They are therefore beyond being forced by others into a broader legal constitution according to those others' ideas of right. Even so, from its throne as the supreme authority for moral legislation, reason absolutely condemns war as a way to settle questions of right. It makes a state of peace an immediate duty. But peace cannot be established or secured without an agreement among peoples. So there must be a special kind of league, which can be called a peace league (foedus pacificum). It would differ from a peace treaty (pactum pacis) in this: the treaty seeks to end just one war, while the league seeks to end all wars forever. This league does not aim to acquire any of a state's power. It aims only to preserve and secure a state's freedom, both for itself and for the other states allied with it. Those states would not, for that reason, have to submit to public laws and their enforcement, as human beings in the natural condition must. We can show that this idea of federation is workable—that it has objective reality. It is to spread gradually over all states and so lead to perpetual peace. Suppose good fortune allows a powerful and enlightened people to form a republic, which by its nature must favor perpetual peace. This republic provides a center for a federal union that other states can join. In this way they can secure the freedom of states in keeping with the idea of the right of nations. Through further alliances of this kind, the union can gradually spread farther and farther.
It makes sense for a people to say: “There must be no war among us, because we want to form ourselves into a state. That is, we want to establish over ourselves a supreme power to make laws, govern, and judge, which will settle our disputes peacefully.” But suppose this state says: “There must be no war between me and other states, although I recognize no supreme lawmaking power that guarantees my rights and whose rights I guarantee in return.” Then it is impossible to understand what could give me confidence in my rights, unless it is a substitute for the compact that establishes civil society: a free federation. Reason must connect this federation with the concept of the right of nations, if that concept is to have any meaning at all.
The concept of a right of nations as a right to war really makes no sense. It would be a right to determine what is right by force, according to one-sided rules, rather than by universally valid external laws that limit each individual's freedom. It could mean only that people who think this way get what they deserve when they wear one another out and so find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence along with those responsible for them. For states in their relations with one another, reason allows only one way out of the lawless condition that contains nothing but war. Like individuals, they must give up their wild, lawless freedom, accept public laws backed by force, and form a state of nations (ciuitas gentium). This state would, of course, keep growing until it finally included all the peoples of the earth. But their idea of the right of nations makes them utterly unwilling to do this. They reject in practice what is right in principle. So, if all is not to be lost, only a negative substitute can take the place of the positive idea of a world republic: a lasting, continually expanding league that keeps war away. Only this can hold back the flood of hostile tendencies that shun law, though there is a constant danger of their breaking out (Godless fury rages within, hideous with its bloodstained mouth. Virgil.).8
7 A Bulgarian prince once gave this answer to the Greek emperor, who had kindly offered to settle their dispute by single combat: “A blacksmith who has tongs will not use his hands to pull the red-hot iron out of the coals.”
8 When a war has ended and peace has been concluded, it might be fitting for a people to proclaim a day of repentance after the festival of thanksgiving. In the state's name, they would ask heaven's forgiveness for the great sin that the human race still commits: refusing to accept a legal constitution in its relations with other peoples. Proud of its independence, it prefers the barbaric means of war, even though war does not decide the very thing being sought, namely, the rights of each state. The thanksgiving festivals held during a war for a victory, and the hymns sung, in true Israelite fashion, to the Lord of Hosts, clash no less sharply with the moral idea of the Father of humankind. They show indifference to the way peoples seek to establish their rights against one another, which is sad enough. But they also add joy at having destroyed a great many people or their happiness.
About this section
Second definitive article is part of Toward Perpetual Peace by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 5 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.