Definitive articles: introduction
Original German
Zweyter Abschnitt,
welcher die Definitivartikel zum ewigen Frieden unter Staaten enthält.
Der Friedenszustand unter Menschen, die neben einander leben, ist kein Naturstand (status naturalis), der vielmehr ein Zustand des Krieges ist, d. i. wenn gleich nicht immer ein Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten, doch immerwährende Bedrohung mit denselben. Er muß also gestiftet werden; denn die Unterlassung der letzteren ist noch nicht Sicherheit dafür, und, ohne daß sie einem Nachbar von dem andern geleistet wird (welches aber nur in einem gesetzlichen Zustande geschehen kann), kann jener diesen, welchen er dazu aufgefordert hat, als einen Feind behandeln3.
3 Gemeiniglich nimmt man an, daß man gegen Niemand feindlich verfahren dürfe, als nur, wenn er mich schon thätig lädirt hat, und das ist auch ganz richtig, wenn beyde im bürgerlich-gesetzlichen Zustande sind. Denn dadurch, daß dieser in denselben getreten ist, leistet er jenem (vermittelst der Obrigkeit, welche über Beyde Gewalt hat) die erforderliche Sicherheit. — Der Mensch aber (oder das Volk) im bloßen Naturstande benimmt mir diese Sicherheit, und lädirt mich schon durch eben diesen Zustand, indem er neben mir ist, obgleich nicht thätig (facto), doch durch die Gesetzlosigkeit seines Zustandes (statu iniusto), wodurch ich beständig von ihm bedrohet werde, und ich kann ihn nöthigen, entweder mit mir in einen gemeinschaftlich-gesetzlichen Zustand zu treten, oder aus meiner Nachbarschaft zu weichen. — Das Postulat also, was allen folgenden Artikeln zum Grunde liegt, ist: Alle Menschen, die auf einander wechselseitig einfließen können, müssen zu irgend einer bürgerlichen Verfassung gehören.
Alle rechtliche Verfassung aber ist, was die Personen betrifft, die darin stehen,
1) die nach dem Staatsbürgerrecht der Menschen, in einem Volk (ius ciuitatis),
2) nach dem Völkerrecht der Staaten in Verhältnis gegen einander (ius gentium),
3) die nach dem Weltbürgerrecht, so fern Menschen und Staaten, in äußerem auf einander einfließendem Verhältnis stehend, als Bürger eines allgemeinen Menschenstaats anzusehen sind (ius cosmopoliticum). Diese Eintheilung ist nicht willkührlich, sondern nothwendig in Beziehung auf die Idee vom ewigen Frieden. Denn wenn nur einer von diesen im Verhältnisse des physischen Einflusses auf den andern, und doch im Naturstande wäre, so würde damit der Zustand des Krieges verbunden seyn, von dem befreyet zu werden hier eben die Absicht ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted translation directly from Kant's complete German text of the expanded 1796 edition, including both supplements, both appendices and his notes. Source: Internet Archive, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek copy.
Second section,
containing the definitive articles for perpetual peace among states.
The condition of peace among human beings living beside one another is not the natural condition (status naturalis), which is rather a condition of war: even if hostilities do not always break out, their threat is perpetual. Peace must therefore be established. For refraining from hostilities does not yet guarantee security against them; unless one neighbor gives another that security, which can happen only in a lawful condition, the one who has demanded it may treat the other as an enemy.3
3 It is commonly assumed that I may act with hostility toward no one unless he has already actively injured me. This is entirely correct when both of us are in a civil, lawful condition. For by entering that condition, he gives the other the required security through the authority that has power over both. But a human being—or a people—in the mere state of nature deprives me of this security and injures me by that very condition, simply by being beside me: not actively, in deed (facto), yet through the lawlessness of his condition (statu iniusto), by which I am constantly threatened. I may compel him either to enter with me into a shared lawful condition or to withdraw from my neighborhood. The postulate underlying all the following articles is therefore this: all human beings capable of affecting one another must belong to some civil constitution.
Rightful constitutions, considered in relation to the persons within them, are:
1) those founded on the civic right of human beings within a people (ius ciuitatis);
2) those founded on the right of nations, governing states in their relations with one another (ius gentium);
3) those founded on cosmopolitan right, insofar as human beings and states, standing in relations of external influence upon one another, must be regarded as citizens of a universal state of humanity (ius cosmopoliticum). This division is not arbitrary, but necessary in relation to the idea of perpetual peace. For if even one of these persons stood in a relation of physical influence upon another while remaining in the state of nature, that would entail the condition of war, from which it is precisely our purpose here to be freed.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted translation directly from the complete German 1796 edition, including its supplements, appendices and author's notes.
Second section,
containing the definitive articles for perpetual peace among states.
Peace among people living side by side is not a state of nature (status naturalis). The state of nature is instead a state of war. This does not always mean open hostilities, but it does mean a constant threat of them. Peace must therefore be established. Simply refraining from hostilities gives no assurance of peace. Unless each neighbor gives the other that assurance—which can happen only under a legal order—the one who has asked for it may treat the other as an enemy3.
3 People generally assume that I may act with hostility toward someone only if that person has already harmed me by an action. This is quite right when both of us live under a civil legal order. By entering that order, the other person gives me the necessary assurance through the authority that has power over us both. But a person (or a people) in a mere state of nature deprives me of this assurance. Simply by being beside me in that condition, that person already harms me. This is not harm through an action (facto), but through the lawless condition itself (statu iniusto, a condition without justice), which keeps me under constant threat. I may force that person either to enter a shared legal order with me or to leave my neighborhood. The basic requirement underlying all the following articles is therefore this: All people who can affect one another must belong to some civil constitution.
Every legal constitution, in terms of the persons who belong to it, falls into one of these categories:
1) A constitution based on the right of citizens within one people (ius ciuitatis).
2) A constitution based on the right of nations, governing states in their relations with one another (ius gentium).
3) A constitution based on the right of world citizenship, insofar as people and states stand in external relations that affect one another and are to be regarded as citizens of a universal human state (ius cosmopoliticum). This division is not arbitrary. It is necessary for the idea of perpetual peace. If even one of these persons or states could physically affect another while still living in a state of nature, a state of war would follow. Freedom from that state of war is precisely what we are seeking here.
About this section
Definitive articles: introduction is part of Toward Perpetual Peace by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 3 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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