Preliminary articles
Original German
Erster Abschnitt,
welcher die Präliminarartikel zum ewigen Frieden unter Staaten enthält.
1 „Es soll kein Friedensschluß für einen solchen gelten, der mit dem geheimen Vorbehalt des Stoffs zu einem künftigen Kriege gemacht worden.“
Denn alsdenn wäre er ja ein bloßer Waffenstillstand, Aufschub der Feindseligkeiten, nicht Friede, der das Ende aller Hostilitäten bedeutet, und dem das Beywort ewig anzuhängen ein schon verdächtiger Pleonasm ist. Die vorhandene, obgleich jetzt vielleicht den Paciscirenden selbst noch nicht bekannte, Ursachen zum künftigen Kriege sind durch den Friedensschluß insgesammt vernichtet, sie mögen auch aus archivarischen Dokumenten mit noch so scharfsichtiger Ausspähungsgeschicklichkeit ausgeklaubt seyn. — Der Vorbehalt (reseruatio mentalis) alter allererst künftig auszudenkender Prätensionen, deren kein Theil für jetzt Erwähnung thun mag, weil beyde zu sehr erschöpft sind, den Krieg fortzusetzen, bey dem bösen Willen, die erste günstige Gelegenheit zu diesem Zweck zu benutzen, gehört zur Jesuitencasuistik, und ist unter der Würde der Regenten, so wie die Willfährigkeit zu dergleichen Deduktionen unter der Würde eines Ministers desselben, wenn man die Sache, wie sie an sich selbst ist beurtheilt. —
Wenn aber, nach aufgeklärten Begriffen der Staatsklugheit, in beständiger Vergrößerung der Macht, durch welche Mittel es auch sey, die wahre Ehre des Staats gesetzt wird, so fällt freylich jenes Urtheil als schulmäßig und pedantisch in die Augen.
2 „Es soll kein für sich bestehender Staat (klein oder groß, das gilt hier gleichviel) von einem andern Staate durch Erbung, Tausch, Kauf oder Schenkung, erworben werden können.“
Ein Staat ist nämlich nicht (wie etwa der Boden, auf dem er seinen Sitz hat) eine Haabe (patrimonium). Er ist eine Gesellschaft von Menschen, über die Niemand anders, als er selbst, zu gebieten und zu disponiren hat. Ihn aber, der selbst als Stamm seine eigene Wurzel hatte, als Pfropfreis einem andern Staate einzuverleiben, heißt seine Existenz, als einer moralischen Person, aufheben, und aus der letzteren eine Sache machen, und widerspricht also der Idee des ursprünglichen Vertrags, ohne die sich kein Recht über ein Volk denken läßt1. In welche Gefahr das Vorurtheil dieser Erwerbungsart Europa, denn die andern Welttheile haben nie davon gewußt, in unsern bis auf die neuesten Zeiten gebracht habe, daß sich nämlich auch Staaten einander heyrathen könnten, ist jedermann bekannt, theils als eine neue Art von Industrie, sich auch ohne Aufwand von Kräften durch Familienbündnisse übermächtig zu machen, theils auch auf solche Art den Länderbesitz zu erweitern. — Auch die Verdingung der Truppen eines Staats an einen andern, gegen einen nicht gemeinschaftlichen Feind, ist dahin zu zählen; denn die Unterthanen werden dabey als nach Belieben zu handhabende Sachen gebraucht und verbraucht.
3 „Stehende Heere (miles perpetuus) sollen mit der Zeit ganz aufhören.“
Denn sie bedrohen andere Staaten unaufhörlich mit Krieg, durch die Bereitschaft, immer dazu gerüstet zu erscheinen; reitzen diese an, sich einander in Menge der gerüsteten, die keine Grenzen kennt, zu übertreffen, und, indem durch die darauf verwandten Kosten der Friede endlich noch drückender wird als ein kurzer Krieg, so sind sie selbst Ursache von Angriffskriegen, um diese Last loszuwerden; wozu kommt, daß zum Tödten, oder getödtet zu werden in Sold genommen zu seyn, einen Gebrauch von Menschen als bloßen Maschinen und Werkzeugen in der Hand eines Andern (des Staats) zu enthalten scheint, der sich nicht wohl mit dem Rechte der Menschheit in unserer eigenen Person vereinigen läßt. Ganz anders ist es mit der freywilligen periodisch vorgenommenen Uebung der Staatsbürger in Waffen bewandt, sich und ihr Vaterland dadurch gegen Angriffe von außen zu sichern. — Mit der Anhäufung eines Schatzes würde es eben so gehen, daß er, von andern Staaten als Bedrohung mit Krieg angesehen, zu zuvorkommenden Angriffen nöthigte (weil unter den drey Mächten, der Heeresmacht, der Bundesmacht und der Geldmacht, die letztere wohl das zuverläßigste Kriegswerkzeug seyn dürfte; wenn nicht die Schwierigkeit, die Größe desselben zu erforschen, dem entgegenstände).
4 „Es sollen keine Staatsschulden in Beziehung auf äußere Staatshändel gemacht werden.“
Zum Behuf der Landesökonomie (der Wegebesserung, neuer Ansiedelungen, Anschaffung der Magazine für besorgliche Mißwachsjahre u. s. w.), außerhalb oder innerhalb dem Staate Hülfe zu suchen, ist diese Hülfsquelle unverdächtig. Aber, als entgegenwirkende Maschine der Mächte gegen einander, ist ein Creditsystem ins Unabsehliche anwachsender und doch immer für die gegenwärtige Forderung (weil sie doch nicht von allen Gläubigern auf einmal geschehen wird) gesicherter Schulden, — die sinnreiche Erfindung eines handeltreibenden Volks in diesem Jahrhundert —, eine gefährliche Geldmacht, nämlich ein Schatz zum Kriegführen, der die Schätze aller andern Staaten zusammengenommen übertrifft, und nur durch den einmal bevorstehenden Ausfall der Taxen (der doch auch durch die Belebung des Verkehrs, vermittelst der Rückwirkung auf Industrie und Erwerb, noch lange hingehalten wird) erschöpft werden kann. Diese Leichtigkeit Krieg zu führen, mit der Neigung der Machthabenden dazu, welche der menschlichen Natur eingeartet zu seyn scheint, verbunden, ist also ein großes Hinderniß des ewigen Friedens, welches zu verbieten um desto mehr ein Präliminarartikel desselben seyn müßte, weil der endlich doch unvermeidliche Staatsbankerott manche andere Staaten unverschuldet in den Schaden mit verwickeln muß, welches eine öffentliche Läsion der letzteren seyn würde. Mithin sind wenigstens andere Staaten berechtigt, sich gegen einen solchen und dessen Anmaßungen zu verbünden.
5 „Kein Staat soll sich in die Verfassung und Regierung eines andern Staats gewaltthätig einmischen.“
Denn was kann ihn dazu berechtigen? Etwa das Skandal, was er den Unterthanen eines andern Staats giebt? Es kann dieser vielmehr, durch das Beyspiel der großen Uebel, die sich ein Volk durch seine Gesetzlosigkeit zugezogen hat, zur Warnung dienen; und überhaupt ist das böse Beyspiel, was eine freye Person der andern giebt, (als scandalum acceptum) keine Läsion derselben. — Dahin würde zwar nicht zu ziehen seyn, wenn ein Staat sich durch innere Veruneinigung in zwey Theile spaltete, deren jeder für sich einen besondern Staat vorstellt, der auf das Ganze Anspruch macht; wo einem derselben Beystand zu leisten einem äußern Staat nicht für Einmischung in die Verfassung des andern (denn es ist alsdann Anarchie) angerechnet werden könnte. So lange aber dieser innere Streit noch nicht entschieden ist, würde diese Einmischung äußerer Mächte Verletzung der Rechte eines nur mit seiner innern Krankheit ringenden, von keinem andern abhängigen Volks, selbst also ein gegebenes Skandal seyn, und die Autonomie aller Staaten unsicher machen.
6 „Es soll sich kein Staat im Kriege mit einem andern solche Feindseligkeiten erlauben, welche das wechselseitige Zutrauen im künftigen Frieden unmöglich machen müssen: als da sind, Anstellung der Meuchelmörder (percussores), Giftmischer (venefici), Brechung der Capitulation, Anstiftung des Verraths (perduellio), in dem bekriegten Staat &c.“
Das sind ehrlose Stratagemen. Denn irgend ein Vertrauen auf die Denkungsart des Feindes muß mitten im Kriege noch übrig bleiben, weil sonst auch kein Friede abgeschlossen werden könnte, und die Feindseligkeit in einen Ausrottungskrieg (bellum internecinum) ausschlagen würde; da der Krieg doch nur das traurige Nothmittel im Naturzustande ist, (wo kein Gerichtshof vorhanden ist, der rechtskräftig urtheilen könnte) durch Gewalt sein Recht zu behaupten; wo keiner von beyden Theilen für einen ungerechten Feind erklärt werden kann (weil das schon einen Richterausspruch voraussetzt), sondern der Ausschlag desselben (gleich als vor einem so genannten Gottesgerichte) entscheidet, auf wessen Seite das Recht ist; zwischen Staaten aber sich kein Bestrafungskrieg (bellum punitiuum) denken läßt (weil zwischen ihnen kein Verhältniß eines Obern zu einem Untergebenen statt findet). — Woraus denn folgt: daß ein Ausrottungskrieg, wo die Vertilgung beyde Theile zugleich, und mit dieser auch alles Rechts treffen kann, den ewigen Frieden nur auf dem großen Kirchhofe der Menschengattung statt finden lassen würde. Ein solcher Krieg also, mithin auch der Gebrauch der Mittel, die dahin führen, muß schlechterdings unerlaubt seyn. — Daß aber die genannte Mittel unvermeidlich dahin führen, erhellet daraus: daß jene höllische Künste, da sie an sich selbst niederträchtig sind, wenn sie in Gebrauch gekommen, sich nicht lange innerhalb der Grenze des Krieges halten, wie etwa der Gebrauch der Spione (vti exploratoribus), wo nur die Ehrlosigkeit Anderer (die nun einmal nicht ausgerottet werden kann) benutzt wird, sondern auch in den Friedenszustand übergehen, und so die Absicht desselben gänzlich vernichten würden.
Obgleich die angeführte Gesetze objectiv, d. i. in der Intention der Machthabenden, lauter Verbotgesetze (leges prohibitiuae) sind, so sind doch einige derselben von der strengen, ohne Unterschied der Umstände geltenden Art (leges strictae), die so fort auf Abschaffung dringen (wie Nr. 1, 5, 6), andere aber (wie Nr. 2, 3, 4), die zwar nicht als Ausnahmen von der Rechtsregel, aber doch in Rücksicht auf die Ausübung derselben, durch die Umstände, subjektiv für die Befugniß erweiternd (leges latae), und Erlaubnisse enthalten, die Vollführung aufzuschieben, ohne doch den Zweck aus den Augen zu verlieren, der diesen Aufschub, z. B. der Wiedererstattung der gewissen Staaten, nach Nr. 2, entzogenen Freyheit, nicht auf den Nimmertag (wie August zu versprechen pflegte, ad calendas graecas) auszusetzen, mithin die Nichterstattung, sondern nur, damit sie nicht übereilt und so der Absicht selbst zuwider geschehe, die Verzögerung erlaubt. Denn das Verbot betrifft hier nur die Erwerbungsart, die fernerhin nicht gelten soll, aber nicht den Besitzstand, der, ob er zwar nicht den erforderlichen Rechtstitel hat, doch zu seiner Zeit (der putativen Erwerbung), nach der damaligen öffentlichen Meynung, von allen Staaten für rechtmäßig gehalten wurde2.
1 Ein Erbreich ist nicht ein Staat, der von einem andern Staate, sondern dessen Recht zu regieren an eine andere physische Person vererbt werden kann. Der Staat erwirbt alsdann einen Regenten, nicht dieser als ein solcher (d. i. der schon ein anderes Reich besitzt) den Staat.
2 Ob es außer dem Gebot (leges praeceptiuae), und Verbot (leges prohibitiuae), noch Erlaubnißgesetze (leges permissiuae) der reinen Vernunft geben könne, ist bisher nicht ohne Grund bezweifelt worden. Denn Gesetze überhaupt enthalten einen Grund objektiver praktischer Nothwendigkeit, Erlaubniß aber einen der praktischen Zufälligkeit gewisser Handlungen; mithin würde ein Erlaubnißgesetz Nöthigung zu einer Handlung, zu dem, wozu jemand nicht genöthiget werden kann, enthalten, welches, wenn das Objekt des Gesetzes in beyderley Beziehung einerley Bedeutung hätte, ein Widerspruch seyn würde. — Nun geht aber hier im Erlaubnißgesetze das vorausgesetzte Verbot nur auf die künftige Erwerbungsart eines Rechts (z. B. durch Erbschaft), die Befreyung aber von diesem Verbot, d. i. die Erlaubniß, auf den gegenwärtigen Besitzstand, welcher letztere, im Ueberschritt aus dem Naturzustande in den bürgerlichen, als ein, obwohl unrechtmäßiger, dennoch ehrlicher, Besitz (possessio putatiua) nach einem Erlaubnißgesetze des Naturrechts noch fernerhin fortdauern kann, obgleich ein putativer Besitz, so bald er als ein solcher erkannt worden, im Naturzustande, imgleichen eine ähnliche Erwerbungsart im nachmaligen bürgerlichen (nach geschehenem Ueberschritt) verboten ist, welche Befugniß des fortdauernden Besitzes nicht statt finden würde, wenn eine solche vermeintliche Erwerbung im bürgerlichen Zustande geschehen wäre; denn da würde er, als Läsion, sofort nach Entdeckung seiner Unrechtmäßigkeit aufhören müssen.
Ich habe hiemit nur beyläufig die Lehrer des Naturrechts auf den Begriff einer lex permissiua, welcher sich einer systematisch-eintheilenden Vernunft von selbst darbietet, aufmerksam machen wollen; vornehmlich, da im Civilgesetze (statuarischen) öfters davon Gebrauch gemacht wird, nur mit dem Unterschiede, daß das Verbotgesetz für sich allein dasteht, die Erlaubniß aber nicht als einschränkende Bedingung (wie es sollte) in jenes Gesetz mit hinein gebracht, sondern unter die Ausnahmen geworfen wird. — Da heißt es dann: dies oder jenes wird verboten: es sey denn Nr. 1, Nr. 2, Nr. 3, und so weiter ins Unabsehliche, die Erlaubnisse nur zufälliger Weise, nicht nach einem Princip, sondern durch Herumtappen unter vorkommenden Fällen, zum Gesetz hinzukommen; denn sonst hätten die Bedingungen in die Formel des Verbotsgesetzes mit hineingebracht werden müssen, wodurch es dann zugleich ein Erlaubnißgesetz geworden wäre. — Es ist daher zu bedauern, daß die sinnreiche, aber unaufgelöst gebliebene, Preisaufgabe des eben so weisen als scharfsinnigen Herrn Grafen von Windischgrätz, welche gerade auf das letztere drang, sobald verlassen worden. Denn die Möglichkeit einer solchen (der mathematischen ähnlichen) Formel ist der einzige ächte Probierstein einer consequent bleibenden Gesetzgebung, ohne welche das so genannte ius certum immer ein frommer Wunsch bleiben wird. — Sonst wird man bloß generale Gesetze (die im Allgemeinen gelten), aber keine universale (die allgemein gelten) haben, wie es doch der Begriff eines Gesetzes zu erfordern scheint.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted translation directly from Kant's complete German text of the expanded 1796 edition, including both supplements, both appendices and his notes. Source: Internet Archive, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek copy.
First section,
containing the preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states.
1 “No peace settlement shall count as such if it is made with a secret reservation of grounds for a future war.”
For then it would be merely an armistice, a postponement of hostilities, not peace, which means the end of all hostilities; to attach the epithet perpetual to it would already be a suspicious redundancy. Every existing cause of a future war, even if the parties making peace are themselves perhaps still unaware of it, is extinguished by the peace settlement, however acutely it might be unearthed from archival documents. The reservation (reseruatio mentalis) of old claims still to be devised in the future, which neither party wishes to mention for the moment because both are too exhausted to continue the war, coupled with the malicious intention of exploiting the first favorable opportunity for this purpose, belongs to Jesuit casuistry. Judged as the matter stands in itself, it is beneath the dignity of rulers, just as a minister's readiness to entertain such deductions is beneath his own dignity.
But if, according to enlightened notions of statecraft, the true honor of a state lies in the constant enlargement of its power, whatever the means, then of course that judgment appears scholastic and pedantic.
2 “No independently existing state, whether small or large—that makes no difference here—shall be capable of acquisition by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.”
A state is not a possession (patrimonium), as the land on which it stands might be. It is a society of human beings over whom no one but itself has the right to command or dispose. To incorporate it, a trunk with roots of its own, into another state as a graft is to abolish its existence as a moral person and turn that person into a thing. It therefore contradicts the idea of the original contract, without which no right over a people can be conceived.1 Everyone knows the dangers into which this prejudice about a way of acquiring states has brought Europe down to the most recent times—the other parts of the world have never known it. The prejudice is that states themselves can marry one another: partly as a new kind of industry, to become overwhelmingly powerful through family alliances without even expending strength, and partly to enlarge territorial possessions in this way. The hiring out of one state's troops to another against an enemy they do not share must be counted here as well, for subjects are thereby used and used up as things to be handled at will.
3 “Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall in time cease altogether.”
For they incessantly threaten other states with war by appearing perpetually prepared for it. They provoke those states to outdo one another in the numbers under arms, an undertaking that knows no bounds. Since the resulting expense eventually makes peace even more burdensome than a short war, standing armies themselves become a cause of wars of aggression intended to cast off this burden. Moreover, being hired to kill or be killed seems to involve using human beings as mere machines and instruments in the hands of another—the state—in a way that can scarcely be reconciled with the right of humanity in our own person. The voluntary, periodic training of citizens in arms, to secure themselves and their country against attacks from outside, is an entirely different matter. Accumulating a treasury would have a similar effect: other states would regard it as a threat of war and be driven to anticipatory attacks. For of the three powers—military power, the power of alliances, and financial power—the last might well be the most dependable instrument of war, were it not for the difficulty of discovering its extent.
4 “No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the state's external affairs.”
Seeking assistance outside or within the state for the purposes of its domestic economy—improving roads, establishing new settlements, providing stores against years of poor harvest, and so forth—is an unobjectionable source of help. But as an instrument by which powers oppose one another, a credit system of debts that grow without limit yet remain secure against present demands, since not all creditors will make their demands at once, is a dangerous financial power. This ingenious invention of a commercial people in the present century is a treasury for waging war that exceeds the treasuries of all other states combined. It can be exhausted only by the eventual failure of tax revenues, which can itself be postponed for a long time by the stimulation of commerce through its effect on industry and earnings. This ease of making war, combined with the inclination toward it among those in power—an inclination that seems ingrained in human nature—is therefore a great obstacle to perpetual peace. A preliminary article prohibiting it is all the more necessary because the national bankruptcy that is ultimately inevitable must also entangle other states in losses through no fault of their own, thereby publicly injuring them. Other states are therefore at least entitled to unite against such a state and its pretensions.
5 “No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.”
For what could entitle it to do so? Perhaps the scandal that the other state gives to its subjects? That state can instead serve as a warning through the example of the great evils a people has brought upon itself by its lawlessness. In general, the bad example one free person gives another, as an offense taken (scandalum acceptum), does not injure the latter's rights. A different case would be a state divided by internal dissension into two parts, each constituting a separate state that claims the whole. To assist one of them could not be charged against an outside state as interference in the constitution of the other, since the condition is then one of anarchy. But so long as this internal conflict remains undecided, interference by external powers would violate the rights of an independent people struggling only with its internal sickness. It would itself therefore be a scandal and make the autonomy of all states insecure.
6 “No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as must make mutual confidence in a future peace impossible: the employment of assassins (percussores) and poisoners (venefici), breach of a capitulation, incitement to treason (perduellio) in the state with which it is at war, and the like.”
These are dishonorable stratagems. Even in the midst of war, some confidence in the enemy's way of thinking must remain, since otherwise no peace could be concluded and hostilities would turn into a war of extermination (bellum internecinum). War is, after all, only the sad expedient of the state of nature, where no court exists that could deliver a legally binding judgment, for asserting one's right by force. Neither party can there be declared an unjust enemy, since that already presupposes a judicial verdict; rather, the war's outcome, as before a so-called judgment of God, decides on which side right lies. Nor can a punitive war (bellum punitiuum) between states be conceived, since they do not stand in the relation of superior and subordinate. It follows that a war of extermination, in which annihilation could overtake both parties together and with them all right, would permit perpetual peace only in the great graveyard of the human race. Such a war, and therefore the use of means leading to it, must be absolutely forbidden. That the means named above inevitably lead to it is clear from this: those infernal arts, being base in themselves, cannot remain long within the bounds of war once they have come into use. The use of spies (vti exploratoribus) is one such example, where only the dishonesty of others, which cannot be eradicated, is exploited. These practices would pass over into the condition of peace as well and thus utterly destroy its purpose.
Although the laws set out above are objectively—that is, in the intention of those in power—all prohibitive laws (leges prohibitiuae), some are of the strict kind, applying without regard to circumstances (leges strictae) and demanding abolition at once, as do articles 1, 5, and 6. Others, such as articles 2, 3, and 4, are not exceptions to the rule of right, yet circumstances allow a subjective extension of discretion regarding their execution (leges latae), and they permit that execution to be postponed. This must never lose sight of its purpose. For instance, postponing the restoration of freedom taken from certain states, under article 2, does not permit putting it off until the day that never comes—as Augustus used to promise, ad calendas graecas—and thus failing to restore it at all. It permits delay only so that restoration does not take place precipitately and thereby defeat its own purpose. For the prohibition concerns only the manner of acquisition, which must cease to be valid in the future, not the state of possession. Although the latter lacks the requisite legal title, it was nevertheless regarded as lawful by all states at the time of its supposed acquisition, according to the public opinion prevailing then.2
1 A hereditary realm is not a state that can be inherited by another state. Rather, its right of government can pass by inheritance to another natural person. The state then acquires a ruler; the ruler, as such—that is, as one who already possesses another realm—does not acquire the state.
2 Whether pure reason can contain permissive laws (leges permissiuae) in addition to commands (leges praeceptiuae) and prohibitions (leges prohibitiuae) has so far been doubted, not without reason. Laws in general contain a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permission contains a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions. A permissive law would therefore contain compulsion to an action to which no one can be compelled. If the law's object had the same meaning in both respects, this would be a contradiction. Here, however, the prohibition presupposed in the permissive law concerns only the future manner of acquiring a right, for example through inheritance, while exemption from that prohibition—that is, permission—concerns the existing state of possession. In the passage from the state of nature to the civil condition, this possession, though unlawful, may nevertheless continue as honest possession (possessio putatiua) under a permissive law of natural right. This holds even though a merely supposed possession, as soon as it is recognized as such, is forbidden in the state of nature, as is a similar manner of acquisition in the subsequent civil condition, after the transition. This authorization to continue possessing would not apply if such a supposed acquisition had occurred in the civil condition; for there, as an injury to right, it would have to cease immediately upon discovery of its unlawfulness.
I have wished only incidentally to draw the attention of teachers of natural right to the concept of a lex permissiva, which presents itself naturally to a reason that divides things systematically. This is especially pertinent because it is often used in civil, statutory law, with this difference: the prohibitory law stands by itself, while permission is not incorporated into that law as a limiting condition, as it should be, but is relegated to the exceptions. The formula then runs: this or that is forbidden, unless it is case 1, case 2, case 3, and so on without end. Permissions thus enter the law merely by chance, not according to a principle, but by groping among the cases that arise. Otherwise the conditions would have had to be incorporated into the formula of the prohibitory law, which would thereby have become a permissive law as well. It is therefore regrettable that the ingenious but unresolved prize question proposed by that equally wise and acute gentleman, Count von Windischgrätz, which pressed precisely for this, was abandoned so soon. The possibility of such a formula, analogous to a mathematical one, is the sole genuine touchstone of legislation that remains consistent; without it, so-called ius certum, certain law, will always remain a pious wish. Otherwise we shall have merely general laws, valid in general, but no universal laws, valid universally, as the very concept of a law seems to require.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted translation directly from the complete German 1796 edition, including its supplements, appendices and author's notes.
First section,
containing the preliminary articles for perpetual peace between states.
1 “No peace agreement may count as one if it is made with a secret reservation of grounds for a future war.”
That would be only a truce, a delay in the fighting, not peace. Peace means the end of all hostilities. Adding the word perpetual to it is already a suspicious redundancy. A peace agreement wipes out every existing cause of a future war, even those the parties themselves may not yet know about. It does not matter how cleverly or keenly someone might dig them out of archival documents. A secret reservation (reservatio mentalis) about old claims still to be thought up later is another matter. Neither side wants to mention them now, because both are too exhausted to continue the war. But they have the bad intention of using the first favorable opportunity to do so. This belongs to the Jesuits' moral hair-splitting. Judged on its own merits, it is beneath the dignity of rulers, just as a willingness to supply such arguments is beneath the dignity of their ministers.
But suppose that, according to enlightened ideas of statecraft, a state's true honor lies in constantly increasing its power, whatever the means. Then that judgment will of course look academic and pedantic.
2 “No independent state, large or small—it makes no difference here—may be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.”
A state is not property (patrimonium), as the land on which it stands might be. It is a society of human beings that no one but itself has the right to command or control. It is a tree trunk with roots of its own. To graft it onto another state as a shoot is to end its existence as a moral person and turn that person into a thing. This contradicts the idea of the original contract. Without that idea, no right to rule over a people is conceivable1. Everyone knows the danger that this assumed way of acquiring states has brought on Europe, even in the most recent times. The other parts of the world have never known it. It is the idea that states, too, can marry each other. Family alliances become a new kind of business: a way to gain overwhelming power without expending any strength, and also a way to extend territorial possessions. Hiring out one state's troops to another against an enemy they do not share also belongs here. Subjects are used and used up as things to be handled at will.
3 “Standing armies (miles perpetuus) must eventually cease altogether.”
Standing armies constantly threaten other states with war by always appearing ready for it. They provoke these states to outdo one another in the number of armed men, a competition with no limit. The costs eventually make peace even more burdensome than a short war. So standing armies themselves cause wars of aggression, undertaken to get rid of that burden. There is another consideration. Being paid to kill or be killed seems to involve using human beings as mere machines and tools in someone else's hands—the state's. That is hard to reconcile with the rights we have as human beings. It is quite different when citizens voluntarily take part in regular weapons training to protect themselves and their country against attacks from outside. Accumulating a treasury would have the same effect as a standing army. Other states would see it as a threat of war and be driven to launch preventive attacks. Of the three powers, military power, alliance power, and financial power, the last might well be the most reliable tool of war, if its size were not so difficult to discover.
4 “No state debts may be incurred for dealings with other states.”
There is nothing suspect about this resource when a state seeks help, at home or abroad, for its domestic economy: improving roads, establishing new settlements, providing stores against feared crop failures, and similar needs. But it is different when powers use a credit system as a machine against one another. The debts grow without any foreseeable limit, yet payment of current claims is always secure, since not all creditors will demand payment at once. This ingenious invention of a trading people in this century is a dangerous financial power. It is a war chest greater than the treasuries of all other states put together. Only the eventual loss of tax revenues can exhaust it. Even that can be delayed for a long time by stimulating commerce, with its effects in turn on industry and earnings. This makes war easy. Combined with rulers' inclination toward war, which seems ingrained in human nature, it is a major obstacle to perpetual peace. Prohibiting it must therefore be a preliminary article of that peace. There is all the more reason for this because the state's ultimately unavoidable bankruptcy must entangle many other states in losses through no fault of their own. That would be a public violation of their rights. So at least other states have the right to form an alliance against such a state and its pretensions.
5 “No state may use force to interfere in another state's constitution and government.”
What could give it that right? Perhaps the bad example a state sets for another state's subjects? Instead, a state can serve as a warning through the example of the great evils a people has brought on itself by its lawlessness. In general, the bad example one free person sets for another (an offense taken) does not violate the other's rights. There is a case that would not count as such interference. Internal conflict might split a state into two parts, each presenting itself as a separate state and claiming the whole. An outside state could then assist one of them without being charged with interfering in the other's constitution, since there would then be anarchy. But as long as this internal struggle has not been decided, interference by outside powers would violate the rights of an independent people struggling only with its own internal sickness. That interference would itself set a bad example and put every state's self-rule at risk.
6 “No state at war with another may allow itself acts of hostility that must make mutual trust impossible in a future peace. These include employing assassins (percussores) or poisoners (venefici), breaking a surrender agreement, inciting treason (perduellio) in the state it is fighting, and the like.”
These are dishonorable tactics. Even in the middle of a war, some trust in the enemy's way of thinking must remain. Otherwise no peace could be agreed on, and the hostility would turn into a war of extermination (bellum internecinum). War is only the sad last resort in a state of nature, where there is no court able to give a binding judgment. It is a way to assert one's rights by force. Neither side can be declared an unjust enemy, since that would already require a judge's ruling. Instead, the outcome decides which side is in the right, as in a so-called trial by ordeal. Nor can there be a war of punishment (bellum punitivum) between states, since neither is a superior and the other its subordinate. It follows that a war of extermination could destroy both sides and, with them, all right. It would bring perpetual peace only in the great graveyard of the human race. Such a war, and therefore the use of means that lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. The means just mentioned inevitably lead there. Those hellish practices are base in themselves. Once they come into use, they will not stay within the limits of war for long. This applies, for example, to the use of spies (uti exploratoribus), which only exploits the dishonorable conduct of others—something that cannot be eradicated. They will spread into peacetime as well and completely defeat its purpose.
All the laws listed above are objectively, that is, in the intention of those in power, prohibitory laws (leges prohibitivae). But some are strict laws, valid regardless of circumstances (leges strictae). They insist on doing away with the prohibited practice immediately, as in Articles 1, 5, and 6. Others, such as Articles 2, 3, and 4, give those concerned more latitude subjectively, depending on circumstances (leges latae). This does not make them exceptions to the rule of right. It concerns only the rule's application. They permit postponing its implementation without losing sight of the goal. That goal allows a delay, for example, in restoring the freedom that certain states have been deprived of, as described in Article 2. But it does not allow that restoration to be put off forever—as Augustus used to promise, until a date that will never come—and so never carried out. It allows a delay only to avoid acting too hastily and defeating the purpose itself. The prohibition here concerns only the way of acquiring a state, which must no longer be accepted. It does not concern the existing possession. That possession lacks the required legal title. But at the time of its supposed acquisition, all states considered it lawful according to the public opinion of that time2.
1 A hereditary kingdom is not a state that can be inherited by another state. Rather, its right to govern can be inherited by another individual. The state then acquires a ruler. The ruler, as someone who already possesses another kingdom, does not acquire the state.
2 There has been good reason to doubt whether pure reason can have permissive laws (leges permissivae) in addition to commands (leges praeceptivae) and prohibitions (leges prohibitivae). Laws in general provide a basis for the objective practical necessity of an action. Permission, on the other hand, provides a basis for certain actions being optional in practice. A permissive law would therefore require an action that someone cannot be required to perform. This would be a contradiction if the law's object meant the same thing in both respects. But here, in a permissive law, the assumed prohibition concerns only a future way of acquiring a right, for example through inheritance. The exemption from that prohibition, or permission, concerns existing possession. During the transition from the state of nature to a civil society, this possession can continue under a permissive law of natural right. Although unlawful, it is still possession held in good faith (possessio putativa). Yet in the state of nature, possession based on a supposed right is forbidden once it is recognized as such. A similar way of acquiring it is also forbidden in the later civil society, after the transition has taken place. This right to continued possession would not exist if the supposed acquisition had occurred within civil society. In that case, the possession would violate someone's rights and would have to end as soon as its unlawfulness was discovered.
I only wanted to draw the attention of teachers of natural right, in passing, to the concept of a permissive law. Reason naturally encounters this concept when it divides things up systematically. This is especially relevant because civil, statutory law often uses it, but with a difference. The prohibitory law stands on its own. Permission is not incorporated into that law as a limiting condition, as it should be, but is thrown in among the exceptions. The wording then runs: this or that is forbidden, unless number 1, number 2, number 3, continuing without any foreseeable end. Permissions are added to the law only by chance, not according to a principle, but by feeling one's way among the cases that arise. Otherwise the conditions would have had to be included in the formula of the prohibitory law. That would have made it a permissive law at the same time. It is therefore regrettable that the ingenious prize question of the equally wise and perceptive Count von Windischgrätz, which called for precisely this, was dropped so quickly without being solved. The possibility of such a formula, like a mathematical one, is the only genuine test of legislation that remains consistent. Without it, so-called legal certainty will always remain a pious wish. Otherwise we will have only general laws, which hold for the most part, but no universal laws, which hold in every case. Yet the very concept of a law seems to require the latter.
About this section
Preliminary articles is part of Toward Perpetual Peace by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 2 of 10 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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