Part II — Introduction to Teleological Judgment
Original German
Zweiter Theil. Kritik der teleologischen Urtheilskraft.
61 A 267 359 Von der objectiven Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur.
Man hat nach transscendentalen Principien guten Grund, eine subjective Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur in ihren besondern Gesetzen zu der Faßlichkeit für die menschliche Urtheilskraft und der Möglichkeit der Verknüpfung der besondern Erfahrungen in ein System derselben anzunehmen; wo dann unter den vielen Producten derselben auch solche als möglich erwartet werden können, die, als ob sie ganz eigentlich für unsere Urtheilskraft angelegt wären, solche specifische ihr angemessene Formen enthalten, welche durch ihre Mannigfaltigkeit und Einheit die Gemüthskräfte (die im Gebrauche dieses Vermögens im Spiele sind) gleichsam zu stärken und zu unterhalten dienen, und denen man daher den Namen schöner Formen beilegt.
Daß aber Dinge der Natur einander als Mittel zu Zwecken dienen, und ihre Möglichkeit selbst nur durch diese Art von Causalität hinreichend verständlich sei, dazu haben wir gar keinen Grund in der allgemeinen Idee der Natur, als Inbegriffs der Gegenstände der Sinne. Denn im obigen A 268 Falle konnte die Vorstellung der Dinge, weil sie etwas in uns ist, als zu der innerlich zweckmäßigen Stimmung unserer Erkenntnißvermögen geschickt und tauglich, ganz wohl auch a priori gedacht werden; wie aber Zwecke, die nicht die unsrigen sind, und die auch der Natur (welche wir nicht als intelligentes Wesen annehmen) nicht zukommen, doch eine besondere Art der Causalität, wenigstens eine ganz eigne Gesetzmäßigkeit derselben ausmachen können oder sollen, läßt sich a priori gar nicht mit einigem Grunde präsumiren. Was aber noch mehr ist, so kann uns selbst die Erfahrung die Wirklichkeit derselben nicht beweisen; es müßte denn eine Vernünftelei vorhergegangen sein, die nur den Begriff des Zwecks in 360 die Natur der Dinge hineinspielt, aber ihn nicht von den Objecten und ihrer Erfahrungserkenntniß hernimmt, denselben also mehr braucht, die Natur nach der Analogie mit einem subjectiven Grunde der Verknüpfung der Vorstellungen in uns begreiflich zu machen, als sie aus objectiven Gründen zu erkennen.
Überdem ist die objective Zweckmäßigkeit, als Princip der Möglichkeit der Dinge der Natur, so weit davon entfernt, mit dem Begriffe derselben nothwendig zusammenzuhängen: daß sie vielmehr gerade das ist, worauf man sich vorzüglich beruft, um die Zufälligkeit derselben (der Natur) und ihrer Form daraus zu beweisen. Denn wenn man z. B. den Bau eines Vogels, die Höhlung in seinen Knochen, die Lage seiner Flügel A 269 zur Bewegung und des Schwanzes zum Steuern u. s. w. anführt: so sagt man, daß dieses alles nach dem bloßen nexus effectivus in der Natur, ohne noch eine besondere Art der Causalität, nämlich die der Zwecke (nexus finalis), zu Hülfe zu nehmen, im höchsten Grade zufällig sei; d. i. daß sich die Natur, als bloßer Mechanism betrachtet, auf tausendfache Art habe anders bilden können, ohne gerade auf die Einheit nach einem solchen Princip zu stoßen, und man also außer dem Begriffe der Natur, nicht in demselben den mindesten Grund dazu a priori allein anzutreffen hoffen dürfe.
Gleichwohl wird die teleologische Beurtheilung, wenigstens problematisch, mit Recht zur Naturforschung gezogen; aber nur um sie nach der Analogie mit der Causalität nach Zwecken unter Principien der Beobachtung und Nachforschung zu bringen, ohne sich anzumaßen sie darnach zu erklären. Sie gehört also zur reflectirenden, nicht der bestimmenden Urtheilskraft. Der Begriff von Verbindungen und Formen der Natur nach Zwecken ist doch wenigstens ein Princip mehr, die Erscheinungen derselben unter Regeln zu bringen, wo die Gesetze der Causalität nach dem bloßen Mechanism derselben nicht zulangen. Denn wir führen einen teleologischen Grund an, wo wir einem Begriffe vom Objecte, als ob er in der Natur (nicht in uns) befindlich wäre, Causalität in Ansehung eines Objects zueignen, oder vielmehr nach der Analogie einer solchen Causalität A 270 (dergleichen wir in uns antreffen) uns die Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes vorstellen, mithin die Natur als durch eignes Vermögen technisch denken; wogegen, wenn wir ihr nicht eine solche Wirkungsart beilegen, ihre Causalität als blinder Mechanism vorgestellt werden müßte. Würden wir dagegen der Natur absichtlich-wirkende Ursachen unterlegen, mithin der 361 Teleologie nicht bloß ein regulatives Princip für die bloße Beurtheilung der Erscheinungen, denen die Natur nach ihren besondern Gesetzen als unterworfen gedacht werden könne, sondern dadurch auch ein constitutives Princip der Ableitung ihrer Producte von ihren Ursachen zum Grunde legen: so würde der Begriff eines Naturzwecks nicht mehr für die reflectirende, sondern die bestimmende Urtheilskraft gehören; alsdann aber in der That gar nicht der Urtheilskraft eigenthümlich angehören (wie der Begriff der Schönheit als formaler subjectiver Zweckmäßigkeit), sondern als Vernunftbegriff eine neue Causalität in der Naturwissenschaft einführen, die wir doch nur von uns selbst entlehnen und andern Wesen beilegen, ohne sie gleichwohl mit uns als gleichartig annehmen zu wollen.
Musean translation
A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
Second Part. Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.
61 A 267 359 On the Objective Purposiveness of Nature.
According to transcendental principles, we have good reason to assume a subjective purposiveness of nature in its particular laws for their comprehensibility by the human power of judgment, and for the possibility of connecting particular experiences into a system. Among nature's many products, we may then also expect as possible some containing specific forms suited to this power of judgment, as though expressly designed for it. Through their manifoldness and unity, these forms serve, as it were, to strengthen and sustain the mental powers (which are at play in the use of this faculty), and are therefore given the name of beautiful forms.
But that things in nature serve one another as means to ends, and that their possibility itself can be sufficiently understood only through this kind of causality, has no ground at all in the general idea of nature as the sum of the objects of the senses. For in the case above A 268, the representation of things, being something within us, could quite well be thought a priori as suited and adapted to the inwardly purposive attunement of our cognitive faculties. But how ends that are not ours, and do not belong to nature either (which we do not assume to be an intelligent being), can or should nevertheless constitute a special kind of causality, or at least an entirely peculiar lawfulness of it, cannot be presumed a priori on any ground whatever. What is more, even experience cannot prove their actuality to us, unless a piece of specious reasoning has preceded it, merely slipping the concept of an end into 360 the nature of things rather than drawing it from objects and our experiential cognition of them. Thus it uses that concept more to make nature comprehensible by analogy with a subjective ground for connecting representations within us than to cognize nature from objective grounds.
Moreover, objective purposiveness, as a principle of the possibility of things in nature, is so far from being necessarily connected with the concept of them that it is, rather, precisely what people chiefly appeal to in order to prove from it the contingency of nature and its form. For if, for example, we cite the structure of a bird, the hollowness of its bones, the position of its wings A 269 for movement and its tail for steering, and so on, we say that all this is contingent in the highest degree according to the mere nexus effectivus, or connection of efficient causes, in nature, unless we enlist another special kind of causality, namely that of ends (nexus finalis, or connection of final causes). That is, nature, considered as mere mechanism, could have formed itself differently in a thousand ways without hitting upon precisely this unity according to such a principle. We may therefore hope to find even the slightest a priori ground for it only outside the concept of nature, not within it.
Nevertheless, teleological judging is rightly brought into the investigation of nature, at least problematically; but only to bring nature under principles of observation and inquiry by analogy with causality according to ends, without presuming to explain it thereby. It thus belongs to the reflective, not the determining power of judgment. The concept of connections and forms in nature according to ends is at least one more principle for bringing its appearances under rules where the laws of causality according to nature's mere mechanism do not suffice. For we adduce a teleological ground when we attribute causality with respect to an object to a concept of that object, as though the concept were in nature (not in us); or rather, when we represent the possibility of the object to ourselves by analogy with such a causality A 270 (as we find within ourselves), and thus think nature as technical through a capacity of its own. By contrast, if we do not attribute such a way of acting to it, its causality would have to be represented as blind mechanism. But if we were to place causes acting intentionally beneath nature, and thus ground 361 teleology not merely on a regulative principle for the mere judging of appearances, to which nature according to its particular laws could be thought subject, but also on a constitutive principle for deriving its products from their causes, then the concept of a natural end would no longer belong to the reflective but to the determining power of judgment. In that case, however, it would not in fact belong distinctively to the power of judgment at all (as does the concept of beauty as formal subjective purposiveness), but, as a concept of reason, would introduce into natural science a new causality, which we nevertheless borrow only from ourselves and attribute to other beings without wishing to assume that they are of the same kind as we are.
Plain English translation
A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.
Second Part. Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment.
61 A 267 359 On Nature's Objective Purposiveness.
Transcendental principles give us good reason to assume a subjective purposiveness of nature in its particular laws: a suitability to being grasped by the human power of judgment and to the possibility of connecting particular experiences into a system. Among nature's many products, we can therefore expect as possible some that contain specific forms suited to our judgment, as if designed expressly for it. Through their variety and unity these forms serve, as it were, to strengthen and sustain the mental powers engaged in the play of this faculty. We therefore call them beautiful forms.
But the general idea of nature as the totality of objects of sense gives us no basis at all for saying that natural things serve one another as means to ends, or that their very possibility can be adequately understood only through this kind of causality. In the previous A 268 case, the representation of things, being something in us, could quite well be thought a priori as fit and suitable for the internally purposive attunement of our cognitive faculties. But we have no grounds at all for presuming a priori how ends that are not ours, and that do not belong to nature either, since we do not assume nature to be an intelligent being, can or should constitute a special kind of causality, or at least a quite distinctive lawfulness of it. Moreover, even experience cannot prove their actuality to us, unless a piece of reasoning has already smuggled the concept of an end into 360 the nature of things. Such reasoning does not draw that concept from the objects and our empirical cognition of them. It uses it more to make nature understandable by analogy with a subjective ground for connecting representations in us than to cognize nature from objective grounds.
Furthermore, objective purposiveness as a principle of the possibility of natural things is far from being necessarily connected with their concept. It is precisely what people chiefly appeal to in order to prove the contingency of nature and its form. For example, when they cite a bird's structure, its hollow bones, the position of its wings A 269 for movement and its tail for steering, and so on, they say that all this would be highly contingent under nature's mere nexus effectivus, the connection of efficient causes, unless another special kind of causality were brought in: that of ends, the nexus finalis. That is, nature considered as mere mechanism could have formed itself differently in a thousand ways without arriving at unity according to such a principle. So we may hope to find even the slightest a priori ground for this only outside the concept of nature, not within it.
Nevertheless, teleological judging is rightly included in natural investigation, at least as a possibility to consider. But this is only to bring nature under principles of observation and inquiry by analogy with causality according to ends, not to claim to explain it that way. Such judging therefore belongs to the reflective, not the determining, power of judgment. The concept of natural connections and forms according to ends is at least one more principle for bringing nature's appearances under rules where the laws of causality according to mere mechanism do not suffice. We introduce a teleological ground when we attribute causality regarding an object to a concept of that object as though the concept were in nature, not in us. Or rather, we represent the object's possibility by analogy with such causality, A 270 which we find in ourselves, and thus think nature as technical through its own capacity. Without attributing this way of operating to nature, we would have to represent its causality as blind mechanism. But suppose we placed intentionally acting causes beneath nature, thereby making 361 teleology not merely a regulative principle for judging appearances, to which nature in its particular laws could be thought subject, but also a constitutive principle for deriving its products from their causes. Then the concept of a natural end would belong no longer to the reflective but to the determining power of judgment. In fact it would then not belong distinctively to judgment at all, as the concept of beauty as formal subjective purposiveness does. Instead, as a concept of reason, it would introduce a new causality into natural science, one we borrow only from ourselves and attribute to other beings without being willing to assume that they are of the same kind as we are.
About this section
Part II — Introduction to Teleological Judgment is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 17 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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