Section 96
Original German
96 Insofern es der daseyende Wille ist, welcher allein verletzt werden kann, dieser aber im Daseyn in die Sphäre eines quantitativen Umfangs, so wie qualitativer Bestimmungen eingetreten, somit darnach verschieden ist, so macht es eben so einen Unterschied für die objective Seite der Verbrechen aus, ob solches Daseyn und dessen Bestimmtheit überhaupt in ihrem ganzen Umfang, hiemit in der ihrem Begriffe gleichen Unendlichkeit, (wie in Mord, Sclaverey, Religionszwang u. s. f.) oder nur nach einem Theile, so wie nach welcher qualitativen Bestimmung verletzt ist.
Die Stoische Ansicht, daß es nur Eine Tugend und Ein Laster giebt, die Drakonische Gesetzgebung, die jedes Verbrechen mit dem Tode bestraft, wie die Rohheit der formellen Ehre, welche die unendliche Persönlichkeit in jede Verletzung legt, haben dieß gemein, daß sie bey dem abstracten Denken des freyen Willens und der Persönlichkeit stehen bleiben und sie nicht in ihrem concreten und bestimmten Daseyn, das sie als Idee haben muß, nehmen. — Der Unterschied von Raub und Diebstahl bezieht sich auf das qualitative, daß bey jenem Ich auch als gegenwärtiges Bewußtseyn, also als diese subjective Unendlichkeit verletzt und persönliche Gewalt gegen mich verübt ist. — Manche qualitative Bestimmungen, wie die Gefährlichkeit für die öffentliche Sicherheit, haben in den weiter bestimmten Verhältnissen ihren Grund, aber sind auch öfters erst auf dem Umwege der Folgen, statt aus dem Begriffe der Sache, aufgefaßt; — wie eben das gefährlichere Verbrechen für sich in seiner unmittelbaren Beschaffenheit, eine dem Umfange oder der Qualität nach schwerere Verletzung ist. — Die subjective moralische Qualität bezieht sich auf den höhern Unterschied, in wiefern ein Ereigniß und That überhaupt eine Handlung ist, und betrifft deren subjective Natur selbst, wovon nachher.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
96 Insofar as it is the existent will alone that can be violated, and this will, in existence, has entered the sphere of quantitative extent as well as of qualitative determinations, and is accordingly different according to them, it likewise makes a difference for the objective side of crimes whether such existence and its determinacy is violated in its entire extent, and thus in the infinity equal to its concept (as in murder, slavery, religious compulsion, and so on), or only in a part, and in which qualitative determination.
The Stoic view that there is only one virtue and one vice, the Draconian legislation that punishes every crime with death, and the crudeness of formal honor, which places infinite personality in every violation, have this in common, that they stop at the abstract thinking of the free will and of personality, and do not take them in their concrete and determinate existence, which they must have as Idea.—The difference between robbery and theft concerns the qualitative, in that in the former I am violated also as present consciousness, hence as this subjective infinity, and personal force is exercised against me.—Many qualitative determinations, such as danger to public security, have their ground in more developed relations, but are also often grasped only by the detour of consequences, instead of from the concept of the matter; just as the more dangerous crime, in its immediate character, is in itself a graver violation in extent or quality.—The subjective moral quality relates to the higher distinction, to how far an event and deed is in general an action, and concerns its subjective nature itself, of which later.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
96 Only the will that has an existence can be violated. But in existing, the will has entered a sphere of quantitative extent and qualitative determinations, and it varies accordingly. This makes a difference to the objective side of crimes. Its existence and determinate character may be violated in their whole extent, and so in the infinity that matches their concept—as in murder, slavery, religious coercion, and so on—or only in part. It also matters which qualitative determination is violated.
The Stoic view that there is only one virtue and one vice, the Draconian legislation that punishes every crime with death, and the crude approach of formal honor that puts infinite personality into every injury have something in common. They stop at the abstract thought of free will and personality. They do not take personality in the concrete and determinate existence it must have as Idea. The difference between robbery and theft concerns quality: in robbery, I am also violated as a present consciousness, and thus as this subjective infinity, and personal force is used against me. Some qualitative determinations, such as danger to public safety, are grounded in more fully developed relationships. But they are also often grasped only by way of their consequences, instead of from the concept of the matter itself. Indeed, the more dangerous crime is, in itself and in its immediate character, a more serious violation in extent or quality. The subjective moral quality concerns the higher distinction of whether an event or deed is an action at all. It concerns the subjective nature of the action itself. More on this later.
About this section
Section 96 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 98 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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