Section 95
Original German
95 Der erste Zwang als Gewalt von dem Freyen ausgeübt, welche das Daseyn der Freyheit in seinem concreten Sinne, das Recht als Recht verletzt, ist Verbrechen, — ein negativ-unendliches Urtheil in seinem vollständigen Sinne, (siehe meine Logik IIter B. S. 99.) durch welches nicht nur das Besondere, die Subsumtion einer Sache unter meinen Willen (§. 85.), sondern zugleich das Allgemeine, Unendliche im Prädicate des Meinigen, die Rechtsfähigkeit und zwar ohne die Vermittlung meiner Meynung (wie im Betrug) (§. 88.), eben so gegen diese negirt wird, — die Sphäre des peinlichen Rechts.
Das Recht, dessen Verletzung das Verbrechen ist, hat zwar bis hieher nur erst die Gestaltungen, die wir gesehen haben, das Verbrechen hiemit auch zunächst nur die auf diese Bestimmungen sich beziehende nähere Bedeutung. Aber das in diesen Formen Substantielle ist das Allgemeine, das in seiner weitern Entwickelung und Gestaltung dasselbe bleibt und daher eben so dessen Verletzung, das Verbrechen, seinem Begriffe nach. Den besondern, weiter bestimmten Inhalt, z. B. in Meyneid, Staatsverbrechen, Münz-Wechsel-Verfälschung u. s. f. betrifft daher auch die im folgenden §. zu berücksichtigende Bestimmung.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
95 The first compulsion, exercised as force by a free being, which violates the existence of freedom in its concrete sense, right as right, is crime—a negative infinite judgment in its full sense (see my Logic, vol. II, p. 99), by which not only the particular, the subsumption of a thing under my will (§ 85), is negated, but at the same time the universal, the infinite in the predicate of the mine, the capacity for right, and indeed without the mediation of my opinion (as in fraud) (§ 88)—the sphere of criminal law.
The right whose violation is crime has so far indeed only the shapes that we have seen, and crime accordingly has so far only the closer meaning relating to these determinations. But what is substantial in these forms is the universal, which remains the same in its further development and shaping, and so likewise does its violation, crime, according to its concept. The particular, further determined content, for example in perjury, crimes against the state, counterfeiting of coin and bills of exchange, and so on, is therefore also the concern of the determination to be considered in the following section.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
95 A first coercion, exercised as force by a free being, violates the existence of freedom in its concrete sense: right as right. It is crime—a negative-infinite judgment in its full sense (see my Logic IIter B. S. 99). What is negated is not just the particular—the placing of a thing under my will (§ 85)—but also the universal and infinite element in the predicate “mine”: my capacity to have rights. And this happens without my opinion acting as an intermediary, as it does in fraud (§ 88); it happens even against that opinion. This is the sphere of criminal law.
So far, the right that crime violates has taken only the forms we have seen. Crime, accordingly, has for now only the more specific meaning connected with these determinations. But what is substantial in these forms is the universal. This remains the same through its further development and formation, as does, therefore, its violation—crime—in its concept. The determination to be considered in the next section also applies, then, to the particular, more fully determined content found in perjury, crimes against the state, counterfeiting coins or bills of exchange, and so on.
About this section
Section 95 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 97 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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