Section 71
Original German
Uebergang vom Eigenthum zum Vertrage.
71 Das Daseyn ist als bestimmtes Seyn wesentlich Seyn für anderes; (siehe oben Anmerk. zu §. 48.) das Eigenthum, nach der Seite, daß es ein Daseyn als äußerliche Sache ist, ist für andere Aeußerlichkeiten und im Zusammenhange dieser Nothwendigkeit und Zufälligkeit. Aber als Daseyn des Willens ist es als für anderes nur für den Willen einer andern Person. Diese Beziehung von Willen auf Willen ist der eigenthümliche und wahrhafte Boden, in welchem die Freyheit Daseyn hat. Diese Vermittlung, Eigenthum nicht mehr nur vermittelst einer Sache und meines subjectiven Willens zu haben, sondern eben so vermittelst eines andern Willens, und hiemit in einem gemeinsamen Willen zu haben, macht die Sphäre des Vertrags aus.
Es ist durch die Vernunft eben so nothwendig, daß die Menschen in Vertrags-Verhältnisse eingehen, — schenken, tauschen, handeln u. s. f. als daß sie Eigenthum besitzen (§. 45. Anm.). Wenn für ihr Bewußtseyn das Bedürfniß überhaupt, das Wohlwollen, der Nutzen u. s. f. es ist, was sie zu Verträgen führt, so ist es an sich die Vernunft, nehmlich die Idee des reellen (d. i. nur im Willen vorhandenen) Daseyns der freyen Persönlichkeit. — Der Vertrag setzt voraus, daß die darein tretenden sich als Personen und Eigenthümer anerkennen; da er ein Verhältniß des objectiven Geistes ist, so ist das Moment der Anerkennung schon in ihm enthalten und vorausgesetzt. (vergl. §. 35. 57. Anmerk.)
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
Transition from Property to Contract
71 Existence, as determinate being, is essentially being for another (see above, the Remark to § 48.). Property, on the side on which it is an existence as an external thing, is for other external things, and stands within their nexus of necessity and contingency. But as the existence of the will, insofar as it is for another, it is only for the will of another person. This relation of will to will is the distinctive and true ground on which freedom has existence. This mediation—having property no longer merely through a thing and my subjective will, but equally through another will, and thus having it within a common will—constitutes the sphere of contract.
It is just as necessary through reason that people enter into contractual relations—give, exchange, trade, and so forth—as that they possess property (§ 45. Remark). If, for their consciousness, it is need in general, benevolence, advantage, and so forth that leads them to contracts, in itself it is reason: namely, the Idea of the real existence—that is, existence present only in the will—of free personality.—Contract presupposes that those entering it recognize one another as persons and property owners. Since it is a relation of objective spirit, the moment of recognition is already contained and presupposed within it (compare § 35. 57. Remarks).
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
Transition from Property to Contract
71 Existence, as determinate being, is essentially being for something else (see the remark above on § 48). Insofar as property exists as an external thing, it exists for other external things and stands within their connections of necessity and chance. But as the existence of the will, it exists for something else only when that something is the will of another person. This relationship of will to will is the distinctive and true ground in which freedom exists. Property is now mediated not just by a thing and my subjective will, but also by another will, and so is held within a shared will. This mediation makes up the sphere of contract.
Reason makes it just as necessary for people to enter contractual relationships—to give, exchange, trade, and so on—as to own property (§ 45, remark). Their consciousness may see need in general, goodwill, advantage, and so on as what leads them to make contracts. But in itself the basis is reason: the Idea of free personality having real existence, that is, existence present only in the will. A contract presupposes that those entering it recognize one another as persons and property owners. Since it is a relationship of objective spirit, the element of recognition is already contained and presupposed in it (compare §§ 35 and 57, remarks).
About this section
Section 71 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 73 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.