Section 66
Original German
66 Unveräußerlich sind daher diejenigen Güter, oder vielmehr substantiellen Bestimmungen, so wie das Recht an sie unverjährbar, welche meine eigenste Person und das allgemeine Wesen meines Selbstbewußtseyns ausmachen, wie meine Persönlichkeit überhaupt, meine allgemeine Willensfreiheit, Sittlichkeit, Religion.
Daß das, was der Geist seinem Begriffe nach oder an sich ist, auch im Daseyn und für sich sey, (somit Person, des Eigenthums fähig sey, Sittlichkeit, Religion habe) — diese Idee ist selbst sein Begriff; (als causa sui, das ist, als freye Ursache, ist er solches, cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens, Spinoza Eth S. I. Def. I.). In eben diesem Begriffe, nur durch sich selbst und als unendliche Rückkehr in sich aus der natürlichen Unmittelbarkeit seines Daseyns, das zu seyn, was er ist, liegt die Möglichkeit des Gegensatzes zwischen dem, was er nur an sich und nicht auch für sich ist, (§. 57.) so wie umgekehrt zwischen dem, was er nur für sich, nicht an sich ist (im Willen das Böse); — und hierin die Möglichkeit der Entäußerung der Persönlichkeit und seines substantiellen Seyns — diese Entäußerung geschehe auf eine bewußtlose oder ausdrückliche Weise. — Beyspiele von Entäußerung der Persönlichkeit sind die Sclaverey, Leibeigenschaft, Unfähigkeit Eigenthum zu besitzen, die Unfreyheit desselben u. s. f., Entäußerung der intelligenten Vernünftigkeit, Moralität, Sittlichkeit, Religion kommt vor im Aberglauben, in der Andern eingeräumten Autorität und Vollmacht, mir, was ich für Handlungen begehen solle, (wenn einer sich ausdrücklich zum Raube, Morde u. s. f. oder zur Möglichkeit von Verbrechen verdingt) mir, was Gewissenspflicht, religiöse Wahrheit sey u. s. f. zu bestimmen und vorzuschreiben. — Das Recht an solches Unveräußerliche ist unverjährbar, denn der Akt, wodurch ich von meiner Persönlichkeit und substantiellem Wesen Besitz nehme, mich zu einem Rechts- und Zurechnungsfähigen, Moralischen, Religiösen mache, entnimmt diese Bestimmungen eben der Aeußerlichkeit, die allein ihnen die Fähigkeit gab, im Besitz eines andern zu seyn. Mit diesem Aufheben der Aeußerlichkeit fällt die Zeitbestimmung und alle Gründe weg, die aus meinem frühern Consens oder Gefallenlassen genommen werden können. Diese Rückkehr meiner in mich selbst, wodurch Ich mich als Idee, als rechtliche und moralische Person existirend mache, hebt das bisherige Verhältniß und das Unrecht auf, das Ich und der Andere meinem Begriff und Vernunft angethan hat, die unendliche Existenz des Selbstbewußtseyns als ein Aeußerliches behandeln lassen und behandelt zu haben. — Diese Rückkehr in mich deckt den Widerspruch auf, Andern meine Rechtsfähigkeit, Sittlichkeit, Religiosität in Besitz gegeben zu haben, was ich selbst nicht besaß, und was sobald ich es besitze, eben wesentlich nur als das Meinige und nicht als ein Aeußerliches existirt. —
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
66 Those goods—or rather, substantial determinations—that constitute my very own person and the universal essence of my self-consciousness, such as my personality in general, my universal freedom of will, ethical life, and religion, are therefore inalienable, and the right to them is not subject to prescription.
That what spirit is according to its concept, or in itself, should also be in existence and for itself—that it should thus be a person, capable of property, and possess ethical life and religion—this Idea is itself its concept. As cause of itself, that is, as free cause, it is that “whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing” (Spinoza Eth S. I. Def. I.). In this very concept of being what it is only through itself and as an infinite return into itself out of the natural immediacy of its existence lies the possibility of the opposition between what it is only in itself and not also for itself (§ 57.), and, conversely, what it is only for itself and not in itself—in the will, evil. Herein lies the possibility of spirit's alienating its personality and substantial being, whether this alienation happens unconsciously or explicitly.—Examples of alienating personality are slavery, serfdom, incapacity to own property, the unfreedom of property, and so forth. Alienation of intelligent rationality, morality, ethical life, and religion occurs in superstition, and in conceding to others the authority and power to determine and prescribe for me what actions I should perform—as when someone expressly hires himself out for robbery, murder, and so forth, or for the possibility of crimes—and what is a duty of conscience, religious truth, and so forth.—The right to such inalienable things is not subject to prescription. For the act by which I take possession of my personality and substantial essence, making myself capable of rights and accountability, moral and religious, removes these determinations from the very externality that alone made them capable of being in another's possession. With this sublation of externality, the determination of time falls away, and with it every ground that might be drawn from my earlier consent or acquiescence. This return of myself into myself, through which I bring myself into existence as Idea, as a legal and moral person, sublates the previous relation and the wrong that I and the other have done to my concept and reason: my having allowed the infinite existence of self-consciousness to be treated as something external, and the other's having treated it so.—This return into myself reveals the contradiction in having given others possession of my capacity for rights, my ethical life, and my religiousness: something I did not myself possess, and which, as soon as I possess it, exists essentially only as mine, not as something external.—
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
66 Those goods—or rather, substantial determinations—that make up my very own person and the universal essence of my self-consciousness therefore cannot be given away. Nor can the right to them be lost through prescription. They include my personality in general, my universal freedom of will, ethical life, and religion.
That spirit also is, in existence and for itself, what it is in its concept or in itself—and so is a person, is capable of owning property, and has ethical life and religion—this Idea is itself spirit's concept. As the cause of itself—that is, as a free cause—it is that “whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing” (Spinoza Eth S. I. Def. I.). This very concept means being what it is only through itself, as an infinite return into itself from the natural immediacy of its existence. It contains the possibility of an opposition between what spirit is only in itself and not also for itself (§ 57), and, conversely, what it is only for itself and not in itself—in the will, evil. Here, too, lies the possibility of giving away personality and its substantial being, whether unconsciously or explicitly.—Examples of giving away personality are slavery, serfdom, inability to own property, restrictions on the freedom of property, and so forth. Giving away intelligent rationality, morality, ethical life, and religion occurs in superstition, and in granting others the authority and power to determine and prescribe what actions I should commit (as when someone expressly hires themselves out for robbery, murder, and so forth, or for the possibility of crimes), what my duty of conscience is, what religious truth is, and so forth.—The right to such things that cannot be given away cannot be lost through prescription. For the act by which I take possession of my personality and substantial essence, making myself capable of rights and responsibility, moral and religious, removes these determinations from the externality that alone made it possible for someone else to possess them. Ending this externality also does away with the relevance of time and with every reason that could be drawn from my earlier consent or acceptance. This return of myself into myself, by which I give myself existence as the Idea, as a person with rights and morality, ends the previous relationship. It also ends the wrong that I and the other person have done to my concept and reason: allowing the infinite existence of self-consciousness to be treated, and treating it, as something external.—This return into myself reveals the contradiction in having given others possession of my capacity for rights, ethical life, and religious commitment—something I did not possess myself, and something that, as soon as I possess it, exists essentially only as my own and not as something external.
About this section
Section 66 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 68 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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