Section 64

64 The form given to a possession, and the sign, are themselves external circumstances without the subjective presence of the will, which alone constitutes their meaning and value. But this presence, which consists in use, employment, or some other expression of the will, falls within time. In relation to time, objectivity consists in the continuance of this expression. Without it, the thing, abandoned by the actuality of will and possession, becomes ownerless. I therefore lose or acquire property through prescription.

Prescription has therefore not been introduced into right merely from an external consideration contrary to strict right: the wish to put an end to the disputes and confusions that old claims would bring into the security of property, and so forth. Rather, prescription rests on the determination of the reality of property, on the necessity that the will to have something should express itself.—Public monuments are national property; or rather, like works of art in general in respect of use, they count, through the soul of remembrance and honor dwelling within them, as living and independent ends. But when abandoned by this soul, they become, in this respect, ownerless for a nation, and pass into contingent private possession, as, for example, the Greek and Egyptian works of art in Turkey.—The right of private ownership held by a writer's family in his productions lapses through prescription for a similar reason. They become ownerless in the sense that—by a course opposite to that of those monuments—they pass into common property, and, according to the particular use of the thing, into contingent private possession.—Mere land dedicated to nonuse for all eternity, whether as burial ground or simply as land, contains an empty arbitrary choice with no present actuality. In violating it, nothing actual is violated; respect for it therefore cannot be guaranteed either.

64 The form given to a possession and the sign placed on it are themselves external circumstances, without the subjective presence of the will. Only that presence gives them their meaning and value. But this presence, which consists in using the thing or otherwise expressing the will, takes place in time. In relation to time, objectivity consists in this expression continuing. Without it, the thing becomes ownerless, abandoned by the actual reality of will and possession. I therefore lose or acquire property through prescription.

Prescription was therefore not introduced into law merely for an external consideration opposed to strict right: the wish to cut off disputes and confusion that old claims would introduce into the security of property, and so forth. Rather, prescription rests on the determination of property's reality, on the requirement that the will to have something must express itself.—Public monuments are national property. More precisely, like works of art in general considered in terms of their use, they count as living, independent ends because of the soul of memory and honor that inhabits them. But when this soul abandons them, they become, in this respect, ownerless for a nation, and chance private possessions, like the Greek and Egyptian works of art in Turkey.—The private property right of an author's family in the author's works expires on similar grounds. The works become ownerless in the sense that, in the opposite way to those monuments, they pass into common ownership, and, according to the particular use made of the thing, into chance private possession.—Bare land dedicated as graves, or even simply on its own, for all time to nonuse, contains an empty, no-longer-present arbitrary choice. Violating it violates nothing actual, so respect for it cannot be guaranteed either.