Section 52
Original German
52 Die Besitzergreifung macht die Materie der Sache zu meinem Eigenthum, da die Materie für sich nicht ihr eigen ist.
Die Materie leistet mir Widerstand, (und sie ist nur dieß, mir Widerstand zu leisten) d. i. sie zeigt mir ihr abstractes Fürsichseyn nur als abstractem Geiste, nemlich als sinnlichem, (verkehrter Weise hält das sinnliche Vorstellen das sinnliche Seyn des Geistes für das Concrete und das Vernünftige für das Abstracte) aber in Beziehung auf den Willen und Eigenthum hat dieß Fürsichseyn der Materie keine Wahrheit. Das Besitzergreifen als äußerliches Thun, wodurch das allgemeine Zueignungsrecht der Naturdinge verwirklicht wird, tritt in die Bedingungen der physischen Stärke, der List, der Geschicklichkeit, der Vermittlung überhaupt, wodurch man körperlicherweise etwas habhaft wird. Nach der qualitativen Verschiedenheit der Naturdinge hat deren Bemächtigung und Besitznahme einen unendlich vielfachen Sinn und eine eben so unendliche Beschränkung und Zufälligkeit. Ohnehin ist die Gattung und das Elementarische als solches, nicht Gegenstand der persönlichen Einzelnheit; um dieß zu werden und ergriffen werden zu können, muß es erst vereinzelt werden (ein Athemzug der Luft, ein Schluck Wassers). An der Unmöglichkeit, eine äußerliche Gattung als solche und das Elementarische in Besitz nehmen zu können, ist nicht die äußerliche physische Unmöglichkeit als das Letzte zu betrachten, sondern daß die Person als Wille sich als Einzelnheit bestimmt und als Person zugleich unmittelbare Einzelnheit ist, hiemit sich auch als solche zum Aeußerlichen als zu Einzelnheiten verhält. (§. 13. Anm. §. 43.) — Die Bemächtigung und das äußerliche Besitzen wird daher auch auf unendliche Weise mehr oder weniger unbestimmt und unvollkommen. Immer aber ist die Materie nicht ohne wesentliche Form und nur durch diese ist sie Etwas. Je mehr ich mir diese Form aneigne, desto mehr komme ich auch in den wirklichen Besitz der Sache. Das Verzehren von Nahrungsmitteln ist eine Durchdringung und Veränderung ihrer qualitativen Natur, durch die sie vor dem Verzehren das sind, was sie sind. Die Ausbildung meines organischen Körpers zu Geschicklichkeiten, so wie die Bildung meines Geistes ist gleichfalls eine mehr oder weniger vollkommene Besitznahme und Durchdringung; der Geist ist es, den ich mir am vollkommensten zu eigen machen kann. Aber diese Wirklichkeit der Besitzergreifung ist verschieden von dem Eigenthum, als solchem, welches durch den freyen Willen vollendet ist. Gegen ihn hat die Sache nicht ein Eigenthümliches für sich zurückbehalten, wenn schon im Besitze, als einem äußerlichen Verhältniß, noch eine Aeußerlichkeit zurückbleibt. Ueber das leere Abstractum einer Materie ohne Eigenschaften, welches im Eigenthum außer mir und der Sache eigen bleiben soll, muß der Gedanke Meister werden.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
52 Taking possession makes the matter of the thing my property, since matter, for itself, does not belong to itself.
Matter resists me—and it is only this: resistance to me. That is, it shows me its abstract being-for-itself only insofar as I am abstract spirit, namely sensuous spirit. (Sensuous representation perversely takes spirit's sensuous being for the concrete and the rational for the abstract.) But in relation to the will and property, this being-for-itself of matter has no truth. Taking possession, as an external act through which the universal right to appropriate natural things is actualized, enters into the conditions of physical strength, cunning, skill, and mediation in general by which one gets bodily hold of something. Given the qualitative diversity of natural things, seizing and taking possession of them has infinitely varied meanings and equally infinite limitations and contingency. In any case, the genus and the elemental as such are not an object of personal individuality; to become such an object and be capable of being seized, they must first be individualized—a breath of air, a mouthful of water. In the impossibility of taking possession of an external genus as such and of the elemental, the ultimate consideration is not external physical impossibility. It is, rather, that the person as will determines themselves as individuality and, as a person, is at the same time immediate individuality, and thus also relates as such to external things as individual things (§ 13. Anm. § 43.).—Seizing and externally possessing are therefore also, in endlessly varied ways, more or less indeterminate and incomplete. But matter is never without essential form, and only through this is it something. The more I appropriate this form, the more I also come into actual possession of the thing. Consuming food is a penetration and alteration of its qualitative nature, through which, before consumption, it is what it is. Training my organic body in skills, like the cultivation of my spirit, is likewise a more or less complete taking of possession and penetration; it is spirit that I can make most perfectly my own. But this actuality of taking possession differs from property as such, which is completed through the free will. In the face of this will, the thing has retained nothing of its own for itself, even though in possession, as an external relation, an externality still remains. Thought must master the empty abstraction of a matter without properties that is supposed, within property, to remain outside me and belong to the thing itself.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
52 Taking possession makes the matter of the thing my property, since matter does not belong to itself.
Matter resists me (and this resistance to me is all it is). That is, it shows its abstract being-for-itself only to me as abstract spirit, namely, as spirit that senses. (Sense-based thinking gets things backward: it takes spirit's sensory existence to be concrete, and what is rational to be abstract.) But in relation to the will and property, this being-for-itself of matter has no truth. Taking possession is an external action that puts into effect the universal right to appropriate natural things. As such, it is subject to the conditions of physical strength, cunning, skill, and the various means by which we physically get hold of something. Because natural things differ in quality, getting control of them and taking possession of them have infinitely many meanings, limitations, and contingencies. Besides, a kind of thing, or an element as such, is not an object for a person's individuality. To become one and be grasped, it must first be made into an individual thing—a breath of air, a swallow of water. It is impossible to take possession of an external kind as such or of an element. But the final point here is not an external, physical impossibility. Rather, as will, the person determines itself as an individual, and as a person it is also immediately an individual. It therefore also relates as an individual to external things as individuals. (§ 13, Remark; § 43.)—So gaining control and possessing externally remain more or less indefinite and incomplete in infinitely many ways. Still, matter is never without an essential form, and only through this form is it something. The more I make this form my own, the more I come into actual possession of the thing. Eating food penetrates and changes the qualitative nature that makes it what it is before it is eaten. Training my organic body in skills, like educating my spirit, is also a more or less complete taking possession and penetration. It is my spirit that I can most completely make my own. But this actual reality of taking possession differs from property as such, which is made complete by the free will. Against this will, the thing has kept nothing of its own for itself, even though possession, as an external relationship, still leaves something external. Thought must master the empty abstraction of matter without properties that is supposed, within property, to remain outside me and belong to the thing itself.
About this section
Section 52 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 54 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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