Section 49
Original German
49 Im Verhältnisse zu äußerlichen Dingen ist das Vernünftige, daß Ich Eigenthum besitze; die Seite des Besondern aber begreift die subjectiven Zwecke, Bedürfnisse, die Willkühr, die Talente, äußere Umstände u. s. f. (§. 45.) hievon hängt der Besitz bloß als solcher ab, aber diese besondere Seite ist in dieser Sphäre der abstracten Persönlichkeit noch nicht identisch mit der Freyheit gesetzt. Was und wie viel Ich besitze, ist daher eine rechtliche Zufälligkeit.
In der Persönlichkeit sind die Mehrern Personen, wenn man hier von Mehrern sprechen will, wo noch kein solcher Unterschied statt findet, gleich. Dieß ist aber ein leerer tautologischer Satz; denn die Person ist als das Abstracte eben das noch nicht Besonderte und in bestimmtem Unterschiede gesetzte. — Gleichheit ist die abstracte Identität des Verstandes, auf welche das reflectirende Denken und damit die Mittelmäßigkeit des Geistes überhaupt, zunächst verfällt, wenn ihm die Beziehung der Einheit auf einen Unterschied vorkommt. Hier wäre die Gleichheit nur Gleichheit der abstracten Personen als solcher, außer welcher eben damit Alles, was den Besitz betrifft, dieser Boden der Ungleichheit, fällt. — Die bisweilen gemachte Foderung der Gleichheit in Austheilung des Erdbodens oder gar des weiter vorhandenen Vermögens, ist ein um so leererer und oberflächlicherer Verstand, als in diese Besonderheit nicht nur die äußere Naturzufälligkeit, sondern auch der ganze Umfang der geistigen Natur in ihrer unendlichen Besonderheit und Verschiedenheit, so wie in ihrer zum Organismus entwickelten Vernunft fällt. — Von einer Ungerechtigkeit der Natur über ungleiches Austheilen des Besitzes und Vermögens kann nicht gesprochen werden, denn die Natur ist nicht frey, und darum weder gerecht, noch ungerecht. Daß alle Menschen ihr Auskommen für ihre Bedürfnisse haben sollen, ist theils ein moralischer und, in dieser Unbestimmtheit ausgesprochen, zwar wohlgemeynter, aber, wie das blos Wohlgemeynte überhaupt, nichts Objectives seyender Wunsch, theils ist Auskommen etwas anders als Besitz und gehört einer andern Sphäre, der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, an.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
49 In relation to external things, what is rational is that I possess property. The aspect of the particular, however, comprises subjective ends, needs, arbitrary choice, talents, external circumstances, and so forth (§ 45.); possession merely as such depends on these, but this particular aspect has not yet, in this sphere of abstract personality, been posited as identical with freedom. What and how much I possess is therefore a contingency in terms of right.
In personality, the several persons—if we wish to speak of several here, where no such difference yet obtains—are equal. But this is an empty, tautological proposition, since the person, as what is abstract, is precisely what is not yet particularized and posited in a determinate difference.—Equality is the abstract identity of the understanding, upon which reflective thought, and thus mediocrity of spirit in general, first alights when faced with the relation of unity to a difference. Here equality would be only the equality of abstract persons as such; everything concerning possession, this ground of inequality, thereby falls outside it.—The demand sometimes made for equality in the distribution of land, or even of all other existing wealth, is an all the emptier and more superficial exercise of the understanding, since this particularity encompasses not only external natural contingency, but also the entire scope of spiritual nature in its infinite particularity and diversity, as well as in its reason developed into an organism.—We cannot speak of an injustice of nature in the unequal distribution of possessions and wealth, for nature is not free, and is therefore neither just nor unjust. That all human beings should have the means to meet their needs is, in part, a moral wish, and, expressed with this indeterminacy, well-meant indeed, but, like what is merely well-meant in general, nothing objective; in part, the means of subsistence are something different from possession and belong to another sphere, that of civil society.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
49 In relation to external things, what is rational is that I own property. But the particular side includes subjective purposes, needs, choice, talents, external circumstances, and so on (§ 45.). Possession merely as such depends on these. In this sphere of abstract personality, however, this particular side is not yet posited as identical with freedom. What and how much I possess is therefore legally contingent.
In personality, the several persons are equal—if we want to speak of several here, where no such distinction yet exists. But this is an empty tautology. As something abstract, the person is precisely what has not yet been particularized and posited in a definite distinction. Equality is the abstract identity of the understanding. It is what reflective thinking, and with it mediocrity of spirit in general, first falls back on when faced with the relation of unity to a difference. Here equality would only be the equality of abstract persons as such. Everything concerning possession—that ground of inequality—therefore falls outside it. The demand sometimes made for equality in the division of land, or even of other available wealth, is an all the emptier and more superficial product of the understanding because this particular sphere includes not only external natural contingencies but also the entire range of spiritual nature, in its infinite particularity and diversity and in its reason developed into an organized whole. We cannot speak of injustice in nature over its unequal distribution of possessions and wealth. Nature is not free and is therefore neither just nor unjust. The demand that everyone should have enough to meet their needs is, on one side, a moral wish. Expressed in this indeterminate way, it is well meant but, like the merely well-meant in general, has no objective reality. On the other side, having enough is different from possession and belongs to another sphere, civil society.
About this section
Section 49 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 51 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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