Section 48
Original German
48 Der Körper, in so fern er unmittelbares Daseyn ist, ist er dem Geiste nicht angemessen; um williges Organ und beseeltes Mittel desselben zu seyn, muß er erst von ihm in Besitz genommen werden. (§. 57.) — Aber für andere bin ich wesentlich ein Freyes in meinem Körper, wie ich ihn unmittelbar habe.
Nur weil Ich als Freyes im Körper lebendig bin, darf dieses lebendige Daseyn nicht zum Lastthiere misbraucht werden. In so fern Ich lebe, ist meine Seele (der Begriff und höher das Freye) und der Leib nicht geschieden, dieser ist das Daseyn der Freyheit und Ich empfinde in ihm. Es ist daher nur ideeloser, sophistischer Verstand, welcher die Unterscheidung machen kann, daß das Ding an sich, die Seele, nicht berührt oder angegriffen werde, wenn der Körper mishandelt und die Existenz der Person der Gewalt eines andern unterworfen wird. Ich kann mich aus meiner Existenz in mich zurückziehen und sie zur äußerlichen machen, — die besondere Empfindung aus mir hinaushalten und in den Fesseln frey seyn. Aber dieß ist mein Wille, für den andern bin Ich in meinem Körper; frey für den andern bin ich nur als frey im Daseyn, ist ein identischer Satz. (s. meine Wissensch. der Logik 1. B. S. 49. f. f.) Meinem Körper von Andern angethane Gewalt ist Mir angethane Gewalt.
Daß, weil Ich empfinde, die Berührung und Gewalt gegen meinen Körper mich unmittelbar als wirklich und gegenwärtig berührt, macht den Unterschied zwischen persönlicher Beleidigung und zwischen Verletzung meines äußern Eigenthums, als in welchem mein Wille nicht in dieser unmittelbaren Gegenwart und Wirklichkeit ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
48 Insofar as the body is immediate existence, it is not adequate to spirit; to be spirit's willing organ and ensouled instrument, it must first be taken into possession by spirit (§ 57.).—But for others I am essentially a free being in my body, as I immediately have it.
Only because I am alive in the body as a free being must this living existence not be abused as a beast of burden. Insofar as I live, my soul (the concept and, at a higher level, what is free) and my body are not separate; the body is the existence of freedom, and in it I feel. It is therefore only an understanding devoid of the Idea and given to sophistry that can draw the distinction that the thing in itself, the soul, is not touched or attacked when the body is maltreated and the person's existence subjected to another's force. I can withdraw from my existence into myself and make it external—hold particular sensation outside myself and be free in chains. But this is my will; for the other, I am in my body. To say that I am free for the other only as free in existence is to state an identity. (s. meine Wissensch. der Logik 1. B. S. 49. f. f.) Violence done to my body by others is violence done to me.
Because I feel, contact with and violence against my body affect me immediately as actual and present. This constitutes the difference between an injury to the person and an injury to my external property, in which my will is not present in this immediate actuality and presence.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
48 As immediate existence, the body is not adequate to spirit. To become its willing organ and animated instrument, the body must first be taken into possession by spirit (§ 57.). But for others I am essentially a free being in my body as I immediately have it.
Only because I am alive in my body as a free being must this living existence not be misused as a beast of burden. Insofar as I live, my soul—the concept and, at a higher level, what is free—and my body are not separate. The body is the existence of freedom, and I feel in it. Only a sophistical understanding devoid of the Idea can therefore claim that the thing in itself, the soul, is not touched or attacked when the body is mistreated and the person’s existence subjected to another’s power. I can withdraw into myself from my existence and make it external to me. I can keep a particular sensation outside myself and be free in chains. But this is my will. For the other person, I am in my body. “I am free for another only as free in existence” is a statement of identity (s. meine Wissensch. der Logik 1. B. S. 49. f. f.). Violence that others do to my body is violence done to me.
Because I feel, touching my body or doing violence to it touches me immediately as actual and present. This makes the difference between a personal offense and an injury to my external property, in which my will is not immediately present and actual in this way.
About this section
Section 48 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 50 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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