Section 337
Original German
337 Das substantielle Wohl des Staats ist sein Wohl als eines besondern Staats in seinem bestimmten Interesse und Zustande und den eben so eigenthümlichen äußern Umständen nebst dem besonderen Traktatenverhältnisse; die Regierung ist somit eine besondere Weisheit, nicht die allgemeine Vorsehung (vergl. §. 324. Anm.) — so wie der Zweck im Verhältnisse zu andern Staaten und das Princip für die Gerechtigkeit der Kriege und Tractate, nicht ein allgemeiner (philanthropischer) Gedanke, sondern das wirklich gekränkte oder bedrohte Wohl in seiner bestimmten Besonderheit ist.
Es ist zu einer Zeit der Gegensatz von Moral und Politik, und die Foderung, daß die zweyte der erstern gemäß sey, viel besprochen worden. Hieher gehört nur darüber überhaupt zu bemerken, daß das Wohl eines Staats eine ganz andere Berechtigung hat als das Wohl des Einzelnen, und die sittliche Substanz, der Staat, ihr Daseyn, d. i. ihr Recht unmittelbar in einer nicht abstracten, sondern in concreter Existenz hat, und daß nur diese concrete Existenz, nicht einer der vielen für moralische Gebote gehaltenen allgemeinen Gedanken, Princip ihres Handelns und Benehmens seyn kann. Die Ansicht von dem vermeyntlichen Unrechte, das die Politik immer in diesem vermeyntlichen Gegensatze haben soll, beruht noch vielmehr auf der Seichtigkeit der Vorstellungen von Moralität, von der Natur des Staats und dessen Verhältnisse zum moralischen Gesichtspunkte.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
337 The substantial welfare of the state is its welfare as a particular state, in its determinate interest and condition and in the equally peculiar external circumstances together with its particular treaty relations; government is thus a particular wisdom, not universal providence (compare § 324, Remark)—just as the end in relation to other states and the principle for the justice of wars and treaties is not a universal (philanthropic) thought, but the welfare actually injured or threatened in its determinate particularity.
At one time the opposition between morality and politics, and the demand that the latter conform to the former, was much discussed. All that belongs here is to remark in general that the welfare of a state has an entirely different entitlement from the welfare of the individual, and that the ethical substance, the state, has its existence, that is, its right, immediately in a concrete existence, not an abstract one, and that only this concrete existence, not one of the many universal thoughts held to be moral commandments, can be the principle of its action and conduct. The view of the supposed wrong that politics is always said to commit in this supposed opposition rests far more on the shallowness of ideas about morality, about the nature of the state, and about its relation to the moral standpoint.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
337 The substantial welfare of the state is its welfare as a particular state, in its definite interest and condition, in the equally peculiar outer circumstances, and in its particular relation of treaties. The government is therefore a particular wisdom, not general providence (compare § 324, Remark). In the same way, the purpose in relation to other states, and the principle for the justice of wars and treaties, is not a general (philanthropic) thought. It is the welfare that has really been hurt or threatened, in its definite particularity.
At one time there was much discussion of the opposition between morals and politics, and of the demand that politics conform to morals. Here it is enough to remark in general that the welfare of a state has a quite different entitlement from the welfare of an individual. The ethical substance, the state, has its existence, that is, its right, immediately in a concrete existence and not an abstract one. Only this concrete existence, and not one of the many general thoughts held to be moral commandments, can be the principle of its acting and conduct. The view of the supposed wrong that politics is always said to commit in this supposed opposition rests rather on the shallowness of ideas about morality, about the nature of the state and about its relation to the moral standpoint.
About this section
Section 337 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 339 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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