Section 336
Original German
336 Indem die Staaten in ihrem Verhältnisse der Selbstständigkeit, als besondere Willen gegen einander sind, und das Gelten der Tractate selbst hierauf beruht, der besondere Wille des Ganzen aber nach seinem Inhalte, sein Wohl überhaupt ist, so ist dieses das höchste Gesetz in seinem Verhalten zu andern, um so mehr als die Idee des Staats eben diß ist, daß in ihr der Gegensatz von dem Rechte als abstracter Freyheit, und vom erfüllenden besonderen Inhalte, dem Wohl, aufgehoben sey, und die erste Anerkennung der Staaten (§. 331.) auf sie als concrete Ganze geht.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
336 Since states in their relation of independence stand against one another as particular wills, and the validity of treaties itself rests on this, while the particular will of the whole is, in its content, its welfare in general, this welfare is the highest law in its conduct toward others, all the more because the Idea of the state is precisely this: that in it the opposition between right as abstract freedom and the fulfilling particular content, welfare, is sublated, and the first recognition of states (§ 331) applies to them as concrete wholes.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
336 States stand toward one another in their relation of independence as particular wills, and the validity of treaties itself rests on this. The particular will of the whole, according to its content, is its welfare in general. So this is the highest law in the state's conduct toward others. This holds all the more because the idea of the state is precisely this: in it the opposition between right as abstract freedom and the particular content that fills it, welfare, is both canceled and preserved. And the first recognition of states (§ 331) is directed at them as concrete wholes.
About this section
Section 336 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 338 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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