Section 311
Original German
311 Die Abordnung als von der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ausgehend, hat ferner den Sinn, daß die Abgeordneten mit deren speziellen Bedürfnissen, Hindernissen, besondern Interessen bekannt seyen, und ihnen selbst angehören. Indem sie nach der Natur der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft von ihren verschiedenen Corporationen ausgeht (§. 308.), und die einfache Weise dieses Ganges nicht durch Abstractionen und die atomistischen Vorstellungen gestört wird, so erfüllt sie damit unmittelbar jenen Gesichtspunkt, und Wählen ist entweder überhaupt etwas überflüßiges oder reducirt sich auf ein geringes Spiel der Meynung und der Willkühr. —
Es bietet sich von selbst das Interesse dar, daß unter den Abgeordneten sich für jeden besonderen großen Zweig der Gesellschaft, z. B. für den Handel, für die Fabriken u. s. f. Individuen befinden, die ihn gründlich kennen und ihm selbst angehören; — in der Vorstellung eines losen unbestimmten Wählens ist dieser wichtige Umstand nur der Zufälligkeit preis gegeben. Jeder solcher Zweig hat aber gegen den andern gleiches Recht, repräsentirt zu werden. Wenn die Abgeordneten als Repräsentanten betrachtet werden, so hat diß einen organisch vernünftigen Sinn nur dann, daß sie nicht Repräsentanten als von Einzelnen, von einer Menge seyen, sondern Repräsentanten einer der wesentlichen Sphären der Gesellschaft, Repräsentanten ihrer großen Interessen. Das Repräsentiren hat damit auch nicht mehr die Bedeutung, daß Einer an der Stelle eines Andern sey, sondern das Interesse selbst ist in seinem Repräsentanten wirklich gegenwärtig, so wie der Repräsentant für sein eigenes objectives Element da ist. — Von dem Wählen durch die vielen Einzelnen kann noch bemerkt werden, daß nothwendig besonders in großen Staaten, die Gleichgültigkeit gegen das Geben seiner Stimme, als die in der Menge eine unbedeutende Wirkung hat, eintritt, und die Stimmberechtigten, diese Berechtigung mag ihnen als etwas noch so hohes angeschlagen und vorgestellt werden, eben zum Stimmgeben nicht erscheinen; — so daß aus solcher Institution vielmehr das Gegentheil ihrer Bestimmung erfolgt, und die Wahl in die Gewalt Weniger, einer Parthei, somit des besonderen, zufälligen Interesses fällt, das gerade neutralisirt werden sollte.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
311 The deputation, as proceeding from civil society, has further the sense that the deputies are acquainted with its special needs, obstacles and particular interests, and belong to it themselves. Since, according to the nature of civil society, it proceeds from its various corporations (§ 308), and the simple manner of this course is not disturbed by abstractions and atomistic notions, it thereby fulfills that point of view immediately, and electing is either altogether something superfluous or reduces itself to a slight play of opinion and arbitrary choice. —
It suggests itself that among the deputies there should be, for each particular great branch of society, for example for commerce and for manufactures and so on, individuals who know it thoroughly and belong to it themselves; in the notion of a loose, indeterminate electing, this important circumstance is abandoned to contingency. Each such branch, however, has the same right as the others to be represented. If the deputies are regarded as representatives, this has an organically rational sense only if they are not representatives as of individuals, of a multitude, but representatives of one of the essential spheres of society, representatives of its great interests. Representing thus no longer has the meaning that one is in the place of another; rather the interest itself is actually present in its representative, just as the representative is there for his own objective element. — Of election by the many individuals it may further be remarked that, particularly in large states, indifference toward casting one's vote necessarily sets in, since in the multitude it has an insignificant effect, and those entitled to vote, however high this entitlement may be rated and represented to them, simply do not appear to cast their votes; — so that from such an institution the opposite of its vocation rather results, and the election falls into the power of a few, of a party, and so of the particular, contingent interest which was precisely to be neutralized.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
311 Since the deputation proceeds from civil society, it further means that the deputies are familiar with its special needs, obstacles and particular interests, and belong to it themselves. Since, by the nature of civil society, it proceeds from its various corporations (§ 308), and the simple course of this process is not disturbed by abstractions and atomistic ideas, it directly meets that requirement. Then electing is either something superfluous altogether or is reduced to a small play of opinion and arbitrary choice. —
The interest suggests itself that, among the deputies, for each particular great branch of society, for example trade and manufacturing, there be individuals who know it thoroughly and belong to it themselves. In the idea of loose, undefined electing, this important point is left to chance. But each such branch has the same right as the others to be represented. If the deputies are considered as representatives, this has an organic and rational sense only if they are not representatives of individuals, of a crowd, but representatives of one of the essential spheres of society, representatives of its great interests. Representing then no longer means that one stands in the place of another. The interest itself is actually present in its representative, just as the representative is there for his own objective element. — Of electing by the many individuals one can remark further that, especially in large states, indifference about casting one's vote necessarily arises, since in the crowd it has a negligible effect. Those entitled to vote, however highly this right may be rated and presented to them, simply do not show up to vote. So the result of such an institution is rather the opposite of its purpose. The election falls into the power of a few, of a party, and so of the particular and accidental interest, which was exactly what was meant to be neutralized.
About this section
Section 311 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 313 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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