Section 299
Original German
299 Diese Gegenstände bestimmen sich in Beziehung auf die Individuen näher nach den zwey Seiten α) was durch den Staat ihnen zu Gute kömmt und sie zu genießen und β) was sie demselben zu leisten haben. Unter jenem sind die privatrechtlichen Gesetze überhaupt, die Rechte der Gemeinden und Corporationen und ganz allgemeine Veranstaltungen und indirect (§. 298.) das Ganze der Verfassung begriffen. Das zu Leistende aber kann nur, indem es auf Geld, als den existirenden allgemeinen Werth der Dinge und der Leistungen, reducirt wird, auf eine gerechte Weise und zugleich auf eine Art bestimmt werden, daß die besonderen Arbeiten und Dienste, die der Einzelne leisten kann, durch seine Willkühr vermittelt werden.
Was Gegenstand der allgemeinen Gesetzgebung und was der Bestimmung der Administrativ-Behörden und der Regulirung der Regierung überhaupt anheim zu stellen sey, läßt sich zwar im Allgemeinen so unterscheiden, daß in jene nur das dem Inhalte nach ganz Allgemeine der gesetzlichen Bestimmungen, in diese aber das Besondere und die Art und Weise der Exekution falle. Aber völlig bestimmt ist diese Unterscheidung schon dadurch nicht, daß das Gesetz, damit es Gesetz, nicht ein bloßes Gebot überhaupt sey, (Wie „du sollt nicht tödten,“ vergl. mit Anm. zum §. 140. S. 144.) in sich bestimmt seyn muß; je bestimmter es aber ist, desto mehr nähert sich sein Inhalt der Fähigkeit, so wie es ist, ausgeführt zu werden. Zugleich aber würde die so weit gehende Bestimmung den Gesetzen eine empirische Seite geben, welche in der wirklichen Ausführung Abänderungen unterworfen werden müßte, was dem Charakter von Gesetzen Abbruch thäte. In der organischen Einheit der Staatsgewalten liegt es selbst, daß es Ein Geist ist, der das Allgemeine festsetzt, und der es zu seiner bestimmten Wirklichkeit bringt und ausführt. — Es kann im Staate zunächst auffallen, daß von den vielen Geschicklichkeiten, Besitzthümern, Thätigkeiten, Talenten, und darin liegenden unendlich mannigfaltigen lebendigen Vermögen, die zugleich mit Gesinnung verbunden sind, der Staat keine directe Leistung fodert, sondern nur das eine Vermögen in Anspruch nimmt, das als Geld erscheint. — Die Leistungen, die sich auf die Vertheidigung des Staats gegen Feinde beziehen, gehören erst zu der Pflicht der folgenden Abtheilung. In der That ist das Geld aber nicht ein besonderes Vermögen neben den übrigen, sondern es ist das Allgemeine derselben, insofern sie sich zu der Aeußerlichkeit des Daseyns produciren, in der sie als eine Sache gefaßt werden können. Nur an dieser äußerlichsten Spitze ist die quantitative Bestimmtheit und damit die Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit der Leistungen möglich. — Plato läßt in seinem Staate die Individuen den besondern Ständen durch die Obern zutheilen, und ihnen ihre besondern Leistungen auflegen (vergl. §. 185. Anm.); in der Feudal-Monarchie hatten Vasallen eben so unbestimmte Dienste, aber auch in ihrer Besonderheit z. B. das Richteramt u. s. f. zu leisten; die Leistungen im Orient, Egypten für die unermeßlichen Architekturen u. s. f. sind eben so von besonderer Qualität u. s. f. In diesen Verhältnissen mangelt das Prinzip der subjectiven Freyheit, daß das substantielle Thun des Individuums, das in solchen Leistungen ohnehin seinem Inhalte nach ein Besonderes ist, durch seinen besonderen Willen vermittelt sey; — ein Recht, das allein durch die Foderung der Leistungen in der Form des allgemeinen Werthes möglich, und das der Grund ist, der diese Verwandlung herbeygeführt hat.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
299 In relation to individuals, these objects are more closely determined along two sides: α) what accrues to them through the state and what they are to enjoy; and β) what they must render to it. The former includes the laws of private right in general, the rights of communities and corporations, and wholly universal arrangements, and indirectly (§ 298) the whole of the constitution. What must be rendered, however, can be determined justly, and at the same time in such a way that the particular labors and services an individual can perform are mediated through his arbitrary choice, only by being reduced to money, as the existing universal value of things and services.
What should be an object of universal legislation and what should be left to the determination of administrative authorities and the regulation of government in general can indeed be distinguished broadly: the former includes only what is wholly universal in the content of statutory provisions, the latter the particular and the manner of execution. But this distinction is not completely determinate, if only because the law, in order to be law rather than merely a command in general—as “You shall not kill”; compare the remark to § 140, p. 144—must be determined within itself. Yet the more determinate it is, the nearer its content comes to being capable of execution as it stands. At the same time, determination carried so far would give laws an empirical side that would have to be subject to alteration in actual execution, which would detract from their character as laws. The organic unity of the powers of the state itself entails that it is one spirit that establishes the universal and brings it to its determinate actuality and carries it out. At first it may seem striking that, of the many skills, possessions, activities, talents, and infinitely manifold living capacities lying within them, which are also connected with disposition, the state demands no direct service, but lays claim only to the one capacity that appears as money. Services relating to defense of the state against enemies belong to the duty of the following division. Yet money is in fact not one particular capacity beside the others, but their universal, insofar as they produce themselves in the externality of existence in which they can be grasped as a thing. Only at this most external point are quantitative determinacy, and hence justice and equality in contributions, possible. Plato, in his state, has superiors assign individuals to particular estates and impose their particular services upon them—compare § 185, remark. In feudal monarchy, vassals had to perform services that were indeterminate, but also particular in character, such as judicial office and so forth. The services in the East, in Egypt for its immeasurable architectural works and so forth, are likewise of a particular quality, and so on. These relations lack the principle of subjective freedom: the individual's substantial activity, which in such services is in any case particular in content, should be mediated through his particular will. This right is possible only through the demand for contributions in the form of universal value, and it is the ground that has brought about this transformation.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
299 These matters are defined more closely, in relation to individuals, by two sides: α) what the state does for them, which they get to enjoy, and β) what they have to do for the state. Under the first fall the laws of private right in general, the rights of communities and corporations, and quite general arrangements, and indirectly (§ 298) the whole of the constitution. What is owed, however, can be fixed in a just way only if it is reduced to money, which is the existing universal value of things and services. It can then also be fixed in such a way that the particular work and services which the individual can give are mediated through his arbitrary choice.
In general, we can distinguish what should be the object of general legislation from what should be left to the administrative authorities and to government regulation. Only what is wholly universal in content among the legal provisions falls to legislation, while the particular and the manner of execution fall to the administration. But this distinction is not fully settled, because a law, to be a law and not a mere command in general (such as "you shall not kill," compare the note to § 140, p. 144), must be determinate in itself. The more determinate it is, the closer its content comes to being capable of being carried out just as it stands. At the same time, such far-reaching determination would give the laws an empirical side. In actual execution this side would have to be changed, and that would harm the character of laws as laws. It lies in the organic unity of the powers of the state that it is one spirit that fixes the universal and that also brings it to its determinate actuality and carries it out. — In the state it may first seem striking that, out of the many skills, possessions, activities and talents, and the endlessly varied living abilities contained in them, which are also joined with attitude, the state demands no direct service. It claims only the one ability that appears as money. — The services that relate to defending the state against enemies belong to duty in the next division. In fact, money is not a particular ability alongside the others. It is the universal of them, insofar as they produce themselves into the outwardness of existence in which they can be taken as a thing. Only at this outermost point is quantitative determination possible, and with it justice and equality of what is given. — Plato in his state has the rulers assign individuals to the particular classes and impose on them their particular services (compare § 185, note). In the feudal monarchy vassals likewise had services of an undefined kind, but also services in their particularity, for example holding judicial office. The services in the East and in Egypt, for the immense buildings and so on, are likewise of a particular kind. In these relationships the principle of subjective freedom is missing. By this principle, the individual's substantial activity, which in such services is anyway particular in content, should be mediated through his particular will. — This is a right that is possible only if services are demanded in the form of universal value. It is also the ground that brought about this change.
About this section
Section 299 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 301 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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