Section 261
Original German
261 Gegen die Sphären des Privatrechts und Privatwohls, der Familie und der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, ist der Staat einerseits eine äußerliche Nothwendigkeit und ihre höhere Macht, deren Natur ihre Gesetze, so wie ihre Interessen untergeordnet und davon abhängig sind; aber andererseits ist er ihr immanenter Zweck und hat seine Stärke in der Einheit seines allgemeinen Endzwecks und des besonderen Interesses der Individuen, darin, daß sie insofern Pflichten gegen ihn haben, als sie zugleich Rechte haben. (§. 155.)
Daß den Gedanken der Abhängigkeit insbesondere auch der privatrechtlichen Gesetze von dem bestimmten Charakter des Staats, und die philosophische Ansicht, den Theil nur in seiner Beziehung auf das Ganze zu betrachten, — vornemlich Montesquieu in seinem berühmten Werke: Der Geist der Gesetze, ins Auge gefaßt, und auch ins Einzelne auszuführen versucht hat, ist schon oben §. 3. Anm. bemerkt worden. — Da die Pflicht zunächst das Verhalten gegen etwas für mich Substantielles, an und für sich Allgemeines ist, das Recht dagegen das Daseyn überhaupt dieses Substantiellen ist, damit die Seite seiner Besonderheit und meiner besondern Freyheit ist, so erscheint beydes auf den formellen Stufen an verschiedene Seiten oder Personen vertheilt. Der Staat, als Sittliches, als Durchdringung des Substantiellen und des Besonderen, enthält, daß meine Verbindlichkeit gegen das Substantielle zugleich das Daseyn meiner besonderen Freyheit d. i. in ihm Pflicht und Recht in einer und derselben Beziehung vereinigt sind. Weil aber ferner zugleich im Staate die unterschiedenen Momente zu ihrer eigenthümlichen Gestaltung und Realität kommen, hiemit der Unterschied von Recht und Pflicht wieder eintritt, so sind sie, indem sie an sich, d. i. formell identisch sind, zugleich ihrem Inhalte nach verschieden. Im Privatrechtlichen und Moralischen fehlt die wirkliche Nothwendigkeit der Beziehung, und damit ist nur die abstracte Gleichheit des Inhalts vorhanden; was in diesen abstracten Sphären dem Einen Recht ist, soll auch dem Andern Recht, und was dem Einen Pflicht ist, soll auch dem Andern Pflicht seyn. Jene absolute Identität der Pflicht und des Rechts findet nur als gleiche Identität des Inhalts Statt, in der Bestimmung, daß dieser Inhalt selbst der ganz allgemeine, nämlich das Eine Prinzip der Pflicht und des Rechts, die persönliche Freyheit des Menschen ist. Sklaven haben deswegen keine Pflichten, weil sie keine Rechte haben; und umgekehrt — (von religiösen Pflichten ist hier nicht die Rede). — Aber in der concreten, sich in sich entwickelnden Idee unterscheiden sich ihre Momente und ihre Bestimmtheit wird zugleich ein verschiedener Inhalt; in der Familie hat der Sohn nicht Rechte desselben Inhalts als er Pflichten gegen den Vater, und der Bürger nicht Rechte desselben Inhalts als er Pflichten gegen Fürst und Regierung hat. — Jener Begriff von Vereinigung von Pflicht und Recht ist eine der wichtigsten Bestimmungen und enthält die innere Stärke der Staaten. — Die abstracte Seite der Pflicht bleibt dabey stehen, das besondere Interesse als ein unwesentliches, selbst unwürdiges Moment zu übersehen und zu verbannen. Die concrete Betrachtung, die Idee, zeigt das Moment der Besonderheit eben so wesentlich und damit seine Befriedigung als schlechthin nothwendig; das Individuum muß in seiner Pflichterfüllung auf irgend eine Weise zugleich sein eigenes Interesse, seine Befriedigung oder Rechnung finden, und ihm aus seinem Verhältniß im Staat ein Recht erwachsen, wodurch die allgemeine Sache seine eigene besondere Sache wird. Das besondere Interesse soll wahrhaft nicht bey Seite gesetzt oder gar unterdrückt sondern mit dem Allgemeinen in Uebereinstimmung gesetzt werden, wodurch es selbst und das Allgemeine erhalten wird. Das Individuum, nach seinen Pflichten Unterthan, findet als Bürger in ihrer Erfüllung den Schutz seiner Person und Eigenthums, die Berücksichtigung seines besonderen Wohls, und die Befriedigung seines substantiellen Wesens, das Bewußtseyn und das Selbstgefühl, Mitglied dieses Ganzen zu seyn, und in dieser Vollbringung der Pflichten als Leistungen und Geschäfte für den Staat hat dieser seine Erhaltung und sein Bestehen. Nach der abstracten Seite wäre das Interesse des Allgemeinen nur, daß seine Geschäfte, die Leistungen, die es erfodert, als Pflichten vollbracht werden.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
261 In relation to the spheres of private right and private welfare, of the family and civil society, the state is on one side an external necessity and their higher power, to whose nature their laws, as well as their interests, are subordinate and on which they depend; but on the other side it is their immanent end, and has its strength in the unity of its universal final end and the particular interest of individuals, in the fact that they have duties toward it to the extent that they at the same time have rights. (§ 155.)
That the dependence of the laws, those of private right in particular, on the determinate character of the state, and the philosophical view that considers the part only in its relation to the whole, were taken in view—and an attempt made to carry them out in detail as well—chiefly by Montesquieu in his famous work, The Spirit of the Laws, has already been remarked above, in the Remark to § 3. — Since duty is in the first place conduct toward something substantial for me, something universal in and for itself, while right, by contrast, is the existence in general of this substantial thing, and thereby the side of its particularity and of my particular freedom, the two appear, at the formal stages, divided between different sides or persons. The state, as something ethical, as the interpenetration of the substantial and the particular, contains this: that my obligation toward the substantial is at the same time the existence of my particular freedom; that is, in the state duty and right are united in one and the same relation. But because, furthermore, the distinct moments in the state at the same time come to their own proper shape and reality, and the distinction between right and duty therefore reappears, they are, while in themselves, that is formally, identical, at the same time different in their content. In the realm of private right and of morality, the actual necessity of the relation is lacking, and so only the abstract equality of content is present: what is right for one in these abstract spheres is to be right for the other too, and what is duty for one is to be duty for the other too. That absolute identity of duty and right occurs only as an identity of content, in the determination that this content is itself the wholly universal, namely the one principle of duty and of right, the personal freedom of the human being. Slaves therefore have no duties, because they have no rights; and conversely—(religious duties are not under discussion here). — But in the concrete Idea, developing itself within itself, its moments are distinguished, and their determinacy at the same time becomes a different content. In the family the son does not have rights of the same content as he has duties toward the father, and the citizen does not have rights of the same content as he has duties toward prince and government. — That concept of the union of duty and right is one of the most important determinations, and contains the inner strength of states. — The abstract side of duty stops short at overlooking and banishing particular interest as an unessential, even unworthy moment. The concrete view, the Idea, shows the moment of particularity to be just as essential, and its satisfaction therefore to be absolutely necessary. In fulfilling his duty the individual must in some way at the same time find his own interest, his satisfaction or account, and a right must arise for him out of his relation in the state, through which the universal cause becomes his own particular cause. Particular interest is truly not to be set aside or, worse, suppressed, but brought into accord with the universal, whereby both it and the universal are preserved. The individual, a subject according to his duties, finds as a citizen, in fulfilling them, the protection of his person and property, regard for his particular welfare, and the satisfaction of his substantial essence, the consciousness and self-feeling of being a member of this whole; and in this accomplishment of duties as services and tasks for the state, the state has its preservation and its continued existence. From the abstract side, the interest of the universal would be only that its tasks, the services it requires, be accomplished as duties.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
261 Compared with the spheres of private right and private welfare, the family and civil society, the state is in one respect an external necessity and their higher power. Their nature, and also their laws and interests, are subordinate to it and depend on it. But in another respect the state is their immanent end. Its strength lies in the unity of its universal final end with the particular interest of individuals. It lies in this: individuals have duties toward the state to the extent that they also have rights. (§ 155.)
Montesquieu, in his famous work The Spirit of the Laws, focused especially on the thought that even the laws of private right depend on the specific character of the state. He also took the philosophical view that a part should be considered only in its relation to the whole, and he tried to carry this out in detail. This was already noted above, in the Remark to § 3. — Duty is, first of all, behavior toward something substantial for me, something that is universal in and for itself. Right, by contrast, is the existence of this substantial thing in general, and so it is the side of its particularity and of my particular freedom. On the merely formal levels, then, the two appear divided between different sides or persons. The state is ethical, a penetration of the substantial and the particular. It therefore contains this: my obligation toward the substantial is at the same time the existence of my particular freedom. That is, in the state duty and right are united in one and the same relation. But in the state the different moments also come to their own distinct shape and reality, and so the difference between right and duty returns. Since they are identical in themselves, that is, formally, they are at the same time different in their content. In private right and in morality, the actual necessity of the relation is missing, and so only an abstract equality of content is present. What is right for one person in these abstract spheres should also be right for the other, and what is duty for one should also be duty for the other. That absolute identity of duty and right occurs only as an equal identity of content. It lies in the determination that this content is itself entirely universal, namely the one principle of duty and of right, the personal freedom of the human being. Slaves therefore have no duties, because they have no rights, and the reverse also holds. (Religious duties are not under discussion here.) — But in the concrete idea, which develops within itself, its moments are distinguished, and their determinateness becomes at the same time a different content. In the family the son does not have rights of the same content as the duties he has toward his father. And the citizen does not have rights of the same content as the duties he has toward the prince and the government. — That concept of the union of duty and right is one of the most important determinations, and it holds the inner strength of states. — The abstract side of duty stops at overlooking and banishing particular interest, as an unessential and even unworthy moment. The concrete view, the idea, shows the moment of particularity to be just as essential, and so shows its satisfaction to be absolutely necessary. In fulfilling his duty, the individual must in some way also find his own interest, his satisfaction or benefit. And a right must grow for him out of his relation to the state, through which the universal cause becomes his own particular cause. Particular interest should truly not be set aside or even suppressed. It should be brought into agreement with the universal, and so both it and the universal are preserved. The individual is a subject in terms of his duties. As a citizen, in fulfilling them, he finds protection of his person and property, consideration of his particular welfare, and satisfaction of his substantial being. He finds the awareness and the self-esteem of being a member of this whole. And in this carrying out of duties, as services and tasks for the state, the state has its preservation and its continued existence. From the abstract side, the interest of the universal would only be that its tasks, the services it requires, are carried out as duties.
About this section
Section 261 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 263 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.