Section 260
Original German
260 A. Das innere Staatsrecht.
Der Staat ist die Wirklichkeit der concreten Freyheit; die concrete Freyheit aber bestehet darin, daß die persönliche Einzelnheit und deren besondere Interessen sowohl ihre vollständige Entwickelung und die Anerkennung ihres Rechts für sich (im Systeme der Familie und der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft) haben, als sie durch sich selbst in das Interesse des Allgemeinen theils übergehen, theils mit Wissen und Willen dasselbe und zwar als ihren eigenen substantiellen Geist anerkennen und für dasselbe als ihren Endzweck thätig sind, so daß weder das Allgemeine ohne das besondere Interesse, Wissen und Wollen gelte und vollbracht werde, noch daß die Individuen bloß für das letztere als Privatpersonen leben, und nicht zugleich in und für das Allgemeine wollen und eine dieses Zwecks bewußte Wirksamkeit haben. Das Prinzip der modernen Staaten hat diese ungeheure Stärke und Tiefe, das Prinzip der Subjectivität sich zum selbstständigen Extreme der persönlichen Besonderheit vollenden zu lassen, und zugleich es in die substantielle Einheit zurückzuführen und so in ihm selbst diese zu erhalten.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
260 A. Internal Public Law.
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom; but concrete freedom consists in this: that personal individuality and its particular interests both have their complete development and the recognition of their right for themselves (in the system of the family and of civil society), and also, on the one hand, pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and on the other, knowingly and willingly acknowledge it as their own substantial spirit and are active for it as their final end. The result is that neither does the universal count or get accomplished without particular interest, knowing and willing, nor do individuals live merely for the latter as private persons, without at the same time willing in and for the universal and having an activity conscious of this end. The principle of modern states has this immense strength and depth: it lets the principle of subjectivity perfect itself into the self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity, and at the same time leads it back into substantial unity, and so preserves this unity within subjectivity itself.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
260 A. Internal Constitutional Law.
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. Concrete freedom means this. Personal individuality and its particular interests get their full development, and their right is recognized in its own terms (in the system of the family and of civil society). At the same time, these interests, through their own action, partly pass over into the interest of the universal. And partly they knowingly and willingly acknowledge the universal as their own substantial spirit, and they work for it as their final end. So the universal does not count or get accomplished without particular interest, knowledge and will. And individuals do not live only for the particular, as private persons, without also willing within and for the universal, and without having an activity that is aware of this aim. The principle of modern states has this immense strength and depth: it lets the principle of subjectivity reach its full development as the independent extreme of personal particularity, and at the same time brings it back to the substantial unity, so that this unity is preserved in the principle of subjectivity itself.
About this section
Section 260 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 262 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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