Section 223
Original German
223 Durch die Zersplitterung dieser Handlungen in immer mehr vereinzelte Handlungen und deren Rechte, die in sich keine Grenze enthält, tritt der Rechtsgang, an sich schon Mittel, als etwas Aeußerliches seinem Zwecke gegenüber. — Indem den Partheyen das Recht, solchen weitläuftigen Formalismus durchzumachen, der ihr Recht ist, zusteht, so ist, indem er ebenso zu einem Uebel und selbst Werkzeuge des Unrechts gemacht werden kann, es ihnen von Gerichtswegen, um die Partheyen und das Recht selbst als die substantielle Sache, worauf es ankommt, gegen den Rechtsgang und dessen Mißbrauch in Schutz zu nehmen, — zur Pflicht zu machen, einem einfachen Gerichte, (Schieds-Friedensgericht) und dem Versuche des Vergleichs sich zu unterwerfen, ehe sie zu jenem schreiten.
Die Billigkeit enthält einen dem formellen Rechte aus moralischen oder andern Rücksichten geschehenden Abbruch, und bezieht sich zunächst auf den Inhalt des Rechtsstreits. Ein Billigkeitsgerichtshof aber wird die Bedeutung haben, daß er über den einzelnen Fall, ohne sich an die Formalitäten des Rechtsganges und insbesondere an die objectiven Beweismittel, wie sie gesetzlich gefaßt werden können, zu halten, so wie auch dem eigenen Interesse des einzelnen Falles als dieses, nicht im Interesse einer allgemeinen zu machenden gesetzlichen Disposition, entscheidet.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
223 Through the fragmentation of these actions into ever more isolated actions and their rights, which contains no limit within itself, legal procedure, itself already a means, comes to stand as something external over against its end. — Since the parties have the right to go through such extensive formalism, which is their right, and since it can equally be turned into an evil and even an instrument of wrong, it is made a duty for them by the court, in order to take the parties and right itself, as the substantial matter at stake, under protection against legal procedure and its abuse, to submit to a simple court (a court of arbitration or of the peace) and to the attempt at a settlement before they proceed to that procedure.
Equity involves an infringement upon formal right made for moral or other considerations, and relates first of all to the content of the legal dispute. A court of equity, however, will have the significance that it decides the individual case without keeping to the formalities of legal procedure and in particular to the objective means of proof as they can be framed by law, and likewise decides in accordance with the individual case's own interest as this case, and not in the interest of a general legal disposition to be made.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
223 These actions split up into more and more separate actions and their rights, and this has no limit in itself. Because of that, the legal procedure, which is already a means in itself, comes to stand as something external to its purpose. — The parties have the right to go through such lengthy formalism, which is their right. But it can equally be turned into an evil and even into a tool of injustice. So that the parties, and right itself as the substantial matter at stake, may be protected against the legal procedure and its abuse, the court must make it the parties' duty to submit to a simple tribunal (an arbitration or justice-of-the-peace court) and to an attempt at settlement before they proceed to the legal procedure.
Equity involves a reduction of formal right for moral or other reasons, and relates first of all to the content of the legal dispute. A court of equity, however, will mean this: it decides the individual case without holding to the formalities of legal procedure, and in particular without holding to the objective means of proof as the law can frame them. It also decides in the interest of the individual case as this case, and not in the interest of a general legal provision that has to be made.
About this section
Section 223 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 225 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.