Section 212
Original German
212 In dieser Identität des Ansichseyns und des Gesetztseyns, hat nur das als Recht Verbindlichkeit, was Gesetz ist. Indem das Gesetztseyn die Seite des Daseyns ausmacht, in der auch das Zufällige des Eigenwillens und anderer Besonderheit eintreten kann, so kann das, was Gesetz ist, in seinem Inhalte noch von dem verschieden seyn, was an sich Recht ist.
Im positiven Rechte ist daher das, was gesetzmäßig ist, die Quelle der Erkenntniß dessen, was Recht ist, oder eigentlich was Rechtens ist; — die positive Rechtswissenschaft ist insofern eine historische Wissenschaft, welche die Autorität zu ihrem Princip hat. Was noch übriges geschehen kann, ist Sache des Verstandes und betrifft die äußere Ordnung, Zusammenstellung, Consequenz, weitere Anwendung u. dergl. Wenn der Verstand sich auf die Natur der Sache selbst einläßt, so zeigen die Theorien, z. B. des Criminalrechts, was er mit seinem Raisonnement aus Gründen anrichtet. — Indem die positive Wissenschaft einerseits nicht nur das Recht, sondern auch die nothwendige Pflicht hat, sowohl die historischen Fortgänge, als die Anwendungen und Zerspaltungen der gegebenen Rechtsbestimmungen in alle Einzelnheiten aus ihren positiven Datis zu deduciren und ihre Consequenz zu zeigen, so darf sie auf der andern Seite sich wenigstens nicht absolut verwundern, wenn sie es auch als eine Querfrage für ihre Beschäftigung ansieht, wenn nun gefragt wird, ob denn nach allen diesen Beweisen eine Rechtsbestimmung vernünftig ist. — Vergl. über das Verstehen §. 3. Anm.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
212 In this identity of being in itself and being posited, only what is law has binding force as right. Since being posited constitutes the side of existence, in which the contingent element of self-will and of other particularity can also enter, what is law can in its content still be different from what is right in itself.
In positive right, therefore, what is lawful is the source of the cognition of what is right, or, more properly, of what is of right;—the positive science of right is in this respect a historical science, which has authority for its principle. What can still be done besides is a matter for the understanding, and concerns external order, compilation, consistency, further application, and the like. When the understanding engages with the nature of the matter itself, the theories—of criminal law, for example—show what it accomplishes with its reasoning from grounds.—Since the positive science, on the one hand, not only has the right but the necessary duty to deduce from its positive data both the historical progressions and the applications and ramifications of the given legal determinations into all their particulars, and to show their consistency, it may, on the other hand, at least not be absolutely astonished—even if it regards it as an incidental question extraneous to its occupation—when the question is now asked whether, after all these proofs, a legal determination is rational.—Compare, on understanding, § 3. Remark.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
212 In this identity of being-in-itself and being-posited, only what is law has binding force as right. Being-posited makes up the side of existence, where the contingency of self-will and other particular features can also enter. So in its content, what is law can still differ from what is right in itself.
In positive right, therefore, what accords with the law is the source of knowledge of what is right—or, more precisely, what is lawful. To this extent, the science of positive law is a historical science whose principle is authority. Anything else that can be done belongs to the understanding. It concerns external arrangement, compilation, consistency, further application, and the like. When the understanding gets involved with the nature of the subject itself, theories—for example, theories of criminal law—show what damage its reasoning from grounds can do. On one side, the science of positive law has not just the right but the necessary duty to derive historical developments, as well as applications and detailed subdivisions of given legal provisions, from its positive data, and to show their consistency. But on the other side, it must at least not be altogether surprised if it is asked whether, after all these demonstrations, a legal provision is rational. It may even regard this as an awkward question for its activity. Compare on understanding § 3. Anm.
About this section
Section 212 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 214 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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