Section 211
Original German
a) Das Recht als Gesetz.
211 Was an sich Recht ist, ist in seinem objectiven Daseyn gesetzt, d. i. durch den Gedanken für das Bewußtseyn bestimmt, und als das was Recht ist und gilt, bekannt, das Gesetz; und das Recht ist durch diese Bestimmung positives Recht überhaupt.
Etwas als allgemeines setzen, d. i. es als allgemeines zum Bewußtseyn bringen — ist bekanntlich denken; (vergl. oben §. 13. Anm. und §. 21. Anm.) indem es so den Inhalt auf seine einfachste Form zurückbringt, giebt es ihm seine letzte Bestimmtheit. Was Recht ist, erhält erst damit, daß es zum Gesetze wird, nicht nur die Form seiner Allgemeinheit, sondern seine wahrhafte Bestimmtheit. Es ist darum bey der Vorstellung des Gesetzgebens nicht bloß das eine Moment vor sich zu haben, daß dadurch etwas als die für alle gültige Regel des Benehmens ausgesprochen werde; sondern das innere wesentliche Moment ist vor diesem anderen die Erkenntniß des Inhalts in seiner bestimmten Allgemeinheit. Gewohnheitsrechte selbst, da nur die Thiere ihr Gesetz als Instinkt haben, nur die Menschen aber es sind, die es als Gewohnheit haben, enthalten das Moment, als Gedanken zu seyn und gewußt zu werden. Ihr Unterschied von Gesetzen bestehet nur darin, daß sie auf eine subjective und zufällige Weise gewußt werden, daher für sich unbestimmter und die Allgemeinheit des Gedankens getrübter, außerdem die Kenntniß des Rechts nach dieser und jener Seite und überhaupt ein zufälliges Eigenthum Weniger ist. Daß sie durch ihre Form, als Gewohnheiten zu seyn, den Vorzug haben sollen, ins Leben übergegangen zu seyn (— man spricht heutigstags Übrigens gerade da am meisten vom Leben und vom Uebergehen ins Leben, wo man in dem todtesten Stoffe und in den todtesten Gedanken versirt) ist eine Täuschung, da die geltenden Gesetze einer Nation, dadurch daß sie geschrieben und gesammelt sind, nicht aufhören, seine Gewohnheiten zu seyn. Wenn die Gewohnheitsrechte dazu kommen, gesammelt und zusammengestellt zu werden, was bei einem nur zu einiger Bildung gediehenen Volke bald geschehen muß, so ist dann diese Sammlung das Gesetzbuch, das sich freylich, weil es bloße Sammlung ist, durch seine Unförmlichkeit, Unbestimmtheit und Lückenhaftigkeit auszeichnen wird. Es wird sich vornemlich von einem eigentlich sogenannten Gesetzbuche dadurch unterscheiden, daß dieses die Rechts-Principien in ihrer Allgemeinheit und damit in ihrer Bestimmtheit denkend auffaßt und ausspricht. Englands Landrecht oder gemeines Recht, ist bekanntlich in Statuten (förmlichen Gesetzen) und in einem sogenannten ungeschriebenen Gesetze enthalten; dieses ungeschriebene Gesetz ist übrigens eben so gut geschrieben, und dessen Kenntniß kann und muß durch Lesen allein (der vielen Quartanten, die es ausfülle,) erworben werden. Welche ungeheure Verwirrung aber auch in der dortigen Rechtspflege sowohl, als in der Sache liegt, schildern die Kenner derselben. Insbesondere bemerken sie den Umstand, daß, da diß ungeschriebene Gesetz in den Decisionen der Gerichtshöfe und Richter enthalten ist, die Richter damit fortdauernd die Gesetzgeber machen, daß sie auf die Autorität ihrer Vorgänger, als die nichts gethan als das ungeschriebene Gesetz ausgesprochen haben, eben so angewiesen sind, als nicht angewiesen sind, da sie selbst das ungeschriebene Gesetz in sich haben, und daraus das Recht haben, über die vorhergegangenen Entscheidungen zu urtheilen, ob sie demselben angemessen sind oder nicht. — Gegen eine ähnliche Verwirrung, die in der spätern römischen Rechtspflege aus den Autoritäten aller der verschiedenen berühmten Jurisconsulten entstehen konnte, wurde von einem Kaiser das sinnreiche Auskunftsmittel getroffen, das den Namen Citirgesetz führt und eine Art von collegialischer Einrichtung unter den längst verstorbenen Rechtsgelehrten, mit Mehrheit der Stimmen und einem Präsidenten, einführte. (S. Herrn Hugos röm. Rechtsgeschichte §. 354.) — Einer gebildeten Nation oder dem juristischen Stande in derselben, die Fähigkeit abzusprechen ein Gesetzbuch zu machen, — da es nicht darum zu thun seyn kann, ein System ihrem Inhalte nach neuer Gesetze zu machen, sondern den vorhandenen gesetzlichen Inhalt in seiner bestimmten Allgemeinheit zu erkennen, d. i. ihn denkend zu fassen, — mit Hinzufügung der Anwendung aufs Besondere, — wäre einer der größten Schimpfe, der einer Nation oder jenem Stande angethan werden könnte. —
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
a) Right as Law
211 What is right in itself is posited in its objective existence, that is, determined through thought for consciousness, and as what is right and valid it is known, the law; and through this determination right is positive right in general.
To posit something as universal, that is, to bring it to consciousness as universal, is, as is well known, to think (compare above § 13. Remark and § 21. Remark); in that it thus brings the content back to its simplest form, it gives it its final determinateness. Only in becoming law does what is right receive not merely the form of its universality, but its true determinateness. In the representation of legislating, therefore, we are not to have before us merely the one moment, that something be pronounced as the rule of conduct valid for all; rather, the inner essential moment is, before this other one, the cognition of the content in its determinate universality. Even customary rights contain the moment of being thoughts and of being known, since only animals have their law as instinct, while only human beings are those who have it as habit. Their difference from laws consists only in this, that they are known in a subjective and contingent manner, and are therefore in themselves less determinate and more turbid with respect to the universality of thought; besides which the knowledge of right in this or that direction, and in general, is a contingent possession of few. That they should have the advantage, through their form of being habits, of having passed over into life (—by the way, nowadays it is precisely where people dwell in the deadest material and in the deadest thoughts that life and passing over into life are spoken of most) is a deception, since the valid laws of a nation do not cease, by being written down and collected, to be its habits. If customary rights come to be collected and compiled—which must soon happen with a people that has reached even some cultivation—then this collection is the code of laws, which indeed, because it is a mere collection, will distinguish itself by its shapelessness, indeterminacy, and gaps. It will be distinguished chiefly from a code properly so called by this, that the latter grasps and expresses the principles of right in their universality, and thus in their determinateness, in a thinking way. England's territorial law, or common law, is well known to be contained in statutes (formal laws) and in a so-called unwritten law; this unwritten law, moreover, is just as much written, and knowledge of it can and must be acquired by reading alone (the many quartos that it fills). But what enormous confusion prevails in the administration of justice there, as in the matter itself, those who know it describe. In particular they remark the circumstance that, since this unwritten law is contained in the decisions of the courts and judges, the judges thereby continually act as the legislators, in that they are as much bound to the authority of their predecessors, who have done nothing but pronounce the unwritten law, as they are not bound to it, since they themselves have the unwritten law within them, and from it have the right to judge whether the preceding decisions are in accordance with it or not.—Against a similar confusion, which in the later Roman administration of justice could arise from the authorities of all the various famous jurisconsults, an emperor devised the ingenious expedient that bears the name Citing Law, and introduced a kind of collegial arrangement among the long since deceased legal scholars, with majority of votes and a president. (See Herr Hugo's History of Roman Law, § 354.)—To deny a cultivated nation, or the juristic estate within it, the capacity to make a code of laws—since the endeavor cannot be to make a system of new laws in their content, but to recognize the existing legal content in its determinate universality, that is, to grasp it thinkingly, with the addition of its application to the particular—would be one of the greatest insults that could be inflicted on a nation or on that estate.—
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
a) Right as Law
211 What is right in itself is posited in its objective existence. That is, thought determines it for consciousness, and it is known as what is and has force as right: law. Through this determination, right becomes positive right generally.
To posit something as universal—to bring it to consciousness as universal—is, as everyone knows, to think (compare above § 13. Anm. and § 21. Anm.). By reducing the content to its simplest form in this way, thinking gives it its final determinacy. Only by becoming law does what is right gain not just the form of its universality, but its true determinacy. So when we think of legislation, we must not focus only on one element: that something is expressed as a rule of behavior valid for everyone. Before this outward element comes the inner, essential one: knowledge of the content in its determinate universality. Customary rights themselves contain the element of being thoughts and becoming known, since only animals have their law as instinct, while only human beings have it as custom. They differ from laws only in being known in a subjective and contingent way. On their own, they are therefore less determinate and the universality of thought is clouded. Moreover, knowledge of right in one respect or another, and generally, is the contingent possession of a few. People claim that their form as customs should give them the advantage of having passed into life (incidentally, people nowadays speak most of life and of passing into life precisely where they are immersed in the deadest material and the deadest thoughts). This is a deception, since a nation's valid laws do not stop being its customs because they have been written down and collected. When customary rights come to be collected and assembled, as must soon happen among a people that has reached even some degree of education and cultivation, that collection is then the code of laws. Of course, because it is merely a collection, its shapelessness, indeterminacy, and gaps will stand out. Its main difference from a code of laws properly so called will be that the latter grasps and states legal principles in thought, in their universality and therefore in their determinacy. England's law of the land, or common law, is, as everyone knows, contained in statutes—formal laws—and in a so-called unwritten law. This unwritten law is in fact written down too. Knowledge of it can and must be acquired simply by reading the many quarto volumes it fills. Experts describe the enormous confusion in both the administration of justice there and the subject itself. They point out especially that, since this unwritten law is contained in the decisions of courts and judges, the judges continually become legislators. They are bound by the authority of their predecessors, who have done nothing but pronounce the unwritten law. Yet they are equally not bound, since they have the unwritten law within themselves and therefore have the right to judge whether earlier decisions conform to it or not. To deal with a similar confusion in later Roman justice, arising from the authorities of all the different famous jurists, an emperor hit on an ingenious solution. It is called the Law of Citations. It introduced a kind of collegiate arrangement among long-dead legal scholars, with a majority vote and a presiding member. (See Mr. Hugo's history of Roman law, § 354.) To deny an educated nation, or its legal profession, the ability to make a code of laws would be one of the greatest insults that could be offered to either. The task cannot be to make a system of new laws in content. It is to know the existing legal content in its determinate universality—that is, to grasp it in thought—and to add its application to particular cases.
About this section
Section 211 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 213 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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