Section 207
Original German
207 Das Individuum giebt sich nur Wirklichkeit, indem es in das Daseyn überhaupt, somit in die bestimmte Besonderheit tritt, hiermit ausschließend sich auf eine der besonderen Sphären des Bedürfnisses beschränkt. Die sittliche Gesinnung in diesem Systeme ist daher die Rechtschaffenheit und die Standesehre, sich und zwar aus eigener Bestimmung durch seine Thätigkeit, Fleiß und Geschicklichkeit zum Gliede eines der Momente der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zu machen und als solches zu erhalten, und nur durch diese Vermittelung mit dem Allgemeinen für sich zu sorgen, so wie dadurch in seiner Vorstellung und der Vorstellung Anderer anerkannt zu seyn. — Die Moralität hat ihre eigenthümliche Stelle in dieser Sphäre, wo die Reflexion auf sein Thun, der Zweck der besondern Bedürfnisse und des Wohls herrschend ist, und die Zufälligkeit in Befriedigung derselben auch eine zufällige und einzelne Hülfe zur Pflicht macht.
Daß das Individuum sich zunächst (d. i. besonders in der Jugend) gegen die Vorstellung sträubt, sich zu einem besondern Stand zu entschließen und dieß als eine Beschränkung seiner allgemeinen Bestimmung und als eine bloß äusserliche Nothwendigkeit ansieht, liegt in dem abstracten Denken, das an dem Allgemeinen und damit Unwirklichen stehen bleibt, und nicht erkennt, daß um dazuseyn, der Begriff überhaupt in den Unterschied des Begriffs und seiner Realität, und damit in die Bestimmtheit und Besonderheit tritt, (s. §. 7.) und daß es nur damit Wirklichkeit und sittliche Objectivität gewinnen kann.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
207 The individual gives himself actuality only by entering into existence in general, and thus into determinate particularity, and hereby, in an exclusive way, confines himself to one of the particular spheres of need. The ethical disposition in this system is therefore probity and the honor of one's estate: to make himself a member of one of the moments of civil society, and to maintain himself as such—by his own determination, through his activity, diligence, and skill—and to provide for himself only through this mediation with the universal, and thereby to be recognized in his own representation and in the representation of others.—Morality has its peculiar place in this sphere, where reflection on one's own doings, the end of particular needs and of welfare, is dominant, and where the contingency in their satisfaction makes contingent and isolated assistance into a duty as well.
That the individual at first (that is, especially in youth) resists the representation of resolving upon a particular estate, and looks on this as a limitation of his universal determination and as a merely external necessity, lies in abstract thinking, which stays fixed on the universal and hence on the unreal, and does not recognize that—in order to exist—the concept in general enters into the difference between the concept and its reality, and thus into determinateness and particularity (see § 7.), and that only thereby can it win actuality and ethical objectivity.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
207 An individual gives himself actual reality only by entering existence generally, and therefore determinate particularity. In doing so, he restricts himself exclusively to one of the particular spheres of need. The ethical outlook in this system is therefore uprightness and the honor of one's estate. By his own decision, through his activity, diligence, and skill, a person makes himself a member of one of the elements of civil society and maintains himself as such. He provides for himself only through this mediation with the universal. Through it, he is recognized in his own representation and in the representation of others. Morality has its proper place in this sphere. Here reflection on one's actions, and the aim of particular needs and well-being, predominate. The contingency of their satisfaction also makes contingent and individual help into a duty.
At first, especially in youth, an individual resists the idea of deciding on a particular estate. He sees it as limiting his universal vocation and as a merely external necessity. This comes from abstract thinking, which stops at the universal and therefore at what has no actual reality. It does not recognize that, in order to exist, the concept generally enters into the difference between the concept and its reality, and therefore into determinacy and particularity (see § 7.). Only in this way can it gain actual reality and ethical objectivity.
About this section
Section 207 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 209 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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