Section 206
Original German
206 Der Stand als die sich objectiv gewordene Besonderheit, theilt sich so einerseits nach dem Begriffe in seine allgemeinen Unterschiede. Andererseits aber, welchem besonderen Stande das Individuum angehöre, darauf haben Naturell, Geburt und Umstände ihren Einfluß, aber die letzte und wesentliche Bestimmung liegt in der subjectiven Meynung und der besondern Willkühr, die sich in dieser Sphäre ihr Recht, Verdienst und ihre Ehre giebt, so daß was in ihr durch innere Nothwendigkeit geschieht, zugleich durch die Willkühr vermittelt ist und für das subjective Bewußtseyn die Gestalt hat, das Werk seines Willens zu seyn.
Auch in dieser Rücksicht thut sich in Bezug auf das Princip der Besonderheit und der subjectiven Willkühr, der Unterschied in dem politischen Leben des Morgenlands und Abendlands, und der antiken und der modernen Welt hervor. Die Eintheilung des Ganzen in Stände erzeugt sich bey jenen zwar objectiv von selbst, weil sie an sich vernünftig ist, aber das Princip der subjectiven Besonderheit erhält dabey nicht zugleich sein Recht, indem z. B. die Zutheilung der Individuen zu den Ständen den Regenten, wie in dem platonischen Staate (de Rep. III. p. 320. ed. Bip. T. VI.), oder der bloßen Geburt, wie in den indischen Casten überlassen ist. So in die Organisation des Ganzen nicht aufgenommen, und in ihm nicht versöhnt, zeigt sich deswegen die subjective Besonderheit, weil sie als wesentliches Moment gleichfalls hervortritt, als feindseeliges, als Verderben der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung (s. §. 185. Anm.), entweder als sie über den Haufen werfend, wie in den griechischen Staaten und in der römischen Republik, oder wenn diese als Gewalt habend oder etwa als religiöse Autorität sich erhält, als innere Verdorbenheit und vollkommene Degradation, — wie gewissermaßen bey den Lacedämoniern und jetzt am vollständigsten bey den Indiern der Fall ist. — Von der objectiven Ordnung aber, in Angemessenheit mit ihr und zugleich in ihrem Recht erhalten, wird die subjective Besonderheit zum Princip aller Belebung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, der Entwickelung der denkenden Thätigkeit, des Verdiensts und der Ehre. Die Anerkennung und das Recht, daß was in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und im Staate durch die Vernunft nothwendig ist, zugleich durch die Willkühr vermittelt geschehe, ist die nähere Bestimmung dessen, was vornemlich in der allgemeinen Vorstellung Freyheit heißt. (§. 121.).
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
206 The estate, as particularity that has become objective, thus divides itself on the one hand, according to the concept, into its universal differences. On the other hand, however, which particular estate the individual belongs to is a matter on which natural disposition, birth, and circumstances have their influence; but the last and essential determination lies in subjective opinion and particular arbitrary choice, which in this sphere gives itself its right, its merit, and its honor, so that what happens in it through inner necessity is at the same time mediated by arbitrary choice, and for subjective consciousness has the shape of being the work of its will.
In this respect too, with regard to the principle of particularity and of subjective arbitrary choice, the difference that obtains in the political life of East and West, of the ancient and the modern world, comes to the fore. With the former, to be sure, the division of the whole into estates generates itself objectively of itself, because it is in itself rational, but the principle of subjective particularity does not thereby receive its right at the same time, since for example the assignment of individuals to the estates is left to the rulers, as in Plato's state (de Rep. III. p. 320. ed. Bip. T. VI.), or to mere birth, as in the Indian castes. Thus not taken up into the organization of the whole, and not reconciled within it, subjective particularity therefore shows itself—since as an essential moment it equally emerges—as hostile, as the corruption of the social order (see § 185. Remark): either as overthrowing it, as in the Greek states and in the Roman republic, or, if the order maintains itself as possessing power or perhaps as religious authority, as inner depravity and complete degradation—as is in some measure the case among the Lacedaemonians, and now most completely among the Indians.—But maintained by the objective order, in conformity with it and at the same time in its right, subjective particularity becomes the principle of all animation of civil society, of the development of thinking activity, of merit, and of honor. The recognition and the right that what is necessary in civil society and in the state through reason should at the same time come about mediated by arbitrary choice is the more precise determination of what is principally called freedom in the general representation. (§ 121.).
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
206 As particularity that has become objective to itself, the estate divides into its general differences according to the concept. But which particular estate an individual belongs to is another matter. Natural disposition, birth, and circumstances have their influence. Yet the final and essential determination lies in subjective opinion and particular choice. In this sphere, these give themselves their right, their merit, and their honor. So what happens in it through inner necessity is at the same time mediated by choice. For subjective consciousness, it takes the form of being the work of its own will.
In this respect too, the principle of particularity and subjective choice reveals the difference between the political life of the East and the West, and between the ancient and the modern world. In the former cases, the division of the whole into estates does arise objectively on its own, because it is rational in itself. But the principle of subjective particularity does not at the same time receive its right. For example, the assignment of individuals to estates is left to rulers, as in Plato's state (de Rep. III. p. 320. ed. Bip. T. VI.), or to mere birth, as in the Indian castes. Subjective particularity is therefore not taken up into the organization of the whole or reconciled within it. Since it also emerges as an essential element, it appears as hostile, as the corruption of the social order (see § 185. Anm.). Either it overthrows that order, as in the Greek states and the Roman republic, or, if the order preserves itself as force or perhaps as religious authority, particularity appears as inner corruption and complete degradation. This was to some extent the case among the Lacedaemonians and is now most completely the case among the Indians. But when the objective order preserves subjective particularity in a way that fits that order, while also respecting particularity's right, subjective particularity becomes the principle of everything that animates civil society: the development of thinking activity, merit, and honor. Recognition of this principle, and the right that what reason makes necessary in civil society and the state should also happen through the mediation of choice, give a more precise meaning to what is chiefly called freedom in ordinary conception (§ 121.).
About this section
Section 206 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 208 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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