Section 128
Original German
128 Die Noth offenbart sowohl die Endlichkeit und damit die Zufälligkeit des Rechts als des Wohls, — des abstracten Daseyns der Freyheit, ohne daß es als Existenz der besondern Person ist, und der Sphäre des besondern Willens ohne die Allgemeinheit des Rechts. Ihre Einseitigkeit und Idealität ist damit gesetzt, wie sie an ihnen selbst im Begriffe schon bestimmt ist; das Recht hat bereits (§. 106.) sein Daseyn als den besondern Willen bestimmt, und die Subjectivität in ihrer umfassenden Besonderheit ist selbst das Daseyn der Freiheit, (§. 127.) so wie sie an sich als unendliche Beziehung des Willens auf sich das Allgemeine der Freiheit ist. Die beyden Momente an ihnen so zu ihrer Wahrheit, ihrer Identität, integrirt, aber zunächst noch in relativer Beziehung auf einander, sind das Gute, als das erfüllte, an und für sich bestimmte Allgemeine, und das Gewissen, als die in sich wissende und in sich den Inhalt bestimmende unendliche Subjectivität.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
128 Necessity reveals the finitude, and with it the contingency, both of right and of welfare — of the abstract being-there of freedom without its being the existence of the particular person, and of the sphere of the particular will without the universality of right. Their one-sidedness and ideality is thereby posited, as it is already determined in themselves in the concept; right has already (§ 106) determined its being-there as the particular will, and subjectivity in its all-embracing particularity is itself the being-there of freedom (§ 127), just as in itself, as the infinite relation of the will to itself, it is the universal of freedom. The two moments thus integrated in themselves into their truth, their identity, but at first still in relative relation to each other, are the good, as the fulfilled universal determined in and for itself, and conscience, as the infinite subjectivity that knows within itself and determines the content within itself.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
128 Necessity reveals the finitude, and with it the contingency, of both right and welfare. Right is the abstract existence of freedom, without being the existence of the particular person. Welfare is the sphere of the particular will, without the universality of right. Their one-sidedness and ideality is thereby posed, as it is already determined in themselves in the concept. Right has already (§ 106) determined its existence as the particular will. And subjectivity, in its all-embracing particularity, is itself the existence of freedom (§ 127), just as in itself, as the infinite relation of the will to itself, it is the universal of freedom. The two moments, in this way brought together into their truth and identity, but at first still in a relative relation to each other, are the good and conscience. The good is the fulfilled universal, determined in and for itself. Conscience is infinite subjectivity that knows within itself and determines its content within itself.
About this section
Section 128 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 130 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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