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Julius Caesar; Book 8 continued by Aulus Hirtius · Complete work

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CHAPTER 4.1

SECTION 4.1.1Ea quae secuta est hieme, qui fuit annus Cn. Pompeio, M. Crasso consulibus, Usipetes Germani et item Tencteri magna [cum] multitudine hominum flumen Rhenum transierunt, non longe a mari, quo Rhenus influit.

SECTION 4.1.2Causa transeundi fuit quod ab Suebis complures annos exagitati bello premebantur et agri cultura prohibebantur.

SECTION 4.1.3Sueborum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium.

SECTION 4.1.4Hi centum pagos habere dicuntur, ex quibus quotannis singula milia armatorum bellandi causa ex finibus educunt. Reliqui, qui domi manserunt, se atque illos alunt;

SECTION 4.1.5hi rursus in vicem anno post in armis sunt, illi domi remanent.

SECTION 4.1.6Sic neque agri cultura nec ratio atque usus belli intermittitur.

SECTION 4.1.7Sed privati ac separati agri apud eos nihil est, neque longius anno remanere uno in loco colendi causa licet.

SECTION 4.1.8Neque multum frumento, sed maximam partem lacte atque pecore vivunt multum sunt in venationibus;

SECTION 4.1.9quae res et cibi genere et cotidiana exercitatione et libertate vitae, quod a pueris nullo officio aut disciplina adsuefacti nihil omnino contra voluntatem faciunt, et vires alit et immani corporum magnitudine homines efficit.

SECTION 4.1.10Atque in eam se consuetudinem adduxerunt ut locis frigidissimis neque vestitus praeter pelles habeant quicquam, quarum propter exiguitatem magna est corporis pars aperta, et laventur in fluminibus.

CHAPTER 4.2

SECTION 4.2.1Mercatoribus est aditus magis eo ut quae bello ceperint quibus vendant habeant, quam quo ullam rem ad se importari desiderent.

SECTION 4.2.2Quin etiam iumentis, quibus maxime Galli delectantur quaeque impenso parant pretio, Germani importatis non utuntur, sed quae sunt apud eos nata, parva atque deformia, haec cotidiana exercitatione summi ut sint laboris efficiunt.

SECTION 4.2.3Equestribus proeliis saepe ex equis desiliunt ac pedibus proeliantur, equos eodem remanere vestigio adsuefecerunt, ad quos se celeriter, cum usus est, recipiunt:

SECTION 4.2.4neque eorum moribus turpius quicquam aut inertius habetur quam ephippiis uti.

SECTION 4.2.5Itaque ad quemvis numerum ephippiatorum equitum quamvis pauci adire audent.

SECTION 4.2.6Vinum omnino ad se importari non patiuntur, quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitrantur.

CHAPTER 4.3

SECTION 4.3.1Publice maximam putant esse laudem quam latissime a suis finibus vacare agros: hac re significari magnum numerum civitatum suam vim sustinere non posse.

SECTION 4.3.2Itaque una ex parte a Suebis circiter milia passuum C agri vacare dicuntur.

SECTION 4.3.3Ad alteram partem succedunt Ubii, quorum fuit civitas ampla atque florens, ut est captus Germanorum; ii paulo, quamquam sunt eiusdem generis, sunt ceteris humaniores, propterea quod Rhenum attingunt multum ad eos mercatores ventitant et ipsi propter propinquitatem [quod] Gallicis sunt moribus adsuefacti.

SECTION 4.3.4Hos cum Suebi multis saepe bellis experti propter amplitudinem gravitatem civitatis finibus expellere non potuissent, tamen vectigales sibi fecerunt ac multo humiliores infirmiores redegerunt.

CHAPTER 4.4

SECTION 4.4.1In eadem causa fuerunt Usipetes et Tencteri, quos supra diximus; qui complures annos Sueborum vim sustinuerunt,

SECTION 4.4.2ad extremum tamen agris expulsi et multis locis Germaniae triennium vagati ad Rhenum pervenerunt, quas regiones Menapii incolebant. Hi ad utramque ripam fluminis agros, aedificia vicosque habebant;

SECTION 4.4.3sed tantae multitudinis adventu perterriti ex iis aedificiis quae trans flumen habuerant demigraverant, et cis Rhenum dispositis praesidiis Germanos transire prohibebant.

SECTION 4.4.4Illi omnia experti, cum neque vi contendere propter inopiam navium neque clam transire propter custodias Menapiorum possent,

SECTION 4.4.5reverti se in suas sedes regionesque simulaverunt et tridui viam progressi rursus reverterunt atque omni hoc itinere una nocte equitatu confecto inscios inopinantes Menapios oppresserunt,

SECTION 4.4.6qui de Germanorum discessu per exploratores certiores facti sine metu trans Rhenum in suos vicos remigraverant.

SECTION 4.4.7His interfectis navibus eorum occupatis, prius quam ea pars Menapiorum quae citra Rhenum erat certior fieret, flumen transierunt atque omnibus eorum aedificiis occupatis reliquam partem hiemis se eorum copiis aluerunt.

CHAPTER 4.5

SECTION 4.5.1His de rebus Caesar certior factus et infirmitatem Gallorum veritus, quod sunt in consiliis capiendis mobiles et novis plerumque rebus student, nihil his committendum existimavit.

SECTION 4.5.2Est enim hoc Gallicae consuetudinis, uti et viatores etiam invitos consistere cogant et quid quisque eorum de quaque re audierit aut cognoverit quaerant et mercatores in oppidis vulgus circumsistat quibus ex regionibus veniant quas ibi res cognoverint pronuntiare cogat.

SECTION 4.5.3His rebus atque auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia ineunt, quorum eos in vestigio paenitere necesse est, cum incertis rumoribus serviant et pleri ad voluntatem eorum ficta respondeant.

CHAPTER 4.6

SECTION 4.6.1Qua consuetudine cognita Caesar, ne graviori bello, occurreret, maturius quam consuerat ad exercitum proficiscitur.

SECTION 4.6.2Eo cum venisset, ea quae fore suspicatus erat facta cognovit:

SECTION 4.6.3missas legationes ab non nullis civitatibus ad Germanos invitatos eos uti ab Rheno discederent: omnia quae[que] postulassent ab se fore parata.

SECTION 4.6.4Qua spe adducti Germani latius iam vagabantur et in fines Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant.

SECTION 4.6.5Principibus Gallice evocatis Caesar ea quae cognoverat dissimulanda sibi existimavit, eorumque animis permulsis et confirmatis equitatu imperato bellum cum Germanis gerere constituit.

CHAPTER 4.7

SECTION 4.7.1Re frumentaria comparata equitibusque delectis iter in ea loca facere coepit, quibus in locis esse Germanos audiebat.

SECTION 4.7.2A quibus cum paucorum dierum iter abesset, legati ab iis venerunt, quorum haec fuit oratio:

SECTION 4.7.3Germanos neque priores populo Romano bellum inferre neque tamen recusare, si lacessantur, quin armis contendant, quod Germanorum consuetudo [haec] sit a maioribus tradita, Quicumque bellum inferant, resistere neque deprecari. Haec tamen dicere venisse invitos, eiectos domo;

SECTION 4.7.4si suam gratiam Romani velint, posse iis utiles esse amicos; vel sibi agros attribuant vel patiantur eos tenere quos armis possederint:

SECTION 4.7.5sese unis Suebis concedere, quibus ne di quidem immortales pares esse possint; reliquum quidem in terris esse neminem quem non superare possint.

CHAPTER 4.8

SECTION 4.8.1Ad haec Caesar quae visum est respondit; sed exitus fuit orationis: sibi nullam cum iis amicitiam esse posse, si in Gallia remanerent;

SECTION 4.8.2neque verum esse, qui suos fines tueri non potuerint alienos occupare; neque ullos in Gallia vacare agros qui dari tantae praesertim multitudini sine iniuria possint;

SECTION 4.8.3sed licere, si velint, in Ubiorum finibus considere, quorum sint legati apud se et de Sueborum iniuriis querantur et a se auxilium petant: hoc se Ubiis imperaturum.

CHAPTER 4.9

SECTION 4.9.1Legati haec se ad suos relaturos dixerunt et re deliberata post diem tertium ad Caesarem reversuros: interea ne propius se castra moveret petierunt.

SECTION 4.9.2Ne id quidem Caesar ab se impetrari posse dixit.

SECTION 4.9.3Cognoverat enim magnam partem equitatus ab iis aliquot diebus ante praedandi frumentandi causa ad Ambivaritos trans Mosam missam: hos expectari equites atque eius rei causa moram interponi arbitrabatur.

CHAPTER 4.10

SECTION 4.10.1[Mosa profluit ex monte Vosego, qui est in finibus Lingonum, et parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus insulam efficit Batavorum, in Oceanum influit

SECTION 4.10.2neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit.

SECTION 4.10.3Rhenus autem oritur ex Lepontiis, qui Alpes incolunt, et longo spatio per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur et,

SECTION 4.10.4ubi Oceano adpropinquavit, in plures diffluit partes multis ingentibus insulis effectis, quarum pars magna a feris barbaris nationibus incolitur,

SECTION 4.10.5ex quibus sunt qui piscibus atque ovis avium vivere existimantur, multis capitibus in Oceanum influit.]

CHAPTER 4.11

SECTION 4.11.1Caesar cum ab hoste non amplius passuum XII milibus abesset, ut erat constitutum, ad eum legati revertuntur; qui in itinere congressi magnopere ne longius progrederetur orabant.

SECTION 4.11.2Cum id non impetrassent, petebant uti ad eos [equites] qui agmen antecessissent praemitteret eos pugna prohiberet, sibique ut potestatem faceret in Ubios legatos mittendi;

SECTION 4.11.3quorum si principes ac senatus sibi iure iurando fidem fecisset, ea condicione quae a Caesare ferretur se usuros ostendebant: ad has res conficiendas sibi tridui spatium daret.

SECTION 4.11.4Haec omnia Caesar eodem illo pertinere arbitrabatur ut tridui mora interposita equites eorum qui abessent reverterentur; tamen sese non longius milibus passuum IIII aquationis causa processurum eo die dixit:

SECTION 4.11.5huc postero die quam frequentissimi convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis cognosceret.

SECTION 4.11.6Interim ad praefectos, qui cum omni equitatu antecesserant, mittit qui nuntiarent ne hostes proelio lacesserent, et si ipsi lacesserentur, sustinerent quoad ipse cum exercitu propius accessisset.

CHAPTER 4.12

SECTION 4.12.1At hostes, ubi primum nostros equites conspexerunt, quorum erat V milium numerus, cum ipsi non amplius DCCC equites haberent, quod ii qui frumentandi causa ierant trans Mosam profecti nondum redierant, nihil timentibus nostris, quod legati eorum paulo ante a Caesare discesserant atque is dies indutiis erat ab his petitus, impetu facto celeriter nostros perturbaverunt;

SECTION 4.12.2rursus his resistentibus consuetudine sua ad pedes desiluerunt subfossis equis compluribus nostris deiectis reliquos in fugam coniecerunt atque ita perterritos egerunt ut non prius fuga desisterent quam in conspectum agminis nostri venissent.

SECTION 4.12.3In eo proelio ex equitibus nostris interficiuntur IIII et LXX,

SECTION 4.12.4in his vir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus, amplissimo genere natus, cuius avus in civitate sua regnum obtinuerat amicus a senatu nostro appellatus.

SECTION 4.12.5Hic cum fratri intercluso ab hostibus auxilium ferret, illum ex periculo eripuit, ipse equo vulnerato deiectus, quoad potuit, fortissime restitit;

SECTION 4.12.6cum circumventus multis vulneribus acceptis cecidisset atque id frater, qui iam proelio excesserat, procul animadvertisset, incitato equo se hostibus obtulit atque interfectus est.

CHAPTER 4.13

SECTION 4.13.1Hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent;

SECTION 4.13.2expectare vero dum hostium copiae augerentur equitatus reverteretur summae dementiae esse iudicabat,

SECTION 4.13.3et cognita Gallorum infirmitate quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent consecuti sentiebat; quibus ad consilia capienda nihil spatii dandum existimabat.

SECTION 4.13.4His constitutis rebus et consilio cum legatis et quaestore communicato, ne quem diem pugnae praetermitteret, oportunissima res accidit, quod postridie eius diei mane eadem et perfidia et simulatione usi Germani frequentes, omnibus principibus maioribusque natu adhibitis, ad eum in castra venerunt,

SECTION 4.13.5simul, ut dicebatur, sui purgandi causa, quod contra atque esset dictum et ipsi petissent, proelium pridie commisissent, simul ut, si quid possent, de indutiis fallendo impetrarent.

SECTION 4.13.6Quos sibi Caesar oblatos gavisus illos retineri iussit; ipse omnes copias castris eduxit equitatumque, quod recenti proelio perterritum esse existimabat, agmen subsequi iussit.

CHAPTER 4.14

SECTION 4.14.1Acie triplici instituta et celeriter VIII milium itinere confecto, prius ad hostium castra pervenit quam quid ageretur Germani sentire possent.

SECTION 4.14.2Qui omnibus rebus subito perterriti et celeritate adventus nostri et discessu suorum, neque consilii habendi neque arma capiendi spatio dato perturbantur, copiasne adversus hostem ducere an castra defendere an fuga salutem petere praestaret.

SECTION 4.14.3Quorum timor cum fremitu et concursu significaretur, milites nostri pristini diei perfidia incitati in castra inruperunt.

SECTION 4.14.4Quo loco qui celeriter arma capere potuerunt paulisper nostris restiterunt atque inter carros impedimenta proelium commiserunt;

SECTION 4.14.5at reliqua multitudo puerorum mulierumque (nam cum omnibus suis domo excesserant Rhenum transierant) passim fugere coepit, ad quos consectandos Caesar equitatum misit.

CHAPTER 4.15

SECTION 4.15.1Germani post tergum clamore audito, cum suos interfici viderent, armis abiectis signis militaribus relictis se ex castris eiecerunt,

SECTION 4.15.2et cum ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni pervenissent, reliqua fuga desperata, magno numero interfecto, reliqui se in flumen praecipitaverunt atque ibi timore, lassitudine, vi fluminis oppressi perierunt.

SECTION 4.15.3Nostri ad unum omnes incolumes, perpaucis vulneratis, ex tanti belli timore, cum hostium numerus capitum CCCCXXX milium fuisset, se in castra receperunt.

SECTION 4.15.4Caesar iis quos in castris retinuerat discedendi potestatem fecit.

SECTION 4.15.5Illi supplicia cruciatusque Gallorum veriti, quorum agros vexaverant, remanere se apud eum velle dixerunt. His Caesar libertatem concessit.

CHAPTER 4.16

SECTION 4.16.1Germanico bello confecto multis de causis Caesar statuit sibi Rhenum esse transeundum; quarum illa fuit iustissima quod, cum videret Germanos tam facile impelli ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire.

SECTION 4.16.2Accessit etiam quod illa pars equitatus Usipetum et Tencterorum, quam supra commemoravi praedandi frumentandique causa Mosam transisse neque proelio interfuisse, post fugam suorum se trans Rhenum in fines Sugambrorum receperat seque cum his coniunxerat.

SECTION 4.16.3Ad quos cum Caesar nuntios misisset, qui postularent eos qui sibi Galliae bellum intulissent sibi dederent, responderunt:

SECTION 4.16.4populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire; si se invito Germanos in Galliam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sui quicquam esse imperii aut potestatis trans Rhenum postularet?

SECTION 4.16.5Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, obsides dederant, magnopere orabant ut sibi auxilium ferret, quod graviter ab Suebis premerentur;

SECTION 4.16.6vel, si id facere occupationibus rei publicae prohiberetur, exercitum modo Rhenum transportaret: id sibi ad auxilium spemque reliqui temporis satis futurum.

SECTION 4.16.7Tantum esse nomen atque opinionem eius exercitus Ariovisto pulso et hoc novissimo proelio facto etiam ad ultimas Germanorum nationes, uti opinione et amicitia populi Romani tuti esse possint.

SECTION 4.16.8Navium magnam copiam ad transportandum exercitum pollicebantur.

CHAPTER 4.17

SECTION 4.17.1Caesar his de causis quas commemoravi Rhenum transire decreverat; sed navibus transire neque satis tutum esse arbitrabatur neque suae neque populi Romani dignitatis esse statuebat.

SECTION 4.17.2Itaque, etsi summa difficultas faciendi pontis proponebatur propter latitudinem, rapiditatem altitudinemque fluminis, tamen id sibi contendendum aut aliter non traducendum exercitum existimabat.

SECTION 4.17.3Rationem pontis hanc instituit. Tigna bina sesquipedalia paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat.

SECTION 4.17.4Haec cum machinationibus immissa in flumen defixerat fistucisque adegerat, non sublicae modo derecte ad perpendiculum, sed prone ac fastigate, ut secundum naturam fluminis procumberent,

SECTION 4.17.5iis item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte contra vim atque impetu fluminis conversa statuebat.

SECTION 4.17.6Haec utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum tignorum iunctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur;

SECTION 4.17.7quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis, tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura ut, quo maior vis aquae se incitavisset, hoc artius inligata tenerentur.

SECTION 4.17.8Haec derecta materia iniecta contexebantur ac longuriis cratibusque consternebantur;

SECTION 4.17.9ac nihilo setius sublicae et ad inferiorem partem fluminis oblique agebantur, quae pro ariete subiectae et cum omni opere coniunctae vim fluminis exciperent,

SECTION 4.17.10et aliae item supra pontem mediocri spatio, ut, si arborum trunci sive naves deiciendi operis causa essent a barbaris missae, his defensoribus earum rerum vis minueretur neu ponti nocerent.

CHAPTER 4.18

SECTION 4.18.1Diebus X, quibus materia coepta erat comportari, omni opere effecto exercitus traducitur.

SECTION 4.18.2Caesar ad utramque partem pontis firmo praesidio relicto in fines Sugambrorum contendit.

SECTION 4.18.3Interim a compluribus civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt; quibus pacem atque amicitiam petentibus liberaliter respondet obsidesque ad se adduci iubet.

SECTION 4.18.4At Sugambri, ex eo tempore quo pons institui coeptus est fuga comparata, hortantibus iis quos ex Tencteris atque Usipetibus apud se habebant, finibus suis excesserant suaque omnia exportaverant seque in solitudinem ac silvas abdiderant.

CHAPTER 4.19

SECTION 4.19.1Caesar paucos dies in eorum finibus moratus, omnibus vicis aedificiisque incensis frumentisque succisis, se in fines Ubiorum recepit atque his auxilium suum pollicitus, si a Suebis premerentur, haec ab iis cognovit:

SECTION 4.19.2Suebos, postea quam per exploratores pontem fieri comperissent, more suo concilio habito nuntios in omnes partes dimisisse, uti de oppidis demigrarent, liberos, uxores suaque omnia in silvis deponerent atque omnes qui arma ferre possent unum in locum convenirent.

SECTION 4.19.3Hunc esse delectum medium fere regionum earum quas Suebi obtinerent; hic Romanorum adventum expectare atque ibi decertare constituisse.

SECTION 4.19.4Quod ubi Caesar comperit, omnibus iis rebus confectis, quarum rerum causa exercitum traducere constituerat, ut Germanis metum iniceret, ut Sugambros ulcisceretur, ut Ubios obsidione liberaret, diebus omnino XVIII trans Rhenum consumptis, satis et ad laudem et ad utilitatem profectum arbitratus se in Galliam recepit pontemque rescidit.

CHAPTER 4.20

SECTION 4.20.1Exigua parte aestatis reliqua Caesar, etsi in his locis, quod omnis Gallia ad septentriones vergit, maturae sunt hiemes, tamen in Britanniam proficisci contendit, quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde subministrata auxilia intellegebat,

SECTION 4.20.2et si tempus anni ad bellum gerendum deficeret, tamen magno sibi usui fore arbitrabatur, si modo insulam adiisset, genus hominum perspexisset, loca, portus, aditus cognovisset; quae omnia fere Gallis erant incognita.

SECTION 4.20.3Neque enim temere praeter mercatores illo adit quisquam, neque his ipsis quicquam praeter oram maritimam atque eas regiones quae sunt contra Galliam notum est.

SECTION 4.20.4Itaque vocatis ad se undique mercatoribus, neque quanta esset insulae magnitudo neque quae aut quantae nationes incolerent, neque quem usum belli haberent aut quibus institutis uterentur, neque qui essent ad maiorem navium multitudinem idonei portus reperire poterat.

CHAPTER 4.21

SECTION 4.21.1Ad haec cognoscenda, prius quam periculum faceret, idoneum esse arbitratus C. Volusenum cum navi longa praemittit.

SECTION 4.21.2Huic mandat ut exploratis omnibus rebus ad se quam primum revertatur.

SECTION 4.21.3Ipse cum omnibus copiis in Morinos proficiscitur, quod inde erat brevissimus in Britanniam traiectus.

SECTION 4.21.4Huc naves undique ex finitimis regionibus et quam superiore aestate ad Veneticum bellum fecerat classem iubet convenire.

SECTION 4.21.5Interim, consilio eius cognito et per mercatores perlato ad Britannos, a compluribus insulae civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt, qui polliceantur obsides dare atque imperio populi Romani obtemperare.

SECTION 4.21.6Quibus auditis, liberaliter pollicitus hortatusque ut in ea sententia permanerent,

SECTION 4.21.7eos domum remittit et cum iis una Commium, quem ipse Atrebatibus superatis regem ibi constituerat, cuius et virtutem et consilium probabat et quem sibi fidelem esse arbitrabatur cuiusque auctoritas in his regionibus magni habebatur, mittit.

SECTION 4.21.8Huic imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet.

SECTION 4.21.9Volusenus perspectis regionibus omnibus quantum ei facultatis dari potuit, qui navi egredi ac se barbaris committere non auderet, V die ad Caesarem revertitur quaeque ibi perspexisset renuntiat.

CHAPTER 4.22

SECTION 4.22.1Dum in his locis Caesar navium parandarum causa moratur, ex magna parte Morinorum ad eum legati venerunt, qui se de superioris temporis consilio excusarent, quod homines barbari et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti bellum populo Romano fecissent, seque ea quae imperasset facturos pollicerentur.

SECTION 4.22.2Hoc sibi Caesar satis oportune accidisse arbitratus, quod neque post tergum hostem relinquere volebat neque belli gerendi propter anni tempus facultatem habebat neque has tantularum rerum occupationes Britanniae anteponendas iudicabat, magnum iis numerum obsidum imperat.

SECTION 4.22.3Quibus adductis eos in fidem recipit. Navibus circiter LXXX onerariis coactis contractisque, quot satis esse ad duas transportandas legiones existimabat, quod praeterea navium longarum habebat quaestori, legatis praefectisque distribuit.

SECTION 4.22.4Huc accedebant XVIII onerariae naves, quae ex eo loco a milibus passuum VIII vento tenebantur quo minus in eundem portum venire possent: has equitibus tribuit.

SECTION 4.22.5Reliquum exercitum Q. Titurio Sabino et L. Aurunculeio Cottae legatis in Menapios atque in eos pagos Morinorum a quibus ad eum legati non venerant ducendum dedit;

SECTION 4.22.6Sulpicium Rufum legatum cum eo praesidio quod satis esse arbitrabatur portum tenere iussit.

CHAPTER 4.23

SECTION 4.23.1His constitutis rebus, nactus idoneam ad navigandum tempestatem III. fere vigilia solvit equitesque in ulteriorem portum progredi et naves conscendere et se sequi iussit.

SECTION 4.23.2A quibus cum paulo tardius esset administratum, ipse hora diei circiter IIII. cum primis navibus Britanniam attigit atque ibi in omnibus collibus expositas hostium copias armatas conspexit.

SECTION 4.23.3Cuius loci haec erat natura atque ita montibus angustis mare continebatur, uti ex locis superioribus in litus telum adigi posset.

SECTION 4.23.4Hunc ad egrediendum nequaquam idoneum locum arbitratus, dum reliquae naves eo convenirent ad horam nonam in ancoris expectavit.

SECTION 4.23.5Interim legatis tribunisque militum convocatis et quae ex Voluseno cognovisset et quae fieri vellet ostendit monuitque, ut rei militaris ratio, maximeque ut maritimae res postularent, ut, cum celerem atque instabilem motum haberent, ad nutum et ad tempus omnes res ab iis administrarentur.

SECTION 4.23.6His dimissis et ventum et aestum uno tempore nactus secundum, dato signo et sublatis ancoris, circiter milia passuum VII ab eo loco progressus aperto ac plano litore naves constituit.

CHAPTER 4.24

SECTION 4.24.1At barbari, consilio Romanorum cognito praemisso equitatu et essedariis, quo plerumque genere in proeliis uti consuerunt, reliquis copiis subsecuti nostros navibus egredi prohibebant.

SECTION 4.24.2Erat ob has causas summa difficultas, quod naves propter magnitudinem nisi in alto constitui non poterant, militibus autem, ignotis locis, impeditis manibus, magno et gravi onere armorum oppressis simul et de navibus desiliendum et in fluctibus consistendum et cum hostibus erat pugnandum,

SECTION 4.24.3cum illi aut ex arido aut paulum in aquam progressi omnibus membris expeditis, notissimis locis, audacter tela coicerent et equos insuefactos incitarent.

SECTION 4.24.4Quibus rebus nostri perterriti atque huius omnino generis pugnae imperiti, non eadem alacritate ac studio quo in pedestribus uti proeliis consuerant utebantur.

CHAPTER 4.25

SECTION 4.25.1Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, naves longas, quarum et species erat barbaris inusitatior et motus ad usum expeditior, paulum removeri ab onerariis navibus et remis incitari et ad latus apertum hostium constitui atque inde fundis, sagittis, tormentis hostes propelli ac submoveri iussit; quae res magno usui nostris fuit.

SECTION 4.25.2Nam et navium figura et remorum motu et inusitato genere tormentorum permoti barbari constiterunt ac paulum modo pedem rettulerunt.

SECTION 4.25.3Atque nostris militibus cunctantibus, maxime propter altitudinem maris, qui X legionis aquilam gerebat, obtestatus deos, ut ea res legioni feliciter eveniret, ' desilite', inquit, ' milites, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero.'

SECTION 4.25.4Hoc cum voce magna dixisset, se ex navi proiecit atque in hostes aquilam ferre coepit.

SECTION 4.25.5Tum nostri cohortati inter se, ne tantum dedecus admitteretur, universi ex navi desiluerunt.

SECTION 4.25.6Hos item ex proximis primi navibus cum conspexissent, subsecuti hostibus adpropinquaverunt.

CHAPTER 4.26

SECTION 4.26.1Pugnatum est ab utrisque acriter. Nostri tamen, quod neque ordines servare neque firmiter insistere neque signa subsequi poterant atque alius alia ex navi quibuscumque signis occurrerat se adgregabat, magnopere perturbabantur;

SECTION 4.26.2hostes vero, notis omnibus vadis, ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi egredientes conspexerant, incitatis equis impeditos adoriebantur,

SECTION 4.26.3plures paucos circumsistebant, alii ab latere aperto in universos tela coniciebant.

SECTION 4.26.4Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, scaphas longarum navium, item speculatoria navigia militibus compleri iussit, et quos laborantes conspexerat, his subsidia submittebat.

SECTION 4.26.5Nostri, simul in arido constiterunt, suis omnibus consecutis, in hostes impetum fecerunt atque eos in fugam dederunt; neque longius prosequi potuerunt, quod equites cursum tenere atque insulam capere non potuerant. Hoc unum ad pristinam fortunam Caesari defuit.

CHAPTER 4.27

SECTION 4.27.1Hostes proelio superati, simul atque se ex fuga receperunt, statim ad Caesarem legatos de pace miserunt; obsides sese daturos quaeque imperasset facturos polliciti sunt.

SECTION 4.27.2Una cum his legatis Commius Atrebas venit, quem supra demonstraveram a Caesare in Britanniam praemissum.

SECTION 4.27.3Hunc illi e navi egressum, cum ad eos oratoris modo Caesaris mandata deferret, comprehenderant atque in vincula coniecerant;

SECTION 4.27.4tum proelio facto remiserunt et in petenda pace eius rei culpam in multitudinem contulerunt et propter imprudentiam ut ignosceretur petiverunt.

SECTION 4.27.5Caesar questus quod, cum ultro in continentem legatis missis pacem ab se petissent, bellum sine causa intulissent, ignoscere se imprudentiae dixit obsidesque imperavit;

SECTION 4.27.6quorum illi partem statim dederunt, partem ex longinquioribus locis arcessitam paucis diebus sese daturos dixerunt.

SECTION 4.27.7Interea suos in agros remigrare iusserunt, principesque undique convenire et se civitatesque suas Caesari commendare coeperunt.

CHAPTER 4.28

SECTION 4.28.1His rebus pace confirmata, post diem quartum quam est in Britanniam ventum naves XVIII, de quibus supra demonstratum est, quae equites sustulerant, ex superiore portu leni vento solverunt.

SECTION 4.28.2Quae cum adpropinquarent Britanniae et ex castris viderentur, tanta tempestas subito coorta est ut nulla earum cursum tenere posset, sed aliae eodem unde erant profectae referrentur, aliae ad inferiorem partem insulae, quae est propius solis occasum, magno suo cum periculo deicerentur;

SECTION 4.28.3quae tamen ancoris iactis cum fluctibus complerentur, necessario adversa nocte in altum provectae continentem petierunt.

CHAPTER 4.29

SECTION 4.29.1Eadem nocte accidit ut esset luna plena, qui dies maritimos aestus maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit, nostrisque id erat incognitum.

SECTION 4.29.2Ita uno tempore et longas naves, [quibus Caesar exercitum transportandum curaverat,] quas Caesar in aridum subduxerat, aestus complebat, et onerarias, quae ad ancoras erant deligatae, tempestas adflictabat, neque ulla nostris facultas aut administrandi aut auxiliandi dabatur.

SECTION 4.29.3Compluribus navibus fractis, reliquae cum essent funibus, ancoris reliquisque armamentis amissis ad navigandum inutiles, magna, id quod necesse erat accidere, totius exercitus perturbatio facta est.

SECTION 4.29.4Neque enim naves erant aliae quibus reportari possent, et omnia deerant quae ad reficiendas naves erant usui, et, quod omnibus constabat hiemari in Gallia oportere, frumentum in his locis in hiemem provisum non erat.

CHAPTER 4.30

SECTION 4.30.1Quibus rebus cognitis, principes Britanniae, qui post proelium ad Caesarem convenerant, inter se conlocuti, cum et equites et naves et frumentum Romanis deesse intellegerent et paucitatem militum ex castrorum exiguitate cognoscerent, quae hoc erant etiam angustiora quod sine impedimentis Caesar legiones transportaverat,

SECTION 4.30.2optimum factu esse duxerunt rebellione facta frumento commeatuque nostros prohibere et rem in hiemem producere, quod his superatis aut reditu interclusis neminem postea belli inferendi causa in Britanniam transiturum confidebant.

SECTION 4.30.3Itaque rursus coniuratione facta paulatim ex castris discedere et suos clam ex agris deducere coeperunt.

CHAPTER 4.31

SECTION 4.31.1At Caesar, etsi nondum eorum consilia cognoverat, tamen et ex eventu navium suarum et ex eo quod obsides dare intermiserant fore id quod accidit suspicabatur.

SECTION 4.31.2Itaque ad omnes casus subsidia comparabat. Nam et frumentum ex agris cotidie in castra conferebat et, quae gravissime adflictae erant naves, earum materia atque aere ad reliquas reficiendas utebatur et quae ad eas res erant usui ex continenti comportari iubebat.

SECTION 4.31.3Itaque, cum summo studio a militibus administraretur, XII navibus amissis, reliquis ut navigari satis commode posset effecit.

CHAPTER 4.32

SECTION 4.32.1Dum ea geruntur, legione ex consuetudine una frumentatum missa, quae appellabatur VII., neque ulla ad id tempus belli suspicione interposita, cum pars hominum in agris remaneret, pars etiam in castra ventitaret, ii qui pro portis castrorum in statione erant Caesari nuntiaverunt pulverem maiorem quam consuetudo ferret in ea parte videri quam in partem legio iter fecisset.

SECTION 4.32.2Caesar—id quod erat—suspicatus aliquid novi a barbaris initum consilii, cohortes quae in statione erant secum in eam partem proficisci, ex reliquis duas in stationem succedere, reliquas armari et confestim sese subsequi iussit.

SECTION 4.32.3Cum paulo longius a castris processisset, suos ab hostibus premi atque aegre sustinere et conferta legione ex omnibus partibus tela coici animadvertit.

SECTION 4.32.4Nam quod omni ex reliquis partibus demesso frumento pars una erat reliqua, suspicati hostes huc nostros esse venturos noctu in silvis delituerant;

SECTION 4.32.5tum dispersos depositis armis in metendo occupatos subito adorti paucis interfectis reliquos incertis ordinibus perturbaverant, simul equitatu atque essedis circumdederant.

CHAPTER 4.33

SECTION 4.33.1Genus hoc est ex essedis pugnae. Primo per omnes partes perequitant et tela coiciunt atque ipso terrore equorum et strepitu rotarum ordines plerumque perturbant, et cum se inter equitum turmas insinuaverunt, ex essedis desiliunt et pedibus proeliantur.

SECTION 4.33.2Aurigae interim paulatim ex proelio excedunt atque ita currus conlocant ut, si illi a multitudine hostium premantur, expeditum ad suos receptum habeant.

SECTION 4.33.3Ita mobilitatem equitum, stabilitatem peditum in proeliis praestant, ac tantum usu cotidiano et exercitatione efficiunt uti in declivi ac praecipiti loco incitatos equos sustinere et brevi moderari ac flectere et per temonem percurrere et in iugo insistere et se inde in currus citissime recipere consuerint.

CHAPTER 4.34

SECTION 4.34.1Quibus rebus perturbatis nostris [novitate pugnae] tempore oportunissimo Caesar auxilium tulit: namque eius adventu hostes constiterunt, nostri se ex timore receperunt.

SECTION 4.34.2Quo facto, ad lacessendum hostem et committendum proelium alienum esse tempus arbitratus suo se loco continuit et brevi tempore intermisso in castra legiones reduxit.

SECTION 4.34.3Dum haec geruntur, nostris omnibus occupatis qui erant in agris reliqui discesserunt.

SECTION 4.34.4Secutae sunt continuos complures dies tempestates, quae et nostros in castris continerent et hostem a pugna prohiberent.

SECTION 4.34.5Interim barbari nuntios in omnes partes dimiserunt paucitatemque nostrorum militum suis praedicaverunt et quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas daretur, si Romanos castris expulissent, demonstraverunt. His rebus celeriter magna multitudine peditatus equitatusque coacta ad castra venerunt.

CHAPTER 4.35

SECTION 4.35.1Caesar, etsi idem quod superioribus diebus acciderat fore videbat, ut, si essent hostes pulsi, celeritate periculum effugerent, tamen nactus equites circiter XXX, quos Commius Atrebas, de quo ante dictum est, secum transportaverat, legiones in acie pro castris constituit.

SECTION 4.35.2Commisso proelio diutius nostrorum militum impetum hostes ferre non potuerunt ac terga verterunt.

SECTION 4.35.3Quos tanto spatio secuti quantum cursu et viribus efficere potuerunt, complures ex iis occiderunt, deinde omnibus longe lateque aedificiis incensis se in castra receperunt.

CHAPTER 4.36

SECTION 4.36.1Eodem die legati ab hostibus missi ad Caesarem de pace venerunt.

SECTION 4.36.2His Caesar numerum obsidum quem ante imperaverat duplicavit eosque in continentem adduci iussit, quod propinqua die aequinoctii infirmis navibus hiemi navigationem subiciendam non existimabat.

SECTION 4.36.3Ipse idoneam tempestatem nactus paulo post mediam noctem naves solvit,

SECTION 4.36.4quae omnes incolumes ad continentem pervenerunt; sed ex iis onerariae duae eosdem portus quos reliquae capere non potuerunt et paulo infra delatae sunt.

CHAPTER 4.37

SECTION 4.37.1Quibus ex navibus cum essent expositi milites circiter CCC atque in castra contenderent, Morini, quos Caesar in Britanniam proficiscens pacatos reliquerat, spe praedae adducti primo non ita magno suorum numero circumsteterunt ac, si sese interfici nollent, arma ponere iusserunt.

SECTION 4.37.2Cum illi orbe facto sese defenderent, celeriter ad clamorem hominum circiter milia VI convenerunt. Qua re nuntiata, Caesar omnem ex castris equitatum suis auxilio misit.

SECTION 4.37.3Interim nostri milites impetum hostium sustinuerunt atque amplius horis IIII fortissime pugnaverunt et paucis vulneribus acceptis complures ex iis occiderunt.

SECTION 4.37.4Postea vero quam equitatus noster in conspectum venit, hostes abiectis armis terga verterunt magnusque eorum numerus est occisus.

CHAPTER 4.38

SECTION 4.38.1Caesar postero die T. Labienum legatum cum iis legionibus quas ex Britannia reduxerat in Morinos qui rebellionem fecerant misit.

SECTION 4.38.2Qui cum propter siccitates paludum quo se reciperent non haberent, quo perfugio superiore anno erant usi, omnes fere in potestatem Labieni venerunt.

SECTION 4.38.3At Q. Titurius et L. Cotta legati, qui in Menapiorum fines legiones duxerant, omnibus eorum agris vastatis, frumentis succisis, aedificiis incensis, quod Menapii se omnes in densissimas silvas abdiderant, se ad Caesarem receperunt.

SECTION 4.38.4Caesar in Belgis omnium legionum hiberna constituit. Eo duae omnino civitates ex Britannia obsides miserunt, reliquae neglexerunt.

SECTION 4.38.5His rebus gestis ex litteris Caesaris dierum XX supplicatio a senatu decreta est.

Mouseia

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 8 Latin books, 404 chapters, and 2,150 sections for fidelity, military precision, political clarity, structure, and narrative force.

CHAPTER 4.1

SECTION 4.1.1In the following winter, during the consulship of Gnaeus Pompeius and Marcus Crassus, the German Usipetes, together with the Tencteri, crossed the Rhine with a great multitude of people, not far from the sea into which the Rhine flows.

SECTION 4.1.2Their reason for crossing was that for several years they had been harried by the Suebi, oppressed by war, and prevented from cultivating their fields.

SECTION 4.1.3The nation of the Suebi is by far the largest and most warlike of all the Germans.

SECTION 4.1.4They are said to possess a hundred cantons, from each of which they lead out every year a thousand armed men to make war. The rest, who remain at home, support themselves and those in the field.

SECTION 4.1.5In the following year these men in turn serve under arms, while the others remain at home.

SECTION 4.1.6Thus neither agriculture nor the theory and practice of war is interrupted.

SECTION 4.1.7But among them there is no private or separately owned land, nor is anyone permitted to remain in one place for more than a year for the purpose of cultivation.

SECTION 4.1.8They do not live much upon grain, but chiefly upon milk and the flesh of livestock, and they devote much of their time to hunting.

SECTION 4.1.9This way of life—through the nature of their food, daily exercise, and freedom, since from childhood they are accustomed to no duty or discipline and do absolutely nothing against their will—nourishes their strength and makes them men of immense physical stature.

SECTION 4.1.10They have trained themselves to such habits that even in the coldest regions they wear no clothing except skins, which are so scanty that a large part of the body remains bare, and they bathe in rivers.

CHAPTER 4.2

SECTION 4.2.1Merchants are admitted among them more so that they may have buyers for what they have captured in war than because they desire anything to be imported.

SECTION 4.2.2Indeed, the Germans do not use imported draft animals, in which the Gauls take the greatest delight and which they purchase at enormous prices. Instead, by daily exercise they make the small and ill-shaped animals bred among them capable of the greatest endurance.

SECTION 4.2.3In cavalry battles they often leap down from their horses and fight on foot. They have trained their horses to remain in the same spot, and when need arises they quickly return to them.

SECTION 4.2.4By their customs nothing is considered more shameful or more spiritless than the use of saddles.

SECTION 4.2.5Therefore, however few they may be, they dare to advance against any number of saddled cavalry.

SECTION 4.2.6They permit no wine at all to be imported, because they believe that it makes men too soft to endure hardship and renders them effeminate.

CHAPTER 4.3

SECTION 4.3.1As a nation, they consider it their greatest distinction for the lands bordering their territory to lie uninhabited as widely as possible. They believe this signifies that a great number of states cannot withstand their power.

SECTION 4.3.2Thus on one side of the Suebi, it is said, the land lies uninhabited for about a hundred miles.

SECTION 4.3.3On the other side lie the Ubii, whose state was extensive and flourishing by German standards. Although they are of the same race, they are somewhat more civilized than the rest, because their territory touches the Rhine, merchants visit them frequently, and they themselves, owing to their proximity, have become accustomed to Gallic ways.

SECTION 4.3.4The Suebi had often tested them in many wars but, because of the size and importance of their state, had been unable to drive them from their territory. Nevertheless, they made them tributaries and reduced them to a condition of far greater humiliation and weakness.

CHAPTER 4.4

SECTION 4.4.1The Usipetes and Tencteri, whom we mentioned above, were in the same situation. For several years they withstood the power of the Suebi.

SECTION 4.4.2At last, however, they were driven from their lands, wandered through many parts of Germany for three years, and reached the Rhine, in regions inhabited by the Menapii. The Menapii possessed fields, buildings, and villages on both banks of the river.

SECTION 4.4.3Terrified by the arrival of so great a multitude, they withdrew from the buildings they had possessed across the river and stationed guards on this side of the Rhine to prevent the Germans from crossing.

SECTION 4.4.4The Germans tried every expedient, but they could neither force a crossing for lack of boats nor cross secretly because of the Menapii’s guards.

SECTION 4.4.5They therefore pretended to return to their own homes and territories, marched away for three days, and then turned back. Their cavalry covered the whole return journey in a single night and fell upon the Menapii, who knew nothing and expected nothing.

SECTION 4.4.6The Menapii, having been informed by scouts of the Germans’ departure, had crossed the Rhine without fear and returned to their villages.

SECTION 4.4.7After killing them and seizing their boats, they crossed the river before that part of the Menapii which lay on this side of the Rhine could be informed; then, taking possession of all their buildings, they sustained themselves on the Menapii’s provisions for the remainder of the winter.

CHAPTER 4.5

SECTION 4.5.1When Caesar was informed of these events, he feared the fickleness of the Gauls, because they are changeable in forming plans and generally eager for revolution, and therefore judged that nothing should be entrusted to them.

SECTION 4.5.2For it is a Gallic custom to compel travelers to stop, even against their will, and to ask what each of them has heard or learned about every matter; and in the towns the common people crowd around merchants and force them to declare from what countries they come and what events they have learned of there.

SECTION 4.5.3Moved by such reports and hearsay, they often form plans concerning matters of the highest importance, only to be forced to repent of them at once, since they are at the mercy of uncertain rumors, and most men give them fabricated answers suited to their wishes.

CHAPTER 4.6

SECTION 4.6.1Knowing this custom, Caesar, so that he might not encounter a more serious war, set out for the army earlier than was his habit.

SECTION 4.6.2When he arrived there, he learned that what he had suspected would happen had taken place:

SECTION 4.6.3embassies had been sent by several states to the Germans, inviting them to withdraw from the Rhine and assuring them that everything they demanded would be made ready by the Gauls.

SECTION 4.6.4Encouraged by this hope, the Germans were already ranging more widely and had reached the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are dependents of the Treveri.

SECTION 4.6.5After summoning the leading men of Gaul, Caesar decided that he must conceal what he had learned. He soothed and reassured their minds, ordered them to furnish cavalry, and resolved to wage war against the Germans.

CHAPTER 4.7

SECTION 4.7.1After securing the grain supply and selecting his cavalry, he began to march toward the places where he heard that the Germans were.

SECTION 4.7.2When he was a few days’ march from them, envoys came from them and spoke as follows:

SECTION 4.7.3The Germans neither made war upon the Roman people first nor, if attacked, refused to contend in arms, because this was the Germans’ ancestral custom: whoever made war upon them, they resisted and did not beg for peace. Yet they had come, they said, unwillingly, driven from their home;

SECTION 4.7.4if the Romans desired their friendship, they could be useful friends to them. Let the Romans either allot them lands or permit them to retain those they had won by arms.

SECTION 4.7.5They yielded to the Suebi alone, whom not even the immortal gods could equal; as for all the rest, there was no one on earth whom they could not overcome.

CHAPTER 4.8

SECTION 4.8.1To this Caesar made such reply as he thought fit; but the conclusion of his speech was that there could be no friendship between him and them if they remained in Gaul;

SECTION 4.8.2nor was it right that men who had been unable to defend their own territory should occupy that of others; and there were no vacant lands in Gaul that could be given, especially to so great a multitude, without injustice;

SECTION 4.8.3but they might, if they wished, settle in the territory of the Ubii, whose envoys were then with him, complaining of the injuries inflicted by the Suebi and seeking aid from him. He would command the Ubii to receive them.

CHAPTER 4.9

SECTION 4.9.1The envoys said that they would report this to their people and, after deliberating on the matter, would return to Caesar on the third day. Meanwhile, they asked him not to move his camp any nearer to them.

SECTION 4.9.2Caesar said that not even this request could be granted.

SECTION 4.9.3For he had learned that several days before they had sent a large part of their cavalry across the Meuse into the territory of the Ambivariti to plunder and forage. He believed that they were waiting for these horsemen and were seeking delay for that reason.

CHAPTER 4.10

SECTION 4.10.1[The Meuse rises in Mount Vosges, which lies in the territory of the Lingones, and, after receiving a branch of the Rhine called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi and flows into the Ocean;

SECTION 4.10.2and no farther than eighty miles from the Ocean, it flows into the Rhine.

SECTION 4.10.3The Rhine, however, rises among the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and rushes swiftly for a great distance through the territories of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci, and Treveri;

SECTION 4.10.4and when it approaches the Ocean, it divides into several channels, forming many immense islands, a large part of which are inhabited by fierce and barbarous tribes,

SECTION 4.10.5some of whom are believed to live on fish and birds’ eggs; and it flows into the Ocean through many mouths.]

CHAPTER 4.11

SECTION 4.11.1When Caesar was no more than twelve miles from the enemy, their envoys returned to him as arranged. Meeting him on the march, they earnestly begged him to advance no farther.

SECTION 4.11.2When they failed to obtain this, they asked him to send orders ahead to the cavalry that had preceded the column and forbid them to engage, and to grant the Germans an opportunity to send envoys to the Ubii.

SECTION 4.11.3They declared that, if the chief men and senate of the Ubii pledged their good faith to them by oath, they would accept the terms Caesar offered. They asked him to grant them three days to conclude these arrangements.

SECTION 4.11.4Caesar believed that all these requests had the same purpose: to secure a delay of three days so that their absent cavalry might return. Nevertheless, he said that on that day he would advance no farther than four miles, for the sake of obtaining water.

SECTION 4.11.5He ordered them to assemble there the next day in the greatest possible numbers, so that he might consider their demands.

SECTION 4.11.6Meanwhile, he sent messengers to the commanders who had gone ahead with all the cavalry, directing them not to provoke the enemy to battle and, if they themselves were attacked, to hold their ground until he came nearer with the army.

CHAPTER 4.12

SECTION 4.12.1But the enemy, as soon as they caught sight of our cavalry, five thousand strong, while they themselves had no more than eight hundred horsemen—for those who had crossed the Meuse to forage had not yet returned—made a charge and quickly threw our men into disorder. Our men feared nothing, because the German envoys had left Caesar only a little before, and that day had been requested by them as a truce.

SECTION 4.12.2When our men rallied and resisted, the Germans, following their usual practice, leaped down from their horses; then, stabbing many of our horses from below and unseating their riders, they put the rest to flight and drove them on in such terror that they did not cease fleeing until they came within sight of our marching column.

SECTION 4.12.3In that engagement seventy-four of our cavalry were killed,

SECTION 4.12.4among them Piso the Aquitanian, a man of the greatest courage and of most distinguished birth, whose grandfather had held the kingship in his own state and had been named a friend by our Senate.

SECTION 4.12.5When his brother was cut off by the enemy, Piso went to his aid and rescued him from danger; but his own horse was wounded and he was thrown, and for as long as he could, he resisted with the utmost bravery.

SECTION 4.12.6When, surrounded and suffering many wounds, he fell, his brother, who had already withdrawn from the battle, saw what had happened from a distance, spurred his horse against the enemy, and was killed.

CHAPTER 4.13

SECTION 4.13.1After this battle Caesar judged that he should no longer hear envoys or accept terms from men who, by deceit and treachery, had sought peace and then made an unprovoked attack.

SECTION 4.13.2He considered it the height of madness to wait until the enemy’s forces were increased and their cavalry returned;

SECTION 4.13.3and, knowing the fickleness of the Gauls, he understood how much prestige the enemy had already gained among them through a single battle. He therefore believed that they must be given no time to form plans.

SECTION 4.13.4After he had settled these matters and communicated his plan to his lieutenants and quaestor, so that he might let no day suitable for battle pass unused, a most favorable circumstance occurred. On the morning of the following day, employing the same treachery and pretense, the Germans came in great numbers to his camp, bringing with them all their chiefs and elders,

SECTION 4.13.5partly, as was said, to clear themselves of blame because, contrary to what had been agreed and to what they themselves had requested, they had joined battle the day before, and partly to obtain, if they could, a truce by deception.

SECTION 4.13.6Delighted that they had put themselves into his hands, Caesar ordered them detained. He then led all his forces out of camp and commanded the cavalry, which he believed had been terrified by the recent engagement, to follow at the rear of the column.

CHAPTER 4.14

SECTION 4.14.1He formed his army in three lines and, rapidly completing a march of eight miles, reached the enemy’s camp before the Germans could perceive what was happening.

SECTION 4.14.2Suddenly terrified by everything—by the speed of our arrival and by the absence of their leaders—and given no time either to take counsel or to seize their arms, they were thrown into confusion over whether it was better to lead their forces against the enemy, defend the camp, or seek safety in flight.

SECTION 4.14.3When their fear revealed itself in shouting and a confused rush, our soldiers, inflamed by the treachery of the previous day, burst into the camp.

SECTION 4.14.4There those who had been able to seize their arms quickly resisted our men for a short time and fought among the wagons and baggage.

SECTION 4.14.5But the rest of the multitude, consisting of children and women—for they had left their homes and crossed the Rhine with all their people—began to flee in every direction. Caesar sent the cavalry to pursue them.

CHAPTER 4.15

SECTION 4.15.1When the Germans heard shouting behind them and saw their people being killed, they threw away their weapons, abandoned their military standards, and rushed out of the camp.

SECTION 4.15.2When they reached the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, they despaired of further flight. A great number were killed, and the rest hurled themselves into the river, where, overwhelmed by fear, exhaustion, and the force of the current, they perished.

SECTION 4.15.3Our men, safe to the last man and with very few wounded, withdrew to camp, delivered from the fear of so great a war, although the enemy had numbered four hundred and thirty thousand souls.

SECTION 4.15.4Caesar gave those whom he had detained in camp permission to depart.

SECTION 4.15.5Fearing punishment and torture at the hands of the Gauls, whose lands they had ravaged, they said that they wished to remain with him. Caesar granted them their freedom.

CHAPTER 4.16

SECTION 4.16.1After the German war had been concluded, Caesar decided for many reasons that he must cross the Rhine. The most compelling was this: since he saw that the Germans were so easily induced to enter Gaul, he wished them also to fear for their own possessions when they understood that an army of the Roman people both could and dared to cross the Rhine.

SECTION 4.16.2There was also the fact that the body of Usipetan and Tencteran cavalry which, as I have related above, had crossed the Meuse to plunder and forage and had not taken part in the battle, had after the flight of their countrymen withdrawn across the Rhine into the territory of the Sugambri and joined forces with them.

SECTION 4.16.3When Caesar sent messengers to the Sugambri demanding that they surrender to him those who had made war upon him and upon Gaul, they replied:

SECTION 4.16.4the dominion of the Roman people ended at the Rhine. If Caesar considered it unjust for the Germans to cross into Gaul against his will, why did he claim any dominion or authority beyond the Rhine?

SECTION 4.16.5The Ubii, however, who alone among the peoples beyond the Rhine had sent envoys to Caesar, established friendship with him, and given hostages, earnestly begged him to bring them aid, because they were being severely oppressed by the Suebi.

SECTION 4.16.6Or, if the demands of public affairs prevented him from doing so, they asked him merely to transport his army across the Rhine: that would be sufficient to aid them and give them hope for the future.

SECTION 4.16.7Such was the renown and reputation of his army, after the expulsion of Ariovistus and this most recent battle, even among the remotest German tribes, that the Ubii could be safe through the prestige and friendship of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.16.8They promised a great number of boats for transporting the army.

CHAPTER 4.17

SECTION 4.17.1For the reasons I have related, Caesar had decided to cross the Rhine; but he considered crossing in boats neither sufficiently safe nor consistent with his own dignity or that of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.17.2Accordingly, although the breadth, swiftness, and depth of the river presented the greatest difficulty in building a bridge, he nevertheless believed that he must attempt it or else not take the army across at all.

SECTION 4.17.3He devised the following plan for the bridge. He joined together in pairs timbers a foot and a half thick, slightly sharpened at their lower ends and cut to match the depth of the river, leaving two feet between the timbers of each pair.

SECTION 4.17.4These were lowered into the river by machines, planted in the bed, and driven down with pile drivers—not upright like ordinary piles, but sloping forward at an incline, so that they leaned in the direction of the current.

SECTION 4.17.5Opposite these, forty feet downstream, he set two other timbers joined in the same fashion, inclined against the force and current of the river.

SECTION 4.17.6Each pair was held apart by a beam two feet thick laid across the top, corresponding to the space between the joined timbers, and was secured at the outer ends by two braces, one on either side.

SECTION 4.17.7With the pairs thus forced apart and bound in opposite directions, the structure possessed such strength and was so designed by its very nature that the greater the force with which the water drove against it, the more tightly its members were held fast.

SECTION 4.17.8These supports were connected by laying timbers lengthwise across them, and the surface was covered with poles and fascines.

SECTION 4.17.9In addition, piles were driven obliquely on the downstream side; these were set underneath like buttresses and joined to the whole structure, so that they might receive the force of the river.

SECTION 4.17.10Other piles were likewise driven a moderate distance upstream from the bridge, so that, if tree trunks or boats were sent down by the barbarians to destroy the work, these defenses might lessen the force of such objects and prevent them from damaging the bridge.

CHAPTER 4.18

SECTION 4.18.1Within ten days from the time when the collection of timber began, the entire work was completed and the army was led across.

SECTION 4.18.2Caesar left a strong guard at each end of the bridge and hastened into the territory of the Sugambri.

SECTION 4.18.3Meanwhile, envoys came to him from several states. When they sought peace and friendship, he answered them generously and ordered hostages to be brought to him.

SECTION 4.18.4But the Sugambri, having prepared for flight from the moment the construction of the bridge began, and urged on by the Tencteri and Usipetes whom they had among them, had left their territory, carried away all their possessions, and concealed themselves in the wilderness and forests.

CHAPTER 4.19

SECTION 4.19.1After remaining a few days in their territory, burning all their villages and buildings, and cutting down their grain, Caesar withdrew into the territory of the Ubii. He promised them his aid if they were oppressed by the Suebi, and learned the following from them:

SECTION 4.19.2After the Suebi learned from scouts that a bridge was being built, they had held an assembly according to their custom and sent messengers in every direction, ordering the people to leave their towns, place their children, wives, and all their possessions in the forests, and assemble in one place every man capable of bearing arms.

SECTION 4.19.3The place selected lay approximately in the center of the territories held by the Suebi. There they had resolved to await the arrival of the Romans and there to fight the decisive battle.

SECTION 4.19.4When Caesar learned of this, having accomplished all the purposes for which he had determined to lead his army across—to strike fear into the Germans, punish the Sugambri, and free the Ubii from siege—and having spent altogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, he judged that he had achieved enough both for honor and for practical advantage. He therefore withdrew into Gaul and demolished the bridge.

CHAPTER 4.20

SECTION 4.20.1Although only a small part of the summer remained, and although winters come early in these regions because all Gaul inclines toward the north, Caesar nevertheless made determined preparations to set out for Britain, since he understood that in almost all his Gallic wars assistance had been furnished to our enemies from that island.

SECTION 4.20.2Even if the season should leave too little time for conducting a campaign, he still believed it would be of great use to him if he merely visited the island, observed the character of its people, and learned about its terrain, harbors, and approaches—all of which were almost entirely unknown to the Gauls.

SECTION 4.20.3For hardly anyone except merchants ventures there, and even they know nothing beyond the seacoast and those regions that face Gaul.

SECTION 4.20.4Accordingly, he summoned merchants to him from every quarter, but could discover neither how large the island was, nor what or how numerous were the peoples who inhabited it, nor what experience they had in war or what customs they followed, nor which harbors were suitable for a large number of ships.

CHAPTER 4.21

SECTION 4.21.1To learn these things before making the attempt himself, Caesar judged Gaius Volusenus a suitable man and sent him ahead in a warship.

SECTION 4.21.2He instructed him to investigate everything and return to him as quickly as possible.

SECTION 4.21.3Caesar himself marched with all his forces into the territory of the Morini, because the crossing from there to Britain was the shortest.

SECTION 4.21.4He ordered ships from all the neighboring regions to assemble there, together with the fleet he had built the previous summer for the war against the Veneti.

SECTION 4.21.5Meanwhile, when his plan became known and was reported to the Britons by merchants, envoys came to him from a number of the island’s states, promising to give hostages and submit to the authority of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.21.6After hearing them, Caesar made generous promises and urged them to remain of that mind.

SECTION 4.21.7He then sent them home, and with them sent Commius, whom he himself had appointed king there after defeating the Atrebates. Caesar approved of his courage and judgment, believed him loyal, and knew that his influence was highly regarded in those regions.

SECTION 4.21.8He ordered Commius to visit as many states as he could, urge them to place themselves under the protection of the Roman people, and announce that Caesar would soon come there.

SECTION 4.21.9Volusenus, after surveying all the regions as far as opportunity permitted a man who did not dare leave his ship and entrust himself to the barbarians, returned to Caesar on the fifth day and reported what he had observed there.

CHAPTER 4.22

SECTION 4.22.1While Caesar remained in those regions to prepare his ships, envoys came to him from a large part of the Morini. They sought to excuse their conduct on the previous occasion, saying that, as barbarous men ignorant of our customs, they had made war upon the Roman people, and they promised to do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 4.22.2Caesar considered this a sufficiently opportune development, because he did not wish to leave an enemy behind him, had no opportunity to conduct a war because of the season, and did not think that attention to such trifling matters should take precedence over Britain. He therefore demanded a large number of hostages from them.

SECTION 4.22.3When these were brought, he accepted the Morini under his protection. After assembling and collecting about eighty transports, which he considered enough to carry two legions, he distributed all the warships he had besides among his quaestor, legates, and prefects.

SECTION 4.22.4In addition, there were eighteen transports eight miles away, prevented by the wind from reaching the same harbor. These he assigned to the cavalry.

SECTION 4.22.5He placed the rest of the army under his legates Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, with orders to lead it against the Menapii and those districts of the Morini from which no envoys had come to him.

SECTION 4.22.6He ordered his legate Sulpicius Rufus to hold the harbor with the garrison he considered sufficient.

CHAPTER 4.23

SECTION 4.23.1After making these arrangements, Caesar found weather suitable for sailing and put to sea at about the third watch. He ordered the cavalry to proceed to the farther harbor, embark, and follow him.

SECTION 4.23.2Since they carried out these orders somewhat slowly, Caesar himself reached Britain with the leading ships at about the fourth hour of the day, and there saw the enemy’s armed forces drawn up on all the hills.

SECTION 4.23.3The nature of the place was such, and the sea was so closely confined by steep heights, that a missile could be cast from the higher ground onto the shore.

SECTION 4.23.4Considering this place wholly unsuitable for disembarkation, Caesar waited at anchor until the ninth hour for the remaining ships to assemble there.

SECTION 4.23.5Meanwhile, he summoned his legates and military tribunes, explained what he had learned from Volusenus and what he wished done, and warned them that, as the principles of warfare—and maritime operations above all—required, since conditions at sea were swift and unstable in their movement, they must execute every order promptly and at his signal.

SECTION 4.23.6After dismissing them, Caesar obtained a favorable wind and tide at the same time. He gave the signal, raised anchor, advanced about seven miles from that place, and brought the ships to rest off an open, level beach.

CHAPTER 4.24

SECTION 4.24.1But the barbarians, perceiving the Romans’ plan, sent their cavalry and charioteers ahead—the kind of troops they generally employed in battle—and followed with the rest of their forces, seeking to prevent our men from leaving the ships.

SECTION 4.24.2The difficulty was extreme for these reasons: because of their size, the ships could not be brought to rest except in deep water, while the soldiers, on unfamiliar ground, with their hands encumbered and weighed down by the great and heavy burden of their arms, had at one and the same time to leap down from the ships, find a footing amid the waves, and fight the enemy.

SECTION 4.24.3The enemy, meanwhile, either stood on dry land or advanced only a little way into the water, with every limb unencumbered; and on ground perfectly familiar to them, they boldly hurled missiles and spurred forward their well-trained horses.

SECTION 4.24.4Terrified by these circumstances and wholly inexperienced in this kind of fighting, our men did not display the same spirit and eagerness they were accustomed to show in battles on land.

CHAPTER 4.25

SECTION 4.25.1When Caesar observed this, he ordered the warships, whose appearance was more unfamiliar to the barbarians and whose maneuverability made them readier for action, to draw off a little from the transports, be driven forward by their oars, and take position on the enemy’s exposed flank. From there, slings, arrows, and artillery were to drive the enemy back and clear them away. This proved of great assistance to our men.

SECTION 4.25.2For the barbarians, disconcerted by the shape of the ships, the movement of the oars, and the unfamiliar kind of artillery, halted and drew back only a little.

SECTION 4.25.3But while our soldiers still hesitated, chiefly because of the depth of the water, the eagle-bearer of the Tenth Legion called upon the gods to make the deed fortunate for the legion. “Leap down, soldiers,” he cried, “unless you mean to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, at least, shall have done my duty to the republic and to my commander.”

SECTION 4.25.4After saying this in a loud voice, he threw himself from the ship and began carrying the eagle against the enemy.

SECTION 4.25.5Then our men, urging one another not to permit so great a disgrace, all leaped down from the ship.

SECTION 4.25.6When the men in the nearest ships saw them, they too followed and advanced against the enemy.

CHAPTER 4.26

SECTION 4.26.1Both sides fought fiercely. Our men, however, were greatly disordered because they could neither keep their ranks nor plant themselves firmly nor follow their standards; instead, each man joined whatever standard he happened to encounter after leaving his own ship.

SECTION 4.26.2The enemy, on the other hand, knew every shoal; and whenever from the shore they saw men leaving a ship singly, they spurred their horses forward and attacked them while they were encumbered.

SECTION 4.26.3Many surrounded a few, while others hurled missiles from the exposed flank against the whole body of our men.

SECTION 4.26.4When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats belonging to the warships, together with the scouting vessels, to be filled with soldiers, and sent reinforcements to any men he saw in difficulty.

SECTION 4.26.5As soon as our men gained a footing on dry land and all their comrades had joined them, they charged the enemy and put them to flight. They could not pursue them farther, however, because the cavalry had been unable to hold its course and reach the island. This alone was lacking to Caesar’s accustomed good fortune.

CHAPTER 4.27

SECTION 4.27.1The enemy, defeated in battle, sent envoys to Caesar to seek peace as soon as they recovered from their flight. They promised to give hostages and do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 4.27.2Commius the Atrebatian came with these envoys—the man whom, as I explained above, Caesar had sent ahead to Britain.

SECTION 4.27.3When he had left his ship and was bringing them Caesar’s commands in the capacity of an envoy, they had seized him and thrown him into chains.

SECTION 4.27.4After the battle, however, they released him; and in seeking peace they laid the blame for the act upon the common people and begged pardon on the grounds of ignorance.

SECTION 4.27.5Caesar complained that, although they had voluntarily sent envoys to the mainland to seek peace from him, they had made war without cause. He said that he would pardon their ignorance and ordered them to provide hostages.

SECTION 4.27.6They gave some of these at once and said that they would give the remainder, who had to be summoned from more distant places, within a few days.

SECTION 4.27.7Meanwhile, they ordered their people to return to their fields, and chiefs began to assemble from every quarter and commend themselves and their states to Caesar.

CHAPTER 4.28

SECTION 4.28.1Peace having been established by these measures, on the fourth day after the arrival in Britain, the eighteen ships mentioned above, which had taken the cavalry aboard, sailed from the farther harbor with a gentle wind.

SECTION 4.28.2As they approached Britain and came within sight of the camp, so violent a storm suddenly arose that none of them could hold its course. Some were driven back to the place from which they had set out; others were swept, at great peril to themselves, toward the lower part of the island, which lies nearer the setting sun.

SECTION 4.28.3Though they cast anchor, they were filling with water from the waves and were therefore compelled, despite the adverse night, to put out to sea and make for the mainland.

CHAPTER 4.29

SECTION 4.29.1That same night there happened to be a full moon, the phase that usually produces the highest ocean tides; and this was unknown to our men.

SECTION 4.29.2Thus, at one and the same time, the tide flooded the warships [in which Caesar had arranged for the army to be transported], which Caesar had drawn up onto dry land, while the storm battered the transports that were riding at anchor; and our men were given no opportunity either to manage the vessels or to render assistance.

SECTION 4.29.3A number of ships were wrecked, while the rest, having lost their ropes, anchors, and other equipment, were rendered unfit to sail. As was inevitable, the entire army was thrown into great consternation.

SECTION 4.29.4For there were no other ships in which they could be carried back, everything needed to repair the vessels was lacking, and, since it was agreed by all that the army must winter in Gaul, no grain had been provided in these regions for the winter.

CHAPTER 4.30

SECTION 4.30.1When the chiefs of Britain who had assembled before Caesar after the battle learned of these events, they conferred among themselves. They understood that the Romans lacked cavalry, ships, and grain, and they inferred the small number of soldiers from the narrow extent of the camp—which was smaller still because Caesar had transported the legions without their baggage.

SECTION 4.30.2They decided that the best course was to renew the war, prevent our men from obtaining grain and other provisions, and prolong the affair into winter, since they were confident that, if the Romans were defeated or cut off from their return, no one thereafter would cross into Britain to make war upon them.

SECTION 4.30.3Accordingly, they formed another conspiracy, began gradually withdrawing from the camp, and secretly summoned their people from the fields.

CHAPTER 4.31

SECTION 4.31.1Although Caesar had not yet discovered their plans, nevertheless, from what had happened to his ships and from the fact that they had stopped delivering hostages, he suspected that what did happen was about to occur.

SECTION 4.31.2He therefore prepared safeguards against every contingency. Each day he had grain brought from the fields into the camp; he used the timber and bronze from the ships that had been most severely damaged to repair the rest; and he ordered whatever was needed for this work to be brought over from the mainland.

SECTION 4.31.3Accordingly, since the soldiers carried out the work with the greatest zeal, Caesar, though twelve ships had been lost, made the rest sufficiently seaworthy for the voyage.

CHAPTER 4.32

SECTION 4.32.1While this work was under way, one legion, called the Seventh, was sent out as usual to gather grain. Up to that time there had been no suspicion of war: some of the inhabitants remained in the fields, and others continued to visit the camp. But the men posted on guard before the camp gates reported to Caesar that an unusually great cloud of dust could be seen in the direction in which the legion had marched.

SECTION 4.32.2Suspecting—as was indeed the case—that the barbarians had embarked upon some new design, Caesar ordered the cohorts on guard to march with him in that direction, two of the remaining cohorts to take their place on guard, and the others to arm themselves and follow him immediately.

SECTION 4.32.3When he had advanced somewhat farther from the camp, he saw that our men were being hard-pressed by the enemy and were scarcely holding their ground, while missiles were being hurled from every side against the closely packed legion.

SECTION 4.32.4For since the grain had been reaped everywhere else and only one tract remained, the enemy, suspecting that our men would come there, had concealed themselves in the woods during the night.

SECTION 4.32.5Then they had suddenly attacked our men while they were scattered, had laid aside their arms, and were occupied with reaping. After killing a few, they threw the rest into confusion before they could form regular ranks, while at the same time surrounding them with cavalry and chariots.

CHAPTER 4.33

SECTION 4.33.1Their manner of fighting from chariots is as follows. First they drive in every direction and hurl missiles, generally throwing the ranks into disorder by the very terror inspired by their horses and the clatter of their wheels. Once they have worked their way between the squadrons of cavalry, they leap down from their chariots and fight on foot.

SECTION 4.33.2Meanwhile, the drivers gradually withdraw from the battle and position the chariots so that, if their warriors are hard-pressed by a mass of enemies, they have a ready means of retreat to their own men.

SECTION 4.33.3Thus in battle they combine the mobility of cavalry with the steadiness of infantry; and by daily practice and training they acquire such skill that, even on sloping and precipitous ground, they are accustomed to check their horses at full gallop, bring them under control and turn them in an instant, run along the chariot pole, stand upon the yoke, and then return from there into their chariots with the greatest speed.

CHAPTER 4.34

SECTION 4.34.1While our men were disordered by these tactics [and by the unfamiliar form of fighting], Caesar brought assistance at the most opportune moment. At his arrival, the enemy halted, and our men recovered from their fear.

SECTION 4.34.2After this, Caesar judged the moment unfavorable for provoking the enemy and joining battle. He therefore kept his force in position and, after a short interval, led the legions back to camp.

SECTION 4.34.3While this was taking place, with all our men occupied, the rest of the enemy who were in the fields withdrew.

SECTION 4.34.4Several days of uninterrupted storms followed, which both kept our men within camp and prevented the enemy from fighting.

SECTION 4.34.5Meanwhile the barbarians sent messengers in every direction, proclaimed to their people how few our soldiers were, and showed them what an opportunity they had to win plunder and secure their freedom forever if they drove the Romans from their camp. By these means they quickly assembled a great force of infantry and cavalry and came against the camp.

CHAPTER 4.35

SECTION 4.35.1Although Caesar foresaw that the same thing would happen as on the preceding days—that if the enemy were routed, they would escape danger by their speed—he nevertheless took advantage of the presence of about thirty horsemen whom Commius the Atrebatian, mentioned above, had brought across with him, and drew up the legions in battle formation before the camp.

SECTION 4.35.2When battle was joined, the enemy could not long withstand the charge of our soldiers and turned their backs.

SECTION 4.35.3Our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength permitted and killed a considerable number of them; then, after setting fire to every building far and wide, they returned to camp.

CHAPTER 4.36

SECTION 4.36.1On the same day envoys sent by the enemy came to Caesar to sue for peace.

SECTION 4.36.2Caesar doubled the number of hostages he had previously required of them and ordered these to be brought to the continent, because the equinox was near and he did not think that, with his ships in poor condition, he should expose the voyage to the hazards of winter.

SECTION 4.36.3Finding favorable weather, he himself set sail shortly after midnight,

SECTION 4.36.4and all the ships reached the continent safely; but two of the transports could not make the same harbors as the others and were carried a little farther down the coast.

CHAPTER 4.37

SECTION 4.37.1When about three hundred soldiers had disembarked from these ships and were making for the camp, the Morini, whom Caesar had left at peace when he departed for Britain, were tempted by the hope of plunder and at first surrounded them with no very large number of their men, ordering them to lay down their arms if they did not wish to be killed.

SECTION 4.37.2When our men formed a circle and defended themselves, about six thousand men quickly gathered at the shouting. When this was reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry from the camp to aid his men.

SECTION 4.37.3Meanwhile our soldiers withstood the enemy’s attack and fought with the utmost courage for more than four hours; though they suffered only a few wounds, they killed a considerable number of the enemy.

SECTION 4.37.4But as soon as our cavalry came into sight, the enemy threw away their weapons and turned their backs, and a great number of them were killed.

CHAPTER 4.38

SECTION 4.38.1The next day Caesar sent his lieutenant Titus Labienus, with the legions he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini who had rebelled.

SECTION 4.38.2Since, because the marshes had dried up, they had no place to which they could retreat—the refuge they had used the previous year—almost all of them fell into Labienus’s power.

SECTION 4.38.3But the lieutenants Quintus Titurius and Lucius Cotta, who had led their legions into the territory of the Menapii, laid waste all their lands, cut down their grain, and burned their buildings; then, because all the Menapii had hidden themselves in the densest forests, they returned to Caesar.

SECTION 4.38.4Caesar established the winter quarters of all the legions among the Belgae. Only two states in all Britain sent hostages there; the rest neglected to do so.

SECTION 4.38.5After these achievements, the senate, upon receiving Caesar’s dispatch, decreed a public thanksgiving of twenty days.

Mouseia

Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 8 Latin books, 404 chapters, and 2,150 sections.

CHAPTER 4.1

SECTION 4.1.1During the following winter, in the year when Gnaeus Pompey and Marcus Crassus were consuls, the German Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine with a great multitude of people, not far from the sea into which the Rhine flows.

SECTION 4.1.2Their reason for crossing was that the Suebi had harassed them for several years, oppressed them through warfare, and prevented them from cultivating their land.

SECTION 4.1.3The nation of the Suebi is by far the largest and most warlike of all the Germans.

SECTION 4.1.4They are said to have a hundred districts, from each of which they annually lead one thousand armed men out of their territory to wage war. The rest, who remain at home, support themselves and the fighting men.

SECTION 4.1.5The following year these in turn bear arms, while the others remain at home.

SECTION 4.1.6In this way, neither agriculture nor the theory and practice of war is interrupted.

SECTION 4.1.7But among them there is no privately owned or separately allotted land, nor is anyone permitted to remain in one place for more than a year for the purpose of cultivation.

SECTION 4.1.8They do not live much on grain, but mostly on milk and livestock, and they spend much of their time hunting.

SECTION 4.1.9This way of life—their diet, daily exercise, and freedom, since from childhood they are accustomed to no duty or discipline and do absolutely nothing against their will—both maintains their strength and makes them people of enormous physical size.

SECTION 4.1.10They have trained themselves to such habits that even in the coldest regions they wear nothing but skins, which are so small that a large part of the body remains exposed, and they bathe in rivers.

CHAPTER 4.2

SECTION 4.2.1Merchants are allowed access to them more so that they may have buyers for what they capture in war than because they want anything imported.

SECTION 4.2.2The Germans do not even use imported draft animals, which the Gauls especially prize and purchase at great expense. Instead, through daily exercise they train the animals bred among them, which are small and unattractive, to have the greatest endurance.

SECTION 4.2.3In cavalry battles they often leap from their horses and fight on foot. They have trained their horses to remain in the same spot, and when necessary they quickly retreat to them.

SECTION 4.2.4According to their customs, nothing is considered more shameful or cowardly than using saddles.

SECTION 4.2.5Consequently, however few they may be, they dare to attack any number of saddled cavalrymen.

SECTION 4.2.6They do not allow wine to be imported at all, because they believe that it makes men soft and effeminate and less able to endure hardship.

CHAPTER 4.3

SECTION 4.3.1As a nation, they consider it their greatest glory to have the land around their borders remain uninhabited for as great a distance as possible. They believe that this demonstrates that a great number of states cannot withstand their power.

SECTION 4.3.2Thus, on one side of the Suebi, the land is said to be uninhabited for about one hundred miles.

SECTION 4.3.3On the other side live the Ubii, whose state was large and prosperous by German standards. Although they are of the same race, they are somewhat more civilized than the others because their territory reaches the Rhine, merchants frequently visit them, and their proximity to Gaul has accustomed them to Gallic customs.

SECTION 4.3.4The Suebi had often tested them in many wars but had been unable to drive them from their territory because of the size and importance of their state. Nevertheless, they made them tributaries and reduced them to a much humbler and weaker condition.

CHAPTER 4.4

SECTION 4.4.1The Usipetes and Tencteri, whom we mentioned above, were in the same situation. For several years they withstood the power of the Suebi,

SECTION 4.4.2but in the end they were driven from their lands and, after wandering through many parts of Germany for three years, reached the Rhine in regions inhabited by the Menapii. The Menapii had fields, buildings, and villages on both banks of the river.

SECTION 4.4.3Terrified by the arrival of so great a multitude, however, they had moved out of the buildings they possessed across the river and stationed guards on this side of the Rhine to prevent the Germans from crossing.

SECTION 4.4.4After trying every possible means, the Germans found that they could neither force a crossing because they lacked boats nor cross secretly because of the Menapii’s guards.

SECTION 4.4.5They pretended to return to their own homes and regions, marched away for three days, and then turned back. Their cavalry covered the entire return journey in a single night and overwhelmed the Menapii, who were unaware and expecting no attack.

SECTION 4.4.6The Menapii had been informed of the Germans’ departure by scouts and had fearlessly moved back across the Rhine into their villages.

SECTION 4.4.7After killing them and seizing their boats, the Germans crossed the river before the part of the Menapii living on this side of the Rhine could learn what had happened. They occupied all their buildings and supported themselves on the Menapii’s provisions for the rest of the winter.

CHAPTER 4.5

SECTION 4.5.1When Caesar was informed of these events, he feared the fickleness of the Gauls, because they are changeable in forming plans and generally eager for political upheaval, and decided that he should entrust nothing to them.

SECTION 4.5.2For it is a Gallic custom to compel travelers, even against their will, to stop and to ask what each of them has heard or learned about every matter. In the towns, the common people crowd around merchants and force them to state what regions they come from and what events they have learned about there.

SECTION 4.5.3Influenced by such reports and hearsay, they often form plans concerning matters of the highest importance, only to be forced to regret them immediately afterward, since they are guided by uncertain rumors and most people give them invented answers designed to please them.

CHAPTER 4.6

SECTION 4.6.1Knowing this custom, Caesar set out for the army earlier than usual, to avoid having to confront a more serious war.

SECTION 4.6.2When he arrived there, he learned that what he had suspected would happen had in fact occurred:

SECTION 4.6.3several states had sent delegations to the Germans, inviting them to leave the Rhine and promising that everything they requested would be made ready for them.

SECTION 4.6.4Encouraged by this prospect, the Germans were already ranging more widely and had reached the territory of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are dependents of the Treveri.

SECTION 4.6.5After summoning the Gallic leaders, Caesar decided that he should conceal what he had learned. He soothed and reassured them, ordered them to provide cavalry, and resolved to wage war against the Germans.

CHAPTER 4.7

SECTION 4.7.1After securing provisions and selecting his cavalrymen, he began marching toward the places where he heard the Germans were located.

SECTION 4.7.2When he was only a few days’ march from them, delegates came from them and spoke as follows:

SECTION 4.7.3The Germans did not make war on the Roman people first, but neither did they refuse to fight with weapons if attacked, because the Germans had inherited from their ancestors the custom of resisting anyone who made war on them and never begging for mercy. They had nevertheless come to say that they were in Gaul against their will, driven from their homeland.

SECTION 4.7.4If the Romans wanted their goodwill, they could be useful friends to them. The Romans should either assign them lands of their own or allow them to retain those they had taken by force of arms.

SECTION 4.7.5They yielded only to the Suebi, whom not even the immortal gods could equal; as for everyone else on earth, there was no one they could not defeat.

CHAPTER 4.8

SECTION 4.8.1Caesar gave the reply he thought appropriate, but the conclusion of his statement was that no friendship between him and them was possible if they remained in Gaul;

SECTION 4.8.2that it was not right for men who had been unable to defend their own territory to seize that of others; and that no lands in Gaul were unoccupied and could be granted, especially to so great a multitude, without wronging others.

SECTION 4.8.3But, if they wished, they could settle in the territory of the Ubii, whose delegates were then with him complaining about the injuries inflicted by the Suebi and requesting his assistance. He would order the Ubii to accept them.

CHAPTER 4.9

SECTION 4.9.1The delegates said that they would report this reply to their people and, after deliberating on the matter, return to Caesar on the third day. Meanwhile, they asked him not to move his camp any closer to them.

SECTION 4.9.2Caesar said that he could not grant even that request.

SECTION 4.9.3For he had learned that several days before, they had sent a large part of their cavalry across the Meuse to the Ambivariti to plunder and obtain grain. He believed that they were waiting for these cavalrymen and were seeking a delay for that reason.

CHAPTER 4.10

SECTION 4.10.1[The Meuse rises in the Vosges Mountains, which are in the territory of the Lingones, and, after receiving a branch of the Rhine called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi and flows into the Atlantic Ocean.

SECTION 4.10.2No more than eighty miles from the Atlantic, it flows into the Rhine.

SECTION 4.10.3The Rhine, however, rises in the territory of the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and flows swiftly for a great distance through the territories of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci, and Treveri.

SECTION 4.10.4As it approaches the Atlantic, it divides into several branches, forming many enormous islands, a large number of which are inhabited by fierce barbarian peoples,

SECTION 4.10.5including some who are believed to live on fish and birds’ eggs, and it flows into the Atlantic through many mouths.]

CHAPTER 4.11

SECTION 4.11.1When Caesar was no more than twelve miles from the enemy, their delegates returned to him as agreed. Meeting him on the march, they earnestly begged him not to advance any farther.

SECTION 4.11.2When they failed to obtain this request, they asked him to send orders ahead to the cavalrymen who had advanced in front of the column and prevent them from fighting, and to give the Germans an opportunity to send delegates to the Ubii.

SECTION 4.11.3They explained that if the leaders and senate of the Ubii guaranteed their good faith under oath, they would accept the terms offered by Caesar. They asked him to give them three days to settle these matters.

SECTION 4.11.4Caesar believed that all these requests had the same purpose: to create a three-day delay in which their absent cavalry could return. Nevertheless, he said that he would advance no more than four miles that day in order to obtain water.

SECTION 4.11.5He told them to assemble there the next day in the greatest possible numbers, so that he could consider their demands.

SECTION 4.11.6Meanwhile, he sent messengers to the commanders who had gone ahead with all the cavalry, instructing them not to provoke the enemy into battle and, if they themselves were attacked, to hold their ground until he came closer with the army.

CHAPTER 4.12

SECTION 4.12.1But as soon as the enemy saw our cavalry, which numbered five thousand, although they themselves had no more than eight hundred cavalrymen because those who had gone across the Meuse to obtain grain had not yet returned, they launched an attack and quickly threw our men into confusion. Our men suspected nothing, because the enemy’s delegates had left Caesar only a short time before and had requested a truce for that day.

SECTION 4.12.2When our men resisted in turn, the Germans followed their usual practice and jumped down to fight on foot. They stabbed several of our horses from below, threw our riders down, put the rest to flight, and drove them on in such terror that they did not stop fleeing until they came within sight of our marching column.

SECTION 4.12.3Seventy-four of our cavalrymen were killed in that battle.

SECTION 4.12.4Among them was the exceptionally brave Aquitanian Piso, a man of the highest birth, whose grandfather had held royal power in his state and had been officially named a friend by our Senate.

SECTION 4.12.5When Piso went to the assistance of his brother, who had been cut off by the enemy, he rescued him from danger. Piso himself was thrown when his horse was wounded, but he resisted with the greatest courage for as long as he could.

SECTION 4.12.6After he had been surrounded, suffered many wounds, and fallen, his brother, who had already withdrawn from the battle, noticed this from a distance, spurred his horse forward, threw himself upon the enemy, and was killed.

CHAPTER 4.13

SECTION 4.13.1After this battle, Caesar believed that he should no longer listen to delegates or accept terms from people who had sought peace as a trick and an ambush and then made an unprovoked attack.

SECTION 4.13.2He judged that it would be the height of madness to wait until the enemy’s forces increased and their cavalry returned.

SECTION 4.13.3Knowing the fickleness of the Gauls, he understood how much prestige the enemy had already gained among them through this single battle, and he believed that they should be given no time to form plans.

SECTION 4.13.4After making these decisions and sharing his plan with his staff officers and quaestor, so that he would not let any opportunity for battle pass, an extremely favorable event occurred. On the morning of the following day, employing the same treachery and deception, the Germans came in great numbers to his camp, bringing all their leaders and elders with them.

SECTION 4.13.5Their purpose, as they claimed, was partly to clear themselves of blame for having engaged in battle the day before, contrary to what had been said and to what they themselves had requested, and partly, if they could, to obtain a truce by deception.

SECTION 4.13.6Caesar was pleased that they had placed themselves in his hands and ordered them detained. He then led all his forces out of camp and ordered the cavalry, which he believed had been badly frightened by the recent battle, to follow behind the column.

CHAPTER 4.14

SECTION 4.14.1He formed his army in three lines and, after rapidly completing an eight-mile march, reached the enemy’s camp before the Germans could realize what was happening.

SECTION 4.14.2Terrified by everything at once—by the speed of our arrival and by the absence of their leaders—and given no time either to form a plan or to take up arms, they were thrown into confusion over whether it would be better to lead their forces against the enemy, defend the camp, or seek safety in flight.

SECTION 4.14.3When their fear became evident in their shouting and frantic rushing about, our soldiers, enraged by the treachery of the previous day, burst into the camp.

SECTION 4.14.4There, those who had been able to take up arms quickly resisted our men for a short time and fought among the wagons and baggage.

SECTION 4.14.5But the rest of the population, including the children and women—for they had left their homeland and crossed the Rhine with all their families—began to flee in every direction. Caesar sent the cavalry to pursue them.

CHAPTER 4.15

SECTION 4.15.1When the Germans heard shouting behind them and saw their people being killed, they threw away their weapons, abandoned their military standards, and rushed out of the camp.

SECTION 4.15.2When they reached the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine and despaired of escaping any farther, a great number were killed. The rest threw themselves into the river and perished there, overcome by fear, exhaustion, and the force of the current.

SECTION 4.15.3Our men, every one of them safe and only a very few wounded, returned to camp freed from the fear of so great a war, although the enemy’s total population had numbered 430,000.

SECTION 4.15.4Caesar gave those whom he had detained in camp permission to leave.

SECTION 4.15.5Fearing punishment and torture at the hands of the Gauls whose lands they had devastated, they said that they wished to remain with him. Caesar granted them their freedom.

CHAPTER 4.16

SECTION 4.16.1After the German war was concluded, Caesar decided for many reasons that he had to cross the Rhine. The strongest of these was that, since he saw how easily the Germans could be induced to enter Gaul, he wanted them to fear for their own possessions as well, when they understood that an army of the Roman people both could and would dare to cross the Rhine.

SECTION 4.16.2Another consideration was that the part of the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri which, as I mentioned above, had crossed the Meuse to plunder and obtain grain and had not taken part in the battle, had retreated after the flight of their people across the Rhine into the territory of the Sugambri and had joined them.

SECTION 4.16.3Caesar sent messengers to the Sugambri demanding that they surrender to him those who had made war on him and on Gaul. They replied:

SECTION 4.16.4“The Rhine marks the limit of the Roman people’s rule. If Caesar thinks it unjust for Germans to cross into Gaul against his wishes, why does he claim any rule or authority beyond the Rhine?”

SECTION 4.16.5The Ubii, however, who alone among the peoples across the Rhine had sent delegates to Caesar, established friendship with him, and given hostages, urgently begged him to assist them because they were being severely oppressed by the Suebi.

SECTION 4.16.6Or, if the affairs of the Republic prevented him from doing so, they asked him merely to transport his army across the Rhine. That would be enough to help them and give them hope for the future.

SECTION 4.16.7They said that, after the defeat of Ariovistus and this latest battle, the fame and reputation of Caesar’s army were so great, even among the most distant German peoples, that the Ubii could remain safe through the prestige and friendship of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.16.8They promised a large number of boats for transporting the army.

CHAPTER 4.17

SECTION 4.17.1For the reasons I have mentioned, Caesar had decided to cross the Rhine. But he believed that crossing in boats would not be sufficiently safe and considered it inconsistent with both his own dignity and that of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.17.2Therefore, although the width, swiftness, and depth of the river presented the greatest difficulty in building a bridge, he nevertheless believed that he must make the attempt or else not take the army across at all.

SECTION 4.17.3He designed the bridge as follows. He joined pairs of timbers, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened slightly at the lower end and cut to match the depth of the river, fastening them two feet apart.

SECTION 4.17.4He had these pairs lowered into the river by machinery, planted in the riverbed, and driven in with pile drivers—not straight down vertically like ordinary pilings, but slanting forward at an incline, so that they leaned in the direction of the current.

SECTION 4.17.5Opposite each pair, forty feet downstream, he placed two more timbers joined in the same way, angled against the force and impact of the current.

SECTION 4.17.6The two pairs were held apart by beams two feet thick inserted across their tops, matching the distance between the joined timbers, and were secured by two clamps, one on each side, at the outer ends.

SECTION 4.17.7With the pairs held apart and fastened in opposite directions, the structure had such strength, and its design was such, that the greater the force with which the water drove against it, the more tightly its components were locked together.

SECTION 4.17.8These supports were connected by laying timbers lengthwise across them, and these were covered with poles and wickerwork.

SECTION 4.17.9In addition, pilings were driven obliquely into the riverbed downstream. These were set beneath the bridge like buttresses and connected with the entire structure so that they would absorb the force of the current.

SECTION 4.17.10Other pilings were likewise driven a moderate distance upstream from the bridge, so that if the barbarians sent tree trunks or boats downstream to demolish the structure, these defenses would lessen the force of such objects and prevent them from damaging the bridge.

CHAPTER 4.18

SECTION 4.18.1Within ten days from the time the gathering of timber began, the entire structure was completed and the army was taken across.

SECTION 4.18.2Caesar left strong guards at both ends of the bridge and hurried into the territory of the Sugambri.

SECTION 4.18.3Meanwhile, delegates came to him from several states. When they asked for peace and friendship, he answered them generously and ordered them to bring him hostages.

SECTION 4.18.4But from the moment construction of the bridge began, the Sugambri had prepared to flee. At the urging of the Tencteri and Usipetes whom they had among them, they had left their territory, carried away all their possessions, and hidden themselves in the wilderness and forests.

CHAPTER 4.19

SECTION 4.19.1Caesar remained in their territory for a few days, burned all their villages and buildings, cut down their grain, and then withdrew into the territory of the Ubii. He promised them his assistance if they were oppressed by the Suebi and learned the following from them:

SECTION 4.19.2After the Suebi learned from scouts that a bridge was being built, they held a council according to their custom and sent messengers in every direction, ordering the people to leave their towns, place their children, wives, and all their possessions in the forests, and have every man capable of bearing arms assemble in one place.

SECTION 4.19.3The place selected was approximately at the center of the regions occupied by the Suebi. There they had decided to await the Romans’ arrival and fight a decisive battle.

SECTION 4.19.4When Caesar learned this, having accomplished everything for which he had decided to lead his army across—to strike fear into the Germans, punish the Sugambri, and free the Ubii from siege—and having spent a total of eighteen days across the Rhine, he considered that he had achieved enough for both honor and practical advantage. He therefore withdrew into Gaul and destroyed the bridge.

CHAPTER 4.20

SECTION 4.20.1Although only a small part of the summer remained, and although winters come early in these regions because all Gaul lies toward the north, Caesar nevertheless made determined preparations to set out for Britain, because he understood that in nearly all the Gallic wars assistance had been supplied to our enemies from there.

SECTION 4.20.2Even if there were not enough time left in the year to conduct a war, he still thought it would be of great use to him if he merely visited the island, observed what kind of people lived there, and learned about the terrain, harbors, and approaches—all of which were almost entirely unknown to the Gauls.

SECTION 4.20.3For hardly anyone except merchants goes there without good reason, and even they know nothing beyond the seacoast and the regions facing Gaul.

SECTION 4.20.4Accordingly, he summoned merchants from every quarter, but he could not discover how large the island was, what peoples inhabited it or how numerous they were, what experience they had in warfare or what customs they followed, or which harbors were suitable for a large number of ships.

CHAPTER 4.21

SECTION 4.21.1To learn these things before taking the risk himself, Caesar considered Gaius Volusenus a suitable man and sent him ahead in a warship.

SECTION 4.21.2He instructed him to investigate everything and return to him as quickly as possible.

SECTION 4.21.3Caesar himself set out with all his forces for the territory of the Morini, because the crossing from there to Britain was the shortest.

SECTION 4.21.4He ordered ships from all the neighboring regions to assemble there from every direction, along with the fleet he had built the previous summer for the war against the Veneti.

SECTION 4.21.5Meanwhile, after his plan became known and was reported to the Britons by merchants, envoys came to him from several states of the island, promising to give hostages and submit to the authority of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.21.6After hearing them, Caesar made generous promises and urged them to remain of that mind.

SECTION 4.21.7He sent them home and dispatched Commius with them. After defeating the Atrebates, Caesar himself had appointed Commius king over them; he approved of his courage and judgment, believed him loyal to himself, and knew that his authority was highly regarded in those regions.

SECTION 4.21.8He ordered Commius to visit as many states as he could, urge them to place themselves under the protection of the Roman people, and announce that Caesar would soon arrive there.

SECTION 4.21.9Volusenus surveyed all the regions as far as he had the opportunity, since he did not dare leave his ship and entrust himself to the barbarians. On the fifth day he returned to Caesar and reported what he had observed there.

CHAPTER 4.22

SECTION 4.22.1While Caesar remained in that area to prepare the ships, envoys came to him from a large part of the Morini. They offered excuses for their conduct in the recent past, saying that, as barbarous people unfamiliar with our customs, they had made war on the Roman people, and they promised to do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 4.22.2Caesar considered their arrival quite timely, because he did not want to leave an enemy behind him, had no opportunity to wage war because of the season, and did not think that dealing with such minor matters should take precedence over Britain. He demanded a large number of hostages from them.

SECTION 4.22.3When the hostages were brought, he accepted the Morini under his protection. After gathering and assembling about eighty transports, as many as he considered sufficient to carry two legions across, he distributed the warships he had in addition among his quaestor, legates, and prefects.

SECTION 4.22.4There were also eighteen transports that were being prevented by the wind from reaching the same harbor from a place eight miles away. These he assigned to the cavalry.

SECTION 4.22.5He placed the rest of the army under his legates Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, with orders to lead it against the Menapii and those districts of the Morini from which no envoys had come to him.

SECTION 4.22.6He ordered his legate Sulpicius Rufus to hold the harbor with the garrison he considered sufficient.

CHAPTER 4.23

SECTION 4.23.1After making these arrangements, Caesar found weather suitable for sailing and put to sea at about the third watch. He ordered the cavalry to proceed to the farther harbor, board their ships, and follow him.

SECTION 4.23.2Because they carried this out somewhat slowly, Caesar himself reached Britain with the leading ships at about the fourth hour of the day and saw the enemy’s armed forces drawn up on all the hills there.

SECTION 4.23.3The nature of the place was such, and the sea was so closely confined by steep hills, that a weapon could be hurled from the higher ground onto the shore.

SECTION 4.23.4Considering this place completely unsuitable for landing, he waited at anchor until the ninth hour for the remaining ships to assemble there.

SECTION 4.23.5Meanwhile, he summoned his legates and military tribunes, explained what he had learned from Volusenus and what he wanted done, and warned them that, as military practice—and especially naval operations—required, since conditions at sea involved rapid and unstable movement, they must carry out every action at his signal and at the proper moment.

SECTION 4.23.6After dismissing them, Caesar took advantage of a favorable wind and tide occurring at the same time. He gave the signal, raised anchor, advanced about seven miles from that place, and stationed his ships off an open, level beach.

CHAPTER 4.24

SECTION 4.24.1But the barbarians, understanding the Romans’ plan, sent their cavalry and chariot fighters ahead—the kind of force they generally used in battle—and followed with the rest of their troops, preventing our men from disembarking from the ships.

SECTION 4.24.2The difficulty was extreme for these reasons: because of their size, the ships could not be stationed except in deep water, while the soldiers, in unfamiliar surroundings, with their hands encumbered and weighed down by the great, heavy burden of their armor, had to jump down from the ships, keep their footing in the waves, and fight the enemy all at the same time.

SECTION 4.24.3The enemy, meanwhile, either stood on dry ground or advanced only a short distance into the water. With all their limbs unencumbered and in terrain completely familiar to them, they boldly hurled their weapons and spurred forward horses accustomed to such conditions.

SECTION 4.24.4Terrified by these circumstances and completely inexperienced in this kind of fighting, our men did not display the same energy and enthusiasm they usually showed in battles on land.

CHAPTER 4.25

SECTION 4.25.1When Caesar noticed this, he ordered the warships, whose appearance was more unfamiliar to the barbarians and whose maneuverability made them better suited for the purpose, to move a short distance away from the transports, be driven forward by their oars, and take up positions against the enemy’s exposed flank. From there the enemy was to be driven back and dislodged with slings, arrows, and artillery. This was of great assistance to our men.

SECTION 4.25.2For the barbarians, alarmed by the shape of the ships, the movement of the oars, and the unfamiliar kind of artillery, halted and drew back only a little.

SECTION 4.25.3While our soldiers were hesitating, chiefly because of the depth of the water, the man who carried the eagle of the Tenth Legion called upon the gods to make his action turn out successfully for the legion. “Jump down, soldiers,” he said, “unless you want to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, at least, will have done my duty to the republic and to my commander.”

SECTION 4.25.4After saying this in a loud voice, he threw himself from the ship and began carrying the eagle toward the enemy.

SECTION 4.25.5Then our men urged one another not to allow so great a disgrace, and all jumped down from the ship.

SECTION 4.25.6When the soldiers in the nearest ships saw them, the first among them followed and advanced toward the enemy.

CHAPTER 4.26

SECTION 4.26.1Both sides fought fiercely. Our men, however, were greatly disordered because they could neither keep their ranks, maintain a firm footing, nor follow their own standards; instead, each man joined whatever standard he happened to encounter after leaving his particular ship.

SECTION 4.26.2The enemy, by contrast, knew all the shallows, and whenever they saw individuals leaving a ship separately, they spurred their horses forward and attacked them while they were encumbered.

SECTION 4.26.3Many surrounded a few, while others hurled weapons against the whole body of our men from their exposed flank.

SECTION 4.26.4When Caesar noticed this, he ordered the boats belonging to the warships, as well as the scout vessels, to be filled with soldiers, and sent reinforcements to those he saw in difficulty.

SECTION 4.26.5As soon as our men gained a firm position on dry ground and all their comrades had joined them, they charged the enemy and put them to flight. They could not pursue them any farther, however, because the cavalry had been unable to maintain its course and reach the island. This alone was lacking from Caesar’s customary good fortune.

CHAPTER 4.27

SECTION 4.27.1After being defeated in battle, the enemy, as soon as they recovered from their flight, immediately sent envoys to Caesar to seek peace. They promised to give hostages and do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 4.27.2Commius the Atrebate came with these envoys—the man I explained above had been sent ahead to Britain by Caesar.

SECTION 4.27.3When Commius disembarked and delivered Caesar’s instructions to them in the capacity of an envoy, they had seized him and put him in chains.

SECTION 4.27.4After the battle, they released him. In seeking peace, they blamed the general population for this act and asked to be pardoned because of their ignorance.

SECTION 4.27.5Caesar complained that, although they had voluntarily sent envoys to the mainland to ask him for peace, they had made war without cause. He said that he would pardon their ignorance and demanded hostages.

SECTION 4.27.6They gave some of these at once and said that they would send for the rest from more distant places and deliver them within a few days.

SECTION 4.27.7Meanwhile, they ordered their people to return to their farms, and their leading men began assembling from every direction and entrusting themselves and their states to Caesar.

CHAPTER 4.28

SECTION 4.28.1With peace established by these actions, on the fourth day after the arrival in Britain, the eighteen ships mentioned above, which had taken the cavalry aboard, put to sea from the farther harbor in a gentle wind.

SECTION 4.28.2As they approached Britain and came into view from the camp, so violent a storm suddenly arose that none of them could maintain its course. Some were carried back to the same place from which they had departed, while others were driven, at great danger to themselves, toward the lower part of the island, which lies closer to the setting sun.

SECTION 4.28.3Although they dropped anchor, the ships began filling with water from the waves. They were therefore forced to put out to sea during the adverse night and make for the mainland.

CHAPTER 4.29

SECTION 4.29.1That same night there was a full moon, the phase that usually produces the highest ocean tides, a fact unknown to our men.

SECTION 4.29.2Thus, at the same time, the tide flooded the warships [in which Caesar had arranged for the army to be transported], which Caesar had hauled onto dry land, while the storm battered the transports that were secured at anchor. Our men had no opportunity either to handle the ships or to assist them.

SECTION 4.29.3Several ships were wrecked, and the rest, having lost their ropes, anchors, and other equipment, were unfit for sailing. As was inevitable, this caused great alarm throughout the entire army.

SECTION 4.29.4There were no other ships in which they could be carried back, everything needed to repair the ships was lacking, and because everyone knew that they had to winter in Gaul, no grain had been provided in that region for the winter.

CHAPTER 4.30

SECTION 4.30.1When the leading men of Britain who had come to Caesar after the battle learned of these circumstances, they conferred among themselves. They understood that the Romans had no cavalry, ships, or grain, and they recognized the small number of soldiers from the limited size of the camp, which was even smaller because Caesar had transported the legions without baggage.

SECTION 4.30.2They concluded that the best course was to renew the rebellion, prevent our men from obtaining grain and other supplies, and prolong the affair into the winter, because they were confident that, if this force were defeated or prevented from returning, no one would afterward cross into Britain to make war.

SECTION 4.30.3Accordingly, they formed another conspiracy and began gradually leaving the camp and secretly bringing their people in from the countryside.

CHAPTER 4.31

SECTION 4.31.1Although Caesar did not yet know their plans, he nevertheless suspected, both from the fate of his ships and from the fact that they had stopped delivering hostages, that what did happen was going to happen.

SECTION 4.31.2He therefore prepared safeguards against every possibility. Each day he brought grain from the countryside into the camp, used the timber and bronze from the ships that had been most seriously damaged to repair the others, and ordered the materials needed for this work to be brought over from the mainland.

SECTION 4.31.3Accordingly, because the soldiers carried out the work with the greatest effort, he lost twelve ships but made the others sufficiently seaworthy for reasonably convenient navigation.

CHAPTER 4.32

SECTION 4.32.1While this work was being done, one legion, called the Seventh, was sent out as usual to gather grain. Up to that time there had been no suspicion of war: some of the people remained in the countryside, while others continued visiting the camp. The men stationed on guard before the camp gates reported to Caesar that an unusually large cloud of dust could be seen in the direction in which the legion had marched.

SECTION 4.32.2Caesar suspected—correctly—that the barbarians had begun some new plan. He ordered the cohorts on guard to set out with him in that direction, two of the remaining cohorts to take their place on guard, and the rest to arm themselves and follow him immediately.

SECTION 4.32.3When he had advanced a little distance from the camp, he saw that our men were being hard-pressed by the enemy and were barely holding out, and that, with the legion packed tightly together, weapons were being hurled at it from every direction.

SECTION 4.32.4Since all the grain in the other areas had been harvested and only one section remained, the enemy, suspecting that our men would come there, had hidden in the woods during the night.

SECTION 4.32.5They then made a sudden attack on our men while they were scattered, had laid down their weapons, and were occupied with reaping. After killing a few, they threw the rest into disorder before they could form definite ranks, while at the same time surrounding them with cavalry and chariots.

CHAPTER 4.33

SECTION 4.33.1This is their method of fighting from chariots. First they drive in every direction, hurling weapons, and generally disrupt the ranks by the very terror inspired by the horses and by the noise of the wheels. Once they have worked their way in among the cavalry squadrons, they leap down from their chariots and fight on foot.

SECTION 4.33.2Meanwhile, the drivers gradually withdraw from the battle and position their chariots so that, if the fighters are hard-pressed by a large number of enemies, they have an unobstructed retreat to their own men.

SECTION 4.33.3Thus in battle they combine the mobility of cavalry with the steadiness of infantry. Through daily experience and training they acquire such skill that, even on a sloping and precipitous site, they can check their horses at full gallop, control and turn them in a short distance, run along the chariot pole, stand on the yoke, and then return from there to their chariots with the greatest speed.

CHAPTER 4.34

SECTION 4.34.1While our men were disordered by these circumstances [and by the unfamiliar kind of fighting], Caesar brought assistance at the most opportune moment. At his arrival the enemy halted, and our men recovered from their fear.

SECTION 4.34.2After this, Caesar considered the time unsuitable for provoking the enemy and beginning a battle, so he held his position and, after a short interval, led the legions back to camp.

SECTION 4.34.3While this was taking place and all our men were occupied, the rest of the enemy who were in the fields withdrew.

SECTION 4.34.4Several days of storms followed without interruption, keeping our men in camp and preventing the enemy from fighting.

SECTION 4.34.5Meanwhile, the barbarians sent messengers in every direction, proclaimed to their people how few our soldiers were, and showed them what an opportunity they had to obtain plunder and free themselves forever if they drove the Romans from their camp. In this way they quickly assembled a large force of infantry and cavalry and came to the camp.

CHAPTER 4.35

SECTION 4.35.1Although Caesar foresaw that the same thing would happen as on the preceding days—that if the enemy were driven back, they would escape danger by their speed—he nevertheless formed the legions in battle line before the camp, having obtained about thirty cavalrymen whom Commius the Atrebatian, mentioned above, had brought across with him.

SECTION 4.35.2When battle was joined, the enemy could not withstand the attack of our soldiers for long and turned and fled.

SECTION 4.35.3Our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength allowed and killed many of them. Then, after setting fire to every building over a wide area, they returned to camp.

CHAPTER 4.36

SECTION 4.36.1That same day, envoys sent by the enemy came to Caesar to ask for peace.

SECTION 4.36.2Caesar doubled the number of hostages he had previously demanded from them and ordered them to be brought to the mainland, because the day of the equinox was near and he did not think that his damaged ships should be exposed to winter sailing.

SECTION 4.36.3When he obtained suitable weather, he himself set sail shortly after midnight,

SECTION 4.36.4and all the ships reached the mainland safely. Two of the transports, however, could not make the same harbors as the others and were carried a little farther down the coast.

CHAPTER 4.37

SECTION 4.37.1About three hundred soldiers disembarked from these ships and were making for the camp when the Morini, whom Caesar had left at peace when he departed for Britain, were drawn by the hope of plunder. At first, they surrounded the soldiers with a force of their own that was not very large and ordered them to lay down their arms if they did not want to be killed.

SECTION 4.37.2When the soldiers formed a circle and defended themselves, about six thousand men quickly gathered at the shouting. When this was reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry from the camp to assist his men.

SECTION 4.37.3Meanwhile, our soldiers withstood the enemy’s attack and fought with the greatest courage for more than four hours. They suffered only a few wounds and killed many of the enemy.

SECTION 4.37.4But when our cavalry came into sight, the enemy threw down their weapons, turned and fled, and a great number of them were killed.

CHAPTER 4.38

SECTION 4.38.1The next day Caesar sent his lieutenant Titus Labienus, with the legions he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini who had rebelled.

SECTION 4.38.2Because the marshes had dried up, the Morini had no place to retreat to—the refuge they had used the previous year—and almost all of them fell into Labienus’s power.

SECTION 4.38.3But the lieutenants Quintus Titurius and Lucius Cotta, who had led their legions into the territory of the Menapii, returned to Caesar after ravaging all their fields, cutting down their grain, and burning their buildings, since the Menapii had all hidden themselves in the densest forests.

SECTION 4.38.4Caesar established the winter quarters of all the legions among the Belgae. Only two states in Britain sent hostages there; the rest failed to do so.

SECTION 4.38.5After these achievements, the Senate, upon receiving Caesar’s dispatch, decreed a public thanksgiving of twenty days.

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