---
type: article
status: Published
slug: "gallic-war"
title: "Commentaries on the Gallic War"
author: "Julius Caesar; Book 8 continued by Aulus Hirtius"
tradition: "roman"
language: "la"
genre: "military history"
period: "58–50 BCE"
source_url: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PerseusDL/canonical-latinLit/ea33cbdb10131fd319522426a70df0070d5b0b68/data/phi0448/phi001/phi0448.phi001.perseus-lat2.xml"
certainty: observed
source: "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PerseusDL/canonical-latinLit/ea33cbdb10131fd319522426a70df0070d5b0b68/data/phi0448/phi001/phi0448.phi001.perseus-lat2.xml"
unknowns: none known
---
# Commentaries on the Gallic War

## Original

### Book 1

CHAPTER 1.1

SECTION 1.1.1
Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur.

SECTION 1.1.2
Hi omnes lingua, institutis, legibus inter se differunt. Gallos ab Aquitanis Garumna flumen, a Belgis Matrona et Sequana dividit.

SECTION 1.1.3
Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate provinciae longissime absunt, minimeque ad eos mercatores saepe commeant atque ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent important,

SECTION 1.1.4
proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibuscum continenter bellum gerunt. Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, quod fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis contendunt, cum aut suis finibus eos prohibent aut ipsi in eorum finibus bellum gerunt.

SECTION 1.1.5
[Eorum una pars, quam Gallos obtinere dictum est, initium capit a flumine Rhodano, continetur Garumna flumine, Oceano, finibus Belgarum, attingit etiam ab Sequanis et Helvetiis flumen Rhenum, vergit ad septentriones.

SECTION 1.1.6
Belgae ab extremis Galliae finibus oriuntur, pertinent ad inferiorem partem fluminis Rheni, spectant in septentrionem et orientem solem.

SECTION 1.1.7
Aquitania a Garumna flumine ad Pyrenaeos montes et eam partem Oceani quae est ad Hispaniam pertinet; spectat inter occasum solis et septentriones.]

CHAPTER 1.2

SECTION 1.2.1
Apud Helvetios longe nobilissimus fuit et ditissimus Orgetorix. Is M. Messala, [et P.] M. Pisone consulibus regni cupiditate inductus coniurationem nobilitatis fecit et civitati persuasit ut de finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent:

SECTION 1.2.2
perfacile esse, cum virtute omnibus praestarent, totius Galliae imperio potiri.

SECTION 1.2.3
Id hoc facilius iis persuasit, quod undique loci natura Helvetii continentur: una ex parte flumine Rheno latissimo atque altissimo, qui agrum Helvetium a Germanis dividit; altera ex parte monte Iura altissimo, qui est inter Sequanos et Helvetios; tertia lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano, qui provinciam nostram ab Helvetiis dividit.

SECTION 1.2.4
His rebus fiebat ut et minus late vagarentur et minus facile finitimis bellum inferre possent;

SECTION 1.2.5
qua ex parte homines bellandi cupidi magno dolore adficiebantur.

SECTION 1.2.6
Pro multitudine autem hominum et pro gloria belli atque fortitudinis angustos se fines habere arbitrabantur, qui in longitudinem milia passuum CCXL, in latitudinem CLXXX patebant.

CHAPTER 1.3

SECTION 1.3.1
His rebus adducti et auctoritate Orgetorigis permoti constituerunt ea quae ad proficiscendum pertinerent comparare, iumentorum et carrorum quam maximum numerum coemere, sementes quam maximas facere, ut in itinere copia frumenti suppeteret, cum proximis civitatibus pacem et amicitiam confirmare.

SECTION 1.3.2
Ad eas res conficiendas biennium sibi satis esse duxerunt; in tertium annum profectionem lege confirmant.

SECTION 1.3.3
Ad eas res conficiendas Orgetorix deligitur. Is sibi legationem ad civitates suscipit. In eo itinere persuadet Castico, Catamantaloedis filio, Sequano, cuius pater regnum in Sequanis multos annos obtinuerat et a senatu populi Romani amicus appellatus erat, ut regnum in civitate sua occuparet, quod pater ante habuerit;

SECTION 1.3.4
itemque Dumnorigi Haeduo, fratri Diviciaci, qui eo tempore principatum in civitate obtinebat ac maxime plebi acceptus erat, ut idem conaretur persuadet eique filiam suam in matrimonium dat.

SECTION 1.3.5
Perfacile factu esse illis probat conata perficere, propterea quod ipse suae civitatis imperium obtenturus esset:

SECTION 1.3.6
non esse dubium quin totius Galliae plurimum Helvetii possent; se suis copiis suoque exercitu illis regna conciliaturum confirmat.

SECTION 1.3.7
Hac oratione adducti inter se fidem et ius iurandum dant et regno occupato per tres potentissimos ac firmissimos populos totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant.

CHAPTER 1.4

SECTION 1.4.1
Ea res est Helvetiis per indicium enuntiata. Moribus suis Orgetoricem ex vinculis causam dicere coegerunt; damnatum poenam sequi oportebat, ut igni cremaretur.

SECTION 1.4.2
Die constituta causae dictionis Orgetorix ad iudicium omnem suam familiam, ad hominum milia decem, undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos, quorum magnum numerum habebat, eodem conduxit; per eos ne causam diceret se eripuit.

SECTION 1.4.3
Cum civitas ob eam rem incitata armis ius suum exequi conaretur multitudinemque hominum ex agris magistratus cogerent, Orgetorix mortuus est;

SECTION 1.4.4
neque abest suspicio, ut Helvetii arbitrantur, quin ipse sibi mortem consciverit.

CHAPTER 1.5

SECTION 1.5.1
Post eius mortem nihilo minus Helvetii id quod constituerant facere conantur, ut e finibus suis exeant.

SECTION 1.5.2
Ubi iam se ad eam rem paratos esse arbitrati sunt, oppida sua omnia, numero ad duodecim, vicos ad quadringentos, reliqua privata aedificia incendunt;

SECTION 1.5.3
frumentum omne, praeter quod secum portaturi erant, comburunt, ut domum reditionis spe sublata paratiores ad omnia pericula subeunda essent; trium mensum molita cibaria sibi quemque domo efferre iubent. Persuadent Rauracis et Tulingis et Latobrigis finitimis, uti eodem usi consilio oppidis suis vicisque exustis una cum iis proficiscantur, Boiosque, qui trans Rhenum incoluerant et in agrum Noricum transierant Noreiamque oppugnabant, receptos ad se socios sibi adsciscunt.

CHAPTER 1.6

SECTION 1.6.1
Erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus domo exire possent: unum per Sequanos, angustum et difficile, inter montem Iuram et flumen Rhodanum, vix qua singuli carri ducerentur, mons autem altissimus impendebat, ut facile perpauci prohibere possent;

SECTION 1.6.2
alterum per provinciam nostram, multo facilius atque expeditius, propterea quod inter fines Helvetiorum et Allobrogum, qui nuper pacati erant, Rhodanus fluit isque non nullis locis vado transitur.

SECTION 1.6.3
Extremum oppidum Allobrogum est proximumque Helvetiorum finibus Genava. Ex eo oppido pons ad Helvetios pertinet. Allobrogibus sese vel persuasuros, quod nondum bono animo in populum Romanum viderentur, existimabant vel vi coacturos ut per suos fines eos ire paterentur. Omnibus rebus ad profectionem comparatis diem dicunt, qua die ad ripam Rhodani omnes conveniant. is dies erat a. d. V. Kal. Apr. L. Pisone, A. Gabinio consulibus.

CHAPTER 1.7

SECTION 1.7.1
Caesari cum id nuntiatum esset, eos per provinciam nostram iter facere conari, maturat ab urbe proficisci et quam maximis potest itineribus in Galliam ulteriorem contendit et ad Genavam pervenit.

SECTION 1.7.2
Provinciae toti quam maximum potest militum numerum imperat (erat omnino in Gallia ulteriore legio una), pontem, qui erat ad Genavam, iubet rescindi.

SECTION 1.7.3
Ubi de eius adventu Helvetii certiores facti sunt, legatos ad eum mittunt nobilissimos civitatis, cuius legationis Nammeius et Verucloetius principem locum obtinebant, qui dicerent sibi esse in animo sine ullo maleficio iter per provinciam facere, propterea quod aliud iter haberent nullum: rogare ut eius voluntate id sibi facere liceat. Caesar, quod memoria tenebat L. Cassium consulem occisum exercitumque eius ab Helvetiis pulsum et sub iugum missum, concedendum non putabat;

SECTION 1.7.4
neque homines inimico animo, data facultate per provinciam itineris faciundi, temperaturos ab iniuria et maleficio existimabat.

SECTION 1.7.5
Tamen, ut spatium intercedere posset dum milites quos imperaverat convenirent, legatis respondit diem se ad deliberandum sumpturum: si quid vellent, ad Id. April. reverterentur.

CHAPTER 1.8

SECTION 1.8.1
Interea ea legione quam secum habebat militibusque, qui ex provincia convenerant, a lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iuram, qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, milia passuum XVIIII murum in altitudinem pedum sedecim fossamque perducit.

SECTION 1.8.2
Eo opere perfecto praesidia disponit, castella communit, quo facilius, si se invito transire conentur, prohibere possit.

SECTION 1.8.3
Ubi ea dies quam constituerat cum legatis venit et legati ad eum reverterunt, negat se more et exemplo populi Romani posse iter ulli per provinciam dare et, si vim facere conentur, prohibiturum ostendit.

SECTION 1.8.4
Helvetii ea spe deiecti navibus iunctis ratibusque compluribus factis, alii vadis Rhodani, qua minima altitudo fluminis erat, non numquam interdiu, saepius noctu si perrumpere possent conati, operis munitione et militum concursu et telis repulsi, hoc conatu destiterunt.

CHAPTER 1.9

SECTION 1.9.1
Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via, qua Sequanis invitis propter angustias ire non poterant.

SECTION 1.9.2
His cum sua sponte persuadere non possent, legatos ad Dumnorigem Haeduum mittunt, ut eo deprecatore a Sequanis impetrarent.

SECTION 1.9.3
Dumnorix gratia et largitione apud Sequanos plurimum poterat et Helvetiis erat amicus, quod ex ea civitate Orgetorigis filiam in matrimonium duxerat, et cupiditate regni adductus novis rebus studebat et quam plurimas civitates suo beneficio habere obstrictas volebat.

SECTION 1.9.4
Itaque rem suscipit et a Sequanis impetrat ut per fines suos Helvetios ire patiantur, obsidesque uti inter sese dent perficit: Sequani, ne itinere Helvetios prohibeant, Helvetii, ut sine maleficio et iniuria transeant.

CHAPTER 1.10

SECTION 1.10.1
Caesari renuntiatur Helvetiis esse in animo per agrum Sequanorum et Haeduorum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia.

SECTION 1.10.2
Id si fieret, intellegebat magno cum periculo provinciae futurum ut homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet.

SECTION 1.10.3
Ob eas causas ei munitioni quam fecerat T. Labienum legatum praeficit; ipse in Italiam magnis itineribus contendit duasque ibi legiones conscribit et tres, quae circum Aquileiam hiemabant, ex hibernis educit et, qua proximum iter in ulteriorem Galliam per Alpes erat, cum his quinque legionibus ire contendit.

SECTION 1.10.4
Ibi Ceutrones et Graioceli et Caturiges locis superioribus occupatis itinere exercitum prohibere conantur. Compluribus his proeliis pulsis ab Ocelo, quod est oppidum citerioris provinciae extremum, in fines Vocontiorum ulterioris provinciae die septimo pervenit; inde in Allobrogum fines, ab Allobrogibus in Segusiavos exercitum ducit. Hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi.

CHAPTER 1.11

SECTION 1.11.1
Helvetii iam per angustias et fines Sequanorum suas copias traduxerant et in Haeduorum fines pervenerant eorumque agros populabantur.

SECTION 1.11.2
Haedui, cum se suaque ab iis defendere non possent, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt rogatum auxilium:

SECTION 1.11.3
ita se omni tempore de populo Romano meritos esse ut paene in conspectu exercitus nostri agri vastari, liberi [eorum] in servitutem abduci, oppida expugnari non debuerint. Eodem tempore quo Haedui Ambarri, necessarii et consanguinei Haeduorum, Caesarem certiorem faciunt sese depopulatis agris non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibere.

SECTION 1.11.4
Item Allobroges, qui trans Rhodanum vicos possessionesque habebant, fuga se ad Caesarem recipiunt et demonstrant sibi praeter agri solum nihil esse reliqui.

SECTION 1.11.5
Quibus rebus adductus Caesar non expectandum sibi statuit dum, omnibus, fortunis sociorum consumptis, in Santonos Helvetii pervenirent.

CHAPTER 1.12

SECTION 1.12.1
Flumen est Arar, quod per fines Haeduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit, incredibili lenitate, ita ut oculis in utram partem fluat iudicari non possit. Id Helvetii ratibus ac lintribus iunctis transibant.

SECTION 1.12.2
Ubi per exploratores Caesar certior factus est tres iam partes copiarum Helvetios id flumen traduxisse, quartam vero partem citra flumen Ararim reliquam esse, de tertia vigilia cum legionibus tribus e castris profectus ad eam partem pervenit quae nondum flumen transierat.

SECTION 1.12.3
Eos impeditos et inopinantes adgressus magnam partem eorum concidit; reliqui sese fugae mandarunt atque in proximas silvas abdiderunt.

SECTION 1.12.4
Is pagus appellabatur Tigurinus; nam omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor pagos divisa est.

SECTION 1.12.5
Hic pagus unus, cum domo exisset, patrum nostrorum memoria L. Cassium consulem interfecerat et eius exercitum sub iugum miserat.

SECTION 1.12.6
Ita sive casu sive consilio deorum immortalium quae pars civitatis Helvetiae insignem calamitatem populo Romano intulerat, ea princeps poenam persolvit.

SECTION 1.12.7
Qua in re Caesar non solum publicas, sed etiam privatas iniurias ultus est, quod eius soceri L. Pisonis avum, L. Pisonem legatum, Tigurini eodem proelio quo Cassium interfecerant.

CHAPTER 1.13

SECTION 1.13.1
Hoc proelio facto, reliquas copias Helvetiorum ut consequi posset, pontem in Arari faciendum curat atque ita exercitum traducit.

SECTION 1.13.2
Helvetii repentino eius adventu commoti cum id quod ipsi diebus XX aegerrime confecerant, ut flumen transirent, illum uno die fecisse intellegerent, legatos ad eum mittunt; cuius legationis Divico princeps fuit, qui bello Cassiano dux Helvetiorum fuerat.

SECTION 1.13.3
Is ita cum Caesare egit: si pacem populus Romanus cum Helvetiis faceret, in eam partem ituros atque ibi futuros Helvetios ubi eos Caesar constituisset atque esse voluisset;

SECTION 1.13.4
sin bello persequi perseveraret, reminisceretur et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtutis Helvetiorum. Quod improviso unum pagum adortus esset, cum ii qui flumen transissent suis auxilium ferre non possent, ne ob eam rem aut suae magnopere virtuti tribueret aut ipsos despiceret. Se ita a patribus maioribusque suis didicisse, ut magis virtute contenderent quam dolo aut insidiis niterentur.

SECTION 1.13.5
Quare ne committeret ut is locus ubi constitissent ex calamitate populi Romani et internecione exercitus nomen caperet aut memoriam proderet.

CHAPTER 1.14

SECTION 1.14.1
His Caesar ita respondit: eo sibi minus dubitationis dari, quod eas res quas legati Helvetii commemorassent memoria teneret, atque eo gravius ferre quo minus merito populi Romani accidissent;

SECTION 1.14.2
qui si alicuius iniuriae sibi conscius fuisset, non fuisse difficile cavere; sed eo deceptum, quod neque commissum a se intellegeret quare timeret neque sine causa timendum putaret.

SECTION 1.14.3
Quod si veteris contumeliae oblivisci vellet, num etiam recentium iniuriarum, quod eo invito iter per provinciam per vim temptassent, quod Haeduos, quod Ambarros, quod Allobrogas vexassent, memoriam deponere posse?

SECTION 1.14.4
Quod sua victoria tam insolenter gloriarentur quodque tam diu se impune iniurias tulisse admirarentur, eodem pertinere.

SECTION 1.14.5
Consuesse enim deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundiores interdum res et diuturniorem impunitatem concedere.

SECTION 1.14.6
Cum ea ita sint, tamen, si obsides ab iis sibi dentur, uti ea quae polliceantur facturos intellegat, et si Haeduis de iniuriis quas ipsis sociisque eorum intulerint, item si Allobrogibus satis faciunt, sese cum iis pacem esse facturum.

SECTION 1.14.7
Divico respondit: ita Helvetios a maioribus suis institutos esse uti obsides accipere, non dare, consuerint; eius rei populum Romanum esse testem. Hoc responso dato discessit.

CHAPTER 1.15

SECTION 1.15.1
Postero die castra ex eo loco movent. Idem facit Caesar equitatumque omnem, ad numerum quattuor milium, quem ex omni provincia et Haeduis atque eorum sociis coactum habebat, praemittit, qui videant quas in partes hostes iter faciant. Qui cupidius novissimum agmen insecuti alieno loco cum equitatu Helvetiorum proelium committunt; et pauci de nostris cadunt.

SECTION 1.15.2
Quo proelio sublati Helvetii, quod quingentis equitibus tantam multitudinem equitum propulerant, audacius subsistere non numquam et novissimo agmine proelio nostros lacessere coeperunt. Caesar suos a proelio continebat, ac satis habebat in praesentia hostem rapinis, pabulationibus populationibusque prohibere.

SECTION 1.15.3
Ita dies circiter XV iter fecerunt uti inter novissimum hostium agmen et nostrum primum non amplius quinis aut senis milibus passuum interesset.

CHAPTER 1.16

SECTION 1.16.1
Interim cotidie Caesar Haeduos frumentum, quod essent publice polliciti, flagitare.

SECTION 1.16.2
Nam propter frigora [quod Gallia sub septentrionibus, ut ante dictum est, posita est,] non modo frumenta in agris matura non erant, sed ne pabuli quidem satis magna copia suppetebat;

SECTION 1.16.3
eo autem frumento quod flumine Arari navibus subvexerat propterea uti minus poterat quod iter ab Arari Helvetii averterant, a quibus discedere nolebat.

SECTION 1.16.4
Diem ex die ducere Haedui: conferri, comportari, adesse dicere.

SECTION 1.16.5
Ubi se diutius duci intellexit et diem instare quo die frumentum militibus metiri oporteret, convocatis eorum principibus, quorum magnam copiam in castris habebat, in his Diviciaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeerat, quem vergobretum appellant Haedui, qui creatur annuus et vitae necisque in suos habet potestatem, graviter eos accusat,

SECTION 1.16.6
quod, cum neque emi neque ex agris sumi possit, tam necessario tempore, tam propinquis hostibus ab iis non sublevetur, praesertim cum magna ex parte eorum precibus adductus bellum susceperit[; multo etiam gravius quod sit destitutus queritur].

CHAPTER 1.17

SECTION 1.17.1
Tum demum Liscus oratione Caesaris adductus quod antea tacuerat proponit: esse non nullos, quorum auctoritas apud plebem plurimum valeat, qui privatim plus possint quam ipsi magistratus.

SECTION 1.17.2
Hos seditiosa atque improba oratione multitudinem deterrere, ne frumentum conferant quod debeant:

SECTION 1.17.3
praestare, si iam principatum Galliae obtinere non possint, Gallorum quam Romanorum imperia perferre,

SECTION 1.17.4
neque dubitare [debeant] quin, si Helvetios superaverint Romani, una cum reliqua Gallia Haeduis libertatem sint erepturi.

SECTION 1.17.5
Ab isdem nostra consilia quaeque in castris gerantur hostibus enuntiari; hos a se coerceri non posse.

SECTION 1.17.6
Quin etiam, quod necessariam rem coactus Caesari enuntiarit, intellegere sese quanto id cum periculo fecerit, et ob eam causam quam diu potuerit tacuisse.

CHAPTER 1.18

SECTION 1.18.1
Caesar hac oratione Lisci Dumnorigem, Diviciaci fratrem, designari sentiebat, sed, quod pluribus praesentibus eas res iactari nolebat, celeriter concilium dimittit, Liscum retinet.

SECTION 1.18.2
Quaerit ex solo ea quae in conventu dixerat. Dicit liberius atque audacius. Eadem secreto ab aliis quaerit; reperit esse vera:

SECTION 1.18.3
ipsum esse Dumnorigem, summa audacia, magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia, cupidum rerum novarum. Complures annos portoria reliquaque omnia Haeduorum vectigalia parvo pretio redempta habere, propterea quod illo licente contra liceri audeat nemo.

SECTION 1.18.4
His rebus et suam rem familiarem auxisse et facultates ad largiendum magnas comparasse;

SECTION 1.18.5
magnum numerum equitatus suo sumptu semper alere et circum se habere,

SECTION 1.18.6
neque solum domi, sed etiam apud finitimas civitates largiter posse, atque huius potentiae causa matrem in Biturigibus homini illic nobilissimo ac potentissimo conlocasse;

SECTION 1.18.7
ipsum ex Helvetiis uxorem habere, sororum ex matre et propinquas suas nuptum in alias civitates conlocasse.

SECTION 1.18.8
Favere et cupere Helvetiis propter eam adfinitatem, odisse etiam suo nomine Caesarem et Romanos, quod eorum adventu potentia eius deminuta et Diviciacus frater in antiquum locum gratiae atque honoris sit restitutus.

SECTION 1.18.9
Si quid accidat Romanis, summam in spem per Helvetios regni obtinendi venire; imperio populi Romani non modo de regno, sed etiam de ea quam habeat gratia desperare.

SECTION 1.18.10
Reperiebat etiam in quaerendo Caesar, quod proelium equestre adversum paucis ante diebus esset factum, initium eius fugae factum a Dumnorige atque eius equitibus (nam equitatui, quem auxilio Caesari Haedui miserant, Dumnorix praeerat): eorum fuga reliquum esse equitatum perterritum.

CHAPTER 1.19

SECTION 1.19.1
Quibus rebus cognitis, cum ad has suspiciones certissimae res accederent, quod per fines Sequanorum Helvetios traduxisset, quod obsides inter eos dandos curasset, quod ea omnia non modo iniussu suo et civitatis sed etiam inscientibus ipsis fecisset, quod a magistratu Haeduorum accusaretur, satis esse causae arbitrabatur quare in eum aut ipse animadverteret aut civitatem animadvertere iuberet.

SECTION 1.19.2
His omnibus rebus unum repugnabat, quod Diviciaci fratris summum in populum Romanum studium, summum in se voluntatem, egregiam fidem, iustitiam, temperantiam cognoverat; nam ne eius supplicio Diviciaci animum offenderet verebatur.

SECTION 1.19.3
Itaque prius quam quicquam conaretur, Diviciacum ad se vocari iubet et, cotidianis interpretibus remotis, per C. Valerium Troucillum, principem Galliae provinciae, familiarem suum, cui summam omnium rerum fidem habebat, cum eo conloquitur;

SECTION 1.19.4
simul commonefacit quae ipso praesente in concilio [Gallorum] de Dumnorige sint dicta, et ostendit quae separatim quisque de eo apud se dixerit.

SECTION 1.19.5
Petit atque hortatur ut sine eius offensione animi vel ipse de eo causa cognita statuat vel civitatem statuere iubeat.

CHAPTER 1.20

SECTION 1.20.1
Diviciacus multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus obsecrare coepit ne quid gravius in fratrem statueret:

SECTION 1.20.2
scire se illa esse vera, nec quemquam ex eo plus quam se doloris capere, propterea quod, cum ipse gratia plurimum domi atque in reliqua Gallia, ille minimum propter adulescentiam posset, per se crevisset;

SECTION 1.20.3
quibus opibus ac nervis non solum ad minuendam gratiam, sed paene ad perniciem suam uteretur. Sese tamen et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri.

SECTION 1.20.4
Quod si quid ei a Caesare gravius accidisset, cum ipse eum locum amicitiae apud eum teneret, neminem existimaturum non sua voluntate factum; qua ex re futurum uti totius Galliae animi a se averterentur.

SECTION 1.20.5
Haec cum pluribus verbis flens a Caesare peteret, Caesar eius dextram prendit; consolatus rogat finem orandi faciat; tanti eius apud se gratiam esse ostendit uti et rei publicae iniuriam et suum dolorem eius voluntati ac precibus condonet. Dumnorigem ad se vocat, fratrem adhibet; quae in eo reprehendat ostendit; quae ipse intellegat, quae civitas queratur proponit; monet ut in reliquum tempus omnes suspiciones vitet; praeterita se Diviciaco fratri condonare dicit. Dumnorigi custodes ponit, ut quae agat, quibuscum loquatur scire possit.

CHAPTER 1.21

SECTION 1.21.1
Eodem die ab exploratoribus certior factus hostes sub monte consedisse milia passuum ab ipsius castris octo, qualis esset natura montis et qualis in circuitu ascensus qui cognoscerent misit.

SECTION 1.21.2
Renuntiatum est facilem esse. De tertia vigilia T. Labienum, legatum pro praetore, cum duabus legionibus et iis ducibus qui iter cognoverant summum iugum montis ascendere iubet; quid sui consilii sit ostendit.

SECTION 1.21.3
Ipse de quarta vigilia eodem itinere quo hostes ierant ad eos contendit equitatumque omnem ante se mittit.

SECTION 1.21.4
P. Considius, qui rei militaris peritissimus habebatur et in exercitu L. Sullae et postea in M. Crassi fuerat, cum exploratoribus praemittitur.

CHAPTER 1.22

SECTION 1.22.1
Prima luce, cum summus mons a [Lucio] Labieno teneretur, ipse ab hostium castris non longius mille et quingentis passibus abesset neque, ut postea ex captivis comperit, aut ipsius adventus aut Labieni cognitus esset,

SECTION 1.22.2
Considius equo admisso ad eum accurrit, dicit montem, quem a Labieno occupari voluerit, ab hostibus teneri: id se a Gallicis armis atque insignibus cognovisse.

SECTION 1.22.3
Caesar suas copias in proximum collem subducit, aciem instruit. Labienus, ut erat ei praeceptum a Caesare ne proelium committeret, nisi ipsius copiae prope hostium castra visae essent, ut undique uno tempore in hostes impetus fieret, monte occupato nostros expectabat proelioque abstinebat.

SECTION 1.22.4
Multo denique die per exploratores Caesar cognovit et montem a suis teneri et Helvetios castra, movisse et Considium timore perterritum quod non vidisset pro viso sibi renuntiavisse. Eo die quo consuerat intervallo hostes sequitur et milia passuum tria ab eorum castris castra ponit.

CHAPTER 1.23

SECTION 1.23.1
Postridie eius diei, quod omnino biduum supererat, cum exercitui frumentum metiri oporteret, et quod a Bibracte, oppido Haeduorum longe maximo et copiosissimo, non amplius milibus passuum XVIII aberat, rei frumentariae prospiciendum existimavit; itaque iter ab Helvetiis avertit ac Bibracte ire contendit.

SECTION 1.23.2
Ea res per fugitivos L. Aemilii, decurionis equitum Gallorum, hostibus nuntiatur.

SECTION 1.23.3
Helvetii, seu quod timore perterritos Romanos discedere a se existimarent, eo magis quod pridie superioribus locis occupatis proelium non commisissent, sive eo quod re frumentaria intercludi posse confiderent, commutato consilio atque itinere converso nostros a novissimo agmine insequi ac lacessere coeperunt.

CHAPTER 1.24

SECTION 1.24.1
Postquam id animum advertit, copias suas Caesar in proximum collem subduxit equitatumque, qui sustineret hostium impetum, misit.

SECTION 1.24.2
Ipse interim in colle medio triplicem aciem instruxit legionum quattuor veteranarum; in summo iugo duas legiones quas in Gallia citeriore proxime conscripserat et omnia auxilia conlocavit,

SECTION 1.24.3
ita ut supra se totum montem hominibus compleret; impedimenta sarcinasque in unum locum conferri et eum ab iis qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit.

SECTION 1.24.4
Helvetii cum omnibus suis carris secuti impedimenta in unum locum contulerunt; ipsi confertissima acie, reiecto nostro equitatu, phalange facta sub primam nostram aciem successerunt.

CHAPTER 1.25

SECTION 1.25.1
Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis equis, ut aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret, cohortatus suos proelium commisit.

SECTION 1.25.2
Milites loco superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfregerunt. Ea disiecta gladiis destrictis in eos impetum fecerunt.

SECTION 1.25.3
Gallis magno ad pugnam erat impedimento quod pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et conligatis, cum ferrum se inflexisset, neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis commode pugnare poterant,

SECTION 1.25.4
multi ut diu iactato bracchio praeoptarent scutum manu emittere et nudo corpore pugnare.

SECTION 1.25.5
Tandem vulneribus defessi et pedem referre et, quod mons suberit circiter mille passuum spatio, eo se recipere coeperunt.

SECTION 1.25.6
Capto monte et succedentibus nostris, Boi et Tulingi, qui hominum milibus circiter XV agmen hostium claudebant et novissimis praesidio erant, ex itinere nostros ab latere aperto adgressi circumvenire, et id conspicati Helvetii, qui in montem sese receperant, rursus instare et proelium redintegrare coeperunt.

SECTION 1.25.7
Romani [conversa] signa bipertito intulerunt: prima et secunda acies, ut victis ac submotis resisteret, tertia, ut venientes sustineret.

CHAPTER 1.26

SECTION 1.26.1
Ita ancipiti proelio diu atque acriter pugnatum est. Diutius cum sustinere nostrorum impetus non possent, alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et carros suos se contulerunt.

SECTION 1.26.2
Nam hoc toto proelio, cum ab hora septima ad vesperum pugnatum sit, aversum hostem videre nemo potuit.

SECTION 1.26.3
Ad multam noctem etiam ad impedimenta pugnatum est, propterea quod pro vallo carros obiecerunt et e loco superiore in nostros venientes tela coiciebant et non nulli inter carros rotasque mataras ac tragulas subiciebant nostrosque vulnerabant.

SECTION 1.26.4
Diu cum esset pugnatum, impedimentis castrisque nostri potiti sunt. Ibi Orgetorigis filia atque unus e filiis captus est.

SECTION 1.26.5
Ex eo proelio circiter hominum milia CXXX superfuerunt eaque tota nocte continenter ierunt [nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso]; in fines Lingonum die quarto pervenerunt, cum et propter vulnera militum et propter sepulturam occisorum nostri [triduum morati] eos sequi non potuissent.

SECTION 1.26.6
Caesar ad Lingonas litteras nuntiosque misit, ne eos frumento neve alia re iuvarent: qui si iuvissent, se eodem loco quo Helvetios habiturum. Ipse triduo intermisso cum omnibus copiis eos sequi coepit.

CHAPTER 1.27

SECTION 1.27.1
Helvetii omnium rerum inopia adducti legatos de deditione ad eum miserunt.

SECTION 1.27.2
Qui cum eum in itinere convenissent seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem petissent, atque eos in eo loco quo tum essent suum adventum expectare iussisset, paruerunt.

SECTION 1.27.3
Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos perfugissent, poposcit.

SECTION 1.27.4
Dum ea conquiruntur et conferuntur, [nocte intermissa] circiter hominum milia VI eius pagi qui Verbigenus appellatur, sive timore perterriti, ne armis traditis supplicio adficerentur, sive spe salutis inducti, quod in tanta multitudine dediticiorum suam fugam aut occultari aut omnino ignorari posse existimarent, prima nocte e castris Helvetiorum egressi ad Rhenum finesque Germanorum contenderunt.

CHAPTER 1.28

SECTION 1.28.1
Quod ubi Caesar resciit, quorum per fines ierant his uti conquirerent et reducerent, si sibi purgati esse vellent, imperavit; reductos in hostium numero habuit;

SECTION 1.28.2
reliquos omnes obsidibus, armis, perfugis traditis in deditionem accepit.

SECTION 1.28.3
Helvetios, Tulingos, Latobrigos in fines suos, unde erant profecti, reverti iussit, et, quod omnibus frugibus amissis domi nihil erat quo famem tolerarent, Allobrogibus imperavit ut iis frumenti copiam facerent; ipsos oppida vicosque, quos incenderant, restituere iussit. Id ea maxime ratione fecit, quod noluit eum locum unde Helvetii discesserant vacare, ne propter bonitatem agrorum Germani, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, ex suis finibus in Helvetiorum fines transirent et finitimi Galliae provinciae Allobrogibusque essent.

SECTION 1.28.4
Boios petentibus Haeduis, quod egregia virtute erant cogniti, ut in finibus suis conlocarent, concessit; quibus illi agros dederunt quosque postea in parem iuris libertatisque condicionem atque ipsi erant receperunt.

CHAPTER 1.29

SECTION 1.29.1
In castris Helvetiorum tabulae repertae sunt litteris Graecis confectae et ad Caesarem relatae, quibus in tabulis nominatim ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset eorum qui arma ferre possent, et item separatim, quot pueri, senes mulieresque.

SECTION 1.29.2
[Quarum omnium rerum] summa erat capitum Helvetiorum milium CCLXIII, Tulingorum milium XXXVI, Latobrigorum XIIII, Rauracorum XXIII, Boiorum XXXII; ex his qui arma ferre possent ad milia nonaginta duo.

SECTION 1.29.3
Summa omnium fuerunt ad milia CCCLXVIII. Eorum qui domum redierunt censu habito, ut Caesar imperaverat, repertus est numerus milium C et X.

CHAPTER 1.30

SECTION 1.30.1
Bello Helvetiorum confecto totius fere Galliae legati, principes civitatum, ad Caesarem gratulatum convenerunt:

SECTION 1.30.2
intellegere sese, tametsi pro veteribus Helvetiorum iniuriis populi Romani ab his poenas bello repetisset, tamen eam rem non minus ex usu [terrae] Galliae quam populi Romani accidisse,

SECTION 1.30.3
propterea quod eo consilio florentissimis rebus domos suas Helvetii reliquissent uti toti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur, locumque domicilio ex magna copia deligerent quem ex omni Gallia oportunissimum ac fructuosissimum iudicassent, reliquasque civitates stipendiarias haberent.

SECTION 1.30.4
Petierunt uti sibi concilium totius Galliae in diem certam indicere idque Caesaris facere voluntate liceret: sese habere quasdam res quas ex communi consensu ab eo petere vellent.

SECTION 1.30.5
Ea re permissa diem concilio constituerunt et iure iurando ne quis enuntiaret, nisi quibus communi consilio mandatum esset, inter se sanxerunt.

CHAPTER 1.31

SECTION 1.31.1
Eo concilio dimisso, idem princeps civitatum qui ante fuerant ad Caesarem reverterunt petieruntque uti sibi secreto in occulto de sua omniumque salute cum eo agere liceret.

SECTION 1.31.2
Ea re impetrata sese omnes flentes Caesari ad pedes proiecerunt: non minus se id contendere et laborare ne ea quae dixissent enuntiarentur quam uti ea quae vellent impetrarent, propterea quod, si enuntiatum esset, summum in cruciatum se venturos viderent.

SECTION 1.31.3
Locutus est pro his Diviciacus Haeduus: Galliae totius factiones esse duas; harum alterius principatum tenere Haeduos, alterius Arvernos.

SECTION 1.31.4
Hi cum tantopere de potentatu inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse uti ab Arvernis Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur.

SECTION 1.31.5
Horum primo circiter milia XV Rhenum transisse; postea quam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductos plures; nunc esse in Gallia ad C et XX milium numerum.

SECTION 1.31.6
Cum his Haeduos eorumque clientes semel atque iterum armis contendisse; magnam calamitatem pulsos accepisse, omnem nobilitatem, omnem senatum, omnem equitatum amisisse.

SECTION 1.31.7
Quibus proeliis calamitatibusque fractos, qui et sua virtute et populi Romani hospitio atque amicitia plurimum ante in Gallia potuissent, coactos esse Sequanis obsides dare nobilissimos civitatis et iure iurando civitatem obstringere sese neque obsides repetituros neque auxilium a populo Romano imploraturos neque recusaturos quo minus perpetuo sub illorum dicione atque imperio essent.

SECTION 1.31.8
Unum se esse ex omni civitate Haeduorum qui adduci non potuerit ut iuraret aut liberos suos obsides daret.

SECTION 1.31.9
Ob eam rem se ex civitate profugisse et Romam ad senatum venisse auxilium postulatum, quod solus neque iure iurando neque obsidibus teneretur.

SECTION 1.31.10
Sed peius victoribus Sequanis quam Haeduis victis accidisse, propterea quod Ariovistus, rex Germanorum, in eorum finibus consedisset tertiamque partem agri Sequani, qui esset optimus totius Galliae, occupavisset et nunc de altera parte tertia Sequanos decedere iuberet, propterea quod paucis mensibus ante Harudum milia hominum XXIIII ad eum venissent, quibus locus ac sedes pararentur.

SECTION 1.31.11
Futurum esse paucis annis uti omnes ex Galliae finibus pellerentur atque omnes Germani Rhenum transirent; neque enim conferendum esse Gallicum cum Germanorum agro neque hanc consuetudinem victus cum illa comparandam.

SECTION 1.31.12
Ariovistum autem, ut semel Gallorum copias proelio vicerit, quod proelium factum sit ad Magetobrigam, superbe et crudeliter imperare, obsides nobilissimi cuiusque liberos poscere et in eos omnia exempla cruciatusque edere, si qua res non ad nutum aut ad voluntatem eius facta sit.

SECTION 1.31.13
Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, temerarium: non posse eius imperia, diutius sustineri.

SECTION 1.31.14
Nisi quid in Caesare populoque Romano sit auxilii, omnibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvetii fecerint, ut domo emigrent, aliud domicilium, alias sedes, remotas a Germanis, petant fortunamque, quaecumque accidat, experiantur. Haec si enuntiata Ariovisto sint, non dubitare quin de omnibus obsidibus qui apud eum sint gravissimum supplicium sumat.

SECTION 1.31.15
Caesarem vel auctoritate sua atque exercitus vel recenti victoria vel nomine populi Romani deterrere posse ne maior multitudo Germanorum Rhenum traducatur, Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti iniuria posse defendere.

CHAPTER 1.32

SECTION 1.32.1
Hac oratione ab Diviciaco habita omnes qui aderant magno fletu auxilium a Caesare petere coeperunt.

SECTION 1.32.2
Animadvertit Caesar unos ex omnibus Sequanos nihil earum rerum facere quas ceteri facerent sed tristes capite demisso terram intueri. Eius rei quae causa esset miratus ex ipsis quaesiit.

SECTION 1.32.3
Nihil Sequani respondere, sed in eadem tristitia taciti permanere. Cum ab his saepius quaereret neque ullam omnino vocem exprimere posset, idem Diviacus Haeduus respondit:

SECTION 1.32.4
hoc esse miseriorem et graviorem fortunam Sequanorum quam reliquorum, quod soli ne in occulto quidem queri neque auxilium implorare auderent absentisque Ariovisti crudelitatem,

SECTION 1.32.5
velut si coram adesset, horrerent, propterea quod reliquis tamen fugae facultas daretur, Sequanis vero, qui intra fines suos Ariovistum recepissent, quorum oppida omnia in potestate eius essent, omnes cruciatus essent perferendi.

CHAPTER 1.33

SECTION 1.33.1
His rebus cognitis Caesar Gallorum animos verbis confirmavit pollicitusque est sibi eam rem curae futuram; magnam se habere spem et beneficio suo et auctoritate adductum Ariovistum finem iniuriis facturum. Hac oratione habita, concilium dimisit.

SECTION 1.33.2
Et secundum ea multae res eum hortabantur quare sibi eam rem cogitandam et suscipiendam putaret, in primis quod Haeduos, fratres consanguineosque saepe numero a senatu appellatos, in servitute atque [in] dicione videbat Germanorum teneri eorumque obsides esse apud Ariovistum ac Sequanos intellegebat; quod in tanto imperio populi Romani turpissimum sibi et rei publicae esse arbitrabatur.

SECTION 1.33.3
Paulatim autem Germanos consuescere Rhenum transire et in Galliam magnam eorum multitudinem venire populo Romano periculosum videbat, neque sibi homines feros ac barbaros temperaturos existimabat quin, cum omnem Galliam occupavissent, ut ante Cimbri Teutonique fecissent, in provinciam exirent atque inde in Italiam contenderent [, praesertim cum Sequanos a provincia nostra Rhodanus divideret]; quibus rebus quam maturrime occurrendum putabat.

SECTION 1.33.4
Ipse autem Ariovistus tantos sibi spiritus, tantam arrogantiam sumpserat, ut ferendus non videretur.

CHAPTER 1.34

SECTION 1.34.1
Quam ob rem placuit ei ut ad Ariovistum legatos mitteret, qui ab eo postularent uti aliquem locum medium utrisque conloquio deligeret: velle sese de re publica et summis utriusque rebus cum eo agere.

SECTION 1.34.2
Ei legationi Ariovistus respondit: si quid ipsi a Caesare opus esset, sese ad eum venturum fuisse; si quid ille se velit, illum ad se venire oportere.

SECTION 1.34.3
Praeterea se neque sine exercitu in eas partes Galliae venire audere quas Caesar possideret, neque exercitum sine magno commeatu atque molimento in unum locum contrahere posse.

SECTION 1.34.4
Sibi autem mirum videri quid in sua Gallia, quam bello vicisset, aut Caesari aut omnino populo Romano negotii esset.

CHAPTER 1.35

SECTION 1.35.1
His responsis ad Caesarem relatis, iterum ad eum Caesar legatos cum his mandatis mittit:

SECTION 1.35.2
quoniam tanto suo populique Romani beneficio adfectus, cum in consulatu suo rex atque amicus a senatu appellatus esset, hanc sibi populoque Romano gratiam referret ut in conloquium venire invitatus gravaretur neque de communi re dicendum sibi et cognoscendum putaret, haec esse quae ab eo postularet:

SECTION 1.35.3
primum ne quam multitudinem hominum amplius trans Rhenum in Galliam traduceret; deinde obsides quos haberet ab Haeduis redderet Sequanisque permitteret ut quos illi haberent voluntate eius reddere illis liceret; neve Haeduos iniuria lacesseret neve his sociisque eorum bellum inferret.

SECTION 1.35.4
Si [id] ita fecisset, sibi populoque Romano perpetuam gratiam atque amicitiam cum eo futuram; si non impetraret, sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum.

CHAPTER 1.36

SECTION 1.36.1
Ad haec Ariovistus respondit: ius esse belli ut qui vicissent iis quos vicissent quem ad modum vellent imperarent. Item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse.

SECTION 1.36.2
Si ipse populo Romano non praescriberet quem ad modum suo iure uteretur, non oportere se a populo Romano in suo iure impediri.

SECTION 1.36.3
Haeduos sibi, quoniam belli fortunam temptassent et armis congressi ac superati essent, stipendiarios esse factos.

SECTION 1.36.4
Magnam Caesarem iniuriam facere, qui suo adventu vectigalia sibi deteriora faceret.

SECTION 1.36.5
Haeduis se obsides redditurum non esse neque his neque eorum sociis iniuria bellum inlaturum, si in eo manerent quod convenisset stipendiumque quotannis penderent; si id non fecissent, longe iis fraternum nomen populi Romani afuturum.

SECTION 1.36.6
Quod sibi Caesar denuntiaret se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum, neminem secum sine sua pernicie contendisse.

SECTION 1.36.7
Cum vellet, congrederetur: intellecturum quid invicti Germani, exercitatissimi in armis, qui inter annos XIIII tectum non subissent, virtute possent.

CHAPTER 1.37

SECTION 1.37.1
Haec eodem tempore Caesari mandata referebantur et legati ab Haeduis et a Treveris veniebant:

SECTION 1.37.2
Haedui questum quod Harudes, qui nuper in Galliam transportati essent, fines eorum popularentur: sese ne obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere potuisse;

SECTION 1.37.3
Treveri autem, pagos centum Sueborum ad ripas Rheni consedisse, qui Rhenum transire conarentur; his praeesse Nasuam et Cimberium fratres. Quibus rebus Caesar vehementer commotus maturandum sibi existimavit, ne, si nova manus Sueborum cum veteribus copiis Ariovisti sese coniunxisset, minus facile resisti posset.

SECTION 1.37.4
Itaque re frumentaria quam celerrime potuit comparata magnis itineribus ad Ariovistum contendit.

CHAPTER 1.38

SECTION 1.38.1
Cum tridui viam processisset, nuntiatum est ei Ariovistum cum suis omnibus copiis ad occupandum Vesontionem, quod est oppidum maximum Sequanorum, contendere [triduique viam a suis finibus processisse]. Id ne accideret, magnopere sibi praecavendum Caesar existimabat. Namque omnium rerum quae ad bellum usui erant summa erat in eo oppido facultas,

SECTION 1.38.2
idque natura loci sic muniebatur ut magnam ad ducendum bellum daret facultatem, propterea quod flumen [alduas] Dubis ut circino circumductum paene totum oppidum cingit,

SECTION 1.38.3
reliquum spatium, quod est non amplius pedum MDC, qua flumen intermittit, mons continet magna altitudine, ita ut radices eius montis ex utraque parte ripae fluminis contingant,

SECTION 1.38.4
hunc murus circumdatus arcem efficit et cum oppido coniungit.

SECTION 1.38.5
Huc Caesar magnis nocturnis diurnisque itineribus contendit occupatoque oppido ibi praesidium conlocat.

CHAPTER 1.39

SECTION 1.39.1
Dum paucos dies ad Vesontionem rei frumentariae commeatusque causa moratur, ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti magnitudine corporum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in armis esse praedicabant (saepe numero sese cum his congressos ne vultum quidem atque aciem oculorum dicebant ferre potuisse), tantus subito timor omnem exercitum occupavit ut non mediocriter omnium mentes animosque perturbaret.

SECTION 1.39.2
Hic primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis, reliquisque qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant:

SECTION 1.39.3
quorum alius alia causa inlata, quam sibi ad proficiscendum necessariam esse diceret, petebat ut eius voluntate discedere liceret; non nulli pudore adducti, ut timoris suspicionem vitarent, remanebant.

SECTION 1.39.4
Hi neque vultum fingere neque interdum lacrimas tenere poterant: abditi in tabernaculis aut suum fatum querebantur aut cum familiaribus suis commune periculum miserabantur. Vulgo totis castris testamenta obsignabantur.

SECTION 1.39.5
Horum vocibus ac timore paulatim etiam ii qui magnum in castris usum habebant, milites centurionesque quique equitatui praeerant, perturbabantur.

SECTION 1.39.6
Qui se ex his minus timidos existimari volebant, non se hostem vereri, sed angustias itineris et magnitudinem silvarum quae intercederent inter ipsos atque Ariovistum, aut rem frumentariam, ut satis commode supportari posset, timere dicebant.

SECTION 1.39.7
Non nulli etiam Caesari nuntiabant, cum castra moveri ac signa ferri iussisset, non fore dicto audientes milites neque propter timorem signa laturos.

CHAPTER 1.40

SECTION 1.40.1
Haec cum animadvertisset, convocato consilio omniumque ordinum ad id consilium adhibitis centurionibus, vehementer eos incusavit: primum, quod aut quam in partem aut quo consilio ducerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitandum putarent.

SECTION 1.40.2
Ariovistum se consule cupidissime populi Romani amicitiam adpetisse; cur hunc tam temere quisquam ab officio discessurum iudicaret?

SECTION 1.40.3
Sibi quidem persuaderi cognitis suis postulatis atque aequitate condicionum perspecta eum neque suam neque populi Romani gratiam repudiaturum.

SECTION 1.40.4
Quod si furore atque amentia impulsum bellum intulisset, quid tandem vererentur? Aut cur de sua virtute aut de ipsius diligentia desperarent?

SECTION 1.40.5
Factum eius hostis periculum patrum nostrorum memoria Cimbris et Teutonis a C. Mario pulsis [cum non minorem laudem exercitus quam ipse imperator meritus videbatur]; factum etiam nuper in Italia servili tumultu, quos tamen aliquid usus ac disciplina, quam a nobis accepissent, sublevarint.

SECTION 1.40.6
Ex quo iudicari posse quantum haberet in se boni constantia, propterea quod quos aliquam diu inermes sine causa timuissent hos postea armatos ac victores superassent.

SECTION 1.40.7
Denique hos esse eosdem Germanos quibuscum saepe numero Helvetii congressi non solum in suis sed etiam in illorum finibus plerumque superarint, qui tamen pares esse nostro exercitui non potuerint.

SECTION 1.40.8
Si quos adversum proelium et fuga Gallorum commoveret, hos, si quaererent, reperire posse diuturnitate belli defatigatis Gallis Ariovistum, cum multos menses castris se ac paludibus tenuisset neque sui potestatem fecisset, desperantes iam de pugna et dispersos subito adortum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse.

SECTION 1.40.9
Cui rationi contra homines barbaros atque imperitos locus fuisset, hac ne ipsum quidem sperare nostros exercitus capi posse.

SECTION 1.40.10
Qui suum timorem in rei frumentariae simulationem angustiasque itineris conferrent, facere arroganter, cum aut de officio imperatoris desperare aut praescribere viderentur.

SECTION 1.40.11
Haec sibi esse curae; frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta matura; de itinere ipsos brevi tempore iudicaturos.

SECTION 1.40.12
Quod non fore dicto audientes neque signa laturi dicantur, nihil se ea re commoveri: scire enim, quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam.

SECTION 1.40.13
Suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam.

SECTION 1.40.14
Itaque se quod in longiorem diem conlaturus fuisset repraesentaturum et proxima nocte de quarta, vigilia castra moturum, ut quam primum intellegere posset utrum apud eos pudor atque officium an timor plus valeret.

SECTION 1.40.15
Quod si praeterea nemo sequatur, tamen se cum sola decima legione iturum, de qua non dubitet, sibique eam praetoriam cohortem futuram. Huic legioni Caesar et indulserat praecipue et propter virtutem confidebat maxime.

CHAPTER 1.41

SECTION 1.41.1
Hac oratione habita mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentes summaque alacritas et cupiditas belli gerendi innata est,

SECTION 1.41.2
princepsque X. legio per tribunos militum ei gratias egit quod de se optimum iudicium fecisset, seque esse ad bellum gerendum paratissimam confirmavit.

SECTION 1.41.3
Deinde reliquae legiones cum tribunis militum et primorum ordinum centurionibus egerunt uti Caesari satis facerent: se neque umquam dubitasse neque timuisse neque de summa belli suum iudicium sed imperatoris esse existimavisse.

SECTION 1.41.4
Eorum satisfactione accepta et itinere exquisito per Diviciacum, quod ex Gallis ei maximam fidem habebat, ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret, de quarta vigilia, ut dixerat, profectus est.

SECTION 1.41.5
Septimo die, cum iter non intermitteret, ab exploratoribus certior factus est Ariovisti copias a nostris milia passuum IIII et XX abesse.

CHAPTER 1.42

SECTION 1.42.1
Cognito Caesaris adventu Ariovistus legatos ad eum mittit: quod antea de conloquio postulasset, id per se fieri licere, quoniam propius accessisset seque id sine periculo facere posse existimaret.

SECTION 1.42.2
Non respuit condicionem Caesar iamque eum ad sanitatem reverti arbitrabatur, cum id quod antea petenti denegasset ultro polliceretur,

SECTION 1.42.3
magnamque in spem veniebat pro suis tantis populique Romani in eum beneficiis cognitis suis postulatis fore uti pertinacia desisteret.

SECTION 1.42.4
Dies conloquio dictus est ex eo die quintus.

SECTION 1.42.5
Interim saepe cum legati ultro citroque inter eos mitterentur, Ariovistus postulavit ne quem peditem ad conloquium Caesar adduceret: vereri se ne per insidias ab eo circumveniretur; uterque cum equitatu veniret: alia ratione sese non esse venturum.

SECTION 1.42.6
Caesar, quod neque conloquium interposita causa tolli volebat neque salutem suam Gallorum equitatui committere audebat, commodissimum esse statuit omnibus equis Gallis equitibus detractis eo legionarios milites legionis X., cui quam maxime confidebat, imponere, ut praesidium quam amicissimum, si quid opus facto esset, haberet.

SECTION 1.42.7
Quod cum fieret, non inridicule quidam ex militibus X. legionis dixit: plus quam pollicitus esset Caesarem facere; pollicitum se in cohortis praetoriae loco X. legionem habiturum ad equum rescribere.

CHAPTER 1.43

SECTION 1.43.1
Planities erat magna et in ea tumulus terrenus satis grandis. Hic locus aequum fere spatium a castris Ariovisti et Caesaris aberat. Eo, ut erat dictum, ad conloquium venerunt.

SECTION 1.43.2
Legionem Caesar, quam equis devexerat, passibus CC ab eo tumulo constituit. Item equites Ariovisti pari intervallo constiterunt.

SECTION 1.43.3
Ariovistus ex equis ut conloquerentur et praeter se denos ad conloquium adducerent postulavit.

SECTION 1.43.4
Ubi eo ventum est, Caesar initio orationis sua senatusque in eum beneficia commemoravit, quod rex appellatus esset a senatu, quod amicus, quod munera amplissime missa; quam rem et paucis contigisse et pro magnis hominum officiis consuesse tribui docebat;

SECTION 1.43.5
illum, cum neque aditum neque causam postulandi iustam haberet, beneficio ac liberalitate sua ac senatus ea praemia consecutum.

SECTION 1.43.6
Docebat etiam quam veteres quamque iustae causae necessitudinis ipsis cum Haeduis intercederent,

SECTION 1.43.7
quae senatus consulta quotiens quamque honorifica in eos facta essent, ut omni tempore totius Galliae principatum Haedui tenuissent, prius etiam quam nostram amicitiam adpetissent.

SECTION 1.43.8
Populi Romani hanc esse consuetudinem, ut socios atque amicos non modo sui nihil deperdere, sed gratia, dignitate, honore auctiores velit esse; quod vero ad amicitiam populi Romani attulissent, id iis eripi quis pati posset?

SECTION 1.43.9
Postulavit deinde eadem quae legatis in mandatis dederat: ne aut Haeduis aut eorum sociis bellum inferret, obsides redderet, si nullam partem Germanorum domum remittere posset, at ne quos amplius Rhenum transire pateretur.

CHAPTER 1.44

SECTION 1.44.1
Ariovistus ad postulata Caesaris pauca respondit, de suis virtutibus multa praedicavit:

SECTION 1.44.2
transisse Rhenum sese non sua sponte, sed rogatum et arcessitum a Gallis; non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse; sedes habere in Gallia ab ipsis concessas, obsides ipsorum voluntate datos; stipendium capere iure belli, quod victores victis imponere consuerint.

SECTION 1.44.3
Non sese Gallis sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse: omnes Galliae civitates ad se oppugnandum venisse ac contra se castra habuisse; eas omnes copias a se uno proelio pulsas ac superatas esse.

SECTION 1.44.4
Si iterum experiri velint, se iterum paratum esse decertare; si pace uti velint, iniquum esse de stipendio recusare, quod sua voluntate ad id tempus pependerint.

SECTION 1.44.5
Amicitiam populi Romani sibi ornamento et praesidio, non detrimento esse oportere, atque se hac spe petisse. Si per populum Romanum stipendium remittatur et dediticii subtrahantur, non minus libenter sese recusaturum populi Romani amicitiam quam adpetierit.

SECTION 1.44.6
Quod multitudinem Germanorum in Galliam traducat, id se sui muniendi, non Galliae oppugnandae causa facere; eius rei testimonium esse quod nisi rogatus non venerit et quod bellum non intulerit sed defenderit.

SECTION 1.44.7
Se prius in Galliam venisse quam populum Romanum. Numquam ante hoc tempus exercitum populi Romani Galliae provinciae finibus egressum.

SECTION 1.44.8
Quid sibi vellet? Cur in suas possessiones veniret? Provinciam suam hanc esse Galliam, sicut illam nostram. Ut ipsi concedi non oporteret, si in nostros fines impetum faceret, sic item nos esse iniquos, quod in suo iure se interpellaremus.

SECTION 1.44.9
Quod fratres a senatu Haeduos appellatos diceret, non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum esse rerum ut non sciret neque bello Allobrogum proximo Haeduos Romanis auxilium tulisse neque ipsos in iis contentionibus quas Haedui secum et cum Sequanis habuissent auxilio populi Romani usos esse.

SECTION 1.44.10
Debere se suspicari simulata Caesarem amicitia, quod exercitum in Gallia habeat, sui opprimendi causa habere.

SECTION 1.44.11
Qui nisi decedat atque exercitum deducat ex his regionibus, sese illum non pro amico sed pro hoste habiturum.

SECTION 1.44.12
Quod si eum interfecerit, multis sese nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse facturum (id se ab ipsis per eorum nuntios compertum habere), quorum omnium gratiam atque amicitiam eius morte redimere posset.

SECTION 1.44.13
Quod si decessisset et liberam possessionem Galliae sibi tradidisset, magno se illum praemio remuneraturum et quaecumque bella geri vellet sine ullo eius labore et periculo confecturum.

CHAPTER 1.45

SECTION 1.45.1
Multa a Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt quare negotio desistere non posset: neque suam neque populi Romani consuetudinem pati ut optime meritos socios desereret, neque se iudicare Galliam potius esse Ariovisti quam populi Romani.

SECTION 1.45.2
Bello superatos esse Arvernos et Rutenos a Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus ignovisset neque in provinciam redegisset neque stipendium posuisset.

SECTION 1.45.3
Quod si antiquissimum quodque tempus spectari oporteret, populi Romani iustissimum esse in Gallia imperium; si iudicium senatus observari oporteret, liberam debere esse Galliam, quam bello victam suis legibus uti voluisset.

CHAPTER 1.46

SECTION 1.46.1
Dum haec in conloquio geruntur, Caesari nuntiatum est equites Ariovisti propius tumulum accedere et ad nostros adequitare, lapides telaque in nostros coicere.

SECTION 1.46.2
Caesar loquendi finem fecit seque ad suos recepit suisque imperavit ne quod omnino telum in hostes reicerent.

SECTION 1.46.3
Nam etsi sine ullo periculo legionis delectae cum equitatu proelium fore videbat, tamen committendum non putabat ut, pulsis hostibus, dici posset eos ab se per fidem in conloquio circumventos.

SECTION 1.46.4
Postea quam in vulgus militum elatum est qua arrogantia in conloquio Ariovistus usus omni Gallia Romanis interdixisset, impetumque in nostros eius equites fecissent, eaque res conloquium ut diremisset, multo maior alacritas studiumque pugnandi maius exercitui iniectum est.

CHAPTER 1.47

SECTION 1.47.1
Biduo post Ariovistus ad Caesarem legatos misit: velle se de iis rebus quae inter eos egi coeptae neque perfectae essent agere cum eo: uti aut iterum conloquio diem constitueret aut, si id minus vellet, ex suis legatis aliquem ad se mitteret.

SECTION 1.47.2
Conloquendi Caesari causa visa non est, et eo magis quod pridie eius diei Germani retineri non potuerant quin tela in nostros coicerent.

SECTION 1.47.3
Legatum ex suis sese magno cum periculo ad eum missurum et hominibus feris obiecturum existimabat.

SECTION 1.47.4
Commodissimum visum est C. Valerium Procillum, C. Valerii Caburi filium, summa virtute et humanitate adulescentem, cuius pater a C. Valerio Flacco civitate donatus erat, et propter fidem et propter linguae Gallicae scientiam, qua multa iam Ariovistus longinqua consuetudine utebatur, et quod in eo peccandi Germanis causa non esset, ad eum mittere, et una M. Metium, qui hospitio Ariovisti utebatur.

SECTION 1.47.5
His mandavit quae diceret Ariovistus cognoscerent et ad se referrent. Quos cum apud se in castris Ariovistus conspexisset, exercitu suo praesente conclamavit: quid ad se venirent? an speculandi causa? Conantes dicere prohibuit et in catenas coniecit.

CHAPTER 1.48

SECTION 1.48.1
Eodem die castra promovit et milibus passuum VI a Caesaris castris sub monte consedit.

SECTION 1.48.2
Postridie eius diei praeter castra Caesaris suas copias traduxit et milibus passuum duobus ultra eum castra fecit eo consilio uti frumento commeatuque qui ex Sequanis et Haeduis supportaretur Caesarem intercluderet.

SECTION 1.48.3
Ex eo die dies continuos V Caesar pro castris suas copias produxit et aciem instructam habuit, ut, si vellet Ariovistus proelio contendere, ei potestas non deesset.

SECTION 1.48.4
Ariovistus his omnibus diebus exercitum castris continuit, equestri proelio cotidie contendit. Genus hoc erat pugnae, quo se Germani exercuerant:

SECTION 1.48.5
equitum milia erant VI, totidem numero pedites velocissimi ac fortissimi, quos ex omni copia singuli singulos suae salutis causa delegerant:

SECTION 1.48.6
cum his in proeliis versabantur, ad eos se equites recipiebant; hi, si quid erat durius, concurrebant, si qui graviore vulnere accepto equo deciderat, circumsistebant;

SECTION 1.48.7
si quo erat longius prodeundum aut celerius recipiendum, tanta erat horum exercitatione celeritas ut iubis sublevati equorum cursum adaequarent.

CHAPTER 1.49

SECTION 1.49.1
Ubi eum castris se tenere Caesar intellexit, ne diutius commeatu prohiberetur, ultra eum locum, quo in loco Germani consederant, circiter passus DC ab his, castris idoneum locum delegit acieque triplici instructa ad eum locum venit.

SECTION 1.49.2
Primam et secundam aciem in armis esse, tertiam castra munire iussit.

SECTION 1.49.3
[Hic locus ab hoste circiter passus DC, uti dictum est, aberat.] Eo circiter hominum XVI milia expedita cum omni equitatu Ariovistus misit, quae copiae nostros terrerent et munitione prohiberent.

SECTION 1.49.4
Nihilo setius Caesar, ut ante constituerat, duas acies hostem propulsare, tertiam opus perficere iussit. Munitis castris duas ibi legiones reliquit et partem auxiliorum, quattuor reliquas legiones in castra maiora reduxit.

CHAPTER 1.50

SECTION 1.50.1
Proximo die instituto suo Caesar ex castris utrisque copias suas eduxit paulumque a maioribus castris progressus aciem instruxit hostibusque pugnandi potestatem fecit.

SECTION 1.50.2
Ubi ne tum quidem eos prodire intellexit, circiter meridiem exercitum in castra reduxit. Tum demum Ariovistus partem suarum copiarum, quae castra minora oppugnaret, misit. Acriter utrimque usque ad vesperum pugnatum est. Solis occasu suas copias Ariovistus multis et inlatis et acceptis vulneribus in castra reduxit.

SECTION 1.50.3
Cum ex captivis quaereret Caesar quam ob rem Ariovistus proelio non decertaret, hanc reperiebat causam, quod apud Germanos ea consuetudo esset ut matres familiae eorum sortibus et vaticinationibus declararent utrum proelium committi ex usu esset necne; eas ita dicere:

SECTION 1.50.4
non esse fas Germanos superare, si ante novam lunam proelio contendissent.

CHAPTER 1.51

SECTION 1.51.1
Postridie eius diei Caesar praesidio utrisque castris quod satis esse visum est reliquit, alarios omnes in conspectu hostium pro castris minoribus constituit, quod minus multitudine militum legionariorum pro hostium numero valebat, ut ad speciem alariis uteretur; ipse triplici instructa acie usque ad castra hostium accessit.

SECTION 1.51.2
Tum demum necessario Germani suas copias castris eduxerunt generatimque constituerunt paribus intervallis, Harudes, Marcomanos, Tribocos, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusios, Suebos, omnemque aciem suam raedis et carris circumdederunt, ne qua spes in fuga relinqueretur.

SECTION 1.51.3
Eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae ad proelium proficiscentes milites passis manibus flentes implorabant ne se in servitutem Romanis traderent.

CHAPTER 1.52

SECTION 1.52.1
Caesar singulis legionibus singulos legatos et quaestorem praefecit, uti eos testes suae quisque virtutis haberet;

SECTION 1.52.2
ipse a dextro cornu, quod eam partem minime firmam hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit.

SECTION 1.52.3
Ita nostri acriter in hostes signo dato impetum fecerunt itaque hostes repente celeriterque procurrerunt, ut spatium pila in hostes coiciendi non daretur.

SECTION 1.52.4
Relictis pilis comminus gladiis pugnatum est. At Germani celeriter ex consuetudine sua phalange facta impetus gladiorum exceperunt.

SECTION 1.52.5
Reperti sunt complures nostri qui in phalanga insilirent et scuta manibus revellerent et desuper vulnerarent.

SECTION 1.52.6
Cum hostium acies a sinistro cornu pulsa atque in fugam coniecta esset, a dextro cornu vehementer multitudine suorum nostram aciem premebant.

SECTION 1.52.7
Id cum animadvertisset P. Crassus adulescens, qui equitatui praeerat, quod expeditior erat quam ii qui inter aciem versabantur, tertiam aciem laborantibus nostris subsidio misit.

CHAPTER 1.53

SECTION 1.53.1
Ita proelium restitutum est, atque omnes hostes terga verterunt nec prius fugere destiterunt quam ad flumen Rhenum milia passuum ex eo loco circiter L pervenerunt.

SECTION 1.53.2
Ibi perpauci aut viribus confisi tranare contenderunt aut lintribus inventis sibi salutem reppererunt.

SECTION 1.53.3
In his fuit Ariovistus, qui naviculam deligatam ad ripam nactus ea profugit; reliquos omnes consecuti equites nostri interfecerunt.

SECTION 1.53.4
Duae fuerunt Ariovisti uxores, una Sueba natione, quam domo secum eduxerat, altera Norica, regis Voccionis soror, quam in Gallia duxerat a fratre missam: utraque in ea fuga periit; duae filiae: harum altera occisa, altera capta est.

SECTION 1.53.5
C. Valerius Procillus, cum a custodibus in fuga trinis catenis vinctus traheretur, in ipsum Caesarem hostes equitatu insequentem incidit.

SECTION 1.53.6
Quae quidem res Caesari non minorem quam ipsa victoria voluptatem attulit, quod hominem honestissimum provinciae Galliae, suum familiarem et hospitem, ereptum ex manibus hostium sibi restitutum videbat neque eius calamitate de tanta voluptate et gratulatione quicquam fortuna deminuerat.

SECTION 1.53.7
Is se praesente de se ter sortibus consultum dicebat, utrum igni statim necaretur an in aliud tempus reservaretur: sortium beneficio se esse incolumem.

SECTION 1.53.8
Item M. Metius repertus et ad eum reductus est.

CHAPTER 1.54

SECTION 1.54.1
Hoc proelio trans Rhenum nuntiato, Suebi, qui ad ripas Rheni venerant, domum reverti coeperunt; quos ubi qui proximi Rhenum incolunt perterritos senserunt, insecuti magnum ex iis numerum occiderunt.

SECTION 1.54.2
Caesar una aestate duobus maximis bellis confectis maturius paulo quam tempus anni postulabat in hiberna in Sequanos exercitum deduxit; hibernis Labienum praeposuit;

SECTION 1.54.3
ipse in citeriorem Galliam ad conventus agendos profectus est.

### Book 2

CHAPTER 2.1

SECTION 2.1.1
Cum esset Caesar in citeriore Gallia [in hibernis], ita uti supra demonstravimus, crebri ad eum rumores adferebantur litterisque item Labieni certior fiebat omnes Belgas, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixeramus, contra populum Romanum coniurare obsidesque inter se dare.

SECTION 2.1.2
Coniurandi has esse causas: primum quod vererentur ne, omni pacata Gallia, ad eos exercitus noster adduceretur;

SECTION 2.1.3
deinde quod ab non nullis Gallis sollicitarentur, partim qui, ut Germanos diutius in Gallia versari noluerant, ita populi Romani exercitum hiemare atque inveterascere in Gallia moleste ferebant, partim qui mobilitate et levitate animi novis imperiis studebant;

SECTION 2.1.4
ab non nullis etiam quod in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates habebant vulgo regna occupabantur; qui minus facile eam rem imperio nostro consequi poterant.

CHAPTER 2.2

SECTION 2.2.1
His nuntiis litterisque commotus Caesar duas legiones in citeriore Gallia novas conscripsit et inita aestate in ulteriorem Galliam qui deduceret Q. Pedium legatum misit.

SECTION 2.2.2
Ipse, cum primum pabuli copia esse inciperet, ad exercitum venit.

SECTION 2.2.3
Dat negotium Senonibus reliquisque Gallis qui finitimi Belgis erant uti ea quae apud eos gerantur cognoscant seque de his rebus certiorem faciant.

SECTION 2.2.4
Hi constanter omnes nuntiaverunt manus cogi, exercitum in unum locum conduci. Tum vero dubitandum non existimavit quin ad eos proficisceretur. Re frumentaria provisa castra movet diebusque circiter XV ad fines Belgarum pervenit.

CHAPTER 2.3

SECTION 2.3.1
Eo cum de improviso celeriusque omnium opinione venisset, Remi, qui proximi Galliae ex Belgis sunt, ad eum legatos Iccium et Andebrogium, primos civitatis, miserunt,

SECTION 2.3.2
qui dicerent se suaque omnia in fidem atque potestatem populi Romani permittere, neque se cum reliquis Belgis consensisse neque contra populum Romanum coniurasse,

SECTION 2.3.3
paratosque esse et obsides dare et imperata facere et oppidis recipere et frumento ceterisque rebus iuvare;

SECTION 2.3.4
reliquos omnes Belgas in armis esse, Germanosque qui cis Rhenum incolant sese cum his coniunxisse,

SECTION 2.3.5
tantumque esse eorum omnium furorem ut ne Suessiones quidem, fratres consanguineosque suos, qui eodem iure et isdem legibus utantur, unum imperium unumque magistratum cum ipsis habeant, deterrere potuerint quin cum iis consentirent.

CHAPTER 2.4

SECTION 2.4.1
Cum ab iis quaereret quae civitates quantaeque in armis essent et quid in bello possent, sic reperiebat: plerosque Belgas esse ortos a Germanis Rhenumque antiquitus traductos propter loci fertilitatem ibi consedisse Gallosque qui ea loca incolerent expulisse, solosque esse qui,

SECTION 2.4.2
patrum nostrorum memoria omni Gallia vexata, Teutonos Cimbrosque intra suos fines ingredi prohibuerint;

SECTION 2.4.3
qua ex re fieri uti earum rerum memoria magnam sibi auctoritatem magnosque spiritus in re militari sumerent.

SECTION 2.4.4
De numero eorum omnia se habere explorata Remi dicebant, propterea quod propinquitatibus adfinitatibusque coniuncti quantam quisque multitudinem in communi Belgarum concilio ad id bellum pollicitus sit cognoverint.

SECTION 2.4.5
Plurimum inter eos Bellovacos et virtute et auctoritate et hominum numero valere: hos posse conficere armata milia centum, pollicitos ex eo numero electa milia LX totiusque belli imperium sibi postulare.

SECTION 2.4.6
Suessiones suos esse finitimos; fines latissimos feracissimosque agros possidere.

SECTION 2.4.7
Apud eos fuisse regem nostra etiam memoria Diviciacum, totius Galliae potentissimum, qui cum magnae partis harum regionum, tum etiam Britanniae imperium obtinuerit; nunc esse regem Galbam: ad hunc propter iustitiam prudentiamque summam totius belli omnium voluntate deferri; oppida habere numero XII, polliceri milia armata L; totidem Nervios,

SECTION 2.4.8
qui maxime feri inter ipsos habeantur longissimeque absint;

SECTION 2.4.9
XV milia Atrebates, Ambianos X milia, Morinos XXV milia, Menapios VII milia, Caletos X milia, Veliocasses et Viromanduos totidem, Atuatucos XVIIII milia;

SECTION 2.4.10
Condrusos, Eburones, Caerosos, Paemanos, qui uno nomine Germani appellantur, arbitrari ad XL milia.

CHAPTER 2.5

SECTION 2.5.1
Caesar Remos cohortatus liberaliterque oratione prosecutus omnem senatum ad se convenire principumque liberos obsides ad se adduci iussit. Quae omnia ab his diligenter ad diem facta sunt.

SECTION 2.5.2
Ipse Diviciacum Haeduum magnopere cohortatus docet quanto opere rei publicae communisque salutis intersit manus hostium distineri, ne cum tanta multitudine uno tempore confligendum sit.

SECTION 2.5.3
Id fieri posse, si suas copias Haedui in fines Bellovacorum introduxerint et eorum agros populari coeperint.

SECTION 2.5.4
His datis mandatis eum a se dimittit. Postquam omnes Belgarum copias in unum locum coactas ad se venire vidit neque iam longe abesse ab iis quos miserat exploratoribus et ab Remis cognovit, flumen Axonam, quod est in extremis Remorum finibus, exercitum traducere maturavit atque ibi castra posuit.

SECTION 2.5.5
Quae res et latus unum castrorum ripis fluminis muniebat et post eum quae erant tuta ab hostibus reddebat et commeatus ab Remis reliquisque civitatibus ut sine periculo ad eum portari possent efficiebat.

SECTION 2.5.6
In eo flumine pons erat. Ibi praesidium ponit et in altera parte fluminis Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum sex cohortibus relinquit; castra in altitudinem pedum XII vallo fossaque duodeviginti pedum muniri iubet.

CHAPTER 2.6

SECTION 2.6.1
Ab his castris oppidum Remorum nomine Bibrax aberat milia passuum VIII. Id ex itinere magno impetu Belgae oppugnare coeperunt. Aegre eo die sustentatum est.

SECTION 2.6.2
Gallorum eadem atque Belgarum oppugnatio est haec: ubi circumiecta multitudine hominum totis moenibus undique in murum lapides iaci coepti sunt murusque defensoribus nudatus est, testudine facta portas succedunt murumque subruunt. Quod tum facile fiebat.

SECTION 2.6.3
Nam cum tanta multitudo lapides ac tela coicerent, in muro consistendi potestas erat nulli.

SECTION 2.6.4
Cum finem oppugnandi nox fecisset, Iccius Remus, summa nobilitate et gratia inter suos, qui tum oppido praeerat, unus ex iis qui legati de pace ad Caesarem venerant, nuntium ad eum mittit, nisi subsidium sibi submittatur, sese diutius sustinere non posse.

CHAPTER 2.7

SECTION 2.7.1
Eo de media nocte Caesar isdem ducibus usus qui nuntii ab Iccio venerant, Numidas et Cretas sagittarios et funditores Baleares subsidio oppidanis mittit;

SECTION 2.7.2
quorum adventu et Remis cum spe defensionis studium propugnandi accessit et hostibus eadem de causa spes potiundi oppidi discessit.

SECTION 2.7.3
Itaque paulisper apud oppidum morati agrosque Remorum depopulati, omnibus vicis aedificiisque quo adire potuerant incensis, ad castra Caesaris omnibus copiis contenderunt et a milibus passuum minus duobus castra posuerunt;

SECTION 2.7.4
quae castra, ut fumo atque ignibus significabatur, amplius milibus passuum VIII latitudinem patebant.

CHAPTER 2.8

SECTION 2.8.1
Caesar primo et propter multitudinem hostium et propter eximiam opinionem virtutis proelio supersedere statuit;

SECTION 2.8.2
cotidie tamen equestribus proeliis quid hostis virtute posset et quid nostri auderent periclitabatur.

SECTION 2.8.3
Ubi nostros non esse inferiores intellexit, loco pro castris ad aciem instruendam natura oportuno atque idoneo, quod is collis ubi castra posita erant paululum ex planitie editus tantum adversus in latitudinem patebat quantum loci acies instructa occupare poterat, atque ex utraque parte lateris deiectus habebat et in fronte leniter fastigatus paulatim ad planitiem redibat, ab utroque latere eius collis transversam fossam obduxit circiter passuum CCCC

SECTION 2.8.4
et ad extremas fossas castella constituit ibique tormenta conlocavit, ne, cum aciem instruxisset, hostes, quod tantum multitudine poterant, ab lateribus pugnantes suos circumvenire possent.

SECTION 2.8.5
Hoc facto, duabus legionibus quas proxime conscripserat in castris relictis ut, si quo opus esset, subsidio duci possent, reliquas VI legiones pro castris in acie constituit. Hostes item suas copias ex castris eductas instruxerunt.

CHAPTER 2.9

SECTION 2.9.1
Palus erat non magna inter nostrum atque hostium exercitum. Hanc si nostri transirent hostes expectabant; nostri autem, si ab illis initium transeundi fieret, ut impeditos adgrederentur parati in armis erant.

SECTION 2.9.2
Interim proelio equestri inter duas acies contendebatur. Ubi neutri transeundi initium faciunt, secundiore equitum proelio nostris Caesar suos in castra reduxit.

SECTION 2.9.3
Hostes protinus ex eo loco ad flumen Axonam contenderunt, quod esse post nostra castra demonstratum est.

SECTION 2.9.4
Ibi vadis repertis partem suarum copiarum traducere conati sunt eo consilio ut, si possent, castellum, cui praeerat Q. Titurius legatus, expugnarent pontemque interscinderent,

SECTION 2.9.5
si minus potuissent, agros Remorum popularentur, qui magno nobis usui ad bellum gerendum erant, commeatuque nostros prohiberent.

CHAPTER 2.10

SECTION 2.10.1
Caesar certior factus ab Titurio omnem equitatum et levis armaturae Numidas, funditores sagittariosque pontem traducit atque ad eos contendit. Acriter in eo loco pugnatum est.

SECTION 2.10.2
Hostes impeditos nostri in flumine adgressi magnum eorum numerum occiderunt;

SECTION 2.10.3
per eorum corpora reliquos audacissime transire conantes multitudine telorum reppulerunt primosque, qui transierant, equitatu circumventos interfecerunt.

SECTION 2.10.4
Hostes, ubi et de expugnando oppido et de flumine transeundo spem se fefellisse intellexerunt neque nostros in locum iniquiorum progredi pugnandi causa viderunt atque ipsos res frumentaria deficere coepit, concilio convocato constituerunt optimum esse domum suam quemque reverti, et quorum in fines primum Romani exercitum introduxissent, ad eos defendendos undique convenirent, ut potius in suis quam in alienis finibus decertarent et domesticis copiis rei frumentariae uterentur.

SECTION 2.10.5
Ad eam sententiam cum reliquis causis haec quoque ratio eos deduxit, quod Diviciacum atque Haeduos finibus Bellovacorum adpropinquare cognoverant. His persuaderi ut diutius morarentur neque suis auxilium terrent non poterat.

CHAPTER 2.11

SECTION 2.11.1
Ea re constituta, secunda vigilia magno cum, strepitu ac tumultu castris egressi nullo certo ordine neque imperio, cum sibi quisque primum itineris locum peteret et domum pervenire properaret, fecerunt ut consimilis fugae profectio videretur.

SECTION 2.11.2
Hac re statim Caesar per speculatores cognita insidias veritus, quod qua de causa discederent nondum perspexerat, exercitum equitatumque castris continuit.

SECTION 2.11.3
Prima luce, confirmata re ab exploratoribus, omnem equitatum, qui novissimum agmen moraretur, praemisit. His Q. Pedium et L. Aurunculeium Cottam legatos praefecit; T. Labienum legatum cum legionibus tribus subsequi iussit.

SECTION 2.11.4
Hi novissimos adorti et multa milia passuum prosecuti magnam multitudinem eorum fugientium conciderunt, cum ab extremo agmine, ad quos ventum erat, consisterent fortiterque impetum nostrorum militum sustinerent,

SECTION 2.11.5
priores, quod abesse a periculo viderentur neque ulla necessitate neque imperio continerentur, exaudito clamore perturbatis ordinibus omnes in fuga sibi praesidium ponerent.

SECTION 2.11.6
Ita sine ullo periculo tantam eorum multitudinem nostri interfecerunt quantum fuit diei spatium; sub occasum solis sequi destiterunt seque in castra, ut erat imperatum, receperunt.

CHAPTER 2.12

SECTION 2.12.1
Postridie eius diei Caesar, prius quam se hostes ex terrore ac fuga reciperent, in fines Suessionum, qui proximi Remis erant, exercitum duxit et magno itinere [confecto] ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit.

SECTION 2.12.2
Id ex itinere oppugnare conatus, quod vacuum ab defensoribus esse audiebat, propter latitudinem fossae murique altitudinem paucis defendentibus expugnare non potuit.

SECTION 2.12.3
Castris munitis vineas agere quaeque ad oppugnandum usui erant comparare coepit.

SECTION 2.12.4
Interim omnis ex fuga Suessionum multitudo in oppidum proxima nocte convenit.

SECTION 2.12.5
Celeriter vineis ad oppidum actis, aggere iacto turribusque constitutis, magnitudine operum, quae neque viderant ante Galli neque audierant, et celeritate Romanorum permoti legatos ad Caesarem de deditione mittunt et petentibus Remis ut conservarentur impetrant.

CHAPTER 2.13

SECTION 2.13.1
Caesar, obsidibus acceptis primis civitatis atque ipsius Galbae regis duobus filiis armisque omnibus ex oppido traditis, in deditionem Suessiones accipit exercitumque in Bellovacos ducit.

SECTION 2.13.2
Qui cum se suaque omnia in oppidum Bratuspantium contulissent atque ab eo oppido Caesar cum exercitu circiter milia passuum V abesset, omnes maiores natu ex oppido egressi manus ad Caesarem tendere et voce significare coeperunt sese in eius fidem ac potestatem venire neque contra populum Romanum armis contendere.

SECTION 2.13.3
Item, cum ad oppidum accessisset castraque ibi poneret, pueri mulieresque ex muro passis manibus suo more pacem ab Romanis petierunt.

CHAPTER 2.14

SECTION 2.14.1
Pro his Diviciacus (nam post discessum Belgarum dimissis Haeduorum copiis ad eum reverterat) facit verba:

SECTION 2.14.2
Bellovacos omni tempore in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae fuisse;

SECTION 2.14.3
impulsos ab suis principibus, qui dicerent Haeduos a Caesare in servitutem redactos omnes indignitates contumeliasque perferre, et ab Haeduis defecisse et populo Romano bellum intulisse.

SECTION 2.14.4
Qui eius consilii principes fuissent, quod intellegerent quantam calamitatem civitati intulissent, in Britanniam profugisse.

SECTION 2.14.5
Petere non solum Bellovacos, sed etiam pro his Haeduos, ut sua clementia ac mansuetudine in eos utatur.

SECTION 2.14.6
Quod si fecerit, Haeduorum auctoritatem apud omnes Belgas amplificaturum, quorum auxiliis atque opibus, si qua bella inciderint, sustentare consuerint.

CHAPTER 2.15

SECTION 2.15.1
Caesar honoris Diviciaci atque Haeduorum causa sese eos in fidem recepturum et conservaturum dixit, et quod erat civitas magna inter Belgas auctoritate atque hominum multitudine praestabat, DC obsides poposcit.

SECTION 2.15.2
His traditis omnibusque armis ex oppido conlatis, ab eo loco in fines Ambianorum pervenit; qui se suaque omnia sine mora dediderunt.

SECTION 2.15.3
Eorum fines Nervii attingebant. Quorum de natura moribusque Caesar cum quaereret, sic reperiebat:

SECTION 2.15.4
nullum esse aditum ad eos mercatoribus; nihil pati vini reliquarumque rerum ad luxuriam pertinentium inferri, quod his rebus relanguescere animos eorum et remitti virtutem existimarent;

SECTION 2.15.5
esse homines feros magnaeque virtutis; increpitare atque incusare reliquos Belgas, qui se populo Romano dedidissent patriamque virtutem proiecissent;

SECTION 2.15.6
confirmare sese neque legatos missuros neque ullam condicionem pacis accepturos.

CHAPTER 2.16

SECTION 2.16.1
Cum per eorum fines triduum iter fecisset, inveniebat ex captivis Sabim flumen a castris suis non amplius milibus passuum X abesse;

SECTION 2.16.2
trans id flumen omnes Nervios consedisse adventumque ibi Romanorum expectare una cum Atrebatibus et Viromanduis, finitimis suis

SECTION 2.16.3
(nam his utrisque persuaserant uti eandem belli fortunam experirentur);

SECTION 2.16.4
expectari etiam ab iis Atuatucorum copias atque esse in itinere;

SECTION 2.16.5
mulieres quique per aetatem ad pugnam inutiles viderentur in eum locum coniecisse quo propter paludes exercitui aditus non esset.

CHAPTER 2.17

SECTION 2.17.1
His rebus cognitis, exploratores centurionesque praemittit qui locum castris idoneum deligant.

SECTION 2.17.2
Cum ex dediticiis Belgis reliquisque Gallis complures Caesarem secuti una iter facerent, quidam ex his, ut postea ex captivis cognitum est, eorum dierum consuetudine itineris nostri exercitus perspecta, nocte ad Nervios pervenerunt atque his demonstrarunt inter singulas legiones impedimentorum magnum numerum intercedere, neque esse quicquam negotii, cum prima legio in castra venisset reliquaeque legiones magnum spatium abessent, hanc sub sarcinis adoriri;

SECTION 2.17.3
qua pulsa impedimentisque direptis, futurum ut reliquae contra consistere non auderent.

SECTION 2.17.4
Adiuvabat etiam eorum consilium qui rem deferebant quod Nervii antiquitus, cum equitatu nihil possent (neque enim ad hoc tempus ei rei student, sed quicquid possunt, pedestribus valent copiis), quo facilius finitimorum equitatum, si praedandi causa ad eos venissent, impedirent, teneris arboribus incisis atque inflexis crebrisque in latitudinem ramis enatis [et] rubis sentibusque interiectis effecerant ut instar muri hae saepes munimentum praeberent, quo non modo non intrari sed ne perspici quidem posset.

SECTION 2.17.5
His rebus cum iter agminis nostri impediretur, non omittendum sibi consilium Nervii existimaverunt.

CHAPTER 2.18

SECTION 2.18.1
Loci natura erat haec, quem locum nostri castris delegerant. Collis ab summo aequaliter declivis ad flumen Sabim, quod supra nominavimus, vergebat.

SECTION 2.18.2
Ab eo flumine pari acclivitate collis nascebatur adversus huic et contrarius, passus circiter CC infimus apertus, ab superiore parte silvestris, ut non facile introrsus perspici posset.

SECTION 2.18.3
Intra eas silvas hostes in occulto sese continebant; in aperto loco secundum flumen paucae stationes equitum videbantur. Fluminis erat altitudo pedum circiter trium.

CHAPTER 2.19

SECTION 2.19.1
Caesar equitatu praemisso subsequebatur omnibus copiis; sed ratio ordoque agminis aliter se habebat ac Belgae ad Nervios detulerant.

SECTION 2.19.2
Nam quod hostibus adpropinquabat, consuetudine sua Caesar VI legiones expeditas ducebat;

SECTION 2.19.3
post eas totius exercitus impedimenta conlocarat; inde duae legiones quae proxime conscriptae erant totum agmen claudebant praesidioque impedimentis erant.

SECTION 2.19.4
Equites nostri cum funditoribus sagittariisque flumen transgressi cum hostium equitatu proelium commiserunt.

SECTION 2.19.5
Cum se illi identidem in silvis ad suos reciperent ac rursus ex silva in nostros impetum facerent, neque nostri longius quam quem ad finem porrecta [ac] loca aperta pertinebant cedentes insequi auderent, interim legiones VI quae primae venerant, opere dimenso, castra munire coeperunt.

SECTION 2.19.6
Ubi prima impedimenta nostri exercitus ab iis qui in silvis abditi latebant visa sunt, quod tempus inter eos committendi proelii convenerat, ut intra silvas aciem ordinesque constituerant atque ipsi sese confirmaverant, subito omnibus copiis provolaverunt impetumque in nostros equites fecerunt.

SECTION 2.19.7
His facile pulsis ac proturbatis, incredibili celeritate ad flumen decucurrerunt, ut paene uno tempore et ad silvas et in flumine [et iam in manibus nostris] hostes viderentur.

SECTION 2.19.8
Eadem autem celeritate adverso colle ad nostra castra atque eos qui in opere occupati erant contenderunt.

CHAPTER 2.20

SECTION 2.20.1
Caesari omnia uno tempore erant agenda: vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne, cum ad arma concurri oporteret; signum tuba dandum; ab opere revocandi milites; qui paulo longius aggeris petendi causa processerant arcessendi; acies instruenda; milites cohortandi; signum dandum.

SECTION 2.20.2
Quarum rerum magnam partem temporis brevitas et incursus hostium impediebat.

SECTION 2.20.3
His difficultatibus duae res erant subsidio, scientia atque usus militum, quod superioribus proeliis exercitati quid fieri oporteret non minus commode ipsi sibi praescribere quam ab aliis doceri poterant, et quod ab opere singulisque legionibus singulos legatos Caesar discedere nisi munitis castris vetuerat.

SECTION 2.20.4
Hi propter propinquitatem et celeritatem hostium nihil iam Caesaris imperium expectabant, sed per se quae videbantur administrabant.

CHAPTER 2.21

SECTION 2.21.1
Caesar, necessariis rebus imperatis, ad cohortandos milites, quam [in] partem fors obtulit, decucurrit et ad legionem decimam devenit.

SECTION 2.21.2
Milites non longiore oratione cohortatus quam uti suae pristinae virtutis memoriam retinerent neu perturbarentur animo hostiumque impetum fortiter sustinerent,

SECTION 2.21.3
quod non longius hostes aberant quam quo telum adigi posset, proelii committendi signum dedit.

SECTION 2.21.4
Atque in alteram item cohortandi causa profectus pugnantibus occurrit.

SECTION 2.21.5
Temporis tanta fuit exiguitas hostiumque tam paratus ad dimicandum animus ut non modo ad insignia accommodanda sed etiam ad galeas induendas scutisque tegimenta detrahenda tempus defuerit.

SECTION 2.21.6
Quam quisque ab opere in partem casu devenit quaeque prima signa conspexit, ad haec constitit, ne in quaerendis suis pugnandi tempus dimitteret.

CHAPTER 2.22

SECTION 2.22.1
Instructo exercitu magis ut loci natura [delectusque collis] et necessitas temporis quam ut rei militaris ratio atque ordo postulabat, cum diversae legiones aliae alia in parte hostibus resisterent saepibusque densissimis, ut ante demonstravimus, interiectis prospectus impediretur, neque certa subsidia conlocari neque quid in quaque parte opus esset provideri neque ab uno omnia imperia administrari poterant.

SECTION 2.22.2
Itaque in tanta rerum iniquitate fortunae quoque eventus varii sequebantur.

CHAPTER 2.23

SECTION 2.23.1
Legionis VIIII. et X. milites, ut in sinistra parte aciei constiterant, pilis emissis cursu ac lassitudine exanimatos vulneribusque confectos Atrebates (nam his ea pars obvenerat) celeriter ex loco superiore in flumen compulerunt et transire conantes insecuti gladiis magnam partem eorum impeditam interfecerunt.

SECTION 2.23.2
Ipsi transire flumen non dubitaverunt et in locum iniquum progressi rursus resistentes hostes redintegrato proelio in fugam coniecerunt.

SECTION 2.23.3
Item alia in parte diversae duae legiones, XI. et VIII., profligatis Viromanduis, quibuscum erant congressae, ex loco superiore in ipsis fluminis ripis proeliabantur.

SECTION 2.23.4
At totis fere castris a fronte et a sinistra parte nudatis, cum in dextro cornu legio XII. et non magno ab ea intervallo VII. constitisset, omnes Nervii confertissimo agmine duce Boduognato, qui summam imperii tenebat, ad eum locum contenderunt; quorum pars ab aperto latere legiones circumvenire, pars summum castrorum locum petere coepit.

CHAPTER 2.24

SECTION 2.24.1
Eodem tempore equites nostri levisque armaturae pedites, qui cum iis una fuerant, quos primo hostium impetu pulsos dixeram, cum se in castra reciperent, adversis hostibus occurrebant ac rursus aliam in partem fugam petebant;

SECTION 2.24.2
et calones, qui ab decumana porta ac summo iugo collis nostros victores flumen transire conspexerant, praedandi causa egressi, cum respexissent et hostes in nostris castris versari vidissent, praecipites fugae sese mandabant.

SECTION 2.24.3
Simul eorum qui cum impedimentis veniebant clamor fremitusque oriebatur, aliique aliam in partem perterriti ferebantur.

SECTION 2.24.4
Quibus omnibus rebus permoti equites Treveri, quorum inter Gallos virtutis opinio est singularis, qui auxilii causa a civitate missi ad Caesarem venerant, cum multitudine hostium castra [nostra] compleri, legiones premi et paene circumventas teneri, calones, equites, funditores, Numidas diversos dissipatosque in omnes partes fugere vidissent, desperatis nostris rebus domum contenderunt:

SECTION 2.24.5
Romanos pulsos superatosque, castris impedimentisque eorum hostes potitos civitati renuntiaverunt.

CHAPTER 2.25

SECTION 2.25.1
Caesar ab X. legionis cohortatione ad dextrum cornu profectus, ubi suos urgeri signisque in unum locum conlatis XII. legionis confertos milites sibi ipsos ad pugnam esse impedimento vidit, quartae cohortis omnibus centurionibus occisis signiferoque interfecto, signo amisso, reliquarum cohortium omnibus fere centurionibus aut vulneratis aut occisis, in his primipilo P. Sextio Baculo, fortissimo viro, multis gravibusque vulneribus confecto, ut iam se sustinere non posset, reliquos esse tardiores et non nullos ab novissimis deserto loco proelio excedere ac tela vitare, hostes neque a fronte ex inferiore loco subeuntes intermittere et ab utroque latere instare et rem esse in angusto vidit, neque ullum esse subsidium quod submitti posset,

SECTION 2.25.2
scuto ab novissimis [uni] militi detracto, quod ipse eo sine scuto venerat, in primam aciem processit centurionibusque nominatim appellatis reliquos cohortatus milites signa inferre et manipulos laxare iussit, quo facilius gladiis uti possent.

SECTION 2.25.3
Cuius adventu spe inlata militibus ac redintegrato animo, cum pro se quisque in conspectu imperatoris etiam in extremis suis rebus operam navare cuperet, paulum hostium impetus tardatus est.

CHAPTER 2.26

SECTION 2.26.1
Caesar, cum VII. legionem, quae iuxta constiterat, item urgeri ab hoste vidisset, tribunos militum monuit ut paulatim sese legiones coniungerent et conversa signa in hostes inferrent.

SECTION 2.26.2
Quo facto cum aliis alii subsidium ferrent neque timerent ne aversi ab hoste circumvenirentur, audacius resistere ac fortius pugnare coeperunt.

SECTION 2.26.3
Interim milites legionum duarum quae in novissimo agmine praesidio impedimentis fuerant, proelio nuntiato, cursu incitato in summo colle ab hostibus conspiciebantur,

SECTION 2.26.4
et T. Labienus castris hostium potitus et ex loco superiore quae res in nostris castris gererentur conspicatus X. legionem subsidio nostris misit.

SECTION 2.26.5
Qui cum ex equitum et calonum fuga quo in loco res esset quantoque in periculo et castra et legiones et imperator versaretur cognovissent, nihil ad celeritatem sibi reliqui fecerunt.

CHAPTER 2.27

SECTION 2.27.1
Horum adventu tanta rerum commutatio est facta ut nostri, etiam qui vulneribus confecti procubuissent, scutis innixi proelium redintegrarent, calones perterritos hostes conspicati etiam inermes armatis occurrerent,

SECTION 2.27.2
equites vero, ut turpitudinem fugae virtute delerent, omnibus in locis pugnae se legionariis militibus praeferrent.

SECTION 2.27.3
At hostes, etiam in extrema spe salutis, tantam virtutem praestiterunt ut, cum primi eorum cecidissent, proximi iacentibus insisterent atque ex eorum corporibus pugnarent,

SECTION 2.27.4
his deiectis et coacervatis cadaveribus qui superessent ut ex tumulo tela in nostros coicerent et pila intercepta remitterent:

SECTION 2.27.5
ut non nequiquam tantae virtutis homines iudicari deberet ausos esse transire latissimum flumen, ascendere altissimas ripas, subire iniquissimum locum; quae facilia ex difficillimis animi magnitudo redegerat.

CHAPTER 2.28

SECTION 2.28.1
Hoc proelio facto et prope ad internecionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto, maiores natu, quos una cum pueris mulieribusque in aestuaria ac paludes coniectos dixeramus, hac pugna nuntiata, cum victoribus nihil impeditum, victis nihil tutum arbitrarentur,

SECTION 2.28.2
omnium qui supererant consensu legatos ad Caesarem miserunt seque ei dediderunt; et in commemoranda civitatis calamitate ex DC ad tres senatores, ex hominum milibus LX vix ad D, qui arma ferre possent, sese redactos esse dixerunt.

SECTION 2.28.3
Quos Caesar, ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordia videretur, diligentissime conservavit suisque finibus atque oppidis uti iussit et finitimis imperavit ut ab iniuria et maleficio se suosque prohiberent.

CHAPTER 2.29

SECTION 2.29.1
Atuatuci, de quibus supra diximus, cum omnibus copiis auxilio Nerviis venirent, hac pugna nuntiata ex itinere domum reverterunt;

SECTION 2.29.2
cunctis oppidis castellisque desertis sua omnia in unum oppidum egregie natura munitum contulerunt.

SECTION 2.29.3
Quod cum ex omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes deiectusque haberet, una ex parte leniter acclivis aditus in latitudinem non amplius pedum CC relinquebatur; quem locum duplici altissimo muro munierant; tum magni ponderis saxa et praeacutas trabes in muro conlocabant.

SECTION 2.29.4
Ipsi erant ex Cimbris Teutonisque prognati, qui, cum iter in provinciam nostram atque Italiam; facerent, iis impedimentis quae secum agere ac portare non poterant citra flumen Rhenum depositis custodiae [ex suis] ac praesidio VI milia hominum una reliquerant.

SECTION 2.29.5
Hi post eorum obitum multos annos a finitimis exagitati, cum alias bellum inferrent, alias inlatum defenderent, consensu eorum omnium pace facta hunc sibi domicilio locum delegerant.

CHAPTER 2.30

SECTION 2.30.1
Ac primo adventu exercitus nostri crebras ex oppido excursiones faciebant parvulisque proeliis cum nostris contendebant;

SECTION 2.30.2
postea vallo pedum XII in circuitu XV milium crebrisque castellis circummuniti oppido sese continebant.

SECTION 2.30.3
Ubi vineis actis aggere extructo turrim procul constitui viderunt, primum inridere ex muro atque increpitare vocibus, quod tanta machinatio a tanto spatio institueretur:

SECTION 2.30.4
quibusnam manibus aut quibus viribus praesertim homines tantulae staturae (nam plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum quorum brevitas nostra contemptui est) tanti oneris turrim in muro sese posse conlocare confiderent?

CHAPTER 2.31

SECTION 2.31.1
Ubi vero moveri et adpropinquare muris viderunt, nova atque inusitata specie commoti legatos ad Caesarem de pace miserunt, qui ad hunc modum locuti,

SECTION 2.31.2
non se existimare Romanos sine ope divina bellum gerere, qui tantae altitudinis machinationes tanta celeritate promovere possent,

SECTION 2.31.3
se suaque omnia eorum potestati permittere dixerunt.

SECTION 2.31.4
Unum petere ac deprecari: si forte pro sua clementia ac mansuetudine, quam ipsi ab aliis audirent, statuisset Atuatucos esse conservandos, ne se armis despoliaret.

SECTION 2.31.5
Sibi omnes fere finitimos esse inimicos ac suae virtuti invidere; a quibus se defendere traditis armis non possent.

SECTION 2.31.6
Sibi praestare, si in eum casum deducerentur, quamvis fortunam a populo Romano pati quam ab his per cruciatum interfici inter quos dominari consuessent.

CHAPTER 2.32

SECTION 2.32.1
Ad haec Caesar respondit: se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem conservaturum, si prius quam murum aries attigisset se dedidissent;

SECTION 2.32.2
sed deditionis nullam esse condicionem nisi armis traditis. Se id quod in Nerviis fecisset facturum finitimisque imperaturum ne quam dediticiis populi Romani iniuriam inferrent.

SECTION 2.32.3
Re renuntiata ad suos illi se quae imperarentur facere dixerunt.

SECTION 2.32.4
Armorum magna multitudine de muro in fossam, quae erat ante oppidum, iacta, sic ut prope summam muri aggerisque altitudinem acervi armorum adaequarent, et tamen circiter parte tertia, ut postea perspectum est, celata atque in oppido retenta, portis patefactis eo die pace sunt usi.

CHAPTER 2.33

SECTION 2.33.1
Sub vesperum Caesar portas claudi militesque ex oppido exire iussit, ne quam noctu oppidani a militibus iniuriam acciperent.

SECTION 2.33.2
Illi ante inito, ut intellectum est, consilio, quod deditione facta nostros praesidia deducturos aut denique indiligentius servaturos crediderant, partim cum iis quae retinuerant et celaverant armis, partim scutis ex cortice factis aut viminibus intextis, quae subito, ut temporis exiguitas postulabat, pellibus induxerant, tertia vigilia, qua minime arduus ad nostras munitiones ascensus videbatur, omnibus copiis repente ex oppido eruptionem fecerunt.

SECTION 2.33.3
Celeriter, ut ante Caesar imperaverat, ignibus significatione facta, ex proximis castellis eo concursum est,

SECTION 2.33.4
pugnatumque ab hostibus ita acriter est ut a viris fortibus in extrema spe salutis iniquo loco contra eos qui ex vallo turribusque tela iacerent pugnari debuit, cum in una virtute omnis spes consisteret.

SECTION 2.33.5
Occisis ad hominum milibus IIII reliqui in oppidum reiecti sunt.

SECTION 2.33.6
Postridie eius diei refractis portis, cum iam defenderet nemo, atque intromissis militibus nostris, sectionem eius oppidi universa Caesar vendidit.

SECTION 2.33.7
Ab iis qui emerant capitum numerus ad eum relatus est milium LIII.

CHAPTER 2.34

SECTION 2.34.1
Eodem tempore a P. Crasso, quem cum legione una miserat ad Venetos, Venellos, Osismos, Coriosolitas, Esuvios, Aulercos, Redones, quae sunt maritimae civitates Oceanumque attingunt, certior factus est omnes eas civitates in dicionem potestatemque populi Romani esse redactas.

CHAPTER 2.35

SECTION 2.35.1
His rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata, tanta huius belli ad barbaros opinio perlata est uti ab iis nationibus quae trans Rhenum incolerent legationes ad Caesarem mitterentur, quae se obsides daturas, imperata facturas pollicerentur.

SECTION 2.35.2
Quas legationes Caesar, quod in Italiam Illyricumque properabat, inita proxima aestate ad se reverti iussit.

SECTION 2.35.3
Ipse in Carnutes, Andes, Turonos quaeque civitates propinquae iis locis erant ubi bellum gesserat, legionibus in hiberna deductis, in Italiam profectus est.

SECTION 2.35.4
Ob easque res ex litteris Caesaris dierum XV supplicatio decreta est, quod ante id tempus accidit nulli.

### Book 3

CHAPTER 3.1

SECTION 3.1.1
Cum in Italiam proficisceretur Caesar, Ser. Galbam cum legione XII. et parte equitatus in Nantuates, Veragros Sedunosque misit, qui a finibus Allobrogum et lacu Lemanno et flumine Rhodano ad summas Alpes pertinent.

SECTION 3.1.2
Causa mittendi fuit quod iter per Alpes, quo magno cum periculo magnisque cum portoriis mercatores ire consuerant, patefieri volebat.

SECTION 3.1.3
Huic permisit, si opus esse arbitraretur, uti in his locis legionem hiemandi causa conlocaret.

SECTION 3.1.4
Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum expugnatis, missis ad eum undique legatis obsidibusque datis et pace facta, constituit cohortes duas in Nantuatibus conlocare et ipse cum reliquis eius legionis cohortibus in vico Veragrorum, qui appellatur Octodurus hiemare;

SECTION 3.1.5
qui vicus positus in valle non magna adiecta planitie altissimis montibus undique continetur.

SECTION 3.1.6
Cum hic in duas partes flumine divideretur, alteram partem eius vici Gallis [ad hiemandum] concessit, alteram vacuam ab his relictam cohortibus attribuit. Eum locum vallo fossaque munivit.

CHAPTER 3.2

SECTION 3.2.1
Cum dies hibernorum complures transissent frumentumque eo comportari iussisset, subito per exploratores certior factus est ex ea parte vici, quam Gallis concesserat, omnes noctu discessisse montesque qui impenderent a maxima multitudine Sedunorum et Veragrorum teneri.

SECTION 3.2.2
Id aliquot de causis acciderat, ut subito Galli belli renovandi legionisque opprimendae consilium caperent:

SECTION 3.2.3
primum, quod legionem neque eam plenissimam detractis cohortibus duabus et compluribus singillatim, qui commeatus petendi causa missi erant, absentibus propter paucitatem despiciebant;

SECTION 3.2.4
tum etiam, quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent et tela coicerent, ne primum quidem impetum suum posse sustineri existimabant.

SECTION 3.2.5
Accedebat quod suos ab se liberos abstractos obsidum nomine dolebant, et Romanos non solum itinerum causa sed etiam perpetuae possessionis culmina Alpium occupare conari et ea loca finitimae provinciae adiungere sibi persuasum habebant.

CHAPTER 3.3

SECTION 3.3.1
His nuntiis acceptis Galba, cum neque opus hibernorum munitionesque plene essent perfectae neque de frumento reliquoque commeatu satis esset provisum quod deditione facta obsidibusque acceptis nihil de bello timendum existimaverat, consilio celeriter convocato sententias exquirere coepit.

SECTION 3.3.2
Quo in consilio, cum tantum repentini periculi praeter opinionem accidisset ac iam omnia fere superiora loca multitudine armatorum completa conspicerentur neque subsidio veniri neque commeatus supportari interclusis itineribus possent,

SECTION 3.3.3
prope iam desperata salute non nullae eius modi sententiae dicebantur, ut impedimentis relictis eruptione facta isdem itineribus quibus eo pervenissent ad salutem contenderent.

SECTION 3.3.4
Maiori tamen parti placuit, hoc reservato ad extremum casum consilio interim rei eventum experiri et castra defendere.

CHAPTER 3.4

SECTION 3.4.1
Brevi spatio interiecto, vix ut iis rebus quas constituissent conlocandis atque administrandis tempus daretur, hostes ex omnibus partibus signo dato decurrere, lapides gaesaque in vallum coicere.

SECTION 3.4.2
Nostri primo integris viribus fortiter propugnare neque ullum flustra telum ex loco superiore mittere, et quaecumque pars castrorum nudata defensoribus premi videbatur, eo occurrere et auxilium ferre,

SECTION 3.4.3
sed hoc superari quod diuturnitate pugnae hostes defessi proelio excedebant, alii integris viribus succedebant;

SECTION 3.4.4
quarum rerum a nostris propter paucitatem fieri nihil poterat, ac non modo defesso ex pugna excedendi, sed ne saucio quidem eius loci ubi constiterat relinquendi ac sui recipiendi facultas dabatur.

CHAPTER 3.5

SECTION 3.5.1
Cum iam amplius horis sex continenter pugnaretur, ac non solum vires sed etiam tela nostros deficerent, atque hostes acrius instarent languidioribusque nostris vallum scindere et fossas complere coepissent, resque esset iam ad extremum perducta casum,

SECTION 3.5.2
P. Sextius Baculus, primi pili centurio, quem Nervico proelio compluribus confectum vulneribus diximus, et item C. Volusenus, tribunus militum, vir et consilii magni et virtutis, ad Galbam accurrunt atque unam esse spem salutis docent, si eruptione facta extremum auxilium experirentur.

SECTION 3.5.3
Itaque convocatis centurionibus celeriter milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium ac tantum modo tela missa exciperent seque ex labore reficerent, post dato signo ex castris erumperent, atque omnem spem salutis in virtute ponerent.

CHAPTER 3.6

SECTION 3.6.1
Quod iussi sunt faciunt, ac subito omnibus portis eruptione facta neque cognoscendi quid fieret neque sui colligendi hostibus facultatem relinquunt.

SECTION 3.6.2
Ita commutata fortuna eos qui in spem potiundorum castrorum venerant undique circumventos intercipiunt, et ex hominum milibus amplius XXX, quem numerum barbarorum ad castra venisse constabat, plus tertia parte interfecta reliquos perterritos in fugam coiciunt ac ne in locis quidem superioribus consistere patiuntur.

SECTION 3.6.3
Sic omnibus hostium copiis fusis armisque exutis se intra munitiones suas recipiunt.

SECTION 3.6.4
Quo proelio facto, quod saepius fortunam temptare Galba nolebat atque alio se in hiberna consilio venisse meminerat, aliis occurrisse rebus videbat, maxime frumenti [commeatusque] inopia permotus postero die omnibus eius vici aedificiis incensis in provinciam reverti contendit,

SECTION 3.6.5
ac nullo hoste prohibente aut iter demorante incolumem legionem in Nantuates, inde in Allobroges perduxit ibique hiemavit.

CHAPTER 3.7

SECTION 3.7.1
His rebus gestis cum omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret, [superatis Belgis, expulsis Germanis, victis in Alpibus Sedunis,] atque ita inita hieme in Illyricum profectus esset, quod eas quoque nationes adire et regiones cognoscere volebat, subitum bellum in Gallia coortum est.

SECTION 3.7.2
Eius belli haec fuit causa. P. Crassus adulescens cum legione VII. proximus mare Oceanum in Andibus hiemabat.

SECTION 3.7.3
Is, quod in his locis inopia frumenti erat, praefectos tribunosque militum complures in finitimas civitates frumenti causa dimisit;

SECTION 3.7.4
quo in numero est T. Terrasidius missus in Esuvios, M. Trebius Gallus in Coriosolites, Q. Velanius eum T. Silio in Venetos.

CHAPTER 3.8

SECTION 3.8.1
Huius est civitatis longe amplissima auctoritas omnis orae maritimae regionum earum, quod et naves habent Veneti plurimas, quibus in Britanniam navigare consuerunt, et scientia atque usu rerum nauticarum ceteros antecedunt et in magno impetu maris atque aperto paucis portibus interiectis, quos tenent ipsi, omnes fere qui eo mari uti consuerunt habent vectigales.

SECTION 3.8.2
Ab his fit initium retinendi Silii atque Velanii, quod per eos suos se obsides, quos Crasso dedissent, recuperaturos existimabant.

SECTION 3.8.3
Horum auctoritate finitimi adducti, ut sunt Gallorum subita et repentina consilia, eadem de causa Trebium Terrasidiumque retinent et celeriter missis legatis per suos principes inter se coniurant nihil nisi communi consilio acturos eundemque omnes fortunae exitum esse laturos,

SECTION 3.8.4
reliquasque civitates sollicitant, ut in ea libertate quam a maioribus acceperint permanere quam Romanorum servitutem perferre malint.

SECTION 3.8.5
Omni ora maritima celeriter ad suam sententiam perducta communem legationem ad P. Crassum mittunt, si velit suos recuperare, obsides sibi remittat.

CHAPTER 3.9

SECTION 3.9.1
Quibus de rebus Caesar a Crasso certior factus, quod ipse aberat longius, naves interim longas aedificari in flumine Ligeri, quod influit in Oceanum, remiges ex provincia institui, nautas gubernatoresque comparari iubet.

SECTION 3.9.2
His rebus celeriter administratis ipse, cum primum per anni tempus potuit, ad exercitum contendit.

SECTION 3.9.3
Veneti reliquaeque item civitates cognito Caesaris adventu [certiores facti], simul quod quantum in se facinus admisissent intellegebant, [legatos, quod nomen ad omnes nationes sanctum inviolatumque semper fuisset, retentos ab se et in vincula coniectos,] pro magnitudine periculi bellum parare et maxime ea quae ad usum navium pertinent providere instituunt, hoc maiore spe quod multum natura loci confidebant.

SECTION 3.9.4
Pedestria esse itinera concisa aestuariis, navigationem impeditam propter inscientiam locorum paucitatemque portuum sciebant,

SECTION 3.9.5
neque nostros exercitus propter inopiam frumenti diutius apud se morari posse confidebant;

SECTION 3.9.6
ac iam ut omnia contra opinionem acciderent, tamen se plurimum navibus posse, [quam] Romanos neque ullam facultatem habere navium, neque eorum locorum ubi bellum gesturi essent vada, portus, insulas novisse;

SECTION 3.9.7
ac longe aliam esse navigationem in concluso mari atque in vastissimo atque apertissimo Oceano perspiciebant.

SECTION 3.9.8
His initis consiliis oppida muniunt,

SECTION 3.9.9
frumenta ex agris in oppida comportant, naves in Venetiam, ubi Caesarem primum bellum gesturum

SECTION 3.9.10
constabat, quam plurimas possunt cogunt. Socios sibi ad id bellum Osismos, Lexovios, Namnetes, Ambiliatos, Morinos, Diablintes, Menapios adsciscunt; auxilia ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, arcessunt.

CHAPTER 3.10

SECTION 3.10.1
Erant hae difficultates belli gerendi quas supra ostendimus, sed tamen multa Caesarem ad id bellum incitabant:

SECTION 3.10.2
iniuria retentorum equitum Romanorum, rebellio facta post deditionem, defectio datis obsidibus, tot civitatum coniuratio, in primis ne hac parte neglecta reliquae nationes sibi idem licere arbitrarentur.

SECTION 3.10.3
Itaque cum intellegeret omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere et ad bellum mobiliter celeriterque excitari, omnes autem homines natura libertati studere et condicionem servitutis odisse, prius quam plures civitates conspirarent, partiendum sibi ac latius distribuendum exercitum putavit.

CHAPTER 3.11

SECTION 3.11.1
Itaque T. Labienum legatum in Treveros, qui proximi flumini Rheno sunt, cum equitatu mittit.

SECTION 3.11.2
Huic mandat, Remos reliquosque Belgas adeat atque in officio contineat Germanosque, qui auxilio a Belgis arcessiti dicebantur, si per vim navibus flumen transire conentur, prohibeat.

SECTION 3.11.3
P. Crassum cum cohortibus legionariis XII et magno numero equitatus in Aquitaniam proficisci iubet, ne ex his nationibus auxilia in Galliam mittantur ac tantae nationes coniungantur.

SECTION 3.11.4
Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum legionibus tribus in Venellos, Coriosolites Lexoviosque mittit, qui eam manum distinendam curet.

SECTION 3.11.5
D. Brutum adulescentem classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat, praeficit et, cum primum possit, in Venetos proficisci iubet. Ipse eo pedestribus copiis contendit.

CHAPTER 3.12

SECTION 3.12.1
Erant eius modi fere situs oppidorum ut posita in extremis lingulis promunturiisque neque pedibus aditum haberent, cum ex alto se aestus incitavisset, quod [bis] accidit semper horarum XII spatio, neque navibus, quod rursus minuente aestu naves in vadis adflictarentur.

SECTION 3.12.2
Ita utraque re oppidorum oppugnatio impediebatur.

SECTION 3.12.3
Ac si quando magnitudine operis forte superati, extruso mari aggere ac molibus atque his oppidi moenibus adaequatis, suis fortunis desperare coeperant, magno numero navium adpulso, cuius rei summam facultatem habebant, omnia sua deportabant seque in proxima oppida recipiebant:

SECTION 3.12.4
ibi se rursus isdem oportunitatibus loci defendebant.

SECTION 3.12.5
Haec eo facilius magnam partem aestatis faciebant quod nostrae naves tempestatibus detinebantur summaque erat vasto atque aperto mari, magnis aestibus, raris ac prope nullis portibus difficultas navigandi.

CHAPTER 3.13

SECTION 3.13.1
Namque ipsorum naves ad hunc modum factae armataeque erant: carinae aliquanto planiores quam nostrarum navium, quo facilius vada ac decessum aestus excipere possent;

SECTION 3.13.2
prorae admodum erectae atque item puppes, ad magnitudinem fluctuum tempestatumque accommodatae;

SECTION 3.13.3
naves totae factae ex robore ad quamvis vim et contumeliam perferendam;

SECTION 3.13.4
transtra ex pedalibus in altitudinem trabibus, confixa clavis ferreis digiti pollicis crassitudine;

SECTION 3.13.5
ancorae pro funibus ferreis catenis revinctae;

SECTION 3.13.6
pelles pro velis alutaeque tenuiter confectae, [hae] sive propter inopiam lini atque eius usus inscientiam, sive eo, quod est magis veri simile, quod tantas tempestates Oceani tantosque impetus ventorum sustineri ac tanta onera navium regi velis non satis commode posse arbitrabantur.

SECTION 3.13.7
Cum his navibus nostrae classi eius modi congressus erat ut una celeritate et pulsu remorum praestaret, reliqua pro loci natura, pro vi tempestatum illis essent aptiora et accommodatiora.

SECTION 3.13.8
Neque enim iis nostrae rostro nocere poterant (tanta in iis erat firmitudo), neque propter altitudinem facile telum adigebatur, et eadem de causa minus commode copulis continebantur.

SECTION 3.13.9
Accedebat ut, cum [saevire ventus coepisset et] se vento dedissent, et tempestatem ferrent facilius et in vadis consisterent tutius et ab aestu relictae nihil saxa et cotes timerent; quarum rerum omnium nostris navibus casus erat extimescendus.

CHAPTER 3.14

SECTION 3.14.1
Compluribus expugnatis oppidis Caesar, ubi intellexit frustra tantum laborem sumi neque hostium fugam captis oppidis reprimi neque iis noceri posse, statuit expectandam classem.

SECTION 3.14.2
Quae ubi convenit ac primum ab hostibus visa est, circiter CCXX naves eorum paratissimae atque omni genere armorum ornatissimae profectae ex portu nostris adversae constiterunt;

SECTION 3.14.3
neque satis Bruto, qui classi praeerat, vel tribunis militum centurionibusque, quibus singulae naves erant attributae, constabat quid agerent aut quam rationem pugnae insisterent.

SECTION 3.14.4
Rostro enim noceri non posse cognoverant; turribus autem excitatis tamen has altitudo puppium ex barbaris navibus superabat, ut neque ex inferiore loco satis commode tela adigi possent et missa a Gallis gravius acciderent.

SECTION 3.14.5
Una erat magno usui res praeparata a nostris, falces praeacutae insertae adfixaeque longuriis, non absimili forma muralium falcium.

SECTION 3.14.6
His cum funes qui antemnas ad malos destinabant comprehensi adductique erant, navigio remis incitato praerumpebantur.

SECTION 3.14.7
Quibus abscisis antemnae necessario concidebant, ut, cum omnis Gallicis navibus spes in velis armamentisque consisteret, his ereptis omnis usus navium uno tempore eriperetur.

SECTION 3.14.8
Reliquum erat certamen positum in virtute, qua nostri milites facile superabant, atque eo magis quod in conspectu Caesaris atque omnis exercitus res gerebatur, ut nullum paulo fortius factum latere posset;

SECTION 3.14.9
omnes enim colles ac loca superiora, unde erat propinquus despectus in mare, ab exercitu tenebantur.

CHAPTER 3.15

SECTION 3.15.1
Deiectis, ut diximus, antemnis, cum singulas binae ac ternae naves circumsteterant, milites summa vi transcendere in hostium naves contendebant.

SECTION 3.15.2
Quod postquam barbari fieri animadverterunt, expugnatis compluribus navibus, cum ei rei nullum reperiretur auxilium, fuga salutem petere contenderunt.

SECTION 3.15.3
Ac iam conversis in eam partem navibus quo ventus ferebat, tanta subito malacia ac tranquillitas extitit ut se ex loco movere non possent.

SECTION 3.15.4
Quae quidem res ad negotium conficiendum maximae fuit oportunitati:

SECTION 3.15.5
nam singulas nostri consectati expugnaverunt, ut perpaucae ex omni numero noctis interventu ad terram per venirent, cum ab hora fere IIII usque ad solis occasum pugnaretur.

CHAPTER 3.16

SECTION 3.16.1
Quo proelio bellum Venetorum totiusque orae maritimae confectum est.

SECTION 3.16.2
Nam cum omnis iuventus, omnes etiam gravioris aetatis in quibus aliquid consilii aut dignitatis fuit eo convenerant, tum navium quod ubique fuerat in unum locum coegerant;

SECTION 3.16.3
quibus amissis reliqui neque quo se reciperent neque quem ad modum oppida defenderent habebant.

SECTION 3.16.4
Itaque se suaque omnia Caesari dediderunt. In quos eo gravius Caesar vindicandum statuit quo diligentius in reliquum tempus a barbaris ius legatorum conservaretur. Itaque omni senatu necato reliquos sub corona vendidit.

CHAPTER 3.17

SECTION 3.17.1
Dum haec in Venetis geruntur, Q. Titurius Sabinus cum iis copiis quas a Caesare acceperat in fines Venellorum pervenit.

SECTION 3.17.2
His praeerat Viridovix ac summam imperii tenebat earum omnium civitatum quae defecerant, ex quibus exercitum [magnasque copias] coegerat;

SECTION 3.17.3
atque his paucis diebus Aulerci Eburovices Lexoviique, senatu suo interfecto quod auctores belli esse nolebant, portas clauserunt seque cum Viridovice coniunxerunt;

SECTION 3.17.4
magnaque praeterea multitudo undique ex Gallia perditorum hominum latronumque convenerat, quos spes praedandi studiumque bellandi ab agri cultura et cotidiano labore revocabat.

SECTION 3.17.5
Sabinus idoneo omnibus rebus loco castris sese tenebat, cum Viridovix contra eum duorum milium spatio consedisset cotidieque productis copiis pugnandi potestatem faceret, ut iam non solum hostibus in contemptionem Sabinus veniret, sed etiam nostrorum militum vocibus non nihil carperetur;

SECTION 3.17.6
tantamque opinionem timoris praebuit ut iam ad vallum castrorum hostes accedere auderent.

SECTION 3.17.7
Id ea de causa faciebat quod cum tanta multitudine hostium, praesertim eo absente qui summam imperii teneret, nisi aequo loco aut oportunitate aliqua data legato dimicandum non existimabat.

CHAPTER 3.18

SECTION 3.18.1
Hac confirmata opinione timoris idoneum quendam hominem et callidum deligit, Gallum, ex iis quos auxilii causa secum habebat.

SECTION 3.18.2
Huic magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque persuadet uti ad hostes transeat, et quid fieri velit edocet.

SECTION 3.18.3
Qui ubi pro perfuga ad eos venit, timorem Romanorum proponit, quibus angustiis ipse Caesar a Venetis prematur docet,

SECTION 3.18.4
neque longius abesse quin proxima nocte Sabinus clam ex castris exercitum educat et ad Caesarem auxilii ferendi causa proficiscatur.

SECTION 3.18.5
Quod ubi auditum est, conclamant omnes occasionem negotii bene gerendi amittendam non esse:

SECTION 3.18.6
ad castra iri oportere. Multae res ad hoc consilium Gallos hortabantur: superiorum dierum Sabini cunctatio, perfugae confirmatio, inopia cibariorum, cui rei parum diligenter ab iis erat provisum, spes Venetici belli, et quod fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt.

SECTION 3.18.7
His rebus adducti non prius Viridovicem reliquosque duces ex concilio dimittunt quam ab iis sit concessum arma uti capiant et ad castra contendant.

SECTION 3.18.8
Qua re concessa laeti, ut explorata victoria, sarmentis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas Romanorum compleant, ad castra pergunt.

CHAPTER 3.19

SECTION 3.19.1
Locus erat castrorum editus et paulatim ab imo acclivis circiter passus mille. Huc magno cursu contenderunt, ut quam minimum spatii ad se colligendos armandosque Romanis daretur, exanimatique pervenerunt.

SECTION 3.19.2
Sabinus suos hortatus cupientibus signum dat. Impeditis hostibus propter ea quae ferebant onera subito duabus portis eruptionem fieri iubet.

SECTION 3.19.3
Factum est oportunitate loci, hostium inscientia ac defatigatione, virtute militum et superiorum pugnarum exercitatione, ut ne unum quidem nostrorum impetum ferrent ac statim terga verterent.

SECTION 3.19.4
Quos impeditos integris viribus milites nostri consecuti magnum numerum eorum occiderunt; reliquos equites consectati paucos, qui ex fuga evaserant, reliquerunt.

SECTION 3.19.5
Sic uno tempore et de navali pugna Sabinus et de Sabini victoria Caesar est certior factus, civitatesque omnes se statim Titurio dediderunt.

SECTION 3.19.6
Nam ut ad bella suscipienda Gallorum alacer ac promptus est animus, sic mollis ac minime resistens ad calamitates ferendas mens eorum est.

CHAPTER 3.20

SECTION 3.20.1
Eodem fere tempore P. Crassus., cum in Aquitaniam pervenisset, quae [pars], ut ante dictum est, [et regionum latitudine et multitudine hominum] tertia pars Galliae est [aestimanda], cum intellegeret in iis locis sibi bellum gerendum ubi paucis ante annis L. Valerius Praeconinus legatus exercitu pulso interfectus esset atque unde L. Manlius proconsul impedimentis amissis profugisset, non mediocrem sibi diligentiam adhibendam intellegebat.

SECTION 3.20.2
Itaque re frumentaria provisa, auxiliis equitatuque comparato, multis praeterea viris fortibus Tolosa et Carcasone et Narbone, quae sunt civitates Galliae provinciae finitimae, ex his regionibus nominatim evocatis, in Sotiatium fines exercitum introduxit.

SECTION 3.20.3
Cuius adventu cognito Sotiates magnis copiis coactis, equitatuque, quo plurimum valebant, in itinere agmen nostrum adorti primum equestre proelium commiserunt,

SECTION 3.20.4
deinde equitatu suo pulso atque insequentibus nostris subito pedestres copias, quas in convalle in insidiis conlocaverant, ostenderunt. Hi nostros disiectos adorti proelium renovarunt.

CHAPTER 3.21

SECTION 3.21.1
Pugnatum est diu atque acriter, cum Sotiates superioribus victoriis freti in sua virtute totius Aquitaniae salutem positam putarent, nostri autem quid sine imperatore et sine reliquis legionibus adulescentulo duce efficere possent perspici cuperent; tandem confecti vulneribus hostes terga verterunt.

SECTION 3.21.2
Quorum magno numero interfecto Crassus ex itinere oppidum Sotiatium oppugnare coepit. Quibus fortiter resistentibus vineas turresque egit.

SECTION 3.21.3
Illi alias eruptione temptata, alias cuniculis ad aggerem vineasque actis (cuius rei sunt longe peritissimi Aquitani, propterea quod multis locis apud eos aerariae secturaeque sunt), ubi diligentia nostrorum nihil his rebus profici posse intellexerunt, legatos ad Crassum mittunt seque in deditionem ut recipiat petunt. Qua re impetrata arma tradere iussi faciunt.

CHAPTER 3.22

SECTION 3.22.1
Atque in eam rem omnium nostrorum intentis animis alia ex parte oppidi Adiatunnus, qui summam imperii tenebat, cum DC devotis, quos illi soldurios appellant,

SECTION 3.22.2
quorum haec est condicio, ut omnibus in vita commodis una cum iis fruantur quorum se amicitiae dediderint, si quid his per vim accidat, aut eundem casum una ferant aut sibi mortem consciscant;

SECTION 3.22.3
neque adhuc hominum memoria repertus est quisquam qui, eo interfecto cuius se amicitiae devovisset, mortem recusaret—

SECTION 3.22.4
cum his Adiatunnus eruptionem facere conatus clamore ab ea parte munitionis sublato cum ad arma milites concurrissent vehementerque ibi pugnatum esset, repulsus in oppidum tamen uti eadem deditionis condicione uteretur a Crasso impetravit.

CHAPTER 3.23

SECTION 3.23.1
Armis obsidibusque acceptis, Crassus in fines Vocatium et Tarusatium profectus est.

SECTION 3.23.2
Tum vero barbari commoti, quod oppidum et natura loci et manu munitum paucis diebus quibus eo ventum erat expugnatum cognoverant, legatos quoque versus dimittere, coniurare, obsides inter se dare, copias parare coeperunt.

SECTION 3.23.3
Mittuntur etiam ad eas civitates legati quae sunt citerioris Hispaniae finitimae Aquitaniae: inde auxilia ducesque arcessuntur.

SECTION 3.23.4
Quorum adventu magna cum auctoritate et magna [cum] hominum multitudine bellum gerere conantur.

SECTION 3.23.5
Duces vero ii deliguntur qui una cum Q. Sertorio omnes annos fuerant summamque scientiam rei militaris habere existimabantur.

SECTION 3.23.6
Hi consuetudine populi Romani loca capere, castra munire, commeatibus nostros intercludere instituunt.

SECTION 3.23.7
Quod ubi Crassus animadvertit, suas copias propter exiguitatem non facile diduci, hostem et vagari et vias obsidere et castris satis praesidii relinquere, ob eam causam minus commode frumentum commeatumque sibi supportari, in dies hostium numerum augeri, non cunctandum existimavit quin pugna decertaret.

SECTION 3.23.8
Hac re ad consilium delata, ubi omnes idem sentire intellexit, posterum diem pugnae constituit.

CHAPTER 3.24

SECTION 3.24.1
Prima luce productis omnibus copiis duplici acie instituta, auxiliis in mediam aciem coniectis, quid hostes consilii caperent expectabat.

SECTION 3.24.2
Illi, etsi propter multitudinem et veterem belli gloriam paucitatemque nostrorum se tuto dimicaturos existimabant, tamen tutius esse arbitrabantur obsessis viis commeatu intercluso sine vulnere victoria potiri,

SECTION 3.24.3
et si propter inopiam rei frumentariae Romani se recipere coepissent, impeditos in agmine et sub sarcinis infirmiores animo adoriri cogitabant.

SECTION 3.24.4
Hoc consilio probato ab ducibus, productis Romanorum copiis, sese castris tenebant.

SECTION 3.24.5
Hac re perspecta Crassus, cum sua cunctatione atque opinione timoris hostes nostros milites alacriores ad pugnandum effecissent atque omnium voces audirentur expectari diutius non oportere quin ad castra iretur, cohortatus suos omnibus cupientibus ad hostium castra contendit.

CHAPTER 3.25

SECTION 3.25.1
Ibi cum alii fossas complerent, alii multis telis coniectis defensores vallo munitionibusque depellerent, auxiliaresque, quibus ad pugnam non multum Crassus confidebat, lapidibus telisque subministrandis et ad aggerem caespitibus comportandis speciem atque opinionem pugnantium praeberent, cum item ab hostibus constanter ac non timide pugnaretur telaque ex loco superiore missa non frustra acciderent,

SECTION 3.25.2
equites circumitis hostium castris Crasso renuntiaverunt non eadem esse diligentia ab decumana porta castra munita facilemque aditum habere.

CHAPTER 3.26

SECTION 3.26.1
Crassus equitum praefectos cohortatus, ut magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque suos excitarent, quid fieri vellet ostendit.

SECTION 3.26.2
Illi, ut erat imperatum, eductis iis cohortibus quae praesidio castris relictae intritae ab labore erant, et longiore itinere circumductis, ne ex hostium castris conspici possent, omnium oculis mentibusque ad pugnam intentis celeriter ad eas quas diximus munitiones pervenerunt

SECTION 3.26.3
atque his prorutis prius in hostium castris constiterunt quam plane ab his videri aut quid rei gereretur cognosci posset.

SECTION 3.26.4
Tum vero clamore ab ea parte audito nostri redintegratis viribus, quod plerumque in spe victoriae accidere consuevit, acrius impugnare coeperunt.

SECTION 3.26.5
Hostes undique circumventi desperatis omnibus rebus se per munitiones deicere et fuga salutem petere contenderunt.

SECTION 3.26.6
Quos equitatus apertissimis campis consectatus ex milium L numero, quae ex Aquitania Cantabrisque convenisse constabat, vix quarta parte relicta, multa nocte se in castra recepit.

CHAPTER 3.27

SECTION 3.27.1
Hac audita pugna maxima pars Aquitaniae sese Crasso dedidit obsidesque ultro misit; quo in numero fuerunt Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, Cocosates:

SECTION 3.27.2
paucae ultimae nationes anni tempore confisae, quod hiems suberat, id facere neglexerunt.

CHAPTER 3.28

SECTION 3.28.1
Eodem fere tempore Caesar, etsi prope exacta iam aestas erat, tamen, quod omni Gallia pacata Morini Menapiique supererant, qui in armis essent neque ad eum umquam legatos de pace misissent, arbitratus id bellum celeriter confici posse eo exercitum duxit; qui longe alia ratione ac reliqui Galli bellum gerere coeperunt.

SECTION 3.28.2
Nam quod intellegebant maximas nationes, quae proelio contendissent, pulsas superatasque esse, continentesque silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaque omnia contulerunt.

SECTION 3.28.3
Ad quarum initium silvarum cum Caesar pervenisset castraque munire instituisset neque hostis interim visus esset, dispersis in opere nostris subito ex omnibus partibus silvae evolaverunt et in nostros impetum fecerunt.

SECTION 3.28.4
Nostri celeriter arma ceperunt eosque in silvas repulerunt et compluribus interfectis longius impeditioribus locis secuti paucos ex suis deperdiderunt.

CHAPTER 3.29

SECTION 3.29.1
Reliquis deinceps diebus Caesar silvas caedere instituit, et ne quis inermibus imprudentibusque militibus ab latere impetus fieri posset, omnem eam materiam quae erat caesa conversam ad hostem conlocabat et pro vallo ad utrumque latus extruebat.

SECTION 3.29.2
Incredibili celeritate magno spatio paucis diebus confecto, cum iam pecus atque extrema impedimenta a nostris tenerentur, ipsi densiores silvas peterent, eius modi sunt tempestates consecutae uti opus necessario intermitteretur et continuatione imbrium diutius sub pellibus milites contineri non possent.

SECTION 3.29.3
Itaque vastatis omnibus eorum agris, vicis aedificiisque incensis, Caesar exercitum reduxit et in Aulercis Lexoviisque, reliquis item civitatibus quae proxime bellum fecerant, in hibernis conlocavit.

### Book 4

CHAPTER 4.1

SECTION 4.1.1
Ea quae secuta est hieme, qui fuit annus Cn. Pompeio, M. Crasso consulibus, Usipetes Germani et item Tencteri magna [cum] multitudine hominum flumen Rhenum transierunt, non longe a mari, quo Rhenus influit.

SECTION 4.1.2
Causa transeundi fuit quod ab Suebis complures annos exagitati bello premebantur et agri cultura prohibebantur.

SECTION 4.1.3
Sueborum gens est longe maxima et bellicosissima Germanorum omnium.

SECTION 4.1.4
Hi centum pagos habere dicuntur, ex quibus quotannis singula milia armatorum bellandi causa ex finibus educunt. Reliqui, qui domi manserunt, se atque illos alunt;

SECTION 4.1.5
hi rursus in vicem anno post in armis sunt, illi domi remanent.

SECTION 4.1.6
Sic neque agri cultura nec ratio atque usus belli intermittitur.

SECTION 4.1.7
Sed privati ac separati agri apud eos nihil est, neque longius anno remanere uno in loco colendi causa licet.

SECTION 4.1.8
Neque multum frumento, sed maximam partem lacte atque pecore vivunt multum sunt in venationibus;

SECTION 4.1.9
quae res et cibi genere et cotidiana exercitatione et libertate vitae, quod a pueris nullo officio aut disciplina adsuefacti nihil omnino contra voluntatem faciunt, et vires alit et immani corporum magnitudine homines efficit.

SECTION 4.1.10
Atque in eam se consuetudinem adduxerunt ut locis frigidissimis neque vestitus praeter pelles habeant quicquam, quarum propter exiguitatem magna est corporis pars aperta, et laventur in fluminibus.

CHAPTER 4.2

SECTION 4.2.1
Mercatoribus est aditus magis eo ut quae bello ceperint quibus vendant habeant, quam quo ullam rem ad se importari desiderent.

SECTION 4.2.2
Quin etiam iumentis, quibus maxime Galli delectantur quaeque impenso parant pretio, Germani importatis non utuntur, sed quae sunt apud eos nata, parva atque deformia, haec cotidiana exercitatione summi ut sint laboris efficiunt.

SECTION 4.2.3
Equestribus proeliis saepe ex equis desiliunt ac pedibus proeliantur, equos eodem remanere vestigio adsuefecerunt, ad quos se celeriter, cum usus est, recipiunt:

SECTION 4.2.4
neque eorum moribus turpius quicquam aut inertius habetur quam ephippiis uti.

SECTION 4.2.5
Itaque ad quemvis numerum ephippiatorum equitum quamvis pauci adire audent.

SECTION 4.2.6
Vinum omnino ad se importari non patiuntur, quod ea re ad laborem ferendum remollescere homines atque effeminari arbitrantur.

CHAPTER 4.3

SECTION 4.3.1
Publice maximam putant esse laudem quam latissime a suis finibus vacare agros: hac re significari magnum numerum civitatum suam vim sustinere non posse.

SECTION 4.3.2
Itaque una ex parte a Suebis circiter milia passuum C agri vacare dicuntur.

SECTION 4.3.3
Ad alteram partem succedunt Ubii, quorum fuit civitas ampla atque florens, ut est captus Germanorum; ii paulo, quamquam sunt eiusdem generis, sunt ceteris humaniores, propterea quod Rhenum attingunt multum ad eos mercatores ventitant et ipsi propter propinquitatem [quod] Gallicis sunt moribus adsuefacti.

SECTION 4.3.4
Hos cum Suebi multis saepe bellis experti propter amplitudinem gravitatem civitatis finibus expellere non potuissent, tamen vectigales sibi fecerunt ac multo humiliores infirmiores redegerunt.

CHAPTER 4.4

SECTION 4.4.1
In eadem causa fuerunt Usipetes et Tencteri, quos supra diximus; qui complures annos Sueborum vim sustinuerunt,

SECTION 4.4.2
ad extremum tamen agris expulsi et multis locis Germaniae triennium vagati ad Rhenum pervenerunt, quas regiones Menapii incolebant. Hi ad utramque ripam fluminis agros, aedificia vicosque habebant;

SECTION 4.4.3
sed tantae multitudinis adventu perterriti ex iis aedificiis quae trans flumen habuerant demigraverant, et cis Rhenum dispositis praesidiis Germanos transire prohibebant.

SECTION 4.4.4
Illi omnia experti, cum neque vi contendere propter inopiam navium neque clam transire propter custodias Menapiorum possent,

SECTION 4.4.5
reverti se in suas sedes regionesque simulaverunt et tridui viam progressi rursus reverterunt atque omni hoc itinere una nocte equitatu confecto inscios inopinantes Menapios oppresserunt,

SECTION 4.4.6
qui de Germanorum discessu per exploratores certiores facti sine metu trans Rhenum in suos vicos remigraverant.

SECTION 4.4.7
His interfectis navibus eorum occupatis, prius quam ea pars Menapiorum quae citra Rhenum erat certior fieret, flumen transierunt atque omnibus eorum aedificiis occupatis reliquam partem hiemis se eorum copiis aluerunt.

CHAPTER 4.5

SECTION 4.5.1
His de rebus Caesar certior factus et infirmitatem Gallorum veritus, quod sunt in consiliis capiendis mobiles et novis plerumque rebus student, nihil his committendum existimavit.

SECTION 4.5.2
Est enim hoc Gallicae consuetudinis, uti et viatores etiam invitos consistere cogant et quid quisque eorum de quaque re audierit aut cognoverit quaerant et mercatores in oppidis vulgus circumsistat quibus ex regionibus veniant quas ibi res cognoverint pronuntiare cogat.

SECTION 4.5.3
His rebus atque auditionibus permoti de summis saepe rebus consilia ineunt, quorum eos in vestigio paenitere necesse est, cum incertis rumoribus serviant et pleri ad voluntatem eorum ficta respondeant.

CHAPTER 4.6

SECTION 4.6.1
Qua consuetudine cognita Caesar, ne graviori bello, occurreret, maturius quam consuerat ad exercitum proficiscitur.

SECTION 4.6.2
Eo cum venisset, ea quae fore suspicatus erat facta cognovit:

SECTION 4.6.3
missas legationes ab non nullis civitatibus ad Germanos invitatos eos uti ab Rheno discederent: omnia quae[que] postulassent ab se fore parata.

SECTION 4.6.4
Qua spe adducti Germani latius iam vagabantur et in fines Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant.

SECTION 4.6.5
Principibus Gallice evocatis Caesar ea quae cognoverat dissimulanda sibi existimavit, eorumque animis permulsis et confirmatis equitatu imperato bellum cum Germanis gerere constituit.

CHAPTER 4.7

SECTION 4.7.1
Re frumentaria comparata equitibusque delectis iter in ea loca facere coepit, quibus in locis esse Germanos audiebat.

SECTION 4.7.2
A quibus cum paucorum dierum iter abesset, legati ab iis venerunt, quorum haec fuit oratio:

SECTION 4.7.3
Germanos neque priores populo Romano bellum inferre neque tamen recusare, si lacessantur, quin armis contendant, quod Germanorum consuetudo [haec] sit a maioribus tradita, Quicumque bellum inferant, resistere neque deprecari. Haec tamen dicere venisse invitos, eiectos domo;

SECTION 4.7.4
si suam gratiam Romani velint, posse iis utiles esse amicos; vel sibi agros attribuant vel patiantur eos tenere quos armis possederint:

SECTION 4.7.5
sese unis Suebis concedere, quibus ne di quidem immortales pares esse possint; reliquum quidem in terris esse neminem quem non superare possint.

CHAPTER 4.8

SECTION 4.8.1
Ad haec Caesar quae visum est respondit; sed exitus fuit orationis: sibi nullam cum iis amicitiam esse posse, si in Gallia remanerent;

SECTION 4.8.2
neque verum esse, qui suos fines tueri non potuerint alienos occupare; neque ullos in Gallia vacare agros qui dari tantae praesertim multitudini sine iniuria possint;

SECTION 4.8.3
sed licere, si velint, in Ubiorum finibus considere, quorum sint legati apud se et de Sueborum iniuriis querantur et a se auxilium petant: hoc se Ubiis imperaturum.

CHAPTER 4.9

SECTION 4.9.1
Legati haec se ad suos relaturos dixerunt et re deliberata post diem tertium ad Caesarem reversuros: interea ne propius se castra moveret petierunt.

SECTION 4.9.2
Ne id quidem Caesar ab se impetrari posse dixit.

SECTION 4.9.3
Cognoverat enim magnam partem equitatus ab iis aliquot diebus ante praedandi frumentandi causa ad Ambivaritos trans Mosam missam: hos expectari equites atque eius rei causa moram interponi arbitrabatur.

CHAPTER 4.10

SECTION 4.10.1
[Mosa profluit ex monte Vosego, qui est in finibus Lingonum, et parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus insulam efficit Batavorum, in Oceanum influit

SECTION 4.10.2
neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit.

SECTION 4.10.3
Rhenus autem oritur ex Lepontiis, qui Alpes incolunt, et longo spatio per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur et,

SECTION 4.10.4
ubi Oceano adpropinquavit, in plures diffluit partes multis ingentibus insulis effectis, quarum pars magna a feris barbaris nationibus incolitur,

SECTION 4.10.5
ex quibus sunt qui piscibus atque ovis avium vivere existimantur, multis capitibus in Oceanum influit.]

CHAPTER 4.11

SECTION 4.11.1
Caesar cum ab hoste non amplius passuum XII milibus abesset, ut erat constitutum, ad eum legati revertuntur; qui in itinere congressi magnopere ne longius progrederetur orabant.

SECTION 4.11.2
Cum id non impetrassent, petebant uti ad eos [equites] qui agmen antecessissent praemitteret eos pugna prohiberet, sibique ut potestatem faceret in Ubios legatos mittendi;

SECTION 4.11.3
quorum si principes ac senatus sibi iure iurando fidem fecisset, ea condicione quae a Caesare ferretur se usuros ostendebant: ad has res conficiendas sibi tridui spatium daret.

SECTION 4.11.4
Haec omnia Caesar eodem illo pertinere arbitrabatur ut tridui mora interposita equites eorum qui abessent reverterentur; tamen sese non longius milibus passuum IIII aquationis causa processurum eo die dixit:

SECTION 4.11.5
huc postero die quam frequentissimi convenirent, ut de eorum postulatis cognosceret.

SECTION 4.11.6
Interim ad praefectos, qui cum omni equitatu antecesserant, mittit qui nuntiarent ne hostes proelio lacesserent, et si ipsi lacesserentur, sustinerent quoad ipse cum exercitu propius accessisset.

CHAPTER 4.12

SECTION 4.12.1
At hostes, ubi primum nostros equites conspexerunt, quorum erat V milium numerus, cum ipsi non amplius DCCC equites haberent, quod ii qui frumentandi causa ierant trans Mosam profecti nondum redierant, nihil timentibus nostris, quod legati eorum paulo ante a Caesare discesserant atque is dies indutiis erat ab his petitus, impetu facto celeriter nostros perturbaverunt;

SECTION 4.12.2
rursus his resistentibus consuetudine sua ad pedes desiluerunt subfossis equis compluribus nostris deiectis reliquos in fugam coniecerunt atque ita perterritos egerunt ut non prius fuga desisterent quam in conspectum agminis nostri venissent.

SECTION 4.12.3
In eo proelio ex equitibus nostris interficiuntur IIII et LXX,

SECTION 4.12.4
in his vir fortissimus Piso Aquitanus, amplissimo genere natus, cuius avus in civitate sua regnum obtinuerat amicus a senatu nostro appellatus.

SECTION 4.12.5
Hic cum fratri intercluso ab hostibus auxilium ferret, illum ex periculo eripuit, ipse equo vulnerato deiectus, quoad potuit, fortissime restitit;

SECTION 4.12.6
cum circumventus multis vulneribus acceptis cecidisset atque id frater, qui iam proelio excesserat, procul animadvertisset, incitato equo se hostibus obtulit atque interfectus est.

CHAPTER 4.13

SECTION 4.13.1
Hoc facto proelio Caesar neque iam sibi legatos audiendos neque condiciones accipiendas arbitrabatur ab iis qui per dolum atque insidias petita pace ultro bellum intulissent;

SECTION 4.13.2
expectare vero dum hostium copiae augerentur equitatus reverteretur summae dementiae esse iudicabat,

SECTION 4.13.3
et cognita Gallorum infirmitate quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent consecuti sentiebat; quibus ad consilia capienda nihil spatii dandum existimabat.

SECTION 4.13.4
His constitutis rebus et consilio cum legatis et quaestore communicato, ne quem diem pugnae praetermitteret, oportunissima res accidit, quod postridie eius diei mane eadem et perfidia et simulatione usi Germani frequentes, omnibus principibus maioribusque natu adhibitis, ad eum in castra venerunt,

SECTION 4.13.5
simul, ut dicebatur, sui purgandi causa, quod contra atque esset dictum et ipsi petissent, proelium pridie commisissent, simul ut, si quid possent, de indutiis fallendo impetrarent.

SECTION 4.13.6
Quos sibi Caesar oblatos gavisus illos retineri iussit; ipse omnes copias castris eduxit equitatumque, quod recenti proelio perterritum esse existimabat, agmen subsequi iussit.

CHAPTER 4.14

SECTION 4.14.1
Acie triplici instituta et celeriter VIII milium itinere confecto, prius ad hostium castra pervenit quam quid ageretur Germani sentire possent.

SECTION 4.14.2
Qui omnibus rebus subito perterriti et celeritate adventus nostri et discessu suorum, neque consilii habendi neque arma capiendi spatio dato perturbantur, copiasne adversus hostem ducere an castra defendere an fuga salutem petere praestaret.

SECTION 4.14.3
Quorum timor cum fremitu et concursu significaretur, milites nostri pristini diei perfidia incitati in castra inruperunt.

SECTION 4.14.4
Quo loco qui celeriter arma capere potuerunt paulisper nostris restiterunt atque inter carros impedimenta proelium commiserunt;

SECTION 4.14.5
at reliqua multitudo puerorum mulierumque (nam cum omnibus suis domo excesserant Rhenum transierant) passim fugere coepit, ad quos consectandos Caesar equitatum misit.

CHAPTER 4.15

SECTION 4.15.1
Germani post tergum clamore audito, cum suos interfici viderent, armis abiectis signis militaribus relictis se ex castris eiecerunt,

SECTION 4.15.2
et cum ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni pervenissent, reliqua fuga desperata, magno numero interfecto, reliqui se in flumen praecipitaverunt atque ibi timore, lassitudine, vi fluminis oppressi perierunt.

SECTION 4.15.3
Nostri ad unum omnes incolumes, perpaucis vulneratis, ex tanti belli timore, cum hostium numerus capitum CCCCXXX milium fuisset, se in castra receperunt.

SECTION 4.15.4
Caesar iis quos in castris retinuerat discedendi potestatem fecit.

SECTION 4.15.5
Illi supplicia cruciatusque Gallorum veriti, quorum agros vexaverant, remanere se apud eum velle dixerunt. His Caesar libertatem concessit.

CHAPTER 4.16

SECTION 4.16.1
Germanico bello confecto multis de causis Caesar statuit sibi Rhenum esse transeundum; quarum illa fuit iustissima quod, cum videret Germanos tam facile impelli ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire.

SECTION 4.16.2
Accessit etiam quod illa pars equitatus Usipetum et Tencterorum, quam supra commemoravi praedandi frumentandique causa Mosam transisse neque proelio interfuisse, post fugam suorum se trans Rhenum in fines Sugambrorum receperat seque cum his coniunxerat.

SECTION 4.16.3
Ad quos cum Caesar nuntios misisset, qui postularent eos qui sibi Galliae bellum intulissent sibi dederent, responderunt:

SECTION 4.16.4
populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire; si se invito Germanos in Galliam transire non aequum existimaret, cur sui quicquam esse imperii aut potestatis trans Rhenum postularet?

SECTION 4.16.5
Ubii autem, qui uni ex Transrhenanis ad Caesarem legatos miserant, amicitiam fecerant, obsides dederant, magnopere orabant ut sibi auxilium ferret, quod graviter ab Suebis premerentur;

SECTION 4.16.6
vel, si id facere occupationibus rei publicae prohiberetur, exercitum modo Rhenum transportaret: id sibi ad auxilium spemque reliqui temporis satis futurum.

SECTION 4.16.7
Tantum esse nomen atque opinionem eius exercitus Ariovisto pulso et hoc novissimo proelio facto etiam ad ultimas Germanorum nationes, uti opinione et amicitia populi Romani tuti esse possint.

SECTION 4.16.8
Navium magnam copiam ad transportandum exercitum pollicebantur.

CHAPTER 4.17

SECTION 4.17.1
Caesar his de causis quas commemoravi Rhenum transire decreverat; sed navibus transire neque satis tutum esse arbitrabatur neque suae neque populi Romani dignitatis esse statuebat.

SECTION 4.17.2
Itaque, etsi summa difficultas faciendi pontis proponebatur propter latitudinem, rapiditatem altitudinemque fluminis, tamen id sibi contendendum aut aliter non traducendum exercitum existimabat.

SECTION 4.17.3
Rationem pontis hanc instituit. Tigna bina sesquipedalia paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat.

SECTION 4.17.4
Haec cum machinationibus immissa in flumen defixerat fistucisque adegerat, non sublicae modo derecte ad perpendiculum, sed prone ac fastigate, ut secundum naturam fluminis procumberent,

SECTION 4.17.5
iis item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte contra vim atque impetu fluminis conversa statuebat.

SECTION 4.17.6
Haec utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum tignorum iunctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur;

SECTION 4.17.7
quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis, tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura ut, quo maior vis aquae se incitavisset, hoc artius inligata tenerentur.

SECTION 4.17.8
Haec derecta materia iniecta contexebantur ac longuriis cratibusque consternebantur;

SECTION 4.17.9
ac nihilo setius sublicae et ad inferiorem partem fluminis oblique agebantur, quae pro ariete subiectae et cum omni opere coniunctae vim fluminis exciperent,

SECTION 4.17.10
et aliae item supra pontem mediocri spatio, ut, si arborum trunci sive naves deiciendi operis causa essent a barbaris missae, his defensoribus earum rerum vis minueretur neu ponti nocerent.

CHAPTER 4.18

SECTION 4.18.1
Diebus X, quibus materia coepta erat comportari, omni opere effecto exercitus traducitur.

SECTION 4.18.2
Caesar ad utramque partem pontis firmo praesidio relicto in fines Sugambrorum contendit.

SECTION 4.18.3
Interim a compluribus civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt; quibus pacem atque amicitiam petentibus liberaliter respondet obsidesque ad se adduci iubet.

SECTION 4.18.4
At Sugambri, ex eo tempore quo pons institui coeptus est fuga comparata, hortantibus iis quos ex Tencteris atque Usipetibus apud se habebant, finibus suis excesserant suaque omnia exportaverant seque in solitudinem ac silvas abdiderant.

CHAPTER 4.19

SECTION 4.19.1
Caesar paucos dies in eorum finibus moratus, omnibus vicis aedificiisque incensis frumentisque succisis, se in fines Ubiorum recepit atque his auxilium suum pollicitus, si a Suebis premerentur, haec ab iis cognovit:

SECTION 4.19.2
Suebos, postea quam per exploratores pontem fieri comperissent, more suo concilio habito nuntios in omnes partes dimisisse, uti de oppidis demigrarent, liberos, uxores suaque omnia in silvis deponerent atque omnes qui arma ferre possent unum in locum convenirent.

SECTION 4.19.3
Hunc esse delectum medium fere regionum earum quas Suebi obtinerent; hic Romanorum adventum expectare atque ibi decertare constituisse.

SECTION 4.19.4
Quod ubi Caesar comperit, omnibus iis rebus confectis, quarum rerum causa exercitum traducere constituerat, ut Germanis metum iniceret, ut Sugambros ulcisceretur, ut Ubios obsidione liberaret, diebus omnino XVIII trans Rhenum consumptis, satis et ad laudem et ad utilitatem profectum arbitratus se in Galliam recepit pontemque rescidit.

CHAPTER 4.20

SECTION 4.20.1
Exigua parte aestatis reliqua Caesar, etsi in his locis, quod omnis Gallia ad septentriones vergit, maturae sunt hiemes, tamen in Britanniam proficisci contendit, quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde subministrata auxilia intellegebat,

SECTION 4.20.2
et si tempus anni ad bellum gerendum deficeret, tamen magno sibi usui fore arbitrabatur, si modo insulam adiisset, genus hominum perspexisset, loca, portus, aditus cognovisset; quae omnia fere Gallis erant incognita.

SECTION 4.20.3
Neque enim temere praeter mercatores illo adit quisquam, neque his ipsis quicquam praeter oram maritimam atque eas regiones quae sunt contra Galliam notum est.

SECTION 4.20.4
Itaque vocatis ad se undique mercatoribus, neque quanta esset insulae magnitudo neque quae aut quantae nationes incolerent, neque quem usum belli haberent aut quibus institutis uterentur, neque qui essent ad maiorem navium multitudinem idonei portus reperire poterat.

CHAPTER 4.21

SECTION 4.21.1
Ad haec cognoscenda, prius quam periculum faceret, idoneum esse arbitratus C. Volusenum cum navi longa praemittit.

SECTION 4.21.2
Huic mandat ut exploratis omnibus rebus ad se quam primum revertatur.

SECTION 4.21.3
Ipse cum omnibus copiis in Morinos proficiscitur, quod inde erat brevissimus in Britanniam traiectus.

SECTION 4.21.4
Huc naves undique ex finitimis regionibus et quam superiore aestate ad Veneticum bellum fecerat classem iubet convenire.

SECTION 4.21.5
Interim, consilio eius cognito et per mercatores perlato ad Britannos, a compluribus insulae civitatibus ad eum legati veniunt, qui polliceantur obsides dare atque imperio populi Romani obtemperare.

SECTION 4.21.6
Quibus auditis, liberaliter pollicitus hortatusque ut in ea sententia permanerent,

SECTION 4.21.7
eos domum remittit et cum iis una Commium, quem ipse Atrebatibus superatis regem ibi constituerat, cuius et virtutem et consilium probabat et quem sibi fidelem esse arbitrabatur cuiusque auctoritas in his regionibus magni habebatur, mittit.

SECTION 4.21.8
Huic imperat quas possit adeat civitates horteturque ut populi Romani fidem sequantur seque celeriter eo venturum nuntiet.

SECTION 4.21.9
Volusenus perspectis regionibus omnibus quantum ei facultatis dari potuit, qui navi egredi ac se barbaris committere non auderet, V die ad Caesarem revertitur quaeque ibi perspexisset renuntiat.

CHAPTER 4.22

SECTION 4.22.1
Dum in his locis Caesar navium parandarum causa moratur, ex magna parte Morinorum ad eum legati venerunt, qui se de superioris temporis consilio excusarent, quod homines barbari et nostrae consuetudinis imperiti bellum populo Romano fecissent, seque ea quae imperasset facturos pollicerentur.

SECTION 4.22.2
Hoc sibi Caesar satis oportune accidisse arbitratus, quod neque post tergum hostem relinquere volebat neque belli gerendi propter anni tempus facultatem habebat neque has tantularum rerum occupationes Britanniae anteponendas iudicabat, magnum iis numerum obsidum imperat.

SECTION 4.22.3
Quibus adductis eos in fidem recipit. Navibus circiter LXXX onerariis coactis contractisque, quot satis esse ad duas transportandas legiones existimabat, quod praeterea navium longarum habebat quaestori, legatis praefectisque distribuit.

SECTION 4.22.4
Huc accedebant XVIII onerariae naves, quae ex eo loco a milibus passuum VIII vento tenebantur quo minus in eundem portum venire possent: has equitibus tribuit.

SECTION 4.22.5
Reliquum exercitum Q. Titurio Sabino et L. Aurunculeio Cottae legatis in Menapios atque in eos pagos Morinorum a quibus ad eum legati non venerant ducendum dedit;

SECTION 4.22.6
Sulpicium Rufum legatum cum eo praesidio quod satis esse arbitrabatur portum tenere iussit.

CHAPTER 4.23

SECTION 4.23.1
His constitutis rebus, nactus idoneam ad navigandum tempestatem III. fere vigilia solvit equitesque in ulteriorem portum progredi et naves conscendere et se sequi iussit.

SECTION 4.23.2
A quibus cum paulo tardius esset administratum, ipse hora diei circiter IIII. cum primis navibus Britanniam attigit atque ibi in omnibus collibus expositas hostium copias armatas conspexit.

SECTION 4.23.3
Cuius loci haec erat natura atque ita montibus angustis mare continebatur, uti ex locis superioribus in litus telum adigi posset.

SECTION 4.23.4
Hunc ad egrediendum nequaquam idoneum locum arbitratus, dum reliquae naves eo convenirent ad horam nonam in ancoris expectavit.

SECTION 4.23.5
Interim legatis tribunisque militum convocatis et quae ex Voluseno cognovisset et quae fieri vellet ostendit monuitque, ut rei militaris ratio, maximeque ut maritimae res postularent, ut, cum celerem atque instabilem motum haberent, ad nutum et ad tempus omnes res ab iis administrarentur.

SECTION 4.23.6
His dimissis et ventum et aestum uno tempore nactus secundum, dato signo et sublatis ancoris, circiter milia passuum VII ab eo loco progressus aperto ac plano litore naves constituit.

CHAPTER 4.24

SECTION 4.24.1
At barbari, consilio Romanorum cognito praemisso equitatu et essedariis, quo plerumque genere in proeliis uti consuerunt, reliquis copiis subsecuti nostros navibus egredi prohibebant.

SECTION 4.24.2
Erat ob has causas summa difficultas, quod naves propter magnitudinem nisi in alto constitui non poterant, militibus autem, ignotis locis, impeditis manibus, magno et gravi onere armorum oppressis simul et de navibus desiliendum et in fluctibus consistendum et cum hostibus erat pugnandum,

SECTION 4.24.3
cum illi aut ex arido aut paulum in aquam progressi omnibus membris expeditis, notissimis locis, audacter tela coicerent et equos insuefactos incitarent.

SECTION 4.24.4
Quibus rebus nostri perterriti atque huius omnino generis pugnae imperiti, non eadem alacritate ac studio quo in pedestribus uti proeliis consuerant utebantur.

CHAPTER 4.25

SECTION 4.25.1
Quod ubi Caesar animadvertit, naves longas, quarum et species erat barbaris inusitatior et motus ad usum expeditior, paulum removeri ab onerariis navibus et remis incitari et ad latus apertum hostium constitui atque inde fundis, sagittis, tormentis hostes propelli ac submoveri iussit; quae res magno usui nostris fuit.

SECTION 4.25.2
Nam et navium figura et remorum motu et inusitato genere tormentorum permoti barbari constiterunt ac paulum modo pedem rettulerunt.

SECTION 4.25.3
Atque nostris militibus cunctantibus, maxime propter altitudinem maris, qui X legionis aquilam gerebat, obtestatus deos, ut ea res legioni feliciter eveniret, ' desilite', inquit, ' milites, nisi vultis aquilam hostibus prodere; ego certe meum rei publicae atque imperatori officium praestitero.'

SECTION 4.25.4
Hoc cum voce magna dixisset, se ex navi proiecit atque in hostes aquilam ferre coepit.

SECTION 4.25.5
Tum nostri cohortati inter se, ne tantum dedecus admitteretur, universi ex navi desiluerunt.

SECTION 4.25.6
Hos item ex proximis primi navibus cum conspexissent, subsecuti hostibus adpropinquaverunt.

CHAPTER 4.26

SECTION 4.26.1
Pugnatum est ab utrisque acriter. Nostri tamen, quod neque ordines servare neque firmiter insistere neque signa subsequi poterant atque alius alia ex navi quibuscumque signis occurrerat se adgregabat, magnopere perturbabantur;

SECTION 4.26.2
hostes vero, notis omnibus vadis, ubi ex litore aliquos singulares ex navi egredientes conspexerant, incitatis equis impeditos adoriebantur,

SECTION 4.26.3
plures paucos circumsistebant, alii ab latere aperto in universos tela coniciebant.

SECTION 4.26.4
Quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, scaphas longarum navium, item speculatoria navigia militibus compleri iussit, et quos laborantes conspexerat, his subsidia submittebat.

SECTION 4.26.5
Nostri, simul in arido constiterunt, suis omnibus consecutis, in hostes impetum fecerunt atque eos in fugam dederunt; neque longius prosequi potuerunt, quod equites cursum tenere atque insulam capere non potuerant. Hoc unum ad pristinam fortunam Caesari defuit.

CHAPTER 4.27

SECTION 4.27.1
Hostes proelio superati, simul atque se ex fuga receperunt, statim ad Caesarem legatos de pace miserunt; obsides sese daturos quaeque imperasset facturos polliciti sunt.

SECTION 4.27.2
Una cum his legatis Commius Atrebas venit, quem supra demonstraveram a Caesare in Britanniam praemissum.

SECTION 4.27.3
Hunc illi e navi egressum, cum ad eos oratoris modo Caesaris mandata deferret, comprehenderant atque in vincula coniecerant;

SECTION 4.27.4
tum proelio facto remiserunt et in petenda pace eius rei culpam in multitudinem contulerunt et propter imprudentiam ut ignosceretur petiverunt.

SECTION 4.27.5
Caesar questus quod, cum ultro in continentem legatis missis pacem ab se petissent, bellum sine causa intulissent, ignoscere se imprudentiae dixit obsidesque imperavit;

SECTION 4.27.6
quorum illi partem statim dederunt, partem ex longinquioribus locis arcessitam paucis diebus sese daturos dixerunt.

SECTION 4.27.7
Interea suos in agros remigrare iusserunt, principesque undique convenire et se civitatesque suas Caesari commendare coeperunt.

CHAPTER 4.28

SECTION 4.28.1
His rebus pace confirmata, post diem quartum quam est in Britanniam ventum naves XVIII, de quibus supra demonstratum est, quae equites sustulerant, ex superiore portu leni vento solverunt.

SECTION 4.28.2
Quae cum adpropinquarent Britanniae et ex castris viderentur, tanta tempestas subito coorta est ut nulla earum cursum tenere posset, sed aliae eodem unde erant profectae referrentur, aliae ad inferiorem partem insulae, quae est propius solis occasum, magno suo cum periculo deicerentur;

SECTION 4.28.3
quae tamen ancoris iactis cum fluctibus complerentur, necessario adversa nocte in altum provectae continentem petierunt.

CHAPTER 4.29

SECTION 4.29.1
Eadem nocte accidit ut esset luna plena, qui dies maritimos aestus maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit, nostrisque id erat incognitum.

SECTION 4.29.2
Ita uno tempore et longas naves, [quibus Caesar exercitum transportandum curaverat,] quas Caesar in aridum subduxerat, aestus complebat, et onerarias, quae ad ancoras erant deligatae, tempestas adflictabat, neque ulla nostris facultas aut administrandi aut auxiliandi dabatur.

SECTION 4.29.3
Compluribus navibus fractis, reliquae cum essent funibus, ancoris reliquisque armamentis amissis ad navigandum inutiles, magna, id quod necesse erat accidere, totius exercitus perturbatio facta est.

SECTION 4.29.4
Neque enim naves erant aliae quibus reportari possent, et omnia deerant quae ad reficiendas naves erant usui, et, quod omnibus constabat hiemari in Gallia oportere, frumentum in his locis in hiemem provisum non erat.

CHAPTER 4.30

SECTION 4.30.1
Quibus rebus cognitis, principes Britanniae, qui post proelium ad Caesarem convenerant, inter se conlocuti, cum et equites et naves et frumentum Romanis deesse intellegerent et paucitatem militum ex castrorum exiguitate cognoscerent, quae hoc erant etiam angustiora quod sine impedimentis Caesar legiones transportaverat,

SECTION 4.30.2
optimum factu esse duxerunt rebellione facta frumento commeatuque nostros prohibere et rem in hiemem producere, quod his superatis aut reditu interclusis neminem postea belli inferendi causa in Britanniam transiturum confidebant.

SECTION 4.30.3
Itaque rursus coniuratione facta paulatim ex castris discedere et suos clam ex agris deducere coeperunt.

CHAPTER 4.31

SECTION 4.31.1
At Caesar, etsi nondum eorum consilia cognoverat, tamen et ex eventu navium suarum et ex eo quod obsides dare intermiserant fore id quod accidit suspicabatur.

SECTION 4.31.2
Itaque ad omnes casus subsidia comparabat. Nam et frumentum ex agris cotidie in castra conferebat et, quae gravissime adflictae erant naves, earum materia atque aere ad reliquas reficiendas utebatur et quae ad eas res erant usui ex continenti comportari iubebat.

SECTION 4.31.3
Itaque, cum summo studio a militibus administraretur, XII navibus amissis, reliquis ut navigari satis commode posset effecit.

CHAPTER 4.32

SECTION 4.32.1
Dum ea geruntur, legione ex consuetudine una frumentatum missa, quae appellabatur VII., neque ulla ad id tempus belli suspicione interposita, cum pars hominum in agris remaneret, pars etiam in castra ventitaret, ii qui pro portis castrorum in statione erant Caesari nuntiaverunt pulverem maiorem quam consuetudo ferret in ea parte videri quam in partem legio iter fecisset.

SECTION 4.32.2
Caesar—id quod erat—suspicatus aliquid novi a barbaris initum consilii, cohortes quae in statione erant secum in eam partem proficisci, ex reliquis duas in stationem succedere, reliquas armari et confestim sese subsequi iussit.

SECTION 4.32.3
Cum paulo longius a castris processisset, suos ab hostibus premi atque aegre sustinere et conferta legione ex omnibus partibus tela coici animadvertit.

SECTION 4.32.4
Nam quod omni ex reliquis partibus demesso frumento pars una erat reliqua, suspicati hostes huc nostros esse venturos noctu in silvis delituerant;

SECTION 4.32.5
tum dispersos depositis armis in metendo occupatos subito adorti paucis interfectis reliquos incertis ordinibus perturbaverant, simul equitatu atque essedis circumdederant.

CHAPTER 4.33

SECTION 4.33.1
Genus hoc est ex essedis pugnae. Primo per omnes partes perequitant et tela coiciunt atque ipso terrore equorum et strepitu rotarum ordines plerumque perturbant, et cum se inter equitum turmas insinuaverunt, ex essedis desiliunt et pedibus proeliantur.

SECTION 4.33.2
Aurigae interim paulatim ex proelio excedunt atque ita currus conlocant ut, si illi a multitudine hostium premantur, expeditum ad suos receptum habeant.

SECTION 4.33.3
Ita mobilitatem equitum, stabilitatem peditum in proeliis praestant, ac tantum usu cotidiano et exercitatione efficiunt uti in declivi ac praecipiti loco incitatos equos sustinere et brevi moderari ac flectere et per temonem percurrere et in iugo insistere et se inde in currus citissime recipere consuerint.

CHAPTER 4.34

SECTION 4.34.1
Quibus rebus perturbatis nostris [novitate pugnae] tempore oportunissimo Caesar auxilium tulit: namque eius adventu hostes constiterunt, nostri se ex timore receperunt.

SECTION 4.34.2
Quo facto, ad lacessendum hostem et committendum proelium alienum esse tempus arbitratus suo se loco continuit et brevi tempore intermisso in castra legiones reduxit.

SECTION 4.34.3
Dum haec geruntur, nostris omnibus occupatis qui erant in agris reliqui discesserunt.

SECTION 4.34.4
Secutae sunt continuos complures dies tempestates, quae et nostros in castris continerent et hostem a pugna prohiberent.

SECTION 4.34.5
Interim barbari nuntios in omnes partes dimiserunt paucitatemque nostrorum militum suis praedicaverunt et quanta praedae faciendae atque in perpetuum sui liberandi facultas daretur, si Romanos castris expulissent, demonstraverunt. His rebus celeriter magna multitudine peditatus equitatusque coacta ad castra venerunt.

CHAPTER 4.35

SECTION 4.35.1
Caesar, etsi idem quod superioribus diebus acciderat fore videbat, ut, si essent hostes pulsi, celeritate periculum effugerent, tamen nactus equites circiter XXX, quos Commius Atrebas, de quo ante dictum est, secum transportaverat, legiones in acie pro castris constituit.

SECTION 4.35.2
Commisso proelio diutius nostrorum militum impetum hostes ferre non potuerunt ac terga verterunt.

SECTION 4.35.3
Quos tanto spatio secuti quantum cursu et viribus efficere potuerunt, complures ex iis occiderunt, deinde omnibus longe lateque aedificiis incensis se in castra receperunt.

CHAPTER 4.36

SECTION 4.36.1
Eodem die legati ab hostibus missi ad Caesarem de pace venerunt.

SECTION 4.36.2
His Caesar numerum obsidum quem ante imperaverat duplicavit eosque in continentem adduci iussit, quod propinqua die aequinoctii infirmis navibus hiemi navigationem subiciendam non existimabat.

SECTION 4.36.3
Ipse idoneam tempestatem nactus paulo post mediam noctem naves solvit,

SECTION 4.36.4
quae omnes incolumes ad continentem pervenerunt; sed ex iis onerariae duae eosdem portus quos reliquae capere non potuerunt et paulo infra delatae sunt.

CHAPTER 4.37

SECTION 4.37.1
Quibus ex navibus cum essent expositi milites circiter CCC atque in castra contenderent, Morini, quos Caesar in Britanniam proficiscens pacatos reliquerat, spe praedae adducti primo non ita magno suorum numero circumsteterunt ac, si sese interfici nollent, arma ponere iusserunt.

SECTION 4.37.2
Cum illi orbe facto sese defenderent, celeriter ad clamorem hominum circiter milia VI convenerunt. Qua re nuntiata, Caesar omnem ex castris equitatum suis auxilio misit.

SECTION 4.37.3
Interim nostri milites impetum hostium sustinuerunt atque amplius horis IIII fortissime pugnaverunt et paucis vulneribus acceptis complures ex iis occiderunt.

SECTION 4.37.4
Postea vero quam equitatus noster in conspectum venit, hostes abiectis armis terga verterunt magnusque eorum numerus est occisus.

CHAPTER 4.38

SECTION 4.38.1
Caesar postero die T. Labienum legatum cum iis legionibus quas ex Britannia reduxerat in Morinos qui rebellionem fecerant misit.

SECTION 4.38.2
Qui cum propter siccitates paludum quo se reciperent non haberent, quo perfugio superiore anno erant usi, omnes fere in potestatem Labieni venerunt.

SECTION 4.38.3
At Q. Titurius et L. Cotta legati, qui in Menapiorum fines legiones duxerant, omnibus eorum agris vastatis, frumentis succisis, aedificiis incensis, quod Menapii se omnes in densissimas silvas abdiderant, se ad Caesarem receperunt.

SECTION 4.38.4
Caesar in Belgis omnium legionum hiberna constituit. Eo duae omnino civitates ex Britannia obsides miserunt, reliquae neglexerunt.

SECTION 4.38.5
His rebus gestis ex litteris Caesaris dierum XX supplicatio a senatu decreta est.

### Book 5

CHAPTER 5.1

SECTION 5.1.1
L. Domitio Ap. Claudio consulibus, discedens ab hibernis Caesar in Italiam, ut quotannis facere consuerat, legatis imperat quos legionibus praefecerat uti quam plurimas possent hieme naves aedificandas veteresque reficiendas curarent. Earum modum formamque demonstrat.

SECTION 5.1.2
Ad celeritatem onerandi subductionesque paulo facit humiliores quam quibus in nostro mari uti consuevimus, atque id eo magis, quod propter crebras commutationes aestuum minus magnos ibi fluctus fieri cognoverat; ad onera, ad multitudinem iumentorum transportandam paulo latiores quam quibus in reliquis utimur maribus.

SECTION 5.1.3
Has omnes actuarias imperat fieri, quam ad rem multum humilitas adiuvat.

SECTION 5.1.4
Ea quae sunt usui ad armandas naves ex Hispania apportari iubet.

SECTION 5.1.5
Ipse conventibus Galliae citerioris peractis in Illyricum proficiscitur, quod a Pirustis finitimam partem provinciae incursionibus vastari audiebat.

SECTION 5.1.6
Eo cum venisset, civitatibus milites imperat certumque in locum convenire iubet.

SECTION 5.1.7
Qua re nuntiata Pirustae legatos ad eum mittunt qui doceant nihil earum rerum publico factum consilio, seseque paratos esse demonstrant omnibus rationibus de iniuriis satisfacere.

SECTION 5.1.8
Accepta oratione eorum Caesar obsides imperat eosque ad certam diem adduci iubet; nisi ita fecerint, sese bello civitatem persecuturum demonstrat.

SECTION 5.1.9
Eis ad diem adductis, ut imperaverat, arbitros inter civitates dat qui litem aestiment poenamque constituant.

CHAPTER 5.2

SECTION 5.2.1
His confectis rebus conventibusque peractis, in citeriorem Galliam revertitur atque inde ad exercitum proficiscitur.

SECTION 5.2.2
Eo cum venisset, circumitis omnibus hibernis, singulari militum studio in summa omnium rerum inopia circiter sescentas eius generis cuius supra demonstravimus naves et longas XXVIII invenit instructas neque multum abesse ab eo quin paucis diebus deduci possint.

SECTION 5.2.3
Collaudatis militibus atque eis qui negotio praefuerant, quid fieri velit ostendit atque omnes ad portum Itium convenire iubet, quo ex portu commodissimum in Britanniam traiectum esse cognoverat, circiter milium passuum XXX transmissum a continenti: huic rei quod satis esse visum est militum reliquit;

SECTION 5.2.4
ipse cum legionibus expeditis IIII et equitibus DCCC in fines Treverorum proficiscitur, quod hi neque ad concilia veniebant neque imperio parebant Germanosque Transrhenanos sollicitare dicebantur.

CHAPTER 5.3

SECTION 5.3.1
Haec civitas longe plurimum totius Galliae equitatu valet magnasque habet copias peditum Rhenumque, ut supra demonstravimus, tangit.

SECTION 5.3.2
In ea civitate duo de principatu inter se contendebant, Indutiomarus et Cingetorix;

SECTION 5.3.3
e quibus alter, simul atque de Caesaris legionumque adventu cognitum est, ad eum venit, se suosque omnes in officio futuros neque ab amicitia populi Romani defecturos confirmavit quaeque in Treveris gererentur ostendit.

SECTION 5.3.4
At Indutiomarus equitatum peditatumque cogere, eisque qui per aetatem in armis esse non poterant in silvam Arduennam abditis, quae ingenti magnitudine per medios fines Treverorum a flumine Rheno ad initium Remorum pertinet, bellum parare instituit.

SECTION 5.3.5
Sed posteaquam nonnulli principes ex ea civitate et familiaritate Cingetorigis adducti et adventu nostri exercitus perterriti ad Caesarem venerunt et de suis privatim rebus ab eo petere coeperunt, quoniam civitati consulere non possent, veritus ne ab omnibus desereretur Indutiomarus legatos ad Caesarem mittit:

SECTION 5.3.6
sese idcirco ab suis discedere atque ad eum venire noluisse, quo facilius civitatem in officio contineret, ne omnis nobilitatis discessu plebs propter imprudentiam laberetur:

SECTION 5.3.7
itaque esse civitatem in sua potestate, seseque, si Caesar permitteret, ad eum in castra venturum, suas civitatisque fortunas eius fidei permissurum.

CHAPTER 5.4

SECTION 5.4.1
Caesar, etsi intellegebat qua de causa ea dicerentur quaeque eum res ab instituto consilio deterreret, tamen, ne aestatem in Treveris consumere cogeretur omnibus ad Britannicum bellum rebus comparatis, Indutiomarum ad se cum CC obsidibus venire iussit.

SECTION 5.4.2
His adductis, in eis filio propinquisque eius omnibus, quos nominatim evocaverat, consolatus Indutiomarum hortatusque est uti in officio maneret;

SECTION 5.4.3
nihilo tamen setius principibus Treverorum ad se convocatis hos singillatim Cingetorigi conciliavit, quod cum merito eius a se fieri intellegebat, tum magni interesse arbitrabatur eius auctoritatem inter suos quam plurimum valere, cuius tam egregiam in se voluntatem perspexisset.

SECTION 5.4.4
Id tulit factum graviter Indutiomarus, suam gratiam inter suos minui, et, qui iam ante inimico in nos animo fuisset, multo gravius hoc dolore exarsit.

CHAPTER 5.5

SECTION 5.5.1
His rebus constitutis Caesar ad portum Itium cum legionibus pervenit.

SECTION 5.5.2
Ibi cognoscit LX naves, quae in Meldis factae erant, tempestate reiectas cursum tenere non potuisse atque eodem unde erant profectae revertisse; reliquas paratas ad navigandum atque omnibus rebus instructas invenit.

SECTION 5.5.3
Eodem equitatus totius Galliae convenit, numero milium quattuor, principesque ex omnibus civitatibus.

SECTION 5.5.4
Ex quibus perpaucos, quorum in se fidem perspexerat, relinquere in Gallia, reliquos obsidum loco secum ducere decreverat, quod, cum ipse abesset, motum Galliae verebatur.

CHAPTER 5.6

SECTION 5.6.1
Erat una cum ceteris Dumnorix Aeduus, de quo ante ab nobis dictum est. Hunc secum habere in primis constituerat, quod eum cupidum rerum novarum, cupidum imperi, magni animi, magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis cognoverat.

SECTION 5.6.2
Accedebat huc quod in concilio Aeduorum Dumnorix dixerat sibi a Caesare regnum civitatis deferri; quod dictum Aedui graviter ferebant, neque recusandi aut deprecandi causa legatos ad Caesarem mittere audebant.

SECTION 5.6.3
Id factum ex suis hospitibus Caesar cognoverat. Ille omnibus primo precibus petere contendit ut in Gallia relinqueretur, partim quod insuetus navigandi mare timeret, partim quod religionibus impediri sese diceret.

SECTION 5.6.4
Posteaquam id obstinate sibi negari vidit, omni spe impetrandi adempta principes Galliae sollicitare, sevocare singulos hortarique coepit uti in continenti remanerent;

SECTION 5.6.5
metu territare: non sine causa fieri, ut Gallia omni nobilitate spoliaretur; id esse consilium Caesaris, ut quos in conspectu Galliae interficere vereretur, hos omnes in Britanniam traductos necaret;

SECTION 5.6.6
fidem reliquis interponere, iusiurandum poscere, ut quod esse ex usu Galliae intellexissent communi consilio administrarent. Haec a compluribus ad Caesarem deferebantur.

CHAPTER 5.7

SECTION 5.7.1
Qua re cognita Caesar, quod tantum civitati Aeduae dignitatis tribuebat, coercendum atque deterrendum quibuscumque rebus posset Dumnorigem statuebat;

SECTION 5.7.2
quod longius eius amentiam progredi videbat, prospiciendum, ne quid sibi ac rei publicae nocere posset. Itaque dies circiter XXV in eo loco commoratus,

SECTION 5.7.3
quod Carus ventus navigationem impediebat, qui magnam partem omnis temporis in his locis flare consuevit, dabat operam ut in officio Dumnorigem contineret, nihilo tamen setius omnia eius consilia cognosceret.

SECTION 5.7.4
Tandem idoneam nactus tempestatem milites equitesque conscendere in naves iubet.

SECTION 5.7.5
At omnium impeditis animis Dumnorix cum equitibus Aeduorum a castris insciente Caesare domum discedere coepit.

SECTION 5.7.6
Qua re nuntiata Caesar intermissa profectione atque omnibus rebus postpositis magnam partem equitatus ad eum insequendum mittit retrahique imperat;

SECTION 5.7.7
si vim faciat neque pareat, interfici iubet, nihil hunc se absente pro sano facturum arbitratus, qui praesentis imperium neglexisset.

SECTION 5.7.8
Ille enim revocatus resistere ac se manu defendere suorumque fidem implorare coepit, saepe clamitans liberum se liberaeque esse civitatis.

SECTION 5.7.9
Illi, ut erat imperatum, circumsistunt hominem atque interficiunt: at equites Aedui ad Caesarem omnes revertuntur.

CHAPTER 5.8

SECTION 5.8.1
His rebus gestis, Labieno in continente cum tribus legionibus et equitum milibus duobus relicto ut portus tueretur et rem frumentariam provideret quaeque in Gallia gererentur cognosceret consiliumque pro tempore et pro re caperet,

SECTION 5.8.2
ipse cum quinque legionibus et pari numero equitum, quem in continenti reliquerat, ad solis occasum naves solvit et leni Africo provectus media circiter nocte vento intermisso cursum non tenuit, et longius delatus aestu orta luce sub sinistra Britanniam relictam conspexit.

SECTION 5.8.3
Tum rursus aestus commutationem secutus remis contendit ut eam partem insulae caperet, qua optimum esse egressum superiore aestate cognoverat.

SECTION 5.8.4
Qua in re admodum fuit militum virtus laudanda, qui vectoriis gravibusque navigiis non intermisso remigandi labore longarum navium cursum adaequarunt.

SECTION 5.8.5
Accessum est ad Britanniam omnibus navibus meridiano fere tempore, neque in eo loco hostis est visus;

SECTION 5.8.6
sed, ut postea Caesar ex captivis cognovit, cum magnae manus eo convenissent, multitudine navium perterritae, quae cum annotinis privatisque quas sui quisque commodi fecerat amplius octingentae uno erant visae tempore, a litore discesserant ac se in superiora loca abdiderant.

CHAPTER 5.9

SECTION 5.9.1
Caesar exposito exercitu et loco castris idoneo capto, ubi ex captivis cognovit quo in loco hostium copiae consedissent, cohortibus decem ad mare relictis et equitibus trecentis, qui praesidio navibus essent, de tertia vigilia ad hostes contendit, eo minus veritus navibus, quod in litore molli atque aperto deligatas ad ancoram relinquebat,

SECTION 5.9.2
et praesidio navibus Q. Atrium praefecit. Ipse noctu progressus milia passuum circiter XII hostium copias conspicatus est.

SECTION 5.9.3
Illi equitatu atque essedis ad flumen progressi ex loco superiore nostros prohibere et proelium committere coeperunt.

SECTION 5.9.4
Repulsi ab equitatu se in silvas abdiderunt, locum nacti egregie et natura et opere munitum, quem domestici belli, ut videbantur, causa iam ante praeparaverant;

SECTION 5.9.5
nam crebris arboribus succisis omnes introitus erant praeclusi.

SECTION 5.9.6
Ipsi ex silvis rari propugnabant nostrosque intra munitiones ingredi prohibebant.

SECTION 5.9.7
At milites legionis septimae, testudine facta et aggere ad munitiones adiecto, locum ceperunt eosque ex silvis expulerunt paucis vulneribus acceptis.

SECTION 5.9.8
Sed eos fugientes longius Caesar prosequi vetuit, et quod loci naturam ignorabat, et quod magna parte diei consumpta munitioni castrorum tempus relinqui volebat.

CHAPTER 5.10

SECTION 5.10.1
Postridie eius diei mane tripertito milites equitesque in expeditionem misit, ut eos qui fugerant persequerentur.

SECTION 5.10.2
His aliquantum itineris progressis, cum iam extremi essent in prospectu, equites a Quinto Atrio ad Caesarem venerunt, qui nuntiarent superiore nocte maxima coorta tempestate prope omnes naves adflictas atque in litore eiectas esse, quod neque ancorae funesque subsisterent, neque nautae gubernatoresque vim tempestatis pati possent;

SECTION 5.10.3
itaque ex eo concursu navium magnum esse incommodum acceptum.

CHAPTER 5.11

SECTION 5.11.1
His rebus cognitis Caesar legiones equitatumque revocari atque in itinere resistere iubet, ipse ad naves revertitur;

SECTION 5.11.2
eadem fere quae ex nuntiis litterisque cognoverat coram perspicit, sic ut amissis circiter XL navibus reliquae tamen refici posse magno negotio viderentur.

SECTION 5.11.3
Itaque ex legionibus fabros deligit et ex continenti alios arcessi iubet;

SECTION 5.11.4
Labieno scribit, ut quam plurimas posset eis legionibus, quae sunt apud eum, naves instituat.

SECTION 5.11.5
Ipse, etsi res erat multae operae ac laboris, tamen commodissimum esse statuit omnes naves subduci et cum castris una munitione coniungi.

SECTION 5.11.6
In his rebus circiter dies X consumit ne nocturnis quidem temporibus ad laborem militum intermissis.

SECTION 5.11.7
Subductis navibus castrisque egregie munitis easdem copias, quas ante, praesidio navibus reliquit: ipse eodem unde redierat proficiscitur.

SECTION 5.11.8
Eo cum venisset, maiores iam undique in eum locum copiae Britannorum convenerant summa imperi bellique administrandi communi consilio permissa Cassivellauno, cuius fines a maritimis civitatibus flumen dividit, quod appellatur Tamesis, a mari circiter milia passuum LXXX.

SECTION 5.11.9
Huic superiore tempore cum reliquis civitatibus continentia bella intercesserant; sed nostro adventu permoti Britanni hunc toti bello imperioque praefecerant.

CHAPTER 5.12

SECTION 5.12.1
Britanniae pars interior ab eis incolitur quos natos in insula ipsi memoria proditum dicunt,

SECTION 5.12.2
maritima pars ab eis, qui praedae ac belli inferendi causa ex Belgio transierunt (qui omnes fere eis nominibus civitatum appellantur, quibus orti ex civitatibus eo pervenerunt) et bello illato ibi permanserunt atque agros colere coeperunt.

SECTION 5.12.3
Hominum est infinita multitudo creberrimaque aedificia fere Gallicis consimilia, pecorum magnus numerus.

SECTION 5.12.4
Vtuntur aut aere aut nummo aureo aut taleis ferreis ad certum pondus examinatis pro nummo.

SECTION 5.12.5
Nascitur ibi plumbum album in mediterraneis regionibus, in maritimis ferrum, sed eius exigua est copia; aere utuntur importato. Materia cuiusque generis ut in Gallia est, praeter fagum atque abietem.

SECTION 5.12.6
Leporem et gallinam et anserem gustare fas non putant; haec tamen alunt animi voluptatisque causa. Loca sunt temperatiora quam in Gallia, remissioribus frigoribus.

CHAPTER 5.13

SECTION 5.13.1
Insula natura triquetra, cuius unum latus est contra Galliam. Huius lateris alter angulus, qui est ad Cantium, quo fere omnes ex Gallia naves appelluntur, ad orientem solem, inferior ad meridiem spectat. Hoc pertinet circiter millia passuum quingenta.

SECTION 5.13.2
Alterum vergit ad Hispaniam atque occidentem solem; qua ex parte est Hibernia, dimidio minor, ut aestimatur, quam Britannia, sed pari spatio transmissus atque ex Gallia est in Britanniam.

SECTION 5.13.3
In hoc medio cursu est insula, quae appellatur Mona: complures praeterea minores subiectae insulae existimantur, de quibus insulis nonnulli scripserunt dies continuos triginta sub bruma esse noctem.

SECTION 5.13.4
Nos nihil de eo percontationibus reperiebamus, nisi certis ex aqua mensuris breviores esse quam in continenti noctes videbamus.

SECTION 5.13.5
Huius est longitudo lateris, ut fert illorum opinio, septingentorum milium.

SECTION 5.13.6
Tertium est contra septentriones; cui parti nulla est obiecta terra, sed eius angulus lateris maxime ad Germaniam spectat. Hoc milia passuum octingenta in longitudinem esse existimatur.

SECTION 5.13.7
Ita omnis insula est in circuitu vicies centum milium passuum.

CHAPTER 5.14

SECTION 5.14.1
Ex his omnibus longe sunt humanissimi qui Cantium incolunt, quae regio est maritima omnis, neque multum a Gallica differunt consuetudine.

SECTION 5.14.2
Interiores plerique frumenta non serunt, sed lacte et carne vivunt pellibusque sunt vestiti. Omnes vero se Britanni vitro inficiunt, quod caeruleum efficit colorem, atque hoc horridiores sunt in pugna aspectu;

SECTION 5.14.3
capilloque sunt promisso atque omni parte corporis rasa praeter caput et labrum superius.

SECTION 5.14.4
Vxores habent deni duodenique inter se communes et maxime fratres cum fratribus parentesque cum liberis; sed qui sunt ex his nati, eorum habentur liberi, quo primum virgo quaeque deducta est.

CHAPTER 5.15

SECTION 5.15.1
Equites hostium essedariique acriter proelio cum equitatu nostro in itinere conflixerunt, tamen ut nostri omnibus partibus superiores fuerint atque eos in silvas collesque compulerint.

SECTION 5.15.2
Sed compluribus interfectis cupidius insecuti nonnullos ex suis amiserunt.

SECTION 5.15.3
At illi intermisso spatio imprudentibus nostris atque occupatis in munitione castrorum subito se ex silvis eiecerunt, impetuque in eos facto qui erant in statione pro castris collocati,

SECTION 5.15.4
acriter pugnaverunt, duabusque missis subsidio cohortibus a Caesare atque eis primis legionum duarum, cum hae perexiguo intermisso loci spatio inter se constitissent, novo genere pugnae perterritis nostris per medios audacissime perruperunt seque inde incolumes receperunt.

SECTION 5.15.5
Eo die Quintus Laberius Durus, tribunus militum, interficitur. Illi pluribus submissis cohortibus repelluntur.

CHAPTER 5.16

SECTION 5.16.1
Toto hoc in genere pugnae, cum sub oculis omnium ac pro castris dimicaretur, intellectum est nostros propter gravitatem armorum, quod neque insequi cedentes possent neque ab signis discedere auderent, minus aptos esse ad huius generis hostem,

SECTION 5.16.2
equites autem magno cum periculo proelio dimicare, propterea quod illi etiam consulto plerumque cederent et, cum paulum ab legionibus nostros removissent, ex essedis desilirent et pedibus dispari proelio contenderent.

SECTION 5.16.3
Equestris autem proeli ratio et cedentibus et insequentibus par atque idem periculum inferebat.

SECTION 5.16.4
Accedebat huc ut numquam conferti sed rari magnisque intervallis proeliarentur stationesque dispositas haberent, atque alios alii deinceps exciperent, integrique et recentes defetigatis succederent.

CHAPTER 5.17

SECTION 5.17.1
Postero die procul a castris hostes in collibus constiterunt rarique se ostendere et lenius quam pridie nostros equites proelio lacessere coeperunt.

SECTION 5.17.2
Sed meridie, cum Caesar pabulandi causa tres legiones atque omnem equitatum cum Gaio Trebonio legato misisset, repente ex omnibus partibus ad pabulatores advolaverunt, sic uti ab signis legionibusque non absisterent.

SECTION 5.17.3
Nostri acriter in eos impetu facto reppulerunt neque finem sequendi fecerunt, quoad subsidio confisi equites, cum post se legiones viderent,

SECTION 5.17.4
praecipites hostes egerunt magnoque eorum numero interfecto neque sui colligendi neque consistendi aut ex essedis desiliendi facultatem dederunt.

SECTION 5.17.5
Ex hac fuga protinus, quae undique convenerant, auxilia discesserunt, neque post id tempus umquam summis nobiscum copiis hostes contenderunt.

CHAPTER 5.18

SECTION 5.18.1
Caesar cognito consilio eorum ad flumen Tamesim in fines Cassivellauni exercitum duxit; quod flumen uno omnino loco pedibus, atque hoc aegre, transiri potest.

SECTION 5.18.2
Eo cum venisset, animum advertit ad alteram fluminis ripam magnas esse copias hostium instructas;

SECTION 5.18.3
ripa autem erat acutis sudibus praefixis munita, eiusdemque generis sub aqua defixae sudes flumine tegebantur.

SECTION 5.18.4
His rebus cognitis a captivis perfugisque Caesar praemisso equitatu confestim legiones subsequi iussit.

SECTION 5.18.5
Sed ea celeritate atque eo impetu milites ierunt, cum capite solo ex aqua exstarent, ut hostes impetum legionum atque equitum sustinere non possent ripasque dimitterent ac se fugae mandarent.

CHAPTER 5.19

SECTION 5.19.1
Cassivellaunus, ut supra demonstravimus, omni deposita spe contentionis dimissis amplioribus copiis milibus circiter quattuor essedariorum relictis itinera nostra servabat paulumque ex via excedebat locisque impeditis ac silvestribus sese occultabat, atque eis regionibus quibus nos iter facturos cognoverat pecora atque homines ex agris in silvas compellebat et,

SECTION 5.19.2
cum equitatus noster liberius praedandi vastandique causa se in agros eiecerat, omnibus viis semitisque essedarios ex silvis emittebat et magno cum periculo nostrorum equitum cum eis confligebat atque hoc metu latius vagari prohibebat.

SECTION 5.19.3
Relinquebatur ut neque longius ab agmine legionum discedi Caesar pateretur, et tantum in agris vastandis incendiisque faciendis hostibus noceretur, quantum labore atque itinere legionarii milites efficere poterant.

CHAPTER 5.20

SECTION 5.20.1
Interim Trinobantes, prope firmissima earum regionum civitas, ex qua Mandubracius adulescens Caesaris fidem secutus ad eum in continentem Galliam venerat, cuius pater in ea civitate regnum obtinuerat interfectusque erat a Cassivellauno, ipse fuga mortem vitaverat, legatos ad Caesarem mittunt pollicenturque sese ei dedituros atque imperata facturos;

SECTION 5.20.2
petunt ut Mandubracium ab iniuria Cassivellauni defendat atque in civitatem mittat, qui praesit imperiumque obtineat.

SECTION 5.20.3
His Caesar imperat obsides quadraginta frumentumque exercitui Mandubraciumque ad eos mittit.

SECTION 5.20.4
Illi imperata celeriter fecerunt, obsides ad numerum frumentumque miserunt.

CHAPTER 5.21

SECTION 5.21.1
Trinobantibus defensis atque ab omni militum iniuria prohibitis Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, Cassi legationibus missis sese Caesari dedunt.

SECTION 5.21.2
Ab his cognoscit non longe ex eo loco oppidum Cassivellauni abesse silvis paludibusque munitum, quo satis magnus hominum pecorisque numerus convenerit.

SECTION 5.21.3
Oppidum autem Britanni vocant, cum silvas impeditas vallo atque fossa munierunt, quo incursionis hostium vitandae causa convenire consuerunt.

SECTION 5.21.4
Eo proficiscitur cum legionibus: locum reperit egregie natura atque opere munitum; tamen hunc duabus ex partibus oppugnare contendit.

SECTION 5.21.5
Hostes paulisper morati militum nostrorum impetum non tulerunt seseque alia ex parte oppidi eiecerunt.

SECTION 5.21.6
Magnus ibi numerus pecoris repertus, multique in fuga sunt comprehensi atque interfecti.

CHAPTER 5.22

SECTION 5.22.1
Dum haec in his locis geruntur, Cassivellaunus ad Cantium, quod esse ad mare supra demonstravimus, quibus regionibus quattuor reges praeerant, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, Segovax, nuntios mittit atque eis imperat uti coactis omnibus copiis castra navalia de improviso adoriantur atque oppugnent.

SECTION 5.22.2
Ei cum ad castra venissent, nostri eruptione facta multis eorum interfectis, capto etiam nobili duce Lugotorige suos incolumes reduxerunt.

SECTION 5.22.3
Cassivellaunus hoc proelio nuntiato tot detrimentis acceptis, vastatis finibus, maxime etiam permotus defectione civitatum legatos per Atrebatem Commium de deditione ad Caesarem mittit.

SECTION 5.22.4
Caesar, cum constituisset hiemare in continenti propter repentinos Galliae motus, neque multum aestatis superesset, atque id facile extrahi posse intellegeret, obsides imperat et quid in annos singulos vectigalis populo Romano Britannia penderet constituit;

SECTION 5.22.5
interdicit atque imperat Cassivellauno, ne Mandubracio neu Trinobantibus noceat.

CHAPTER 5.23

SECTION 5.23.1
Obsidibus acceptis exercitum reducit ad mare, naves invenit refectas.

SECTION 5.23.2
His deductis, quod et captivorum magnum numerum habebat, et nonnullae tempestate deperierant naves, duobus commeatibus exercitum reportare instituit.

SECTION 5.23.3
Ac sic accidit, uti ex tanto navium numero tot navigationibus neque hoc neque superiore anno ulla omnino navis,

SECTION 5.23.4
quae milites portaret, desideraretur; at ex eis, quae inanes ex continenti ad eum remitterentur et prioris commeatus expositis militibus et quas postea Labienus faciendas curaverat numero LX, perpaucae locum caperent, reliquae fere omnes reicerentur.

SECTION 5.23.5
Quas cum aliquamdiu Caesar frustra exspectasset, ne anni tempore a navigatione excluderetur,

SECTION 5.23.6
quod aequinoctium suberat, necessario angustius milites collocavit ac summa tranquillitate consecuta, secunda inita cum solvisset vigilia, prima luce terram attigit omnesque incolumes naves perduxit.

CHAPTER 5.24

SECTION 5.24.1
Subductis navibus concilioque Gallorum Samarobrivae peracto, quod eo anno frumentum in Gallia propter siccitates angustius provenerat, coactus est aliter ac superioribus annis exercitum in hibernis collocare legionesque in plures civitates distribuere;

SECTION 5.24.2
ex quibus unam in Morinos ducendam Gaio Fabio legato dedit, alteram in Nervios Quinto Ciceroni, tertiam in Esubios Lucio Roscio; quartam in Remis cum Tito Labieno in confinio Treverorum hiemare iussit. Tres in Belgis collocavit:

SECTION 5.24.3
eis Marcum Crassum quaestorem et Lucium Munatium Plancum et Gaium Trebonium legatos praefecit.

SECTION 5.24.4
Vnam legionem, quam proxime trans Padum conscripserat, et cohortes V in Eburones, quorum pars maxima est inter Mosam ac Rhenum, qui sub imperio Ambiorigis et Catuvolci erant, misit.

SECTION 5.24.5
Eis militibus Quintum Titurium Sabinum et Lucium Aurunculeium Cottam legatos praeesse iussit.

SECTION 5.24.6
Ad hunc modum distributis legionibus facillime inopiae frumentariae sese mederi posse existimavit.

SECTION 5.24.7
Atque harum tamen omnium legionum hiberna praeter eam, quam Lucio Roscio in pacatissimam et quietissimam partem ducendam dederat, milibus passuum centum continebantur.

SECTION 5.24.8
Ipse interea, quoad legiones collocatas munitaque hiberna cognovisset, in Gallia morari constituit.

CHAPTER 5.25

SECTION 5.25.1
Erat in Carnutibus summo loco natus Tasgetius, cuius maiores in sua civitate regnum obtinuerant.

SECTION 5.25.2
Huic Caesar pro eius virtute atque in se benevolentia, quod in omnibus bellis singulari eius opera fuerat usus, maiorum locum restituerat.

SECTION 5.25.3
Tertium iam hunc annum regnantem inimici, multis palam ex civitate eius auctoribus, eum interfecerunt.

SECTION 5.25.4
Defertur ea res ad Caesarem. Ille veritus, quod ad plures pertinebat, ne civitas eorum impulsu deficeret, Lucium Plancum cum legione ex Belgio celeriter in Carnutes proficisci iubet ibique hiemare quorumque opera cognoverat Tasgetium interfectum, hos comprehensos ad se mittere.

SECTION 5.25.5
Interim ab omnibus legatis quaestoreque, quibus legiones tradiderat, certior factus est in hiberna perventum locumque hibernis esse munitum.

CHAPTER 5.26

SECTION 5.26.1
Diebus circiter XV, quibus in hiberna ventum est, initium repentini tumultus ac defectionis ortum est ab Ambiorige et Catuvolco;

SECTION 5.26.2
qui, cum ad fines regni sui Sabino Cottaeque praesto fuissent frumentumque in hiberna comportavissent, Indutiomari Treveri nuntiis impulsi suos concitaverunt subitoque oppressis lignatoribus magna manu ad castra oppugnatum venerunt.

SECTION 5.26.3
Cum celeriter nostri arma cepissent vallumque adscendissent atque una ex parte Hispanis equitibus emissis equestri proelio superiores fuissent, desperata re hostes suos ab oppugnatione reduxerunt.

SECTION 5.26.4
Tum suo more conclamaverunt, uti aliqui ex nostris ad colloquium prodiret: habere sese, quae de re communi dicere vellent, quibus rebus controversias minui posse sperarent.

CHAPTER 5.27

SECTION 5.27.1
Mittitur ad eos colloquendi causa Gaius Arpineius, eques Romanus, familiaris Quinti Tituri, et Quintus Iunius ex Hispania quidam, qui iam ante missu Caesaris ad Ambiorigem ventitare consuerat; apud quos Ambiorix ad hunc modum locutus est:

SECTION 5.27.2
sese pro Caesaris in se beneficiis plurimum ei confiteri debere, quod eius opera stipendio liberatus esset, quod Aduatucis, finitimis suis, pendere consuesset, quodque ei et filius et fratris filius ab Caesare remissi essent, quos Aduatuci obsidum numero missos apud se in servitute et catenis tenuissent;

SECTION 5.27.3
neque id, quod fecerit de oppugnatione castrorum, aut iudicio aut voluntate sua fecisse, sed coactu civitatis, suaque esse eiusmodi imperia, ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem.

SECTION 5.27.4
Civitati porro hanc fuisse belli causam, quod repentinae Gallorum coniurationi resistere non potuerit. Id se facile ex humilitate sua probare posse, quod non adeo sit imperitus rerum ut suis copiis populum Romanum superari posse confidat.

SECTION 5.27.5
Sed esse Galliae commune consilium: omnibus hibernis Caesaris oppugnandis hunc esse dictum diem, ne qua legio alterae legioni subsidio venire posset;

SECTION 5.27.6
non facile Gallos Gallis negare potuisse, praesertim cum de recuperanda communi libertate consilium initum videretur.

SECTION 5.27.7
Quibus quoniam pro pietate satisfecerit, habere nunc se rationem offici pro beneficiis Caesaris: monere, orare Titurium pro hospitio, ut suae ac militum saluti consulat.

SECTION 5.27.8
Magnam manum Germanorum conductam Rhenum transisse; hanc adfore biduo.

SECTION 5.27.9
Ipsorum esse consilium, velintne priusquam finitimi sentiant eductos ex hibernis milites aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum circiter quinquaginta, alter paulo amplius ab eis absit.

SECTION 5.27.10
Illud se polliceri et iureiurando confirmare tutum iter per fines daturum;

SECTION 5.27.11
quod cum faciat, et civitati sese consulere, quod hibernis levetur, et Caesari pro eius meritis gratiam referre. Hac oratione habita discedit Ambiorix.

CHAPTER 5.28

SECTION 5.28.1
Arpineius et Iunius, quae audierunt, ad legatos deferunt. Illi repentina re perturbati, etsi ab hoste ea dicebantur, tamen non neglegenda existimabant maximeque hac re permovebantur, quod civitatem ignobilem atque humilem Eburonum sua sponte populo Romano bellum facere ausam vix erat credendum.

SECTION 5.28.2
Itaque ad consilium rem deferunt magnaque inter eos exsistit controversia.

SECTION 5.28.3
Lucius Aurunculeius compluresque tribuni militum et primorum ordinum centuriones nihil temere agendum neque ex hibernis iniussu Caesaris discedendum existimabant: quantasvis [magnas] copias etiam Germanorum sustineri posse munitis hibernis docebant: rem esse testimonio, quod primum hostium impetum multis ultro vulneribus illatis fortissime sustinuerint: re frumentaria non premi; interea et ex proximis hibernis et a Caesare conventura subsidia: postremo quid esse levius aut turpius, quam auctore hoste de summis rebus capere consilium?

CHAPTER 5.29

SECTION 5.29.1
Contra ea Titurius sero facturos clamitabat, cum maiores manus hostium adiunctis Germanis convenissent, aut cum aliquid calamitatis in proximis hibernis esset acceptum. Brevem consulendi esse occasionem. Caesarem arbitrari profectum in Italiam;

SECTION 5.29.2
neque aliter Carnutes interficiendi Tasgeti consilium fuisse capturos, neque Eburones, si ille adesset, tanta contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse.

SECTION 5.29.3
Non hostem auctorem, sed rem spectare: subesse Rhenum; magno esse Germanis dolori Ariovisti mortem et superiores nostras victorias;

SECTION 5.29.4
ardere Galliam tot contumeliis acceptis sub populi Romani imperium redactam superiore gloria rei militaris exstincta.

SECTION 5.29.5
Postremo quis hoc sibi persuaderet, sine certa re Ambiorigem ad eiusmodi consilium descendisse?

SECTION 5.29.6
Suam sententiam in utramque partem esse tutam: si nihil esset durius, nullo cum periculo ad proximam legionem perventuros; si Gallia omnis cum Germanis consentiret, unam esse in celeritate positam salutem.

SECTION 5.29.7
Cottae quidem atque eorum, qui dissentirent, consilium quem habere exitum? In quo si non praesens periculum, at certe longinqua obsidione fames esset timenda.

CHAPTER 5.30

SECTION 5.30.1
Hac in utramque partem disputatione habita, cum a Cotta primisque ordinibus acriter resisteretur, "Vincite," inquit, "si ita vultis," Sabinus, et id clariore voce, ut magna pars militum exaudiret;

SECTION 5.30.2
"neque is sum," inquit, "qui gravissime ex vobis mortis periculo terrear: hi sapient; si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent,

SECTION 5.30.3
qui, si per te liceat, perendino die cum proximis hibernis coniuncti communem cum reliquis belli casum sustineant, non reiecti et relegati longe ab ceteris aut ferro aut fame intereant."

CHAPTER 5.31

SECTION 5.31.1
Consurgitur ex consilio; comprehendunt utrumque et orant, ne sua dissensione et pertinacia rem in summum periculum deducant:

SECTION 5.31.2
facilem esse rem, seu maneant, seu proficiscantur, si modo unum omnes sentiant ac probent; contra in dissensione nullam se salutem perspicere. Res disputatione ad mediam noctem perducitur.

SECTION 5.31.3
Tandem dat Cotta permotus manus: superat sententia Sabini. Pronuntiatur prima luce ituros.

SECTION 5.31.4
Consumitur vigiliis reliqua pars noctis, cum sua quisque miles circumspiceret, quid secum portare posset, quid ex instrumento hibernorum relinquere cogeretur.

SECTION 5.31.5
Omnia excogitantur, quare nec sine periculo maneatur, et languore militum et vigiliis periculum augeatur.

SECTION 5.31.6
Prima luce sic ex castris proficiscuntur, ut quibus esset persuasum non ab hoste, sed ab homine amicissimo Ambiorige consilium datum, longissimo agmine maximisque impedimentis.

CHAPTER 5.32

SECTION 5.32.1
At hostes, posteaquam ex nocturno fremitu vigiliisque de profectione eorum senserunt, collocatis insidiis bipertito in silvis opportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum circiter duobus Romanorum adventum exspectabant,

SECTION 5.32.2
et cum se maior pars agminis in magnam convallem demisisset, ex utraque parte eius vallis subito se ostenderunt novissimosque premere et primos prohibere ascensu atque iniquissimo nostris loco proelium committere coeperunt.

CHAPTER 5.33

SECTION 5.33.1
Tum demum Titurius, qui nihil ante providisset, trepidare et concursare cohortesque disponere, haec tamen ipsa timide atque ut eum omnia deficere viderentur; quod plerumque eis accidere consuevit, qui in ipso negotio consilium capere coguntur.

SECTION 5.33.2
At Cotta, qui cogitasset haec posse in itinere accidere atque ob eam causam profectionis auctor non fuisset, nulla in re communi saluti deerat et in appellandis cohortandisque militibus imperatoris et in pugna militis officia praestabat.

SECTION 5.33.3
Cum propter longitudinem agminis minus facile omnia per se obire et, quid quoque loco faciendum esset, providere possent, iusserunt pronuntiare, ut impedimenta relinquerent atque in orbem consisterent.

SECTION 5.33.4
Quod consilium etsi in eiusmodi casu reprehendendum non est, tamen incommode accidit:

SECTION 5.33.5
nam et nostris militibus spem minuit et hostes ad pugnam alacriores effecit, quod non sine summo timore et desperatione id factum videbatur. Praeterea accidit, quod fieri necesse erat, ut vulgo milites ab signis discederent, quae quisque eorum carissima haberet, ab impedimentis petere atque arripere properaret, clamore et fletu omnia complerentur.

CHAPTER 5.34

SECTION 5.34.1
At barbaris consilium non defuit. Nam duces eorum tota acie pronuntiare iusserunt, ne quis ab loco discederet: illorum esse praedam atque illis reservari quaecumque Romani reliquissent: proinde omnia in victoria posita existimarent.

SECTION 5.34.2
Erant et virtute et studio pugnandi pares; nostri, tametsi ab duce et a fortuna deserebantur, tamen omnem spem salutis in virtute ponebant, et quotiens quaeque cohors procurrerat, ab ea parte magnus numerus hostium cadebat.

SECTION 5.34.3
Qua re animadversa Ambiorix pronuntiari iubet, ut procul tela coniciant neu propius accedant et, quam in partem Romani impetum fecerint, cedant (levitate armorum et cotidiana exercitatione nihil eis noceri posse),

SECTION 5.34.4
rursus se ad signa recipientes insequantur.

CHAPTER 5.35

SECTION 5.35.1
Quo praecepto ab eis diligentissime observato, cum quaepiam cohors ex orbe excesserat atque impetum fecerat, hostes velocissime refugiebant.

SECTION 5.35.2
Interim eam partem nudari necesse erat et ab latere aperto tela recipi.

SECTION 5.35.3
Rursus cum in eum locum unde erant egressi reverti coeperant, et ab eis qui cesserant et ab eis qui proximi steterant circumveniebantur;

SECTION 5.35.4
sin autem locum tenere vellent, nec virtuti locus relinquebatur, neque ab tanta multitudine coniecta tela conferti vitare poterant.

SECTION 5.35.5
Tamen tot incommodis conflictati, multis vulneribus acceptis resistebant et magna parte diei consumpta, cum a prima luce ad horam octavam pugnaretur, nihil quod ipsis esset indignum committebant.

SECTION 5.35.6
Tum Tito Balventio, qui superiore anno primum pilum duxerat, viro forti et magnae auctoritatis, utrumque femur tragula traicitur;

SECTION 5.35.7
Quintus Lucanius, eiusdem ordinis, fortissime pugnans, dum circumvento filio subvenit, interficitur;

SECTION 5.35.8
Lucius Cotta legatus omnes cohortes ordinesque adhortans in adversum os funda vulneratur.

CHAPTER 5.36

SECTION 5.36.1
His rebus permotus Quintus Titurius, cum procul Ambiorigem suos cohortantem conspexisset, interpretem suum Gnaeum Pompeium ad eum mittit rogatum ut sibi militibusque parcat.

SECTION 5.36.2
Ille appellatus respondit: si velit secum colloqui, licere; sperare a multitudine impetrari posse, quod ad militum salutem pertineat; ipsi vero nihil nocitum iri, inque eam rem se suam fidem interponere. Ille cum Cotta saucio communicat,

SECTION 5.36.3
si videatur, pugna ut excedant et cum Ambiorige una colloquantur: sperare ab eo de sua ac militum salute impetrari posse. Cotta se ad armatum hostem iturum negat atque in eo perseverat.

CHAPTER 5.37

SECTION 5.37.1
Sabinus quos in praesentia tribunos militum circum se habebat et primorum ordinum centuriones se sequi iubet et, cum propius Ambiorigem accessisset, iussus arma abicere imperatum facit suisque ut idem faciant imperat.

SECTION 5.37.2
Interim, dum de condicionibus inter se agunt longiorque consulto ab Ambiorige instituitur sermo, paulatim circumventus interficitur.

SECTION 5.37.3
Tum vero suo more victoriam conclamant atque ululatum tollunt impetuque in nostros facto ordines perturbant.

SECTION 5.37.4
Ibi Lucius Cotta pugnans interficitur cum maxima parte militum. Reliqui se in castra recipiunt unde erant egressi;

SECTION 5.37.5
ex quibus Lucius Petrosidius aquilifer, cum magna multitudine hostium premeretur, aquilam intra vallum proiecit; ipse pro castris fortissime pugnans occiditur. Illi aegre ad noctem oppugnationem sustinent;

SECTION 5.37.6
noctu ad unum omnes desperata salute se ipsi interficiunt.

SECTION 5.37.7
Pauci ex proelio lapsi incertis itineribus per silvas ad Titum Labienum legatum in hiberna perveniunt atque eum de rebus gestis certiorem faciunt.

CHAPTER 5.38

SECTION 5.38.1
Hac victoria sublatus Ambiorix statim cum equitatu in Aduatucos, qui erant eius regno finitimi, proficiscitur; neque noctem neque diem intermittit peditatumque se subsequi iubet.

SECTION 5.38.2
Re demonstrata Aduatucisque concitatis postero die in Nervios pervenit hortaturque, ne sui in perpetuum liberandi atque ulciscendi Romanos pro eis quas acceperint iniuriis occasionem dimittant:

SECTION 5.38.3
interfectos esse legatos duos magnamque partem exercitus interisse demonstrat;

SECTION 5.38.4
nihil esse negoti subito oppressam legionem quae cum Cicerone hiemet interfici; se ad eam rem profitetur adiutorem. Facile hac oratione Nerviis persuadet.

CHAPTER 5.39

SECTION 5.39.1
Itaque confestim dimissis nuntiis ad Ceutrones, Grudios, Levacos, Pleumoxios, Geidumnos, qui omnes sub eorum imperio sunt, quam maximas manus possunt cogunt et de improviso ad Ciceronis hiberna advolant nondum ad eum fama de Tituri morte perlata.

SECTION 5.39.2
Huic quoque accidit, quod fuit necesse, ut nonnulli milites, qui lignationis munitionisque causa in silvas discessissent, repentino equitum adventu interciperentur.

SECTION 5.39.3
His circumventis magna manu Eburones, Nervii, Aduatuci atque horum omnium socii et clientes legionem oppugnare incipiunt. Nostri celeriter ad arma concurrunt, vallum conscendunt.

SECTION 5.39.4
Aegre is dies sustentatur, quod omnem spem hostes in celeritate ponebant atque hanc adepti victoriam in perpetuum se fore victores confidebant.

CHAPTER 5.40

SECTION 5.40.1
Mittuntur ad Caesarem confestim ab Cicerone litterae magnis propositis praemiis, si pertulissent: obsessis omnibus viis missi intercipiuntur.

SECTION 5.40.2
Noctu ex materia, quam munitionis causa comportaverant, turres admodum CXX excitantur incredibili celeritate; quae deesse operi videbantur, perficiuntur.

SECTION 5.40.3
Hostes postero die multo maioribus coactis copiis castra oppugnant, fossam complent. Eadem ratione, qua pridie, ab nostris resistitur:

SECTION 5.40.4
hoc idem reliquis deinceps fit diebus.

SECTION 5.40.5
Nulla pars nocturni temporis ad laborem intermittitur; non aegris, non vulneratis facultas quietis datur.

SECTION 5.40.6
Quaecumque ad proximi diei oppugnationem opus sunt noctu comparantur; multae praeustae sudes, magnus muralium pilorum numerus instituitur; turres contabulantur, pinnae loricaeque ex cratibus attexuntur.

SECTION 5.40.7
Ipse Cicero, cum tenuissima valetudine esset, ne nocturnum quidem sibi tempus ad quietem relinquebat, ut ultro militum concursu ac vocibus sibi parcere cogeretur.

CHAPTER 5.41

SECTION 5.41.1
Tunc duces principesque Nerviorum qui aliquem sermonis aditum causamque amicitiae cum Cicerone habebant colloqui sese velle dicunt.

SECTION 5.41.2
Facta potestate eadem quae Ambiorix cum Titurio egerat commemorant: omnem esse in armis Galliam;

SECTION 5.41.3
Germanos Rhenum transisse; Caesaris reliquorumque hiberna oppugnari.

SECTION 5.41.4
Addunt etiam de Sabini morte: Ambiorigem ostentant fidei faciendae causa.

SECTION 5.41.5
Errare eos dicunt, si quidquam ab his praesidi sperent, qui suis rebus diffidant; sese tamen hoc esse in Ciceronem populumque Romanum animo, ut nihil nisi hiberna recusent atque hanc inveterascere consuetudinem nolint:

SECTION 5.41.6
licere illis incolumibus per se ex hibernis discedere et quascumque in partes velint sine metu proficisci.

SECTION 5.41.7
Cicero ad haec unum modo respondit: non esse consuetudinem populi Romani accipere ab hoste armato condicionem:

SECTION 5.41.8
si ab armis discedere velint, se adiutore utantur legatosque ad Caesarem mittant; sperare pro eius iustitia, quae petierint, impetraturos.

CHAPTER 5.42

SECTION 5.42.1
Ab hac spe repulsi Nervii vallo pedum IX et fossa pedum XV hiberna cingunt.

SECTION 5.42.2
Haec et superiorum annorum consuetudine ab nobis cognoverant et, quosdam de exercitu habebant captivos, ab eis docebantur;

SECTION 5.42.3
sed nulla ferramentorum copia quae esset ad hunc usum idonea, gladiis caespites circumcidere, manibus sagulisque terram exhaurire nitebantur.

SECTION 5.42.4
Qua quidem ex re hominum multitudo cognosci potuit: nam minus horis tribus milium pedum XV in circuitu munitionem perfecerunt

SECTION 5.42.5
reliquisque diebus turres ad altitudinem valli, falces testudinesque, quas idem captivi docuerant, parare ac facere coeperunt.

CHAPTER 5.43

SECTION 5.43.1
Septimo oppugnationis die maximo coorto vento ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes fundis et fervefacta iacula in casas, quae more Gallico stramentis erant tectae, iacere coeperunt.

SECTION 5.43.2
Hae celeriter ignem comprehenderunt et venti magnitudine in omnem locum castrorum distulerunt.

SECTION 5.43.3
Hostes maximo clamore sicuti parta iam atque explorata victoria turres testudinesque agere et scalis vallum ascendere coeperunt.

SECTION 5.43.4
At tanta militum virtus atque ea praesentia animi fuit, ut, cum undique flamma torrerentur maximaque telorum multitudine premerentur suaque omnia impedimenta atque omnes fortunas conflagrare intellegerent, non modo demigrandi causa de vallo decederet nemo, sed paene ne respiceret quidem quisquam, ac tum omnes acerrime fortissimeque pugnarent.

SECTION 5.43.5
Hic dies nostris longe gravissimus fuit; sed tamen hunc habuit eventum, ut eo die maximus numerus hostium vulneraretur atque interficeretur, ut se sub ipso vallo constipaverant recessumque primis ultimi non dabant.

SECTION 5.43.6
Paulum quidem intermissa flamma et quodam loco turri adacta et contingente vallum tertiae cohortis centuriones ex eo, quo stabant, loco recesserunt suosque omnes removerunt, nutu vocibusque hostes, si introire vellent, vocare coeperunt; quorum progredi ausus est nemo.

SECTION 5.43.7
Tum ex omni parte lapidibus coniectis deturbati, turrisque succensa est.

CHAPTER 5.44

SECTION 5.44.1
Erant in ea legione fortissimi viri, centuriones, qui primis ordinibus appropinquarent, Titus Pullo et Lucius Vorenus.

SECTION 5.44.2
Hi perpetuas inter se controversias habebant, quinam anteferretur, omnibusque annis de locis summis simultatibus contendebant.

SECTION 5.44.3
Ex his Pullo, cum acerrime ad munitiones pugnaretur, "Quid dubitas," inquit, "Vorene? aut quem locum tuae probandae virtutis exspectas?

SECTION 5.44.4
Hic dies de nostris controversiis iudicabit." Haec cum dixisset, procedit extra munitiones quaque pars hostium confertissima est visa irrumpit.

SECTION 5.44.5
Ne Vorenus quidem tum sese vallo continet, sed omnium veritus existimationem subsequitur.

SECTION 5.44.6
Mediocri spatio relicto Pullo pilum in hostes immittit atque unum ex multitudine procurrentem traicit; quo percusso et exanimato hunc scutis protegunt, in hostem tela universi coniciunt neque dant regrediendi facultatem.

SECTION 5.44.7
Transfigitur scutum Pulloni et verutum in balteo defigitur.

SECTION 5.44.8
Avertit hic casus vaginam et gladium educere conanti dextram moratur manum, impeditumque hostes circumsistunt.

SECTION 5.44.9
Succurrit inimicus illi Vorenus et laboranti subvenit.

SECTION 5.44.10
Ad hunc se confestim a Pullone omnis multitudo convertit:

SECTION 5.44.11
illum veruto arbitrantur occisum. Gladio comminus rem gerit Vorenus atque uno interfecto reliquos paulum propellit;

SECTION 5.44.12
dum cupidius instat, in locum deiectus inferiorem concidit. Huic rursus circumvento fert subsidium Pullo,

SECTION 5.44.13
atque ambo incolumes compluribus interfectis summa cum laude sese intra munitiones recipiunt.

SECTION 5.44.14
Sic fortuna in contentione et certamine utrumque versavit, ut alter alteri inimicus auxilio salutique esset, neque diiudicari posset, uter utri virtute anteferendus videretur.

CHAPTER 5.45

SECTION 5.45.1
Quanto erat in dies gravior atque asperior oppugnatio, et maxime quod magna parte militum confecta vulneribus res ad paucitatem defensorum pervenerat, tanto crebriores litterae nuntiique ad Caesarem mittebantur; quorum pars deprehensa in conspectu nostrorum militum cum cruciatu necabatur.

SECTION 5.45.2
Erat unus intus Nervius nomine Vertico, loco natus honesto, qui a prima obsidione ad Ciceronem perfugerat suamque ei fidem praestiterat.

SECTION 5.45.3
Hic servo spe libertatis magnisque persuadet praemiis, ut litteras ad Caesarem deferat.

SECTION 5.45.4
Has ille in iaculo illigatas effert et Gallus inter Gallos sine ulla suspicione versatus ad Caesarem pervenit.

SECTION 5.45.5
Ab eo de periculis Ciceronis legionisque cognoscitur.

CHAPTER 5.46

SECTION 5.46.1
Caesar acceptis litteris hora circiter XI diei statim nuntium in Bellovacos ad M. Crassum quaestorem mittit, cuius hiberna aberant ab eo milia passuum XXV;

SECTION 5.46.2
iubet media nocte legionem proficisci celeriterque ad se venire.

SECTION 5.46.3
Exit cum nuntio Crassus. Alterum ad Gaium Fabium legatum mittit, ut in Atrebatium fines legionem adducat, qua sibi iter faciendum sciebat.

SECTION 5.46.4
Scribit Labieno, si rei publicae commodo facere posset, cum legione ad fines Nerviorum veniat. Reliquam partem exercitus, quod paulo aberat longius, non putat exspectandam; equites circiter quadringentos ex proximis hibernis colligit.

CHAPTER 5.47

SECTION 5.47.1
Hora circiter tertia ab antecursoribus de Crassi adventu certior factus eo die milia passuum XX procedit.

SECTION 5.47.2
Crassum Samarobrivae praeficit legionemque attribuit, quod ibi impedimenta exercitus, obsides civitatum, litteras publicas frumentumque omne quod eo tolerandae hiemis causa devexerat relinquebat.

SECTION 5.47.3
Fabius, ut imperatum erat, non ita multum moratus in itinere cum legione occurrit.

SECTION 5.47.4
Labienus interitu Sabini et caede cohortium cognita, cum omnes ad eum Treverorum copiae venissent, veritus, si ex hibernis fugae similem profectionem fecisset, ut hostium impetum sustinere posset, praesertim quos recenti victoria efferri sciret, litteras Caesari remittit, quanto cum periculo legionem ex hibernis educturus esset; rem gestam in Eburonibus perscribit; docet omnes equitatus peditatusque copias Treverorum tria milia passuum longe ab suis castris consedisse.

CHAPTER 5.48

SECTION 5.48.1
Caesar consilio eius probato, etsi opinione trium legionum deiectus ad duas redierat, tamen unum communis salutis auxilium in celeritate ponebat. Venit magnis itineribus in Nerviorum fines.

SECTION 5.48.2
Ibi ex captivis cognoscit, quae apud Ciceronem gerantur, quantoque in periculo res sit.

SECTION 5.48.3
Tum cuidam ex equitibus Gallis magnis praemiis persuadet uti ad Ciceronem epistolam deferat.

SECTION 5.48.4
Hanc Graecis conscriptam litteris mittit, ne intercepta epistola nostra ab hostibus consilia cognoscantur.

SECTION 5.48.5
Si adire non possit, monet ut tragulam cum epistola ad amentum deligata intra munitionem castrorum abiciat.

SECTION 5.48.6
In litteris scribit se cum legionibus profectum celeriter adfore; hortatur ut pristinam virtutem retineat.

SECTION 5.48.7
Gallus periculum veritus, ut erat praeceptum, tragulam mittit.

SECTION 5.48.8
Haec casu ad turrim adhaesit neque ab nostris biduo animadversa tertio die a quodam milite conspicitur, dempta ad Ciceronem defertur.

SECTION 5.48.9
Ille perlectam in conventu militum recitat maximaque omnes laetitia adficit.

SECTION 5.48.10
Tum fumi incendiorum procul videbantur; quae res omnem dubitationem adventus legionum expulit.

CHAPTER 5.49

SECTION 5.49.1
Galli re cognita per exploratores obsidionem relinquunt, ad Caesarem omnibus copiis contendunt. Hae erant armata circiter milia LX.

SECTION 5.49.2
Cicero data facultate Gallum ab eodem Verticone, quem supra demonstravimus, repetit, qui litteras ad Caesarem deferat; hunc admonet, iter caute diligenterque faciat:

SECTION 5.49.3
perscribit in litteris hostes ab se discessisse omnemque ad eum multitudinem convertisse.

SECTION 5.49.4
Quibus litteris circiter media nocte Caesar adlatis suos facit certiores eosque ad dimicandum animo confirmat.

SECTION 5.49.5
Postero die luce prima movet castra et circiter milia passuum quattuor progressus trans vallem et rivum multitudinem hostium conspicatur.

SECTION 5.49.6
Erat magni periculi res tantulis copiis iniquo loco dimicare; tum, quoniam obsidione liberatum Ciceronem sciebat, aequo animo remittendum de celeritate existimabat:

SECTION 5.49.7
consedit et quam aequissimo loco potest castra communit atque haec, etsi erant exigua per se vix hominum milium septem praesertim nullis cum impedimentis, tamen angustiis viarum quam maxime potest contrahit, eo consilio, ut in summam contemptionem hostibus veniat.

SECTION 5.49.8
Interim speculatoribus in omnes partes dimissis explorat quo commodissime itinere vallem transire possit.

CHAPTER 5.50

SECTION 5.50.1
Eo die parvulis equestribus proeliis ad aquam factis utrique sese suo loco continent:

SECTION 5.50.2
Galli, quod ampliores copias,

SECTION 5.50.3
quae nondum convenerant, exspectabant; Caesar, si forte timoris simulatione hostes in suum locum elicere posset, ut citra vallem pro castris proelio contenderet, si id efficere non posset,

SECTION 5.50.4
ut exploratis itineribus minore cum periculo vallem rivumque transiret. Prima luce hostium equitatus ad castra accedit proeliumque cum nostris equitibus committit.

SECTION 5.50.5
Caesar consulto equites cedere seque in castra recipere iubet, simul ex omnibus partibus castra altiore vallo muniri portasque obstrui atque in his administrandis rebus quam maxime concursari et cum simulatione agi timoris iubet.

CHAPTER 5.51

SECTION 5.51.1
Quibus omnibus rebus hostes invitati copias traducunt aciemque iniquo loco constituunt, nostris vero etiam de vallo deductis propius accedunt et tela intra munitionem ex omnibus partibus coniciunt

SECTION 5.51.2
praeconibusque circummissis pronuntiari iubent, seu quis Gallus seu Romanus velit ante horam tertiam ad se transire, sine periculo licere; post id tempus non fore potestatem:

SECTION 5.51.3
ac sic nostros contempserunt, ut obstructis in speciem portis singulis ordinibus caespitum, quod ea non posse introrumpere videbantur, alii vallum manu scindere, alii fossas complere inciperent.

SECTION 5.51.4
Tum Caesar omnibus portis eruptione facta equitatuque emisso celeriter hostes in fugam dat, sic uti omnino pugnandi causa resisteret nemo, magnumque ex eis numerum occidit atque omnes armis exuit.

CHAPTER 5.52

SECTION 5.52.1
Longius prosequi veritus, quod silvae paludesque intercedebant neque etiam parvulo detrimento illorum locum relinqui videbat, omnibus suis incolumibus copiis eodem die ad Ciceronem pervenit.

SECTION 5.52.2
Institutas turres, testudines munitionesque hostium admiratur; legione producta cognoscit non decimum quemque esse reliquum militem sine vulnere:

SECTION 5.52.3
ex his omnibus iudicat rebus, quanto cum periculo et quanta cum virtute res sint administratae.

SECTION 5.52.4
Ciceronem pro eius merito legionemque collaudat; centuriones singillatim tribunosque militum appellat, quorum egregiam fuisse virtutem testimonio Ciceronis cognoverat. De casu Sabini et Cottae certius ex captivis cognoscit.

SECTION 5.52.5
Postero die contione habita rem gestam proponit, milites consolatur et confirmat:

SECTION 5.52.6
quod detrimentum culpa et temeritate legati sit acceptum, hoc aequiore animo ferendum docet, quod beneficio deorum immortalium et virtute eorum expiato incommodo neque hostibus diutina laetatio neque ipsis longior dolor relinquatur.

CHAPTER 5.53

SECTION 5.53.1
Interim ad Labienum per Remos incredibili celeritate de victoria Caesaris fama perfertur, ut, cum ab hibernis Ciceronis milia passuum abesset circiter LX, eoque post horam nonam diei Caesar pervenisset, ante mediam noctem ad portas castrorum clamor oreretur, quo clamore significatio victoriae gratulatioque ab Remis Labieno fieret.

SECTION 5.53.2
Hac fama ad Treveros perlata Indutiomarus, qui postero die castra Labieni oppugnare decreverat, noctu profugit copiasque omnes in Treveros reducit.

SECTION 5.53.3
Caesar Fabium cum sua legione remittit in hiberna, ipse cum tribus legionibus circum Samarobrivam trinis hibernis hiemare constituit et, quod tanti motus Galliae exstiterant, totam hiemem ipse ad exercitum manere decrevit.

SECTION 5.53.4
Nam illo incommodo de Sabini morte perlato omnes fere Galliae civitates de bello consultabant, nuntios legationesque in omnes partes dimittebant et quid reliqui consili caperent atque unde initium belli fieret explorabant nocturnaque in locis desertis concilia habebant.

SECTION 5.53.5
Neque ullum fere totius hiemis tempus sine sollicitudine Caesaris intercessit, quin aliquem de consiliis ac motu Gallorum nuntium acciperet.

SECTION 5.53.6
In his ab Lucio Roscio, quem legioni tertiae decimae praefecerat, certior factus est magnas Gallorum copias earum civitatum, quae Armoricae appellantur, oppugnandi sui causa convenisse

SECTION 5.53.7
neque longius milia passuum octo ab hibernis suis afuisse, sed nuntio allato de victoria Caesaris discessisse, adeo ut fugae similis discessus videretur.

CHAPTER 5.54

SECTION 5.54.1
At Caesar principibus cuiusque civitatis ad se evocatis alias territando, cum se scire quae fierent denuntiaret, alias cohortando magnam partem Galliae in officio tenuit.

SECTION 5.54.2
Tamen Senones, quae est civitas in primis firma et magnae inter Gallos auctoritatis, Cavarinum, quem Caesar apud eos regem constituerat, cuius frater Moritasgus adventu in Galliam Caesaris cuiusque maiores regnum obtinuerant, interficere publico consilio conati, cum ille praesensisset ac profugisset, usque ad fines insecuti

SECTION 5.54.3
regno domoque expulerunt et, missis ad Caesarem satisfaciendi causa legatis, cum is omnem ad se senatum venire iussisset, dicto audientes non fuerunt.

SECTION 5.54.4
Ac tantum apud homines barbaros valuit esse aliquos repertos principes inferendi belli tantamque omnibus voluntatum commutationem attulit, ut praeter Aeduos et Remos, quos praecipuo semper honore Caesar habuit, alteros pro vetere ac perpetua erga populum Romanum fide, alteros pro recentibus Gallici belli officiis, nulla fere civitas fuerit non suspecta nobis.

SECTION 5.54.5
Idque adeo haud scio mirandumne sit, cum compluribus aliis de causis, tum maxime quod ei, qui virtute belli omnibus gentibus praeferebantur, tantum se eius opinionis deperdidisse ut a populo Romano imperia perferrent gravissime dolebant.

CHAPTER 5.55

SECTION 5.55.1
Treveri vero atque Indutiomarus totius hiemis nullum tempus intermiserunt, quin trans Rhenum legatos mitterent, civitates sollicitarent, pecunias pollicerentur, magna parte exercitus nostri interfecta multo minorem superesse dicerent partem.

SECTION 5.55.2
Neque tamen ulli civitati Germanorum persuaderi potuit, ut Rhenum transiret, cum se bis expertos dicerent, Ariovisti bello et Tencterorum transitu: non esse amplius fortunam temptaturos. Hac spe lapsus Indutiomarus nihilo minus copias cogere,

SECTION 5.55.3
exercere, a finitimis equos parare, exules damnatosque tota Gallia magnis praemiis ad se allicere coepit.

SECTION 5.55.4
Ac tantam sibi iam his rebus in Gallia auctoritatem comparaverat ut undique ad eum legationes concurrerent, gratiam atque amicitiam publice privatimque peterent.

CHAPTER 5.56

SECTION 5.56.1
Vbi intellexit ultro ad se veniri, altera ex parte Senones Carnutesque conscientia facinoris instigari, altera Nervios Aduatucosque bellum Romanis parare, neque sibi voluntariorum copias defore, si ex finibus suis progredi coepisset, armatum concilium indicit. Hoc more Gallorum est initium belli,

SECTION 5.56.2
quo lege communi omnes puberes armati convenire consuerunt; qui ex eis novissimus convenit, in conspectu multitudinis omnibus cruciatibus affectus necatur.

SECTION 5.56.3
In eo concilio Cingetorigem, alterius principem factionis, generum suum, quem supra demonstravimus Caesaris secutum fidem ab eo non discessisse, hostem iudicat bonaque eius publicat.

SECTION 5.56.4
His rebus confectis, in concilio pronuntiat arcessitum se a Senonibus et Carnutibus aliisque compluribus Galliae civitatibus;

SECTION 5.56.5
huc iturum per fines Remorum eorumque agros populaturum ac, priusquam id faciat, castra Labieni oppugnaturum. Quae fieri velit praecipit.

CHAPTER 5.57

SECTION 5.57.1
Labienus, cum et loci natura et manu munitissumis castris sese teneret, de suo ac legionis periculo nihil timebat; ne quam occasionem rei bene gerendae dimitteret, cogitabat.

SECTION 5.57.2
Itaque a Cingetorige atque eius propinquis oratione Indutiomari cognita, quam in concilio habuerat, nuntios mittit ad finitimas civitates equitesque undique evocat: his certum diem conveniendi dicit.

SECTION 5.57.3
Interim prope cotidie cum omni equitatu Indutiomarus sub castris eius vagabatur, alias ut situm castrorum cognosceret, alias colloquendi aut territandi causa: equites plerumque omnes tela intra vallum coniciebant.

SECTION 5.57.4
Labienus suos intra munitionem continebat timorisque opinionem, quibuscumque poterat rebus, augebat.

CHAPTER 5.58

SECTION 5.58.1
Cum maiore in dies contemptione Indutiomarus ad castra accederet, nocte una intromissis equitibus omnium finitimarum civitatum quos arcessendos curaverat, tanta diligentia omnes suos custodiis intra castra continuit, ut nulla ratione ea res enuntiari aut ad Treveros perferri posset.

SECTION 5.58.2
Interim ex consuetudine cotidiana Indutiomarus ad castra accedit atque ibi magnam partem diei consumit; equites tela coniciunt et magna cum contumelia verborum nostros ad pugnam evocant.

SECTION 5.58.3
Nullo ab nostris dato responso, ubi visum est, sub vesperum dispersi ac dissipati discedunt.

SECTION 5.58.4
Subito Labienus duabus portis omnem equitatum emittit; praecipit atque interdicit, proterritis hostibus atque in fugam coniectis (quod fore, sicut accidit, videbat) unum omnes peterent Indutiomarum, neu quis quem prius vulneret, quam illum interfectum viderit, quod mora reliquorum spatium nactum illum effugere nolebat; magna proponit eis qui occiderint praemia;

SECTION 5.58.5
summittit cohortes equitibus subsidio.

SECTION 5.58.6
Comprobat hominis consilium fortuna, et cum unum omnes peterent, in ipso fluminis vado deprehensus Indutiomarus interficitur, caputque eius refertur in castra: redeuntes equites quos possunt consectantur atque occidunt.

SECTION 5.58.7
Hac re cognita omnes Eburonum et Nerviorum quae convenerant copiae discedunt, pauloque habuit post id factum Caesar quietiorem Galliam.

### Book 6

CHAPTER 6.1

SECTION 6.1.1
Multis de causis Caesar maiorem Galliae motum exspectans per Marcum Silanum, Gaium Antistium Reginum, Titum Sextium legatos delectum habere instituit.

SECTION 6.1.2
Simul ab Gnaeo Pompeio proconsule petit, quoniam ipse ad urbem cum imperio rei publicae causa remaneret, quos ex Cisalpina Gallia consulis sacramento rogavisset,

SECTION 6.1.3
ad signa convenire et ad se proficisci iuberet, magni interesse etiam in reliquum tempus ad opinionem Galliae existimans tantas videri Italiae facultates ut, si quid esset in bello detrimenti acceptum, non modo id brevi tempore sarciri, sed etiam maioribus augeri copiis posset.

SECTION 6.1.4
Quod cum Pompeius et rei publicae et amicitiae tribuisset, celeriter confecto per suos dilectu tribus ante exactam hiemem et constitutis et adductis legionibus duplicatoque earum cohortium numero, quas cum Quinto Titurio amiserat, et celeritate et copiis docuit, quid populi Romani disciplina atque opes possent.

CHAPTER 6.2

SECTION 6.2.1
Interfecto Indutiomaro, ut docuimus, ad eius propinquos a Treveris imperium defertur. Illi finitimos Germanos sollicitare et pecuniam polliceri non desistunt. Cum ab proximis impetrare non possent,

SECTION 6.2.2
ulteriores temptant. Inventis nonnullis civitatibus iureiurando inter se confirmant obsidibusque de pecunia cavent: Ambiorigem sibi societate et foedere adiungunt.

SECTION 6.2.3
Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar, cum undique bellum parari videret, Nervios, Aduatucos ac Menapios adiunctis Cisrhenanis omnibus Germanis esse in armis, Senones ad imperatum non venire et cum Carnutibus finitimisque civitatibus consilia communicare, a Treveris Germanos crebris legationibus sollicitari, maturius sibi de bello cogitandum putavit.

CHAPTER 6.3

SECTION 6.3.1
Itaque nondum hieme confecta proximis quattuor coactis legionibus de improviso in fines Nerviorum contendit et,

SECTION 6.3.2
priusquam illi aut convenire aut profugere possent, magno pecoris atque hominum numero capto atque ea praeda militibus concessa vastatisque agris in deditionem venire atque obsides sibi dare coegit.

SECTION 6.3.3
Eo celeriter confecto negotio rursus in hiberna legiones reduxit.

SECTION 6.3.4
Concilio Galliae primo vere, ut instituerat, indicto, cum reliqui praeter Senones, Carnutes Treverosque venissent, initium belli ac defectionis hoc esse arbitratus, ut omnia postponere videretur, concilium Lutetiam Parisiorum transfert.

SECTION 6.3.5
Confines erant hi Senonibus civitatemque patrum memoria coniunxerant, sed ab hoc consilio afuisse existimabantur.

SECTION 6.3.6
Hac re pro suggestu pronuntiata eodem die cum legionibus in Senones proficiscitur magnisque itineribus eo pervenit.

CHAPTER 6.4

SECTION 6.4.1
Cognito eius adventu Acco, qui princeps eius consili fuerat, iubet in oppida multitudinem convenire. Conantibus, priusquam id effici posset, adesse Romanos nuntiatur.

SECTION 6.4.2
Necessario sententia desistunt legatosque deprecandi causa ad Caesarem mittunt: adeunt per Aeduos, quorum antiquitus erat in fide civitas.

SECTION 6.4.3
Libenter Caesar petentibus Aeduis dat veniam excusationemque accipit, quod aestivum tempus instantis belli, non quaestionis esse arbitrabatur.

SECTION 6.4.4
Obsidibus imperatis centum hos Aeduis custodiendos tradit.

SECTION 6.4.5
Eodem Carnutes legatos obsidesque mittunt usi deprecatoribus Remis, quorum erant in clientela: eadem ferunt responsa.

SECTION 6.4.6
Peragit concilium Caesar equitesque imperat civitatibus.

CHAPTER 6.5

SECTION 6.5.1
Hac parte Galliae pacata totus et mente et animo in bellum Treverorum et Ambiorigis insistit.

SECTION 6.5.2
Cavarinum cum equitatu Senonum secum proficisci iubet, ne quis aut ex huius iracundia aut ex eo, quod meruerat, odio civitatis motus exsistat.

SECTION 6.5.3
His rebus constitutis, quod pro explorato habebat Ambiorigem proelio non esse concertaturum, reliqua eius consilia animo circumspiciebat.

SECTION 6.5.4
Erant Menapii propinqui Eburonum finibus, perpetuis paludibus silvisque muniti, qui uni ex Gallia de pace ad Caesarem legatos numquam miserant. Cum his esse hospitium Ambiorigi sciebat; item per Treveros venisse Germanis in amicitiam cognoverat.

SECTION 6.5.5
Haec prius illi detrahenda auxilia existimabat quam ipsum bello lacesseret, ne desperata salute aut se in Menapios abderet aut cum Transrhenanis congredi cogeretur.

SECTION 6.5.6
Hoc inito consilio totius exercitus impedimenta ad Labienum in Treveros mittit duasque legiones ad eum proficisci iubet; ipse cum legionibus expeditis quinque in Menapios proficiscitur.

SECTION 6.5.7
Illi nulla coacta manu loci praesidio freti in silvas paludesque confugiunt suaque eodem conferunt.

CHAPTER 6.6

SECTION 6.6.1
Caesar partitis copiis cum Gaio Fabio legato et Marco Crasso quaestore celeriterque effectis pontibus adit tripertito, aedificia vicosque incendit, magno pecoris atque hominum numero potitur.

SECTION 6.6.2
Quibus rebus coacti Menapii legatos ad eum pacis petendae causa mittunt.

SECTION 6.6.3
Ille obsidibus acceptis hostium se habiturum numero confirmat, si aut Ambiorigem aut eius legatos finibus suis recepissent. His confirmatis rebus Commium Atrebatem cum equitatu custodis loco in Menapiis relinquit; ipse in Treveros proficiscitur.

CHAPTER 6.7

SECTION 6.7.1
Dum haec a Caesare geruntur, Treveri magnis coactis peditatus equitatusque copiis Labienum cum una legione, quae in eorum finibus hiemaverat, adoriri parabant.

SECTION 6.7.2
Iamque ab eo non longius bidui via aberant, cum duas venisse legiones missu Caesaris cognoscunt.

SECTION 6.7.3
Positis castris a milibus passuum XV auxilia Germanorum exspectare constituunt.

SECTION 6.7.4
Labienus hostium cognito consilio sperans temeritate eorum fore aliquam dimicandi facultatem praesidio quinque cohortium impedimentis relicto cum viginti quinque cohortibus magnoque equitatu contra hostem proficiscitur et mille passuum intermisso spatio castra communit.

SECTION 6.7.5
Erat inter Labienum atque hostem difficili transitu flumen ripisque praeruptis. Hoc neque ipse transire habebat in animo neque hostes transituros existimabat.

SECTION 6.7.6
Augebatur auxiliorum cotidie spes. Loquitur in concilio palam, quoniam Germani appropinquare dicantur, sese suas exercitusque fortunas in dubium non devocaturum et postero die prima luce castra moturum. Celeriter haec ad hostes deferuntur,

SECTION 6.7.7
ut ex magno Gallorum equitum numero nonnullos Gallicis rebus favere natura cogebat.

SECTION 6.7.8
Labienus noctu tribunis militum primisque ordinibus convocatis, quid sui sit consili proponit et, quo facilius hostibus timoris det suspicionem, maiore strepitu et tumultu, quam populi Romani fert consuetudo castra moveri iubet. His rebus fugae similem profectionem effecit.

SECTION 6.7.9
Haec quoque per exploratores ante lucem in tanta propinquitate castrorum ad hostes deferuntur.

CHAPTER 6.8

SECTION 6.8.1
Vix agmen novissimum extra munitiones processerat, cum Galli cohortati inter se, ne speratam praedam ex manibus dimitterent—longum esse perterritis Romanis Germanorum auxilium exspectare, neque suam pati dignitatem ut tantis copiis tam exiguam manum praesertim fugientem atque impeditam adoriri non audeant—flumen transire et iniquo loco committere proelium non dubitant.

SECTION 6.8.2
Quae fore suspicatus Labienus, ut omnes citra flumen eliceret, eadem usus simulatione itineris placide progrediebatur.

SECTION 6.8.3
Tum praemissis paulum impedimentis atque in tumulo quodam collocatis "Habetis," inquit, "milites, quam petistis facultatem: hostem impedito atque iniquo loco tenetis:

SECTION 6.8.4
praestate eandem nobis ducibus virtutem, quam saepe numero imperatori praestitistis, atque illum adesse et haec coram cernere existimate."

SECTION 6.8.5
Simul signa ad hostem converti aciemque dirigi iubet, et paucis turmis praesidio ad impedimenta dimissis reliquos equites ad latera disponit.

SECTION 6.8.6
Celeriter nostri clamore sublato pila in hostes immittunt. Illi, ubi praeter spem quos fugere credebant infestis signis ad se ire viderunt, impetum modo ferre non potuerunt ac primo concursu in fugam coniecti proximas silvas petierunt.

SECTION 6.8.7
Quos Labienus equitatu consectatus, magno numero interfecto, compluribus captis, paucis post diebus civitatem recepit. Nam Germani qui auxilio veniebant percepta Treverorum fuga sese domum receperunt.

SECTION 6.8.8
Cum his propinqui Indutiomari, qui defectionis auctores fuerant, comitati eos ex civitate excesserunt.

SECTION 6.8.9
Cingetorigi, quem ab initio permansisse in officio demonstravimus, principatus atque imperium est traditum.

CHAPTER 6.9

SECTION 6.9.1
Caesar, postquam ex Menapiis in Treveros venit, duabus de causis Rhenum transire constituit; quarum una erat, quod auxilia contra se Treveris miserant,

SECTION 6.9.2
altera, ne ad eos Ambiorix receptum haberet.

SECTION 6.9.3
His constitutis rebus paulum supra eum locum quo ante exercitum traduxerat facere pontem instituit.

SECTION 6.9.4
Nota atque instituta ratione magno militum studio paucis diebus opus efficitur.

SECTION 6.9.5
Firmo in Treveris ad pontem praesidio relicto, ne quis ab his subito motus oreretur, reliquas copias equitatumque traducit.

SECTION 6.9.6
Vbii, qui ante obsides dederant atque in deditionem venerant, purgandi sui causa ad eum legatos mittunt, qui doceant neque auxilia ex sua civitate in Treveros missa neque ab se fidem laesam:

SECTION 6.9.7
petunt atque orant ut sibi parcat, ne communi odio Germanorum innocentes pro nocentibus poenas pendant; si amplius obsidum vellet, dare pollicentur.

SECTION 6.9.8
Cognita Caesar causa reperit ab Suebis auxilia missa esse; Vbiorum satisfactionem accipit, aditus viasque in Suebos perquirit.

CHAPTER 6.10

SECTION 6.10.1
Interim paucis post diebus fit ab Vbiis certior Suebos omnes in unum locum copias cogere atque eis nationibus quae sub eorum sint imperio denuntiare, ut auxilia peditatus equitatusque mittant.

SECTION 6.10.2
His cognitis rebus rem frumentariam providet, castris idoneum locum deligit; Vbiis imperat ut pecora deducant suaque omnia ex agris in oppida conferant, sperans barbaros atque imperitos homines inopia cibariorum adductos ad iniquam pugnandi condicionem posse deduci;

SECTION 6.10.3
mandat, ut crebros exploratores in Suebos mittant quaeque apud eos gerantur cognoscant.

SECTION 6.10.4
Illi imperata faciunt et paucis diebus intermissis referunt: Suebos omnes, posteaquam certiores nuntii de exercitu Romanorum venerint, cum omnibus suis sociorumque copiis, quas coegissent, penitus ad extremos fines se recepisse:

SECTION 6.10.5
silvam esse ibi infinita magnitudine, quae appellatur Bacenis; hanc longe introrsus pertinere et pro nativo muro obiectam Cheruscos ab Suebis Suebosque ab Cheruscis iniuriis incursionibusque prohibere: ad eius initium silvae Suebos adventum Romanorum exspectare constituisse.

CHAPTER 6.11

SECTION 6.11.1
Quoniam ad hunc locum perventum est, non alienum esse videtur de Galliae Germaniaeque moribus et quo differant hae nationes inter sese proponere.

SECTION 6.11.2
In Gallia non solum in omnibus civitatibus atque in omnibus pagis partibusque, sed paene etiam in singulis domibus factiones sunt, earumque factionum principes sunt

SECTION 6.11.3
qui summam auctoritatem eorum iudicio habere existimantur, quorum ad arbitrium iudiciumque summa omnium rerum consiliorumque redeat.

SECTION 6.11.4
Itaque eius rei causa antiquitus institutum videtur, ne quis ex plebe contra potentiorem auxili egeret: suos enim quisque opprimi et circumveniri non patitur, neque, aliter si faciat, ullam inter suos habet auctoritatem.

SECTION 6.11.5
Haec eadem ratio est in summa totius Galliae: namque omnes civitates in partes divisae sunt duas.

CHAPTER 6.12

SECTION 6.12.1
Cum Caesar in Galliam venit, alterius factionis principes erant Aedui, alterius Sequani.

SECTION 6.12.2
Hi cum per se minus valerent, quod summa auctoritas antiquitus erat in Aeduis magnaeque eorum erant clientelae, Germanos atque Ariovistum sibi adiunxerant eosque ad se magnis iacturis pollicitationibusque perduxerant.

SECTION 6.12.3
Proeliis vero compluribus factis secundis atque omni nobilitate Aeduorum interfecta tantum potentia antecesserant,

SECTION 6.12.4
ut magnam partem clientium ab Aeduis ad se traducerent obsidesque ab eis principum filios acciperent et publice iurare cogerent nihil se contra Sequanos consili inituros et partem finitimi agri per vim occupatam possiderent Galliaeque totius principatum obtinerent.

SECTION 6.12.5
Qua necessitate adductus Diviciacus auxili petendi causa Romam ad senatum profectus infecta re redierat.

SECTION 6.12.6
Adventu Caesaris facta commutatione rerum, obsidibus Aeduis redditis, veteribus clientelis restitutis, novis per Caesarem comparatis, quod hi, qui se ad eorum amicitiam adgregaverant,

SECTION 6.12.7
meliore condicione atque aequiore imperio se uti videbant, reliquis rebus eorum gratia dignitateque amplificata Sequani principatum dimiserant. In eorum locum Remi successerant: quos quod adaequare apud Caesarem gratia intellegebatur, ei, qui propter veteres inimicitias nullo modo cum Aeduis coniungi poterant, se Remis in clientelam dicabant.

SECTION 6.12.8
Hos illi diligenter tuebantur: ita et novam et repente collectam auctoritatem tenebant.

SECTION 6.12.9
Eo tum statu res erat, ut longe principes haberentur Aedui, secundum locum dignitatis Remi obtinerent.

CHAPTER 6.13

SECTION 6.13.1
In omni Gallia eorum hominum, qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt duo. Nam plebes paene servorum habetur loco, quae nihil audet per se, nullo adhibetur consilio.

SECTION 6.13.2
Plerique, cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus: in hos eadem omnia sunt iura, quae dominis in servos.

SECTION 6.13.3
Sed de his duobus generibus alterum est druidum, alterum equitum.

SECTION 6.13.4
Illi rebus divinis intersunt, sacrificia publica ac privata procurant, religiones interpretantur: ad hos magnus adulescentium numerus disciplinae causa concurrit, magnoque hi sunt apud eos honore.

SECTION 6.13.5
Nam fere de omnibus controversiis publicis privatisque constituunt, et, si quod est admissum facinus, si caedes facta, si de hereditate, de finibus controversia est, idem decernunt, praemia poenasque constituunt;

SECTION 6.13.6
si qui aut privatus aut populus eorum decreto non stetit, sacrificiis interdicunt. Haec poena apud eos est gravissima.

SECTION 6.13.7
Quibus ita est interdictum, hi numero impiorum ac sceleratorum habentur, his omnes decedunt, aditum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant, neque his petentibus ius redditur neque honos ullus communicatur.

SECTION 6.13.8
His autem omnibus druidibus praeest unus, qui summam inter eos habet auctoritatem.

SECTION 6.13.9
Hoc mortuo aut si qui ex reliquis excellit dignitate succedit, aut, si sunt plures pares, suffragio druidum, nonnumquam etiam armis de principatu contendunt.

SECTION 6.13.10
hi certo anni tempore in finibus Carnutum, quae regio totius Galliae media habetur, considunt in loco consecrato. Huc omnes undique, qui controversias habent, conveniunt eorumque decretis iudiciisque parent.

SECTION 6.13.11
Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata esse existimatur,

SECTION 6.13.12
et nunc, qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt, plerumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur.

CHAPTER 6.14

SECTION 6.14.1
Druides a bello abesse consuerunt neque tributa una cum reliquis pendunt; militiae vacationem omniumque rerum habent immunitatem.

SECTION 6.14.2
Tantis excitati praemiis et sua sponte multi in disciplinam conveniunt et a parentibus propinquisque mittuntur.

SECTION 6.14.3
Magnum ibi numerum versuum ediscere dicuntur. Itaque annos nonnulli vicenos in disciplina permanent.

SECTION 6.14.4
Neque fas esse existimant ea litteris mandare, cum in reliquis fere rebus, publicis privatisque rationibus Graecis litteris utantur. Id mihi duabus de causis instituisse videntur, quod neque in vulgum disciplinam efferri velint neque eos, qui discunt, litteris confisos minus memoriae studere: quod fere plerisque accidit, ut praesidio litterarum diligentiam in perdiscendo ac memoriam remittant.

SECTION 6.14.5
In primis hoc volunt persuadere, non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios, atque hoc maxime ad virtutem excitari putant metu mortis neglecto.

SECTION 6.14.6
Multa praeterea de sideribus atque eorum motu, de mundi ac terrarum magnitudine, de rerum natura, de deorum immortalium vi ac potestate disputant et iuventuti tradunt.

CHAPTER 6.15

SECTION 6.15.1
Alterum genus est equitum. Hi, cum est usus atque aliquod bellum incidit (quod fere ante Caesaris adventum quotannis accidere solebat, uti aut ipsi iniurias inferrent aut illatas propulsarent), omnes in bello versantur,

SECTION 6.15.2
atque eorum ut quisque est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos clientesque habet. Hanc unam gratiam potentiamque noverunt.

CHAPTER 6.16

SECTION 6.16.1
Natio est omnis Gallorum admodum dedita religionibus,

SECTION 6.16.2
atque ob eam causam, qui sunt adfecti gravioribus morbis quique in proeliis periculisque versantur, aut pro victimis homines immolant aut se immolaturos vovent administrisque ad ea sacrificia druidibus utuntur, quod, pro vita hominis nisi hominis vita reddatur,

SECTION 6.16.3
non posse deorum immortalium numen placari arbitrantur, publiceque eiusdem generis habent instituta sacrificia. Alii immani magnitudine simulacra habent,

SECTION 6.16.4
quorum contexta viminibus membra vivis hominibus complent; quibus succensis circumventi flamma exanimantur homines.

SECTION 6.16.5
Supplicia eorum qui in furto aut in latrocinio aut aliqua noxia sint comprehensi gratiora dis immortalibus esse arbitrantur; sed, cum eius generis copia defecit, etiam ad innocentium supplicia descendunt.

CHAPTER 6.17

SECTION 6.17.1
Deum maxime Mercurium colunt. Huius sunt plurima simulacra: hunc omnium inventorem artium ferunt, hunc viarum atque itinerum ducem, hunc ad quaestus pecuniae mercaturasque habere vim maximam arbitrantur. Post hunc Apollinem et Martem et Iovem et Minervam.

SECTION 6.17.2
De his eandem fere, quam reliquae gentes, habent opinionem: Apollinem morbos depellere, Minervam operum atque artificiorum initia tradere, Iovem imperium caelestium tenere, Martem bella regere.

SECTION 6.17.3
Huic, cum proelio dimicare constituerunt, ea quae bello ceperint plerumque devovent: cum superaverunt, animalia capta immolant reliquasque res in unum locum conferunt.

SECTION 6.17.4
Multis in civitatibus harum rerum exstructos tumulos locis consecratis conspicari licet;

SECTION 6.17.5
neque saepe accidit, ut neglecta quispiam religione aut capta apud se occultare aut posita tollere auderet, gravissimumque ei rei supplicium cum cruciatu constitutum est.

CHAPTER 6.18

SECTION 6.18.1
Galli se omnes ab Dite patre prognatos praedicant idque ab druidibus proditum dicunt.

SECTION 6.18.2
Ob eam causam spatia omnis temporis non numero dierum sed noctium finiunt; dies natales et mensum et annorum initia sic observant ut noctem dies subsequatur.

SECTION 6.18.3
In reliquis vitae institutis hoc fere ab reliquis differunt, quod suos liberos, nisi cum adoleverunt, ut munus militiae sustinere possint, palam ad se adire non patiuntur filiumque puerili aetate in publico in conspectu patris adsistere turpe ducunt.

CHAPTER 6.19

SECTION 6.19.1
Viri, quantas pecunias ab uxoribus dotis nomine acceperunt, tantas ex suis bonis aestimatione facta cum dotibus communicant.

SECTION 6.19.2
Huius omnis pecuniae coniunctim ratio habetur fructusque servantur: uter eorum vita superarit, ad eum pars utriusque cum fructibus superiorum temporum pervenit.

SECTION 6.19.3
Viri in uxores, sicuti in liberos, vitae necisque habent potestatem; et cum pater familiae illustriore loco natus decessit, eius propinqui conveniunt et, de morte si res in suspicionem venit, de uxoribus in servilem modum quaestionem habent et, si compertum est, igni atque omnibus tormentis excruciatas interficiunt.

SECTION 6.19.4
Funera sunt pro cultu Gallorum magnifica et sumptuosa; omniaque quae vivis cordi fuisse arbitrantur in ignem inferunt, etiam animalia, ac paulo supra hanc memoriam servi et clientes, quos ab eis dilectos esse constabat, iustis funeribus confectis una cremabantur.

CHAPTER 6.20

SECTION 6.20.1
Quae civitates commodius suam rem publicam administrare existimantur, habent legibus sanctum, si quis quid de re publica a finitimis rumore aut fama acceperit, uti ad magistratum deferat neve cum quo alio communicet,

SECTION 6.20.2
quod saepe homines temerarios atque imperitos falsis rumoribus terreri et ad facinus impelli et de summis rebus consilium capere cognitum est.

SECTION 6.20.3
Magistratus quae visa sunt occultant quaeque esse ex usu iudicaverunt multitudini produnt. De re publica nisi per concilium loqui non conceditur.

CHAPTER 6.21

SECTION 6.21.1
Germani multum ab hac consuetudine differunt. Nam neque druides habent, qui rebus divinis praesint, neque sacrificiis student.

SECTION 6.21.2
Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt et quorum aperte opibus iuvantur, Solem et Vulcanum et Lunam, reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt.

SECTION 6.21.3
Vita omnis in venationibus atque in studiis rei militaris consistit: ab parvulis labori ac duritiae student. Qui diutissime impuberes permanserunt,

SECTION 6.21.4
maximam inter suos ferunt laudem: hoc ali staturam, ali vires nervosque confirmari putant.

SECTION 6.21.5
Intra annum vero vicesimum feminae notitiam habuisse in turpissimis habent rebus; cuius rei nulla est occultatio, quod et promiscue in fluminibus perluuntur et pellibus aut parvis renonum tegimentis utuntur magna corporis parte nuda.

CHAPTER 6.22

SECTION 6.22.1
Agriculturae non student, maiorque pars eorum victus in lacte, caseo, carne consistit.

SECTION 6.22.2
Neque quisquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios; sed magistratus ac principes in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum, qui una coierunt, quantum et quo loco visum est agri attribuunt atque anno post alio transire cogunt.

SECTION 6.22.3
Eius rei multas adferunt causas: ne adsidua consuetudine capti studium belli gerendi agricultura commutent; ne latos fines parare studeant, potentioresque humiliores possessionibus expellant; ne accuratius ad frigora atque aestus vitandos aedificent; ne qua oriatur pecuniae cupiditas, qua ex re factiones dissensionesque nascuntur;

SECTION 6.22.4
ut animi aequitate plebem contineant, cum suas quisque opes cum potentissimis aequari videat.

CHAPTER 6.23

SECTION 6.23.1
Civitatibus maxima laus est quam latissime circum se vastatis finibus solitudines habere.

SECTION 6.23.2
Hoc proprium virtutis existimant, expulsos agris finitimos cedere, neque quemquam prope audere consistere:

SECTION 6.23.3
simul hoc se fore tutiores arbitrantur repentinae incursionis timore sublato.

SECTION 6.23.4
Cum bellum civitas aut inlatum defendit aut infert, magistratus, qui ei bello praesint, ut vitae necisque habeant potestatem, deliguntur.

SECTION 6.23.5
In pace nullus est communis magistratus, sed principes regionum atque pagorum inter suos ius dicunt controversiasque minuunt.

SECTION 6.23.6
Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines cuiusque civitatis fiunt, atque ea iuventutis exercendae ac desidiae minuendae causa fieri praedicant.

SECTION 6.23.7
Atque ubi quis ex principibus in concilio dixit se ducem fore, qui sequi velint, profiteantur, consurgunt ei qui et causam et hominem probant suumque auxilium pollicentur atque ab multitudine collaudantur:

SECTION 6.23.8
qui ex his secuti non sunt, in desertorum ac proditorum numero ducuntur, omniumque his rerum postea fides derogatur.

SECTION 6.23.9
Hospitem violare fas non putant; qui quacumque de causa ad eos venerunt, ab iniuria prohibent, sanctos habent, hisque omnium domus patent victusque communicatur.

CHAPTER 6.24

SECTION 6.24.1
Ac fuit antea tempus, cum Germanos Galli virtute superarent, ultro bella inferrent, propter hominum multitudinem agrique inopiam trans Rhenum colonias mitterent.

SECTION 6.24.2
Itaque ea quae fertilissima Germaniae sunt loca circum Hercyniam silvam, quam Eratostheni et quibusdam Graecis fama notam esse video, quam illi Orcyniam appellant, Volcae Tectosages occupaverunt atque ibi consederunt;

SECTION 6.24.3
quae gens ad hoc tempus his sedibus sese continet summamque habet iustitiae et bellicae laudis opinionem.

SECTION 6.24.4
Nunc quod in eadem inopia, egestate, patientia qua Germani permanent, eodem victu et cultu corporis utuntur; Gallis autem provinciarum propinquitas et transmarinarum rerum notitia multa ad copiam atque usus largitur,

SECTION 6.24.6
paulatim adsuefacti superari multisque victi proeliis ne se quidem ipsi cum illis virtute comparant.

CHAPTER 6.25

SECTION 6.25.1
Huius Hercyniae silvae, quae supra demonstrata est, latitudo novem dierum iter expedito patet: non enim aliter finiri potest, neque mensuras itinerum noverunt.

SECTION 6.25.2
Oritur ab Helvetiorum et Nemetum et Rauracorum finibus rectaque fluminis Danubi regione pertinet ad fines Dacorum et Anartium;

SECTION 6.25.3
hinc se flectit sinistrorsus diversis ab flumine regionibus multarumque gentium fines propter magnitudinem adtingit;

SECTION 6.25.4
neque quisquam est huius Germaniae, qui se aut adisse ad initium eius silvae dicat, cum dierum iter LX processerit, aut, quo ex loco oriatur, acceperit.

SECTION 6.25.5
Multaque in ea genera ferarum nasci constat, quae reliquis in locis visa non sint; ex quibus quae maxime differant ab ceteris et memoriae prodenda videantur haec sunt.

CHAPTER 6.26

SECTION 6.26.1
Est bos cervi figura, cuius a media fronte inter aures unum cornu exsistit excelsius magisque directum his, quae nobis nota sunt, cornibus: ab eius summo sicut palmae ramique late diffunduntur. Eadem est feminae marisque natura, eadem forma magnitudoque cornuum.

CHAPTER 6.27

SECTION 6.27.1
Sunt item, quae appellantur alces. Harum est consimilis capris figura et varietas pellium, sed magnitudine paulo antecedunt mutilaeque sunt cornibus et crura sine nodis articulisque habent

SECTION 6.27.2
neque quietis causa procumbunt neque, si quo adflictae casu conciderunt, erigere sese aut sublevare possunt.

SECTION 6.27.3
His sunt arbores pro cubilibus: ad eas se applicant atque ita paulum modo reclinatae quietem capiunt.

SECTION 6.27.4
Quarum ex vestigiis cum est animadversum a venatoribus, quo se recipere consuerint, omnes eo loco aut ab radicibus subruunt aut accidunt arbores, tantum ut summa species earum stantium relinquatur. Huc cum se consuetudine reclinaverunt,

SECTION 6.27.5
infirmas arbores pondere adfligunt atque una ipsae concidunt.

CHAPTER 6.28

SECTION 6.28.1
Tertium est genus eorum, qui uri appellantur. Hi sunt magnitudine paulo infra elephantos, specie et colore et figura tauri.

SECTION 6.28.2
Magna vis eorum est et magna velocitas, neque homini neque ferae quam conspexerunt parcunt. Hos studiose foveis captos interficiunt.

SECTION 6.28.3
Hoc se labore durant adulescentes atque hoc genere venationis exercent, et qui plurimos ex his interfecerunt, relatis in publicum cornibus, quae sint testimonio, magnam ferunt laudem.

SECTION 6.28.4
Sed adsuescere ad homines et mansuefieri ne parvuli quidem excepti possunt.

SECTION 6.28.5
Amplitudo cornuum et figura et species multum a nostrorum boum cornibus differt.

SECTION 6.28.6
Haec studiose conquisita ab labris argento circumcludunt atque in amplissimis epulis pro poculis utuntur.

CHAPTER 6.29

SECTION 6.29.1
Caesar, postquam per Vbios exploratores comperit Suebos sese in silvas recepisse, inopiam frumenti veritus, quod, ut supra demonstravimus, minime omnes Germani agriculturae student, constituit non progredi longius; sed,

SECTION 6.29.2
ne omnino metum reditus sui barbaris tolleret atque ut eorum auxilia tardaret, reducto exercitu partem ultimam pontis,

SECTION 6.29.3
quae ripas Vbiorum contingebat, in longitudinem pedum ducentorum rescindit atque in extremo ponte turrim tabulatorum quattuor constituit praesidiumque cohortium duodecim pontis tuendi causa ponit magnisque eum locum munitionibus firmat. Ei loco praesidioque Gaium Volcatium Tullum adulescentem praefecit.

SECTION 6.29.4
Ipse, cum maturescere frumenta inciperent, ad bellum Ambiorigis profectus per Arduennam silvam, quae est totius Galliae maxima atque ab ripis Rheni finibusque Treverorum ad Nervios pertinet milibusque amplius quingentis in longitudinem patet, Lucium Minucium Basilum cum omni equitatu praemittit, si quid celeritate itineris atque opportunitate temporis proficere possit;

SECTION 6.29.5
monet, ut ignes in castris fieri prohibeat, ne qua eius adventus procul significatio fiat: sese confestim subsequi dicit.

CHAPTER 6.30

SECTION 6.30.1
Basilus, ut imperatum est, facit. Celeriter contraque omnium opinionem confecto itinere multos in agris inopinantes deprehendit: eorum indicio ad ipsum Ambiorigem contendit, quo in loco cum paucis equitibus esse dicebatur.

SECTION 6.30.2
Multum cum in omnibus rebus tum in re militari potest fortuna. Nam sicut magno accidit casu ut in ipsum incautum etiam atque imparatum incideret, priusque eius adventus ab omnibus videretur, quam fama ac nuntius adferretur: sic magnae fuit fortunae omni militari instrumento, quod circum se habebat, erepto, raedis equisque comprehensis ipsum effugere mortem. Sed hoc quoque factum est,

SECTION 6.30.3
quod aedificio circumdato silva, ut sunt fere domicilia Gallorum, qui vitandi aestus causa plerumque silvarum atque fluminum petunt propinquitates, comites familiaresque eius angusto in loco paulisper equitum nostrorum vim sustinuerunt.

SECTION 6.30.4
His pugnantibus illum in equum quidam ex suis intulit: fugientem silvae texerunt. Sic et ad subeundum periculum et ad vitandum multum fortuna valuit.

CHAPTER 6.31

SECTION 6.31.1
Ambiorix copias suas iudicione non conduxerit, quod proelio dimicandum non existimarit, an tempore exclusus et repentino equitum adventu prohibitus, cum reliquum exercitum subsequi crederet, dubium est.

SECTION 6.31.2
Sed certe dimissis per agros nuntiis sibi quemque consulere iussit. Quorum pars in Arduennam silvam, pars in continentes paludes profugit;

SECTION 6.31.3
qui proximi Oceano fuerunt, his insulis sese occultaverunt, quas aestus efficere consuerunt;

SECTION 6.31.4
multi ex suis finibus egressi se suaque omnia alienissimis crediderunt.

SECTION 6.31.5
Catuvolcus, rex dimidiae partis Eburonum, qui una cum Ambiorige consilium inierat, aetate iam confectus, cum laborem aut belli aut fugae ferre non posset, omnibus precibus detestatus Ambiorigem, qui eius consilii auctor fuisset, taxo, cuius magna in Gallia Germaniaque copia est, se exanimavit.

CHAPTER 6.32

SECTION 6.32.1
Segni Condrusique, ex gente et numero Germanorum, qui sunt inter Eburones Treverosque, legatos ad Caesarem miserunt oratum, ne se in hostium numero duceret neve omnium Germanorum, qui essent citra Rhenum, unam esse causam iudicaret: nihil se de bello cogitavisse, nulla Ambiorigi auxilia misisse.

SECTION 6.32.2
Caesar explorata re quaestione captivorum, si qui ad eos Eburones ex fuga convenissent, ad se ut reducerentur, imperavit; si ita fecissent, fines eorum se violaturum negavit.

SECTION 6.32.3
Tum copiis in tres partes distributis impedimenta omnium legionum Aduatucam contulit.

SECTION 6.32.4
Id castelli nomen est. Hoc fere est in mediis Eburonum finibus, ubi Titurius atque Aurunculeius hiemandi causa consederant.

SECTION 6.32.5
Hunc cum reliquis rebus locum probabat, tum quod superioris anni munitiones integrae manebant, ut militum laborem sublevaret. Praesidio impedimentis legionem quartamdecimam reliquit, unam ex eis tribus, quas proxime conscriptas ex Italia traduxerat.

SECTION 6.32.6
Ei legioni castrisque Quintum Tullium Ciceronem praeficit ducentosque equites attribuit.

CHAPTER 6.33

SECTION 6.33.1
Partito exercitu Titum Labienum cum legionibus tribus ad Oceanum versus in eas partes quae Menapios attingunt proficisci iubet;

SECTION 6.33.2
Gaium Trebonium cum pari legionum numero ad eam regionem quae ad Aduatucos adiacet depopulandam mittit;

SECTION 6.33.3
ipse cum reliquis tribus ad flumen Scaldem, quod influit in Mosam, extremasque Arduennae partis ire constituit, quo cum paucis equitibus profectum Ambiorigem audiebat.

SECTION 6.33.4
Discedens post diem septimum sese reversurum confirmat; quam ad diem ei legioni quae in praesidio relinquebatur deberi frumentum sciebat.

SECTION 6.33.5
Labienum Treboniumque hortatur, si rei publicae commodo facere possint, ad eum diem revertantur, ut rursus communicato consilio exploratisque hostium rationibus aliud initium belli capere possint.

CHAPTER 6.34

SECTION 6.34.1
Erat, ut supra demonstravimus, manus certa nulla, non oppidum, non praesidium, quod se armis defenderet, sed in omnes partes dispersa multitudo.

SECTION 6.34.2
Vbi cuique aut valles abdita aut locus silvestris aut palus impedita spem praesidi aut salutis aliquam offerebat, consederat.

SECTION 6.34.3
Haec loca vicinitatibus erant nota, magnamque res diligentiam requirebat non in summa exercitus tuenda (nullum enim poterat universis a perterritis ac dispersis periculum accidere), sed in singulis militibus conservandis; quae tamen ex parte res ad salutem exercitus pertinebat.

SECTION 6.34.4
Nam et praedae cupiditas multos longius evocabat, et silvae incertis occultisque itineribus confertos adire prohibebant.

SECTION 6.34.5
Si negotium confici stirpemque hominum sceleratorum interfici vellet, dimittendae plures manus diducendique erant milites;

SECTION 6.34.6
si continere ad signa manipulos vellet, ut instituta ratio et consuetudo exercitus Romani postulabat, locus ipse erat praesidio barbaris, neque ex occulto insidiandi et dispersos circumveniendi singulis deerat audacia.

SECTION 6.34.7
Vt in eiusmodi difficultatibus, quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur, ut potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi ad ulciscendum ardebant, quam cum aliquo militum detrimento noceretur.

SECTION 6.34.8
Dimittit ad finitimas civitates nuntios Caesar: omnes ad se vocat spe praedae ad diripiendos Eburones, ut potius in silvis Gallorum vita quam legionarius miles periclitetur, simul ut magna multitudine circumfusa pro tali facinore stirps ac nomen civitatis tollatur.

SECTION 6.34.9
Magnus undique numerus celeriter convenit.

CHAPTER 6.35

SECTION 6.35.1
Haec in omnibus Eburonum partibus gerebantur, diesque appetebat septimus, quem ad diem Caesar ad impedimenta legionemque reverti constituerat.

SECTION 6.35.2
Hic quantum in bello fortuna possit et quantos adferat casus cognosci potuit.

SECTION 6.35.3
Dissipatis ac perterritis hostibus, ut demonstravimus, manus erat nulla quae parvam modo causam timoris adferret.

SECTION 6.35.4
Trans Rhenum ad Germanos pervenit fama, diripi Eburones atque ultro omnes ad praedam evocari.

SECTION 6.35.5
Cogunt equitum duo milia Sugambri, qui sunt proximi Rheno, a quibus receptos ex fuga Tencteros atque Vsipetes supra docuimus.

SECTION 6.35.6
Transeunt Rhenum navibus ratibusque triginta milibus passuum infra eum locum, ubi pons erat perfectus praesidiumque ab Caesare relictum: primos Eburonum fines adeunt; multos ex fuga dispersos excipiunt, magno pecoris numero, cuius sunt cupidissimi barbari, potiuntur.

SECTION 6.35.7
Invitati praeda longius procedunt. Non hos palus in bello latrociniisque natos, non silvae morantur. Quibus in locis sit Caesar ex captivis quaerunt; profectum longius reperiunt omnemque exercitum discessisse cognoscunt.

SECTION 6.35.8
Atque unus ex captivis "Quid vos," inquit, "hanc miseram ac tenuem sectamini praedam, quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos?

SECTION 6.35.9
Tribus horis Aduatucam venire potestis: huc omnes suas fortunas exercitus Romanorum contulit: praesidi tantum est, ut ne murus quidem cingi possit, neque quisquam egredi extra munitiones audeat."

SECTION 6.35.10
Oblata spe Germani quam nacti erant praedam in occulto relinquunt; ipsi Aduatucam contendunt usi eodem duce, cuius haec indicio cognoverant.

CHAPTER 6.36

SECTION 6.36.1
Cicero, qui omnes superiores dies praeceptis Caesaris cum summa diligentia milites in castris continuisset ac ne calonem quidem quemquam extra munitionem egredi passus esset, septimo die diffidens de numero dierum Caesarem fidem servaturum, quod longius progressum audiebat, neque ulla de reditu eius fama adferebatur, simul eorum permotus vocibus,

SECTION 6.36.2
qui illius patientiam paene obsessionem appellabant, siquidem ex castris egredi non liceret, nullum eiusmodi casum exspectans, quo novem oppositis legionibus maximoque equitatu dispersis ac paene deletis hostibus in milibus passuum tribus offendi posset, quinque cohortes frumentatum in proximas segetes mittit, quas inter et castra unus omnino collis intererat. Complures erant ex legionibus aegri relicti;

SECTION 6.36.3
ex quibus qui hoc spatio dierum convaluerant, circiter CCC, sub vexillo una mittuntur; magna praeterea multitudo calonum, magna vis iumentorum, quae in castris subsederant, facta potestate sequitur.

CHAPTER 6.37

SECTION 6.37.1
Hoc ipso tempore et casu Germani equites interveniunt protinusque eodem illo, quo venerant, cursu ab decumana porta in castra irrumpere conantur,

SECTION 6.37.2
nec prius sunt visi obiectis ab ea parte silvis, quam castris appropinquarent, usque eo ut qui sub vallo tenderent mercatores recipiendi sui facultatem non haberent.

SECTION 6.37.3
Inopinantes nostri re nova perturbantur, ac vix primum impetum cohors in statione sustinet.

SECTION 6.37.4
Circumfunduntur ex reliquis hostes partibus, si quem aditum reperire possent.

SECTION 6.37.5
Aegre portas nostri tuentur, reliquos aditus locus ipse per se munitioque defendit.

SECTION 6.37.6
Totis trepidatur castris, atque alius ex alio causam tumultus quaerit; neque quo signa ferantur neque quam in partem quisque conveniat provident.

SECTION 6.37.7
Alius iam castra capta pronuntiat, alius deleto exercitu atque imperatore victores barbaros venisse contendit;

SECTION 6.37.8
plerique novas sibi ex loco religiones fingunt Cottaeque et Tituri calamitatem, qui in eodem occiderint castello, ante oculos ponunt.

SECTION 6.37.9
Tali timore omnibus perterritis confirmatur opinio barbaris, ut ex captivo audierant, nullum esse intus praesidium.

SECTION 6.37.10
perrumpere nituntur seque ipsi adhortantur, ne tantam fortunam ex manibus dimittant.

CHAPTER 6.38

SECTION 6.38.1
Erat aeger cum praesidio relictus Publius Sextius Baculus, qui primum pilum ad Caesarem duxerat, cuius mentionem superioribus proeliis fecimus, ac diem iam quintum cibo caruerat.

SECTION 6.38.2
Hic diffisus suae atque omnium saluti inermis ex tabernaculo prodit: videt imminere hostes atque in summo esse rem discrimine: capit arma a proximis atque in porta consistit:

SECTION 6.38.3
consequuntur hunc centuriones eius cohortis quae in statione erat: paulisper una proelium sustinent.

SECTION 6.38.4
Relinquit animus Sextium gravibus acceptis vulneribus: aegre per manus tractus servatur.

SECTION 6.38.5
Hoc spatio interposito reliqui sese confirmant tantum, ut in munitionibus consistere audeant speciemque defensorum praebeant.

CHAPTER 6.39

SECTION 6.39.1
Interim confecta frumentatione milites nostri clamorem exaudiunt: praecurrunt equites; quanto res sit in periculo cognoscunt.

SECTION 6.39.2
Hic vero nulla munitio est quae perterritos recipiat: modo conscripti atque usus militaris imperiti ad tribunum militum centurionesque ora convertunt; quid ab his praecipiatur exspectant. Nemo est tam fortis quin rei novitate perturbetur.

SECTION 6.39.3
Barbari signa procul conspicati oppugnatione desistunt:

SECTION 6.39.4
redisse primo legiones credunt, quas longius discessisse ex captivis cognoverant; postea despecta paucitate ex omnibus partibus impetum faciunt.

CHAPTER 6.40

SECTION 6.40.1
Calones in proximum tumulum procurrunt. Hinc celeriter deiecti se in signa manipulosque coniciunt: eo magis timidos perterrent milites.

SECTION 6.40.2
Alii cuneo facto ut celeriter perrumpant censent, quoniam tam propinqua sint castra, et si pars aliqua circumventa ceciderit, at reliquos servari posse confidunt;

SECTION 6.40.3
alii, ut in iugo consistant atque eundem omnes ferant casum.

SECTION 6.40.4
Hoc veteres non probant milites, quos sub vexillo una profectos docuimus. Itaque inter se cohortati duce Gaio Trebonio, equite Romano, qui eis erat praepositus, per medios hostes perrumpunt incolumesque ad unum omnes in castra perveniunt.

SECTION 6.40.5
Hos subsecuti calones equitesque eodem impetu militum virtute servantur.

SECTION 6.40.6
At ei qui in iugo constiterant, nullo etiam nunc usu rei militaris percepto neque in eo quod probaverant consilio permanere, ut se loco superiore defenderent, neque eam quam prodesse aliis vim celeritatemque viderant imitari potuerunt, sed se in castra recipere conati iniquum in locum demiserunt.

SECTION 6.40.7
Centuriones, quorum nonnulli ex inferioribus ordinibus reliquarum legionum virtutis causa in superiores erant ordines huius legionis traducti, ne ante partam rei militaris laudem amitterent, fortissime pugnantes conciderunt.

SECTION 6.40.8
Militum pars horum virtute summotis hostibus praeter spem incolumis in castra pervenit, pars a barbaris circumventa periit.

CHAPTER 6.41

SECTION 6.41.1
Germani desperata expugnatione castrorum, quod nostros iam constitisse in munitionibus videbant, cum ea praeda quam in silvis deposuerant trans Rhenum sese receperunt.

SECTION 6.41.2
Ac tantus fuit etiam post discessum hostium terror ut ea nocte, cum Gaius Volusenus missus cum equitatu ad castra venisset, fidem non faceret adesse cum incolumi Caesarem exercitu.

SECTION 6.41.3
Sic omnino animos timor praeoccupaverat ut paene alienata mente deletis omnibus copiis equitatum se ex fuga recepisse dicerent neque incolumi exercitu Germanos castra oppugnaturos fuisse contenderent.

SECTION 6.41.4
Quem timorem Caesaris adventus sustulit.

CHAPTER 6.42

SECTION 6.42.1
Reversus ille eventus belli non ignorans unum, quod cohortes ex statione et praesidio essent emissae, questus ne minimo quidem casu locum relinqui debuisse, multum fortunam in repentino hostium adventu potuisse iudicavit,

SECTION 6.42.2
multo etiam amplius, quod paene ab ipso vallo portisque castrorum barbaros avertisset. quarum omnium rerum maxime admirandum videbatur,

SECTION 6.42.3
quod Germani, qui eo consilio Rhenum transierant, ut Ambiorigis fines depopularentur, ad castra Romanorum delati optatissimum Ambiorigi beneficium obtulerunt.

CHAPTER 6.43

SECTION 6.43.1
Caesar rursus ad vexandos hostes profectus magno coacto numero ex finitimis civitatibus in omnes partes dimittit.

SECTION 6.43.2
Omnes vici atque omnia aedificia quae quisque conspexerat incendebantur; praeda ex omnibus locis agebatur;

SECTION 6.43.3
frumenta non solum tanta multitudine iumentorum atque hominum consumebantur, sed etiam anni tempore atque imbribus procubuerant ut, si qui etiam in praesentia se occultassent, tamen his deducto exercitu rerum omnium inopia pereundum videretur.

SECTION 6.43.4
Ac saepe in eum locum ventum est tanto in omnes partes diviso equitatu, ut modo visum ab se Ambiorigem in fuga circumspicerent captivi nec plane etiam abisse ex conspectu contenderent, ut spe consequendi illata atque infinito labore suscepto,

SECTION 6.43.5
qui se summam ab Caesare gratiam inituros putarent, paene naturam studio vincerent, semperque paulum ad summam felicitatem defuisse videretur,

SECTION 6.43.6
atque ille latebris aut saltibus se eriperet et noctu occultatus alias regiones partesque peteret non maiore equitum praesidio quam quattuor, quibus solis vitam suam committere audebat.

CHAPTER 6.44

SECTION 6.44.1
Tali modo vastatis regionibus exercitum Caesar duarum cohortium damno Durocortorum Remorum reducit concilioque in eum locum Galliae indicto de coniuratione Senonum et Carnutum quaestionem habere instituit et de Accone, qui princeps eius consili fuerat,

SECTION 6.44.2
graviore sententia pronuntiata more maiorum supplicium sumpsit.

SECTION 6.44.3
Non nulli iudicium veriti profugerunt. Quibus cum aqua atque igni interdixisset, duas legiones ad fines Treverorum, duas in Lingonibus, sex reliquas in Senonum finibus Agedinci in hibernis collocavit frumentoque exercitui proviso, ut instituerat, in Italiam ad conventus agendos profectus est.

### Book 7

CHAPTER 7.1

SECTION 7.1.1
Quieta Gallia Caesar, ut constituerat, in Italiam ad conventus agendos proficiscitur. Ibi cognoscit de Clodii caede [de] senatusque consulto certior factus, ut omnes iuniores Italiae coniurarent, delectum tota provincia habere instituit.

SECTION 7.1.2
Eae res in Galliam Transalpinam celeriter perferuntur. Addunt ipsi et adfingunt rumoribus Galli, quod res poscere videbatur, retineri urbano motu Caesarem neque in tantis dissensionibus ad exercitum venire posse.

SECTION 7.1.3
Hac impulsi occasione, qui iam ante se populi Romani imperio subiectos dolerent liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipiunt.

SECTION 7.1.4
Indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis silvestribus ac remotis locis queruntur de Acconis morte;

SECTION 7.1.5
posse hunc casum ad ipsos recidere demonstrant: miserantur communem Galliae fortunam: omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemiis deposcunt qui belli initium faciant et sui capitis periculo Galliam in libertatem vindicent.

SECTION 7.1.6
In primis rationem esse habendam dicunt, priusquam eorum clandestina consilia efferantur, ut Caesar ab exercitu intercludatur. Id esse facile,

SECTION 7.1.7
quod neque legiones audeant absente imperatore ex hibernis egredi, neque imperator sine praesidio ad legiones pervenire possit;

SECTION 7.1.8
postremo in acie praestare interfici quam non veterem belli gloriam libertatemque quam a maioribus acceperint recuperare.

CHAPTER 7.2

SECTION 7.2.1
His rebus agitatis profitentur Carnutes se nullum periculum communis salutis causa recusare principesque ex omnibus bellum facturos pollicentur et,

SECTION 7.2.2
quoniam in praesentia obsidibus cavere inter se non possint ne res efferatur, ut iureiurando ac fide sanciatur, petunt, collatis militaribus signis, quo more eorum gravissima caerimonia continetur, ne facto initio belli ab reliquis deserantur.

SECTION 7.2.3
Tum collaudatis Carnutibus, dato iureiurando ab omnibus qui aderant, tempore eius rei constituto ab concilio disceditur.

CHAPTER 7.3

SECTION 7.3.1
Vbi ea dies venit, Carnutes Cotuato et Conconnetodumno ducibus, desperatis hominibus, Cenabum signo dato concurrunt civesque Romanos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant, in his Gaium Fufium Citam, honestum equitem Romanum, qui rei frumentariae iussu Caesaris praeerat, interficiunt bonaque eorum diripiunt.

SECTION 7.3.2
Celeriter ad omnes Galliae civitates fama perfertur. Nam ubicumque maior atque illustrior incidit res, clamore per agros regionesque significant; hunc alii deinceps excipiunt et proximis tradunt, ut tum accidit.

SECTION 7.3.3
Nam quae Cenabi oriente sole gesta essent, ante primam confectam vigiliam in finibus Arvernorum audita sunt, quod spatium est milium passuum circiter centum LX.

CHAPTER 7.4

SECTION 7.4.1
Simili ratione ibi Vercingetorix, Celtilli filius, Arvernus, summae potentiae adulescens, cuius pater principatum Galliae totius obtinuerat et ob eam causam, quod regnum appetebat, ab civitate erat interfectus, convocatis suis clientibus facile incendit.

SECTION 7.4.2
Cognito eius consilio ad arma concurritur. Prohibetur ab Gobannitione, patruo suo, reliquisque principibus, qui hanc temptandam fortunam non existimabant; expellitur ex oppido Gergovia;

SECTION 7.4.3
non destitit tamen atque in agris habet dilectum egentium ac perditorum. Hac coacta manu, quoscumque adit ex civitate ad suam sententiam perducit;

SECTION 7.4.4
hortatur ut communis libertatis causa arma capiant, magnisque coactis copiis adversarios suos a quibus paulo ante erat eiectus expellit ex civitate.

SECTION 7.4.5
Rex ab suis appellatur. Dimittit quoque versus legationes; obtestatur ut in fide maneant.

SECTION 7.4.6
Celeriter sibi Senones, Parisios, Pictones, Cadurcos, Turonos, Aulercos, Lemovices, Andos reliquosque omnes qui Oceanum attingunt adiungit: omnium consensu ad eum defertur imperium.

SECTION 7.4.7
Qua oblata potestate omnibus his civitatibus obsides imperat, certum numerum militum ad se celeriter adduci iubet,

SECTION 7.4.8
armorum quantum quaeque civitas domi quodque ante tempus efficiat constituit; in primis equitatui studet.

SECTION 7.4.9
Summae diligentiae summam imperi severitatem addit; magnitudine supplici dubitantes cogit.

SECTION 7.4.10
nam maiore commisso delicto igni atque omnibus tormentis necat, leviore de causa auribus desectis aut singulis effossis oculis domum remittit, ut sint reliquis documento et magnitudine poenae perterreant alios.

CHAPTER 7.5

SECTION 7.5.1
His suppliciis celeriter coacto exercitu Lucterium Cadurcum, summae hominem audaciae, cum parte copiarum in Rutenos mittit; ipse in Bituriges proficiscitur. Eius adventu Bituriges ad Aeduos,

SECTION 7.5.2
quorum erant in fide, legatos mittunt subsidium rogatum, quo facilius hostium copias sustinere possint.

SECTION 7.5.3
Aedui de consilio legatorum, quos Caesar ad exercitum reliquerat, copias equitatus peditatusque subsidio Biturigibus mittunt.

SECTION 7.5.4
Qui cum ad flumen Ligerim venissent, quod Bituriges ab Aeduis dividit, paucos dies ibi morati neque flumen transire

SECTION 7.5.5
ausi domum revertuntur legatisque nostris renuntiant se Biturigum perfidiam veritos revertisse, quibus id consili fuisse cognoverint, ut, si flumen transissent, una ex parte ipsi, altera Arverni se circumsisterent.

SECTION 7.5.6
Id eane de causa, quam legatis pronuntiarunt, an perfidia adducti fecerint, quod nihil nobis constat, non videtur pro certo esse proponendum.

SECTION 7.5.7
Bituriges eorum discessu statim cum Arvernis iunguntur.

CHAPTER 7.6

SECTION 7.6.1
His rebus in Italiam Caesari nuntiatis, cum iam ille urbanas res virtute Cn. Pompei commodiorem in statum pervenisse intellegeret, in Transalpinam Galliam profectus est.

SECTION 7.6.2
Eo cum venisset, magna difficultate adficiebatur, qua ratione ad exercitum pervenire posset.

SECTION 7.6.3
Nam si legiones in provinciam arcesseret, se absente in itinere proelio dimicaturas intellegebat;

SECTION 7.6.4
si ipse ad exercitum contenderet, ne eis quidem eo tempore qui quieti viderentur suam salutem recte committi videbat.

CHAPTER 7.7

SECTION 7.7.1
Interim Lucterius Cadurcus in Rutenos missus eam civitatem Arvernis conciliat.

SECTION 7.7.2
Progressus in Nitiobriges et Gabalos ab utrisque obsides accipit et magna coacta manu in provinciam Narbonem versus eruptionem facere contendit.

SECTION 7.7.3
Qua re nuntiata Caesar omnibus consiliis antevertendum existimavit, ut Narbonem proficisceretur.

SECTION 7.7.4
Eo cum venisset, timentes confirmat, praesidia in Rutenis provincialibus, Volcis Arecomicis, Tolosatibus circumque Narbonem, quae loca hostibus erant finitima, constituit;

SECTION 7.7.5
partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque, quod ex Italia adduxerat, in Helvios, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire iubet.

CHAPTER 7.8

SECTION 7.8.1
His rebus comparatis, represso iam Lucterio et remoto, quod intrare intra praesidia periculosum putabat, in Helvios proficiscitur.

SECTION 7.8.2
Etsi mons Cevenna, qui Arvernos ab Helviis discludit, durissimo tempore anni altissima nive iter impediebat, tamen discussa nive sex in altitudinem pedum atque ita viis patefactis summo militum sudore ad fines Arvernorum pervenit.

SECTION 7.8.3
Quibus oppressis inopinantibus, quod se Cevenna ut muro munitos existimabant, ac ne singulari quidem umquam homini eo tempore anni semitae patuerant, equitibus imperat, ut quam latissime possint vagentur et quam maximum hostibus terrorem inferant.

SECTION 7.8.4
Celeriter haec fama ac nuntiis ad Vercingetorigem perferuntur; quem perterriti omnes Arverni circumsistunt atque obsecrant, ut suis fortunis consulat, neve ab hostibus diripiantur, praesertim cum videat omne ad se bellum translatum.

SECTION 7.8.5
Quorum ille precibus permotus castra ex Biturigibus movet in Arvernos versus.

CHAPTER 7.9

SECTION 7.9.1
At Caesar biduum in his locis moratus, quod haec de Vercingetorige usu ventura opinione praeceperat, per causam supplementi equitatusque cogendi ab exercitu discedit; Brutum adulescentem his copiis praeficit;

SECTION 7.9.2
hunc monet, ut in omnes partes equites quam latissime pervagentur: daturum se operam, ne longius triduo ab castris absit.

SECTION 7.9.3
His constitutis rebus suis inopinantibus quam maximis potest itineribus Viennam pervenit.

SECTION 7.9.4
Ibi nactus recentem equitatum, quem multis ante diebus eo praemiserat, neque diurno neque nocturno itinere intermisso per fines Aeduorum in Lingones contendit, ubi duae legiones hiemabant, ut, si quid etiam de sua salute ab Aeduis iniretur consili, celeritate praecurreret.

SECTION 7.9.5
Eo cum pervenisset, ad reliquas legiones mittit priusque omnes in unum locum cogit quam de eius adventu Arvernis nuntiari posset.

SECTION 7.9.6
Hac re cognita Vercingetorix rursus in Bituriges exercitum reducit atque inde profectus Gorgobinam, Boiorum oppidum, quos ibi Helvetico proelio victos Caesar collocaverat Aeduisque attribuerat, oppugnare instituit.

CHAPTER 7.10

SECTION 7.10.1
Magnam haec res Caesari difficultatem ad consilium capiendum adferebat, si reliquam partem hiemis uno loco legiones contineret, ne stipendiariis Aeduorum expugnatis cuncta Gallia deficeret, quod nullum amicis in eo praesidium videretur positum esse; si maturius ex hibernis educeret, ne ab re frumentaria duris subvectionibus laboraret.

SECTION 7.10.2
Praestare visum est tamen omnis difficultates perpeti, quam tanta contumelia accepta omnium suorum voluntates alienare.

SECTION 7.10.3
Itaque cohortatus Aeduos de supportando commeatu praemittit ad Boios qui de suo adventu doceant hortenturque ut in fide maneant atque hostium impetum magno animo sustineant.

SECTION 7.10.4
Duabus Agedinci legionibus atque impedimentis totius exercitus relictis ad Boios proficiscitur.

CHAPTER 7.11

SECTION 7.11.1
Altero die cum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset, ne quem post se hostem relinqueret, quo expeditiore re frumentaria uteretur, oppugnare instituit idque biduo circumvallavit;

SECTION 7.11.2
tertio die missis ex oppido legatis de deditione arma conferri, iumenta produci, sescentos obsides dari iubet.

SECTION 7.11.3
Ea qui conficeret, C. Trebonium legatum relinquit. Ipse, ut quam primum iter faceret, Cenabum Carnutum proficiscitur;

SECTION 7.11.4
qui tum primum allato nuntio de oppugnatione Vellaunoduni, cum longius eam rem ductum iri existimarent, praesidium Cenabi tuendi causa, quod eo mitterent, comparabant. Huc biduo pervenit.

SECTION 7.11.5
Castris ante oppidum positis diei tempore exclusus in posterum oppugnationem differt quaeque ad eam rem usui sint militibus imperat

SECTION 7.11.6
et, quod oppidum Cenabum pons fluminis Ligeris contingebat, veritus ne noctu ex oppido profugerent, duas legiones in armis excubare iubet.

SECTION 7.11.7
Cenabenses paulo ante mediam noctem silentio ex oppido egressi flumen transire coeperunt. Qua re per exploratores nuntiata Caesar legiones

SECTION 7.11.8
quas expeditas esse iusserat portis incensis intromittit atque oppido potitur, perpaucis ex hostium numero desideratis quin cuncti caperentur, quod pontis atque itinerum angustiae multitudinis fugam intercluserant.

SECTION 7.11.9
Oppidum diripit atque incendit, praedam militibus donat, exercitum Ligerem traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit.

CHAPTER 7.12

SECTION 7.12.1
Vercingetorix, ubi de Caesaris adventu cognovit, oppugnatione destitit atque obviam Caesari proficiscitur.

SECTION 7.12.2
Ille oppidum Biturigum positum in via Noviodunum oppugnare instituerat.

SECTION 7.12.3
Quo ex oppido cum legati ad eum venissent oratum ut sibi ignosceret suaeque vitae consuleret, ut celeritate reliquas res conficeret, qua pleraque erat consecutus, arma conferri, equos produci, obsides dari iubet.

SECTION 7.12.4
Parte iam obsidum tradita, cum reliqua administrarentur, centurionibus et paucis militibus intromissis, qui arma iumentaque conquirerent, equitatus hostium procul visus est, qui agmen Vercingetorigis antecesserat.

SECTION 7.12.5
Quem simul atque oppidani conspexerunt atque in spem auxili venerunt, clamore sublato arma capere, portas claudere, murum complere coeperunt. Centuriones in oppido,

SECTION 7.12.6
cum ex significatione Gallorum novi aliquid ab eis iniri consili intellexissent, gladiis destrictis portas occupaverunt suosque omnes incolumes receperunt.

CHAPTER 7.13

SECTION 7.13.1
Caesar ex castris equitatum educi iubet, proelium equestre committit: laborantibus iam suis Germanos equites circiter CCCC summittit, quos ab initio habere secum instituerat.

SECTION 7.13.2
Eorum impetum Galli sustinere non potuerunt atque in fugam coniecti multis amissis se ad agmen receperunt. Quibus profligatis rursus oppidani perterriti comprehensos eos, quorum opera plebem concitatam existimabant, ad Caesarem perduxerunt seseque ei dediderunt.

SECTION 7.13.3
Quibus rebus confectis, Caesar ad oppidum Avaricum, quod erat maximum munitissimumque in finibus Biturigum atque agri fertilissima regione, profectus est, quod eo oppido recepto civitatem Biturigum se in potestatem redacturum confidebat.

CHAPTER 7.14

SECTION 7.14.1
Vercingetorix tot continuis incommodis Vellaunoduni, Cenabi, Novioduni acceptis suos ad concilium convocat.

SECTION 7.14.2
Docet longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea gestum sit. Omnibus modis huic rei studendum, ut pabulatione et commeatu Romani prohibeantur:

SECTION 7.14.3
id esse facile, quod equitatu ipsi abundent et quod anni tempore subleventur;

SECTION 7.14.4
pabulum secari non posse; necessario dispersos hostes ex aedificiis petere: hos omnes cotidie ab equitibus deligi posse.

SECTION 7.14.5
Praeterea salutis causa rei familiaris commoda neglegenda: vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere hoc spatio ab via quoque versus, quo pabulandi causa adire posse videantur. Harum ipsis rerum copiam suppetere,

SECTION 7.14.6
quod, quorum in finibus bellum geratur, eorum opibus subleventur:

SECTION 7.14.7
Romanos aut inopiam non laturos aut magno periculo longius ab castris processuros;

SECTION 7.14.8
neque interesse, ipsosne interficiant, impedimentisne exuant, quibus amissis bellum geri non possit.

SECTION 7.14.9
Praeterea oppida incendi oportere, quae non munitione et loci natura ab omni sint periculo tuta, neu suis sint ad detractandam militiam receptacula neu Romanis proposita ad copiam commeatus praedamque tollendam.

SECTION 7.14.10
haec si gravia aut acerba videantur, multo illa gravius aestimare, liberos, coniuges in servitutem abstrahi, ipsos interfici; quae sit necesse accidere victis.

CHAPTER 7.15

SECTION 7.15.1
Omnium consensu hac sententia probata uno die amplius XX urbes Biturigum incenduntur.

SECTION 7.15.2
Hoc idem fit in reliquis civitatibus: in omnibus partibus incendia conspiciuntur; quae etsi magno cum dolore omnes ferebant, tamen hoc sibi solati proponebant, quod se prope explorata victoria celeriter amissa reciperaturos confidebant.

SECTION 7.15.3
Deliberatur de Avarico in communi concilio, incendi placeret an defendi.

SECTION 7.15.4
Procumbunt omnibus Gallis ad pedes Bituriges, ne pulcherrimam prope totius Galliae urbem, quae praesidio et ornamento sit civitati, suis manibus succendere cogerentur:

SECTION 7.15.5
facile se loci natura defensuros dicunt, quod prope ex omnibus partibus flumine et palude circumdata unum habeat et perangustum aditum.

SECTION 7.15.6
Datur petentibus venia dissuadente primo Vercingetorige, post concedente et precibus ipsorum et misericordia vulgi. Defensores oppido idonei deliguntur.

CHAPTER 7.16

SECTION 7.16.1
Vercingetorix minoribus Caesarem itineribus subsequitur et locum castris deligit paludibus silvisque munitum ab Avarico longe milia passuum XVI.

SECTION 7.16.2
Ibi per certos exploratores in singula diei tempora quae ad Avaricum agerentur cognoscebat et quid fieri vellet imperabat.

SECTION 7.16.3
Omnis nostras pabulationes frumentationesque observabat dispersosque, cum longius necessario procederent, adoriebatur magnoque incommodo adficiebat, etsi, quantum ratione provideri poterat, ab nostris occurrebatur, ut incertis temporibus diversisque itineribus iretur.

CHAPTER 7.17

SECTION 7.17.1
Castris ad eam partem oppidi positis Caesar, quae intermissa [a] flumine et a paludibus aditum, ut supra diximus, angustum habebat, aggerem apparare, vineas agere, turres duas constituere coepit: nam circumvallare loci natura prohibebat.

SECTION 7.17.2
De re frumentaria Boios atque Aeduos adhortari non destitit; quorum alteri, quod nullo studio agebant, non multum adiuvabant, alteri non magnis facultatibus, quod civitas erat exigua et infirma, celeriter quod habuerunt consumpserunt.

SECTION 7.17.3
Summa difficultate rei frumentariae adfecto exercitu tenuitate Boiorum, indiligentia Aeduorum, incendiis aedificiorum, usque eo ut complures dies frumento milites caruerint et pecore ex longinquioribus vicis adacto extremam famem sustentarent, nulla tamen vox est ab eis audita populi Romani maiestate et superioribus victoriis indigna.

SECTION 7.17.4
Quin etiam Caesar cum in opere singulas legiones appellaret et, si acerbius inopiam ferrent, se dimissurum oppugnationem diceret, universi ab eo, ne id faceret, petebant:

SECTION 7.17.5
sic se complures annos illo imperante meruisse, ut nullam ignominiam acciperent, nusquam infecta re discederent:

SECTION 7.17.6
hoc se ignominiae laturos loco, si inceptam oppugnationem reliquissent:

SECTION 7.17.7
praestare omnes perferre acerbitates, quam non civibus Romanis, qui Cenabi perfidia Gallorum interissent, parentarent.

SECTION 7.17.8
Haec eadem centurionibus tribunisque militum mandabant, ut per eos ad Caesarem deferrentur.

CHAPTER 7.18

SECTION 7.18.1
Cum iam muro turres appropinquassent, ex captivis Caesar cognovit Vercingetorigem consumpto pabulo castra movisse propius Avaricum atque ipsum cum equitatu expeditisque, qui inter equites proeliari consuessent, insidiarum causa eo profectum, quo nostros postero die pabulatum venturos arbitraretur.

SECTION 7.18.2
Quibus rebus cognitis media nocte silentio profectus ad hostium castra mane pervenit.

SECTION 7.18.3
Illi celeriter per exploratores adventu Caesaris cognito carros impedimentaque sua in artiores silvas abdiderunt, copias omnes in loco edito atque aperto instruxerunt.

SECTION 7.18.4
Qua re nuntiata Caesar celeriter sarcinas conferri, arma expediri iussit.

CHAPTER 7.19

SECTION 7.19.1
Collis erat leniter ab infimo acclivis. Hunc ex omnibus fere partibus palus difficilis atque impedita cingebat non latior pedibus quinquaginta.

SECTION 7.19.2
Hoc se colle interruptis pontibus Galli fiducia loci continebant generatimque distributi in civitates omnia vada ac saltus eius paludis obtinebant,

SECTION 7.19.3
sic animo parati, ut, si eam paludem Romani perrumpere conarentur, haesitantes premerent ex loco superiore; ut qui propinquitatem loci videret paratos prope aequo Marte ad dimicandum existimaret, qui iniquitatem condicionis perspiceret inani simulatione sese ostentare cognosceret.

SECTION 7.19.4
Indignantes milites Caesar, quod conspectum suum hostes perferre possent tantulo spatio interiecto, et signum proeli exposcentes edocet, quanto detrimento et quot virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare victoriam; quos cum sic animo paratos videat,

SECTION 7.19.5
ut nullum pro sua laude periculum recusent, summae se iniquitatis condemnari debere, nisi eorum vitam sua salute habeat cariorem.

SECTION 7.19.6
Sic milites consolatus eodem die reducit in castra reliquaque quae ad oppugnationem pertinebant oppidi administrare instituit.

CHAPTER 7.20

SECTION 7.20.1
Vercingetorix, cum ad suos redisset, proditionis insimulatus, quod castra propius Romanos movisset, quod cum omni equitatu discessisset, quod sine imperio tantas copias reliquisset, quod eius discessu Romani tanta opportunitate et celeritate venissent:

SECTION 7.20.2
non haec omnia fortuito aut sine consilio accidere potuisse; regnum illum Galliae malle Caesaris concessu quam ipsorum habere beneficio—:

SECTION 7.20.3
tali modo accusatus ad haec respondit: Quod castra movisset, factum inopia pabuli etiam ipsis hortantibus; quod propius Romanos accessisset, persuasum loci opportunitate, qui se ipsum munitione defenderet:

SECTION 7.20.4
equitum vero operam neque in loco palustri desiderari debuisse et illic fuisse utilem, quo sint profecti.

SECTION 7.20.5
Summam imperi se consulto nulli discedentem tradidisse, ne is multitudinis studio ad dimicandum impelleretur; cui rei propter animi mollitiem studere omnes videret, quod diutius laborem ferre non possent.

SECTION 7.20.6
Romani si casu intervenerint, fortunae, si alicuius indicio vocati, huic habendam gratiam, quod et paucitatem eorum ex loco superiore cognoscere et virtutem despicere potuerint, qui dimicare non ausi turpiter se in castra receperint.

SECTION 7.20.7
Imperium se ab Caesare per proditionem nullum desiderare, quod habere victoria posset, quae iam esset sibi atque omnibus Gallis explorata: quin etiam ipsis remittere, si sibi magis honorem tribuere, quam ab se salutem accipere videantur.

SECTION 7.20.8
"Haec ut intellegatis," inquit, "a me sincere pronuntiari, audite Romanos milites." Producit servos,

SECTION 7.20.9
quos in pabulatione paucis ante diebus exceperat et fame vinculisque excruciaverat. Hi iam ante edocti quae interrogati pronuntiarent,

SECTION 7.20.10
milites se esse legionarios dicunt; fame et inopia adductos clam ex castris exisse, si quid frumenti aut pecoris in agris reperire possent:

SECTION 7.20.11
simili omnem exercitum inopia premi, nec iam vires sufficere cuiusquam nec ferre operis laborem posse: itaque statuisse imperatorem, si nihil in oppugnatione oppidi profecissent, triduo exercitum deducere. "Haec," inquit, "a me," Vercingetorix, "beneficia habetis,

SECTION 7.20.12
quem proditionis insimulatis; cuius opera sine vestro sanguine tantum exercitum victorem fame consumptum videtis; quem turpiter se ex fuga recipientem ne qua civitas suis finibus recipiat a me provisum est."

CHAPTER 7.21

SECTION 7.21.1
Conclamat omnis multitudo et suo more armis concrepat, quod facere in eo consuerunt cuius orationem approbant: summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem, nec de eius fide dubitandum, nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse.

SECTION 7.21.2
Statuunt, ut X milia hominum delecta ex omnibus copiis in oppidum mittantur,

SECTION 7.21.3
nec solis Biturigibus communem salutem committendam censent, quod paene in eo, si id oppidum retinuissent, summam victoriae constare intellegebant.

CHAPTER 7.22

SECTION 7.22.1
Singulari militum nostrorum virtuti consilia cuiusque modi Gallorum occurrebant, ut est summae genus sollertiae atque ad omnia imitanda et efficienda, quae ab quoque traduntur, aptissimum.

SECTION 7.22.2
Nam et laqueis falces avertebant, quas, cum destinaverant, tormentis introrsus reducebant, et aggerem cuniculis subtrahebant, eo scientius quod apud eos magnae sunt ferrariae atque omne genus cuniculorum notum atque usitatum est.

SECTION 7.22.3
Totum autem murum ex omni parte turribus contabulaverant atque has coriis intexerant.

SECTION 7.22.4
Tum crebris diurnis nocturnisque eruptionibus aut aggeri ignem inferebant aut milites occupatos in opere adoriebantur, et nostrarum turrium altitudinem, quantum has cotidianus agger expresserat,

SECTION 7.22.5
commissis suarum turrium malis adaequabant, et apertos cuniculos praeusta et praeacuta materia et pice fervefacta et maximi ponderis saxis morabantur moenibusque appropinquare prohibebant.

CHAPTER 7.23

SECTION 7.23.1
Muri autem omnes Gallici hac fere forma sunt. Trabes derectae perpetuae in longitudinem paribus intervallis, distantes inter se binos pedes, in solo collocantur.

SECTION 7.23.2
Hae revinciuntur introrsus et multo aggere vestiuntur: ea autem, quae diximus, intervalla grandibus in fronte saxis effarciuntur.

SECTION 7.23.3
His collocatis et coagmentatis alius insuper ordo additur, ut idem illud intervallum servetur neque inter se contingant trabes, sed paribus intermissae spatiis singulae singulis saxis interiectis arte contineantur.

SECTION 7.23.4
Sic deinceps omne opus contexitur, dum iusta muri altitudo expleatur.

SECTION 7.23.5
Hoc cum in speciem varietatemque opus deforme non est alternis trabibus ac saxis, quae rectis lineis suos ordines servant, tum ad utilitatem et defensionem urbium summam habet opportunitatem, quod et ab incendio lapis et ab ariete materia defendit, quae perpetuis trabibus pedes quadragenos plerumque introrsus revincta neque perrumpi neque distrahi potest.

CHAPTER 7.24

SECTION 7.24.1
His tot rebus impedita oppugnatione milites, cum toto tempore frigore et assiduis imbribus tardarentur, tamen continenti labore omnia haec superaverunt et diebus XXV aggerem latum pedes CCCXXX, altum pedes LXXX exstruxerunt.

SECTION 7.24.2
Cum is murum hostium paene contingeret, et Caesar ad opus consuetudine excubaret militesque hortaretur, ne quod omnino tempus ab opere intermitteretur, paulo ante tertiam vigiliam est animadversum fumare aggerem, quem cuniculo hostes succenderant,

SECTION 7.24.3
eodemque tempore toto muro clamore sublato duabus portis ab utroque latere turrium eruptio fiebat.

SECTION 7.24.4
Alii faces atque aridam materiem de muro in aggerem eminus iaciebant, picem reliquasque res, quibus ignis excitari potest, fundebant, ut quo primum curreretur aut cui rei ferretur auxilium vix ratio iniri posset.

SECTION 7.24.5
Tamen, quod instituto Caesaris semper duae legiones pro castris excubabant pluresque partitis temporibus erant in opere, celeriter factum est, ut alii eruptionibus resisterent, alii turres reducerent aggeremque interscinderent, omnis vero ex castris multitudo ad restinguendum concurreret.

CHAPTER 7.25

SECTION 7.25.1
Cum in omnibus locis consumpta iam reliqua parte noctis pugnaretur, semperque hostibus spes victoriae redintegraretur, eo magis, quod deustos pluteos turrium videbant nec facile adire apertos ad auxiliandum animadvertebant, semperque ipsi recentes defessis succederent omnemque Galliae salutem in illo vestigio temporis positam arbitrarentur, accidit inspectantibus nobis quod dignum memoria visum praetereundum non existimavimus.

SECTION 7.25.2
Quidam ante portam oppidi Gallus per manus sebi ac picis traditas glebas in ignem e regione turris proiciebat: scorpione ab latere dextro traiectus exanimatusque concidit.

SECTION 7.25.3
Hunc ex proximis unus iacentem transgressus eodem illo munere fungebatur;

SECTION 7.25.4
eadem ratione ictu scorpionis exanimato alteri successit tertius et tertio quartus, nec prius ille est a propugnatoribus vacuus relictus locus quam restincto aggere atque omni ex parte summotis hostibus finis est pugnandi factus.

CHAPTER 7.26

SECTION 7.26.1
Omnia experti Galli, quod res nulla successerat, postero die consilium ceperunt ex oppido profugere hortante et iubente Vercingetorige.

SECTION 7.26.2
Id silentio noctis conati non magna iactura suorum sese effecturos sperabant, propterea quod neque longe ab oppido castra Vercingetorigis aberant, et palus, quae perpetua intercedebat, Romanos ad insequendum tardabat.

SECTION 7.26.3
Iamque hoc facere noctu apparabant, cum matres familiae repente in publicum procurrerunt flentesque proiectae ad pedes suorum omnibus precibus petierunt, ne se et communes liberos hostibus ad supplicium dederent, quos ad capiendam fugam naturae et virium infirmitas impediret.

SECTION 7.26.4
Vbi eos in sententia perstare viderunt, quod plerumque in summo periculo timor misericordiam non recipit, conclamare et significare de fuga Romanis coeperunt.

SECTION 7.26.5
Quo timore perterriti Galli, ne ab equitatu Romanorum viae praeoccuparentur, consilio destiterunt.

CHAPTER 7.27

SECTION 7.27.1
Postero die Caesar promota turri perfectisque operibus quae facere instituerat, magno coorto imbre non inutilem hanc ad capiendum consilium tempestatem arbitratus est, quod paulo incautius custodias in muro dispositas videbat, suosque languidius in opere versari iussit et quid fieri vellet ostendit.

SECTION 7.27.2
Legionibusque intra vineas in occulto expeditis, cohortatus ut aliquando pro tantis laboribus fructum victoriae perciperent, eis qui primi murum ascendissent praemia proposuit militibusque signum dedit.

SECTION 7.27.3
Illi subito ex omnibus partibus evolaverunt murumque celeriter compleverunt.

CHAPTER 7.28

SECTION 7.28.1
Hostes re nova perterriti muro turribusque deiecti in foro ac locis patentioribus cuneatim constiterunt, hoc animo ut si qua ex parte obviam contra veniretur acie instructa depugnarent.

SECTION 7.28.2
Vbi neminem in aequum locum sese demittere, sed toto undique muro circumfundi viderunt, veriti ne omnino spes fugae tolleretur, abiectis armis ultimas oppidi partes continenti impetu petiverunt,

SECTION 7.28.3
parsque ibi, cum angusto exitu portarum se ipsi premerent, a militibus, pars iam egressa portis ab equitibus est interfecta;

SECTION 7.28.4
nec fuit quisquam, qui praedae studeret. Sic et Cenabi caede et labore operis incitati non aetate confectis, non mulieribus, non infantibus pepercerunt.

SECTION 7.28.5
Denique ex omni numero, qui fuit circiter milium XL, vix DCCC, qui primo clamore audito se ex oppido eiecerunt, incolumes ad Vercingetorigem pervenerunt.

SECTION 7.28.6
Quos ille multa iam nocte silentio ex fuga excepit, veritus ne qua in castris ex eorum concursu et misericordia vulgi seditio oreretur, ut procul in via dispositis familiaribus suis principibusque civitatum disparandos deducendosque ad suos curaret, quae cuique civitati pars castrorum ab initio obvenerat.

CHAPTER 7.29

SECTION 7.29.1
Postero die concilio convocato consolatus cohortatusque est ne se admodum animo demitterent, ne perturbarentur incommodo;

SECTION 7.29.2
non virtute neque in acie vicisse Romanos, sed artificio quodam et scientia oppugnationis, cuius rei fuerint ipsi imperiti;

SECTION 7.29.3
errare, si qui in bello omnes secundos rerum proventus exspectent.

SECTION 7.29.4
Sibi numquam placuisse Avaricum defendi, cuius rei testes ipsos haberet; sed factum imprudentia Biturigum et nimia obsequentia reliquorum uti hoc incommodum acciperetur;

SECTION 7.29.5
id tamen se celeriter maioribus commodis sanaturum.

SECTION 7.29.6
Nam quae ab reliquis Gallis civitates dissentirent, has sua diligentia adiuncturum atque unum consilium totius Galliae effecturum, cuius consensui ne orbis quidem terrarum possit obsistere; idque se prope iam effectum habere.

SECTION 7.29.7
Interea aequum esse ab eis communis salutis causa impetrari ut castra munire instituerent, quo facilius repentinos hostium impetus sustinerent.

CHAPTER 7.30

SECTION 7.30.1
Fuit haec oratio non ingrata Gallis, et maxime, quod ipse animo non defecerat tanto accepto incommodo neque se in occultum abdiderat et conspectum multitudinis fugerat;

SECTION 7.30.2
plusque animo providere et praesentire existimabatur, quod re integra primo incendendum Avaricum, post deserendum censuerat.

SECTION 7.30.3
Itaque ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversae auctoritatem minuunt, sic huius ex contrario dignitas incommodo accepto in dies augebatur.

SECTION 7.30.4
Simul in spem veniebant eius adfirmatione de reliquis adiungendis civitatibus; primumque eo tempore Galli castra munire instituerunt et sic sunt animo confirmati, homines insueti laboris, ut omnia quae imperarentur sibi patienda existimarent.

CHAPTER 7.31

SECTION 7.31.1
Nec minus quam est pollicitus Vercingetorix animo laborabat ut reliquas civitates adiungeret, atque eas donis pollicitationibusque alliciebat. Huic rei idoneos homines deligebat,

SECTION 7.31.2
quorum quisque aut oratione subdola aut amicitia facillime capere posset. Qui Avarico expugnato refugerant,

SECTION 7.31.3
armandos vestiendosque curat;

SECTION 7.31.4
simul, ut deminutae copiae redintegrarentur, imperat certum numerum militum civitatibus, quem et quam ante diem in castra adduci velit, sagittariosque omnes, quorum erat permagnus numerus in Gallia, conquiri et ad se mitti iubet. His rebus celeriter id quod Avarici deperierat expletur.

SECTION 7.31.5
Interim Teutomatus, Olloviconis filius, rex Nitiobrigum, cuius pater ab senatu nostro amicus erat appellatus, cum magno equitum suorum numero et quos ex Aquitania conduxerat ad eum pervenit.

CHAPTER 7.32

SECTION 7.32.1
Caesar Avarici complures dies commoratus summamque ibi copiam frumenti et reliqui commeatus nactus exercitum ex labore atque inopia refecit.

SECTION 7.32.2
Iam prope hieme confecta cum ipso anni tempore ad gerendum bellum vocaretur et ad hostem proficisci constituisset, sive eum ex paludibus silvisque elicere sive obsidione premere posset, legati ad eum principes Aeduorum veniunt oratum ut maxime necessario tempore civitati subveniat:

SECTION 7.32.3
summo esse in periculo rem, quod, cum singuli magistratus antiquitus creari atque regiam potestatem annum obtinere consuessent, duo magistratum gerant et se uterque eorum legibus creatum esse dicat.

SECTION 7.32.4
Horum esse alterum Convictolitavem, florentem et illustrem adulescentem, alterum Cotum, antiquissima familia natum atque ipsum hominem summae potentiae et magnae cognationis, cuius frater Valetiacus proximo anno eundem magistratum gesserit.

SECTION 7.32.5
Civitatem esse omnem in armis; divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque eorum clientelas. Quod si diutius alatur controversia, fore uti pars cum parte civitatis confligat. Id ne accidat, positum in eius diligentia atque auctoritate.

CHAPTER 7.33

SECTION 7.33.1
Caesar, etsi a bello atque hoste discedere detrimentosum esse existimabat, tamen non ignorans quanta ex dissensionibus incommoda oriri consuessent, ne tanta et tam coniuncta populo Romano civitas, quam ipse semper aluisset omnibusque rebus ornasset, ad vim atque arma descenderet, atque ea pars quae minus sibi confideret auxilia a Vercingetorige arcesseret,

SECTION 7.33.2
huic rei praevertendum existimavit et, quod legibus Aeduorum eis, qui summum magistratum obtinerent, excedere ex finibus non liceret, ne quid de iure aut de legibus eorum deminuisse videretur, ipse in Aeduos proficisci statuit senatumque omnem et quos inter controversia esset ad se Decetiam evocavit.

SECTION 7.33.3
Cum prope omnis civitas eo convenisset, docereturque paucis clam convocatis alio loco, alio tempore atque oportuerit fratrem a fratre renuntiatum, cum leges duo ex una familia vivo utroque non solum magistratus creari vetarent, sed etiam in senatu esse prohiberent, Cotum imperium deponere coegit, Convictolitavem,

SECTION 7.33.4
qui per sacerdotes more civitatis intermissis magistratibus esset creatus, potestatem obtinere iussit.

CHAPTER 7.34

SECTION 7.34.1
Hoc decreto interposito cohortatus Aeduos, ut controversiarum ac dissensionis obliviscerentur atque omnibus omissis his rebus huic bello servirent eaque quae meruissent praemia ab se devicta Gallia exspectarent equitatumque omnem et peditum milia decem sibi celeriter mitterent, quae in praesidiis rei frumentariae causa disponeret, exercitum in duas partes divisit:

SECTION 7.34.2
quattuor legiones in Senones Parisiosque Labieno ducendas dedit, sex ipse in Arvernos ad oppidum Gergoviam secundum flumen Elaver duxit; equitatus partem illi attribuit, partem sibi reliquit.

SECTION 7.34.3
Qua re cognita Vercingetorix omnibus interruptis eius fluminis pontibus ab altera fluminis parte iter facere coepit.

CHAPTER 7.35

SECTION 7.35.1
Cum uterque utrimque exisset exercitus, in conspectu fereque e regione castris castra ponebant dispositis exploratoribus, necubi effecto ponte Romani copias traducerent. Erat in magnis Caesaris difficultatibus res, ne maiorem aestatis partem flumine impediretur, quod non fere ante autumnum Elaver vado transiri solet.

SECTION 7.35.2
Itaque, ne id accideret, silvestri loco castris positis e regione unius eorum pontium, quos Vercingetorix rescindendos curaverat, postero die cum duabus legionibus in occulto restitit;

SECTION 7.35.3
reliquas copias cum omnibus impedimentis, ut consueverat, misit, apertis quibusdam cohortibus, uti numerus legionum constare videretur.

SECTION 7.35.4
His quam longissime possent egredi iussis, cum iam ex diei tempore coniecturam ceperat in castra perventum, isdem sublicis, quarum pars inferior integra remanebat, pontem reficere coepit.

SECTION 7.35.5
Celeriter effecto opere legionibusque traductis et loco castris idoneo delecto reliquas copias revocavit.

SECTION 7.35.6
Vercingetorix re cognita, ne contra suam voluntatem dimicare cogeretur, magnis itineribus antecessit.

CHAPTER 7.36

SECTION 7.36.1
Caesar ex eo loco quintis castris Gergoviam pervenit equestrique eo die proelio levi facto perspecto urbis situ, quae posita in altissimo monte omnes aditus difficiles habebat, de expugnatione desperavit, de obsessione non prius agendum constituit, quam rem frumentariam expedisset.

SECTION 7.36.2
At Vercingetorix castris, prope oppidum positis, mediocribus circum se intervallis separatim singularum civitatium copias collocaverat atque omnibus eius iugi collibus occupatis, qua despici poterat,

SECTION 7.36.3
horribilem speciem praebebat; principesque earum civitatium, quos sibi ad consilium capiendum delegerat, prima luce cotidie ad se convenire iubebat, seu quid communicandum, seu quid administrandum videretur;

SECTION 7.36.4
neque ullum fere diem intermittebat quin equestri proelio interiectis sagittariis, quid in quoque esset animi ac virtutis suorum perspiceret.

SECTION 7.36.5
Erat e regione oppidi collis sub ipsis radicibus montis, egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcisus; quem si tenerent nostri, et aquae magna parte et pabulatione libera prohibituri hostes videbantur;

SECTION 7.36.6
sed is locus praesidio ab his non nimis firmo tenebatur;

SECTION 7.36.7
tamen silentio noctis Caesar ex castris egressus, priusquam subsidio ex oppido veniri posset, deiecto praesidio potitus loco duas ibi legiones collocavit fossamque duplicem duodenum pedum a maioribus castris ad minora perduxit, ut tuto ab repentino hostium incursu etiam singuli commeare possent.

CHAPTER 7.37

SECTION 7.37.1
Dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur, Convictolitavis Aeduus, cui magistratum adiudicatum a Caesare demonstravimus, sollicitatus ab Arvernis pecunia cum quibusdam adulescentibus colloquitur; quorum erat princeps Litaviccus atque eius fratres, amplissima familia nati adulescentes.

SECTION 7.37.2
Cum his praemium communicat hortaturque, ut se liberos et imperio natos meminerint.

SECTION 7.37.3
Vnam esse Aeduorum civitatem, quae certissimam Galliae victoriam detineat; eius auctoritate reliquas contineri; qua traducta locum consistendi Romanis in Gallia non fore.

SECTION 7.37.4
Esse nonnullo se Caesaris beneficio adfectum, sic tamen, ut iustissimam apud eum causam obtinuerit; sed plus communi libertati tribuere.

SECTION 7.37.5
Cur enim potius Aedui de suo iure et de legibus ad Caesarem disceptatorem, quam Romani ad Aeduos veniant?

SECTION 7.37.6
Celeriter adulescentibus et oratione magistratus et praemio deductis, cum se vel principes eius consili fore profiterentur, ratio perficiendi quaerebatur, quod civitatem temere ad suscipiendum bellum adduci posse non confidebant.

SECTION 7.37.7
Placuit ut Litaviccus decem illis milibus, quae Caesari ad bellum mitterentur, praeficeretur atque ea ducenda curaret, fratresque eius ad Caesarem praecurrerent. Reliqua qua ratione agi placeat constituunt.

CHAPTER 7.38

SECTION 7.38.1
Litaviccus accepto exercitu, cum milia passuum circiter XXX ab Gergovia abesset, convocatis subito militibus lacrimans, "Quo proficiscimur," inquit, "milites?

SECTION 7.38.2
Omnis noster equitatus, omnis nobilitas interiit; principes civitatis, Eporedorix et Viridomarus, insimulati proditionis ab Romanis indicta causa interfecti sunt.

SECTION 7.38.3
Haec ab ipsis cognoscite, qui ex ipsa caede fugerunt: nam ego fratribus atque omnibus meis propinquis interfectis dolore prohibeor,

SECTION 7.38.4
quae gesta sunt, pronuntiare." Producuntur hi quos ille edocuerat quae dici vellet, atque eadem, quae Litaviccus pronuntiaverat, multitudini exponunt: multos equites Aeduorum interfectos,

SECTION 7.38.5
quod collocuti cum Arvernis dicerentur; ipsos se inter multitudinem militum occultasse atque ex media caede fugisse.

SECTION 7.38.6
Conclamant Aedui et Litaviccum obsecrant ut sibi consulat. "Quasi vero," inquit ille, "consili sit res, ac non necesse sit nobis Gergoviam contendere et cum Arvernis nosmet coniungere.

SECTION 7.38.7
An dubitamus quin nefario facinore admisso Romani iam ad nos interficiendos concurrant? Proinde, si quid in nobis animi est,

SECTION 7.38.8
persequamur eorum mortem qui indignissime interierunt, atque hos latrones interficiamus." Ostendit cives Romanos, qui eius praesidi fiducia una erant:

SECTION 7.38.9
magnum numerum frumenti commeatusque diripit, ipsos crudeliter excruciatos interficit.

SECTION 7.38.10
nuntios tota civitate Aeduorum dimittit, eodem mendacio de caede equitum et principum permovet; hortatur ut simili ratione atque ipse fecerit suas iniurias persequantur.

CHAPTER 7.39

SECTION 7.39.1
Eporedorix Aeduus, summo loco natus adulescens et summae domi potentiae, et una Viridomarus, pari aetate et gratia, sed genere dispari, quem Caesar ab Diviciaco sibi traditum ex humili loco ad summam dignitatem perduxerat, in equitum numero convenerant nominatim ab eo evocati.

SECTION 7.39.2
His erat inter se de principatu contentio, et in illa magistratuum controversia alter pro Convictolitavi, alter pro Coto summis opibus pugnaverant.

SECTION 7.39.3
Ex eis Eporedorix cognito Litavicci consilio media fere nocte rem ad Caesarem defert; orat ne patiatur civitatem pravis adulescentium consiliis ab amicitia populi Romani deficere; quod futurum provideat, si se tot hominum milia cum hostibus coniunxerint, quorum salutem neque propinqui neglegere, neque civitas levi momento aestimare posset.

CHAPTER 7.40

SECTION 7.40.1
Magna adfectus sollicitudine hoc nuntio Caesar, quod semper Aeduorum civitati praecipue indulserat, nulla interposita dubitatione legiones expeditas quattuor equitatumque omnem ex castris educit;

SECTION 7.40.2
nec fuit spatium tali tempore ad contrahenda castra, quod res posita in celeritate videbatur; Gaium Fabium legatum cum legionibus duabus castris praesidio relinquit.

SECTION 7.40.3
Fratres Litavicci cum comprehendi iussisset, paulo ante reperit ad hostes fugisse.

SECTION 7.40.4
Adhortatus milites, ne necessario tempore itineris labore permoveantur, cupidissimis omnibus progressus milia passuum XXV agmen Aeduorum conspicatus immisso equitatu iter eorum moratur atque impedit interdicitque omnibus ne quemquam interficiant. Eporedorigem et Viridomarum,

SECTION 7.40.5
quos illi interfectos existimabant, inter equites versari suosque appellare iubet.

SECTION 7.40.6
His cognitis et Litavicci fraude perspecta Aedui manus tendere, deditionem significare et proiectis armis mortem deprecari incipiunt.

SECTION 7.40.7
Litaviccus cum suis clientibus, quibus more Gallorum nefas est etiam in extrema fortuna deserere patronos, Gergoviam profugit.

CHAPTER 7.41

SECTION 7.41.1
Caesar nuntiis ad civitatem Aeduorum missis, qui suo beneficio conservatos docerent quos iure belli interficere potuisset, tribusque horis noctis exercitui ad quietem datis castra ad Gergoviam movit.

SECTION 7.41.2
Medio fere itinere equites a Fabio missi, quanto res in periculo fuerit, exponunt. Summis copiis castra oppugnata demonstrant, cum crebro integri defessis succederent nostrosque assiduo labore defatigarent, quibus propter magnitudinem castrorum perpetuo esset isdem in vallo permanendum;

SECTION 7.41.3
multitudine sagittarum atque omnis generis telorum multos vulneratos; ad haec sustinenda magno usui fuisse tormenta.

SECTION 7.41.4
Fabium discessu eorum duabus relictis portis obstruere ceteras pluteosque vallo addere et se in posterum diem similemque casum apparare.

SECTION 7.41.5
His rebus cognitis Caesar summo studio militum ante ortum solis in castra pervenit.

CHAPTER 7.42

SECTION 7.42.1
Dum haec ad Gergoviam geruntur, Aedui primis nuntiis ab Litavicco acceptis nullum sibi ad cognoscendum spatium relinquunt.

SECTION 7.42.2
Impellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas, quae maxime illi hominum generi est innata, ut levem auditionem habeant pro re comperta.

SECTION 7.42.3
Bona civium Romanorum diripiunt, caedes faciunt, in servitutem abstrahunt.

SECTION 7.42.4
Adiuvat rem proclinatam Convictolitavis plebemque ad furorem impellit, ut facinore admisso ad sanitatem reverti pudeat.

SECTION 7.42.5
Marcum Aristium, tribunum militum, iter ad legionem facientem fide data ex oppido Cabillono educunt: idem facere cogunt eos, qui negotiandi causa ibi constiterant.

SECTION 7.42.6
Hos continuo (in) itinere adorti omnibus impedimentis exuunt; repugnantes diem noctemque obsident; multis utrimque interfectis maiorem multitudinem armatorum concitant.

CHAPTER 7.43

SECTION 7.43.1
Interim nuntio allato omnes eorum milites in potestate Caesaris teneri, concurrunt ad Aristium, nihil publico factum consilio demonstrant; quaestionem de bonis direptis decernunt,

SECTION 7.43.2
Litavicci fratrumque bona publicant, legatos ad Caesarem sui purgandi gratia mittunt.

SECTION 7.43.3
Haec faciunt reciperandorum suorum causa; sed contaminati facinore et capti compendio ex direptis bonis, quod ea res ad multos pertinebat, timore poenae exterriti consilia clam de bello inire incipiunt civitatesque reliquas legationibus sollicitant.

SECTION 7.43.4
Quae tametsi Caesar intellegebat, tamen quam mitissime potest legatos appellat: nihil se propter inscientiam levitatemque vulgi gravius de civitate iudicare neque de sua in Aeduos benevolentia deminuere.

SECTION 7.43.5
Ipse maiorem Galliae motum exspectans, ne ab omnibus civitatibus circumsisteretur, consilia inibat quemadmodum ab Gergovia discederet ac rursus omnem exercitum contraheret,

SECTION 7.43.6
ne profectio nata ab timore defectionis similis fugae videretur.

CHAPTER 7.44

SECTION 7.44.1
Haec cogitanti accidere visa est facultas bene rei gerendae. Nam cum in minora castra operis perspiciendi causa venisset, animadvertit collem, qui ab hostibus tenebatur, nudatum hominibus, qui superioribus diebus vix prae multitudine cerni poterat.

SECTION 7.44.2
Admiratus quaerit ex perfugis causam, quorum magnus ad eum cotidie numerus confluebat.

SECTION 7.44.3
Constabat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed hunc silvestrem et angustum, qua esset aditus ad alteram partem oppidi; huic loco vehementer illos timere nec iam aliter sentire, uno colle ab Romanis occupato, si alterum amisissent, quin paene circumvallati atque omni exitu et pabulatione interclusi viderentur: ad hunc muniendum omnes a Vercingetorige evocatos.

CHAPTER 7.45

SECTION 7.45.1
Hac re cognita Caesar mittit complures equitum turmas; eis de media nocte imperat, ut paulo tumultuosius omnibus locis vagarentur.

SECTION 7.45.2
Prima luce magnum numerum impedimentorum ex castris mulorumque produci deque his stramenta detrahi mulionesque cum cassidibus equitum specie ac simulatione collibus circumvehi iubet.

SECTION 7.45.3
His paucos addit equites qui latius ostentationis causa vagarentur. Longo circuitu easdem omnes iubet petere regiones.

SECTION 7.45.4
Haec procul ex oppido videbantur, ut erat a Gergovia despectus in castra, neque tanto spatio certi quid esset explorari poterat.

SECTION 7.45.5
Legionem unam eodem iugo mittit et paulum progressam inferiore constituit loco silvisque occultat.

SECTION 7.45.6
Augetur Gallis suspicio, atque omnes illo ad munitionem copiae traducuntur.

SECTION 7.45.7
Vacua castra hostium Caesar conspicatus tectis insignibus suorum occultatisque signis militaribus raros milites, ne ex oppido animadverterentur, ex maioribus castris in minora traducit legatisque, quos singulis legionibus praefecerat, quid fieri velit ostendit:

SECTION 7.45.8
in primis monet ut contineant milites, ne studio pugnandi aut spe praedae longius progrediantur;

SECTION 7.45.9
quid iniquitas loci habeat incommodi proponit: hoc una celeritate posse mutari; occasionis esse rem, non proeli.

SECTION 7.45.10
His rebus expositis signum dat et ab dextra parte alio ascensu eodem tempore Aeduos mittit.

CHAPTER 7.46

SECTION 7.46.1
Oppidi murus ab planitie atque initio ascensus recta regione, si nullus anfractus intercederet, MCC passus aberat:

SECTION 7.46.2
quidquid huc circuitus ad molliendum clivum accesserat, id spatium itineris augebat.

SECTION 7.46.3
A medio fere colle in longitudinem, ut natura montis ferebat, ex grandibus saxis sex pedum murum qui nostrorum impetum tardaret praeduxerant Galli, atque inferiore omni spatio vacuo relicto superiorem partem collis usque ad murum oppidi densissimis castris compleverant.

SECTION 7.46.4
Milites dato signo celeriter ad munitionem perveniunt eamque transgressi trinis castris potiuntur;

SECTION 7.46.5
ac tanta fuit in castris capiendis celeritas, ut Teutomatus, rex Nitiobrigum, subito in tabernaculo oppressus, ut meridie conquieverat, superiore corporis parte nudata vulnerato equo vix se ex manibus praedantium militum eriperet.

CHAPTER 7.47

SECTION 7.47.1
Consecutus id quod animo proposuerat, Caesar receptui cani iussit legionique decimae, quacum erat, continuo signa constituit.

SECTION 7.47.2
Ac reliquarum legionum milites non exaudito sono tubae, quod satis magna valles intercedebat, tamen ab tribunis militum legatisque, ut erat a Caesare praeceptum, retinebantur.

SECTION 7.47.3
Sed elati spe celeris victoriae et hostium fuga et superiorum temporum secundis proeliis nihil adeo arduum sibi esse existimaverunt quod non virtute consequi possent, neque finem prius sequendi fecerunt quam muro oppidi portisque appropinquarunt. Tum vero ex omnibus urbis partibus orto clamore,

SECTION 7.47.4
qui longius aberant repentino tumultu perterriti, cum hostem intra portas esse existimarent, sese ex oppido eiecerunt.

SECTION 7.47.5
Matres familiae de muro vestem argentumque iactabant et pectore nudo prominentes passis manibus obtestabantur Romanos, ut sibi parcerent neu, sicut Avarici fecissent, ne a mulieribus quidem atque infantibus abstinerent:

SECTION 7.47.6
nonnullae de muris per manus demissae sese militibus tradebant.

SECTION 7.47.7
Lucius Fabius, centurio legionis VIII, quem inter suos eo die dixisse constabat excitari se Avaricensibus praemiis neque commissurum, ut prius quisquam murum ascenderet, tres suos nactus manipulares atque ab eis sublevatus murum ascendit: hos ipse rursus singulos exceptans in murum extulit.

CHAPTER 7.48

SECTION 7.48.1
Interim ei qui ad alteram partem oppidi, ut supra demonstravimus, munitionis causa convenerant, primo exaudito clamore, inde etiam crebris nuntiis incitati, oppidum a Romanis teneri, praemissis equitibus magno concursu eo contenderunt.

SECTION 7.48.2
Eorum ut quisque primus venerat, sub muro consistebat suorumque pugnantium numerum augebat.

SECTION 7.48.3
Quorum cum magna multitudo convenisset, matres familiae, quae paulo ante Romanis de muro manus tendebant, suos obtestari et more Gallico passum capillum ostentare liberosque in conspectum proferre coeperunt.

SECTION 7.48.4
Erat Romanis nec loco nec numero aequa contentio; simul et cursu et spatio pugnae defatigati non facile recentes atque integros sustinebant.

CHAPTER 7.49

SECTION 7.49.1
Caesar, cum iniquo loco pugnari hostiumque augeri copias videret, praemetuens suis ad Titum Sextium legatum, quem minoribus castris praesidio reliquerat, misit, ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo colle ab dextro latere hostium constitueret,

SECTION 7.49.2
ut, si nostros loco depulsos vidisset, quo minus libere hostes insequerentur terreret.

SECTION 7.49.3
Ipse paulum ex eo loco cum legione progressus, ubi constiterat, eventum pugnae exspectabat.

CHAPTER 7.50

SECTION 7.50.1
Cum acerrime comminus pugnaretur, hostes loco et numero, nostri virtute confiderent, subito sunt Aedui visi ab latere nostris aperto, quos Caesar ab dextra parte alio ascensu manus distinendae causa miserat.

SECTION 7.50.2
Hi similitudine armorum vehementer nostros perterruerunt, ac tametsi dextris humeris exsertis animadvertebantur, quod insigne pactum esse consuerat, tamen id ipsum sui fallendi causa milites ab hostibus factum existimabant.

SECTION 7.50.3
Eodem tempore Lucius Fabius centurio quique una murum ascenderant circumventi atque interfecti muro praecipitabantur.

SECTION 7.50.4
Marcus Petronius, eiusdem legionis centurio, cum portam excidere conatus esset, a multitudine oppressus ac sibi desperans multis iam vulneribus acceptis manipularibus suis, qui illum secuti erant, "Quoniam," inquit, "me una vobiscum servare non possum, vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi.

SECTION 7.50.5
Vos data facultate vobis consulite." Simul in medios hostes irrupit duobusque interfectis reliquos a porta paulum summovit.

SECTION 7.50.6
Conantibus auxiliari suis "Frustra," inquit, "meae vitae subvenire conamini, quem iam sanguis viresque deficiunt. Proinde abite, dum est facultas, vosque ad legionem recipite." Ita pugnans post paulum concidit ac suis saluti fuit.

CHAPTER 7.51

SECTION 7.51.1
Nostri, cum undique premerentur, XLVI centurionibus amissis deiecti sunt loco. Sed intolerantius Gallos insequentes legio decima tardavit, quae pro subsidio paulo aequiore loco constiterat.

SECTION 7.51.2
Hanc rursus XIII legionis cohortes exceperunt, quae ex castris minoribus eductae cum Tito Sextio legato ceperant locum superiorem.

SECTION 7.51.3
Legiones, ubi primum planitiem attigerunt, infestis contra hostes signis constiterunt.

SECTION 7.51.4
Vercingetorix ab radicibus collis suos intra munitiones reduxit. Eo die milites sunt paulo minus septingenti desiderati.

CHAPTER 7.52

SECTION 7.52.1
Postero die Caesar contione advocata temeritatem cupiditatemque militum reprehendit, quod sibi ipsi iudicavissent quo procedendum aut quid agendum videretur, neque signo recipiendi dato constitissent neque ab tribunis militum legatisque retineri potuissent.

SECTION 7.52.2
Exposuit quid iniquitas loci posset, quid ipse ad Avaricum sensisset, cum sine duce et sine equitatu deprehensis hostibus exploratam victoriam dimisisset, ne parvum modo detrimentum in contentione propter iniquitatem loci accideret.

SECTION 7.52.3
Quanto opere eorum animi magnitudinem admiraretur, quos non castrorum munitiones, non altitudo montis, non murus oppidi tardare potuisset, tanto opere licentiam arrogantiamque reprehendere, quod plus se quam imperatorem de victoria atque exitu rerum sentire existimarent;

SECTION 7.52.4
nec minus se ab milite modestiam et continentiam quam virtutem atque animi magnitudinem desiderare.

CHAPTER 7.53

SECTION 7.53.1
Hac habita contione et ad extremam orationem confirmatis militibus, ne ob hanc causam animo permoverentur neu quod iniquitas loci attulisset id virtuti hostium tribuerent, eadem de profectione cogitans quae ante senserat legiones ex castris eduxit aciemque idoneo loco constituit.

SECTION 7.53.2
Cum Vercingetorix nihil magis in aequum locum descenderet, levi facto equestri proelio atque secundo in castra exercitum reduxit.

SECTION 7.53.3
Cum hoc idem postero die fecisset, satis ad Gallicam ostentationem minuendam militumque animos confirmandos factum existimans in Aeduos movit castra.

SECTION 7.53.4
Ne tum quidem insecutis hostibus tertio die ad flumen Elaver venit; pontem refecit exercitumque traduxit.

CHAPTER 7.54

SECTION 7.54.1
Ibi a Viridomaro atque Eporedorige Aeduis appellatus discit cum omni equitatu Litaviccum ad sollicitandos Aeduos profectum: opus esse ipsos antecedere ad confirmandam civitatem.

SECTION 7.54.2
Etsi multis iam rebus perfidiam Aeduorum perspectam habebat atque horum discessu admaturari defectionem civitatis existimabat, tamen eos retinendos non constituit, ne aut inferre iniuriam videretur aut dare timoris aliquam suspicionem. Discedentibus his breviter sua in Aeduos merita exposuit,

SECTION 7.54.3
quos et quam humiles accepisset, compulsos in oppida, multatos agris omnibus ereptis copiis, imposito stipendio, obsidibus summa cum contumelia extortis,

SECTION 7.54.4
et quam in fortunam quamque in amplitudinem deduxisset, ut non solum in pristinum statum redissent, sed omnium temporum dignitatem et gratiam antecessisse viderentur. His datis mandatis eos ab se dimisit.

CHAPTER 7.55

SECTION 7.55.1
Noviodunum erat oppidum Aeduorum ad ripas Ligeris opportuno loco positum.

SECTION 7.55.2
Huc Caesar omnes obsides Galliae, frumentum, pecuniam publicam, suorum atque exercitus impedimentorum magnam partem contulerat;

SECTION 7.55.3
huc magnum numerum equorum huius belli causa in Italia atque Hispania coemptum miserat.

SECTION 7.55.4
Eo cum Eporedorix Viridomarusque venissent et de statu civitatis cognovissent, Litaviccum Bibracti ab Aeduis receptum, quod est oppidum apud eos maximae auctoritatis, Convictolitavim magistratum magnamque partem senatus ad eum convenisse, legatos ad Vercingetorigem de pace et amicitia concilianda publice missos, non praetermittendum tantum commodum existimaverunt.

SECTION 7.55.5
Itaque interfectis Novioduni custodibus quique eo negotiandi causa convenerant pecuniam atque equos inter se partiti sunt;

SECTION 7.55.6
obsides civitatum Bibracte ad magistratum deducendos curaverunt; oppidum,

SECTION 7.55.7
quod a se teneri non posse iudicabant, ne cui esset usui Romanis, incenderunt;

SECTION 7.55.8
frumenti quod subito potuerunt navibus avexerunt, reliquum flumine atque incendio corruperunt.

SECTION 7.55.9
Ipsi ex finitimis regionibus copias cogere, praesidia custodiasque ad ripas Ligeris disponere equitatumque omnibus locis iniciendi timoris causa ostentare coeperunt, si ab re frumentaria Romanos excludere aut adductos inopia in provinciam expellere possent.

SECTION 7.55.10
quam ad spem multum eos adiuvabat, quod Liger ex nivibus creverat, ut omnino vado non posse transiri videretur.

CHAPTER 7.56

SECTION 7.56.1
Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar maturandum sibi censuit, si esset in perficiendis pontibus periclitandum, ut prius quam essent maiores eo coactae copiae dimicaret.

SECTION 7.56.2
Nam ut commutato consilio iter in provinciam converteret, id ne metu quidem necessario faciendum existimabat; cum infamia atque indignitas rei et oppositus mons Cevenna viarumque difficultas impediebat, tum maxime quod abiuncto Labieno atque eis legionibus quas una miserat vehementer timebat.

SECTION 7.56.3
Itaque admodum magnis diurnis nocturnisque itineribus confectis contra omnium opinionem ad Ligerem venit

SECTION 7.56.4
vadoque per equites invento pro rei necessitate opportuno, ut brachia modo atque humeri ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposito equitatu qui vim fluminis refringeret, atque hostibus primo aspectu perturbatis,

SECTION 7.56.5
incolumem exercitum traduxit frumentumque in agris et pecoris copiam nactus repleto his rebus exercitu iter in Senones facere instituit.

CHAPTER 7.57

SECTION 7.57.1
Dum haec apud Caesarem geruntur, Labienus eo supplemento, quod nuper ex Italia venerat, relicto Agedinci, ut esset impedimentis praesidio, cum quattuor legionibus Lutetiam proficiscitur. Id est oppidum Parisiorum, quod positum est in insula fluminis Sequanae.

SECTION 7.57.2
Cuius adventu ab hostibus cognito magnae ex finitimis civitatibus copiae convenerunt.

SECTION 7.57.3
Summa imperi traditur Camulogeno Aulerco, qui prope confectus aetate tamen propter singularem scientiam rei militaris ad eum est honorem evocatus.

SECTION 7.57.4
Is cum animadvertisset perpetuam esse paludem, quae influeret in Sequanam atque illum omnem locum magnopere impediret, hic consedit nostrosque transitu prohibere instituit.

CHAPTER 7.58

SECTION 7.58.1
Labienus primo vineas agere, cratibus atque aggere paludem explere atque iter munire conabatur.

SECTION 7.58.2
Postquam id difficilius confieri animadvertit, silentio e castris tertia vigilia egressus eodem quo venerat itinere Metiosedum pervenit.

SECTION 7.58.3
Id est oppidum Senonum in insula Sequanae positum, ut paulo ante de Lutetia diximus. Deprensis navibus circiter quinquaginta celeriterque coniunctis atque eo militibus iniectis et rei novitate perterritis oppidanis, quorum magna pars erat ad bellum evocata, sine contentione oppido potitur.

SECTION 7.58.5
Refecto ponte, quem superioribus diebus hostes resciderant, exercitum traducit et secundo flumine ad Lutetiam iter facere coepit.

SECTION 7.58.6
Hostes re cognita ab eis, qui Metiosedo fugerant, Lutetiam incendi pontesque eius oppidi rescindi iubent; ipsi profecti a palude ad ripas Sequanae e regione Lutetiae contra Labieni castra considunt.

CHAPTER 7.59

SECTION 7.59.1
Iam Caesar a Gergovia discessisse audiebatur, iam de Aeduorum defectione et secundo Galliae motu rumores adferebantur, Gallique in colloquiis interclusum itinere et Ligeri Caesarem inopia frumenti coactum in provinciam contendisse confirmabant.

SECTION 7.59.2
Bellovaci autem defectione Aeduorum cognita, qui ante erant per se infideles, manus cogere atque aperte bellum parare coeperunt.

SECTION 7.59.3
Tum Labienus tanta rerum commutatione longe aliud sibi capiendum consilium atque antea senserat intellegebat,

SECTION 7.59.4
neque iam, ut aliquid adquireret proelioque hostes lacesseret, sed ut incolumem exercitum Agedincum reduceret, cogitabat.

SECTION 7.59.5
Namque altera ex parte Bellovaci, quae civitas in Gallia maximam habet opinionem virtutis, instabant, alteram Camulogenus parato atque instructo exercitu tenebat; tum legiones a praesidio atque impedimentis interclusas maximum flumen distinebat.

SECTION 7.59.6
Tantis subito difficultatibus obiectis ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat.

CHAPTER 7.60

SECTION 7.60.1
Sub vesperum consilio convocato cohortatus ut ea quae imperasset diligenter industrieque administrarent, naves, quas Metiosedo deduxerat, singulas equitibus Romanis attribuit, et prima confecta vigilia quattuor milia passuum secundo flumine silentio progredi ibique se exspectari iubet.

SECTION 7.60.2
Quinque cohortes, quas minime firmas ad dimicandum esse existimabat, castris praesidio relinquit;

SECTION 7.60.3
quinque eiusdem legionis reliquas de media nocte cum omnibus impedimentis adverso flumine magno tumultu proficisci imperat.

SECTION 7.60.4
Conquirit etiam lintres: has magno sonitu remorum incitatas in eandem partem mittit. Ipse post paulo silentio egressus cum tribus legionibus eum locum petit quo naves appelli iusserat.

CHAPTER 7.61

SECTION 7.61.1
Eo cum esset ventum, exploratores hostium, ut omni fluminis parte erant dispositi, inopinantes, quod magna subito erat coorta tempestas, ab nostris opprimuntur;

SECTION 7.61.2
exercitus equitatusque equitibus Romanis administrantibus, quos ei negotio praefecerat, celeriter transmittitur.

SECTION 7.61.3
Vno fere tempore sub lucem hostibus nuntiatur in castris Romanorum praeter consuetudinem tumultuari et magnum ire agmen adverso flumine sonitumque remorum in eadem parte exaudiri et paulo infra milites navibus transportari.

SECTION 7.61.4
Quibus rebus auditis, quod existimabant tribus locis transire legiones atque omnes perturbatos defectione Aeduorum fugam parare, suas quoque copias in tres partes distribuerunt.

SECTION 7.61.5
Nam praesidio e regione castrorum relicto et parva manu Metiosedum versus missa, quae tantum progrediatur, quantum naves processissent, reliquas copias contra Labienum duxerunt.

CHAPTER 7.62

SECTION 7.62.1
Prima luce et nostri omnes erant transportati, et hostium acies cernebatur.

SECTION 7.62.2
Labienus milites cohortatus ut suae pristinae virtutis et secundissimorum proeliorum retinerent memoriam atque ipsum Caesarem, cuius ductu saepe numero hostes superassent, praesentem adesse existimarent, dat signum proeli.

SECTION 7.62.3
Primo concursu ab dextro cornu, ubi septima legio constiterat, hostes pelluntur atque in fugam coniciuntur;

SECTION 7.62.4
ab sinistro, quem locum duodecima legio tenebat, cum primi ordines hostium transfixi telis concidissent, tamen acerrime reliqui resistebant, nec dabat suspicionem fugae quisquam.

SECTION 7.62.5
Ipse dux hostium Camulogenus suis aderat atque eos cohortabatur.

SECTION 7.62.6
Incerto nunc etiam exitu victoriae, cum septimae legionis tribunis esset nuntiatum quae in sinistro cornu gererentur, post tergum hostium legionem ostenderunt signaque intulerunt.

SECTION 7.62.7
Ne eo quidem tempore quisquam loco cessit, sed circumventi omnes interfectique sunt.

SECTION 7.62.8
Eandem fortunam tulit Camulogenus. At ei qui praesidio contra castra Labieni erant relicti, cum proelium commissum audissent, subsidio suis ierunt collemque ceperunt, neque nostrorum militum victorum impetum sustinere potuerunt.

SECTION 7.62.9
Sic cum suis fugientibus permixti, quos non silvae montesque texerunt, ab equitatu sunt interfecti.

SECTION 7.62.10
hoc negotio confecto Labienus revertitur Agedincum, ubi impedimenta totius exercitus relicta erant: inde cum omnibus copiis ad Caesarem pervenit.

CHAPTER 7.63

SECTION 7.63.1
Defectione Aeduorum cognita bellum augetur. Legationes in omnes partes circummittuntur:

SECTION 7.63.2
quantum gratia, auctoritate, pecunia valent, ad sollicitandas civitates nituntur;

SECTION 7.63.3
nacti obsides, quos Caesar apud eos deposuerat, horum supplicio dubitantes territant.

SECTION 7.63.4
Petunt a Vercingetorige Aedui ut ad se veniat rationesque belli gerendi communicet.

SECTION 7.63.5
Re impetrata contendunt ut ipsis summa imperi tradatur, et re in controversiam deducta totius Galliae concilium Bibracte indicitur. Eodem conveniunt undique frequentes.

SECTION 7.63.6
Multitudinis suffragiis res permittitur: ad unum omnes Vercingetorigem probant imperatorem.

SECTION 7.63.7
Ab hoc concilio Remi, Lingones, Treveri afuerunt: illi, quod amicitiam Romanorum sequebantur; Treveri, quod aberant longius et ab Germanis premebantur, quae fuit causa quare toto abessent bello et neutris auxilia mitterent.

SECTION 7.63.8
Magno dolore Aedui ferunt se deiectos principatu, queruntur fortunae commutationem et Caesaris indulgentiam in se requirunt, neque tamen suscepto bello suum consilium ab reliquis separare audent.

SECTION 7.63.9
Inviti summae spei adulescentes Eporedorix et Viridomarus Vercingetorigi parent.

CHAPTER 7.64

SECTION 7.64.1
Ipse imperat reliquis civitatibus obsides diemque ei rei constituit. Omnes equites, quindecim milia numero, celeriter convenire iubet;

SECTION 7.64.2
peditatu quem antea habuerit se fore contentum dicit, neque fortunam temptaturum aut in acie dimicaturum, sed, quoniam abundet equitatu, perfacile esse factu frumentationibus pabulationibusque Romanos prohibere,

SECTION 7.64.3
aequo modo animo sua ipsi frumenta corrumpant aedificiaque incendant, qua rei familiaris iactura perpetuum imperium libertatemque se consequi videant.

SECTION 7.64.4
His constitutis rebus Aeduis Segusiavisque, qui sunt finitimi provinciae, decem milia peditum imperat; huc addit equites octingentos.

SECTION 7.64.5
His praeficit fratrem Eporedorigis bellumque inferri Allobrogibus iubet.

SECTION 7.64.6
Altera ex parte Gabalos proximosque pagos Arvernorum in Helvios, item Rutenos Cadurcosque ad fines Volcarum Arecomicorum depopulandos mittit.

SECTION 7.64.7
Nihilo minus clandestinis nuntiis legationibusque Allobrogas sollicitat, quorum mentes nondum ab superiore bello resedisse sperabat.

SECTION 7.64.8
Horum principibus pecunias, civitati autem imperium totius provinciae pollicetur.

CHAPTER 7.65

SECTION 7.65.1
Ad hos omnes casus provisa erant praesidia cohortium duarum et viginti, quae ex ipsa provincia ab Lucio Caesare legato ad omnes partes opponebantur.

SECTION 7.65.2
Helvii sua sponte cum finitimis proelio congressi pelluntur et Gaio Valerio Donnotauro, Caburi filio, principe civitatis, compluribusque aliis interfectis intra oppida ac muros compelluntur.

SECTION 7.65.3
Allobroges crebris ad Rhodanum dispositis praesidiis magna cum cura et diligentia suos fines tuentur.

SECTION 7.65.4
Caesar, quod hostes equitatu superiores esse intellegebat et interclusis omnibus itineribus nulla re ex provincia atque Italia sublevari poterat, trans Rhenum in Germaniam mittit ad eas civitates quas superioribus annis pacaverat, equitesque ab his arcessit et levis armaturae pedites, qui inter eos proeliari consuerant.

SECTION 7.65.5
Eorum adventu, quod minus idoneis equis utebantur, a tribunis militum reliquisque equitibus Romanis atque evocatis equos sumit Germanisque distribuit.

CHAPTER 7.66

SECTION 7.66.1
Interea, dum haec geruntur, hostium copiae ex Arvernis equitesque qui toti Galliae erant imperati conveniunt.

SECTION 7.66.2
Magno horum coacto numero, cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret, quo facilius subsidium provinciae ferri posset, circiter milia passuum decem ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit

SECTION 7.66.3
convocatisque ad concilium praefectis equitum venisse tempus victoriae demonstrat. Fugere in provinciam Romanos Galliaque excedere.

SECTION 7.66.4
Id sibi ad praesentem obtinendam libertatem satis esse; ad reliqui temporis pacem atque otium parum profici: maioribus enim coactis copiis reversuros neque finem bellandi facturos. Proinde agmine impeditos adorirentur.

SECTION 7.66.5
Si pedites suis auxilium ferant atque in eo morentur, iter facere non posse; si, id quod magis futurum confidat, relictis impedimentis suae saluti consulant, et usu rerum necessariarum et dignitate spoliatum iri.

SECTION 7.66.6
Nam de equitibus hostium, quin nemo eorum progredi modo extra agmen audeat, et ipsos quidem non debere dubitare, et quo maiore faciant animo, copias se omnes pro castris habiturum et terrori hostibus futurum.

SECTION 7.66.7
Conclamant equites sanctissimo iureiurando confirmari oportere, ne tecto recipiatur, ne ad liberos, ne ad parentes, ad uxorem aditum habeat, qui non bis per agmen hostium perequitasset.

CHAPTER 7.67

SECTION 7.67.1
Probata re atque omnibus iureiurando adactis postero die in tres partes distributo equitatu duae se acies ab duobus lateribus ostendunt, una primo agmine iter impedire coepit.

SECTION 7.67.2
Qua re nuntiata Caesar suum quoque equitatum tripertito divisum contra hostem ire iubet. Pugnatur una omnibus in partibus.

SECTION 7.67.3
Consistit agmen; impedimenta intra legiones recipiuntur.

SECTION 7.67.4
Si qua in parte nostri laborare aut gravius premi videbantur, eo signa inferri Caesar aciemque constitui iubebat; quae res et hostes ad insequendum tardabat et nostros spe auxili confirmabat.

SECTION 7.67.5
Tandem Germani ab dextro latere summum iugum nacti hostes loco depellunt; fugientes usque ad flumen, ubi Vercingetorix cum pedestribus copiis consederat, persequuntur compluresque interficiunt.

SECTION 7.67.6
Qua re animadversa reliqui ne circumirentur veriti se fugae mandant. Omnibus locis fit caedes.

SECTION 7.67.7
Tres nobilissimi Aedui capti ad Caesarem perducuntur: Cotus, praefectus equitum, qui controversiam cum Convictolitavi proximis comitiis habuerat, et Cavarillus, qui post defectionem Litavicci pedestribus copiis praefuerat, et Eporedorix, quo duce ante adventum Caesaris Aedui cum Sequanis bello contenderant.

CHAPTER 7.68

SECTION 7.68.1
Fugato omni equitatu Vercingetorix copias, ut pro castris collocaverat, reduxit protinusque Alesiam, quod est oppidum Mandubiorum, iter facere coepit celeriterque impedimenta ex castris educi et se subsequi iussit.

SECTION 7.68.2
Caesar impedimentis in proximum collem deductis, duabus legionibus praesidio relictis, secutus quantum diei tempus est passum, circiter tribus milibus hostium ex novissimo agmine interfectis altero die ad Alesiam castra fecit.

SECTION 7.68.3
Perspecto urbis situ perterritisque hostibus, quod equitatu, qua maxime parte exercitus confidebant, erant pulsi, adhortatus ad laborem milites circumvallare instituit.

CHAPTER 7.69

SECTION 7.69.1
Ipsum erat oppidum Alesia in colle summo admodum edito loco, ut nisi obsidione expugnari non posse videretur.

SECTION 7.69.2
Cuius collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina subluebant.

SECTION 7.69.3
Ante id oppidum planities circiter milia passuum tria in longitudinem patebat:

SECTION 7.69.4
reliquis ex omnibus partibus colles mediocri interiecto spatio pari altitudinis fastigio oppidum cingebant.

SECTION 7.69.5
Sub muro, quae pars collis ad orientem solem spectabat, hunc omnem locum copiae Gallorum compleverant fossamque et maceriam sex in altitudinem pedum praeduxerant.

SECTION 7.69.6
Eius munitionis quae ab Romanis instituebatur circuitus XI milia passuum tenebat.

SECTION 7.69.7
Castra opportunis locis erant posita ibique castella viginti tria facta, quibus in castellis interdiu stationes ponebantur, ne qua subito eruptio fieret: haec eadem noctu excubitoribus ac firmis praesidiis tenebantur.

CHAPTER 7.70

SECTION 7.70.1
Opere instituto fit equestre proelium in ea planitie, quam intermissam collibus tria milia passuum in longitudinem patere supra demonstravimus. Summa vi ab utrisque contenditur.

SECTION 7.70.2
Laborantibus nostris Caesar Germanos summittit legionesque pro castris constituit, ne qua subito irruptio ab hostium peditatu fiat.

SECTION 7.70.3
Praesidio legionum addito nostris animus augetur: hostes in fugam coniecti se ipsi multitudine impediunt atque angustioribus portis relictis coacervantur.

SECTION 7.70.4
Germani acrius usque ad munitiones secuntur.

SECTION 7.70.5
Fit magna caedes: nonnulli relictis equis fossam transire et maceriam transcendere conantur. Paulum legiones Caesar quas pro vallo constituerat promoveri iubet.

SECTION 7.70.6
Non minus qui intra munitiones erant perturbantur Galli: veniri ad se confestim existimantes ad arma conclamant; nonnulli perterriti in oppidum irrumpunt.

SECTION 7.70.7
Vercingetorix iubet portas claudi, ne castra nudentur. Multis interfectis, compluribus equis captis Germani sese recipiunt.

CHAPTER 7.71

SECTION 7.71.1
Vercingetorix, priusquam munitiones ab Romanis perficiantur, consilium capit omnem ab se equitatum noctu dimittere.

SECTION 7.71.2
Discedentibus mandat ut suam quisque eorum civitatem adeat omnesque qui per aetatem arma ferre possint ad bellum cogant.

SECTION 7.71.3
Sua in illos merita proponit obtestaturque ut suae salutis rationem habeant neu se optime de communi libertate meritum in cruciatum hostibus dedant. Quod si indiligentiores fuerint, milia hominum delecta octoginta una secum interitura demonstrat.

SECTION 7.71.4
Ratione inita se exigue dierum triginta habere frumentum, sed paulo etiam longius tolerari posse parcendo. His datis mandatis,

SECTION 7.71.5
qua opus erat intermissum, secunda vigilia silentio equitatum mittit.

SECTION 7.71.6
Frumentum omne ad se referri iubet; capitis poenam eis qui non paruerint constituit:

SECTION 7.71.7
pecus, cuius magna erat copia ab Mandubiis compulsa, viritim distribuit; frumentum parce et paulatim metiri instituit;

SECTION 7.71.8
copias omnes quas pro oppido collocaverat in oppidum recepit.

SECTION 7.71.9
His rationibus auxilia Galliae exspectare et bellum parat administrare.

CHAPTER 7.72

SECTION 7.72.1
Quibus rebus cognitis ex perfugis et captivis, Caesar haec genera munitionis instituit. Fossam pedum viginti directis lateribus duxit, ut eius fossae solum tantundem pateret quantum summae fossae labra distarent.

SECTION 7.72.2
Reliquas omnes munitiones ab ea fossa pedes quadringentos reduxit, [id] hoc consilio, quoniam tantum esset necessario spatium complexus, nec facile totum corpus corona militum cingeretur, ne de improviso aut noctu ad munitiones hostium multitudo advolaret aut interdiu tela in nostros operi destinatos conicere possent.

SECTION 7.72.3
Hoc intermisso spatio duas fossas quindecim pedes latas, eadem altitudine perduxit, quarum interiorem campestribus ac demissis locis aqua ex flumine derivata complevit.

SECTION 7.72.4
Post eas aggerem ac vallum duodecim pedum exstruxit. Huic loricam pinnasque adiecit grandibus cervis eminentibus ad commissuras pluteorum atque aggeris, qui ascensum hostium tardarent, et turres toto opere circumdedit, quae pedes LXXX inter se distarent.

CHAPTER 7.73

SECTION 7.73.1
Erat eodem tempore et materiari et frumentari et tantas munitiones fieri necesse deminutis nostris copiis quae longius ab castris progrediebantur: ac non numquam opera nostra Galli temptare atque eruptionem ex oppido pluribus portis summa vi facere conabantur.

SECTION 7.73.2
Qua re ad haec rursus opera addendum Caesar putavit, quo minore numero militum munitiones defendi possent. Itaque truncis arborum aut admodum firmis ramis abscisis atque horum delibratis ac praeacutis cacuminibus perpetuae fossae quinos pedes altae ducebantur.

SECTION 7.73.3
Huc illi stipites demissi et ab infimo revincti, ne revelli possent, ab ramis eminebant.

SECTION 7.73.4
Quini erant ordines coniuncti inter se atque implicati; quo qui intraverant, se ipsi acutissimis vallis induebant.

SECTION 7.73.5
Hos cippos appellabant. Ante quos obliquis ordinibus in quincuncem dispositis scrobes tres in altitudinem pedes fodiebantur paulatim angustiore ad infimum fastigio.

SECTION 7.73.6
Huc teretes stipites feminis crassitudine ab summo praeacuti et praeusti demittebantur, ita ut non amplius digitis quattuor ex terra eminerent;

SECTION 7.73.7
simul confirmandi et stabiliendi causa singuli ab infimo solo pedes terra exculcabantur, reliqua pars scrobis ad occultandas insidias viminibus ac virgultis integebatur.

SECTION 7.73.8
Huius generis octoni ordines ducti ternos inter se pedes distabant.

SECTION 7.73.9
Id ex similitudine floris lilium appellabant. Ante haec taleae pedem longae ferreis hamis infixis totae in terram infodiebantur mediocribusque intermissis spatiis omnibus locis disserebantur; quos stimulos nominabant.

CHAPTER 7.74

SECTION 7.74.1
His rebus perfectis regiones secutus quam potuit aequissimas pro loci natura quattuordecim milia passuum complexus pares eiusdem generis munitiones, diversas ab his, contra exteriorem hostem perfecit, ut ne magna quidem multitudine, si ita accidat, munitionum praesidia circumfundi possent;

SECTION 7.74.2
ac ne cum periculo ex castris egredi cogatur, dierum triginta pabulum frumentumque habere omnes convectum iubet.

CHAPTER 7.75

SECTION 7.75.1
Dum haec apud Alesiam geruntur, Galli concilio principum indicto non omnes eos qui arma ferre possent, ut censuit Vercingetorix, convocandos statuunt, sed certum numerum cuique ex civitate imperandum, ne tanta multitudine confusa nec moderari nec discernere suos nec frumentandi rationem habere possent.

SECTION 7.75.2
Imperant Aeduis atque eorum clientibus, Segusiavis, Ambivaretis, Aulercis Brannovicibus, Blannoviis, milia XXXV; parem numerum Arvernis adiunctis Eleutetis, Cadurcis, Gabalis, Vellaviis, qui sub imperio Arvernorum esse consuerunt; Sequanis,

SECTION 7.75.3
Senonibus, Biturigibus, Santonis, Rutenis, Carnutibus duodena milia; Bellovacis X; totidem Lemovicibus; octona Pictonibus et Turonis et Parisiis et Helvetiis; [Suessionibus,] Ambianis, Mediomatricis, Petrocoriis, Nerviis, Morinis, Nitiobrigibus quina milia; Aulercis Cenomanis totidem; Atrebatibus [IIII milibus]; Veliocassis, Lexoviis et Aulercis Eburovicibus terna; Rauracis et Boiis bina;

SECTION 7.75.4
[XXX milia] universis civitatibus, quae Oceanum attingunt quaeque eorum consuetudine Armoricae appellantur, quo sunt in numero Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lemovices, Venelli.

SECTION 7.75.5
Ex his Bellovaci suum numerum non compleverunt, quod se suo nomine atque arbitrio cum Romanis bellum gesturos dicebant neque cuiusquam imperio obtemperaturos; rogati tamen ab Commio pro eius hospitio duo milia una miserunt.

CHAPTER 7.76

SECTION 7.76.1
Huius opera Commi, ut antea demonstravimus, fideli atque utili superioribus annis erat usus in Britannia Caesar; quibus ille pro meritis civitatem eius immunem esse iusserat, iura legesque reddiderat atque ipsi Morinos attribuerat.

SECTION 7.76.2
Tamen tanta universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae, ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur, omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent.

SECTION 7.76.3
Coactis equitum VIII milibus et peditum circiter CCL haec in Aeduorum finibus recensebantur, numerusque inibatur, praefecti constituebantur.

SECTION 7.76.4
Commio Atrebati, Viridomaro et Eporedorigi Aeduis, Vercassivellauno Arverno, consobrino Vercingetorigis, summa imperi traditur. His delecti ex civitatibus attribuuntur, quorum consilio bellum administraretur.

SECTION 7.76.5
Omnes alacres et fiduciae pleni ad Alesiam proficiscuntur,

SECTION 7.76.6
neque erat omnium quisquam qui aspectum modo tantae multitudinis sustineri posse arbitraretur, praesertim ancipiti proelio, cum ex oppido eruptione pugnaretur, foris tantae copiae equitatus peditatusque cernerentur.

CHAPTER 7.77

SECTION 7.77.1
At ei, qui Alesiae obsidebantur praeterita die, qua auxilia suorum exspectaverant, consumpto omni frumento, inscii quid in Aeduis gereretur, concilio coacto

SECTION 7.77.2
de exitu suarum fortunarum consultabant. Ac variis dictis sententiis, quarum pars deditionem, pars, dum vires suppeterent, eruptionem censebat, non praetereunda oratio Critognati videtur propter eius singularem et nefariam crudelitatem.

SECTION 7.77.3
Hic summo in Arvernis ortus loco et magnae habitus auctoritatis, "Nihil," inquit, "de eorum sententia dicturus sum, qui turpissimam servitutem deditionis nomine appellant, neque hos habendos civium loco neque ad concilium adhibendos censeo.

SECTION 7.77.4
Cum his mihi res sit, qui eruptionem probant; quorum in consilio omnium vestrum consensu pristinae residere virtutis memoria videtur. Animi est ista mollitia,

SECTION 7.77.5
non virtus, paulisper inopiam ferre non posse. Qui se ultro morti offerant facilius reperiuntur quam qui dolorem patienter ferant.

SECTION 7.77.6
Atque ego hanc sententiam probarem (tantum apud me dignitas potest), si nullam praeterquam vitae nostrae iacturam fieri viderem:

SECTION 7.77.7
sed in consilio capiendo omnem Galliam respiciamus, quam ad nostrum auxilium concitavimus.

SECTION 7.77.8
Quid hominum milibus LXXX uno loco interfectis propinquis consanguineisque nostris animi fore existimatis, si paene in ipsis cadaveribus proelio decertare cogentur?

SECTION 7.77.9
Nolite hos vestro auxilio exspoliare, qui vestrae salutis causa suum periculum neglexerunt, nec stultitia ac temeritate vestra aut animi imbecillitate omnem Galliam prosternere et perpetuae servituti subicere.

SECTION 7.77.10
An, quod ad diem non venerunt, de eorum fide constantiaque dubitatis? Quid ergo? Romanos in illis ulterioribus munitionibus animine causa cotidie exerceri putatis?

SECTION 7.77.11
Si illorum nuntiis confirmari non potestis omni aditu praesaepto, his utimini testibus appropinquare eorum adventum; cuius rei timore exterriti diem noctemque in opere versantur.

SECTION 7.77.12
quid ergo mei consili est? Facere, quod nostri maiores nequaquam pari bello Cimbrorum Teutonumque fecerunt; qui in oppida compulsi ac simili inopia subacti eorum corporibus qui aetate ad bellum inutiles videbantur vitam toleraverunt neque se hostibus tradiderunt.

SECTION 7.77.13
cuius rei si exemplum non haberemus, tamen libertatis causa institui et posteris prodi pulcherrimum iudicarem.

SECTION 7.77.14
nam quid illi simile bello fuit? Depopulata Gallia Cimbri magnaque illata calamitate finibus quidem nostris aliquando excesserunt atque alias terras petierunt; iura, leges, agros, libertatem nobis reliquerunt.

SECTION 7.77.15
Romani vero quid petunt aliud aut quid volunt, nisi invidia adducti, quos fama nobiles potentesque bello cognoverunt, horum in agris civitatibusque considere atque his aeternam iniungere servitutem? Neque enim ulla alia condicione bella gesserunt.

SECTION 7.77.16
Quod si ea quae in longinquis nationibus geruntur ignoratis, respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta iure et legibus commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute."

CHAPTER 7.78

SECTION 7.78.1
Sententiis dictis constituunt ut ei qui valetudine aut aetate inutiles sunt bello oppido excedant, atque omnia prius experiantur, quam ad Critognati sententiam descendant:

SECTION 7.78.2
illo tamen potius utendum consilio, si res cogat atque auxilia morentur, quam aut deditionis aut pacis subeundam condicionem.

SECTION 7.78.3
Mandubii, qui eos oppido receperant, cum liberis atque uxoribus exire coguntur. Hi, cum ad munitiones Romanorum accessissent,

SECTION 7.78.4
flentes omnibus precibus orabant, ut se in servitutem receptos cibo iuvarent.

SECTION 7.78.5
At Caesar dispositis in vallo custodibus recipi prohibebat.

CHAPTER 7.79

SECTION 7.79.1
Interea Commius reliquique duces quibus summa imperi permissa erat cum omnibus copiis ad Alesiam perveniunt et colle exteriore occupato non longius mille passibus ab nostris munitionibus considunt.

SECTION 7.79.2
Postero die equitatu ex castris educto omnem eam planitiem, quam in longitudinem tria milia passuum patere demonstravimus, complent pedestresque copias paulum ab eo loco abditas in locis superioribus constituunt.

SECTION 7.79.3
Erat ex oppido Alesia despectus in campum. Concurrunt his auxiliis visis; fit gratulatio inter eos, atque omnium animi ad laetitiam excitantur.

SECTION 7.79.4
Itaque productis copiis ante oppidum considunt et proximam fossam cratibus integunt atque aggere explent seque ad eruptionem atque omnes casus comparant.

CHAPTER 7.80

SECTION 7.80.1
Caesar omni exercitu ad utramque partem munitionum disposito, ut, si usus veniat, suum quisque locum teneat et noverit, equitatum ex castris educi et proelium committi iubet.

SECTION 7.80.2
Erat ex omnibus castris, quae summum undique iugum tenebant, despectus, atque omnes milites intenti pugnae proventum exspectabant.

SECTION 7.80.3
Galli inter equites raros sagittarios expeditosque levis armaturae interiecerant, qui suis cedentibus auxilio succurrerent et nostrorum equitum impetus sustinerent. Ab his complures de improviso vulnerati proelio excedebant.

SECTION 7.80.4
Cum suos pugna superiores esse Galli confiderent et nostros multitudine premi viderent, ex omnibus partibus et ei qui munitionibus continebantur et hi qui ad auxilium convenerant clamore et ululatu suorum animos confirmabant.

SECTION 7.80.5
Quod in conspectu omnium res gerebatur neque recte ac turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque et laudis cupiditas et timor ignominiae ad virtutem excitabant.

SECTION 7.80.6
Cum a meridie prope ad solis occasum dubia victoria pugnaretur, Germani una in parte confertis turmis in hostes impetum fecerunt eosque propulerunt;

SECTION 7.80.7
quibus in fugam coniectis sagittarii circumventi interfectique sunt.

SECTION 7.80.8
Item ex reliquis partibus nostri cedentes usque ad castra insecuti sui colligendi facultatem non dederunt.

SECTION 7.80.9
At ei qui ab Alesia processerant maesti prope victoria desperata se in oppidum receperunt.

CHAPTER 7.81

SECTION 7.81.1
Vno die intermisso Galli atque hoc spatio magno cratium, scalarum, harpagonum numero effecto media nocte silentio ex castris egressi ad campestres munitiones accedunt.

SECTION 7.81.2
Subito clamore sublato, qua significatione qui in oppido obsidebantur de suo adventu cognoscere possent, crates proicere, fundis, sagittis, lapidibus nostros de vallo proturbare reliquaque quae ad oppugnationem pertinent parant administrare.

SECTION 7.81.3
Eodem tempore clamore exaudito dat tuba signum suis Vercingetorix atque ex oppido educit.

SECTION 7.81.4
Nostri, ut superioribus diebus, ut cuique erat locus attributus, ad munitiones accedunt; fundis librilibus sudibusque quas in opere disposuerant ac glandibus Gallos proterrent.

SECTION 7.81.5
Prospectu tenebris adempto multa utrimque vulnera accipiuntur. Complura tormentis tela coniciuntur.

SECTION 7.81.6
At Marcus Antonius et Gaius Trebonius legati, quibus hae partes ad defendendum obvenerant, qua ex parte nostros premi intellexerant, his auxilio ex ulterioribus castellis deductos summittebant.

CHAPTER 7.82

SECTION 7.82.1
Dum longius ab munitione aberant Galli, plus multitudine telorum proficiebant; posteaquam propius successerunt, aut se stimulis inopinantes induebant aut in scrobes delati transfodiebantur aut ex vallo ac turribus traiecti pilis muralibus interibant.

SECTION 7.82.2
Multis undique vulneribus acceptis nulla munitione perrupta, cum lux appeteret, veriti ne ab latere aperto ex superioribus castris eruptione circumvenirentur, se ad suos receperunt.

SECTION 7.82.3
At interiores, dum ea quae a Vercingetorige ad eruptionem praeparata erant proferunt, priores fossas explent, diutius in his rebus administrandis morati prius suos discessisse cognoverunt, quam munitionibus appropinquarent. Ita re infecta in oppidum reverterunt.

CHAPTER 7.83

SECTION 7.83.1
Bis magno cum detrimento repulsi Galli quid agant consulunt; locorum peritos adhibent: ex his superiorum castrorum situs munitionesque cognoscunt.

SECTION 7.83.2
Erat a septentrionibus collis, quem propter magnitudinem circuitus opere circumplecti non potuerant nostri: necessario paene iniquo loco et leniter declivi castra fecerunt.

SECTION 7.83.3
Haec Gaius Antistius Reginus et Gaius Caninius Rebilus legati cum duabus legionibus obtinebant.

SECTION 7.83.4
Cognitis per exploratores regionibus duces hostium LX milia ex omni numero deligunt earum civitatum quae maximam virtutis opinionem habebant;

SECTION 7.83.5
quid quoque pacto agi placeat occulte inter se constituunt; adeundi tempus definiunt, cum meridies esse videatur.

SECTION 7.83.6
His copiis Vercassivellaunum Arvernum, unum ex quattuor ducibus, propinquum Vercingetorigis, praeficiunt.

SECTION 7.83.7
Ille ex castris prima vigilia egressus prope confecto sub lucem itinere post montem se occultavit militesque ex nocturno labore sese reficere iussit.

SECTION 7.83.8
Cum iam meridies appropinquare videretur, ad ea castra quae supra demonstravimus contendit; eodemque tempore equitatus ad campestres munitiones accedere et reliquae copiae pro castris sese ostendere coeperunt.

CHAPTER 7.84

SECTION 7.84.1
Vercingetorix ex arce Alesiae suos conspicatus ex oppido egreditur; crates, longurios, musculos, falces reliquaque quae eruptionis causa paraverat profert.

SECTION 7.84.2
Pugnatur uno tempore omnibus locis, atque omnia temptantur: quae minime visa pars firma est, huc concurritur.

SECTION 7.84.3
Romanorum manus tantis munitionibus distinetur nec facile pluribus locis occurrit.

SECTION 7.84.4
Multum ad terrendos nostros valet clamor, qui post tergum pugnantibus exstitit, quod suum periculum in aliena vident salute constare:

SECTION 7.84.5
omnia enim plerumque quae absunt vehementius hominum mentes perturbant.

CHAPTER 7.85

SECTION 7.85.1
Caesar idoneum locum nactus quid quaque ex parte geratur cognoscit; laborantibus summittit.

SECTION 7.85.2
Vtrisque ad animum occurrit unum esse illud tempus, quo maxime contendi conveniat:

SECTION 7.85.3
Galli, nisi perfregerint munitiones, de omni salute desperant; Romani, si rem obtinuerint, finem laborum omnium exspectant.

SECTION 7.85.4
Maxime ad superiores munitiones laboratur, quo Vercassivellaunum missum demonstravimus. Iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium magnum habet momentum.

SECTION 7.85.5
Alii tela coniciunt, alii testudine facta subeunt; defatigatis in vicem integri succedunt.

SECTION 7.85.6
Agger ab universis in munitionem coniectus et ascensum dat Gallis et ea quae in terra occultaverant Romani contegit; nec iam arma nostris nec vires suppetunt.

CHAPTER 7.86

SECTION 7.86.1
His rebus cognitis Caesar Labienum cum cohortibus sex subsidio laborantibus mittit:

SECTION 7.86.2
imperat, si sustinere non posset, deductis cohortibus eruptione pugnaret; id nisi necessario ne faciat.

SECTION 7.86.3
Ipse adit reliquos, cohortatur ne labori succumbant; omnium superiorum dimicationum fructum in eo die atque hora docet consistere.

SECTION 7.86.4
Interiores desperatis campestribus locis propter magnitudinem munitionum loca praerupta ex ascensu temptant: huc ea quae paraverant conferunt.

SECTION 7.86.5
Multitudine telorum ex turribus propugnantes deturbant, aggere et cratibus fossas explent, falcibus vallum ac loricam rescindunt.

CHAPTER 7.87

SECTION 7.87.1
Mittit primo Brutum adulescentem cum cohortibus Caesar, post cum aliis Gaium Fabium legatum; postremo ipse, cum vehementius pugnaretur, integros subsidio adducit.

SECTION 7.87.2
Restituto proelio ac repulsis hostibus eo quo Labienum miserat contendit; cohortes quattuor ex proximo castello deducit, equitum partem sequi, partem circumire exteriores munitiones et ab tergo hostes adoriri iubet.

SECTION 7.87.3
Labienus, postquam neque aggeres neque fossae vim hostium sustinere poterant, coactis una XL cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidiis deductas fors obtulit, Caesarem per nuntios facit certiorem quid faciendum existimet. Accelerat Caesar, ut proelio intersit.

CHAPTER 7.88

SECTION 7.88.1
Eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito, quo insigni in proeliis uti consuerat, turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus haec declivia et devexa cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt.

SECTION 7.88.2
Vtrimque clamore sublato excipit rursus ex vallo atque omnibus munitionibus clamor. Nostri omissis pilis gladiis rem gerunt.

SECTION 7.88.3
Repente post tergum equitatus cernitur; cohortes aliae appropinquant. Hostes terga vertunt; fugientibus equites occurrunt. Fit magna caedes. Sedulius, dux et princeps Lemovicum, occiditur;

SECTION 7.88.4
Vercassivellaunus Arvernus vivus in fuga comprehenditur; signa militaria septuaginta quattuor ad Caesarem referuntur: pauci ex tanto numero se incolumes in castra recipiunt.

SECTION 7.88.5
Conspicati ex oppido caedem et fugam suorum desperata salute copias a munitionibus reducunt.

SECTION 7.88.6
Fit protinus hac re audita ex castris Gallorum fuga. Quod nisi crebris subsidiis ac totius diei labore milites essent defessi, omnes hostium copiae deleri potuissent.

SECTION 7.88.7
De media nocte missus equitatus novissimum agmen consequitur: magnus numerus capitur atque interficitur; reliqui ex fuga in civitates discedunt.

CHAPTER 7.89

SECTION 7.89.1
Postero die Vercingetorix concilio convocato id bellum se suscepisse non suarum necessitatium,

SECTION 7.89.2
sed communis libertatis causa demonstrat, et quoniam sit fortunae cedendum, ad utramque rem se illis offerre, seu morte sua Romanis satisfacere seu vivum tradere velint. Mittuntur de his rebus ad Caesarem legati.

SECTION 7.89.3
Iubet arma tradi, principes produci.

SECTION 7.89.4
Ipse in munitione pro castris consedit: eo duces producuntur; Vercingetorix deditur, arma proiciuntur.

SECTION 7.89.5
Reservatis Aeduis atque Arvernis, si per eos civitates reciperare posset, ex reliquis captivis toto exercitui capita singula praedae nomine distribuit.

CHAPTER 7.90

SECTION 7.90.1
His rebus confectis in Aeduos proficiscitur; civitatem recipit.

SECTION 7.90.2
Eo legati ab Arvernis missi quae imperaret se facturos pollicentur. Imperat magnum numerum obsidum.

SECTION 7.90.3
Legiones in hiberna mittit. Captivorum circiter viginti milia Aeduis Arvernisque reddit.

SECTION 7.90.4
Titum Labienum duabus cum legionibus et equitatu in Sequanos proficisci iubet: huic Marcum Sempronium Rutilum attribuit.

SECTION 7.90.5
Gaium Fabium legatum et Lucium Minucium Basilum cum legionibus duabus in Remis collocat, ne quam ab finitimis Bellovacis calamitatem accipiant.

SECTION 7.90.6
Gaium Antistium Reginum in Ambivaretos, Titum Sextium in Bituriges, Gaium Caninium Rebilum in Rutenos cum singulis legionibus mittit.

SECTION 7.90.7
Quintum Tullium Ciceronem et Publium Sulpicium Cabilloni et Matiscone in Aeduis ad Ararim rei frumentariae causa collocat. Ipse Bibracte hiemare constituit. His litteris cognitis Romae dierum viginti supplicatio redditur.

### Book 8

CHAPTER 8.0

SECTION 8.0.1
Coactus assiduis tuis vocibus, Balbe, cum cotidiana mea recusatio non difficultatis excusationem, sed inertiae videretur deprecationem habere, rem difficillimam suscepi.

SECTION 8.0.2
Caesaris nostri commentarios rerum gestarum Galliae, non comparantibus superioribus atque insequentibus eius scriptis, contexui novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci usque ad exitum non quidem civilis dissensionis, cuius finem nullum videmus, sed vitae Caesaris.

SECTION 8.0.3
Quos utinam qui legent scire possint quam invitus susceperim scribendos, qua facilius caream stultitiae atque arrogantiae crimine, qui me mediis interposuerim Caesaris scriptis.

SECTION 8.0.4
Constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose ab aliis esse perfectum, quod non horum elegantia commentariorum superetur:

SECTION 8.0.5
qui sunt editi, ne scientia tantarum rerum scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium iudicio ut praerepta, non praebita, facultas scriptoribus videatur.

SECTION 8.0.6
Cuius tamen rei maior nostra quam reliquorum est admiratio: ceteri enim, quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam, quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecerit scimus.

SECTION 8.0.7
Erat autem in Caesare cum facultas atque elegantia summa scribendi, tum verissima scientia suorum consiliorum explicandorum.

SECTION 8.0.8
Mihi ne illud quidem accidit, ut Alexandrino atque Africano bello interessem; quae bella quamquam ex parte nobis Caesaris sermone sunt nota, tamen aliter audimus ea, quae rerum novitate aut admiratione nos capiunt, aliter, quae pro testimonio sumus dicturi.

SECTION 8.0.9
Sed ego nimirum, dum omnes excusationis causas colligo ne cum Caesare conferar, hoc ipsum crimen arrogantiae subeo, quod me iudicio cuiusquam existimem posse cum Caesare comparari. Vale.

CHAPTER 8.1

SECTION 8.1.1
Omni Gallia devicta Caesar cum a superiore aestate nullum bellandi tempus intermisisset militesque hibernorum quiete reficere a tantis laboribus vellet, complures eodem tempore civitates renovare belli consilia nuntiabantur coniurationesque facere.

SECTION 8.1.2
Cuius rei verisimilis causa adferebatur, quod Gallis omnibus cognitum esset neque ulla multitudine in unum locum coacta resisti posse Romanis, nec, si diversa bella complures eodem tempore intulissent civitates, satis auxili aut spati aut copiarum habiturum exercitum populi Romani ad omnia persequenda; non esse autem alicui civitati sortem incommodi recusandam, si tali mora reliquae possent se vindicare in libertatem.

CHAPTER 8.2

SECTION 8.2.1
Quae ne opinio Gallorum confirmaretur, Caesar Marcum Antonium quaestorem suis praefecit hibernis; ipse equitum praesidio pridie Kal. Ianuarias ab oppido Bibracte proficiscitur ad legionem XIII, quam non longe a finibus Aeduorum collocaverat in finibus Biturigum, eique adiungit legionem XI, quae proxima fuerat.

SECTION 8.2.2
Binis cohortibus ad impedimenta tuenda relictis reliquum exercitum in copiosissimos agros Biturigum inducit, qui, cum latos fines et complura oppida haberent, unius legionis hibernis non potuerint contineri quin bellum pararent coniurationesque facerent.

CHAPTER 8.3

SECTION 8.3.1
Repentino adventu Caesaris accidit, quod imparatis disiectisque accidere fuit necesse, ut sine timore ullo rura colentes prius ab equitatu opprimerentur quam confugere in oppida possent.

SECTION 8.3.2
Namque etiam illud vulgare incursionis hostium signum, quod incendiis aedificiorum intellegi consuevit, Caesaris erat interdicto sublatum, ne aut copia pabuli frumentique, si longius progredi vellet, deficeretur, aut hostes incendiis terrerentur.

SECTION 8.3.3
Multis hominum milibus captis perterriti Bituriges; qui primum adventum potuerant effugere Romanorum, in finitimas civitates aut privatis hospitiis confisi aut societate consiliorum confugerant.

SECTION 8.3.4
Frustra: nam Caesar magnis itineribus omnibus locis occurrit nec dat ulli civitati spatium de aliena potius quam de domestica salute cogitandi; qua celeritate et fideles amicos retinebat et dubitantes terrore ad condiciones pacis adducebat.

SECTION 8.3.5
Tali condicione proposita Bituriges, cum sibi viderent clementia Caesaris reditum patere in eius amicitiam finitimasque civitates sine ulla poena dedisse obsides atque in fidem receptas esse, idem fecerunt.

CHAPTER 8.4

SECTION 8.4.1
Caesar militibus pro tanto labore ac patientia, qui brumalibus diebus itineribus difficillimis, frigoribus intolerandis studiosissime permanserant in labore, ducenos sestertios, centurionibus tot milia nummum praedae nomine condonanda pollicetur legionibusque in hiberna remissis ipse se recipit die XXXX Bibracte.

SECTION 8.4.2
Ibi cum ius diceret, Bituriges ad eum legatos mittunt auxilium petitum contra Carnutes, quos intulisse bellum sibi querebantur.

SECTION 8.4.3
Qua re cognita, cum dies non amplius decem et octo in hibernis esset moratus, legiones XIIII et VI ex hibernis ab Arare educit, quas ibi collocatas explicandae rei frumentariae causa superiore commentario demonstratum est: ita cum duabus legionibus ad persequendos Carnutes proficiscitur.

CHAPTER 8.5

SECTION 8.5.1
Cum fama exercitus ad hostes esset perlata, calamitate ceterorum ducti Carnutes desertis vicis oppidisque, quae tolerandae hiemis causa constitutis repente exiguis ad necessitatem aedificiis incolebant (nuper enim devicti complura oppida dimiserant), dispersi profugiunt.

SECTION 8.5.2
Caesar erumpentes eo maxime tempore acerrimas tempestates cum subire milites nollet, in oppido Carnutum Cenabo castra ponit atque in tecta partim Gallorum, partim quae coniectis celeriter stramentis tentoriorum integendorum gratia erant inaedificata, milites compegit.

SECTION 8.5.3
Equites tamen et auxiliarios pedites in omnes partes mittit quascumque petisse dicebantur hostes; nec frustra:

SECTION 8.5.4
nam plerumque magna praeda potiti nostri revertuntur. Oppressi Carnutes hiemis difficultate, terrore periculi, cum tectis expulsi nullo loco diutius consistere auderent nec silvarum praesidio tempestatibus durissimis tegi possent, dispersi magna parte amissa suorum dissipantur in finitimas civitates.

CHAPTER 8.6

SECTION 8.6.1
Caesar tempore anni difficillimo, cum satis haberet convenientes manus dissipare, ne quod initium belli nasceretur, quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum haberet sub tempus aestivorum nullum summum bellum posse conflari, Gaium Trebonium cum duabus legionibus, quas secum habebat, in hibernis Cenabi collocavit;

SECTION 8.6.2
ipse, cum crebris legationibus Remorum certior fieret Bellovacos, qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque praestabant, finitimasque his civitates duce Correo Bellovaco et Commio Atrebate exercitus comparare atque in unum locum cogere, ut omni multitudine in fines Suessionum, qui Remis erant attributi, facerent impressionem, pertinere autem non tantum ad dignitatem sed etiam ad salutem suam iudicaret nullam calamitatem socios optime de re publica meritos accipere,

SECTION 8.6.3
legionem ex hibernis evocat rursus undecimam; litteras autem ad Gaium Fabium mittit, ut in fines Suessionum legiones duas quas habebat adduceret, alteramque ex duabus ab Labieno arcessit.

SECTION 8.6.4
Ita, quantum hibernorum opportunitas bellique ratio postulabat, perpetuo suo labore in vicem legionibus expeditionum onus iniungebat.

CHAPTER 8.7

SECTION 8.7.1
His copiis coactis ad Bellovacos proficiscitur castrisque in eorum finibus positis equitum turmas dimittit in omnes partes ad aliquos excipiendos ex quibus hostium consilia cognosceret.

SECTION 8.7.2
Equites officio functi renuntiant paucos in aedificiis esse inventos, atque hos, non qui agrorum colendorum causa remansissent (namque esse undique diligenter demigratum), sed qui speculandi causa essent remissi.

SECTION 8.7.3
A quibus cum quaereret Caesar quo loco multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve esset consilium eorum, inveniebat Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in unum locum convenisse,

SECTION 8.7.4
itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos, Veliocasses, Atrebatas; locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude delegisse, impedimenta omnia in ulteriores silvas contulisse.

SECTION 8.7.5
Complures esse principes belli auctores, sed multitudinem maxime Correo obtemperare, quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani intellexissent.

SECTION 8.7.6
Paucis ante diebus ex his castris Atrebatem Commium discessisse ad auxilia Germanorum adducenda; quorum et vicinitas propinqua et multitudo esset infinita.

SECTION 8.7.7
Constituisse autem Bellovacos omnium principum consensu, summa plebis cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum tribus legionibus veniret, offerre se ad dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore postea condicione cum toto exercitu decertare cogerentur;

SECTION 8.7.8
si maiores copias adduceret, in eo loco permanere quem delegissent, pabulatione autem, quae propter anni tempus cum exigua tum disiecta esset, et frumentatione et reliquo commeatu ex insidiis prohibere Romanos.

CHAPTER 8.8

SECTION 8.8.1
Quae Caesar consentientibus pluribus cum cognosset atque ea quae proponerentur consilia plena prudentiae longeque a temeritate barbarorum remota esse iudicaret, omnibus rebus inserviendum statuit, quo celerius hostis contempta sua paucitate prodiret in aciem.

SECTION 8.8.2
Singularis enim virtutis veterrimas legiones VII, VIII, VIIII habebat, summae spei delectaeque iuventutis XI, quae octavo iam stipendio tamen in collatione reliquarum nondum eandem vetustatis ac virtutis ceperat opinionem.

SECTION 8.8.3
Itaque consilio advocato, rebus eis quae ad se essent delatae omnibus expositis animos multitudinis confirmat.

SECTION 8.8.4
Si forte hostes trium legionum numero posset elicere ad dimicandum, agminis ordinem ita constituit, ut legio septima, octava, nona ante omnia irent impedimenta, deinde omnium impedimentorum agmen, quod tamen erat mediocre, ut in expeditionibus esse consuevit, cogeret undecima, ne maioris multitudinis species accidere hostibus posset quam ipsi depoposcissent.

SECTION 8.8.5
Hac ratione paene quadrato agmine instructo in conspectum hostium celerius opinione eorum exercitum adducit.

CHAPTER 8.9

SECTION 8.9.1
Cum repente instructas velut in acie certo gradu legiones accedere Galli viderent, quorum erant ad Caesarem plena fiduciae consilia perlata, sive certaminis periculo sive subito adventu sive exspectatione nostri consili copias instruunt pro castris nec loco superiore decedunt.

SECTION 8.9.2
Caesar, etsi dimicare optaverat, tamen admiratus tantam multitudinem hostium valle intermissa magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente castra castris hostium confert.

SECTION 8.9.3
Haec imperat vallo pedum XII muniri, loriculam pro [hac] ratione eius altitudinis inaedificari; fossam duplicem pedum denum quinum lateribus deprimi directis; turres excitari crebras in altitudinem trium tabulatorum, pontibus traiectis constratisque coniungi, quorum frontes viminea loricula munirentur; ut ab hostibus duplici fossa, duplici propugnatorum ordine defenderentur,

SECTION 8.9.4
quorum alter ex pontibus, quo tutior altitudine esset, hoc audacius longiusque permitteret tela, alter, qui propior hostem in ipso vallo collocatus esset, ponte ab incidentibus telis tegeretur. Portis fores altioresque turres imposuit.

CHAPTER 8.10

SECTION 8.10.1
Huius munitionis duplex erat consilium. Namque et operum magnitudinem et timorem suum sperabat fiduciam barbaris allaturum, et cum pabulatum frumentatumque longius esset proficiscendum, parvis copiis castra munitione ipsa videbat posse defendi.

SECTION 8.10.2
Interim crebro paucis utrimque procurrentibus inter bina castra palude interiecta contendebatur; quam tamen paludem nonnumquam aut nostra auxilia Gallorum Germanorumque transibant acriusque hostes insequebantur, aut vicissim hostes eadem transgressi nostros longius summovebant.

SECTION 8.10.3
Accidebat autem cotidianis pabulationibus (id quod accidere erat necesse, cum raris disiectisque ex aedificiis pabulum conquireretur), ut impeditis locis dispersi pabulatores circumvenirentur;

SECTION 8.10.4
quae res, etsi mediocre detrimentum iumentorum ac servorum nostris adferebat, tamen stultas cogitationes incitabat barbarorum, atque eo magis, quod Commius, quem profectum ad auxilia Germanorum arcessenda docui, cum equitibus venerat; qui, tametsi numero non amplius erant quingenti, tamen Germanorum adventu barbari nitebantur.

CHAPTER 8.11

SECTION 8.11.1
Caesar, cum animadverteret hostem complures dies castris palude et loci natura munitis se tenere neque oppugnari castra eorum sine dimicatione perniciosa nec locum munitionibus claudi nisi a maiore exercitu posse, litteras ad Trebonium mittit, ut quam celerrime posset legionem XIII, quae cum T. Sextio legato in Biturigibus hiemabat, arcesseret atque ita cum tribus legionibus magnis itineribus ad se veniret;

SECTION 8.11.2
ipse equites in vicem Remorum ac Lingonum reliquarumque civitatum, quorum magnum numerum evocaverat, praesidio pabulationibus mittit, qui subitas hostium incursiones sustinerent.

CHAPTER 8.12

SECTION 8.12.1
Quod cum cotidie fieret ac iam consuetudine diligentia minueretur, quod plerumque accidit diuturnitate, Bellovaci delecta manu peditum cognitis stationibus cotidianis equitum nostrorum

SECTION 8.12.2
silvestribus locis insidias disponunt eodemque equites postero die mittunt, qui primum elicerent nostros, deinde circumventos aggrederentur.

SECTION 8.12.3
Cuius mali sors incidit Remis, quibus ille dies fungendi muneris obvenerat. Namque hi, cum repente hostium equites animadvertissent ac numero superiores paucitatem contempsissent, cupidius insecuti peditibus undique sunt circumdati.

SECTION 8.12.4
Quo facto perturbati celerius quam consuetudo fert equestris proeli se receperunt amisso Vertisco, principe civitatis, praefecto equitum;

SECTION 8.12.5
qui cum vix equo propter aetatem posset uti, tamen consuetudine Gallorum neque aetatis excusatione in suscipienda praefectura usus erat neque dimicari sine se voluerat.

SECTION 8.12.6
Inflantur atque incitantur hostium animi secundo proelio, principe et praefecto Remorum interfecto,

SECTION 8.12.7
nostrique detrimento admonentur diligentius exploratis locis stationes disponere ac moderatius cedentem insequi hostem.

CHAPTER 8.13

SECTION 8.13.1
Non intermittunt interim cotidiana proelia in conspectu utrorumque castrorum, quae ad vada transitusque fiebant paludis.

SECTION 8.13.2
Qua contentione Germani, quos propterea Caesar traduxerat Rhenum ut equitibus interpositi proeliarentur, cum constantius universi paludem transissent paucisque resistentibus interfectis pertinacius reliquam multitudinem essent insecuti, perterriti non solum ei qui aut comminus opprimebantur aut eminus vulnerabantur, sed etiam qui longius subsidiari consuerant, turpiter refugerunt,

SECTION 8.13.3
nec prius finem fugae fecerunt saepe amissis superioribus locis quam se aut in castra suorum reciperent, aut nonnulli pudore coacti longius profugerent.

SECTION 8.13.4
Quorum periculo sic omnes copiae sunt perturbatae ut vix iudicari posset, utrum secundis minimisque rebus insolentiores an adverso mediocri casu timidiores essent.

CHAPTER 8.14

SECTION 8.14.1
Compluribus diebus isdem in castris consumptis, cum propius accessisse legiones et Gaium Trebonium legatum cognossent, duces Bellovacorum veriti similem obsessionem Alesiae noctu dimittunt eos quos aut aetate aut viribus inferiores aut inermes habebant, unaque reliqua impedimenta.

SECTION 8.14.2
Quorum perturbatum et confusum dum explicant agmen (magna enim multitudo carrorum etiam expeditos sequi Gallos consuevit), oppressi luce copias armatorum pro suis instruunt castris, ne prius Romani persequi se inciperent quam longius agmen impedimentorum suorum processisset.

SECTION 8.14.3
At Caesar neque resistentes adgrediendos tanto collis ascensu iudicabat, neque non usque eo legiones admovendas ut discedere ex eo loco sine periculo barbari militibus instantibus non possent.

SECTION 8.14.4
Ita, cum palude impedita a castris castra dividi videret, quae transeundi difficultas celeritatem insequendi tardare posset, atque id iugum quod trans paludem paene ad hostium castra pertineret mediocri valle a castris eorum intercisum animum adverteret, pontibus palude constrata legiones traducit celeriterque in summam planitiem iugi pervenit, quae declivi fastigio duobus ab lateribus muniebatur.

SECTION 8.14.5
Ibi legionibus instructis ad ultimum iugum pervenit aciemque eo loco constituit unde tormento missa tela in hostium cuneos conici possent.

CHAPTER 8.15

SECTION 8.15.1
Barbari confisi loci natura, cum dimicare non recusarent, si forte Romani subire collem conarentur, paulatim copias distributas dimittere non possent, ne dispersi perturbarentur, in acie permanserunt.

SECTION 8.15.2
Quorum pertinacia cognita Caesar XX cohortibus instructis castrisque eo loco metatis muniri iubet castra.

SECTION 8.15.3
Absolutis operibus pro vallo legiones instructas collocat, equites frenatis equis in statione disponit.

SECTION 8.15.4
Bellovaci, cum Romanos ad insequendum paratos viderent neque pernoctare aut diutius permanere sine periculo eodem loco possent, tale consilium sui recipiendi ceperunt.

SECTION 8.15.5
Fasces, ubi consederant (namque in acie sedere Gallos consuesse superioribus commentariis Caesaris declaratum est), per manus stramentorum ac virgultorum, quorum summa erat in castris copia, inter se traditos ante aciem collocarunt extremoque tempore diei signo pronuntiato uno tempore incenderunt.

SECTION 8.15.6
Ita continens flamma copias omnes repente a conspectu texit Romanorum. Quod ubi accidit, barbari vehementissimo cursu refugerunt.

CHAPTER 8.16

SECTION 8.16.1
Caesar, etsi discessum hostium animadvertere non poterat incendiis oppositis, tamen id consilium cum fugae causa initum suspicaretur, legiones promovet, turmas mittit ad insequendum; ipse veritus insidias, ne forte in eodem loco subsistere hostis atque elicere nostros in locum conaretur iniquum, tardius procedit.

SECTION 8.16.2
Equites cum intrare fumum et flammam densissimam timerent ac, si qui cupidius intraverant, vix suorum ipsi priores partes animadverterent equorum, insidias veriti liberam facultatem sui recipiendi Bellovacis dederunt.

SECTION 8.16.3
Ita fuga timoris simul calliditatisque plena sine ullo detrimento milia non amplius decem progressi hostes loco munitissimo castra posuerunt.

SECTION 8.16.4
Inde cum saepe in insidiis equites peditesque disponerent, magna detrimenta Romanis in pabulationibus inferebant.

CHAPTER 8.17

SECTION 8.17.1
Quod cum crebrius accideret, ex captivo quodam comperit Caesar Correum, Bellovacorum ducem, fortissimorum milia sex peditum delegisse equitesque ex omni numero mille, quos in insidiis eo loco collocaret, quem in locum propter copiam frumenti ac pabuli Romanos missuros suspicaretur.

SECTION 8.17.2
Quo cognito consilio legiones plures quam solebat educit equitatumque, qua consuetudine pabulatoribus mittere praesidio consuerat, praemittit: huic interponit auxilia levis armaturae; ipse cum legionibus quam potest maxime appropinquat.

CHAPTER 8.18

SECTION 8.18.1
Hostes in insidiis dispositi, cum sibi delegissent campum ad rem gerendam non amplius patentem in omnes partes passibus mille, silvis undique aut impeditissimo flumine munitum, velut indagine hunc insidiis circumdederunt.

SECTION 8.18.2
Explorato hostium consilio nostri ad proeliandum animo atque armis parati, cum subsequentibus legionibus nullam dimicationem recusarent, turmatim in eum locum devenerunt.

SECTION 8.18.3
Quorum adventu cum sibi Correus oblatam occasionem rei gerendae existimaret, primum cum paucis se ostendit atque in proximas turmas impetum fecit.

SECTION 8.18.4
Nostri constanter incursum sustinent insidiatorum neque plures in unum locum conveniunt; quod plerumque equestribus proeliis cum propter aliquem timorem accidit, tum multitudine ipsorum detrimentum accipitur.

CHAPTER 8.19

SECTION 8.19.1
Cum dispositis turmis in vicem rari proeliarentur neque ab lateribus circumveniri suos paterentur, erumpunt ceteri Correo proeliante ex silvis.

SECTION 8.19.2
Fit magna contentione diversum proelium. Quod cum diutius pari Marte iniretur, paulatim ex silvis instructa multitudo procedit peditum, quae nostros coegit cedere equites. Quibus celeriter subveniunt levis armaturae pedites, quos ante legiones missos docui, turmisque nostrorum interpositi constanter proeliantur.

SECTION 8.19.3
Pugnatur aliquamdiu pari contentione; deinde, ut ratio postulabat proeli, qui sustinuerant primos impetus insidiarum hoc ipso fiunt superiores, quod nullum ab insidiantibus imprudentes acceperant detrimentum.

SECTION 8.19.4
Accedunt propius interim legiones, crebrique eodem tempore et nostris et hostibus nuntii adferuntur, imperatorem instructis copiis adesse.

SECTION 8.19.5
Qua re cognita praesidio cohortium confisi nostri acerrime proeliantur, ne, si tardius rem gessissent, victoriae gloriam communicasse cum legionibus viderentur;

SECTION 8.19.6
hostes concidunt animis atque itineribus diversis fugam quaerunt. Nequiquam: nam quibus difficultatibus locorum Romanos claudere voluerant, eis ipsi tenebantur.

SECTION 8.19.7
Victi tamen perculsique maiore parte amissa consternati profugiunt partim silvis petitis, partim flumine (qui tamen in fuga a nostris acriter insequentibus conficiuntur),

SECTION 8.19.8
cum interim nulla calamitate victus Correus excedere proelio silvasque petere aut invitantibus nostris ad deditionem potuit adduci, quin fortissime proeliando compluresque vulnerando cogeret elatos iracundia victores in se tela conicere.

CHAPTER 8.20

SECTION 8.20.1
Tali modo re gesta recentibus proeli vestigiis ingressus Caesar, cum victos tanta calamitate existimaret hostes nuntio accepto locum castrorum relicturos, quae non longius ab ea caede abesse plus minus octo milibus dicebantur, tametsi flumine impeditum transitum videbat, tamen exercitu traducto progreditur.

SECTION 8.20.2
At Bellovaci reliquaeque civitates repente ex fuga paucis atque his vulneratis receptis, qui silvarum beneficio casum evitaverant, omnibus adversis, cognita calamitate, interfecto Correo, amisso equitatu et fortissimis peditibus, cum adventare Romanos existimarent, concilio repente cantu tubarum convocato conclamant, legati obsidesque ad Caesarem mittantur.

CHAPTER 8.21

SECTION 8.21.1
Hoc omnibus probato consilio Commius Atrebas ad eos confugit Germanos, a quibus ad id bellum auxilia mutuatus erat.

SECTION 8.21.2
Ceteri e vestigio mittunt ad Caesarem legatos petuntque, ut ea poena sit contentus hostium, quam si sine dimicatione inferre integris posset, pro sua clementia atque humanitate numquam profecto esset illaturus.

SECTION 8.21.3
Adflictas opes equestri proelio Bellovacorum esse; delectorum peditum multa milia interisse, vix refugisse nuntios caedis.

SECTION 8.21.4
Tamen magnum ut in tanta calamitate Bellovacos eo proelio commodum esse consecutos, quod Correus, auctor belli, concitator multitudinis, esset interfectus. Numquam enim senatum tantum in civitate illo vivo quantum imperitam plebem potuisse.

CHAPTER 8.22

SECTION 8.22.1
Haec orantibus legatis commemorat Caesar: Eodem tempore superiore anno Bellovacos ceterasque Galliae civitates suscepisse bellum: pertinacissime hos ex omnibus in sententia permansisse neque ad sanitatem reliquorum deditione esse perductos.

SECTION 8.22.2
Scire atque intellegere se causam peccati facillime mortuis delegari. Neminem vero tantum pollere, ut invitis principibus, resistente senatu, omnibus bonis repugnantibus infirma manu plebis bellum concitare et gerere posset. Sed tamen se contentum fore ea poena quam sibi ipsi contraxissent.

CHAPTER 8.23

SECTION 8.23.1
Nocte insequenti legati responsa ad suos referunt, obsides conficiunt. Concurrunt reliquarum civitatium legati, quae Bellovacorum speculabantur eventum;

SECTION 8.23.2
obsides dant, imperata faciunt excepto Commio, quem timor prohibebat cuiusquam fidei suam committere salutem.

SECTION 8.23.3
Nam superiore anno Titus Labienus, Caesare in Gallia citeriore ius dicente, cum Commium comperisset sollicitare civitates et coniurationem contra Caesarem facere, infidelitatem eius sine ulla perfidia iudicavit comprimi posse.

SECTION 8.23.4
Quem quia non arbitrabatur vocatum in castra venturum, ne temptando cautiorem faceret, Gaium Volusenum Quadratum misit, qui eum per simulationem colloqui curaret interficiendum. Ad eam rem delectos idoneos ei tradit centuriones.

SECTION 8.23.5
Cum in colloquium ventum esset, et, ut convenerat, manum Commi Volusenus arripuisset, centurio vel insueta re permotus vel celeriter a familiaribus prohibitus Commi conficere hominem non potuit; graviter tamen primo ictu gladio caput percussit.

SECTION 8.23.6
Cum utrimque gladii destricti essent, non tam pugnandi quam diffugiendi fuit utrorumque consilium: nostrorum, quod mortifero vulnere Commium credebant adfectum; Gallorum, quod insidiis cognitis plura quam videbant extimescebant. Quo facto statuisse Commius dicebatur numquam in conspectum cuiusquam Romani venire.

CHAPTER 8.24

SECTION 8.24.1
Bellicosissimis gentibus devictis Caesar, cum videret nullam iam esse civitatem quae bellum pararet quo sibi resisteret, sed nonnullos ex oppidis demigrare, ex agris diffugere ad praesens imperium evitandum, plures in partes exercitum dimittere constituit.

SECTION 8.24.2
M. Antonium quaestorem cum legione duodecima sibi coniungit. C. Fabium legatum cum cohortibus XXV mittit in diversissimam partem Galliae, quod ibi quasdam civitates in armis esse audiebat neque C. Caninium Rebilum legatum, qui in illis regionibus erat, satis firmas duas legiones habere existimabat.

SECTION 8.24.3
Titum Labienum ad se evocat; legionem autem XV, quae cum eo fuerat in hibernis, in togatam Galliam mittit ad colonias civium Romanorum tuendas, ne quod simile incommodum accideret decursione barbarorum ac superiore aestate Tergestinis acciderat, qui repentino latrocinio atque impetu illorum erant oppressi.

SECTION 8.24.4
Ipse ad vastandos depopulandosque fines Ambiorigis proficiscitur; quem perterritum ac fugientem cum redigi posse in suam potestatem desperasset, proximum suae dignitatis esse ducebat, adeo fines eius vastare civibus, aedificiis, pecore, ut odio suorum Ambiorix, si quos fortuna reliquos fecisset, nullum reditum propter tantas calamitates haberet in civitatem.

CHAPTER 8.25

SECTION 8.25.1
Cum in omnes partes finium Ambiorigis aut legiones aut auxilia dimisisset atque omnia caedibus, incendiis, rapinis vastasset, magno numero hominum interfecto aut capto Labienum cum duabus legionibus in Treveros mittit,

SECTION 8.25.2
quorum civitas propter Germaniae vicinitatem cotidianis exercitata bellis cultu et feritate non multum a Germanis differebat neque imperata umquam nisi exercitu coacta faciebat.

CHAPTER 8.26

SECTION 8.26.1
Interim Gaius Caninius legatus, cum magnam multitudinem convenisse hostium in fines Pictonum litteris nuntiisque Durati cognosceret, qui perpetuo in amicitia manserat Romanorum, cum pars quaedam civitatis eius defecisset, ad oppidum Lemonum contendit.

SECTION 8.26.2
Quo cum adventaret atque ex captivis certius cognosceret multis hominum milibus a Dumnaco, duce Andium, Duratium clausum Lemoni oppugnari neque infirmas legiones hostibus committere auderet, castra posuit loco munito.

SECTION 8.26.3
Dumnacus, cum appropinquare Caninium cognosset, copiis omnibus ad legiones conversis castra Romanorum oppugnare instituit.

SECTION 8.26.4
Cum complures dies in oppugnatione consumpsisset et magno suorum detrimento nullam partem munitionum convellere potuisset, rursus ad obsidendum Lemonum redit.

CHAPTER 8.27

SECTION 8.27.1
Eodem tempore C. Fabius legatus complures civitates in fidem recipit, obsidibus firmat litterisque Gai Canini Rebili fit certior quae in Pictonibus gerantur.

SECTION 8.27.2
Quibus rebus cognitis proficiscitur ad auxilium Duratio ferendum. At Dumnacus adventu Fabi cognito desperata salute, si tempore eodem coactus esset et Romanum externum sustinere hostem et respicere ac timere oppidanos, repente ex eo loco cum copiis recedit nec se satis tutum fore arbitratur, nisi flumine Ligeri, quod erat ponte propter magnitudinem transeundum, copias traduxisset.

SECTION 8.27.3
Fabius, etsi nondum in conspectum venerat hostibus neque se Caninio coniunxerat, tamen doctus ab eis qui locorum noverant naturam potissimum credidit hostes perterritos eum locum, quem petebant, petituros.

SECTION 8.27.4
Itaque cum copiis ad eundem pontem contendit equitatumque tantum procedere ante agmen imperat legionum, quantum cum processisset, sine defatigatione equorum in eadem se reciperet castra.

SECTION 8.27.5
Consequuntur equites nostri, ut erat praeceptum, invaduntque Dumnaci agmen et fugientes perterritosque sub sarcinis in itinere adgressi magna praeda multis interfectis potiuntur. Ita re bene gesta se recipiunt in castra.

CHAPTER 8.28

SECTION 8.28.1
Insequenti nocte Fabius equites praemittit sic paratos ut confligerent atque omne agmen morarentur, dum consequeretur ipse.

SECTION 8.28.2
Cuius praeceptis ut res gereretur, Quintus Atius Varus, praefectus equitum, singularis et animi et prudentiae vir, suos hortatur agmenque hostium consecutus turmas partim idoneis locis disponit, parte equitum proelium committit.

SECTION 8.28.3
Confligit audacius equitatus hostium succedentibus sibi peditibus, qui toto agmine subsistentes equitibus suis contra nostros ferunt auxilium. Fit proelium acri certamine.

SECTION 8.28.4
Namque nostri contemptis pridie superatis hostibus, cum subsequi legiones meminissent, et pudore cedendi et cupiditate per se conficiendi proeli fortissime contra pedites proeliantur,

SECTION 8.28.5
hostesque nihil amplius copiarum accessurum credentes, ut pridie cognoverant, delendi equitatus nostri nacti occasionem videbantur.

CHAPTER 8.29

SECTION 8.29.1
Cum aliquamdiu summa contentione dimicaretur, Dumnacus instruit aciem quae suis esset equitibus in vicem praesidio, cum repente confertae legiones in conspectum hostium veniunt.

SECTION 8.29.2
Quibus visis perculsae barbarorum turmae ac perterritae acies hostium, perturbato impedimentorum agmine, magno clamore discursuque passim fugae se mandant.

SECTION 8.29.3
At nostri equites, qui paulo ante cum resistentibus fortissime conflixerant, laetitia victoriae elati magno undique clamore sublato cedentibus circumfusi, quantum equorum vires ad persequendum dextraeque ad caedendum valent, tantum eo proelio interficiunt.

SECTION 8.29.4
Itaque amplius milibus XII aut armatorum aut eorum qui eo timore arma proiecerant interfectis omnis multitudo capitur impedimentorum.

CHAPTER 8.30

SECTION 8.30.1
Qua ex fuga cum constaret Drappetem Senonem, qui, ut primum defecerat Gallia, collectis undique perditis hominibus, servis ad libertatem vocatis, exulibus omnium civitatum adscitis, receptis latronibus impedimenta et commeatus Romanorum interceperat, non amplius hominum duobus milibus ex fuga collectis provinciam petere unaque consilium cum eo Lucterium Cadurcum cepisse, quem superiore commentario prima defectione Galliae facere in provinciam voluisse impetum cognitum est,

SECTION 8.30.2
Caninius legatus cum legionibus duabus ad eos persequendos contendit, ne detrimento aut timore provinciae magna infamia perditorum hominum latrociniis caperetur.

CHAPTER 8.31

SECTION 8.31.1
Gaius Fabius cum reliquo exercitu in Carnutes ceterasque proficiscitur civitates, quarum eo proelio, quod cum Dumnaco fecerat, copias esse accisas sciebat.

SECTION 8.31.2
Non enim dubitabat quin recenti calamitate summissiores essent futurae, dato vero spatio ac tempore eodem instigante Dumnaco possent concitari.

SECTION 8.31.3
Qua in re summa felicitas celeritasque in recipiendis civitatibus Fabium consequitur.

SECTION 8.31.4
Nam Carnutes, qui saepe vexati numquam pacis fecerant mentionem, datis obsidibus veniunt in deditionem, ceteraeque civitates positae in ultimis Galliae finibus Oceano coniunctae, quae Armoricae appellantur, auctoritate adductae Carnutum adventu Fabi legionumque imperata sine mora faciunt.

SECTION 8.31.5
Dumnacus suis finibus expulsus errans latitansque solus extremas Galliae regiones petere est coactus.

CHAPTER 8.32

SECTION 8.32.1
At Drappes unaque Lucterius, cum legiones Caniniumque adesse cognoscerent nec se sine certa pernicie persequente exercitu putarent provinciae fines intrare posse nec iam libere vagandi latrociniorumque faciendorum facultatem haberent, in finibus consistunt Cadurcorum.

SECTION 8.32.2
Ibi cum Lucterius apud suos cives quondam integris rebus multum potuisset, semperque auctor novorum consiliorum magnam apud barbaros auctoritatem haberet, oppidum Vxellodunum, quod in clientela fuerat eius, egregie natura loci munitum, occupat suis et Drappetis copiis oppidanosque sibi coniungit.

CHAPTER 8.33

SECTION 8.33.1
Quo cum confestim Gaius Caninius venisset animadverteretque omnes oppidi partes praeruptissimis saxis esse munitas, quo defendente nullo tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile, magna autem impedimenta oppidanorum videret, quae si clandestina fuga subtrahere conarentur, effugere non modo equitatum, sed ne legiones quidem possent, tripertito cohortibus divisis trina excelsissimo loco castra fecit;

SECTION 8.33.2
a quibus paulatim, quantum copiae patiebantur, vallum in oppidi circuitum ducere instituit.

CHAPTER 8.34

SECTION 8.34.1
Quod cum animadverterent oppidani miserrimaque Alesiae memoria solliciti similem casum obsessionis vererentur, maximeque ex omnibus Lucterius, qui fortunae illius periculum fecerat, moneret frumenti rationem esse habendam, constituunt omnium consensu parte ibi relicta copiarum ipsi cum expeditis ad importandum frumentum proficisci.

SECTION 8.34.2
Eo consilio probato proxima nocte duobus milibus armatorum relictis reliquos ex oppido Drappes et Lucterius educunt.

SECTION 8.34.3
Hi paucos dies morati ex finibus Cadurcorum, qui partim re frumentaria sublevare eos cupiebant, partim prohibere quo minus sumerent non poterant, magnum numerum frumenti comparant, nonnumquam autem expeditionibus nocturnis castella nostrorum adoriuntur.

SECTION 8.34.4
Quam ob causam Gaius Caninius toto oppido munitiones circumdare moratur, ne aut opus effectum tueri non possit aut plurimis in locis infirma disponat praesidia.

CHAPTER 8.35

SECTION 8.35.1
Magna copia frumenti comparata considunt Drappes et Lucterius non longius ab oppido X milibus, unde paulatim frumentum in oppidum supportarent.

SECTION 8.35.2
Ipsi inter se provincias partiuntur: Drappes castris praesidio cum parte copiarum restitit; Lucterius agmen iumentorum ad oppidum ducit.

SECTION 8.35.3
Dispositis ibi praesidiis hora noctis circiter decima silvestribus angustisque itineribus frumentum importare in oppidum instituit.

SECTION 8.35.4
Quorum strepitum vigiles castrorum cum sensissent, exploratoresque missi quae gererentur renuntiassent, Caninius celeriter cum cohortibus armatis ex proximis castellis in frumentarios sub ipsam lucem impetum fecit.

SECTION 8.35.5
Ei repentino malo perterriti diffugiunt ad sua praesidia; quae nostri ut viderunt, acrius contra armatos incitati neminem ex eo numero vivum capi patiuntur. Profugit inde cum paucis Lucterius nec se recipit in castra.

CHAPTER 8.36

SECTION 8.36.1
Re bene gesta Caninius ex captivis comperit partem copiarum cum Drappete esse in castris a milibus longe non amplius XII.

SECTION 8.36.2
Qua re ex compluribus cognita, cum intellegeret fugato duce altero perterritos reliquos facile opprimi posse, magnae felicitatis esse arbitrabatur neminem ex caede refugisse in castra qui de accepta calamitate nuntium Drappeti perferret.

SECTION 8.36.3
Sed in experiendo cum periculum nullum videret, equitatum omnem Germanosque pedites, summae velocitatis homines, ad castra hostium praemittit; ipse legionem unam in trina castra distribuit, alteram secum expeditam ducit.

SECTION 8.36.4
Cum propius hostes accessisset, ab exploratoribus quos praemiserat cognoscit castra eorum, ut barbarorum fere consuetudo est, relictis locis superioribus ad ripas fluminis esse demissa; at Germanos equitesque imprudentibus omnibus de improviso advolasse proeliumque commisisse.

SECTION 8.36.5
Qua re cognita legionem armatam instructamque adducit. Ita repente omnibus ex partibus signo dato loca superiora capiuntur.

SECTION 8.36.6
Quod ubi accidit, Germani equitesque signis legionis visis vehementissime proeliantur. Confestim cohortes undique impetum faciunt omnibusque aut interfectis aut captis magna praeda potiuntur. Capitur ipse eo proelio Drappes.

CHAPTER 8.37

SECTION 8.37.1
Caninius felicissime re gesta sine ullo paene militis vulnere ad obsidendos oppidanos revertitur

SECTION 8.37.2
externoque hoste deleto, cuius timore antea dividere praesidia et munitione oppidanos circumdare prohibitus erat, opera undique imperat administrari. Venit eodem cum suis copiis postero die Gaius Fabius partemque oppidi sumit ad obsidendum.

CHAPTER 8.38

SECTION 8.38.1
Caesar interim M. Antonium quaestorem cum cohortibus XV in Bellovacis relinquit, ne qua rursus novorum consiliorum capiendorum Belgis facultas daretur.

SECTION 8.38.2
Ipse reliquas civitates adit, obsides plures imperat, timentes omnium animos consolatione sanat.

SECTION 8.38.3
Cum in Carnutes venisset, quorum in civitate superiore commentario Caesar exposuit initium belli esse ortum, quod praecipue eos propter conscientiam facti timere animadvertebat, quo celerius civitatem timore liberaret, principem sceleris illius et concitatorem belli, Gutruatum, ad supplicium depoposcit.

SECTION 8.38.4
Qui etsi ne civibus quidem suis se committebat, tamen celeriter omnium cura quaesitus in castra perducitur.

SECTION 8.38.5
Cogitur in eius supplicium Caesar contra suam naturam concursu maximo militum, qui ei omnia pericula et detrimenta belli accepta referebant, adeo ut verberibus exanimatum corpus securi feriretur.

CHAPTER 8.39

SECTION 8.39.1
Ibi crebris litteris Canini fit certior quae de Drappete et Lucterio gesta essent, quoque in consilio permanerent oppidani.

SECTION 8.39.2
Quorum etsi paucitatem contemnebat, tamen pertinaciam magna poena esse adficiendam iudicabat, ne universa Gallia non sibi vires defuisse ad resistendum Romanis, sed constantiam putaret, neve hoc exemplo ceterae civitates locorum opportunitate fretae se vindicarent in libertatem,

SECTION 8.39.3
cum omnibus Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam aestatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum ultra periculum vererentur.

SECTION 8.39.4
Itaque Q. Calenum legatum cum legionibus reliquit qui iustis itineribus subsequeretur; ipse cum omni equitatu quam potest celerrime ad Caninium contendit.

CHAPTER 8.40

SECTION 8.40.1
Cum contra exspectationem omnium Caesar Vxellodunum venisset oppidumque operibus clausum animadverteret neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla condicione posse, magna autem copia frumenti abundare oppidanos ex perfugis cognosset, aqua prohibere hostem temptare coepit.

SECTION 8.40.2
Flumen infimam vallem dividebat, quae totum paene montem cingebat, in quo positum erat praeruptum undique oppidum Vxellodunum.

SECTION 8.40.3
Hoc avertere loci natura prohibebat: in infimis enim sic radicibus montis ferebatur, ut nullam in partem depressis fossis derivari posset.

SECTION 8.40.4
Erat autem oppidanis difficilis et praeruptus eo descensus, ut prohibentibus nostris sine vulneribus ac periculo vitae neque adire flumen neque arduo se recipere possent ascensu.

SECTION 8.40.5
Qua difficultate eorum cognita Caesar sagittariis funditoribusque dispositis, tormentis etiam quibusdam locis contra facillimos descensus collocatis aqua fluminis prohibebat oppidanos.

CHAPTER 8.41

SECTION 8.41.1
Quorum omnis postea multitudo aquatorum unum in locum conveniebat sub ipsius oppidi murum, ubi magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab ea parte, quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat.

SECTION 8.41.2
Hoc fonte prohiberi posse oppidanos cum optarent reliqui, Caesar unus videret, e regione eius vineas agere adversus montem et aggerem instruere coepit magno cum labore et continua dimicatione.

SECTION 8.41.3
Oppidani enim loco superiore decurrunt et eminus sine periculo proeliantur multosque pertinaciter succedentes vulnerant; non deterrentur tamen milites nostri vineas proferre et labore atque operibus locorum vincere difficultates.

SECTION 8.41.4
Eodem tempore cuniculos tectos ab vineis agunt ad caput fontis; quod genus operis sine ullo periculo, sine suspicione hostium facere licebat.

SECTION 8.41.5
Exstruitur agger in altitudinem pedum sexaginta, collocatur in eo turris decem tabulatorum, non quidem quae moenibus aequaret (id enim nullis operibus effici poterat), sed quae superare fontis fastigium posset.

SECTION 8.41.6
Ex ea cum tela tormentis iacerentur ad fontis aditum, nec sine periculo possent aquari oppidani, non tantum pecora atque iumenta, sed etiam magna hostium multitudo siti consumebatur.

CHAPTER 8.42

SECTION 8.42.1
Quo malo perterriti oppidani cupas sebo, pice, scandulis complent; eas ardentes in opera provolvunt eodemque tempore acerrime proeliantur, ut ab incendio restinguendo dimicationis periculo deterreant Romanos.

SECTION 8.42.2
Magna repente in ipsis operibus flamma exstitit. Quaecumque enim per locum praecipitem missa erant, ea vineis et aggere suppressa comprehendebant id ipsum quod morabatur.

SECTION 8.42.3
Milites contra nostri, quamquam periculoso genere proeli locoque iniquo premebantur, tamen omnia fortissimo sustinebant animo.

SECTION 8.42.4
Res enim gerebatur et excelso loco et in conspectu exercitus nostri, magnusque utrimque clamor oriebatur.

SECTION 8.42.5
Ita quam quisque poterat maxime insignis, quo notior testatiorque virtus esset eius, telis hostium flammaeque se offerebat.

CHAPTER 8.43

SECTION 8.43.1
Caesar cum complures suos vulnerari videret, ex omnibus oppidi partibus cohortes montem ascendere et simulatione moenium occupandorum clamorem undique iubet tollere.

SECTION 8.43.2
Quo facto perterriti oppidani, cum quid ageretur in locis reliquis essent suspensi, revocant ab impugnandis operibus armatos murisque disponunt.

SECTION 8.43.3
Ita nostri fine proeli facto celeriter opera flamma comprehensa partim restinguunt, partim interscindunt.

SECTION 8.43.4
Cum pertinaciter resisterent oppidani, magna etiam parte amissa siti suorum in sententia permanerent, ad postremum cuniculis venae fontis intercisae sunt atque aversae.

SECTION 8.43.5
Quo facto repente perennis exaruit fons tantamque attulit oppidanis salutis desperationem, ut id non hominum consilio, sed deorum voluntate factum putarent. Itaque se necessitate coacti tradiderunt.

CHAPTER 8.44

SECTION 8.44.1
Caesar, cum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret neque vereretur ne quid crudelitate naturae videretur asperius fecisse, neque exitum consiliorum suorum animadverteret, si tali ratione diversis in locis plures consilia inissent, exemplo supplici deterrendos reliquos existimavit.

SECTION 8.44.2
Itaque omnibus qui arma tulerant manus praecidit vitamque concessit, quo testatior esset poena improborum.

SECTION 8.44.3
Drappes, quem captum esse a Caninio docui, sive indignitate et dolore vinculorum sive timore gravioris supplici paucis diebus cibo se abstinuit atque ita interiit.

SECTION 8.44.4
Eodem tempore Lacterius, quem profugisse ex proelio scripsi, cum in potestatem venisset Epasnacti Arverni

SECTION 8.44.5
(crebro enim mutandis locis multorum fidei se committebat, quod nusquam diutius sine periculo commoraturus videbatur, cum sibi conscius esset, quam inimicum deberet Caesarem habere),

SECTION 8.44.6
hunc Epasnactus Arvernus, amicissimus populi Romani, sine dubitatione ulla vinctum ad Caesarem deduxit.

CHAPTER 8.45

SECTION 8.45.1
Labienus interim in Treveris equestre proelium facit secundum compluribusque Treveris interfectis et Germanis, qui nullis adversus Romanos auxilia denegabant, principes eorum vivos redigit in suam potestatem

SECTION 8.45.2
atque in his Surum Aeduum, qui et virtutis et generis summam nobilitatem habebat solusque ex Aeduis ad id tempus permanserat in armis.

CHAPTER 8.46

SECTION 8.46.1
Ea re cognita Caesar, cum in omnibus partibus Galliae bene res geri videret iudicaretque superioribus aestivis Galliam devictam subactamque esse, Aquitaniam numquam adisset, per Publium Crassum quadam ex parte devicisset, cum duabus legionibus in eam partem Galliae est profectus, ut ibi extremum tempus consumeret aestivorum.

SECTION 8.46.2
Quam rem sicuti cetera celeriter feliciterque confecit. Namque omnes Aquitaniae civitates legatos ad Caesarem miserunt obsidesque ei dederunt.

SECTION 8.46.3
Quibus rebus gestis ipse equitum praesidio Narbonem profectus est, exercitum per legatos in hiberna deduxit:

SECTION 8.46.4
quattuor legiones in Belgio collocavit cum M. Antonio et C. Trebonio et P. Vatinio legatis, duas legiones in Aeduos deduxit, quorum in omni Gallia summam esse auctoritatem sciebat, duas in Turonis ad fines Carnutum posuit, quae omnem illam regionem coniunctam Oceano continerent, duas reliquas in Lemovicum finibus non longe ab Arvernis, ne qua pars Galliae vacua ab exercitu esset.

SECTION 8.46.5
Paucos dies ipse in provincia moratus, cum celeriter omnes conventus percucurrisset, publicas controversias cognosset,

SECTION 8.46.6
bene meritis praemia tribuisset (cognoscendi enim maximam facultatem habebat, quali quisque fuisset animo in totius Galliae defectione, quam sustinuerat fidelitate atque auxiliis provinciae illius), his confectis rebus ad legiones in Belgium se recipit hibernatque Nemetocennae.

CHAPTER 8.47

SECTION 8.47.1
Ibi cognoscit Commium Atrebatem proelio cum equitatu suo contendisse.

SECTION 8.47.2
Nam cum Antonius in hiberna venisset, civitasque Atrebatum in officio esset, Commius, qui post illam vulnerationem, quam supra commemoravi, semper ad omnes motus paratus suis civibus esse consuesset, ne consilia belli quaerentibus auctor armorum duxque deesset,

SECTION 8.47.3
parente Romanis civitate cum suis equitibus latrociniis se suosque alebat infestisque itineribus commeatus complures, qui comportabantur in hiberna Romanorum, intercipiebat.

CHAPTER 8.48

SECTION 8.48.1
Erat attributus Antonio praefectus equitum C. Volusenus Quadratus qui cum eo hibernaret. Hunc Antonius ad persequendum equitatum hostium mittit.

SECTION 8.48.2
Volusenus ad eam virtutem, quae singularis erat in eo, magnum odium Commi adiungebat, quo libentius id faceret quod imperabatur. Itaque dispositis insidiis saepius equites eius adgressus secunda proelia faciebat.

SECTION 8.48.3
Novissime, cum vehementius contenderetur, ac Volusenus ipsius intercipiendi Commi cupiditate pertinacius eum cum paucis insecutus esset, ille autem fuga vehementi Volusenum produxisset longius, inimicus homini suorum invocat fidem atque auxilium, ne sua vulnera per fidem imposita paterentur impunita, conversoque equo se a ceteris incautius permittit in praefectum.

SECTION 8.48.4
Faciunt hoc idem omnes eius equites paucosque nostros convertunt atque insequuntur.

SECTION 8.48.5
Commius incensum calcaribus equum coniungit equo Quadrati lanceaque infesta magnis viribus medium femur traicit Voluseni.

SECTION 8.48.6
Praefecto vulnerato non dubitant nostri resistere et conversis equis hostem pellere.

SECTION 8.48.7
Quod ubi accidit, complures hostium magno nostrorum impetu perculsi vulnerantur ac partim in fuga proteruntur, partim intercipiuntur; quod malum dux equi velocitate evitavit: graviter adeo vulneratus praefectus, ut vitae periculum aditurus videretur, refertur in castra.

SECTION 8.48.8
Commius autem sive expiato suo dolore sive magna parte amissa suorum legatos ad Antonium mittit seque et ibi futurum, ubi praescripserit, et ea facturum, quae imperarit, obsidibus firmat;

SECTION 8.48.9
unum illud orat, ut timori suo concedatur, ne in conspectum veniat cuiusquam Romani. Cuius postulationem Antonius cum iudicaret ab iusto nasci timore, veniam petenti dedit, obsides accepit.

SECTION 8.48.10
Scio Caesarem singulorum annorum singulos commentarios confecisse; quod ego non existimavi mihi esse faciendum, propterea quod insequens annus, L. Paulo C. Marcello consulibus, nullas habet magnopere Galliae res gestas.

SECTION 8.48.11
Ne quis tamen ignoraret, quibus in locis Caesar exercitusque eo tempore fuissent, pauca esse scribenda coniungendaque huic commentario statui.

CHAPTER 8.49

SECTION 8.49.1
Caesar in Belgio cum hiemaret, unum illud propositum habebat, continere in amicitia civitates, nulli spem aut causam dare armorum.

SECTION 8.49.2
Nihil enim minus volebat quam sub decessu suo necessitatem sibi aliquam imponi belli gerendi, ne, cum exercitum deducturus esset, bellum aliquod relinqueretur quod omnis Gallia libenter sine praesenti periculo susciperet.

SECTION 8.49.3
Itaque honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis praemiis adficiendo, nulla onera iniungendo defessam tot adversis proeliis Galliam condicione parendi meliore facile in pace continuit.

CHAPTER 8.50

SECTION 8.50.1
Ipse hibernis peractis contra consuetudinem in Italiam quam maximis itineribus est profectus, ut municipia et colonias appellaret, quibus M. Antoni quaestoris sui, commendaverat sacerdoti petitionem.

SECTION 8.50.2
Contendebat enim gratia cum libenter pro homine sibi coniunctissimo, quem paulo ante praemiserat ad petitionem, tum acriter contra factionem et potentiam paucorum, qui M. Antoni repulsa Caesaris decedentis gratiam convellere cupiebant.

SECTION 8.50.3
Hunc etsi augurem prius factum quam Italiam attingeret in itinere audierat, tamen non minus iustam sibi causam municipia et colonias adeundi existimavit, ut eis gratias ageret, quod frequentiam atque officium suum Antonio praestitissent,

SECTION 8.50.4
simulque se et honorem suum sequentis anni commendaret, propterea quod insolenter adversarii sui gloriarentur L. Lentulum et C. Marcellum consules creatos qui omnem honorem et dignitatem Caesaris spoliarent, ereptum Ser. Galbae consulatum, cum is multo plus gratia suffragiisque valuisset, quod sibi coniunctus et familiaritate et consuetudine legationis esset.

CHAPTER 8.51

SECTION 8.51.1
Exceptus est Caesaris adventus ab omnibus municipiis et coloniis incredibili honore atque amore.

SECTION 8.51.2
Tum primum enim veniebat ab illo universae Galliae bello. Nihil relinquebatur quod ad ornatum portarum, itinerum, locorum omnium qua Caesar iturus erat excogitari poterat.

SECTION 8.51.3
Cum liberis omnis multitudo obviam procedebat, hostiae omnibus locis immolabantur, tricliniis stratis fora templaque occupabantur, ut vel exspectatissimi triumphi laetitia praecipi posset. Tanta erat magnificentia apud opulentiores, cupiditas apud humiliores.

CHAPTER 8.52

SECTION 8.52.1
Cum omnes regiones Galliae togatae Caesar percucurrisset, summa celeritate ad exercitum Nemetocennam rediit legionibusque ex omnibus hibernis ad fines Treverorum evocatis eo profectus est ibique exercitum lustravit.

SECTION 8.52.2
T. Labienum Galliae togatae praefecit, quo maiore commendatione conciliaretur ad consulatus petitionem. Ipse tantum itinerum faciebat, quantum satis esse ad mutationem locorum propter salubritatem existimabat.

SECTION 8.52.3
Ibi quamquam crebro audiebat Labienum ab inimicis suis sollicitari certiorque fiebat id agi paucorum consiliis, ut interposita senatus auctoritate aliqua parte exercitus spoliaretur, tamen neque de Labieno credidit quidquam neque contra senatus auctoritatem ut aliquid faceret potuit adduci. Iudicabat enim liberis sententiis patrum conscriptorum causam suam facile obtineri.

SECTION 8.52.4
Nam C. Curio, tribunus plebis, cum Caesaris causam dignitatemque defendendam suscepisset, saepe erat senatui pollicitus, si quem timor armorum Caesaris laederet, et quoniam Pompei dominatio atque arma non minimum terrorem foro inferrent, discederet uterque ab armis exercitusque dimitteret: fore eo facto liberam et sui iuris civitatem.

SECTION 8.52.5
Neque hoc tantum pollicitus est, sed etiam per se discessionem facere coepit; quod ne fieret consules amicique Pompei iusserunt atque ita rem morando discusserunt.

CHAPTER 8.53

SECTION 8.53.1
Magnum hoc testimonium senatus erat universi conveniensque superiori facto. Nam Marcellus proximo anno, cum impugnaret Caesaris dignitatem, contra legem Pompei et Crassi rettulerat ante tempus ad senatum de Caesaris provinciis, sententiisque dictis discessionem faciente Marcello, qui sibi omnem dignitatem ex Caesaris invidia quaerebat, senatus frequens in alia omnia transiit.

SECTION 8.53.2
Quibus non frangebantur animi inimicorum Caesaris, sed admonebantur quo maiores pararent necessitates, quibus cogi posset senatus id probare, quod ipsi constituissent.

CHAPTER 8.54

SECTION 8.54.1
Fit deinde senatus consultum, ut ad bellum Parthicum legio una a Cn. Pompeio, altera a C. Caesare mitteretur; neque obscure duae legiones uni detrahuntur.

SECTION 8.54.2
Nam Cn. Pompeius legionem primam, quam ad Caesarem miserat, confectam ex delectu provinciae Caesaris, eam tamquam ex suo numero dedit.

SECTION 8.54.3
Caesar tamen, cum de voluntate minime dubium esset adversariorum suorum, Pompeio legionem remisit et suo nomine quintam decimam, quam in Gallia citeriore habuerat, ex senatus consulto iubet tradi. In eius locum tertiam decimam legionem in Italiam mittit quae praesidia tueretur, ex quibus praesidiis quinta decima deducebatur.

SECTION 8.54.4
Ipse exercitui distribuit hiberna: C. Trebonium cum legionibus quattuor in Belgio collocat, C. Fabium cum totidem in Aeduos deducit.

SECTION 8.54.5
Sic enim existimabat tutissimam fore Galliam, si Belgae, quorum maxima virtus, Aedui, quorum auctoritas summa esset, exercitibus continerentur. Ipse in Italiam profectus est.

CHAPTER 8.55

SECTION 8.55.1
Quo cum venisset, cognoscit per C. Marcellum consulem legiones duas ab se remissas, quae ex senatus consulto deberent ad Parthicum bellum duci, Cn. Pompeio traditas atque in Italia retentas esse.

SECTION 8.55.2
Hoc facto quamquam nulli erat dubium, quidnam contra Caesarem pararetur, tamen Caesar omnia patienda esse statuit, quoad sibi spes aliqua relinqueretur iure potius disceptandi quam belli gerendi. Contendit

## Translation — Mouseia

> Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 8 Latin books, 404 chapters, and 2,150 sections for fidelity, military precision, political clarity, structure, and narrative force.

### Book 1

CHAPTER 1.1

SECTION 1.1.1
All Gaul is divided into three parts, one inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and the third by those who in their own language are called Celts, and in ours Gauls.

SECTION 1.1.2
All these peoples differ from one another in language, customs, and laws. The river Garumna separates the Gauls from the Aquitani, and the Matrona and Sequana separate them from the Belgae.

SECTION 1.1.3
Of all these peoples, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are farthest removed from the culture and refinement of the Province, and merchants very seldom travel among them and import those things that tend to weaken courage;

SECTION 1.1.4
they are also nearest to the Germans who dwell across the Rhine, with whom they are continually at war. For the same reason, the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in valor, because they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, either keeping them out of their own territory or themselves waging war within the Germans’ borders.

SECTION 1.1.5
[The one part occupied by the Gauls, as has been stated, begins at the river Rhodanus; it is bounded by the river Garumna, the Ocean, and the territory of the Belgae; on the side of the Sequani and Helvetii it also reaches the river Rhine, and it extends toward the north.

SECTION 1.1.6
The territory of the Belgae begins at the farthest borders of Gaul, extends to the lower reaches of the Rhine, and faces north and east.

SECTION 1.1.7
Aquitania extends from the river Garumna to the Pyrenees and to that part of the Ocean which lies toward Spain; it faces between west and north.]

CHAPTER 1.2

SECTION 1.2.1
Among the Helvetii, by far the most noble and wealthy man was Orgetorix. In the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso, driven by a desire for kingship, he formed a conspiracy among the nobility and persuaded his people to leave their territory with all their forces:

SECTION 1.2.2
since they surpassed all others in valor, it would be very easy for them to gain dominion over the whole of Gaul.

SECTION 1.2.3
He persuaded them of this all the more easily because the Helvetii are hemmed in on every side by the nature of the country: on one side by the Rhine, a very broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on another by the lofty Jura mountain range, which lies between the Sequani and the Helvetii; and on a third by Lake Lemannus and the river Rhodanus, which separates our Province from the Helvetii.

SECTION 1.2.4
These circumstances both restricted the range of their movements and made it less easy for them to wage war upon their neighbors;

SECTION 1.2.5
and in this respect, being men eager for war, they were deeply distressed.

SECTION 1.2.6
Considering the size of their population and their renown for warfare and courage, they thought their territory too confined, though it extended two hundred and forty miles in length and one hundred and eighty in breadth.

CHAPTER 1.3

SECTION 1.3.1
Moved by these considerations and stirred by the authority of Orgetorix, they resolved to prepare everything required for their departure: to purchase as many draft animals and wagons as possible, to sow crops on the largest possible scale so that they would have an ample supply of grain on the march, and to establish peace and friendship with the neighboring peoples.

SECTION 1.3.2
They judged that two years would be sufficient to complete these preparations; by law they fixed their departure for the third year.

SECTION 1.3.3
Orgetorix was chosen to carry out these plans. He undertook an embassy to the neighboring peoples. On that journey he persuaded Casticus, a Sequanian and the son of Catamantaloedes—whose father had held the kingship among the Sequani for many years and had been called a friend by the Senate of the Roman people—to seize in his own state the kingship that his father had held before him;

SECTION 1.3.4
and he likewise persuaded Dumnorix the Aeduan, brother of Diviciacus, who at that time held the leading position in his state and enjoyed the highest favor with the common people, to make the same attempt, and gave him his own daughter in marriage.

SECTION 1.3.5
He showed them that it would be very easy to bring their designs to completion, because he himself was certain to secure command over his own state:

SECTION 1.3.6
there was no doubt, he said, that the Helvetii were the most powerful people in all Gaul; and he assured them that with his own resources and his own army he would win kingdoms for them.

SECTION 1.3.7
Persuaded by this argument, they exchanged pledges and oaths, and hoped that, once they had seized their kingships, they would be able, through the three most powerful and firmly established peoples, to gain possession of the whole of Gaul.

CHAPTER 1.4

SECTION 1.4.1
This scheme was revealed to the Helvetii by an informer. In accordance with their custom, they compelled Orgetorix to plead his case in chains; if condemned, the penalty required him to be burned alive.

SECTION 1.4.2
On the day appointed for his trial, Orgetorix summoned to the court from every quarter his entire household, numbering about ten thousand persons, and assembled there all his dependents and debtors, of whom he had a great number; by their aid he escaped having to plead his case.

SECTION 1.4.3
When the state, enraged by this conduct, attempted to enforce its rights by arms, and the magistrates were gathering a multitude of men from the countryside, Orgetorix died;

SECTION 1.4.4
and there is reason to suspect, as the Helvetii believe, that he took his own life.

CHAPTER 1.5

SECTION 1.5.1
After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless continued their attempt to carry out their resolve and leave their territory.

SECTION 1.5.2
When they considered themselves ready for the undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, about twelve in number, to some four hundred villages, and to all their remaining private buildings;

SECTION 1.5.3
they burned all their grain except what they intended to carry with them, so that, with all hope of returning home removed, they might be readier to face every danger; and they ordered every man to carry from home a three-month supply of ground grain for himself. They persuaded their neighbors, the Rauraci, Tulingi, and Latobrigi, to adopt the same plan, burn their towns and villages, and depart together with them; and they admitted as allies and joined to themselves the Boii, who had lived across the Rhine, had crossed into Norican territory, and were besieging Noreia.

CHAPTER 1.6

SECTION 1.6.1
There were only two routes by which they could leave their homeland. One ran through the territory of the Sequani, a narrow and difficult passage between the Jura mountain range and the river Rhodanus, where wagons could scarcely be drawn in single file; moreover, a very high mountain overhung the route, so that a very few men could easily block it.

SECTION 1.6.2
The other ran through our Province and was far easier and more open, because the Rhodanus flows between the territory of the Helvetii and that of the Allobroges, who had recently been pacified, and in several places the river can be crossed by fords.

SECTION 1.6.3
The outermost town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territory of the Helvetii, is Genava. From that town a bridge extends to the Helvetian side. They believed that they could either persuade the Allobroges, who did not yet appear well disposed toward the Roman people, or compel them by force to allow passage through their territory. When everything had been prepared for the departure, they appointed a day on which all were to assemble on the bank of the Rhodanus. That day was the fifth before the Kalends of April, in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius.

CHAPTER 1.7

SECTION 1.7.1
When Caesar was informed that they were attempting to march through our Province, he hastened to leave Rome, traveled by the longest forced marches he could make into Further Gaul, and arrived at Genava.

SECTION 1.7.2
He ordered the entire Province to furnish as many soldiers as possible—for there was only one legion in Further Gaul—and commanded that the bridge at Genava be demolished.

SECTION 1.7.3
When the Helvetii learned of his arrival, they sent as envoys to him the most distinguished men of their state, with Nammeius and Verucloetius holding the foremost place in the delegation. They were to say that the Helvetii intended to march through the Province without doing any harm, because they had no other route; and they asked to be permitted to do so with his consent. Caesar, remembering that the consul Lucius Cassius had been killed and his army defeated by the Helvetii and sent beneath the yoke, did not think their request should be granted;

SECTION 1.7.4
nor did he believe that men of hostile disposition, if given the opportunity to march through the Province, would refrain from outrage and wrongdoing.

SECTION 1.7.5
Nevertheless, to allow time for the soldiers he had ordered to assemble, he replied to the envoys that he would take a period for deliberation: if they wanted anything further, they should return on the Ides of April.

CHAPTER 1.8

SECTION 1.8.1
Meanwhile, with the legion he had with him and the soldiers who had assembled from the Province, he constructed a wall nineteen miles long and sixteen feet high, together with a trench, from Lake Lemannus, which empties into the river Rhodanus, to the Jura mountain range, which separates the territory of the Sequani from that of the Helvetii.

SECTION 1.8.2
When this work was completed, he posted garrisons and fortified strongpoints, so that he could more easily prevent them from crossing if they attempted it against his will.

SECTION 1.8.3
When the day he had appointed with the envoys arrived and they returned to him, he declared that, in accordance with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, he could grant no one passage through the Province, and made it clear that if they attempted to use force, he would prevent them.

SECTION 1.8.4
Disappointed in this hope, the Helvetii lashed boats together, built a number of rafts, and at other places attempted to cross by the fords of the Rhodanus where the river was shallowest, sometimes by day but more often by night, to see whether they could break through. Repulsed by the strength of the fortifications, the rapid concentration of the soldiers, and their missiles, they abandoned the attempt.

CHAPTER 1.9

SECTION 1.9.1
Only one route remained, through the territory of the Sequani; because of its narrowness they could not take it without the consent of the Sequani.

SECTION 1.9.2
Since they could not persuade them on their own, they sent envoys to Dumnorix the Aeduan, hoping through his intercession to obtain the Sequani’s consent.

SECTION 1.9.3
Dumnorix possessed very great influence among the Sequani through his popularity and lavish gifts, and he was friendly to the Helvetii because he had married the daughter of Orgetorix, a woman of that state. Driven by a desire for kingship, he favored revolution and wished to have as many states as possible bound to him by favors.

SECTION 1.9.4
He therefore undertook the matter and obtained from the Sequani permission for the Helvetii to pass through their territory; he also arranged for them to exchange hostages: the Sequani as a pledge not to obstruct the Helvetii on their march, and the Helvetii as a pledge to pass through without wrongdoing or injury.

CHAPTER 1.10

SECTION 1.10.1
Caesar was informed that the Helvetii intended to march through the territories of the Sequani and the Aedui into the lands of the Santoni, who live not far from the territory of the Tolosates, a people within the Province.

SECTION 1.10.2
He understood that, if this happened, it would greatly endanger the Province by placing a warlike people, hostile to the Roman people, on the borders of an open and exceptionally fertile region.

SECTION 1.10.3
For these reasons he placed his lieutenant Titus Labienus in command of the fortifications he had constructed. He himself hastened by forced marches into Italy, enrolled two legions there, brought out of winter quarters the three that were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five legions pressed forward by the shortest route across the Alps into Further Gaul.

SECTION 1.10.4
There the Ceutrones, Graioceli, and Caturiges occupied the higher ground and attempted to block the army’s passage. After routing them in several engagements, Caesar reached the territory of the Vocontii in the Further Province on the seventh day from Ocelum, the outermost town of the Nearer Province. From there he led his army into the territory of the Allobroges, and from the Allobroges into that of the Segusiavi. These are the first people beyond the Province across the Rhodanus.

CHAPTER 1.11

SECTION 1.11.1
The Helvetii had already led their forces through the narrow pass and the territory of the Sequani, had reached the lands of the Aedui, and were ravaging their fields.

SECTION 1.11.2
Since the Aedui could not defend themselves or their possessions against them, they sent envoys to Caesar to ask for aid:

SECTION 1.11.3
they had, they said, deserved so well of the Roman people at all times that their lands ought not to have been laid waste, their children carried off into slavery, and their towns stormed almost within sight of our army. At the same time, the Ambarri, allies and kinsmen of the Aedui, informed Caesar that, with their fields devastated, they could not easily ward off the enemy’s violence from their towns.

SECTION 1.11.4
Likewise, the Allobroges, who had villages and estates across the Rhodanus, fled to Caesar and declared that nothing remained to them but the bare soil of their land.

SECTION 1.11.5
Moved by these circumstances, Caesar decided that he must not wait until the Helvetii, after consuming all the possessions of his allies, reached the territory of the Santoni.

CHAPTER 1.12

SECTION 1.12.1
There is a river called the Arar, which flows through the territories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhodanus with such incredible gentleness that the eye cannot determine in which direction it flows. The Helvetii were crossing it on rafts and boats lashed together.

SECTION 1.12.2
When Caesar was informed by scouts that the Helvetii had already led three-quarters of their forces across that river, while about one-quarter remained on the near side of the Arar, he left camp during the third watch with three legions and reached the body that had not yet crossed the river.

SECTION 1.12.3
Attacking them while they were encumbered and unsuspecting, he cut down a great part of them; the rest fled and concealed themselves in the nearest forests.

SECTION 1.12.4
This canton was called the Tigurinus, for the whole Helvetian state is divided into four cantons.

SECTION 1.12.5
This one canton, when it had left its homeland within the memory of our fathers, had killed the consul Lucius Cassius and sent his army beneath the yoke.

SECTION 1.12.6
Thus, whether by chance or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetian state which had inflicted a signal disaster upon the Roman people was the first to pay the penalty.

SECTION 1.12.7
In this affair Caesar avenged not only wrongs done to the state but also those done to his own family, because in the same battle in which they killed Cassius, the Tigurini had also killed the lieutenant Lucius Piso, grandfather of Caesar’s father-in-law, Lucius Piso.

CHAPTER 1.13

SECTION 1.13.1
After this battle, in order to overtake the remaining forces of the Helvetii, Caesar had a bridge built across the Arar and led his army over it.

SECTION 1.13.2
The Helvetii, alarmed by his sudden arrival, realized that he had accomplished in a single day what they themselves had completed with the greatest difficulty in twenty days—the crossing of the river—and sent envoys to him. The leader of the delegation was Divico, who had commanded the Helvetii in the war against Cassius.

SECTION 1.13.3
He addressed Caesar as follows: if the Roman people made peace with the Helvetii, they would go and remain in whatever region Caesar assigned and wished them to occupy;

SECTION 1.13.4
but if he persisted in pursuing them with war, he should remember both the former reverse suffered by the Roman people and the ancient valor of the Helvetii. Because Caesar had unexpectedly attacked a single canton when those who had crossed the river could not bring aid to their countrymen, he should neither ascribe too much to his own valor nor despise the Helvetii. They had learned from their fathers and ancestors to contend by courage rather than rely on deceit or ambushes.

SECTION 1.13.5
Therefore Caesar should take care not to cause the place where they had taken their stand to derive its name, or hand down its memory, from a disaster to the Roman people and the destruction of an army.

CHAPTER 1.14

SECTION 1.14.1
Caesar replied to them as follows: there was all the less room for hesitation in his mind because he remembered the events the Helvetian envoys had mentioned, and he resented them all the more bitterly because they had occurred through no fault of the Roman people;

SECTION 1.14.2
if the Roman people had been conscious of having committed any wrong, it would not have been difficult to take precautions; but they had been deceived because they were unaware of having done anything that should cause them fear and did not think they ought to be afraid without cause.

SECTION 1.14.3
Even if he were willing to forget that former outrage, could he also cast aside the memory of their recent injuries—their attempt, against his will, to force a passage through the Province, and their attacks upon the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges?

SECTION 1.14.4
Their insolent boasting of their victory, and their wonder that they had so long committed outrages with impunity, pointed to the same conclusion.

SECTION 1.14.5
For the immortal gods were accustomed, when they wished to punish men for their crimes, sometimes to grant them greater prosperity and a longer season of impunity, so that a reversal of fortune might cause them all the greater anguish.

SECTION 1.14.6
Nevertheless, such being the case, if they gave him hostages so that he might know they would perform what they promised, and if they made satisfaction to the Haedui for the injuries they had inflicted upon them and their allies, and likewise to the Allobroges, he would make peace with them.

SECTION 1.14.7
Divico replied that the Helvetii had been so instructed by their ancestors that they were accustomed to receive hostages, not to give them; the Roman people could bear witness to that fact. Having given this answer, he departed.

CHAPTER 1.15

SECTION 1.15.1
The next day they moved camp from that place. Caesar did the same, and sent ahead all his cavalry, about four thousand strong, which he had assembled from the whole Province, from the Haedui, and from their allies, to discover in what direction the enemy was marching. In their eagerness to pursue the enemy’s rear guard, these troops engaged the Helvetian cavalry on unfavorable ground, and a few of our men fell.

SECTION 1.15.2
Elated by this encounter, because with five hundred horsemen they had driven back so great a body of cavalry, the Helvetii began at times to halt more boldly and to provoke our men to battle with their rear guard. Caesar restrained his men from fighting and considered it sufficient for the present to prevent the enemy from plundering, foraging, and ravaging the countryside.

SECTION 1.15.3
In this manner they marched for about fifteen days, with no more than five or six miles separating the enemy’s rear guard from our vanguard.

CHAPTER 1.16

SECTION 1.16.1
Meanwhile Caesar daily demanded from the Haedui the grain they had officially promised.

SECTION 1.16.2
For because of the cold climate—Gaul, as stated before, lies toward the north—not only was the grain in the fields not yet ripe, but not even a sufficient abundance of fodder was available;

SECTION 1.16.3
and he could make less use of the grain he had brought up in ships along the river Arar, because the Helvetii had turned their march away from the Arar, and he did not wish to leave them.

SECTION 1.16.4
The Haedui put him off from day to day, saying that the grain was being collected, was being brought in, was close at hand.

SECTION 1.16.5
When he realized that he was being delayed too long, and that the day was approaching on which grain had to be issued to the soldiers, he summoned their leading men, of whom he had a large number in camp, among them Diviciacus and Liscus, who held the highest magistracy, which the Haedui call the vergobret—a magistrate elected annually who holds the power of life and death over his people—and severely accused them,

SECTION 1.16.6
because at so critical a time, with the enemy so near, when grain could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, they gave him no assistance, especially since he had undertaken the war largely at their entreaties; and he complained still more bitterly that he had been abandoned.

CHAPTER 1.17

SECTION 1.17.1
Then at last, moved by Caesar’s speech, Liscus disclosed what he had previously kept silent: there were certain men whose influence with the common people was supreme and who, though private citizens, possessed more power than the magistrates themselves.

SECTION 1.17.2
By seditious and unscrupulous speeches these men were frightening the populace away from contributing the grain they owed:

SECTION 1.17.3
if they could no longer retain the leadership of Gaul, it was better to endure the rule of Gauls than that of Romans,

SECTION 1.17.4
and they ought not to doubt that, if the Romans defeated the Helvetii, they would strip the Haedui of their liberty along with the rest of Gaul.

SECTION 1.17.5
The same men reported our plans and all that took place in camp to the enemy; he was unable to restrain them.

SECTION 1.17.6
Indeed, he understood how great a danger he had incurred by being compelled to reveal this necessary information to Caesar, and for that reason had remained silent as long as he could.

CHAPTER 1.18

SECTION 1.18.1
From this statement by Liscus, Caesar perceived that Dumnorix, the brother of Diviciacus, was meant; but because he did not wish these matters discussed in the presence of many, he quickly dismissed the council and detained Liscus.

SECTION 1.18.2
He questioned him privately about what he had said in the assembly. Liscus spoke more freely and boldly. Caesar made the same inquiries privately of others and found the allegations true:

SECTION 1.18.3
the man was Dumnorix, a person of extraordinary audacity, highly popular with the common people because of his generosity, and eager for revolution. For many years he had secured at a low price the right to collect the customs duties and all the other revenues of the Haedui, because whenever he bid, no one dared bid against him.

SECTION 1.18.4
By these means he had both increased his personal fortune and acquired ample resources for largesse;

SECTION 1.18.5
he always maintained at his own expense and kept about him a large body of cavalry,

SECTION 1.18.6
and he possessed great influence not only at home but also among neighboring states; to strengthen that power, he had married his mother among the Bituriges to a man of the highest birth and influence there;

SECTION 1.18.7
he himself had a Helvetian wife, and had given his maternal half sisters and other female relatives in marriage into other states.

SECTION 1.18.8
He favored the Helvetii and desired their success because of that connection by marriage; he also hated Caesar and the Romans on his own account, because their arrival had diminished his power and restored his brother Diviciacus to his former position of influence and honor.

SECTION 1.18.9
If any disaster befell the Romans, he entertained the highest hopes of gaining kingship through the Helvetii; under the dominion of the Roman people, he despaired not only of kingship but even of retaining the influence he already possessed.

SECTION 1.18.10
In the course of his inquiry Caesar also discovered that in the unsuccessful cavalry engagement fought a few days before, Dumnorix and his horsemen had begun the flight—for Dumnorix commanded the cavalry the Haedui had sent to Caesar’s aid—and that their flight had thrown the rest of the cavalry into a panic.

CHAPTER 1.19

SECTION 1.19.1
When these facts became known, and when these suspicions were reinforced by the most conclusive evidence—that Dumnorix had conducted the Helvetii through the territory of the Sequani, that he had arranged the exchange of hostages between them, that he had done all this not only without Caesar’s orders or those of his state but even without their knowledge, and that he was accused by the chief magistrate of the Haedui—Caesar considered that there was sufficient cause either for him to punish Dumnorix himself or to order his state to punish him.

SECTION 1.19.2
One consideration opposed all these facts: Caesar knew the supreme devotion of Dumnorix’s brother Diviciacus to the Roman people, his extraordinary goodwill toward Caesar himself, and his remarkable loyalty, justice, and self-restraint; for he feared that by punishing Dumnorix he might alienate Diviciacus.

SECTION 1.19.3
Therefore, before attempting anything, he ordered Diviciacus to be summoned to him and, dismissing his customary interpreters, spoke with him through Gaius Valerius Troucillus, a leading man of the province of Gaul, his intimate friend, in whom he placed the highest confidence in every matter;

SECTION 1.19.4
at the same time he reminded him of what had been said about Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls while Diviciacus himself was present, and disclosed what each man had said about him privately to Caesar.

SECTION 1.19.5
He asked and urged Diviciacus, without taking offense, either to pass judgment on Dumnorix himself after investigating the case or to order the state to do so.

CHAPTER 1.20

SECTION 1.20.1
Diviciacus embraced Caesar with many tears and began to entreat him not to impose too severe a punishment upon his brother:

SECTION 1.20.2
he knew that the charges were true, and no one suffered more pain from them than he did, because when he himself possessed the greatest influence at home and throughout the rest of Gaul, while his brother had possessed very little because of his youth, Dumnorix had risen through his support;

SECTION 1.20.3
and Dumnorix was now using those resources and that power not only to diminish his influence but almost to destroy him. Yet he was moved both by brotherly love and by concern for public opinion.

SECTION 1.20.4
If any severe punishment befell Dumnorix at Caesar’s hands while he himself held such a place in Caesar’s friendship, no one would believe it had been done against his wishes; as a result, the sympathies of all Gaul would turn away from him.

SECTION 1.20.5
As Diviciacus pleaded this case at greater length, weeping, Caesar took his right hand, consoled him, and asked him to cease his entreaties. He showed that Diviciacus’s influence with him was so great that, in deference to his wishes and prayers, he forgave both the injury done to the Roman state and his own personal grievance. He summoned Dumnorix and called in his brother; he pointed out what he found blameworthy in Dumnorix, set forth what he himself knew and what the state complained of, and warned him to avoid all grounds for suspicion in the future. He said that, for the sake of his brother Diviciacus, he forgave the past. He placed guards over Dumnorix so that he might know what he did and with whom he spoke.

CHAPTER 1.21

SECTION 1.21.1
That same day, after scouts informed him that the enemy had encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp, Caesar sent men to ascertain the character of the mountain and the nature of the ascent on every side.

SECTION 1.21.2
They reported that the ascent was easy. During the third watch he ordered Titus Labienus, his lieutenant with praetorian authority, to ascend to the mountain’s highest ridge with two legions and with the guides who had reconnoitered the route; he explained his plan to him.

SECTION 1.21.3
He himself, during the fourth watch, hastened toward the enemy by the same route they had taken and sent all his cavalry ahead of him.

SECTION 1.21.4
Publius Considius, who was considered highly experienced in military affairs and had served in the army of Lucius Sulla and afterward in that of Marcus Crassus, was sent ahead with the scouts.

CHAPTER 1.22

SECTION 1.22.1
At daybreak, when the summit of the mountain was held by Lucius Labienus, while Caesar himself was no more than a mile and a half from the enemy’s camp, and when, as he afterward learned from prisoners, neither his own approach nor Labienus’s had been discovered,

SECTION 1.22.2
Considius galloped up to him at full speed and reported that the mountain Caesar had wished Labienus to occupy was held by the enemy; he had recognized this from the Gallic arms and insignia.

SECTION 1.22.3
Caesar withdrew his forces to the nearest hill and drew them up in battle order. Labienus, having been instructed by Caesar not to engage unless Caesar’s own forces were seen near the enemy’s camp, so that an assault might be made upon the enemy from every side at the same moment, held the mountain and waited for our men, refraining from battle.

SECTION 1.22.4
Only when the day was far advanced did Caesar learn from his scouts both that the mountain was held by his own men and that the Helvetii had broken camp, and that Considius, panic-stricken by fear, had reported as seen what he had not seen. That day Caesar followed the enemy at his customary distance and pitched camp three miles from theirs.

CHAPTER 1.23

SECTION 1.23.1
The following day, since only two days remained before grain had to be issued to the army, and since he was no more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and richest town of the Haedui, Caesar judged that he must provide for the grain supply. He therefore turned away from the Helvetii and hastened toward Bibracte.

SECTION 1.23.2
This movement was reported to the enemy by deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a decurion of the Gallic cavalry.

SECTION 1.23.3
The Helvetii, either because they thought the Romans were withdrawing from them in terror—all the more because, after occupying higher ground the day before, they had not joined battle—or because they trusted that the Romans could be cut off from their grain supply, changed their plan, reversed their march, and began to pursue and harass our rear guard.

CHAPTER 1.24

SECTION 1.24.1
When Caesar observed this, he withdrew his forces to the nearest hill and sent out his cavalry to check the enemy’s attack.

SECTION 1.24.2
Meanwhile, halfway up the hill, he drew up his four veteran legions in three lines; on the highest ridge he stationed the two legions he had most recently levied in Cisalpine Gaul, together with all the auxiliaries,

SECTION 1.24.3
so that the whole mountain above him was filled with men. He ordered all the baggage and packs to be brought together in one place and that position fortified by the troops stationed in the upper line.

SECTION 1.24.4
The Helvetii, who had followed with all their wagons, brought their baggage together in one place; then, in an exceedingly close-packed formation, they drove back our cavalry, formed a phalanx, and advanced against our first line.

CHAPTER 1.25

SECTION 1.25.1
Caesar had first his own horse and then the horses of all the others removed from sight, so that by making the danger equal for everyone he might take away all hope of flight; then, after encouraging his men, he joined battle.

SECTION 1.25.2
From their higher ground the soldiers hurled their pila and easily broke through the enemy’s phalanx. Once it was shattered, they drew their swords and charged.

SECTION 1.25.3
The Gauls were greatly hampered in the fighting because a single cast of the pila had pierced and fastened together several of their shields; and since the iron shanks had bent, they could neither wrench the pila free nor fight with sufficient ease while their left arms were encumbered,

SECTION 1.25.4
so that many, after shaking their arms for a long time, preferred to cast away their shields and fight with their bodies unprotected.

SECTION 1.25.5
At last, exhausted by wounds, they began to give ground and withdraw to a mountain about a mile away.

SECTION 1.25.6
After they had taken possession of the mountain and our men were advancing after them, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about fifteen thousand men closed the enemy’s column and protected its rear, attacked our exposed flank directly from the line of march and began to surround us. Seeing this, the Helvetii who had withdrawn to the mountain began once more to press forward and renew the battle.

SECTION 1.25.7
The Romans wheeled their standards and advanced in two directions: the first and second lines opposed the enemy who had been defeated and driven back, while the third checked those now advancing.

CHAPTER 1.26

SECTION 1.26.1
Thus the battle was fought on two fronts, long and fiercely. When the enemy could no longer withstand the assaults of our men, one body withdrew, as it had begun to do, to the mountain; the other retired to its baggage and wagons.

SECTION 1.26.2
For throughout this entire battle, though the fighting lasted from the seventh hour until evening, no one saw an enemy turn his back.

SECTION 1.26.3
The battle continued around the baggage until late at night, because the enemy had set their wagons before them as a rampart and, from their higher position, hurled missiles against our men as they advanced; some from between the wagons and wheels thrust their pikes and javelins upward and wounded our men.

SECTION 1.26.4
After a long struggle, our men gained possession of the baggage and the camp. There the daughter of Orgetorix and one of his sons were captured.

SECTION 1.26.5
About one hundred and thirty thousand persons survived that battle, and they marched continuously throughout the entire night, without halting for any part of it. On the fourth day they reached the territory of the Lingones, since our men, delayed for three days both by the soldiers’ wounds and by the burial of the slain, had been unable to pursue them.

SECTION 1.26.6
Caesar sent letters and messengers to the Lingones, warning them not to assist the Helvetii with grain or anything else; if they did assist them, he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii. After an interval of three days, he himself began to pursue them with all his forces.

CHAPTER 1.27

SECTION 1.27.1
Driven by the want of every necessity, the Helvetii sent envoys to him to negotiate their surrender.

SECTION 1.27.2
When these envoys met him on the march, threw themselves at his feet, and, speaking as suppliants and weeping, begged for peace, he ordered them to await his arrival in the place where they then were, and they obeyed.

SECTION 1.27.3
After Caesar arrived there, he demanded hostages, their weapons, and the slaves who had fled to them.

SECTION 1.27.4
While these things were being sought out and brought together, after night had intervened, about six thousand men of the canton called the Verbigenus, either terrified by the fear that, once they had surrendered their arms, they would be put to death, or lured by the hope of escape, because they believed that amid so great a multitude of surrendered men their flight might either be concealed or pass wholly unnoticed, left the Helvetian camp at the beginning of the night and hastened toward the Rhine and the territories of the Germans.

CHAPTER 1.28

SECTION 1.28.1
When Caesar learned of this, he ordered the peoples through whose territories they had passed to search for them and bring them back, if they wished to be cleared of blame in his eyes; when they were brought back, he treated them as enemies.

SECTION 1.28.2
All the rest, after they had surrendered hostages, arms, and deserters, he accepted in submission.

SECTION 1.28.3
He ordered the Helvetii, Tulingi, and Latobrigi to return to their own territories, from which they had set out; and because, with all their crops destroyed, there was nothing at home with which they could stave off hunger, he ordered the Allobroges to provide them with a supply of grain. He ordered the Helvetii themselves to rebuild the towns and villages they had burned. His chief reason for doing this was that he did not wish the region from which the Helvetii had departed to remain vacant, lest, because of the excellence of the land, the Germans who lived across the Rhine should cross from their own territories into those of the Helvetii and become neighbors of the Province of Gaul and of the Allobroges.

SECTION 1.28.4
At the request of the Haedui, because the Boii had become known for their outstanding courage, he permitted them to settle the Boii within their own territories. The Haedui gave them lands and later admitted them to the same condition of rights and freedom that they themselves enjoyed.

CHAPTER 1.29

SECTION 1.29.1
In the camp of the Helvetii, tablets written in Greek characters were found and brought to Caesar. On these tablets an account had been drawn up by name of the number who had left home and were capable of bearing arms, and likewise, in separate lists, the number of children, old men, and women.

SECTION 1.29.2
The total of all these was 263,000 Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobrigi, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000 Boii. Of these, about 92,000 were capable of bearing arms.

SECTION 1.29.3
The total number of all was about 368,000. Of those who returned home, a census taken in accordance with Caesar’s orders showed a total of 110,000.

CHAPTER 1.30

SECTION 1.30.1
When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, envoys from nearly all Gaul, the leading men of their states, assembled to congratulate Caesar.

SECTION 1.30.2
They declared that they understood that, although Caesar had waged war to exact punishment from the Helvetii for their ancient wrongs against the Roman people, the outcome had nevertheless served the interests of the land of Gaul no less than those of the Roman people,

SECTION 1.30.3
because the Helvetii, though their affairs were at their most prosperous, had left their homes with the design of making war upon all Gaul and seizing supreme power; of choosing from the great abundance of places the site they judged most advantageous and fertile in all Gaul as their dwelling place; and of making the remaining states tributary to them.

SECTION 1.30.4
They asked that they be permitted, with Caesar’s approval, to appoint a fixed day for a council of all Gaul. They had certain requests which, by common consent, they wished to make of him.

SECTION 1.30.5
When permission was granted, they fixed a day for the council and bound one another by oath not to disclose its proceedings except to those entrusted with that task by their common decision.

CHAPTER 1.31

SECTION 1.31.1
After that council had been dismissed, the same leading men of the states who had previously come to Caesar returned and asked to be permitted to confer with him privately and in secret concerning their own safety and that of all Gaul.

SECTION 1.31.2
Their request was granted, and they all threw themselves weeping at Caesar’s feet. They declared that they strove and labored no less to prevent what they said from being disclosed than to obtain what they desired, because they saw that, if it were disclosed, they would be subjected to the most terrible torture.

SECTION 1.31.3
Diviciacus the Haeduan spoke on their behalf: all Gaul was divided into two factions; the Haedui held the leadership of one, the Arverni of the other.

SECTION 1.31.4
While these peoples had been contending fiercely with one another for supremacy for many years, the result had been that the Arverni and Sequani hired Germans as mercenaries.

SECTION 1.31.5
At first about fifteen thousand of them had crossed the Rhine; later, when those fierce and barbarous men had come to relish the lands, civilization, and wealth of the Gauls, more had been brought across. There were now about 120,000 of them in Gaul.

SECTION 1.31.6
The Haedui and their dependents had fought them in arms time and again; defeated, they had suffered a great disaster and had lost all their nobility, all their senate, and all their cavalry.

SECTION 1.31.7
Broken by these battles and disasters, the Haedui, who before had held the greatest power in Gaul both through their own valor and through their ties of hospitality and friendship with the Roman people, had been forced to give the Sequani the most distinguished men of their state as hostages and to bind their state by oath that they would neither demand the hostages’ return, nor implore aid from the Roman people, nor refuse to remain forever under the dominion and authority of the Sequani.

SECTION 1.31.8
He alone, out of the entire Haeduan state, could not be induced either to take the oath or to give his children as hostages.

SECTION 1.31.9
For that reason he had fled from his state and gone to Rome to seek aid from the Senate, because he alone was bound neither by oath nor by hostages.

SECTION 1.31.10
Yet a worse fate had befallen the victorious Sequani than the defeated Haedui, because Ariovistus, king of the Germans, had settled within their territory and seized one-third of the land of the Sequani, which was the best in all Gaul; and he was now ordering the Sequani to withdraw from another third, because a few months before twenty-four thousand Harudes had come to join him, and a place and settlements had to be prepared for them.

SECTION 1.31.11
Within a few years, all the Gauls would be driven from their territories, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine; for Gallic land could not be compared with that of the Germans, nor could this manner of life be compared with theirs.

SECTION 1.31.12
Moreover, ever since Ariovistus had defeated the forces of the Gauls in battle—a battle fought at Magetobriga—he had ruled with arrogance and cruelty, demanding as hostages the children of every man of highest rank and inflicting upon them every kind of exemplary punishment and torture if anything was not done at his nod or according to his pleasure.

SECTION 1.31.13
He was a barbarous, hot-tempered, and reckless man; his commands could no longer be endured.

SECTION 1.31.14
Unless some aid was to be found in Caesar and the Roman people, all the Gauls would have to do what the Helvetii had done: emigrate from their homes, seek another dwelling place and other settlements far removed from the Germans, and try whatever fortune might befall them. If these words were reported to Ariovistus, Diviciacus had no doubt that he would inflict the most terrible punishment upon all the hostages in his possession.

SECTION 1.31.15
Caesar, either by his own authority and that of his army, or by his recent victory, or by the name of the Roman people, could deter a still greater multitude of Germans from being brought across the Rhine and could protect all Gaul from the violence of Ariovistus.

CHAPTER 1.32

SECTION 1.32.1
When Diviciacus had delivered this speech, all who were present began, with loud weeping, to seek aid from Caesar.

SECTION 1.32.2
Caesar noticed that, alone among all the others, the Sequani did none of the things the rest were doing, but remained sorrowful, gazing at the ground with bowed heads. Wondering at the reason for this, he questioned them.

SECTION 1.32.3
The Sequani made no reply, but remained silent in the same dejection. When he questioned them repeatedly and could elicit no answer at all, the same Diviciacus the Haeduan replied:

SECTION 1.32.4
the fortune of the Sequani was more wretched and grievous than that of the rest, because they alone dared not even complain in secret or implore aid, and shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus in his absence

SECTION 1.32.5
as though he were present before them; for the rest still had the opportunity of flight, but the Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories and whose towns were all in his power, had to endure every kind of torture.

CHAPTER 1.33

SECTION 1.33.1
When Caesar had learned these facts, he reassured the Gauls with his words and promised that he would take the matter under his care. He had great hope that Ariovistus, moved by his favor and authority, would put an end to his wrongs. After delivering this speech, he dismissed the council.

SECTION 1.33.2
Besides these considerations, many circumstances urged him to believe that he ought to take thought for the matter and undertake it. Chief among them was that he saw the Haedui, repeatedly styled brothers and kinsmen by the Senate, held in slavery and under the dominion of the Germans, and understood that their hostages were in the hands of Ariovistus and the Sequani. Given the vast power of the Roman people, he considered this deeply disgraceful both to himself and to the Republic.

SECTION 1.33.3
Moreover, he saw that it was dangerous to the Roman people for the Germans gradually to become accustomed to crossing the Rhine and for a great multitude of them to enter Gaul. Nor did he think that these fierce and barbarous men would restrain themselves, once they had occupied all Gaul, from marching into the Province, as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before them, and from there advancing into Italy—especially since only the Rhône separated the Sequani from our Province. He therefore believed that these developments must be met as quickly as possible.

SECTION 1.33.4
Ariovistus himself, moreover, had assumed such pride and such arrogance that he seemed no longer to be tolerated.

CHAPTER 1.34

SECTION 1.34.1
Caesar therefore decided to send envoys to Ariovistus to demand that he choose some place midway between them for a conference. Caesar wished, he said, to discuss with him matters of public concern and of the highest importance to them both.

SECTION 1.34.2
To this embassy Ariovistus replied that, if he himself had needed anything from Caesar, he would have gone to him; if Caesar wanted anything from him, Caesar ought to come to him.

SECTION 1.34.3
Besides, he dared not come without an army into those parts of Gaul that Caesar possessed, nor could he concentrate his army in one place without a great supply train and enormous exertion.

SECTION 1.34.4
Moreover, he found it strange what business either Caesar or the Roman people at large had in his part of Gaul, which he had conquered in war.

CHAPTER 1.35

SECTION 1.35.1
When these replies were reported to Caesar, he again sent envoys to Ariovistus with the following instructions:

SECTION 1.35.2
since, after receiving so great a favor from Caesar and the Roman people—having been styled king and friend by the Senate during Caesar’s consulship—he now returned this gratitude to Caesar and the Roman people by refusing an invitation to a conference and by judging that he need neither speak nor learn about a matter of common concern, these were Caesar’s demands of him:

SECTION 1.35.3
first, that he bring no further multitude of men across the Rhine into Gaul; next, that he return the hostages he held from the Haedui and permit the Sequani, with his consent, to return to them the hostages they held; and that he neither provoke the Haedui by wrongful acts nor make war upon them or their allies.

SECTION 1.35.4
If he acted accordingly, Caesar and the Roman people would enjoy lasting favor and friendship with him. If Caesar did not obtain these demands, then, since during the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso the Senate had decreed that whoever governed the Province of Gaul should, so far as he could do so consistently with the interests of the Republic, defend the Haedui and the other friends of the Roman people, Caesar would not overlook the wrongs done to the Haedui.

CHAPTER 1.36

SECTION 1.36.1
To these demands Ariovistus replied that the law of war was that those who had conquered should rule those whom they had conquered in whatever manner they wished. The Roman people likewise had been accustomed to rule the conquered, not according to another’s dictates, but according to their own judgment.

SECTION 1.36.2
If he did not dictate to the Roman people how they should exercise their rights, he ought not to be hindered by the Roman people in the exercise of his own rights.

SECTION 1.36.3
The Haedui had become his tributaries because they had tried the fortune of war, had met him in arms, and had been defeated.

SECTION 1.36.4
Caesar was doing him a great wrong, since by his arrival he was diminishing the revenues due him.

SECTION 1.36.5
He would not return the hostages to the Haedui, nor would he wrongfully make war upon them or their allies, provided they abided by what had been agreed and paid their tribute each year. If they did not, the fraternal title bestowed upon them by the Roman people would be far from helping them.

SECTION 1.36.6
As for Caesar’s warning that he would not overlook the wrongs done to the Haedui, no man had ever contended with Ariovistus except to his own destruction.

SECTION 1.36.7
Let Caesar engage him whenever he wished; he would learn what the valor of the unconquered Germans could accomplish—men highly trained in arms who for fourteen years had never passed beneath a roof.

CHAPTER 1.37

SECTION 1.37.1
These messages were being reported to Caesar at the same time that envoys arrived from the Haedui and the Treveri:

SECTION 1.37.2
the Haedui to complain that the Harudes, who had recently been transported into Gaul, were ravaging their territories, and that even by giving hostages they had been unable to purchase peace from Ariovistus;

SECTION 1.37.3
the Treveri to report that one hundred cantons of the Suebi had settled on the banks of the Rhine and were attempting to cross it, and that the brothers Nasua and Cimberius commanded them. Deeply alarmed by these developments, Caesar believed that he must act quickly, lest, if the new host of Suebi joined the old forces of Ariovistus, resistance should become more difficult.

SECTION 1.37.4
Accordingly, after securing provisions as rapidly as he could, he hastened against Ariovistus by forced marches.

CHAPTER 1.38

SECTION 1.38.1
When he had advanced for three days, word was brought to him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize Vesontio, the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days’ march from his own territory. Caesar believed that he must take the greatest precautions to prevent this. For in that town there was a most abundant supply of everything useful for war,

SECTION 1.38.2
and the nature of its position fortified it so strongly that it offered a great advantage for conducting a campaign, because the river Dubis, as though traced with a compass, encircles nearly the entire town.

SECTION 1.38.3
The remaining space, where the river leaves a gap, is no more than sixteen hundred feet across and is enclosed by a mountain of great height, whose base touches the riverbanks on either side.

SECTION 1.38.4
A wall carried around this mountain makes it a citadel and joins it to the town.

SECTION 1.38.5
Caesar hastened there by long marches night and day, seized the town, and stationed a garrison in it.

CHAPTER 1.39

SECTION 1.39.1
While he remained for a few days at Vesontio to secure grain and other supplies, inquiries by our men and the statements of Gauls and merchants—who proclaimed that the Germans were of enormous physical stature, of incredible valor, and highly trained in arms, and who said that in their frequent encounters with them they had been unable to endure even the expression on their faces or the fierce gaze of their eyes—suddenly filled the entire army with such fear that it profoundly disturbed the minds and spirits of them all.

SECTION 1.39.2
This fear first arose among the military tribunes, prefects, and others who had followed Caesar from Rome for friendship’s sake and possessed no great experience in warfare.

SECTION 1.39.3
Each of them offered a different excuse, which he claimed made his departure necessary, and asked to be permitted to leave with Caesar’s consent; some, moved by shame and wishing to avoid the suspicion of fear, remained.

SECTION 1.39.4
They could neither compose their features nor at times restrain their tears. Hidden away in their tents, they either lamented their own fate or commiserated with their intimate friends over the danger they shared. Wills were being sealed everywhere throughout the camp.

SECTION 1.39.5
By their talk and their fear, even those who had great experience in camp—soldiers, centurions, and commanders of cavalry—were gradually thrown into confusion.

SECTION 1.39.6
Those among them who wished to be considered less timid said that they did not fear the enemy, but were apprehensive about the narrowness of the route and the vast forests that lay between themselves and Ariovistus, or about the grain supply and whether it could be brought forward with sufficient ease.

SECTION 1.39.7
Some even reported to Caesar that when he ordered the camp to be struck and the standards advanced, the soldiers would not obey his command or carry the standards, because of their fear.

CHAPTER 1.40

SECTION 1.40.1
When Caesar observed this, he called a council and summoned to it the centurions of every rank. He reproached them bitterly: first, because they thought it their business to inquire or consider in what direction or with what purpose they were being led.

SECTION 1.40.2
During his consulship Ariovistus had most eagerly sought the friendship of the Roman people; why should anyone so rashly suppose that he would abandon his duty?

SECTION 1.40.3
For his own part, Caesar was convinced that once Ariovistus learned his demands and perceived the fairness of his terms, he would reject neither Caesar’s goodwill nor that of the Roman people.

SECTION 1.40.4
But if, driven by rage and madness, he did make war, what, after all, had they to fear? Why should they despair either of their own courage or of their commander’s vigilance?

SECTION 1.40.5
Within the memory of their fathers, this enemy had been put to the test when the Cimbri and Teutones were defeated by Gaius Marius [and the army was thought to have earned no less glory than the commander himself]. The Germans had also recently been tested in Italy during the slave uprising, although the slaves had been aided to some extent by the experience and discipline they had acquired from us.

SECTION 1.40.6
From this it could be judged how much good there was in steadfastness, since the men whom they had for some time feared without cause while those men were unarmed, they had afterward overcome when they were armed and victorious.

SECTION 1.40.7
Finally, these were the same Germans whom the Helvetii had encountered time and again and had generally defeated, not only in their own territory but in German territory as well; yet the Helvetii had been unable to stand against our army.

SECTION 1.40.8
If any were disturbed by the Gauls’ defeat and flight, they could discover, if they made inquiry, that after the Gauls had been exhausted by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus had kept within his camp and the marshes for many months without giving them an opportunity to fight; then, when they had despaired of battle and dispersed, he had attacked them suddenly and prevailed more by calculation and strategy than by valor.

SECTION 1.40.9
Though such a strategy had succeeded against barbarous and inexperienced men, Ariovistus himself could not expect our armies to be caught by it.

SECTION 1.40.10
Those who disguised their fear by professing anxiety about the grain supply and the narrowness of the route were behaving arrogantly, since they appeared either to despair of their commander’s ability to perform his duty or to dictate to him.

SECTION 1.40.11
These matters were his concern. The Sequani, Leuci, and Lingones were furnishing grain, and the crops were already ripe in the fields. As for the route, they themselves would soon be able to judge it.

SECTION 1.40.12
As for the assertion that they would not obey orders or carry the standards, he was not at all disturbed by it. He knew that whenever an army had failed to obey its commander, either fortune had deserted him through failure in the field, or his greed had been exposed by the discovery of some crime.

SECTION 1.40.13
His integrity had been demonstrated throughout his life, and his good fortune in the war against the Helvetii.

SECTION 1.40.14
He would therefore do at once what he had intended to postpone until a later day, and would strike camp during the fourth watch of the coming night, so that he might learn as soon as possible whether honor and duty or fear held greater power over them.

SECTION 1.40.15
Even if no one else followed, he would nevertheless march with the Tenth Legion alone, for he had no doubts about it, and it would serve as his praetorian cohort. Caesar had always shown this legion particular favor and, because of its courage, placed the greatest confidence in it.

CHAPTER 1.41

SECTION 1.41.1
After this speech, the feelings of all were transformed in a remarkable fashion, and the greatest eagerness and desire to wage war arose among them.

SECTION 1.41.2
The Tenth Legion was the first, through its military tribunes, to thank him for forming so excellent an opinion of it, and declared that it was entirely ready to wage war.

SECTION 1.41.3
Then the remaining legions, through their military tribunes and the centurions of the senior grades, sought to satisfy Caesar. They declared that they had never doubted or been afraid, and had never supposed that judgment concerning the conduct of the whole war belonged to them rather than to their commander.

SECTION 1.41.4
Caesar accepted their assurances and, after having the route investigated by Diviciacus—the Gaul in whom he placed the greatest trust—so that he might lead the army by open country on a detour of more than fifty miles, set out during the fourth watch, as he had said he would.

SECTION 1.41.5
On the seventh day, having continued the march without interruption, he was informed by scouts that Ariovistus’s forces were twenty-four miles from ours.

CHAPTER 1.42

SECTION 1.42.1
When Ariovistus learned of Caesar’s approach, he sent envoys to him. The conference that Caesar had previously requested could now take place, since Caesar had come nearer and Ariovistus believed that he could attend it without danger.

SECTION 1.42.2
Caesar did not reject the proposal and now believed that Ariovistus was returning to reason, since he voluntarily offered what he had previously refused when requested.

SECTION 1.42.3
He conceived great hope that, in view of the great benefits conferred upon Ariovistus by himself and the Roman people, Ariovistus would learn his demands and abandon his obstinacy.

SECTION 1.42.4
The conference was appointed for the fifth day from that day.

SECTION 1.42.5
Meanwhile, as envoys were frequently passing back and forth between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar bring no infantryman to the conference. He feared, he said, that Caesar might surround him in an ambush. Each should come with cavalry; on no other condition would he attend.

SECTION 1.42.6
Caesar did not wish the conference to be canceled upon the introduction of a pretext, but he did not dare entrust his safety to the Gallic cavalry. He therefore decided that the most expedient course was to take all the horses away from the Gallic horsemen and mount upon them legionaries from the Tenth Legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence, so that, if action became necessary, he might have the most devoted possible bodyguard.

SECTION 1.42.7
While this was being done, one of the soldiers of the Tenth Legion remarked, not without wit, that Caesar was doing more than he had promised: he had promised to treat the Tenth Legion as his praetorian cohort, but now he was enrolling it among the cavalry.

CHAPTER 1.43

SECTION 1.43.1
There was a broad plain, and upon it a fairly large earthen mound. This place was almost equally distant from the camps of Ariovistus and Caesar. There, as agreed, they came to hold their conference.

SECTION 1.43.2
Caesar stationed the legion he had brought on horseback two hundred paces from the mound. Ariovistus’s horsemen likewise halted at an equal distance.

SECTION 1.43.3
Ariovistus demanded that they confer on horseback and that each bring ten men besides himself to the meeting.

SECTION 1.43.4
When they arrived, Caesar began his speech by recounting the benefits that he and the Senate had conferred upon Ariovistus: that the Senate had given him the title of king, that he had been declared a friend, and that gifts had been sent to him with the greatest generosity. Caesar explained that such distinctions had fallen to the lot of few men and were customarily bestowed only in return for great services.

SECTION 1.43.5
Ariovistus, though he had neither access to the Senate nor any just grounds for making such a request, had obtained these honors through Caesar’s own favor and generosity and that of the Senate.

SECTION 1.43.6
Caesar also explained how ancient and how just were the bonds of alliance that existed between the Romans and the Haedui;

SECTION 1.43.7
how many decrees of the Senate had been passed in their favor and how honorable those decrees had been; and how the Haedui had at all times held supremacy over all Gaul, even before they had sought our friendship.

SECTION 1.43.8
It was the custom of the Roman people not merely to permit their allies and friends to suffer no loss, but to desire that they be increased in influence, dignity, and honor. Who, then, could endure having taken from them what they had possessed when they entered into friendship with the Roman people?

SECTION 1.43.9
He then made the same demands that he had entrusted to his envoys: Ariovistus must not make war upon the Haedui or their allies; he must return the hostages; and, if he could not send any part of the Germans back home, he must at least permit no more of them to cross the Rhine.

CHAPTER 1.44

SECTION 1.44.1
Ariovistus answered Caesar’s demands briefly, but spoke at length in praise of his own prowess:

SECTION 1.44.2
He had crossed the Rhine not of his own accord, but because the Gauls had asked and summoned him. He had not left his home and kindred without great hopes and great rewards. The settlements he held in Gaul had been granted by the Gauls themselves, and the hostages had been given of their own free will. He received tribute by the law of war, which victors were accustomed to impose upon the vanquished.

SECTION 1.44.3
He had not made war upon the Gauls; the Gauls had made war upon him. All the states of Gaul had come to attack him and had encamped against him; all their forces had been routed and defeated by him in a single battle.

SECTION 1.44.4
If they wished to make another trial, he was ready to fight it out again. If they wished to enjoy peace, it was unjust for them to refuse the tribute that they had paid voluntarily down to that time.

SECTION 1.44.5
The friendship of the Roman people ought to bring him honor and protection, not injury, and he had sought it in that hope. If, through the intervention of the Roman people, the tribute were canceled and those who had surrendered were withdrawn from his authority, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman people as gladly as he had sought it.

SECTION 1.44.6
As for his bringing a great number of Germans into Gaul, he was doing so to protect himself, not to attack Gaul. The proof was that he had not come except at the Gauls’ request and had not begun the war, but had defended himself.

SECTION 1.44.7
He had come into Gaul before the Roman people. Never before this time had an army of the Roman people gone beyond the boundaries of the Province of Gaul.

SECTION 1.44.8
What did Caesar want with him? Why had he entered Ariovistus’s possessions? This part of Gaul was his province, just as the other was ours. Just as Ariovistus ought not to be indulged if he made an attack upon our territory, so we were equally unjust to interfere with him in the exercise of his own rights.

SECTION 1.44.9
As for Caesar’s assertion that the Haedui had been called brothers by the Senate, Ariovistus was neither so barbarous nor so ignorant of affairs that he did not know that the Haedui had brought no aid to the Romans in the recent war with the Allobroges, and that they themselves had received no aid from the Roman people in the struggles they had waged against him and the Sequani.

SECTION 1.44.10
He was bound to suspect that Caesar, under the pretense of friendship, was keeping an army in Gaul for the purpose of crushing him.

SECTION 1.44.11
Unless Caesar withdrew and led his army away from these regions, Ariovistus would regard him not as a friend, but as an enemy.

SECTION 1.44.12
If he killed Caesar, he would gratify many nobles and leading men of the Roman people—he knew this from messages they themselves had sent—and by Caesar’s death he could purchase the favor and friendship of them all.

SECTION 1.44.13
But if Caesar withdrew and surrendered to him the unrestricted possession of Gaul, Ariovistus would reward him magnificently and would bring to a conclusion, without any labor or danger to Caesar, whatever wars Caesar wished to have waged.

CHAPTER 1.45

SECTION 1.45.1
Caesar spoke at length to explain why he could not abandon the matter. Neither his own custom nor that of the Roman people permitted them to desert allies who had rendered the greatest services, nor did he judge that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people.

SECTION 1.45.2
The Arverni and Ruteni had been defeated in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, but the Roman people had pardoned them, had neither reduced their country to a province nor imposed tribute upon them.

SECTION 1.45.3
If the earliest title in time ought to be regarded, the sovereignty of the Roman people in Gaul was the most just. If the judgment of the Senate ought to be observed, Gaul should be free, since after conquering it in war the Senate had wished it to retain its own laws.

CHAPTER 1.46

SECTION 1.46.1
While these matters were being discussed at the conference, Caesar was informed that Ariovistus’s horsemen were drawing nearer to the mound, riding up toward our men, and hurling stones and missiles at them.

SECTION 1.46.2
Caesar ended the discussion and withdrew to his own men, whom he ordered not to cast back any missile whatever against the enemy.

SECTION 1.46.3
For although he saw that a battle between his chosen legion and the enemy cavalry would involve no danger, he nevertheless did not think it right to engage, lest, after the enemy had been routed, it be said that he had surrounded and attacked them during a conference held under pledge of good faith.

SECTION 1.46.4
When word spread among the common soldiers of the arrogance with which Ariovistus had barred the Romans from all Gaul during the conference, and how his horsemen had attacked our men and thereby broken off the meeting, the army was filled with far greater eagerness and a still stronger desire to fight.

CHAPTER 1.47

SECTION 1.47.1
Two days later Ariovistus sent envoys to Caesar. He wished, he said, to discuss with him the matters they had begun to consider but had not concluded. Caesar should either appoint another day for a conference or, if he were unwilling to do that, send one of his envoys to Ariovistus.

SECTION 1.47.2
Caesar saw no reason for another conference, especially since on the previous day the Germans could not be restrained from casting missiles at our men.

SECTION 1.47.3
He believed that he would be sending any envoy of his own to Ariovistus at great risk and exposing him to savage men.

SECTION 1.47.4
It seemed best to send Gaius Valerius Procillus, the son of Gaius Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and refinement, whose father had been granted Roman citizenship by Gaius Valerius Flaccus. He was chosen both for his loyalty and for his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, through long familiarity, now spoke extensively, and because the Germans had no reason to commit any offense against him. With him Caesar sent Marcus Metius, who enjoyed guest-friendship with Ariovistus.

SECTION 1.47.5
He instructed them to learn what Ariovistus had to say and report it to him. When Ariovistus saw them in his camp, he cried out in the presence of his army: Why had they come to him? Was it to spy? He prevented them from attempting to speak and cast them into chains.

CHAPTER 1.48

SECTION 1.48.1
That same day Ariovistus moved his camp forward and established himself beneath a mountain, six miles from Caesar’s camp.

SECTION 1.48.2
On the following day he led his forces past Caesar’s camp and made camp two miles beyond it, intending thereby to cut Caesar off from the grain and supplies being brought from the Sequani and Haedui.

SECTION 1.48.3
For five successive days from that day, Caesar led his forces out before the camp and kept them drawn up in battle order, so that if Ariovistus wished to contend in battle he would not lack the opportunity.

SECTION 1.48.4
Throughout all these days Ariovistus kept his army within camp, but engaged in cavalry combat every day. This was the manner of fighting in which the Germans had trained themselves:

SECTION 1.48.5
There were six thousand horsemen and an equal number of the swiftest and bravest infantrymen, each of whom a horseman had personally chosen from the entire force for the protection of his own life.

SECTION 1.48.6
The horsemen fought in battle alongside these men and withdrew to them for protection. If the situation became especially dangerous, the infantrymen rushed forward; if any horseman fell from his horse after receiving a serious wound, they surrounded him;

SECTION 1.48.7
If they had to advance farther than usual or withdraw more rapidly, their training gave them such speed that, supporting themselves by the horses’ manes, they could keep pace with them at a gallop.

CHAPTER 1.49

SECTION 1.49.1
When Caesar realized that Ariovistus was keeping within his camp, he chose a suitable site for a camp beyond the place where the Germans had settled, about six hundred paces from them, so that he might not be cut off from supplies any longer; then, drawing up his army in three lines, he advanced to that spot.

SECTION 1.49.2
He ordered the first and second lines to remain under arms and the third to fortify the camp.

SECTION 1.49.3
[This position, as has been stated, was about six hundred paces from the enemy.] Ariovistus sent there about sixteen thousand light-armed men with all his cavalry, intending this force to intimidate our men and prevent them from completing the fortifications.

SECTION 1.49.4
Nevertheless, Caesar, as he had previously determined, ordered two lines to repel the enemy and the third to complete the work. When the camp had been fortified, he left two legions and part of the auxiliaries there and led the other four legions back to the larger camp.

CHAPTER 1.50

SECTION 1.50.1
The next day Caesar, in accordance with his plan, led his forces out of both camps, advanced a short distance from the larger camp, drew up his battle line, and offered the enemy an opportunity to fight.

SECTION 1.50.2
When he saw that even then they would not come out, he led his army back into camp at about noon. Only then did Ariovistus send part of his forces to attack the smaller camp. Both sides fought fiercely until evening. At sunset Ariovistus withdrew his troops into camp, after many wounds had been both inflicted and received.

SECTION 1.50.3
When Caesar asked the prisoners why Ariovistus would not decide the issue in battle, he discovered this reason: it was the custom among the Germans for their matrons to declare by lots and divinations whether or not it was advantageous to engage in battle; and they were saying

SECTION 1.50.4
that it was not ordained for the Germans to conquer if they fought a battle before the new moon.

CHAPTER 1.51

SECTION 1.51.1
On the following day Caesar left in each camp what seemed a sufficient garrison and stationed all the auxiliary troops in sight of the enemy before the smaller camp, because, in view of the enemy’s numbers, he was weaker in legionary troops and wished to use the auxiliaries to give the appearance of greater strength; he himself advanced as far as the enemy’s camp with his army drawn up in three lines.

SECTION 1.51.2
Then at last the Germans were compelled to lead their forces out of camp. They stationed them by tribes at equal intervals—the Harudes, Marcomani, Triboci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, and Suebi—and surrounded their entire battle line with wagons and carts, so that no hope of escape should remain.

SECTION 1.51.3
Upon these they placed their women, who, weeping and stretching out their hands, implored the soldiers as they went forth to battle not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.

CHAPTER 1.52

SECTION 1.52.1
Caesar placed a legate and the quaestor in command of each separate legion, so that every man might have them as witnesses to his courage;

SECTION 1.52.2
he himself opened the battle from the right wing, because he had observed that this was the enemy’s weakest quarter.

SECTION 1.52.3
At the signal our men charged the enemy so fiercely, and the enemy in turn rushed forward so suddenly and swiftly, that there was no room to cast the javelins against them.

SECTION 1.52.4
The javelins were discarded, and the fighting was carried on at close quarters with swords. But the Germans quickly formed a phalanx according to their custom and received the assault of the swordsmen.

SECTION 1.52.5
Many of our men were found who leaped upon the phalanx, tore away the shields with their hands, and struck the enemy from above.

SECTION 1.52.6
Although the enemy’s line had been driven back on the left wing and put to flight, on the right wing the great mass of their men was pressing our line hard.

SECTION 1.52.7
When the young Publius Crassus, who commanded the cavalry, observed this, being freer to survey the field than those who were engaged amid the battle line, he sent the third line to support our hard-pressed men.

CHAPTER 1.53

SECTION 1.53.1
Thus the battle was restored, and all the enemy turned their backs; nor did they cease their flight until they reached the river Rhine, about fifty miles from the battlefield.

SECTION 1.53.2
There a very few, trusting to their strength, attempted to swim across, or found small boats and so gained safety.

SECTION 1.53.3
Among them was Ariovistus, who found a little boat moored to the bank and escaped in it; all the rest were overtaken and killed by our cavalry.

SECTION 1.53.4
Ariovistus had two wives, one a Sueban by birth, whom he had brought with him from home, the other a Norican, the sister of King Voccio, whom he had married in Gaul after her brother sent her to him. Both perished in the rout. He also had two daughters: one of them was killed, the other captured.

SECTION 1.53.5
Gaius Valerius Procillus, as he was being dragged away in the flight by his guards, bound with three chains, fell in with Caesar himself, who was pursuing the enemy with the cavalry.

SECTION 1.53.6
This occurrence indeed gave Caesar no less pleasure than the victory itself, because he saw restored to him, rescued from the enemy’s hands, a man of the highest character in the province of Gaul, his own friend and guest; nor had fortune diminished any part of his great delight and rejoicing by bringing calamity upon Procillus.

SECTION 1.53.7
Procillus said that, in his presence, the lots had been consulted three times concerning him—whether he should be burned to death at once or reserved for another occasion—and that by the favor of the lots he remained unharmed.

SECTION 1.53.8
Marcus Metius was likewise found and brought back to Caesar.

CHAPTER 1.54

SECTION 1.54.1
When news of this battle was carried across the Rhine, the Suebi who had come to its banks began to return home. When the peoples who live nearest the Rhine perceived their panic, they pursued them and killed a great number.

SECTION 1.54.2
Having concluded two very great wars in a single summer, Caesar led his army into winter quarters among the Sequani somewhat earlier than the season required. He placed Labienus in command of the winter quarters;

SECTION 1.54.3
he himself departed for Cisalpine Gaul to hold the assizes.

### Book 2

CHAPTER 2.1

SECTION 2.1.1
While Caesar was in Cisalpine Gaul [in winter quarters], as we have shown above, frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also informed by letters from Labienus, that all the Belgae, whom we have said constitute the third part of Gaul, were conspiring against the Roman people and exchanging hostages among themselves.

SECTION 2.1.2
The reasons for the conspiracy were these: first, they feared that, once all Gaul had been pacified, our army would be led against them;

SECTION 2.1.3
second, they were being incited by certain Gauls—some who, just as they had been unwilling for the Germans to remain longer in Gaul, likewise resented the Roman people’s army wintering and becoming permanently established there; others who, from fickleness and instability of mind, were eager for new governments;

SECTION 2.1.4
and still others because in Gaul royal power was commonly seized by the more powerful men and by those who had the means to hire retainers, whereas under our dominion they could accomplish this less easily.

CHAPTER 2.2

SECTION 2.2.1
Moved by these reports and letters, Caesar enrolled two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul and, at the opening of summer, sent the legate Quintus Pedius to lead them into Transalpine Gaul.

SECTION 2.2.2
He himself came to the army as soon as forage began to be plentiful.

SECTION 2.2.3
He charged the Senones and the other Gauls who bordered on the Belgae to learn what was taking place among them and keep him informed of these matters.

SECTION 2.2.4
They all reported consistently that bands of men were being gathered and an army concentrated in one place. Caesar then judged that he must no longer hesitate to march against them. After arranging the grain supply, he broke camp and in about fifteen days reached the borders of the Belgae.

CHAPTER 2.3

SECTION 2.3.1
When he arrived there unexpectedly and sooner than anyone had anticipated, the Remi, the Belgic people nearest to Gaul, sent to him as envoys Iccius and Andebrogius, the foremost men of their state,

SECTION 2.3.2
to declare that they entrusted themselves and all they possessed to the protection and authority of the Roman people; that they had neither joined the other Belgae nor conspired against the Roman people;

SECTION 2.3.3
and that they were ready to give hostages, obey his commands, receive him into their towns, and assist him with grain and other supplies;

SECTION 2.3.4
that all the other Belgae were under arms, and that the Germans who lived on this side of the Rhine had joined them;

SECTION 2.3.5
and that the frenzy of them all was so great that they had been unable to deter even the Suessiones—their own brothers and kinsmen, who enjoyed the same rights and laws and shared with them one government and one magistracy—from joining the conspiracy.

CHAPTER 2.4

SECTION 2.4.1
When Caesar asked them which states were under arms, how large they were, and what military strength they possessed, he learned the following: most of the Belgae were descended from the Germans and had crossed the Rhine in ancient times; attracted by the fertility of the country, they had settled there and driven out the Gauls who inhabited the region; and they alone,

SECTION 2.4.2
within the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was being ravaged, had prevented the Teutones and Cimbri from entering their territories;

SECTION 2.4.3
and consequently the memory of those deeds gave them great prestige and great confidence in military affairs.

SECTION 2.4.4
The Remi said that they possessed exact information about all their numbers, because, being connected with them by ties of blood and marriage, they had learned how large a force each people had promised for that war in the common council of the Belgae.

SECTION 2.4.5
The Bellovaci were the most powerful among them in courage, influence, and numbers. They could muster one hundred thousand armed men, had promised sixty thousand picked troops from that number, and demanded for themselves the supreme command of the entire war.

SECTION 2.4.6
The Suessiones were their own neighbors and possessed very extensive territories and exceptionally fertile fields.

SECTION 2.4.7
Within our own memory their king had been Diviciacus, the most powerful man in all Gaul, who had held dominion over a great part of these regions and even over Britain. Their king now was Galba, upon whom, because of his justice and exceptional wisdom, the supreme command of the entire war was being conferred by unanimous consent. They had twelve towns and promised fifty thousand armed men; the Nervii promised the same number,

SECTION 2.4.8
and were considered the fiercest among the Belgae themselves and lived farthest away;

SECTION 2.4.9
the Atrebates promised fifteen thousand, the Ambiani ten thousand, the Morini twenty-five thousand, the Menapii seven thousand, the Caleti ten thousand, the Veliocasses and Viromandui the same number, and the Atuatuci nineteen thousand;

SECTION 2.4.10
the Condrusi, Eburones, Caerosi, and Paemani, who are collectively called Germans, were estimated at about forty thousand.

CHAPTER 2.5

SECTION 2.5.1
After encouraging the Remi and addressing them with generous praise, Caesar ordered their entire senate to assemble before him and the children of their leading men to be brought to him as hostages. All these requirements were punctually fulfilled by them on the appointed day.

SECTION 2.5.2
He himself earnestly urged Diviciacus the Aeduan to action, explaining how greatly it concerned the republic and their common safety that the enemy’s forces should be kept apart, so that it would not be necessary to engage so great a multitude at one time.

SECTION 2.5.3
This could be accomplished, he said, if the Aedui led their forces into the territory of the Bellovaci and began to ravage their lands.

SECTION 2.5.4
After giving him these instructions, Caesar dismissed him. When he saw that all the forces of the Belgae, concentrated in one place, were advancing against him, and learned from the scouts he had sent out and from the Remi that they were now not far away, he hastened to lead his army across the river Axona, which lies at the extreme frontier of the Remi, and there pitched camp.

SECTION 2.5.5
This position protected one side of the camp by the riverbanks, secured the country behind him from the enemy, and made it possible for supplies from the Remi and the other states to be carried to him without danger.

SECTION 2.5.6
There was a bridge over the river. Caesar stationed a guard there and left the legate Quintus Titurius Sabinus with six cohorts on the other side of the river. He ordered the camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high and a ditch eighteen feet wide.

CHAPTER 2.6

SECTION 2.6.1
Eight miles from this camp stood a town of the Remi named Bibrax. The Belgae attacked it directly from their line of march with great violence. It was held only with difficulty that day.

SECTION 2.6.2
The Gauls and Belgae employ the same method of attacking a town. After surrounding the entire circuit of the walls with a mass of men, they begin hurling stones against the wall from every direction; and when the wall has been stripped of defenders, they form a tortoise, advance to the gates, and undermine the wall. On that occasion this was easily done.

SECTION 2.6.3
For when so great a multitude was hurling stones and missiles, no one had any possibility of maintaining his position on the wall.

SECTION 2.6.4
When night put an end to the assault, Iccius the Remian—a man of the highest birth and influence among his people, who then commanded the town and had been one of the envoys who came to Caesar to sue for peace—sent him a messenger to say that unless reinforcements were dispatched to him, he could hold out no longer.

CHAPTER 2.7

SECTION 2.7.1
At midnight Caesar sent Numidians, Cretan archers, and Balearic slingers to reinforce the townspeople, using as guides the same men who had come as messengers from Iccius;

SECTION 2.7.2
their arrival gave the Remi, together with hope of defense, a stronger determination to resist, while for the same reason the enemy lost hope of taking the town.

SECTION 2.7.3
Accordingly, after lingering near the town for a short time and laying waste the fields of the Remi, they burned every village and building they could reach, then marched with all their forces toward Caesar’s camp and pitched their own camp less than two miles away;

SECTION 2.7.4
that camp, as the smoke and fires indicated, extended more than eight miles in breadth.

CHAPTER 2.8

SECTION 2.8.1
At first Caesar resolved to refrain from battle, both because of the enemy’s numbers and because of their extraordinary reputation for courage;

SECTION 2.8.2
nevertheless, by daily cavalry engagements he tested what the enemy could accomplish by their valor and what our men would dare.

SECTION 2.8.3
When he realized that our men were not inferior, he found the ground before the camp naturally favorable and well suited for drawing up a battle line. The hill on which the camp stood rose slightly from the plain and extended across its forward face only as widely as a deployed army could occupy; it had steep descents on either flank, while in front it sloped gently and gradually returned to the level of the plain. From each side of this hill he drew a transverse ditch about four hundred paces long

SECTION 2.8.4
and built redoubts at the ends of the ditches, where he placed artillery, so that, once he had drawn up his line, the enemy, because they were so powerful in numbers, might not fight around the flanks and envelop his men.

SECTION 2.8.5
This done, he left in camp the two legions he had most recently enrolled, so that they could be brought up as reinforcements wherever there might be need, and drew up the other six legions in battle order before the camp. The enemy likewise led their forces out of camp and deployed them.

CHAPTER 2.9

SECTION 2.9.1
Between our army and the enemy’s lay a marsh of no great extent. The enemy waited to see whether our men would cross it; our men, meanwhile, stood ready under arms to attack them while encumbered if they should begin to cross.

SECTION 2.9.2
Meanwhile, a cavalry engagement was fought between the two battle lines. When neither side began to cross, Caesar, after the cavalry engagement had gone more favorably for our men, led his forces back into camp.

SECTION 2.9.3
The enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Axona, which, as has been stated, lay behind our camp.

SECTION 2.9.4
There, finding fords, they attempted to lead part of their forces across, intending, if they could, to storm the fort commanded by the lieutenant Quintus Titurius and destroy the bridge;

SECTION 2.9.5
or, if they could not, to ravage the lands of the Remi, who were of great service to us in conducting the war, and cut our men off from supplies.

CHAPTER 2.10

SECTION 2.10.1
When Titurius informed Caesar of this, he led all the cavalry, the lightly armed Numidians, the slingers, and the archers across the bridge and hastened against them. A fierce battle was fought at that place.

SECTION 2.10.2
Our men attacked the enemy while they were encumbered in the river and killed a great number of them;

SECTION 2.10.3
the rest, who most boldly attempted to cross over the bodies of their comrades, they drove back with a hail of missiles, while those who had crossed first were surrounded by the cavalry and slain.

SECTION 2.10.4
When the enemy realized that their hopes had failed both of storming the town and of crossing the river, and saw that our men would not advance onto less favorable ground for the sake of battle, while their own supply of grain began to run short, they called a council and decided that it was best for each man to return home, and that all should assemble from every quarter to defend whichever people’s territory the Romans first invaded with their army. Thus they would fight on their own soil rather than another’s and make use of their stores of provisions at home.

SECTION 2.10.5
Among the other reasons that brought them to this decision was their discovery that Diviciacus and the Haedui were approaching the borders of the Bellovaci. The Bellovaci could not be persuaded to remain any longer and refrain from carrying aid to their own people.

CHAPTER 2.11

SECTION 2.11.1
Having reached this decision, they left camp during the second watch with great noise and confusion, without any fixed order or command, each man seeking the foremost place on the road for himself and hastening to reach home, so that their departure looked very much like a rout.

SECTION 2.11.2
Caesar learned of this immediately through his scouts, but, fearing an ambush because he had not yet discovered why they were withdrawing, kept the army and cavalry within the camp.

SECTION 2.11.3
At daybreak, when the scouts had confirmed the report, he sent all the cavalry ahead to delay the enemy’s rear guard. He placed the lieutenants Quintus Pedius and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta in command of them and ordered the lieutenant Titus Labienus to follow with three legions.

SECTION 2.11.4
They attacked the rear and, pursuing it for many miles, cut down a great multitude of the fugitives. Those at the end of the column whom they overtook would halt and stoutly withstand the attack of our soldiers,

SECTION 2.11.5
but those in front, because they seemed far removed from danger and were held together by neither necessity nor command, would hear the shouting, break ranks in panic, and seek safety one and all in flight.

SECTION 2.11.6
Thus, without any danger to themselves, our men killed as great a number of them as the hours of daylight allowed. At sunset they ceased their pursuit and withdrew to camp, as they had been ordered.

CHAPTER 2.12

SECTION 2.12.1
On the following day, before the enemy could recover from their terror and flight, Caesar led his army into the territory of the Suessiones, who were nearest to the Remi, and, after completing a long march, hastened to the town of Noviodunum.

SECTION 2.12.2
He attempted to take it by assault directly from the march, because he heard that it had no defenders, but owing to the breadth of the ditch and the height of the wall he was unable to capture it, though only a few men defended it.

SECTION 2.12.3
After fortifying his camp, he began to advance covered galleries and prepare everything needed for the assault.

SECTION 2.12.4
Meanwhile, during the following night, the entire host of the Suessiones that had escaped the rout assembled within the town.

SECTION 2.12.5
When the covered galleries had swiftly been advanced toward the town, a ramp constructed, and towers erected, the Gauls, shaken by the magnitude of works such as they had never before seen or heard of and by the speed of the Romans, sent envoys to Caesar to arrange their surrender; and when the Remi petitioned that they be spared, their request was granted.

CHAPTER 2.13

SECTION 2.13.1
Caesar accepted the surrender of the Suessiones after receiving as hostages the foremost men of the state and two sons of King Galba himself, and after all the weapons in the town had been delivered. He then led his army against the Bellovaci.

SECTION 2.13.2
They had brought themselves and all their possessions into the town of Bratuspantium. When Caesar and his army were about five miles from the town, all the elders came out, stretched out their hands toward Caesar, and began to declare aloud that they placed themselves under his protection and authority and would not contend in arms against the Roman people.

SECTION 2.13.3
Likewise, when he approached the town and was pitching camp there, the boys and women, with hands outstretched from the wall, begged the Romans for peace in their customary manner.

CHAPTER 2.14

SECTION 2.14.1
Diviciacus spoke on their behalf—for after the departure of the Belgae he had dismissed the forces of the Haedui and returned to Caesar:

SECTION 2.14.2
The Bellovaci had always been loyal friends of the Haeduan state;

SECTION 2.14.3
they had been incited by their chiefs, who claimed that the Haedui had been reduced to slavery by Caesar and were enduring every kind of indignity and insult, and so had revolted from the Haedui and made war on the Roman people.

SECTION 2.14.4
The leaders of that policy, realizing what a great calamity they had brought upon their state, had fled to Britain.

SECTION 2.14.5
Not only the Bellovaci but also the Haedui on their behalf begged Caesar to exercise his accustomed clemency and forbearance toward them.

SECTION 2.14.6
If he did so, he would increase the authority of the Haedui among all the Belgae, by whose auxiliary troops and resources they had customarily sustained themselves whenever wars arose.

CHAPTER 2.15

SECTION 2.15.1
Out of regard for Diviciacus and the Haedui, Caesar said that he would receive the Bellovaci under his protection and preserve them; but because their state possessed great authority among the Belgae and surpassed them in population, he demanded six hundred hostages.

SECTION 2.15.2
After these had been delivered and all the weapons in the town surrendered, he proceeded from that place into the territory of the Ambiani, who without delay surrendered themselves and all their possessions.

SECTION 2.15.3
The Nervii bordered upon their territory. When Caesar inquired into the character and customs of that people, he learned the following:

SECTION 2.15.4
Merchants were allowed no access to them; they permitted no wine or other articles tending toward luxury to be imported, because they believed that such things weakened their spirits and diminished their courage;

SECTION 2.15.5
they were a fierce people of great valor; they bitterly reproached and accused the other Belgae for surrendering to the Roman people and casting aside their ancestral courage;

SECTION 2.15.6
and they firmly declared that they would neither send envoys nor accept any terms of peace.

CHAPTER 2.16

SECTION 2.16.1
After marching for three days through their territory, Caesar learned from prisoners that the river Sabis was no more than ten miles from his camp;

SECTION 2.16.2
that all the Nervii had taken up their position beyond that river and were awaiting the arrival of the Romans there, together with the Atrebates and Viromandui, their neighbors

SECTION 2.16.3
—for they had persuaded both these peoples to share the same fortune in war—;

SECTION 2.16.4
that the forces of the Atuatuci were also expected by them and were on the march;

SECTION 2.16.5
and that they had gathered the women and all who seemed too young or too old to fight in a place to which an army had no access because of the marshes.

CHAPTER 2.17

SECTION 2.17.1
On learning these facts, Caesar sent scouts and centurions ahead to select a suitable site for a camp.

SECTION 2.17.2
A considerable number of the surrendered Belgae and other Gauls were following Caesar and marching with him. Some of these, as was later learned from prisoners, had observed the army’s customary order of march during those days, and went by night to the Nervii. They explained that a great mass of baggage came between each legion and the next, and that there would be no difficulty, once the first legion had reached the campsite while the other legions were still a long way off, in attacking it while it was burdened with its packs;

SECTION 2.17.3
once it had been driven off and the baggage plundered, the remaining legions would not dare to stand against them.

SECTION 2.17.4
The plan of those who brought this information was also aided by the fact that from ancient times the Nervii, having no strength in cavalry—for even to this day they pay no attention to that arm, but all the power they possess lies in their infantry—had sought to obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors more easily if they entered their territory for the sake of plunder. They cut into young trees and bent them over, and, as numerous branches grew out sideways, interwove brambles and thornbushes among them, creating hedges that afforded protection like a wall, through which it was impossible not merely to enter but even to see.

SECTION 2.17.5
Since these obstacles impeded the march of our column, the Nervii decided that they must not let the proposed opportunity pass.

CHAPTER 2.18

SECTION 2.18.1
The nature of the ground our men had selected for the camp was as follows. From its summit a hill sloped evenly down toward the river Sabis, which we mentioned above.

SECTION 2.18.2
From that river another hill rose with a like ascent, facing and opposite the first. Its lower part was open for about two hundred paces, but its upper part was wooded, so that it was not easy to see into its interior.

SECTION 2.18.3
The enemy kept themselves concealed within those woods. In the open ground along the river a few cavalry outposts were visible. The river was about three feet deep.

CHAPTER 2.19

SECTION 2.19.1
Caesar had sent the cavalry ahead and was following with all his forces, but the arrangement and order of his column differed from what the Belgae had reported to the Nervii.

SECTION 2.19.2
For as he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, in accordance with his custom, was leading six legions unencumbered by baggage;

SECTION 2.19.3
behind them he had placed the baggage of the entire army; then the two legions most recently levied closed the whole column and guarded the baggage.

SECTION 2.19.4
Our cavalry, together with the slingers and archers, crossed the river and engaged the enemy’s cavalry.

SECTION 2.19.5
The enemy repeatedly withdrew to their own men in the woods and then charged our men again from the forest, while our men did not dare to pursue them in retreat beyond the point where the open ground extended. Meanwhile the six legions that had arrived first marked out the work and began to fortify the camp.

SECTION 2.19.6
As soon as the first part of our army’s baggage was sighted by those who lay hidden in the woods—the moment they had agreed upon for beginning the battle—the enemy, who had formed their battle line and ranks within the forest and steeled themselves for the attack, suddenly rushed forth with all their forces and charged our cavalry.

SECTION 2.19.7
Having easily driven and scattered them, they ran down to the river with incredible speed, so that the enemy seemed almost at the same instant to be at the woods, in the river, and already upon us.

SECTION 2.19.8
With the same speed they pressed uphill toward our camp and against the men occupied with the fortifications.

CHAPTER 2.20

SECTION 2.20.1
Caesar had to do everything at once: the battle flag had to be displayed, the signal for the men to run to arms; the trumpet call had to be sounded; the soldiers had to be recalled from the work; those who had gone a little farther away to fetch materials for the rampart had to be summoned back; the battle line had to be formed; the soldiers had to be exhorted; and the signal for battle had to be given.

SECTION 2.20.2
The shortness of the time and the enemy’s assault prevented a large part of these measures from being carried out.

SECTION 2.20.3
Two things offered relief amid these difficulties: the knowledge and experience of the soldiers, who, trained in earlier battles, could prescribe for themselves what had to be done no less ably than others could instruct them; and Caesar’s order that each lieutenant remain with his respective legion at the work until the camp had been fortified.

SECTION 2.20.4
Because of the enemy’s nearness and speed, these officers no longer waited for commands from Caesar but carried out on their own whatever measures seemed best.

CHAPTER 2.21

SECTION 2.21.1
After issuing the necessary commands, Caesar ran down to exhort the soldiers in whatever quarter chance presented and came to the Tenth Legion.

SECTION 2.21.2
He exhorted the soldiers in no longer a speech than to remember their former valor, not to lose heart, and stoutly to withstand the enemy’s assault;

SECTION 2.21.3
and because the enemy was no farther away than the distance to which a missile could be hurled, he gave the signal to begin battle.

SECTION 2.21.4
Then, as he went to another part of the line for the same purpose of exhortation, he found the men already fighting.

SECTION 2.21.5
So little time was available, and the enemy’s spirit was so ready for combat, that there was no time not only to fasten on their insignia but even to put on their helmets and strip the coverings from their shields.

SECTION 2.21.6
Each man took his stand in whatever part of the line he happened to reach from the work and beside whatever standards he first caught sight of, lest he lose time for fighting in searching for his own unit.

CHAPTER 2.22

SECTION 2.22.1
The army was drawn up more as the nature of the ground, the slope of the hill, and the urgency of the moment demanded than as military method and order required. The legions were separated, each resisting the enemy in a different quarter, while the extremely dense hedges described above obstructed the view; therefore no fixed reserves could be posted, no provision could be made for what was needed in each part of the field, and all commands could not be directed by a single man.

SECTION 2.22.2
Accordingly, amid such unfavorable circumstances, the turns of fortune were also varied.

CHAPTER 2.23

SECTION 2.23.1
The soldiers of the Ninth and Tenth Legions, who had taken their stand on the left of the battle line, hurled their pila and swiftly drove the Atrebates—for that was the enemy assigned to their part of the field—down from the higher ground into the river, exhausted and breathless from their run and covered with wounds. Our men pursued them as they attempted to cross and killed with their swords a great part of them while they were struggling in the water.

SECTION 2.23.2
They themselves did not hesitate to cross the river, and though they advanced onto unfavorable ground, they renewed the battle when the enemy again made a stand and put them to flight.

SECTION 2.23.3
Likewise, in another part of the field, two separated legions, the Eleventh and the Eighth, routed the Viromandui, with whom they had engaged, and fought their way down from the higher ground to the very banks of the river.

SECTION 2.23.4
But almost the whole camp had been left exposed in front and on the left. The Twelfth Legion was posted on the right wing, with the Seventh at no great distance from it, and all the Nervii, in a densely packed column under the leadership of Boduognatus, who held the supreme command, hastened toward that point. Some of them began to surround the legions on their exposed flank, while others made for the highest part of the camp.

CHAPTER 2.24

SECTION 2.24.1
At the same time our cavalry and lightly armed infantry, who had been with them and whom I said had been driven back by the enemy’s first assault, encountered the enemy face-to-face as they withdrew into camp and once more fled in another direction;

SECTION 2.24.2
and the camp servants, who from the rear gate and the summit of the ridge had seen our victorious troops crossing the river and had gone out to plunder, looked back and saw the enemy moving about within our camp, whereupon they hurled themselves headlong into flight.

SECTION 2.24.3
At the same moment a clamor and uproar arose among those arriving with the baggage, and in terror they rushed in every direction.

SECTION 2.24.4 Moved by all these circumstances, the Treveran cavalry—whose reputation for valor is unrivaled among the Gauls, and who had been sent by their state to Caesar as auxiliaries—when they saw our camp filling with a multitude of enemies, the legions hard pressed and held almost completely surrounded, and the camp servants, cavalry, slingers, and Numidians fleeing apart and scattered in every direction, despaired of our fortunes and hastened home.

SECTION 2.24.5 They reported to their state that the Romans had been routed and defeated and that the enemy had gained possession of their camp and baggage.

CHAPTER 2.25

SECTION 2.25.1 Caesar, leaving his exhortation of the Tenth Legion and proceeding to the right wing, saw that his men were being hard pressed; that, with the standards brought together in one place, the soldiers of the Twelfth Legion were so densely packed that they hindered one another in fighting; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort had been killed, its standard-bearer slain, and its standard lost; that nearly all the centurions of the remaining cohorts had been either wounded or killed, among them the chief centurion, Publius Sextius Baculus, a man of exceptional courage, who had been disabled by many severe wounds and could no longer support himself; that the rest were losing heart, while some in the rear were abandoning their posts, withdrawing from the battle, and avoiding the missiles; that the enemy, advancing uphill from the lower ground, did not slacken their frontal attack and were pressing hard on both flanks; and that the situation had become critical, with no reserve available to be sent forward.

SECTION 2.25.2 Since he himself had come there without a shield, he took one from a soldier in the rear and advanced into the front line. Addressing the centurions by name and encouraging the remaining soldiers, he ordered them to advance the standards and open out the maniples so that they could use their swords more readily.

SECTION 2.25.3 His arrival gave the soldiers hope and restored their courage. Since every man, even in this extremity, was eager to do his utmost under the eyes of his commander, the enemy’s assault was checked for a time.

CHAPTER 2.26

SECTION 2.26.1 When Caesar saw that the Seventh Legion, which had taken its stand nearby, was likewise being hard pressed by the enemy, he instructed the military tribunes to bring the legions gradually together and, wheeling about, to advance their standards against the enemy.

SECTION 2.26.2 Once this was done, each body supported the other, and, no longer fearing that they would be surrounded from behind by the enemy, they began to resist more boldly and fight more vigorously.

SECTION 2.26.3 Meanwhile, the soldiers of the two legions that had been guarding the baggage at the rear of the column, upon receiving word of the battle, broke into a run and came into the enemy’s view on the summit of the hill;

SECTION 2.26.4 and Titus Labienus, having taken possession of the enemy’s camp and observed from the higher ground what was happening in our own, sent the Tenth Legion to the assistance of our men.

SECTION 2.26.5 From the flight of the cavalry and camp servants, the soldiers learned the state of affairs, the position of the battle, and the grave danger threatening the camp, the legions, and the commander; and they spared no effort to increase their speed.

CHAPTER 2.27

SECTION 2.27.1 Their arrival brought about so great a change in fortune that even those of our men who had fallen, disabled by their wounds, propped themselves upon their shields and renewed the fight, while the camp servants, seeing the enemy terrified, attacked armed men even though they themselves were unarmed;

SECTION 2.27.2 and the cavalry, determined to wipe out the disgrace of their flight by valor, everywhere in the battle sought to surpass the legionaries.

SECTION 2.27.3 But the enemy, even when their last hope of safety was gone, displayed such courage that, when their front ranks had fallen, those nearest stepped upon the bodies of the dead and fought from atop them;

SECTION 2.27.4 and when these too had been struck down and the corpses lay heaped together, the survivors used the pile as a mound from which to hurl missiles at our men and catch our javelins and throw them back.

SECTION 2.27.5 Thus it must be judged that men of such courage had not without reason dared to cross a very broad river, climb its exceedingly high banks, and advance over ground of the greatest disadvantage: their greatness of spirit had made the most difficult undertakings easy.

CHAPTER 2.28

SECTION 2.28.1 After this battle had been fought and the people and name of the Nervii had been reduced almost to annihilation, the elders—who, as we have said, had been gathered with the women and children in the tidal marshes and swamps—received news of the battle and concluded that nothing could hinder the victors and that nowhere was safe for the defeated.

SECTION 2.28.2 With the unanimous consent of all who survived, they sent envoys to Caesar and surrendered to him. In recounting the calamity that had befallen their state, they said that their six hundred senators had been reduced to three, and that of sixty thousand men able to bear arms scarcely five hundred remained.

SECTION 2.28.3 Caesar, wishing it to appear that he had shown mercy toward the wretched and suppliant people, took the greatest care to preserve them, ordered them to continue in possession of their own territory and towns, and commanded their neighbors to restrain themselves and their dependents from injury and outrage against them.

CHAPTER 2.29

SECTION 2.29.1 The Atuatuci, of whom we have spoken above, were coming with all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii; but when news of this battle reached them, they turned back from their march and returned home.

SECTION 2.29.2 Abandoning all their towns and strongholds, they gathered all their possessions into a single town exceptionally well fortified by nature.

SECTION 2.29.3 On every side around it this town had very high cliffs and steep descents, except at one point, where there remained a gently sloping approach no more than two hundred feet wide. This place they had fortified with an exceedingly high double wall, and they were then placing stones of great weight and sharpened timbers upon the wall.

SECTION 2.29.4 They themselves were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones, who, when making their way into our Province and Italy, had left on this side of the Rhine the baggage they could neither drive nor carry with them, and had also left six thousand of their own men together to guard and defend it.

SECTION 2.29.5 For many years after the destruction of their countrymen, these men were harried by the neighboring peoples, at one time making war upon them and at another defending themselves against their attacks. At last, after peace had been concluded by common consent among them all, they chose this place for their dwelling.

CHAPTER 2.30

SECTION 2.30.1 At the first arrival of our army, they made frequent sorties from the town and engaged our men in minor skirmishes.

SECTION 2.30.2 Later, when they had been enclosed by a rampart twelve feet high, extending for fifteen miles around them and strengthened by numerous redoubts, they kept within the town.

SECTION 2.30.3 When they saw the covered galleries being advanced, the siege mound being constructed, and a tower being erected at a distance, they at first laughed from the wall and assailed us with taunts, because so vast a machine was being built so far away:

SECTION 2.30.4 with what hands or with what strength, they asked, could men of such puny stature hope to place a tower of so enormous a weight upon their wall? For because of their own great bodily size, the Gauls generally hold our shortness of stature in contempt.

CHAPTER 2.31

SECTION 2.31.1 But when they saw the tower moving and approaching their walls, they were struck by the strange and unfamiliar sight and sent envoys to Caesar to sue for peace. These spoke as follows:

SECTION 2.31.2 they did not believe that the Romans could wage war without divine assistance, since they were able to move forward machines of such great height with such speed;

SECTION 2.31.3 and they said that they entrusted themselves and all they possessed to Roman power.

SECTION 2.31.4 They had only one request and entreaty: if Caesar, in accordance with the clemency and humanity of which they had heard from others, should decide that the Atuatuci were to be spared, he should not strip them of their arms.

SECTION 2.31.5 Nearly all their neighbors were their enemies and envied their valor; if they surrendered their arms, they would be unable to defend themselves against them.

SECTION 2.31.6 If they were to be reduced to such a condition, it would be better for them to suffer any fate at the hands of the Roman people than to be tortured to death by those over whom they had been accustomed to rule.

CHAPTER 2.32

SECTION 2.32.1 To this Caesar replied that, more from his own customary practice than from any merit of theirs, he would preserve their state, provided they surrendered before the battering ram touched their wall;

SECTION 2.32.2 but there could be no terms of surrender unless their arms were handed over. He would do what he had done in the case of the Nervii and would command their neighbors not to inflict any injury upon those who had surrendered to the Roman people.

SECTION 2.32.3 When this answer had been reported to their people, they said that they would obey his commands.

SECTION 2.32.4 A great quantity of arms was thrown from the wall into the ditch before the town, so that the heaps of weapons rose almost to the height of the top of the wall and the siege mound. Nevertheless, as was later discovered, approximately a third had been concealed and retained within the town. The gates were opened, and for that day they enjoyed peace.

CHAPTER 2.33

SECTION 2.33.1 Toward evening Caesar ordered the gates to be closed and the soldiers to leave the town, so that the townspeople might suffer no injury from them during the night.

SECTION 2.33.2 The Atuatuci had previously formed a plan, as was afterward learned, because they believed that once their surrender had been accepted, our men would withdraw their guards or at least keep watch less carefully. Some took the weapons they had retained and concealed; others carried shields made of bark or woven wicker, which, as the shortness of time required, they had hastily covered with hides. During the third watch, at the point where the ascent to our fortifications seemed least difficult, they suddenly made a sortie from the town with all their forces.

SECTION 2.33.3 Fires were immediately kindled as signals, in accordance with Caesar’s previous orders, and men hurried to the spot from the nearest redoubts.

SECTION 2.33.4 The enemy fought as fiercely as brave men, with their last hope of safety at stake and on unfavorable ground, were bound to fight against troops hurling missiles from the rampart and towers, when all hope depended upon valor alone.

SECTION 2.33.5 About four thousand of them were killed, and the remainder were driven back into the town.

SECTION 2.33.6 On the following day, when the gates had been broken down and no one remained to defend them, our soldiers were admitted, and Caesar sold the entire population and property of the town at auction.

SECTION 2.33.7 The purchasers reported to him that the number of persons sold was fifty-three thousand.

CHAPTER 2.34

SECTION 2.34.1 At the same time Caesar was informed by Publius Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion against the Veneti, Venelli, Osismi, Coriosolites, Esuvii, Aulerci, and Redones—maritime states bordering upon the Ocean—that all those states had been brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people.

CHAPTER 2.35

SECTION 2.35.1 With these achievements completed and all Gaul pacified, so great a reputation for this war spread among the barbarians that nations dwelling beyond the Rhine sent embassies to Caesar, promising to give hostages and carry out his commands.

SECTION 2.35.2 Since Caesar was hastening to Italy and Illyricum, he ordered these embassies to return to him at the beginning of the following summer.

SECTION 2.35.3 He himself placed the legions in winter quarters among the Carnutes, Andes, Turoni, and the other states near the regions where he had waged war, and then departed for Italy.

SECTION 2.35.4 In consequence of these achievements, upon receipt of Caesar’s dispatches, the Senate decreed a thanksgiving of fifteen days, an honor that before this time had been granted to no one.

### Book 3

CHAPTER 3.1

SECTION 3.1.1 When Caesar was departing for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the Twelfth Legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, whose territory extends from the frontiers of the Allobroges, Lake Geneva, and the Rhône River to the highest Alps.

SECTION 3.1.2 His reason for sending him was that he wished the route through the Alps—by which merchants had been accustomed to travel at great risk and under heavy tolls—to be opened.

SECTION 3.1.3 He authorized Galba, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion in that region for the winter.

SECTION 3.1.4 After fighting several successful engagements and storming a number of their strongholds, Galba received envoys from every quarter, accepted hostages, and concluded peace. He then decided to station two cohorts among the Nantuates and to winter in a village of the Veragri called Octodurus with the remaining cohorts of that legion.

SECTION 3.1.5 This village lies in a valley of no great extent, with a small plain adjoining it, and is enclosed on every side by exceedingly high mountains.

SECTION 3.1.6 Since a river divided the village into two parts, Galba granted one part to the Gauls for their winter quarters and assigned to his cohorts the other, which they had vacated. He fortified this position with a rampart and ditch.

CHAPTER 3.2

SECTION 3.2.1 After a number of days had passed in winter quarters and Galba had ordered grain to be brought there, scouts suddenly informed him that during the night all the Gauls had departed from the part of the village he had granted them, and that the overhanging mountains were occupied by an immense multitude of Seduni and Veragri.

SECTION 3.2.2 Several reasons had led the Gauls suddenly to form a plan to renew the war and overwhelm the legion.

SECTION 3.2.3 First, they despised the legion because of its small numbers: it was not even at full strength, since two cohorts had been detached and many individual soldiers sent out to obtain supplies were absent.

SECTION 3.2.4 Furthermore, owing to the disadvantage of the Romans’ position, they believed that when they themselves rushed down from the mountains into the valley and hurled their missiles, not even their first assault could be withstood.

SECTION 3.2.5 In addition, they resented that their children had been taken from them under the name of hostages, and they were convinced that the Romans were attempting to occupy the summits of the Alps not merely to secure passage but to possess them permanently and annex that region to the neighboring Province.

CHAPTER 3.3

SECTION 3.3.1 Upon receiving this information, Galba found that neither the construction of the winter camp nor its fortifications had been fully completed, and that no adequate provision had been made for grain and other supplies, because, after the surrender and the acceptance of hostages, he had believed there was no reason to fear war. He therefore summoned a council without delay and began asking for opinions.

SECTION 3.3.2 In this council, since so great and sudden a danger had arisen contrary to all expectation, nearly all the higher ground could already be seen filled with a multitude of armed men, and, because the roads had been cut off, neither reinforcements could reach them nor supplies be brought in,

SECTION 3.3.3 their safety was almost despaired of, and some proposed that they abandon the baggage, make a sortie, and strive to escape by the same roads along which they had come.

SECTION 3.3.4 The majority, however, favored reserving this plan for the last extremity and meanwhile awaiting the outcome of events and defending the camp.

CHAPTER 3.4

SECTION 3.4.1 After only a brief interval—scarcely enough time to arrange and carry out the measures they had decided upon—the enemy, at a given signal, rushed down from every direction and hurled stones and javelins against the rampart.

SECTION 3.4.2 At first, while their strength was unimpaired, our men defended the fortifications bravely and hurled no missile ineffectually from their higher position. Whenever any part of the camp, stripped of defenders, appeared to be under pressure, they hurried there and brought assistance.

SECTION 3.4.3 But in this respect they were at a disadvantage: whenever the enemy grew weary in the long struggle, they withdrew from the battle and others took their place with strength unimpaired.

SECTION 3.4.4 Because of their small numbers, our men could do nothing of the kind. Not only was the weary soldier given no opportunity to withdraw from the fight, but even the wounded man was unable to leave the place where he had taken his stand and retire to safety.

CHAPTER 3.5

SECTION 3.5.1 By now the fighting had continued without interruption for more than six hours, and our men were running short not only of strength but also of missiles. The enemy pressed their attack more fiercely and, as our men grew weaker, began to tear down the rampart and fill the ditches. The situation had now been brought to the last extremity.

SECTION 3.5.2 Publius Sextius Baculus, chief centurion—the man whom we have said was disabled by numerous wounds in the battle against the Nervii—and Gaius Volusenus, a military tribune of great judgment and courage, hurried to Galba and told him that there was only one hope of safety: they must make a sortie and try this last resort.

SECTION 3.5.3
Accordingly, he quickly summoned the centurions and instructed the soldiers to break off the fighting for a short time, merely intercept the missiles hurled at them, and recover from their exertions; then, when the signal was given, they were to burst from the camp and place all hope of safety in their courage.

CHAPTER 3.6

SECTION 3.6.1
They did as they were ordered, and, suddenly sallying from every gate, left the enemy no chance either to understand what was happening or to rally.

SECTION 3.6.2
Thus, with fortune reversed, they surrounded on every side and cut down the men who had come in the hope of taking the camp; and of the more than thirty thousand barbarians known to have approached it, they killed over a third, threw the rest into a panic and routed them, and did not allow them to make a stand even on the higher ground.

SECTION 3.6.3
Thus, after routing the enemy’s entire force and stripping it of its arms, they withdrew within their own fortifications.

SECTION 3.6.4
After this battle, Galba was unwilling to put fortune to the test again and remembered that he had entered winter quarters with a different plan, only to find himself confronted by different circumstances. Moved above all by the shortage of grain and provisions, he burned every building in that village the next day and hastened to return to the Province;

SECTION 3.6.5
and with no enemy barring or delaying his march, he led the legion safely into the territory of the Nantuates, and from there into that of the Allobroges, where he wintered.

CHAPTER 3.7

SECTION 3.7.1
After these events, Caesar believed for every reason that Gaul had been pacified—the Belgae had been overcome, the Germans driven out, and the Seduni defeated in the Alps—and so, at the beginning of winter, he had departed for Illyricum, wishing to visit those peoples also and become acquainted with their countries, when war suddenly broke out in Gaul.

SECTION 3.7.2
The cause of this war was as follows. The young Publius Crassus was wintering with the Seventh Legion among the Andes, near the Ocean.

SECTION 3.7.3
Because grain was scarce in those parts, he sent several prefects and military tribunes into the neighboring states to obtain it;

SECTION 3.7.4
among them Titus Terrasidius was sent to the Esuvii, Marcus Trebius Gallus to the Coriosolites, and Quintus Velanius together with Titus Silius to the Veneti.

CHAPTER 3.8

SECTION 3.8.1
The state of the Veneti possessed by far the greatest authority along the entire seacoast of those regions, both because they had more ships than any other people, in which they were accustomed to sail to Britain, and because they surpassed all others in their knowledge and experience of seamanship. Moreover, along that stormy and exposed coast, where harbors were few and far between and all were in their possession, they made tributaries of nearly everyone accustomed to navigate those waters.

SECTION 3.8.2
They took the initiative by detaining Silius and Velanius, believing that through them they would recover the hostages they had given Crassus.

SECTION 3.8.3
Influenced by their authority, the neighboring peoples—with the sudden and impulsive decision characteristic of the Gauls—detained Trebius and Terrasidius for the same reason. They swiftly sent envoys through their leading men and swore among themselves that they would act only by common agreement and would all endure the same outcome of fortune;

SECTION 3.8.4
and they urged the remaining states to choose to preserve the liberty inherited from their ancestors rather than endure servitude to Rome.

SECTION 3.8.5
When they had quickly brought the entire seacoast over to their view, they sent a joint embassy to Publius Crassus: if he wished to recover his men, he must return their hostages to them.

CHAPTER 3.9

SECTION 3.9.1
When Caesar was informed of these events by Crassus, he was himself at a considerable distance; in the meantime, therefore, he ordered warships to be built on the Liger, which flows into the Ocean, rowers to be levied from the Province, and sailors and helmsmen to be procured.

SECTION 3.9.2
These arrangements were carried out rapidly, and as soon as the season permitted, Caesar himself hastened to the army.

SECTION 3.9.3
When the Veneti and the other states learned of Caesar’s arrival, they understood at the same time the enormity of the crime they had committed: they had detained envoys—a title always held sacred and inviolable among every nation—and cast them into chains. They therefore began to prepare for war in proportion to the magnitude of the danger and, above all, to provide everything required for the use of their ships, with all the greater hope because they placed great confidence in the natural character of their country.

SECTION 3.9.4
They knew that the land routes were broken by tidal inlets and that navigation was hindered by unfamiliarity with the region and by the scarcity of harbors;

SECTION 3.9.5
and they were confident that our armies could not remain long among them because of the shortage of grain.

SECTION 3.9.6
Even if everything should turn out contrary to their expectations, they were nevertheless very powerful in ships, while the Romans had no fleet at all and knew neither the shallows, harbors, nor islands of the region where they were about to wage war;

SECTION 3.9.7
and they clearly understood that navigation on an enclosed sea was far different from navigation on the vast and wholly exposed Ocean.

SECTION 3.9.8
Having adopted these plans, they fortified their towns,

SECTION 3.9.9
carried grain from the fields into the towns, and assembled as many ships as they could in the country of the Veneti, where it was known that Caesar would first wage war.

SECTION 3.9.10
They enlisted as allies for that war the Osismi, Lexovii, Namnetes, Ambiliati, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii, and summoned reinforcements from Britain, which lies opposite those regions.

CHAPTER 3.10

SECTION 3.10.1
These were the difficulties of conducting the war that we have described above; nevertheless, many considerations impelled Caesar to undertake it:

SECTION 3.10.2
the outrage of detaining Roman knights, the renewal of rebellion after surrender, the revolt after hostages had been given, the conspiracy of so many states, and, above all, the fear that if he neglected this quarter, the remaining nations would suppose that they too were free to act in the same way.

SECTION 3.10.3
Accordingly, since he understood that nearly all the Gauls were eager for revolution and were readily and swiftly roused to war—and that all men by nature desire liberty and hate the condition of servitude—he thought that, before more states could conspire together, he must divide his army and distribute it more widely.

CHAPTER 3.11

SECTION 3.11.1
Accordingly, he sent his lieutenant Titus Labienus with the cavalry to the Treveri, who live nearest the Rhine.

SECTION 3.11.2
He instructed him to visit the Remi and the other Belgae and keep them loyal, and to prevent the Germans—who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae as reinforcements—from crossing the river in boats by force, should they attempt it.

SECTION 3.11.3
He ordered Publius Crassus to depart for Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a large body of cavalry, to prevent reinforcements from those nations from being sent into Gaul and such powerful peoples from joining together.

SECTION 3.11.4
He sent his lieutenant Quintus Titurius Sabinus with three legions among the Venelli, Coriosolites, and Lexovii, to see that their forces were kept occupied.

SECTION 3.11.5
He placed the young Decimus Brutus in command of the fleet and of the Gallic ships he had ordered to assemble from the Pictones, Santoni, and the other pacified regions, and instructed him to set out against the Veneti as soon as he could. Caesar himself hastened there with the land forces.

CHAPTER 3.12

SECTION 3.12.1
The towns were generally situated in such a manner that, built at the extremities of narrow spits and promontories, they could not be approached on foot when the tide had surged in from the open sea—an event that always occurs twice in the space of twelve hours—nor by ships, because when the tide ebbed again, the vessels would be stranded in the shallows.

SECTION 3.12.2
Thus in both ways the assault upon the towns was obstructed.

SECTION 3.12.3
And if at any time they happened to be overcome by the magnitude of our works—when the sea had been shut out by a causeway and massive embankments, and these had been raised to the height of the town walls—and began to despair of their fortunes, they brought in a great number of ships, of which they had the utmost abundance, carried away all their possessions, and withdrew to the nearest towns.

SECTION 3.12.4
There they once more defended themselves with the same advantages of position.

SECTION 3.12.5
They were able to do this more readily through a great part of the summer because our ships were held back by storms, and navigation on that vast and exposed sea, with its powerful tides and its rare and almost nonexistent harbors, was exceedingly difficult.

CHAPTER 3.13

SECTION 3.13.1
Their own ships were built and equipped in the following manner: the keels were considerably flatter than those of our vessels, so that they could more readily endure the shallows and the ebbing tide;

SECTION 3.13.2
the prows were extremely high, and the sterns likewise, adapted to the great size of the waves and the violence of the storms;

SECTION 3.13.3
the ships were built entirely of oak, to withstand any degree of force and battering;

SECTION 3.13.4
the crossbeams were made of timbers a foot thick and fastened with iron spikes as thick as a man’s thumb;

SECTION 3.13.5
the anchors were secured with iron chains instead of ropes;

SECTION 3.13.6
and in place of sails they used hides and thin, finely dressed leather—whether from a scarcity of flax and ignorance of its use, or, more probably, because they believed that ordinary sails could not conveniently withstand such fierce storms of the Ocean and such violent blasts of wind, or control ships of such great weight.

SECTION 3.13.7
When our fleet encountered these ships, it held the advantage only in speed and in the impulse of the oars; in all other respects, the enemy’s vessels were better suited and adapted to the nature of the waters and the violence of the storms.

SECTION 3.13.8
Our ships could not damage them with their rams, so great was their strength; because of their height, a missile could not easily be hurled onto them; and for the same reason they were less easily held by grappling hooks.

SECTION 3.13.9
Moreover, when the wind began to rage and they yielded themselves to it, they could weather the storm more easily, rest more safely in the shallows, and, when left aground by the tide, had nothing to fear from rocks and reefs—all hazards that our ships had to dread.

CHAPTER 3.14

SECTION 3.14.1
After capturing several towns, Caesar realized that so much toil was being spent in vain: the enemy’s flight could not be checked by taking their towns, nor could any injury be done to them. He therefore resolved to wait for the fleet.

SECTION 3.14.2
When it had assembled and was first sighted by the enemy, about two hundred and twenty of their ships, fully prepared and splendidly equipped with every kind of armament, sailed out of the harbor and took position facing ours.

SECTION 3.14.3
Neither Brutus, who commanded the fleet, nor the military tribunes and centurions to whom individual ships had been assigned were entirely certain what to do or what method of battle to adopt.

SECTION 3.14.4
They knew that the enemy could not be harmed by the ram; and although towers had been raised on our ships, these were still overtopped by the lofty sterns of the barbarians’ vessels, so that our missiles could not conveniently be hurled from the lower position, while those cast by the Gauls struck with greater force.

SECTION 3.14.5
One device prepared by our men proved highly useful: extremely sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon long poles, resembling in form the hooks used in attacking walls.

SECTION 3.14.6
With these, they caught and pulled taut the ropes that bound the yards to the masts; then, as the ship was driven forward by the oars, the ropes were snapped.

SECTION 3.14.7
Once they were severed, the yards necessarily fell, and since all the hope of the Gallic ships depended upon their sails and rigging, when these were torn away, the ships were rendered entirely useless in an instant.

SECTION 3.14.8
The rest of the contest depended upon courage, in which our soldiers easily held the advantage, all the more because the action was fought in full view of Caesar and the entire army, so that no deed of exceptional bravery could pass unnoticed;

SECTION 3.14.9
for the army occupied all the hills and higher ground from which there was a close view down upon the sea.

CHAPTER 3.15

SECTION 3.15.1
Once the yards had been brought down, as we have described, two or three of our ships surrounded each enemy vessel, and the soldiers strove with all their might to board it.

SECTION 3.15.2
When the barbarians saw what was happening, and several of their ships had been captured, they could find no remedy for the danger and endeavored to seek safety in flight.

SECTION 3.15.3
But just as they had turned their ships in the direction toward which the wind was carrying them, so sudden a calm and stillness arose that they could not move from the spot.

SECTION 3.15.4
This circumstance afforded the greatest possible opportunity to finish the action;

SECTION 3.15.5
for our men pursued and captured the ships one by one, so that only a very few of the entire number reached land under cover of night, although the battle had lasted from about the fourth hour until sunset.

CHAPTER 3.16

SECTION 3.16.1
By this battle the war with the Veneti and the entire seacoast was brought to an end.

SECTION 3.16.2
For not only had all the young men assembled there, but also all the older men who possessed any judgment or distinction; and they had gathered in one place every ship they had anywhere possessed.

SECTION 3.16.3
With these lost, the survivors had neither any place to which they could retreat nor any means of defending their towns.

SECTION 3.16.4
Accordingly, they surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar. He resolved to punish them with particular severity, so that in the future the rights of envoys might be observed more scrupulously by the barbarians. He therefore put the entire senate to death and sold the rest at auction.

CHAPTER 3.17

SECTION 3.17.1
While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Quintus Titurius Sabinus reached the territory of the Venelli with the forces he had received from Caesar.

SECTION 3.17.2
Viridovix commanded them and held supreme authority over all the states that had revolted, from which he had raised an army and powerful forces.

SECTION 3.17.3
Within the past few days, moreover, the Aulerci Eburovices and the Lexovii had killed their own senates because they had refused to support the war, closed their gates, and joined Viridovix.

SECTION 3.17.4
In addition, a great multitude of desperate men and brigands had assembled from every part of Gaul, drawn away from agriculture and their daily labor by the hope of plunder and eagerness for war.

SECTION 3.17.5
Sabinus kept within his camp, which occupied a position advantageous in every respect, while Viridovix had encamped opposite him at a distance of two miles and daily led out his forces and offered battle. Thus Sabinus had by now not only fallen into contempt among the enemy, but was also subjected to some reproach in the talk of our own soldiers;

SECTION 3.17.6
and he created so strong an impression of fear that the enemy now dared to approach the very rampart of the camp.

SECTION 3.17.7
He acted in this way because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage so great a multitude of enemies—especially in the absence of the commander holding supreme authority—unless he could fight on equal ground or some favorable opportunity arose.

CHAPTER 3.18

SECTION 3.18.1
When this impression of fear had become firmly established, he selected a suitable and shrewd man, a Gaul, from among those whom he had with him as auxiliaries.

SECTION 3.18.2
By promises of great rewards, he persuaded this man to go over to the enemy and instructed him in what he wished done.

SECTION 3.18.3
When the man came among them posing as a deserter, he described the Romans’ fear and explained the desperate straits in which Caesar himself was being pressed by the Veneti;

SECTION 3.18.4
and he declared that no later than the following night Sabinus would secretly lead his army out of camp and set off to bring aid to Caesar.

SECTION 3.18.5
When this was heard, they all cried out that the opportunity for a successful action must not be allowed to escape:

SECTION 3.18.6
they must march upon the camp. Many considerations urged the Gauls toward this decision: Sabinus’s hesitation during the preceding days, the deserter’s assurance, the shortage of provisions, for which they had made insufficient preparation, their hopes concerning the war against the Veneti, and the fact that men generally are eager to believe what they desire.

SECTION 3.18.7
Influenced by these arguments, they refused to dismiss Viridovix and the other leaders from the council until they had agreed to take up arms and march against the camp.

SECTION 3.18.8
When this was granted, they joyfully set out for the camp, as though victory were already assured, gathering bundles of brushwood and twigs with which to fill the Roman trenches.

CHAPTER 3.19

SECTION 3.19.1
The camp stood on high ground, rising gradually from the plain for about a mile. They rushed toward it at full speed, so as to give the Romans as little time as possible to assemble and arm themselves, and arrived utterly exhausted.

SECTION 3.19.2
Sabinus exhorted his men and, eager as they were, gave the signal. While the enemy were encumbered by the loads they carried, he ordered a sudden sortie from two gates.

SECTION 3.19.3
The advantage of the ground, the enemy’s ignorance and exhaustion, the courage of our soldiers, and the experience they had gained in earlier battles combined to make the enemy unable to withstand even our first charge; they immediately turned and fled.

SECTION 3.19.4
Our soldiers, still fresh and unencumbered, overtook them and killed a great number; the cavalry pursued the rest and left only a few who escaped from the rout.

SECTION 3.19.5
Thus at the same time Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of Sabinus’s victory, and all the states immediately surrendered to Titurius.

SECTION 3.19.6
For just as the spirit of the Gauls is ardent and eager in undertaking wars, so their resolution is weak and offers scarcely any resistance when they must endure disaster.

CHAPTER 3.20

SECTION 3.20.1
At about the same time, Publius Crassus reached Aquitania, which, as stated before, must be reckoned—both from the extent of its territory and from the number of its inhabitants—as a third part of Gaul. He understood that he would have to wage war in the very regions where, a few years earlier, the lieutenant Lucius Valerius Praeconinus had been killed after his army was routed, and from which the proconsul Lucius Manlius had fled after losing his baggage. He therefore realized that no ordinary degree of care would be required of him.

SECTION 3.20.2
Accordingly, after securing the grain supply and assembling auxiliaries and cavalry, he also summoned by name many brave men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, communities of the Roman province bordering those regions, and led his army into the territory of the Sotiates.

SECTION 3.20.3
When the Sotiates learned of his approach, they assembled a large force and, with the cavalry in which their chief strength lay, attacked our column on the march, first engaging us in a cavalry battle.

SECTION 3.20.4
Then, after their cavalry had been routed and ours were pursuing, they suddenly revealed the infantry forces they had posted in ambush in a hollow. These attacked our scattered men and renewed the battle.

CHAPTER 3.21

SECTION 3.21.1
The fighting was long and fierce. The Sotiates, confident from their former victories, believed that the safety of all Aquitania rested upon their valor; while our men wished it to be seen what they could accomplish under a youthful commander, without Caesar and without the other legions. At last the enemy, worn down by wounds, turned and fled.

SECTION 3.21.2
After killing a great number of them, Crassus continued his march and began to assault the stronghold of the Sotiates. When they resisted bravely, he brought forward covered galleries and towers.

SECTION 3.21.3
At one time they attempted a sortie, at another they drove tunnels toward the siege mound and covered galleries—a craft in which the Aquitani are by far the most expert, because in many places among them there are copper mines and excavations. When they realized that the vigilance of our men made all these efforts useless, they sent envoys to Crassus and begged him to accept their surrender. Their request was granted, and, when ordered to hand over their arms, they did so.

CHAPTER 3.22

SECTION 3.22.1
While the attention of all our men was fixed upon this business, Adiatunnus, who held supreme command, appeared at another part of the stronghold with six hundred devoted retainers, whom they call soldurii.

SECTION 3.22.2
The condition of these men is that they share all the comforts of life with those to whose friendship they have pledged themselves; but if any violent fate befalls those men, they must either suffer the same fate with them or take their own lives.

SECTION 3.22.3
And within living memory no one has yet been found who, after the death of the man to whose friendship he had devoted himself, refused to die.

SECTION 3.22.4
With these men Adiatunnus attempted a sortie. A shout arose from that part of the fortifications, the soldiers rushed to arms, and a fierce battle was fought there. He was driven back into the stronghold, but nevertheless obtained from Crassus permission to surrender on the same terms.

CHAPTER 3.23

SECTION 3.23.1
After receiving their arms and hostages, Crassus marched into the territories of the Vocates and Tarusates.

SECTION 3.23.2
Then the barbarians were thoroughly alarmed, because they learned that a stronghold fortified both by nature and by human skill had been captured within a few days of our arrival. They began sending envoys in every direction, swearing mutual oaths, exchanging hostages, and preparing forces.

SECTION 3.23.3
Envoys were also sent to those states of Nearer Spain that bordered Aquitania, and auxiliaries and commanders were summoned from there.

SECTION 3.23.4
Upon their arrival, the Aquitani attempted to wage war with great confidence and an immense multitude of men.

SECTION 3.23.5
As their commanders they chose men who had served throughout all the years with Quintus Sertorius and were believed to possess the highest knowledge of warfare.

SECTION 3.23.6
Following the practice of the Roman people, these men began to seize advantageous positions, fortify camps, and cut our forces off from supplies.

SECTION 3.23.7
When Crassus observed that, because of their small numbers, his own forces could not easily be divided, while the enemy could range freely, block the roads, and still leave a sufficient guard in camp; that for this reason grain and other provisions could not conveniently be brought to him; and that the enemy’s numbers were increasing daily, he decided that he must not delay in bringing the matter to a decisive battle.

SECTION 3.23.8
He laid the matter before a council of war, and when he found that all held the same opinion, he appointed the following day for battle.

CHAPTER 3.24

SECTION 3.24.1
At daybreak he led out all his forces, drew them up in two lines, and placed the auxiliaries in the center. He then waited to see what plan the enemy would adopt.

SECTION 3.24.2
Although the enemy believed that, because of their great numbers, their ancient military renown, and the small size of our force, they could fight without danger, they nevertheless thought it safer to block the roads, cut off our supplies, and gain victory without suffering wounds.

SECTION 3.24.3
If the Romans began to retreat because of a shortage of grain, they intended to attack them while they were encumbered on the march and burdened with packs, and therefore weaker in spirit.

SECTION 3.24.4
Their commanders approved this plan, and although the Roman forces had been led out, they remained within their camp.

SECTION 3.24.5
When Crassus perceived this, and saw that the enemy’s hesitation and apparent fear had made our soldiers still more eager to fight, while voices rose from every quarter declaring that they ought to wait no longer before advancing against the camp, he exhorted his men and, amid the enthusiasm of all, marched upon the enemy’s camp.

CHAPTER 3.25

SECTION 3.25.1
There some filled the trenches, while others discharged volleys of missiles and drove the defenders from the rampart and fortifications. The auxiliaries, in whom Crassus placed little confidence as fighting troops, nevertheless conveyed the appearance and impression of combatants by supplying stones and missiles and carrying sods to the siege mound. The enemy likewise fought steadily and without fear, and the missiles cast from their higher position did not fall without effect.

SECTION 3.25.2
Meanwhile, cavalrymen who had ridden around the enemy’s camp reported to Crassus that the defenses at the rear gate had not been constructed with equal care and offered an easy approach.

CHAPTER 3.26

SECTION 3.26.1
Crassus urged the cavalry commanders to rouse their men with promises of great rewards, and explained what he wished to be done.

SECTION 3.26.2
As ordered, they led out the cohorts that had been left to guard the camp and were still fresh from lack of exertion. They took them around by a longer route so that they could not be seen from the enemy’s camp, and while every eye and every thought was fixed upon the fighting, they swiftly reached the fortifications already mentioned.

SECTION 3.26.3
They demolished these defenses and established themselves inside the enemy’s camp before they could be clearly seen or the enemy could understand what was happening.

SECTION 3.26.4
Then, when the shouting was heard from that quarter, our men renewed their strength—as commonly happens when victory is in sight—and began to press the attack more fiercely.

SECTION 3.26.5
The enemy, surrounded on every side and despairing of everything, strove to throw themselves over the fortifications and seek safety in flight.

SECTION 3.26.6
The cavalry pursued them over entirely open ground and, of the fifty thousand men known to have assembled from Aquitania and the country of the Cantabri, left scarcely a quarter alive before returning to camp late in the night.

CHAPTER 3.27

SECTION 3.27.1
When news of this battle was heard, the greater part of Aquitania surrendered to Crassus and voluntarily sent hostages. Among these peoples were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, and Cocosates.

SECTION 3.27.2
A few of the most remote tribes, trusting to the season because winter was at hand, neglected to do so.

CHAPTER 3.28

SECTION 3.28.1
At about the same time Caesar, although summer was now nearly over, nevertheless led his army against the Morini and Menapii. For while all the rest of Gaul had been pacified, these alone remained under arms and had never sent envoys to him to seek peace. He believed that this war could be swiftly concluded; but they began to conduct it in a manner altogether different from the rest of the Gauls.

SECTION 3.28.2
For they understood that the greatest nations, which had met the Romans in battle, had been driven back and defeated; and since they possessed unbroken forests and marshes, they withdrew into them with all their possessions.

SECTION 3.28.3
When Caesar reached the edge of these forests and began fortifying his camp, without any enemy having been seen in the meantime, they suddenly burst from every part of the woods while our men were scattered at their work and launched an attack upon them.

SECTION 3.28.4
Our men quickly seized their weapons, drove them back into the forests, and killed a considerable number. They pursued them too far into difficult ground, however, and lost a few of their own men.

CHAPTER 3.29

SECTION 3.29.1
During the days that followed, Caesar began cutting down the forests. To prevent any attack from being made against the flank of soldiers who were unarmed and unsuspecting, he placed all the felled timber facing the enemy and piled it up on both sides as a rampart.

SECTION 3.29.2
With incredible speed a great extent of ground was cleared within a few days. Our men had already secured the enemy’s cattle and the rearmost part of their baggage, while the enemy themselves were seeking the denser forests, when storms of such severity followed that the work had to be suspended; and because the rains continued, the soldiers could no longer be kept under tents.

SECTION 3.29.3
Accordingly, after devastating all their fields and burning their villages and buildings, Caesar led his army back and placed it in winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lexovii, and likewise among the other states that had most recently made war.

### Book 4

CHAPTER 4.1

SECTION 4.1.1
In the following winter, during the consulship of Gnaeus Pompeius and Marcus Crassus, the German Usipetes, together with the Tencteri, crossed the Rhine with a great multitude of people, not far from the sea into which the Rhine flows.

SECTION 4.1.2
Their reason for crossing was that for several years they had been harried by the Suebi, oppressed by war, and prevented from cultivating their fields.

SECTION 4.1.3
The nation of the Suebi is by far the largest and most warlike of all the Germans.

SECTION 4.1.4
They are said to possess a hundred cantons, from each of which they lead out every year a thousand armed men to make war. The rest, who remain at home, support themselves and those in the field.

SECTION 4.1.5
In the following year these men in turn serve under arms, while the others remain at home.

SECTION 4.1.6
Thus neither agriculture nor the theory and practice of war is interrupted.

SECTION 4.1.7
But among them there is no private or separately owned land, nor is anyone permitted to remain in one place for more than a year for the purpose of cultivation.

SECTION 4.1.8
They do not live much upon grain, but chiefly upon milk and the flesh of livestock, and they devote much of their time to hunting.

SECTION 4.1.9
This way of life—through the nature of their food, daily exercise, and freedom, since from childhood they are accustomed to no duty or discipline and do absolutely nothing against their will—nourishes their strength and makes them men of immense physical stature.

SECTION 4.1.10
They have trained themselves to such habits that even in the coldest regions they wear no clothing except skins, which are so scanty that a large part of the body remains bare, and they bathe in rivers.

CHAPTER 4.2

SECTION 4.2.1
Merchants are admitted among them more so that they may have buyers for what they have captured in war than because they desire anything to be imported.

SECTION 4.2.2
Indeed, the Germans do not use imported draft animals, in which the Gauls take the greatest delight and which they purchase at enormous prices. Instead, by daily exercise they make the small and ill-shaped animals bred among them capable of the greatest endurance.

SECTION 4.2.3
In cavalry battles they often leap down from their horses and fight on foot. They have trained their horses to remain in the same spot, and when need arises they quickly return to them.

SECTION 4.2.4
By their customs nothing is considered more shameful or more spiritless than the use of saddles.

SECTION 4.2.5
Therefore, however few they may be, they dare to advance against any number of saddled cavalry.

SECTION 4.2.6
They permit no wine at all to be imported, because they believe that it makes men too soft to endure hardship and renders them effeminate.

CHAPTER 4.3

SECTION 4.3.1
As a nation, they consider it their greatest distinction for the lands bordering their territory to lie uninhabited as widely as possible. They believe this signifies that a great number of states cannot withstand their power.

SECTION 4.3.2
Thus on one side of the Suebi, it is said, the land lies uninhabited for about a hundred miles.

SECTION 4.3.3
On the other side lie the Ubii, whose state was extensive and flourishing by German standards. Although they are of the same race, they are somewhat more civilized than the rest, because their territory touches the Rhine, merchants visit them frequently, and they themselves, owing to their proximity, have become accustomed to Gallic ways.

SECTION 4.3.4
The Suebi had often tested them in many wars but, because of the size and importance of their state, had been unable to drive them from their territory. Nevertheless, they made them tributaries and reduced them to a condition of far greater humiliation and weakness.

CHAPTER 4.4

SECTION 4.4.1
The Usipetes and Tencteri, whom we mentioned above, were in the same situation. For several years they withstood the power of the Suebi.

SECTION 4.4.2
At last, however, they were driven from their lands, wandered through many parts of Germany for three years, and reached the Rhine, in regions inhabited by the Menapii. The Menapii possessed fields, buildings, and villages on both banks of the river.

SECTION 4.4.3
Terrified by the arrival of so great a multitude, they withdrew from the buildings they had possessed across the river and stationed guards on this side of the Rhine to prevent the Germans from crossing.

SECTION 4.4.4
The Germans tried every expedient, but they could neither force a crossing for lack of boats nor cross secretly because of the Menapii’s guards.

SECTION 4.4.5
They therefore pretended to return to their own homes and territories, marched away for three days, and then turned back. Their cavalry covered the whole return journey in a single night and fell upon the Menapii, who knew nothing and expected nothing.

SECTION 4.4.6
The Menapii, having been informed by scouts of the Germans’ departure, had crossed the Rhine without fear and returned to their villages.

SECTION 4.4.7
After killing them and seizing their boats, they crossed the river before that part of the Menapii which lay on this side of the Rhine could be informed; then, taking possession of all their buildings, they sustained themselves on the Menapii’s provisions for the remainder of the winter.

CHAPTER 4.5

SECTION 4.5.1
When Caesar was informed of these events, he feared the fickleness of the Gauls, because they are changeable in forming plans and generally eager for revolution, and therefore judged that nothing should be entrusted to them.

SECTION 4.5.2
For it is a Gallic custom to compel travelers to stop, even against their will, and to ask what each of them has heard or learned about every matter; and in the towns the common people crowd around merchants and force them to declare from what countries they come and what events they have learned of there.

SECTION 4.5.3
Moved by such reports and hearsay, they often form plans concerning matters of the highest importance, only to be forced to repent of them at once, since they are at the mercy of uncertain rumors, and most men give them fabricated answers suited to their wishes.

CHAPTER 4.6

SECTION 4.6.1
Knowing this custom, Caesar, so that he might not encounter a more serious war, set out for the army earlier than was his habit.

SECTION 4.6.2
When he arrived there, he learned that what he had suspected would happen had taken place:

SECTION 4.6.3
embassies had been sent by several states to the Germans, inviting them to withdraw from the Rhine and assuring them that everything they demanded would be made ready by the Gauls.

SECTION 4.6.4
Encouraged by this hope, the Germans were already ranging more widely and had reached the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are dependents of the Treveri.

SECTION 4.6.5
After summoning the leading men of Gaul, Caesar decided that he must conceal what he had learned. He soothed and reassured their minds, ordered them to furnish cavalry, and resolved to wage war against the Germans.

CHAPTER 4.7

SECTION 4.7.1
After securing the grain supply and selecting his cavalry, he began to march toward the places where he heard that the Germans were.

SECTION 4.7.2
When he was a few days’ march from them, envoys came from them and spoke as follows:

SECTION 4.7.3
The Germans neither made war upon the Roman people first nor, if attacked, refused to contend in arms, because this was the Germans’ ancestral custom: whoever made war upon them, they resisted and did not beg for peace. Yet they had come, they said, unwillingly, driven from their home;

SECTION 4.7.4
if the Romans desired their friendship, they could be useful friends to them. Let the Romans either allot them lands or permit them to retain those they had won by arms.

SECTION 4.7.5
They yielded to the Suebi alone, whom not even the immortal gods could equal; as for all the rest, there was no one on earth whom they could not overcome.

CHAPTER 4.8

SECTION 4.8.1
To this Caesar made such reply as he thought fit; but the conclusion of his speech was that there could be no friendship between him and them if they remained in Gaul;

SECTION 4.8.2
nor was it right that men who had been unable to defend their own territory should occupy that of others; and there were no vacant lands in Gaul that could be given, especially to so great a multitude, without injustice;

SECTION 4.8.3
but they might, if they wished, settle in the territory of the Ubii, whose envoys were then with him, complaining of the injuries inflicted by the Suebi and seeking aid from him. He would command the Ubii to receive them.

CHAPTER 4.9

SECTION 4.9.1
The envoys said that they would report this to their people and, after deliberating on the matter, would return to Caesar on the third day. Meanwhile, they asked him not to move his camp any nearer to them.

SECTION 4.9.2
Caesar said that not even this request could be granted.

SECTION 4.9.3
For he had learned that several days before they had sent a large part of their cavalry across the Meuse into the territory of the Ambivariti to plunder and forage. He believed that they were waiting for these horsemen and were seeking delay for that reason.

CHAPTER 4.10

SECTION 4.10.1
[The Meuse rises in Mount Vosges, which lies in the territory of the Lingones, and, after receiving a branch of the Rhine called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi and flows into the Ocean;

SECTION 4.10.2
and no farther than eighty miles from the Ocean, it flows into the Rhine.

SECTION 4.10.3
The Rhine, however, rises among the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and rushes swiftly for a great distance through the territories of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci, and Treveri;

SECTION 4.10.4
and when it approaches the Ocean, it divides into several channels, forming many immense islands, a large part of which are inhabited by fierce and barbarous tribes,

SECTION 4.10.5
some of whom are believed to live on fish and birds’ eggs; and it flows into the Ocean through many mouths.]

CHAPTER 4.11

SECTION 4.11.1
When Caesar was no more than twelve miles from the enemy, their envoys returned to him as arranged. Meeting him on the march, they earnestly begged him to advance no farther.

SECTION 4.11.2
When they failed to obtain this, they asked him to send orders ahead to the cavalry that had preceded the column and forbid them to engage, and to grant the Germans an opportunity to send envoys to the Ubii.

SECTION 4.11.3
They declared that, if the chief men and senate of the Ubii pledged their good faith to them by oath, they would accept the terms Caesar offered. They asked him to grant them three days to conclude these arrangements.

SECTION 4.11.4
Caesar believed that all these requests had the same purpose: to secure a delay of three days so that their absent cavalry might return. Nevertheless, he said that on that day he would advance no farther than four miles, for the sake of obtaining water.

SECTION 4.11.5
He ordered them to assemble there the next day in the greatest possible numbers, so that he might consider their demands.

SECTION 4.11.6
Meanwhile, he sent messengers to the commanders who had gone ahead with all the cavalry, directing them not to provoke the enemy to battle and, if they themselves were attacked, to hold their ground until he came nearer with the army.

CHAPTER 4.12

SECTION 4.12.1
But the enemy, as soon as they caught sight of our cavalry, five thousand strong, while they themselves had no more than eight hundred horsemen—for those who had crossed the Meuse to forage had not yet returned—made a charge and quickly threw our men into disorder. Our men feared nothing, because the German envoys had left Caesar only a little before, and that day had been requested by them as a truce.

SECTION 4.12.2
When our men rallied and resisted, the Germans, following their usual practice, leaped down from their horses; then, stabbing many of our horses from below and unseating their riders, they put the rest to flight and drove them on in such terror that they did not cease fleeing until they came within sight of our marching column.

SECTION 4.12.3
In that engagement seventy-four of our cavalry were killed,

SECTION 4.12.4
among them Piso the Aquitanian, a man of the greatest courage and of most distinguished birth, whose grandfather had held the kingship in his own state and had been named a friend by our Senate.

SECTION 4.12.5
When his brother was cut off by the enemy, Piso went to his aid and rescued him from danger; but his own horse was wounded and he was thrown, and for as long as he could, he resisted with the utmost bravery.

SECTION 4.12.6
When, surrounded and suffering many wounds, he fell, his brother, who had already withdrawn from the battle, saw what had happened from a distance, spurred his horse against the enemy, and was killed.

CHAPTER 4.13

SECTION 4.13.1
After this battle Caesar judged that he should no longer hear envoys or accept terms from men who, by deceit and treachery, had sought peace and then made an unprovoked attack.

SECTION 4.13.2
He considered it the height of madness to wait until the enemy’s forces were increased and their cavalry returned;

SECTION 4.13.3
and, knowing the fickleness of the Gauls, he understood how much prestige the enemy had already gained among them through a single battle. He therefore believed that they must be given no time to form plans.

SECTION 4.13.4
After he had settled these matters and communicated his plan to his lieutenants and quaestor, so that he might let no day suitable for battle pass unused, a most favorable circumstance occurred. On the morning of the following day, employing the same treachery and pretense, the Germans came in great numbers to his camp, bringing with them all their chiefs and elders,

SECTION 4.13.5
partly, as was said, to clear themselves of blame because, contrary to what had been agreed and to what they themselves had requested, they had joined battle the day before, and partly to obtain, if they could, a truce by deception.

SECTION 4.13.6
Delighted that they had put themselves into his hands, Caesar ordered them detained. He then led all his forces out of camp and commanded the cavalry, which he believed had been terrified by the recent engagement, to follow at the rear of the column.

CHAPTER 4.14

SECTION 4.14.1
He formed his army in three lines and, rapidly completing a march of eight miles, reached the enemy’s camp before the Germans could perceive what was happening.

SECTION 4.14.2
Suddenly terrified by everything—by the speed of our arrival and by the absence of their leaders—and given no time either to take counsel or to seize their arms, they were thrown into confusion over whether it was better to lead their forces against the enemy, defend the camp, or seek safety in flight.

SECTION 4.14.3
When their fear revealed itself in shouting and a confused rush, our soldiers, inflamed by the treachery of the previous day, burst into the camp.

SECTION 4.14.4
There those who had been able to seize their arms quickly resisted our men for a short time and fought among the wagons and baggage.

SECTION 4.14.5
But the rest of the multitude, consisting of children and women—for they had left their homes and crossed the Rhine with all their people—began to flee in every direction. Caesar sent the cavalry to pursue them.

CHAPTER 4.15

SECTION 4.15.1
When the Germans heard shouting behind them and saw their people being killed, they threw away their weapons, abandoned their military standards, and rushed out of the camp.

SECTION 4.15.2
When they reached the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, they despaired of further flight. A great number were killed, and the rest hurled themselves into the river, where, overwhelmed by fear, exhaustion, and the force of the current, they perished.

SECTION 4.15.3
Our men, safe to the last man and with very few wounded, withdrew to camp, delivered from the fear of so great a war, although the enemy had numbered four hundred and thirty thousand souls.

SECTION 4.15.4
Caesar gave those whom he had detained in camp permission to depart.

SECTION 4.15.5
Fearing punishment and torture at the hands of the Gauls, whose lands they had ravaged, they said that they wished to remain with him. Caesar granted them their freedom.

CHAPTER 4.16

SECTION 4.16.1
After the German war had been concluded, Caesar decided for many reasons that he must cross the Rhine. The most compelling was this: since he saw that the Germans were so easily induced to enter Gaul, he wished them also to fear for their own possessions when they understood that an army of the Roman people both could and dared to cross the Rhine.

SECTION 4.16.2
There was also the fact that the body of Usipetan and Tencteran cavalry which, as I have related above, had crossed the Meuse to plunder and forage and had not taken part in the battle, had after the flight of their countrymen withdrawn across the Rhine into the territory of the Sugambri and joined forces with them.

SECTION 4.16.3
When Caesar sent messengers to the Sugambri demanding that they surrender to him those who had made war upon him and upon Gaul, they replied:

SECTION 4.16.4
the dominion of the Roman people ended at the Rhine. If Caesar considered it unjust for the Germans to cross into Gaul against his will, why did he claim any dominion or authority beyond the Rhine?

SECTION 4.16.5
The Ubii, however, who alone among the peoples beyond the Rhine had sent envoys to Caesar, established friendship with him, and given hostages, earnestly begged him to bring them aid, because they were being severely oppressed by the Suebi.

SECTION 4.16.6
Or, if the demands of public affairs prevented him from doing so, they asked him merely to transport his army across the Rhine: that would be sufficient to aid them and give them hope for the future.

SECTION 4.16.7
Such was the renown and reputation of his army, after the expulsion of Ariovistus and this most recent battle, even among the remotest German tribes, that the Ubii could be safe through the prestige and friendship of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.16.8
They promised a great number of boats for transporting the army.

CHAPTER 4.17

SECTION 4.17.1
For the reasons I have related, Caesar had decided to cross the Rhine; but he considered crossing in boats neither sufficiently safe nor consistent with his own dignity or that of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.17.2
Accordingly, although the breadth, swiftness, and depth of the river presented the greatest difficulty in building a bridge, he nevertheless believed that he must attempt it or else not take the army across at all.

SECTION 4.17.3
He devised the following plan for the bridge. He joined together in pairs timbers a foot and a half thick, slightly sharpened at their lower ends and cut to match the depth of the river, leaving two feet between the timbers of each pair.

SECTION 4.17.4
These were lowered into the river by machines, planted in the bed, and driven down with pile drivers—not upright like ordinary piles, but sloping forward at an incline, so that they leaned in the direction of the current.

SECTION 4.17.5
Opposite these, forty feet downstream, he set two other timbers joined in the same fashion, inclined against the force and current of the river.

SECTION 4.17.6
Each pair was held apart by a beam two feet thick laid across the top, corresponding to the space between the joined timbers, and was secured at the outer ends by two braces, one on either side.

SECTION 4.17.7
With the pairs thus forced apart and bound in opposite directions, the structure possessed such strength and was so designed by its very nature that the greater the force with which the water drove against it, the more tightly its members were held fast.

SECTION 4.17.8
These supports were connected by laying timbers lengthwise across them, and the surface was covered with poles and fascines.

SECTION 4.17.9
In addition, piles were driven obliquely on the downstream side; these were set underneath like buttresses and joined to the whole structure, so that they might receive the force of the river.

SECTION 4.17.10
Other piles were likewise driven a moderate distance upstream from the bridge, so that, if tree trunks or boats were sent down by the barbarians to destroy the work, these defenses might lessen the force of such objects and prevent them from damaging the bridge.

CHAPTER 4.18

SECTION 4.18.1
Within ten days from the time when the collection of timber began, the entire work was completed and the army was led across.

SECTION 4.18.2
Caesar left a strong guard at each end of the bridge and hastened into the territory of the Sugambri.

SECTION 4.18.3
Meanwhile, envoys came to him from several states. When they sought peace and friendship, he answered them generously and ordered hostages to be brought to him.

SECTION 4.18.4
But the Sugambri, having prepared for flight from the moment the construction of the bridge began, and urged on by the Tencteri and Usipetes whom they had among them, had left their territory, carried away all their possessions, and concealed themselves in the wilderness and forests.

CHAPTER 4.19

SECTION 4.19.1
After remaining a few days in their territory, burning all their villages and buildings, and cutting down their grain, Caesar withdrew into the territory of the Ubii. He promised them his aid if they were oppressed by the Suebi, and learned the following from them:

SECTION 4.19.2
After the Suebi learned from scouts that a bridge was being built, they had held an assembly according to their custom and sent messengers in every direction, ordering the people to leave their towns, place their children, wives, and all their possessions in the forests, and assemble in one place every man capable of bearing arms.

SECTION 4.19.3
The place selected lay approximately in the center of the territories held by the Suebi. There they had resolved to await the arrival of the Romans and there to fight the decisive battle.

SECTION 4.19.4
When Caesar learned of this, having accomplished all the purposes for which he had determined to lead his army across—to strike fear into the Germans, punish the Sugambri, and free the Ubii from siege—and having spent altogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, he judged that he had achieved enough both for honor and for practical advantage. He therefore withdrew into Gaul and demolished the bridge.

CHAPTER 4.20

SECTION 4.20.1
Although only a small part of the summer remained, and although winters come early in these regions because all Gaul inclines toward the north, Caesar nevertheless made determined preparations to set out for Britain, since he understood that in almost all his Gallic wars assistance had been furnished to our enemies from that island.

SECTION 4.20.2
Even if the season should leave too little time for conducting a campaign, he still believed it would be of great use to him if he merely visited the island, observed the character of its people, and learned about its terrain, harbors, and approaches—all of which were almost entirely unknown to the Gauls.

SECTION 4.20.3
For hardly anyone except merchants ventures there, and even they know nothing beyond the seacoast and those regions that face Gaul.

SECTION 4.20.4
Accordingly, he summoned merchants to him from every quarter, but could discover neither how large the island was, nor what or how numerous were the peoples who inhabited it, nor what experience they had in war or what customs they followed, nor which harbors were suitable for a large number of ships.

CHAPTER 4.21

SECTION 4.21.1
To learn these things before making the attempt himself, Caesar judged Gaius Volusenus a suitable man and sent him ahead in a warship.

SECTION 4.21.2
He instructed him to investigate everything and return to him as quickly as possible.

SECTION 4.21.3
Caesar himself marched with all his forces into the territory of the Morini, because the crossing from there to Britain was the shortest.

SECTION 4.21.4
He ordered ships from all the neighboring regions to assemble there, together with the fleet he had built the previous summer for the war against the Veneti.

SECTION 4.21.5
Meanwhile, when his plan became known and was reported to the Britons by merchants, envoys came to him from a number of the island’s states, promising to give hostages and submit to the authority of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.21.6
After hearing them, Caesar made generous promises and urged them to remain of that mind.

SECTION 4.21.7
He then sent them home, and with them sent Commius, whom he himself had appointed king there after defeating the Atrebates. Caesar approved of his courage and judgment, believed him loyal, and knew that his influence was highly regarded in those regions.

SECTION 4.21.8
He ordered Commius to visit as many states as he could, urge them to place themselves under the protection of the Roman people, and announce that Caesar would soon come there.

SECTION 4.21.9
Volusenus, after surveying all the regions as far as opportunity permitted a man who did not dare leave his ship and entrust himself to the barbarians, returned to Caesar on the fifth day and reported what he had observed there.

CHAPTER 4.22

SECTION 4.22.1
While Caesar remained in those regions to prepare his ships, envoys came to him from a large part of the Morini. They sought to excuse their conduct on the previous occasion, saying that, as barbarous men ignorant of our customs, they had made war upon the Roman people, and they promised to do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 4.22.2
Caesar considered this a sufficiently opportune development, because he did not wish to leave an enemy behind him, had no opportunity to conduct a war because of the season, and did not think that attention to such trifling matters should take precedence over Britain. He therefore demanded a large number of hostages from them.

SECTION 4.22.3
When these were brought, he accepted the Morini under his protection. After assembling and collecting about eighty transports, which he considered enough to carry two legions, he distributed all the warships he had besides among his quaestor, legates, and prefects.

SECTION 4.22.4
In addition, there were eighteen transports eight miles away, prevented by the wind from reaching the same harbor. These he assigned to the cavalry.

SECTION 4.22.5
He placed the rest of the army under his legates Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, with orders to lead it against the Menapii and those districts of the Morini from which no envoys had come to him.

SECTION 4.22.6
He ordered his legate Sulpicius Rufus to hold the harbor with the garrison he considered sufficient.

CHAPTER 4.23

SECTION 4.23.1
After making these arrangements, Caesar found weather suitable for sailing and put to sea at about the third watch. He ordered the cavalry to proceed to the farther harbor, embark, and follow him.

SECTION 4.23.2
Since they carried out these orders somewhat slowly, Caesar himself reached Britain with the leading ships at about the fourth hour of the day, and there saw the enemy’s armed forces drawn up on all the hills.

SECTION 4.23.3
The nature of the place was such, and the sea was so closely confined by steep heights, that a missile could be cast from the higher ground onto the shore.

SECTION 4.23.4
Considering this place wholly unsuitable for disembarkation, Caesar waited at anchor until the ninth hour for the remaining ships to assemble there.

SECTION 4.23.5
Meanwhile, he summoned his legates and military tribunes, explained what he had learned from Volusenus and what he wished done, and warned them that, as the principles of warfare—and maritime operations above all—required, since conditions at sea were swift and unstable in their movement, they must execute every order promptly and at his signal.

SECTION 4.23.6
After dismissing them, Caesar obtained a favorable wind and tide at the same time. He gave the signal, raised anchor, advanced about seven miles from that place, and brought the ships to rest off an open, level beach.

CHAPTER 4.24

SECTION 4.24.1
But the barbarians, perceiving the Romans’ plan, sent their cavalry and charioteers ahead—the kind of troops they generally employed in battle—and followed with the rest of their forces, seeking to prevent our men from leaving the ships.

SECTION 4.24.2
The difficulty was extreme for these reasons: because of their size, the ships could not be brought to rest except in deep water, while the soldiers, on unfamiliar ground, with their hands encumbered and weighed down by the great and heavy burden of their arms, had at one and the same time to leap down from the ships, find a footing amid the waves, and fight the enemy.

SECTION 4.24.3
The enemy, meanwhile, either stood on dry land or advanced only a little way into the water, with every limb unencumbered; and on ground perfectly familiar to them, they boldly hurled missiles and spurred forward their well-trained horses.

SECTION 4.24.4
Terrified by these circumstances and wholly inexperienced in this kind of fighting, our men did not display the same spirit and eagerness they were accustomed to show in battles on land.

CHAPTER 4.25

SECTION 4.25.1
When Caesar observed this, he ordered the warships, whose appearance was more unfamiliar to the barbarians and whose maneuverability made them readier for action, to draw off a little from the transports, be driven forward by their oars, and take position on the enemy’s exposed flank. From there, slings, arrows, and artillery were to drive the enemy back and clear them away. This proved of great assistance to our men.

SECTION 4.25.2
For the barbarians, disconcerted by the shape of the ships, the movement of the oars, and the unfamiliar kind of artillery, halted and drew back only a little.

SECTION 4.25.3
But while our soldiers still hesitated, chiefly because of the depth of the water, the eagle-bearer of the Tenth Legion called upon the gods to make the deed fortunate for the legion. “Leap down, soldiers,” he cried, “unless you mean to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, at least, shall have done my duty to the republic and to my commander.”

SECTION 4.25.4
After saying this in a loud voice, he threw himself from the ship and began carrying the eagle against the enemy.

SECTION 4.25.5
Then our men, urging one another not to permit so great a disgrace, all leaped down from the ship.

SECTION 4.25.6
When the men in the nearest ships saw them, they too followed and advanced against the enemy.

CHAPTER 4.26

SECTION 4.26.1
Both sides fought fiercely. Our men, however, were greatly disordered because they could neither keep their ranks nor plant themselves firmly nor follow their standards; instead, each man joined whatever standard he happened to encounter after leaving his own ship.

SECTION 4.26.2
The enemy, on the other hand, knew every shoal; and whenever from the shore they saw men leaving a ship singly, they spurred their horses forward and attacked them while they were encumbered.

SECTION 4.26.3
Many surrounded a few, while others hurled missiles from the exposed flank against the whole body of our men.

SECTION 4.26.4
When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boats belonging to the warships, together with the scouting vessels, to be filled with soldiers, and sent reinforcements to any men he saw in difficulty.

SECTION 4.26.5
As soon as our men gained a footing on dry land and all their comrades had joined them, they charged the enemy and put them to flight. They could not pursue them farther, however, because the cavalry had been unable to hold its course and reach the island. This alone was lacking to Caesar’s accustomed good fortune.

CHAPTER 4.27

SECTION 4.27.1
The enemy, defeated in battle, sent envoys to Caesar to seek peace as soon as they recovered from their flight. They promised to give hostages and do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 4.27.2
Commius the Atrebatian came with these envoys—the man whom, as I explained above, Caesar had sent ahead to Britain.

SECTION 4.27.3
When he had left his ship and was bringing them Caesar’s commands in the capacity of an envoy, they had seized him and thrown him into chains.

SECTION 4.27.4
After the battle, however, they released him; and in seeking peace they laid the blame for the act upon the common people and begged pardon on the grounds of ignorance.

SECTION 4.27.5
Caesar complained that, although they had voluntarily sent envoys to the mainland to seek peace from him, they had made war without cause. He said that he would pardon their ignorance and ordered them to provide hostages.

SECTION 4.27.6
They gave some of these at once and said that they would give the remainder, who had to be summoned from more distant places, within a few days.

SECTION 4.27.7
Meanwhile, they ordered their people to return to their fields, and chiefs began to assemble from every quarter and commend themselves and their states to Caesar.

CHAPTER 4.28

SECTION 4.28.1
Peace having been established by these measures, on the fourth day after the arrival in Britain, the eighteen ships mentioned above, which had taken the cavalry aboard, sailed from the farther harbor with a gentle wind.

SECTION 4.28.2
As they approached Britain and came within sight of the camp, so violent a storm suddenly arose that none of them could hold its course. Some were driven back to the place from which they had set out; others were swept, at great peril to themselves, toward the lower part of the island, which lies nearer the setting sun.

SECTION 4.28.3
Though they cast anchor, they were filling with water from the waves and were therefore compelled, despite the adverse night, to put out to sea and make for the mainland.

CHAPTER 4.29

SECTION 4.29.1
That same night there happened to be a full moon, the phase that usually produces the highest ocean tides; and this was unknown to our men.

SECTION 4.29.2
Thus, at one and the same time, the tide flooded the warships [in which Caesar had arranged for the army to be transported], which Caesar had drawn up onto dry land, while the storm battered the transports that were riding at anchor; and our men were given no opportunity either to manage the vessels or to render assistance.

SECTION 4.29.3
A number of ships were wrecked, while the rest, having lost their ropes, anchors, and other equipment, were rendered unfit to sail. As was inevitable, the entire army was thrown into great consternation.

SECTION 4.29.4
For there were no other ships in which they could be carried back, everything needed to repair the vessels was lacking, and, since it was agreed by all that the army must winter in Gaul, no grain had been provided in these regions for the winter.

CHAPTER 4.30

SECTION 4.30.1
When the chiefs of Britain who had assembled before Caesar after the battle learned of these events, they conferred among themselves. They understood that the Romans lacked cavalry, ships, and grain, and they inferred the small number of soldiers from the narrow extent of the camp—which was smaller still because Caesar had transported the legions without their baggage.

SECTION 4.30.2
They decided that the best course was to renew the war, prevent our men from obtaining grain and other provisions, and prolong the affair into winter, since they were confident that, if the Romans were defeated or cut off from their return, no one thereafter would cross into Britain to make war upon them.

SECTION 4.30.3
Accordingly, they formed another conspiracy, began gradually withdrawing from the camp, and secretly summoned their people from the fields.

CHAPTER 4.31

SECTION 4.31.1
Although Caesar had not yet discovered their plans, nevertheless, from what had happened to his ships and from the fact that they had stopped delivering hostages, he suspected that what did happen was about to occur.

SECTION 4.31.2
He therefore prepared safeguards against every contingency. Each day he had grain brought from the fields into the camp; he used the timber and bronze from the ships that had been most severely damaged to repair the rest; and he ordered whatever was needed for this work to be brought over from the mainland.

SECTION 4.31.3
Accordingly, since the soldiers carried out the work with the greatest zeal, Caesar, though twelve ships had been lost, made the rest sufficiently seaworthy for the voyage.

CHAPTER 4.32

SECTION 4.32.1
While this work was under way, one legion, called the Seventh, was sent out as usual to gather grain. Up to that time there had been no suspicion of war: some of the inhabitants remained in the fields, and others continued to visit the camp. But the men posted on guard before the camp gates reported to Caesar that an unusually great cloud of dust could be seen in the direction in which the legion had marched.

SECTION 4.32.2
Suspecting—as was indeed the case—that the barbarians had embarked upon some new design, Caesar ordered the cohorts on guard to march with him in that direction, two of the remaining cohorts to take their place on guard, and the others to arm themselves and follow him immediately.

SECTION 4.32.3
When he had advanced somewhat farther from the camp, he saw that our men were being hard-pressed by the enemy and were scarcely holding their ground, while missiles were being hurled from every side against the closely packed legion.

SECTION 4.32.4
For since the grain had been reaped everywhere else and only one tract remained, the enemy, suspecting that our men would come there, had concealed themselves in the woods during the night.

SECTION 4.32.5
Then they had suddenly attacked our men while they were scattered, had laid aside their arms, and were occupied with reaping. After killing a few, they threw the rest into confusion before they could form regular ranks, while at the same time surrounding them with cavalry and chariots.

CHAPTER 4.33

SECTION 4.33.1
Their manner of fighting from chariots is as follows. First they drive in every direction and hurl missiles, generally throwing the ranks into disorder by the very terror inspired by their horses and the clatter of their wheels. Once they have worked their way between the squadrons of cavalry, they leap down from their chariots and fight on foot.

SECTION 4.33.2
Meanwhile, the drivers gradually withdraw from the battle and position the chariots so that, if their warriors are hard-pressed by a mass of enemies, they have a ready means of retreat to their own men.

SECTION 4.33.3
Thus in battle they combine the mobility of cavalry with the steadiness of infantry; and by daily practice and training they acquire such skill that, even on sloping and precipitous ground, they are accustomed to check their horses at full gallop, bring them under control and turn them in an instant, run along the chariot pole, stand upon the yoke, and then return from there into their chariots with the greatest speed.

CHAPTER 4.34

SECTION 4.34.1
While our men were disordered by these tactics [and by the unfamiliar form of fighting], Caesar brought assistance at the most opportune moment. At his arrival, the enemy halted, and our men recovered from their fear.

SECTION 4.34.2
After this, Caesar judged the moment unfavorable for provoking the enemy and joining battle. He therefore kept his force in position and, after a short interval, led the legions back to camp.

SECTION 4.34.3
While this was taking place, with all our men occupied, the rest of the enemy who were in the fields withdrew.

SECTION 4.34.4
Several days of uninterrupted storms followed, which both kept our men within camp and prevented the enemy from fighting.

SECTION 4.34.5
Meanwhile the barbarians sent messengers in every direction, proclaimed to their people how few our soldiers were, and showed them what an opportunity they had to win plunder and secure their freedom forever if they drove the Romans from their camp. By these means they quickly assembled a great force of infantry and cavalry and came against the camp.

CHAPTER 4.35

SECTION 4.35.1
Although Caesar foresaw that the same thing would happen as on the preceding days—that if the enemy were routed, they would escape danger by their speed—he nevertheless took advantage of the presence of about thirty horsemen whom Commius the Atrebatian, mentioned above, had brought across with him, and drew up the legions in battle formation before the camp.

SECTION 4.35.2
When battle was joined, the enemy could not long withstand the charge of our soldiers and turned their backs.

SECTION 4.35.3
Our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength permitted and killed a considerable number of them; then, after setting fire to every building far and wide, they returned to camp.

CHAPTER 4.36

SECTION 4.36.1
On the same day envoys sent by the enemy came to Caesar to sue for peace.

SECTION 4.36.2
Caesar doubled the number of hostages he had previously required of them and ordered these to be brought to the continent, because the equinox was near and he did not think that, with his ships in poor condition, he should expose the voyage to the hazards of winter.

SECTION 4.36.3
Finding favorable weather, he himself set sail shortly after midnight,

SECTION 4.36.4
and all the ships reached the continent safely; but two of the transports could not make the same harbors as the others and were carried a little farther down the coast.

CHAPTER 4.37

SECTION 4.37.1
When about three hundred soldiers had disembarked from these ships and were making for the camp, the Morini, whom Caesar had left at peace when he departed for Britain, were tempted by the hope of plunder and at first surrounded them with no very large number of their men, ordering them to lay down their arms if they did not wish to be killed.

SECTION 4.37.2
When our men formed a circle and defended themselves, about six thousand men quickly gathered at the shouting. When this was reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry from the camp to aid his men.

SECTION 4.37.3
Meanwhile our soldiers withstood the enemy’s attack and fought with the utmost courage for more than four hours; though they suffered only a few wounds, they killed a considerable number of the enemy.

SECTION 4.37.4
But as soon as our cavalry came into sight, the enemy threw away their weapons and turned their backs, and a great number of them were killed.

CHAPTER 4.38

SECTION 4.38.1
The next day Caesar sent his lieutenant Titus Labienus, with the legions he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini who had rebelled.

SECTION 4.38.2
Since, because the marshes had dried up, they had no place to which they could retreat—the refuge they had used the previous year—almost all of them fell into Labienus’s power.

SECTION 4.38.3
But the lieutenants Quintus Titurius and Lucius Cotta, who had led their legions into the territory of the Menapii, laid waste all their lands, cut down their grain, and burned their buildings; then, because all the Menapii had hidden themselves in the densest forests, they returned to Caesar.

SECTION 4.38.4
Caesar established the winter quarters of all the legions among the Belgae. Only two states in all Britain sent hostages there; the rest neglected to do so.

SECTION 4.38.5
After these achievements, the senate, upon receiving Caesar’s dispatch, decreed a public thanksgiving of twenty days.

### Book 5

CHAPTER 5.1

SECTION 5.1.1
In the consulship of Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius, Caesar, on leaving winter quarters for Italy, as he was accustomed to do every year, ordered the lieutenants whom he had placed in command of the legions to see that as many ships as possible were built during the winter and that the old ones were repaired. He specified their dimensions and design.

SECTION 5.1.2
To permit rapid loading and hauling ashore, he made them somewhat lower than the vessels we ordinarily use on our own sea, especially because he had learned that the frequent changes of the tides prevented the waves there from becoming very large; to carry cargo and transport large numbers of pack animals, he made them somewhat broader than those we use on other seas.

SECTION 5.1.3
He ordered all these ships to be built for swift movement under oars, a purpose greatly aided by their low profile.

SECTION 5.1.4
He ordered the equipment needed to rig the ships to be brought from Spain.

SECTION 5.1.5
He himself, after completing the assizes in Cisalpine Gaul, set out for Illyricum, because he had heard that the Pirustae were ravaging the neighboring part of the province with their incursions.

SECTION 5.1.6
When he arrived there, he ordered the states to furnish soldiers and directed them to assemble at a fixed place.

SECTION 5.1.7
When this was reported to them, the Pirustae sent envoys to him to explain that none of these acts had been committed by public decision, and they declared themselves ready to make satisfaction for the injuries by every means.

SECTION 5.1.8
After hearing their plea, Caesar demanded hostages and ordered them to be brought by a fixed date; unless they did so, he declared that he would wage war against their state.

SECTION 5.1.9
When the hostages were brought on the appointed day, as he had ordered, he appointed arbitrators between the states to assess the damages and determine the penalty.

CHAPTER 5.2

SECTION 5.2.1
After settling these matters and completing the assizes, he returned to Cisalpine Gaul and from there set out for the army.

SECTION 5.2.2
When he arrived, he made a circuit of all the winter quarters and found that, despite an extreme scarcity of every material, the extraordinary zeal of the soldiers had produced about six hundred ships of the kind described above and twenty-eight warships, all fully equipped and not far from being ready for launching within a few days.

SECTION 5.2.3
After warmly praising the soldiers and those who had supervised the work, he explained what he wished done and ordered all the forces to assemble at Portus Itius, from which he had learned that the passage to Britain was most convenient, the crossing from the continent being about thirty miles. He left behind what seemed a sufficient number of soldiers for this task;

SECTION 5.2.4
he himself set out with four lightly equipped legions and eight hundred cavalry for the territory of the Treveri, because they neither attended the councils nor obeyed his commands and were said to be inciting the Germans across the Rhine.

CHAPTER 5.3

SECTION 5.3.1
This state possesses by far the strongest cavalry in all Gaul, has large infantry forces, and borders upon the Rhine, as we have shown above.

SECTION 5.3.2
In this state two men, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were contending with each other for supremacy;

SECTION 5.3.3
one of them, as soon as Caesar’s approach with the legions became known, came to him, affirmed that he and all his followers would remain loyal and would not abandon the friendship of the Roman people, and informed him of what was taking place among the Treveri.

SECTION 5.3.4
Indutiomarus, however, began gathering cavalry and infantry and preparing for war, after concealing in the Ardennes Forest those who by reason of age were unable to bear arms. This forest, immense in extent, stretches through the middle of the Treveran territory from the Rhine to the borders of the Remi.

SECTION 5.3.5
But afterward, when a number of leading men of that state, influenced by their friendship with Cingetorix and alarmed by the arrival of our army, came to Caesar and began making private requests concerning their own affairs, since they could do nothing for the state, Indutiomarus, fearing that everyone would desert him, sent envoys to Caesar:

SECTION 5.3.6
he had been unwilling, they said, to leave his people and come to Caesar so that he might more easily keep the state loyal, and so that, with all the nobles gone, the common people might not stray through lack of judgment;

SECTION 5.3.7
the state was therefore under his control, and, if Caesar permitted, he would come to him in camp and entrust both his own fortunes and those of his state to Caesar’s protection.

CHAPTER 5.4

SECTION 5.4.1
Although Caesar understood why this was being said and what circumstance was deterring Indutiomarus from his original plan, nevertheless, to avoid being forced to spend the summer among the Treveri when all preparations had been made for the war in Britain, he ordered Indutiomarus to come to him with two hundred hostages.

SECTION 5.4.2
When these were brought, including his son and all his relatives, whom Caesar had summoned by name, Caesar reassured Indutiomarus and urged him to remain loyal;

SECTION 5.4.3
nevertheless, he summoned the leading men of the Treveri to him and reconciled each of them individually to Cingetorix. He understood that Cingetorix’s services deserved this treatment from him, and he also considered it highly important that the authority of a man whose exceptional devotion to him he had clearly perceived should carry the greatest possible weight among his own people.

SECTION 5.4.4
Indutiomarus bitterly resented this action, since it diminished his influence among his people; and though he had already been hostile to us, this indignity inflamed his resentment far more fiercely.

CHAPTER 5.5

SECTION 5.5.1
After settling these matters, Caesar reached Portus Itius with the legions.

SECTION 5.5.2
There he learned that sixty ships built in the territory of the Meldi had been driven back by a storm, had been unable to hold their course, and had returned to the place from which they had departed. He found the rest ready to sail and fully equipped with everything necessary.

SECTION 5.5.3
The cavalry of all Gaul, four thousand strong, assembled there as well, together with the leading men from every state.

SECTION 5.5.4
Of these Caesar had decided to leave in Gaul only a very few whose loyalty to him he had proved, and to take the rest with him as hostages, because he feared a rising in Gaul during his absence.

CHAPTER 5.6

SECTION 5.6.1
Among the others was the Aeduan Dumnorix, whom we have mentioned before. Caesar had particularly resolved to take him along, because he knew him to be eager for revolution, eager for power, bold in spirit, and a man of great authority among the Gauls.

SECTION 5.6.2
Added to this was the fact that Dumnorix had declared in the council of the Aedui that Caesar was offering him the kingship of the state. The Aedui deeply resented this statement, yet did not dare send envoys to Caesar either to reject the proposal or to entreat him not to carry it out.

SECTION 5.6.3
Caesar had learned of the matter from his personal guests. At first Dumnorix strove with every entreaty to be left in Gaul, partly because, being unaccustomed to sailing, he feared the sea, and partly because he said that religious scruples prevented him.

SECTION 5.6.4
When he saw that his request was being firmly refused and that all hope of obtaining it had been taken away, he began soliciting the leading men of Gaul, taking them aside one by one and urging them to remain on the continent;

SECTION 5.6.5
he tried to frighten them, saying that it was not without reason that Gaul was being stripped of all her nobility; this was Caesar’s design—to carry over to Britain and kill there all those whom he was afraid to put to death before the eyes of Gaul;

SECTION 5.6.6
he pledged his word to the others and demanded an oath that they would act by common agreement in whatever manner they judged best for the interests of Gaul. These activities were reported to Caesar by a number of men.

CHAPTER 5.7

SECTION 5.7.1
When Caesar learned of this, because he attached so much importance to the standing of the Aeduan state, he determined that Dumnorix must be restrained and deterred by whatever means he could employ;

SECTION 5.7.2
and since he saw that the man’s madness was going too far, he had to take precautions lest Dumnorix be able to harm either him or the republic. He therefore remained in that place for about twenty-five days,

SECTION 5.7.3
because the northwest wind, which commonly blows in that region for a large part of every season, was preventing the voyage. During this time he took care to keep Dumnorix loyal, while nevertheless learning of all his designs.

SECTION 5.7.4
At last, finding favorable weather, he ordered the soldiers and cavalry to embark.

SECTION 5.7.5
But while everyone’s attention was occupied, Dumnorix, without Caesar’s knowledge, began leaving the camp for home with the Aeduan cavalry.

SECTION 5.7.6
When this was reported, Caesar suspended the departure, set every other matter aside, and sent a large part of the cavalry in pursuit, with orders to bring him back;

SECTION 5.7.7
if he offered resistance and refused to obey, Caesar ordered them to kill him, judging that a man who had disregarded his authority while he was present would do nothing rational during his absence.

SECTION 5.7.8
For when Dumnorix was ordered to return, he began to resist, defend himself by force, and appeal to the loyalty of his followers, repeatedly shouting that he was a free man and belonged to a free state.

SECTION 5.7.9
The cavalrymen, as they had been ordered, surrounded the man and killed him; all the Aeduan horsemen then returned to Caesar.

CHAPTER 5.8

SECTION 5.8.1
After these events, Caesar left Labienus on the continent with three legions and two thousand cavalry to guard the ports, provide for the grain supply, learn what was happening in Gaul, and adopt whatever measures circumstances and events required.

SECTION 5.8.2
He himself, with five legions and a number of cavalry equal to that which he had left on the continent, set sail at sunset. Carried forward by a gentle southwest wind, he failed to hold his course when the wind died about midnight; borne too far by the tide, at daybreak he saw Britain lying behind him on the left.

SECTION 5.8.3
Then, following the turn of the tide, he again strained at the oars to reach that part of the island where he had learned the preceding summer that a landing could best be made.

SECTION 5.8.4
In this the soldiers’ courage was especially worthy of praise, for in transports and heavily laden vessels, without any respite from the labor of rowing, they matched the speed of the warships.

SECTION 5.8.5
All the ships reached Britain at about noon, and no enemy was seen at that place;

SECTION 5.8.6
but, as Caesar afterward learned from prisoners, although large forces had assembled there, they had been terrified by the multitude of ships—more than eight hundred appearing at one time when those from the previous year and the private vessels each man had built for his own convenience were included—and had withdrawn from the shore and concealed themselves on the higher ground.

CHAPTER 5.9

SECTION 5.9.1
Caesar disembarked the army and selected a suitable site for camp. When he learned from prisoners where the enemy’s forces had taken position, he left ten cohorts and three hundred cavalry by the sea to guard the ships and, during the third watch, marched against the enemy. He felt less concern for the ships because he was leaving them moored at anchor on a soft, open shore,

SECTION 5.9.2
and he placed Quintus Atrius in command of the guard over them. Advancing by night for about twelve miles, Caesar sighted the enemy’s forces.

SECTION 5.9.3
They advanced with cavalry and chariots to the river and, from the higher ground, began trying to bar our advance and engaging us in battle.

SECTION 5.9.4
Driven back by our cavalry, they concealed themselves in the woods, having found a position exceptionally well fortified both by nature and by human labor, which they appeared to have prepared earlier for a war among themselves;

SECTION 5.9.5
for all the approaches had been blocked by felling trees at close intervals.

SECTION 5.9.6
They themselves fought from the woods in scattered groups and prevented our men from entering the fortifications.

SECTION 5.9.7
But the soldiers of the Seventh Legion formed a tortoise, raised an earthwork against the fortifications, captured the position, and drove them from the woods, suffering only a few wounds.

SECTION 5.9.8
Caesar, however, forbade them to pursue the fugitives too far, both because he did not know the nature of the terrain and because, with a large part of the day already spent, he wished to leave time for fortifying the camp.

CHAPTER 5.10

SECTION 5.10.1
Early the following day he sent the infantry and cavalry out in three divisions to pursue those who had fled.

SECTION 5.10.2
After they had advanced some distance, when the rear of the column was still in sight, horsemen came to Caesar from Quintus Atrius to report that a violent storm had arisen the previous night and that almost all the ships had been damaged and cast upon the shore, since neither anchors nor cables had held fast, nor had the sailors and helmsmen been able to withstand the force of the tempest;

SECTION 5.10.3
and thus the collision of the ships had caused heavy damage.

CHAPTER 5.11

SECTION 5.11.1
On learning this, Caesar ordered the legions and cavalry to be recalled and to halt on the march; he himself returned to the ships.

SECTION 5.11.2
He saw with his own eyes almost exactly what he had learned from the messengers and dispatches: about forty ships had been lost, while the rest appeared capable of repair, though only with great difficulty.

SECTION 5.11.3
He therefore selected craftsmen from the legions and ordered others to be summoned from the mainland;

SECTION 5.11.4
he wrote to Labienus instructing him to build as many ships as possible with the legions under his command.

SECTION 5.11.5
For his own part, though the undertaking required great effort and labor, he decided that the best course was to haul all the ships ashore and connect them with the camp by a single fortification.

SECTION 5.11.6
He spent about ten days on these operations, without suspending the soldiers’ labor even during the night.

SECTION 5.11.7
When the ships had been hauled ashore and the camp excellently fortified, he left the same forces as before to guard the ships; he himself set out for the place from which he had returned.

SECTION 5.11.8
When he arrived there, larger forces of Britons had already assembled from every quarter, and by common consent supreme command and direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose territory is separated from the maritime states by a river called the Thames, about eighty miles from the sea.

SECTION 5.11.9
In former times he had been continually at war with the other states; but the Britons, alarmed by our arrival, had placed him in command of the entire war and of all their forces.

CHAPTER 5.12

SECTION 5.12.1
The interior of Britain is inhabited by people who, according to their own tradition, were born on the island;

SECTION 5.12.2
the coastal region, by those who crossed over from Belgic territory for the sake of plunder and warfare—all of whom are called, for the most part, by the names of the states from which they sprang and from which they came there—and who, after making war, remained there and began to cultivate the land.

SECTION 5.12.3
The population is immense, the farmsteads exceedingly numerous and generally like those of Gaul, and the number of cattle is great.

SECTION 5.12.4
They use either bronze, or gold coins, or iron bars adjusted to a fixed weight as currency.

SECTION 5.12.5
Tin is found there in the inland regions and iron along the coast, though only in small quantities; the bronze they use is imported. Timber of every kind is found as in Gaul, except beech and fir.

SECTION 5.12.6
They consider it unlawful to eat hare, chicken, or goose, though they raise these creatures for pleasure and amusement. The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, with less severe cold.

CHAPTER 5.13

SECTION 5.13.1
The island is triangular by nature, and one of its sides faces Gaul. Of the two corners of this side, the one by Kent, where almost all ships from Gaul put in, faces east; the lower one faces south. This side extends for about five hundred miles.

SECTION 5.13.2
The second side slopes toward Spain and the west; on this side lies Ireland, believed to be half the size of Britain, though the crossing to it is equal in distance to that from Gaul to Britain.

SECTION 5.13.3
Midway on this passage is an island called Mona; in addition, several smaller islands are believed to lie offshore, and some writers have recorded that at the winter solstice night lasts there for thirty consecutive days.

SECTION 5.13.4
We could discover nothing about this from our inquiries, except that, by exact measurements with a water clock, we observed that the nights were shorter than on the mainland.

SECTION 5.13.5
The length of this side, according to their reckoning, is seven hundred miles.

SECTION 5.13.6
The third side faces north; no land lies opposite it, but the corner of this side points chiefly toward Germany. It is believed to extend eight hundred miles in length.

SECTION 5.13.7
Thus the whole island measures two thousand miles in circumference.

CHAPTER 5.14

SECTION 5.14.1
Of all these peoples, by far the most civilized are those who inhabit Kent, a region lying wholly along the coast, and their customs differ little from those of the Gauls.

SECTION 5.14.2
Most of the inhabitants of the interior do not sow grain, but live on milk and meat and are clothed in skins. All the Britons, however, stain themselves with woad, which produces a blue color, and this makes their appearance in battle all the more terrifying;

SECTION 5.14.3
they wear their hair long and shave every part of the body except the head and upper lip.

SECTION 5.14.4
Groups of ten or twelve men have wives in common, especially brothers with brothers and fathers with sons; but the children born of these unions are regarded as belonging to the man to whom each woman was first given as a virgin.

CHAPTER 5.15

SECTION 5.15.1
The enemy’s cavalry and charioteers fought fiercely with our cavalry along the line of march; nevertheless, our men gained the advantage everywhere and drove them into the woods and hills.

SECTION 5.15.2
But after killing a number of them, our men pursued too eagerly and lost some of their own.

SECTION 5.15.3
After an interval, however, while our men were off their guard and occupied in fortifying the camp, the enemy suddenly burst from the woods, charged those who had been posted on guard before the camp,

SECTION 5.15.4
and fought fiercely. Caesar sent two cohorts to their support, the leading cohorts of two legions; but though these had taken position with only a very narrow space between them, the enemy, while our men were dismayed by this unfamiliar manner of fighting, dashed through their midst with the greatest daring and withdrew safely.

SECTION 5.15.5
On that day Quintus Laberius Durus, a military tribune, was killed. The enemy were driven back when more cohorts were sent forward.

CHAPTER 5.16

SECTION 5.16.1
Throughout this entire engagement, fought before the eyes of everyone and in front of the camp, it became clear that the weight of our men’s armor made them less suited to fight an enemy of this kind, since they could neither pursue them when they retreated nor dared leave the standards;

SECTION 5.16.2
the cavalry, meanwhile, fought at great peril, because the enemy often retreated deliberately and, after drawing our horsemen a short distance away from the legions, leaped down from their chariots and fought on foot on unequal terms.

SECTION 5.16.3
The nature of the cavalry action, moreover, exposed both those who retreated and those who pursued to equal and identical danger.

SECTION 5.16.4
Added to this was the fact that they never fought in a close mass, but in scattered groups with wide intervals between them, and had detachments posted in reserve; each group relieved another in succession, and fresh, unwearied men took the place of those who were exhausted.

CHAPTER 5.17

SECTION 5.17.1
The next day the enemy took position on the hills at some distance from the camp, showed themselves only in scattered groups, and began to challenge our cavalry to battle less vigorously than on the preceding day.

SECTION 5.17.2
But at noon, when Caesar had sent three legions and all the cavalry under the legate Gaius Trebonius to forage, they suddenly swept down upon the foragers from every quarter, pressing so close that they did not draw away from the standards and legions.

SECTION 5.17.3
Our men charged them fiercely and drove them back, never ceasing their pursuit, until the cavalry, confident of support when they saw the legions behind them,

SECTION 5.17.4
drove the enemy headlong and, after killing a great number of them, gave them no opportunity to rally, make a stand, or leap down from their chariots.

SECTION 5.17.5
Immediately after this rout, the auxiliary forces that had assembled from every quarter dispersed, and from that time onward the enemy never again opposed us with their full strength.

CHAPTER 5.18

SECTION 5.18.1
Having learned their plan, Caesar led his army to the River Thames, into the territory of Cassivellaunus. This river can be crossed on foot at only one place, and even there only with difficulty.

SECTION 5.18.2
When he arrived, he observed that large enemy forces were drawn up on the opposite bank of the river;

SECTION 5.18.3
the bank was fortified with sharp stakes planted along it, and stakes of the same kind had been driven beneath the water and were concealed by the river.

SECTION 5.18.4
After learning these facts from prisoners and deserters, Caesar sent the cavalry ahead and ordered the legions to follow at once.

SECTION 5.18.5
But the soldiers advanced with such speed and force, though only their heads rose above the water, that the enemy could not withstand the charge of the legions and cavalry, but abandoned the banks and took to flight.

CHAPTER 5.19

SECTION 5.19.1
Cassivellaunus, as we have explained above, abandoned all hope of a pitched struggle, dismissed the greater part of his forces, and retained about four thousand charioteers. He watched our line of march, withdrew a short distance from the road, and concealed himself in rough and wooded country. In those districts through which he had learned that we intended to march, he drove the cattle and inhabitants from the fields into the woods; and,

SECTION 5.19.2
whenever our cavalry ranged more freely into the countryside for the sake of plunder and devastation, he sent his charioteers out of the woods by every road and path. They engaged our horsemen at great risk to our men and, by inspiring this fear, prevented them from roaming farther afield.

SECTION 5.19.3
The only course left was for Caesar not to permit his men to move any great distance from the column of legions, and for the enemy to suffer no more harm from the devastation of their fields and the burning of their property than the legionaries could inflict through their own labor and the extent of their march.

CHAPTER 5.20

SECTION 5.20.1
Meanwhile the Trinobantes, nearly the strongest state in that region, sent envoys to Caesar and promised to surrender to him and obey his commands. From this state the young Mandubracius, placing himself under Caesar’s protection, had come to him on the mainland of Gaul. Mandubracius’s father had held the kingship in that state and had been killed by Cassivellaunus, while Mandubracius himself had escaped death by flight.

SECTION 5.20.2
They asked Caesar to protect Mandubracius from violence at the hands of Cassivellaunus and to send him back to their state to govern it and hold supreme authority.

SECTION 5.20.3
Caesar demanded forty hostages and grain for the army, and sent Mandubracius to them.

SECTION 5.20.4
They swiftly fulfilled his commands, sending the required number of hostages and the grain.

CHAPTER 5.21

SECTION 5.21.1
After the Trinobantes had been taken under his protection and safeguarded from every injury by the soldiers, the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, and Cassi sent embassies and surrendered to Caesar.

SECTION 5.21.2
From them he learned that Cassivellaunus’s stronghold lay not far from that place, protected by woods and marshes, and that a considerable number of people and cattle had gathered there.

SECTION 5.21.3
The Britons call it a stronghold when they fortify a dense woodland with rampart and ditch, a place where they are accustomed to assemble in order to escape hostile incursions.

SECTION 5.21.4
He marched there with the legions and found the place excellently fortified both by nature and by human labor; nevertheless, he undertook to assault it from two sides.

SECTION 5.21.5
The enemy held their ground for a short time, but could not withstand the assault of our soldiers and rushed out from another side of the stronghold.

SECTION 5.21.6
A great number of cattle were found there, and many of the enemy were overtaken and killed in their flight.

CHAPTER 5.22

SECTION 5.22.1
While these operations were taking place in that region, Cassivellaunus sent messengers to Kent, which, as we explained above, lies by the sea. Four kings ruled those districts—Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax—and he ordered them to collect all their forces and make a sudden assault upon the naval camp.

SECTION 5.22.2
When they came to the camp, our men made a sortie, killed many of them, captured even the distinguished leader Lugotorix, and brought their own men back unharmed.

SECTION 5.22.3
When news of this battle reached Cassivellaunus, after he had suffered so many reverses and seen his territory laid waste, and especially because he was deeply shaken by the defection of the states, he sent envoys through Commius the Atrebatian to Caesar to negotiate his surrender.

SECTION 5.22.4
Caesar had decided to winter on the mainland because of the sudden disturbances in Gaul. Since little of the summer remained and he understood that the negotiations could easily be drawn out, he demanded hostages and fixed the annual tribute Britain was to pay to the Roman people;

SECTION 5.22.5
he strictly commanded Cassivellaunus not to harm Mandubracius or the Trinobantes.

CHAPTER 5.23

SECTION 5.23.1
After receiving the hostages, Caesar led the army back to the sea and found the ships repaired.

SECTION 5.23.2
When they had been launched, because he had a great number of prisoners and some of the ships had been lost in the storm, he decided to carry the army back in two crossings.

SECTION 5.23.3
And so it happened that, despite so many ships and so many voyages, not a single ship carrying soldiers was lost, either that year

SECTION 5.23.4
or the year before; but of those sent back empty to him from the mainland, both after landing the soldiers of the first crossing and among the sixty that Labienus had afterward caused to be built, very few reached their destination, while nearly all the rest were driven back.

SECTION 5.23.5
After Caesar had waited for them in vain for some time, he feared that the season of the year would prevent him from sailing,

SECTION 5.23.6
since the equinox was approaching. He therefore had no choice but to crowd the soldiers more closely aboard; and when a perfect calm came on, he set sail at the beginning of the second watch, reached land at daybreak, and brought every ship safely into port.

CHAPTER 5.24

SECTION 5.24.1
After the ships had been hauled ashore and a council of the Gauls held at Samarobriva, Caesar was compelled, because the grain crop in Gaul that year had been scantier on account of drought, to quarter his army for the winter differently from previous years and to distribute the legions among a larger number of states.

SECTION 5.24.2
Of these, he assigned one legion to the legate Gaius Fabius to lead into the territory of the Morini, another to Quintus Cicero among the Nervii, and a third to Lucius Roscius among the Esubii; he ordered a fourth to winter among the Remi with Titus Labienus, on the frontier of the Treveri. He stationed three among the Belgae,

SECTION 5.24.3
placing the quaestor Marcus Crassus and the legates Lucius Munatius Plancus and Gaius Trebonius in command of them.

SECTION 5.24.4
He sent one legion, which he had most recently raised beyond the Po, and five cohorts into the territory of the Eburones, the greater part of whom dwell between the Meuse and the Rhine and were under the rule of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus.

SECTION 5.24.5
He ordered the legates Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta to command these troops.

SECTION 5.24.6
By distributing the legions in this manner, he believed that he could most easily remedy the shortage of grain.

SECTION 5.24.7
Nevertheless, the winter quarters of all these legions, except the one he had assigned to Lucius Roscius to lead into a thoroughly pacified and tranquil region, lay within a radius of one hundred miles.

SECTION 5.24.8
Meanwhile Caesar himself decided to remain in Gaul until he learned that the legions had been stationed and their winter quarters fortified.

CHAPTER 5.25

SECTION 5.25.1
Among the Carnutes there was a man of the highest birth named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had held the kingship in their state.

SECTION 5.25.2
In recognition of his courage and goodwill toward Caesar, whose exceptional services Caesar had employed in all his wars, Caesar had restored him to the position of his ancestors.

SECTION 5.25.3
He was now in the third year of his reign when his enemies murdered him, with many men of his state openly supporting the deed.

SECTION 5.25.4
The matter was reported to Caesar. Fearing, because many men were implicated, that their influence might cause the state to revolt, he ordered Lucius Plancus to march rapidly with his legion from Belgic territory into the country of the Carnutes and winter there, and to arrest and send to him those whom he learned to have been responsible for Tasgetius’s murder.

SECTION 5.25.5
Meanwhile, all the legates and the quaestor to whom he had entrusted the legions informed him that they had reached their winter quarters and had fortified their positions.

CHAPTER 5.26

SECTION 5.26.1
About fifteen days after the troops had entered winter quarters, a sudden uprising and revolt began under Ambiorix and Catuvolcus.

SECTION 5.26.2
Although they had met Sabinus and Cotta at the borders of their kingdom and had brought grain into the winter quarters, they were incited by messages from Indutiomarus of the Treveri, roused their people, suddenly overpowered the soldiers who were gathering wood, and came with a large force to attack the camp.

SECTION 5.26.3
Our men quickly took up arms and mounted the rampart; and when, by sending out the Spanish cavalry on one side, they gained the advantage in the cavalry engagement, the enemy despaired of success and withdrew their men from the attack.

SECTION 5.26.4
Then, in their customary manner, they shouted that one of our men should come forward for a conference: they had something to say concerning the common interest, and hoped that what they had to offer might lessen the points at issue.

CHAPTER 5.27

SECTION 5.27.1
Gaius Arpineius, a Roman knight and friend of Quintus Titurius, and a certain Quintus Junius from Spain, who had previously been accustomed to visit Ambiorix on Caesar’s missions, were sent to confer with them. To these men Ambiorix spoke as follows:

SECTION 5.27.2
He acknowledged that he owed Caesar a very great debt for the benefits Caesar had conferred upon him: through Caesar’s intervention he had been freed from the tribute he had been accustomed to pay to the Aduatuci, his neighbors; and Caesar had restored to him both his son and his brother’s son, whom the Aduatuci, after receiving them as hostages, had kept among themselves in slavery and in chains.

SECTION 5.27.3
As for his attack upon the camp, he had acted neither upon his own judgment nor of his own free will, but under compulsion from his people; and his authority was of such a kind that the multitude had no less power over him than he himself had over the multitude.

SECTION 5.27.4
The reason his state had gone to war was that it had been unable to resist the sudden conspiracy of the Gauls. He could readily prove this from his own humble position, for he was not so inexperienced in affairs as to trust that the Roman people could be defeated by his forces.

SECTION 5.27.5
But this was the common design of Gaul: the present day had been appointed for attacks upon all Caesar’s winter quarters, so that no legion could come to the assistance of another.

SECTION 5.27.6
It had not been easy for Gauls to refuse Gauls, especially when the design appeared to have been undertaken for the recovery of their common liberty.

SECTION 5.27.7
Since he had now satisfied their claims upon his loyalty, he was mindful of the duty he owed in return for Caesar’s benefits: in the name of their bond of hospitality, he warned and implored Titurius to provide for his own safety and that of his soldiers.

SECTION 5.27.8
A large force of hired Germans had crossed the Rhine and would arrive in two days.

SECTION 5.27.9
It was for the Romans themselves to decide whether, before the neighboring peoples learned of it, they wished to lead their soldiers out of winter quarters and take them either to Cicero or to Labienus, one of whom was about fifty miles away, the other a little farther.

SECTION 5.27.10
This much he promised and confirmed by oath: he would grant them safe passage through his territory.

SECTION 5.27.11
In doing so, he would both serve his own state, which would be relieved of the winter quarters, and repay Caesar’s kindness for the benefits he had conferred. Having delivered this speech, Ambiorix departed.

CHAPTER 5.28

SECTION 5.28.1
Arpineius and Junius reported to the legates what they had heard. Though deeply disturbed by the sudden turn of events, the legates judged that, even if the statements came from an enemy, they should not be disregarded. They were especially troubled by the fact that it was scarcely credible that the obscure and insignificant state of the Eburones would have dared on its own initiative to make war upon the Roman people.

SECTION 5.28.2
They therefore referred the matter to a council, and a great dispute arose among them.

SECTION 5.28.3
Lucius Aurunculeius, several military tribunes, and the centurions of the senior ranks believed that nothing should be done rashly and that they should not leave winter quarters without Caesar’s orders. They pointed out that forces of any size, even large bodies of Germans, could be held off from fortified winter quarters. The facts themselves bore witness to this, since they had withstood the enemy’s first assault with the greatest courage and had inflicted many wounds besides. They were not pressed for provisions; meanwhile, relief would arrive both from the nearest winter quarters and from Caesar. Finally, what could be more frivolous or more shameful than to take counsel on matters of the highest importance at an enemy’s prompting?

CHAPTER 5.29

SECTION 5.29.1
Titurius, on the other hand, kept shouting that they would act too late once larger forces of the enemy had assembled with the Germans added to them, or once some disaster had been suffered in the nearest winter quarters. The opportunity for deliberation was brief. He believed that Caesar had departed for Italy.

SECTION 5.29.2
Otherwise, the Carnutes would never have formed their plan to kill Tasgetius, nor, if Caesar were present, would the Eburones have come against the camp with such contempt for us.

SECTION 5.29.3
He was looking not to the enemy as an adviser, but to the facts: the Rhine was close at hand; the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories caused the Germans bitter resentment.

SECTION 5.29.4
Gaul, reduced beneath the dominion of the Roman people after suffering so many humiliations and seeing its former military glory extinguished, was ablaze with anger.

SECTION 5.29.5
Finally, who could persuade himself that Ambiorix would have resorted to such a plan without certain knowledge of the facts?

SECTION 5.29.6
His own proposal was safe in either event: if nothing very serious was afoot, they would reach the nearest legion without any danger; but if all Gaul were in league with the Germans, their only hope of safety lay in speed.

SECTION 5.29.7
What outcome could Cotta’s plan, and that of those who disagreed with him, possibly have? Even if it held no immediate danger, they must certainly fear starvation in a protracted siege.

CHAPTER 5.30

SECTION 5.30.1
After these arguments had been advanced on both sides, and while Cotta and the senior centurions continued to resist vehemently, Sabinus said, “Have it your way, if that is what you wish,” speaking in a louder voice so that a large part of the soldiers could hear him.

SECTION 5.30.2
“I am not the man among you,” he said, “who is most terrified by the danger of death. These men will understand; if anything more serious happens, they will demand an accounting from you,

SECTION 5.30.3
when, if you allowed it, they could join the nearest winter quarters the day after tomorrow and face the common fortunes of war together with the rest, instead of being cast off and banished far from their comrades to perish either by the sword or by starvation.”

CHAPTER 5.31

SECTION 5.31.1
The council rose. The members took hold of both commanders and begged them not to bring matters into the greatest danger through their disagreement and obstinacy.

SECTION 5.31.2
The situation would be manageable, whether they remained or departed, provided only that all held and approved a single view; in disagreement, on the other hand, they could see no hope of safety. The debate continued until midnight.

SECTION 5.31.3
At last Cotta, overcome by their appeals, yielded. Sabinus’s opinion prevailed. It was announced that they would depart at daybreak.

SECTION 5.31.4
The remainder of the night was spent awake, as each soldier looked over his belongings to see what he could carry with him and what part of the equipment of the winter quarters he would be forced to leave behind.

SECTION 5.31.5
Every possible reason was devised to show that remaining would not be without danger, while the soldiers’ exhaustion and loss of sleep only increased that danger.

SECTION 5.31.6
At daybreak they marched out of the camp as though they had been convinced that the advice had come not from an enemy but from their dearest friend Ambiorix, proceeding in a very long column and burdened with an enormous train of baggage.

CHAPTER 5.32

SECTION 5.32.1
But when the enemy learned from the nighttime commotion and wakefulness that the Romans intended to depart, they divided their forces in two and laid ambushes in the woods at a favorable and concealed position about two miles away, where they waited for the Romans to arrive.

SECTION 5.32.2
When the greater part of the column had descended into a broad, deep valley, they suddenly revealed themselves on both sides of it and began pressing the rear, blocking the vanguard from climbing out, and engaging our men on ground most unfavorable to them.

CHAPTER 5.33

SECTION 5.33.1
Only then did Titurius, who had foreseen nothing, begin to panic, run to and fro, and arrange the cohorts—and even these tasks he performed timidly and in such a way that he appeared at a loss in everything, as commonly happens to men who are forced to form their plans in the very midst of action.

SECTION 5.33.2
Cotta, however, who had considered that such things might happen on the march and for that reason had not favored their departure, failed the common safety in no respect. In calling upon and encouraging the soldiers he performed the duties of a commander, and in battle those of a common soldier.

SECTION 5.33.3
Because the length of the column made it difficult for them personally to attend to everything and determine what should be done at every point, they ordered an announcement to be made that the soldiers should abandon the baggage and form a circle.

SECTION 5.33.4
Although this decision cannot be condemned in such circumstances, it nevertheless had an unfortunate effect.

SECTION 5.33.5
It both diminished the confidence of our soldiers and made the enemy more eager for battle, since it appeared that such an order could have been given only in the utmost fear and desperation. Moreover, what was bound to happen did happen: soldiers everywhere left their standards, and each man hurried to the baggage to seek out and seize whatever he valued most, while shouting and weeping filled the whole scene.

CHAPTER 5.34

SECTION 5.34.1
But the barbarians were not at a loss for a plan. Their leaders ordered it proclaimed throughout the line that no man was to leave his position: the booty was theirs, and whatever the Romans abandoned was being reserved for them; therefore they should consider that everything depended upon victory.

SECTION 5.34.2
The two sides were evenly matched in courage and eagerness to fight. Although our men were abandoned by both their commander and fortune, they nevertheless placed all hope of safety in their valor; and whenever any cohort charged forward, a great number of the enemy fell on that side.

SECTION 5.34.3
Observing this, Ambiorix ordered it proclaimed that his men should cast their missiles from a distance and not approach too closely, but should give way in whatever direction the Romans attacked—for, because of their light arms and daily training, the Romans could do them no harm—

SECTION 5.34.4
and then pursue them as they withdrew again to their standards.

CHAPTER 5.35

SECTION 5.35.1
They observed this command with the greatest care: whenever any cohort left the circle and made a charge, the enemy retreated with the utmost speed.

SECTION 5.35.2
Meanwhile, that part of the formation was necessarily left exposed and received missiles upon its unprotected flank.

SECTION 5.35.3
Then, when the soldiers began to return to the position from which they had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had given way and by those who had remained close by.

SECTION 5.35.4
But if they chose to hold their ground, there was no scope left for valor, and, packed closely together, they could not evade the missiles cast by so great a multitude.

SECTION 5.35.5
Nevertheless, though beset by so many disadvantages and suffering many wounds, they continued to resist; and after a great part of the day had passed—for the fighting lasted from daybreak until the eighth hour—they did nothing unworthy of themselves.

SECTION 5.35.6
Then Titus Balventius, a brave man of great authority who in the previous year had served as chief centurion, had both thighs pierced by a heavy javelin.

SECTION 5.35.7
Quintus Lucanius, a centurion of the same rank, was killed while fighting with the utmost courage as he went to the aid of his surrounded son.

SECTION 5.35.8
Lucius Cotta, the legate, while encouraging all the cohorts and ranks, was struck full in the face by a sling-stone.

CHAPTER 5.36

SECTION 5.36.1
Shaken by these events, Quintus Titurius, seeing Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, sent his interpreter, Gnaeus Pompeius, to ask him to spare himself and his soldiers.

SECTION 5.36.2
When addressed, Ambiorix replied that if Titurius wished to confer with him, he was free to do so; he hoped that the multitude could be persuaded to grant what concerned the soldiers’ safety; Titurius himself, however, would suffer no harm, and upon this he pledged his word. Titurius communicated the proposal to the wounded Cotta:

SECTION 5.36.3
if Cotta approved, they should withdraw from the fighting and confer together with Ambiorix; Titurius hoped that they could obtain from him their own safety and that of the soldiers. Cotta refused to go to an armed enemy and persisted in his refusal.

CHAPTER 5.37

SECTION 5.37.1
Sabinus ordered the military tribunes and centurions of the senior ranks who were then around him to follow. When he had approached nearer to Ambiorix and was ordered to throw down his arms, he obeyed the command and ordered his men to do the same.

SECTION 5.37.2
Meanwhile, as they negotiated the terms and Ambiorix deliberately prolonged the conversation, Sabinus was gradually surrounded and killed.

SECTION 5.37.3
Then indeed the enemy, in their customary manner, shouted out their victory, raised a great howl, charged our men, and threw the ranks into confusion.

SECTION 5.37.4
There Lucius Cotta was killed fighting, together with the greater part of the soldiers. The rest withdrew into the camp from which they had set out.

SECTION 5.37.5
Among them, Lucius Petrosidius, the eagle-bearer, when hard pressed by a great mass of the enemy, hurled the eagle inside the rampart; he himself was killed while fighting with the utmost courage before the camp. The survivors barely sustained the attack until nightfall.

SECTION 5.37.6
During the night, despairing of safety, every one of them killed himself.

SECTION 5.37.7
A few who escaped from the battle made their way by uncertain paths through the woods to the winter quarters of the legate Titus Labienus and informed him of what had happened.

CHAPTER 5.38

SECTION 5.38.1
Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediately set out with his cavalry for the Aduatuci, whose territory bordered his kingdom. He halted neither by night nor by day and ordered the infantry to follow him.

SECTION 5.38.2
After explaining what had happened and rousing the Aduatuci, he reached the Nervii on the following day and urged them not to let slip the opportunity to free themselves forever and avenge upon the Romans the injuries they had suffered.

SECTION 5.38.3
He pointed out that two legates had been killed and that a large part of the army had perished.

SECTION 5.38.4
It would be no difficult matter, he said, to take by surprise and destroy the legion wintering with Cicero; he declared himself ready to assist in the undertaking. By this speech he easily persuaded the Nervii.

CHAPTER 5.39

SECTION 5.39.1
Accordingly, they immediately sent messengers to the Ceutrones, Grudii, Levaci, Pleumoxii, and Geidumni, all of whom were under their rule, mustered the largest forces they could, and swept unexpectedly upon Cicero’s winter quarters before news of Titurius’s death had yet reached him.

SECTION 5.39.2
There too the inevitable occurred: several soldiers who had gone into the woods to gather timber and obtain material for the fortifications were cut off by the sudden arrival of the cavalry.

SECTION 5.39.3
After surrounding them, the Eburones, Nervii, Aduatuci, and the allies and dependents of all these peoples began, in great force, to attack the legion. Our men quickly rushed to arms and mounted the rampart.

SECTION 5.39.4
That day was sustained only with difficulty, because the enemy placed all their hope in speed and trusted that, if they won this victory, they would be victorious forever.

CHAPTER 5.40

SECTION 5.40.1
Cicero immediately sent letters to Caesar, offering great rewards to the messengers if they delivered them; but because all the roads were beset, those he sent were intercepted.

SECTION 5.40.2
During the night, from the timber they had brought in for the fortifications, they raised about one hundred and twenty towers with incredible speed; whatever appeared to be lacking in the defensive works was completed.

SECTION 5.40.3
The next day the enemy, having assembled far greater forces, attacked the camp and filled in the ditch. Our men resisted in the same manner as on the day before.

SECTION 5.40.4
The same thing continued to happen on each succeeding day.

SECTION 5.40.5
No part of the night was left free from labor; neither the sick nor the wounded were given any opportunity to rest.

SECTION 5.40.6
Whatever was needed for the next day’s assault was prepared by night: great numbers of stakes hardened in the fire and a large supply of heavy wall-javelins were made ready; the towers were furnished with floors, and battlements and breastworks of wicker were constructed.

SECTION 5.40.7
Cicero himself, though in extremely poor health, did not allow himself even the nighttime for rest, until the soldiers of their own accord crowded around him and by their entreaties compelled him to spare himself.

CHAPTER 5.41

SECTION 5.41.1
Then the leaders and chief men of the Nervii who had some means of addressing Cicero and some claim to his friendship declared that they wished to confer with him.

SECTION 5.41.2
When permission was granted, they repeated the same assertions that Ambiorix had made to Titurius: all Gaul was under arms;

SECTION 5.41.3
the Germans had crossed the Rhine; Caesar’s winter quarters and those of the other commanders were under attack.

SECTION 5.41.4
They added an account of Sabinus’s death and displayed Ambiorix as a pledge of their truthfulness.

SECTION 5.41.5
They said that the Romans were mistaken if they expected any protection from men who had no confidence in their own position. Nevertheless, their own feelings toward Cicero and the Roman people were such that they objected to nothing but the establishment of winter quarters and did not wish this practice to become permanent:

SECTION 5.41.6
the Romans might depart from their winter quarters unharmed by them and proceed without fear in whatever direction they wished.

SECTION 5.41.7
To this Cicero made only one reply: it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept terms from an enemy under arms.

SECTION 5.41.8
If they were willing to lay down their arms, they might employ him as their advocate and send envoys to Caesar; he hoped that, in view of Caesar’s justice, they would obtain what they requested.

CHAPTER 5.42

SECTION 5.42.1
Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surrounded the winter quarters with a rampart nine feet high and a ditch fifteen feet wide.

SECTION 5.42.2
They had learned these methods from observing us in previous years and were also instructed by certain prisoners whom they held from our army;

SECTION 5.42.3
but since they possessed no supply of iron tools suited to this work, they were forced to cut the turf with their swords and remove the earth with their hands and cloaks.

SECTION 5.42.4
From this feat some idea of their great numbers could be formed, for in less than three hours they completed a circuit of fortifications fifteen thousand feet in circumference,

SECTION 5.42.5
and during the following days they began to prepare and construct towers as high as the rampart, grappling hooks, and covered galleries, all of which the same prisoners had taught them to make.

CHAPTER 5.43

SECTION 5.43.1
On the seventh day of the assault, when a violent wind arose, they began to sling red-hot bullets of molded clay and to hurl heated javelins upon the huts, which in the Gallic fashion were roofed with thatch.

SECTION 5.43.2
The huts quickly caught fire, and the force of the wind carried the flames throughout the camp.

SECTION 5.43.3
With a tremendous shout, as though victory were already won and assured, the enemy began to move forward their towers and covered galleries and to scale the rampart with ladders.

SECTION 5.43.4
But such was the courage and presence of mind of our soldiers that, though they were scorched by flames on every side, overwhelmed by a vast shower of missiles, and aware that all their baggage and all their possessions were burning, not only did no one leave the rampart to withdraw from the danger, but scarcely anyone even looked back; and at that moment they all fought with the greatest fierceness and bravery.

SECTION 5.43.5
This day was by far the most terrible for our men; nevertheless, it had this result: on that day the greatest number of the enemy were wounded and killed, because they had crowded together immediately beneath the rampart and those in the rear gave those in front no room to retreat.

SECTION 5.43.6
When the flames had somewhat subsided and a tower had been brought up at one point until it touched the rampart, the centurions of the third cohort withdrew from the place where they stood and removed all their men; then with gestures and shouts they began inviting the enemy to enter if they wished. Not one of them dared advance.

SECTION 5.43.7
Then, pelted with stones from every side, they were driven off, and the tower was set on fire.

CHAPTER 5.44

SECTION 5.44.1
In that legion there were two centurions of outstanding bravery, Titus Pullo and Lucius Vorenus, both of whom were approaching promotion to the first rank.

SECTION 5.44.2
These men were constantly disputing which of them should take precedence, and every year they contended for the highest positions with the bitterest rivalry.

SECTION 5.44.3
Of the two, Pullo, when the fighting at the fortifications was at its fiercest, said: “Why do you hesitate, Vorenus? What opportunity are you waiting for to prove your courage?

SECTION 5.44.4
This day shall decide our disputes.” With these words he went outside the fortifications and charged into the place where the enemy’s line appeared thickest.

SECTION 5.44.5
Vorenus then could not keep himself within the rampart either, but, fearing what everyone would think of him, followed close behind.

SECTION 5.44.6
After advancing a moderate distance, Pullo hurled his pilum at the enemy and pierced one man who was running forward from the multitude. When the man had been struck and killed, the enemy covered his body with their shields, all hurled their weapons at Pullo, and gave him no opportunity to retreat.

SECTION 5.44.7
Pullo’s shield was pierced, and a light spear lodged in his sword belt.

SECTION 5.44.8
This accident turned his scabbard aside and hindered his right hand as he tried to draw his sword; while he was thus encumbered, the enemy surrounded him.

SECTION 5.44.9
His rival Vorenus came to his aid and rescued him in his distress.

SECTION 5.44.10
At once the whole multitude turned away from Pullo against Vorenus,

SECTION 5.44.11
believing Pullo had been killed by the spear. Vorenus fought them at close quarters with his sword, killed one, and drove the rest back a short distance;

SECTION 5.44.12
but as he pressed forward too eagerly, he stumbled down into a hollow and fell. When he in turn was surrounded, Pullo came to his aid,

SECTION 5.44.13
and after killing several of the enemy, both men withdrew unharmed within the fortifications, covered with the highest distinction.

SECTION 5.44.14
Thus fortune dealt with both men in their rivalry and contest: each, though the other’s rival, became his helper and preserver, and it could not be determined which of the two should be judged superior in courage.

CHAPTER 5.45

SECTION 5.45.1
The more severe and bitter the assault became from day to day—and especially because a large part of the soldiers had been disabled by wounds and the number of defenders had been reduced—the more frequently letters and messengers were sent to Caesar. Some of the messengers were caught and tortured to death in sight of our soldiers.

SECTION 5.45.2
Inside the camp was a Nervian named Vertico, a man of honorable birth, who at the beginning of the siege had fled for protection to Cicero and had proved his loyalty to him.

SECTION 5.45.3
By promising freedom and great rewards, he persuaded a slave to carry a letter to Caesar.

SECTION 5.45.4
The man carried it out fastened to a javelin and, moving as a Gaul among Gauls without arousing any suspicion, reached Caesar.

SECTION 5.45.5
From him Caesar learned of the dangers threatening Cicero and the legion.

CHAPTER 5.46

SECTION 5.46.1
Upon receiving the letter at about the eleventh hour of the day, Caesar immediately sent a messenger into the territory of the Bellovaci to Marcus Crassus, his quaestor, whose winter quarters were twenty-five miles away.

SECTION 5.46.2
He ordered the legion to set out at midnight and come to him with all speed.

SECTION 5.46.3
Crassus departed with the messenger. Caesar sent another to his lieutenant Gaius Fabius, ordering him to bring his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, through which Caesar knew he himself would have to march.

SECTION 5.46.4
He wrote to Labienus, directing him to come with his legion to the borders of the Nervii if he could do so without injury to the public interest. He did not think it necessary to wait for the rest of the army, since it was somewhat farther away; from the nearest winter quarters he assembled about four hundred cavalry.

CHAPTER 5.47

SECTION 5.47.1
At about the third hour, the scouts informed him that Crassus was approaching, and that day Caesar advanced twenty miles.

SECTION 5.47.2
He placed Crassus in command at Samarobriva and assigned him a legion, because he was leaving there the army’s baggage, the hostages of the states, the official records, and all the grain he had brought there to sustain the army through the winter.

SECTION 5.47.3
Fabius, as ordered, made no great delay and met Caesar on the march with his legion.

SECTION 5.47.4
Labienus, having learned of the destruction of Sabinus and the slaughter of the cohorts, and with all the forces of the Treveri now gathered against him, feared that if he made a departure from his winter quarters resembling a flight, he would be unable to withstand the enemy’s attack, especially since he knew they were elated by their recent victory. He therefore sent a letter back to Caesar explaining the great danger involved in leading his legion out of winter quarters. He gave a full account of what had happened among the Eburones and informed Caesar that all the cavalry and infantry of the Treveri had encamped three miles from his camp.

CHAPTER 5.48

SECTION 5.48.1
Caesar approved his decision. Although the expectation of having three legions had been disappointed and he was reduced to two, he still believed that the one means of securing the common safety lay in speed. By forced marches he entered the territory of the Nervii.

SECTION 5.48.2
There he learned from prisoners what was happening at Cicero’s camp and how critical the situation was.

SECTION 5.48.3
Then, by promising great rewards, he persuaded one of his Gallic horsemen to carry a letter to Cicero.

SECTION 5.48.4
He sent it written in Greek characters, so that if the letter were intercepted, the enemy might not discover our plans.

SECTION 5.48.5
If the man could not reach Cicero, Caesar instructed him to bind the letter to the thong of a throwing spear and cast it inside the camp’s fortifications.

SECTION 5.48.6
In the letter he wrote that he had set out with the legions and would soon be there; he urged Cicero to maintain his former courage.

SECTION 5.48.7
The Gaul, fearing the danger, hurled the spear as he had been instructed.

SECTION 5.48.8
By chance it lodged against a tower and remained unnoticed by our men for two days. On the third day a soldier saw it, took it down, and carried it to Cicero.

SECTION 5.48.9
After reading the letter through, Cicero recited it before an assembly of the soldiers and filled them all with the greatest joy.

SECTION 5.48.10
Then the smoke of fires could be seen in the distance, and this removed all doubt that the legions were approaching.

CHAPTER 5.49

SECTION 5.49.1
When the Gauls learned of this through their scouts, they abandoned the siege and hastened against Caesar with all their forces. These amounted to about sixty thousand armed men.

SECTION 5.49.2
Given the opportunity, Cicero again obtained from the same Vertico mentioned above a Gaul to carry a letter to Caesar. He warned the man to make the journey cautiously and attentively.

SECTION 5.49.3
In the letter he reported fully that the enemy had withdrawn from him and had turned their entire multitude against Caesar.

SECTION 5.49.4
The letter was delivered to Caesar at about midnight. He informed his men of its contents and strengthened their resolve for battle.

SECTION 5.49.5
At first light the next day he broke camp, and after advancing about four miles he sighted the multitude of the enemy across a valley and a stream.

SECTION 5.49.6
It would have been extremely dangerous to fight on unfavorable ground with so small a force. Since he now knew that Cicero had been relieved from the siege, he thought he could set aside his haste without anxiety.

SECTION 5.49.7
He halted and fortified a camp on the most favorable ground he could find. Although the camp was already small in itself, since his force scarcely numbered seven thousand men and had no baggage, he contracted it as much as possible by making the passageways narrow, intending thereby to bring himself into the utmost contempt in the eyes of the enemy.

SECTION 5.49.8
Meanwhile, he sent scouts in every direction to discover by what route he could most conveniently cross the valley.

CHAPTER 5.50

SECTION 5.50.1
That day, after a few minor cavalry skirmishes near the water, both sides remained in their own positions:

SECTION 5.50.2
the Gauls because they were waiting for larger forces,

SECTION 5.50.3
which had not yet assembled; Caesar because he hoped that by feigning fear he might entice the enemy onto his own ground and fight a battle before his camp on this side of the valley—or, if he could not accomplish that,

SECTION 5.50.4
that after reconnoitering the routes he might cross the valley and stream with less danger. At first light the enemy’s cavalry approached the camp and engaged our horsemen.

SECTION 5.50.5
Caesar deliberately ordered his cavalry to give way and withdraw into the camp. At the same time he ordered the camp to be fortified on every side with a higher rampart and the gates to be barricaded; and in carrying out these measures he commanded his men to run about as conspicuously as possible and act as though terrified.

CHAPTER 5.51

SECTION 5.51.1
Enticed by all these signs, the enemy brought their forces across and drew up their battle line on unfavorable ground. When our men were even withdrawn from the rampart, they came closer and hurled missiles from every side inside the fortifications.

SECTION 5.51.2
They sent heralds around and ordered them to proclaim that if any Gaul or Roman wished to come over to them before the third hour, he might do so without danger; after that time there would be no opportunity.

SECTION 5.51.3
They held our men in such contempt that, because the gates had been blocked merely for appearance with a single row of turf at each entrance and they did not think they could break in through them, some began tearing down the rampart with their hands, while others began filling the ditches.

SECTION 5.51.4
Then Caesar launched a sortie from every gate and sent out the cavalry. He quickly put the enemy to flight, so that not one of them stood his ground with any intention of fighting. He killed a great number of them and stripped them all of their weapons.

CHAPTER 5.52

SECTION 5.52.1
Fearing to pursue them any farther because woods and marshes intervened, and seeing that they had no opportunity to make even the slightest stand, Caesar reached Cicero that same day with all his forces unharmed.

SECTION 5.52.2
He marveled at the towers, covered galleries, and fortifications the enemy had constructed. When the legion was paraded before him, he discovered that not one soldier in ten remained unwounded.

SECTION 5.52.3
From all these circumstances he judged how great the danger had been and how courageously the defense had been conducted.

SECTION 5.52.4
He praised Cicero as his merit deserved and commended the legion. He addressed individually those centurions and military tribunes whose exceptional bravery he had learned of from Cicero’s testimony. From the prisoners he obtained a more certain account of the fate of Sabinus and Cotta.

SECTION 5.52.5
The next day he called an assembly, set forth what had happened, and consoled and encouraged the soldiers.

SECTION 5.52.6
He explained that the loss suffered through the fault and recklessness of a lieutenant ought to be borne with greater composure because, through the favor of the immortal gods and their own courage, the disaster had been avenged, leaving neither lasting joy to the enemy nor prolonged grief to themselves.

CHAPTER 5.53

SECTION 5.53.1
Meanwhile, news of Caesar’s victory was carried through the Remi to Labienus with incredible speed. Although he was about sixty miles from Cicero’s winter quarters and Caesar had not reached them until after the ninth hour of the day, before midnight a shout arose at the gates of Labienus’s camp, by which the Remi announced the victory and offered him their congratulations.

SECTION 5.53.2
When this report reached the Treveri, Indutiomarus, who had determined to attack Labienus’s camp the next day, fled during the night and led all his forces back into the territory of the Treveri.

SECTION 5.53.3
Caesar sent Fabius back to winter quarters with his legion. He himself resolved to winter with three legions around Samarobriva, each in separate quarters; and because such great disturbances had arisen throughout Gaul, he determined to remain personally with the army for the entire winter.

SECTION 5.53.4
For when the disastrous news of Sabinus’s death was reported, nearly all the states of Gaul were deliberating about war, dispatching messengers and embassies in every direction, seeking to discover what course the others intended to take and where the war should begin, and holding councils by night in deserted places.

SECTION 5.53.5
Indeed, scarcely any period of the entire winter passed without anxiety for Caesar, and without his receiving some report of the plans and movements of the Gauls.

SECTION 5.53.6
Among these reports, Lucius Roscius, whom he had placed in command of the Thirteenth Legion, informed him that large forces of Gauls from the states called the Armorican states had assembled to attack him

SECTION 5.53.7
and had come within eight miles of his winter quarters, but that, when news of Caesar’s victory arrived, they had withdrawn so hastily that their departure appeared more like a rout.

CHAPTER 5.54

SECTION 5.54.1
Caesar, meanwhile, summoned the leading men of each state to appear before him and kept a large part of Gaul obedient, sometimes by intimidation, declaring that he knew what was being done, and sometimes by exhortation.

SECTION 5.54.2
Nevertheless, the Senones, a state of exceptional strength and great authority among the Gauls, attempted by public resolution to kill Cavarinus, whom Caesar had established as king among them, and whose brother Moritasgus had held the kingship at the time of Caesar’s arrival in Gaul, as his ancestors had done before him. When Cavarinus learned of the plot and fled, they pursued him as far as the borders,

SECTION 5.54.3
drove him from his kingdom and home, and sent envoys to Caesar to offer satisfaction; but when Caesar ordered their entire senate to come before him, they refused to obey his command.

SECTION 5.54.4
Among these barbarous peoples, the mere fact that some leaders had been found ready to make war carried such weight and produced so great a change in the sentiments of them all that, apart from the Aedui and the Remi—whom Caesar had always held in especial honor, the former because of their ancient and unbroken loyalty to the Roman people, the latter because of their recent services in the Gallic War—there was scarcely a state that did not become an object of suspicion to us.

SECTION 5.54.5
And I am not sure that this should be thought so surprising, for besides many other reasons, those who had been esteemed superior to every nation in martial valor deeply resented having forfeited so much of that reputation that they were now compelled to submit to the commands of the Roman people.

CHAPTER 5.55

SECTION 5.55.1
The Treveri, however, and Indutiomarus allowed no part of the entire winter to pass without sending envoys across the Rhine, soliciting the states there, promising money, and declaring that, since a large part of our army had been destroyed, only a much smaller part remained.

SECTION 5.55.2
Yet no German state could be persuaded to cross the Rhine. They said that they had twice made the trial, in the war of Ariovistus and at the crossing of the Tencteri, and that they would not tempt fortune again. Though disappointed in this hope, Indutiomarus nevertheless began to raise forces,

SECTION 5.55.3
train them, procure horses from the neighboring peoples, and entice to his side, with great rewards, exiles and condemned men from all over Gaul.

SECTION 5.55.4
By these means he had already acquired such authority in Gaul that embassies flocked to him from every quarter, publicly and privately seeking his favor and friendship.

CHAPTER 5.56

SECTION 5.56.1
When he perceived that men were coming to him of their own accord, that on the one side the Senones and Carnutes were being spurred on by consciousness of their crime, and on the other the Nervii and Aduatuci were preparing war against the Romans, and that he would lack no bands of volunteers if he began to advance beyond his own borders, he proclaimed an armed council. By Gallic custom, this marks the beginning of war,

SECTION 5.56.2
and under their common law all men of military age are accustomed to assemble there under arms; whoever comes last is tortured to death in the sight of the multitude.

SECTION 5.56.3
At that council he declared Cingetorix, the leader of the opposing faction and his own son-in-law—who, as we have shown above, had embraced Caesar’s cause and had not deserted it—a public enemy, and confiscated his property.

SECTION 5.56.4
When these measures had been completed, he announced in the council that he had been summoned by the Senones, the Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul;

SECTION 5.56.5
that he would march there through the territory of the Remi and lay waste their lands, but before doing so would attack Labienus’s camp. He then gave orders for the measures he wished carried out.

CHAPTER 5.57

SECTION 5.57.1
Labienus, since he occupied a camp exceptionally well fortified both by the nature of the ground and by human labor, had no fear for his own safety or that of the legion; rather, he was considering how he might avoid letting slip any opportunity for a successful action.

SECTION 5.57.2
Accordingly, when he learned from Cingetorix and his kinsmen what Indutiomarus had said in the council, he sent messengers to the neighboring states and summoned cavalry from every quarter, appointing a fixed day for them to assemble.

SECTION 5.57.3
Meanwhile, almost every day Indutiomarus ranged beneath his camp with all his cavalry, sometimes to learn the position of the camp, at other times to seek a conference or inspire terror; and nearly all his horsemen hurled missiles inside the rampart.

SECTION 5.57.4
Labienus kept his men within the fortifications and by every means in his power strengthened the impression that he was afraid.

CHAPTER 5.58

SECTION 5.58.1
As Indutiomarus approached the camp each day with greater contempt, Labienus admitted one night the cavalrymen from all the neighboring states whom he had arranged to summon, and with such vigilance kept all his men confined within the camp by guards that there was no possible means by which the matter could be disclosed or reported to the Treveri.

SECTION 5.58.2
Meanwhile, in accordance with his daily custom, Indutiomarus approached the camp and spent a large part of the day there; his horsemen hurled missiles and, with many insulting words, challenged our men to battle.

SECTION 5.58.3
When our men made no reply, the enemy, as soon as they thought fit, departed toward evening, scattered and dispersed.

SECTION 5.58.4
Suddenly Labienus sent all his cavalry out through two gates. He commanded and strictly enjoined them, once the enemy had been terrified and put to flight—as he foresaw would happen, and as it did—that every man should make for Indutiomarus alone, and that no one should wound any other enemy until he had seen Indutiomarus slain. He did not want the delay caused by pursuit of the others to give Indutiomarus time to escape. He offered great rewards to those who killed him,

SECTION 5.58.5
and sent cohorts forward to support the cavalry.

SECTION 5.58.6
Fortune confirmed the wisdom of his plan. Since every man made for Indutiomarus alone, he was overtaken and killed in the very ford of the river, and his head was carried back to the camp. As the horsemen returned, they pursued and killed all whom they could overtake.

SECTION 5.58.7
When this became known, all the forces of the Eburones and Nervii that had assembled withdrew, and after this event Caesar enjoyed somewhat greater tranquility in Gaul.

### Book 6

CHAPTER 6.1

SECTION 6.1.1
For many reasons Caesar expected a more extensive uprising in Gaul, and therefore instructed his legates Marcus Silanus, Gaius Antistius Reginus, and Titus Sextius to conduct a levy.

SECTION 6.1.2
At the same time he requested Gnaeus Pompeius, the proconsul, since he himself remained near Rome vested with military command on public business, to order the men whom, during his consulship, he had bound by the military oath in Cisalpine Gaul

SECTION 6.1.3
to assemble under the standards and march to Caesar. For Caesar judged it of great importance, even for the future, to the opinion held of Rome in Gaul, that the resources of Italy should appear so great that, if any loss were suffered in war, it could not only be repaired in a short time but could even be replaced by larger forces.

SECTION 6.1.4
When Pompeius granted the request for the sake both of the republic and of their friendship, Caesar’s officers quickly completed the levy; and before the winter had ended, three legions had been formed and brought to him, doubling the number of the cohorts he had lost with Quintus Titurius. By the speed and scale of this reinforcement, he showed what the discipline and resources of the Roman people could accomplish.

CHAPTER 6.2

SECTION 6.2.1
After the death of Indutiomarus, as we have related, the Treveri transferred command to his kinsmen. They did not cease soliciting the neighboring Germans and promising them money. When they could not prevail upon the nearest tribes,

SECTION 6.2.2
they approached those farther away. Having found several states willing, they bound them by a mutual oath and guaranteed the promised money by giving hostages; they also joined Ambiorix to themselves in alliance and covenant.

SECTION 6.2.3
When Caesar learned of these events and saw that war was being prepared on every side—that the Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii, together with all the Germans on this side of the Rhine, were under arms; that the Senones had not obeyed his summons and were sharing their plans with the Carnutes and neighboring states; and that the Germans were being solicited by frequent embassies from the Treveri—he judged that he must take thought for war earlier than usual.

CHAPTER 6.3

SECTION 6.3.1
Accordingly, before the winter was yet over, he assembled the four nearest legions and marched unexpectedly into the territory of the Nervii;

SECTION 6.3.2
and before they could either assemble or flee, he captured a great number of cattle and men, gave that booty to the soldiers, laid waste their lands, and compelled them to surrender and give him hostages.

SECTION 6.3.3
Having swiftly completed this operation, he led the legions back again to their winter quarters.

SECTION 6.3.4
At the beginning of spring he summoned the council of Gaul, as he had determined. When all the other states came except the Senones, Carnutes, and Treveri, he regarded their absence as the beginning of war and revolt; and to make it clear that he was setting all other business aside, he transferred the council to Lutetia, a town of the Parisii.

SECTION 6.3.5
The Parisii bordered upon the Senones and within the memory of their fathers had united with them as one state, but they were believed to have taken no part in this design.

SECTION 6.3.6
After announcing this decision from the tribunal, Caesar departed that same day with the legions for the territory of the Senones and reached it by forced marches.

CHAPTER 6.4

SECTION 6.4.1
When his approach became known, Acco, who had been the chief author of their design, ordered the population to assemble in the fortified towns. Before this could be accomplished, however, word came to those attempting it that the Romans were already upon them.

SECTION 6.4.2
They were therefore compelled to abandon their purpose and sent envoys to Caesar to plead for mercy. They approached him through the Aedui, under whose protection their state had been from ancient times.

SECTION 6.4.3
At the request of the Aedui, Caesar readily pardoned them and accepted their excuses, because he judged that the summer season was a time for the war now impending, not for an investigation.

SECTION 6.4.4
He required one hundred hostages and handed them over to the Aedui for safekeeping.

SECTION 6.4.5
The Carnutes likewise sent envoys and hostages to the same place, employing as their intercessors the Remi, whose dependents they were; they received the same answer.

SECTION 6.4.6
Caesar concluded the council and ordered the states to furnish cavalry.

CHAPTER 6.5

SECTION 6.5.1
With this part of Gaul pacified, he devoted his whole mind and purpose to the war against the Treveri and Ambiorix.

SECTION 6.5.2
He ordered Cavarinus to accompany him with the cavalry of the Senones, lest some disturbance should arise either from Cavarinus’s violent temper or from the hatred he had deservedly incurred among his people.

SECTION 6.5.3
Having settled these matters, and taking it as certain that Ambiorix would not contend in open battle, Caesar considered carefully what other plans he might adopt.

SECTION 6.5.4
The Menapii lived near the territory of the Eburones and were protected by an unbroken expanse of marshes and forests; they alone among the Gauls had never sent envoys to Caesar to discuss peace. Caesar knew that Ambiorix had ties of hospitality with them; he had also learned that through the Treveri Ambiorix had entered into friendship with the Germans.

SECTION 6.5.5
He judged that these sources of support must be taken from Ambiorix before he attacked the man himself, lest, despairing of safety, Ambiorix should either hide among the Menapii or be driven to join the peoples across the Rhine.

SECTION 6.5.6
Having formed this plan, he sent the baggage of the entire army to Labienus in the territory of the Treveri and ordered two legions to march there; he himself set out against the Menapii with five legions unencumbered by baggage.

SECTION 6.5.7
The Menapii assembled no force, but, relying on the protection afforded by the terrain, fled into the forests and marshes and carried their possessions there as well.

CHAPTER 6.6

SECTION 6.6.1
Caesar divided his forces with his legate Gaius Fabius and his quaestor Marcus Crassus, and, after bridges had swiftly been constructed, advanced by three routes. He burned buildings and villages and captured a great number of cattle and people.

SECTION 6.6.2
Compelled by these losses, the Menapii sent envoys to him to seek peace.

SECTION 6.6.3
After receiving hostages, Caesar declared that he would treat them as enemies if they admitted either Ambiorix or his envoys into their territory. When these arrangements had been confirmed, he left Commius the Atrebatian among the Menapii with cavalry to keep watch over them, while he himself departed for the territory of the Treveri.

CHAPTER 6.7

SECTION 6.7.1
While Caesar was conducting these operations, the Treveri assembled large forces of infantry and cavalry and prepared to attack Labienus, who had wintered in their territory with a single legion.

SECTION 6.7.2
They were already no more than two days’ march from him when they learned that two legions sent by Caesar had arrived.

SECTION 6.7.3
They pitched camp fifteen miles away and resolved to await reinforcements from the Germans.

SECTION 6.7.4
When Labienus learned the enemy’s plan, he hoped that their rashness would afford him some opportunity for battle. Leaving five cohorts to guard the baggage, he advanced against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and a large body of cavalry, and fortified a camp with an interval of one mile between the armies.

SECTION 6.7.5
Between Labienus and the enemy lay a river difficult to cross, with steep banks. He had no intention of crossing it himself and did not suppose that the enemy would cross it.

SECTION 6.7.6
Their hope of receiving reinforcements increased daily. Labienus spoke openly in a council of war, declaring that, since the Germans were said to be approaching, he would not place his own fortunes and those of the army in jeopardy, and that at first light on the following day he would break camp. These words were swiftly reported to the enemy,

SECTION 6.7.7
since among so great a number of Gallic cavalrymen, natural sympathies compelled some to favor the cause of the Gauls.

SECTION 6.7.8
During the night Labienus summoned the military tribunes and senior centurions, explained his plan, and, to make the enemy more readily suspect that he was afraid, ordered the camp to be struck with more noise and confusion than Roman custom permits. In this way he made the departure resemble a flight.

SECTION 6.7.9
Because the camps were so close together, these developments too were reported to the enemy by scouts before dawn.

CHAPTER 6.8

SECTION 6.8.1
The rear of the column had scarcely passed beyond the fortifications when the Gauls exhorted one another not to let the booty they had hoped for slip from their grasp. They said that, with the Romans terrified, it would take too long to await the German reinforcements, and that their honor did not permit them, with so great a force, to shrink from attacking so small a body, especially when it was fleeing and encumbered by baggage. They did not hesitate, therefore, to cross the river and engage on unfavorable ground.

SECTION 6.8.2
Labienus had suspected that this would happen, and, in order to lure them all to his side of the river, continued to advance slowly, maintaining the same pretense of marching away.

SECTION 6.8.3
Then, after sending the baggage a little way ahead and placing it on a hill, he said: “Soldiers, you have the opportunity you sought. You hold the enemy at a disadvantage, on unfavorable ground.

SECTION 6.8.4
“Display under us, your commanders, the same valor that you have so often displayed under your commander-in-chief, and imagine that he is here and sees these deeds with his own eyes.”

SECTION 6.8.5
At once he ordered the standards turned against the enemy and the battle line formed, and, after detaching a few squadrons to guard the baggage, stationed the rest of the cavalry on the flanks.

SECTION 6.8.6
Our men quickly raised a battle cry and hurled their javelins at the enemy. When the Gauls saw, contrary to all expectation, that the men they believed to be fleeing were advancing against them with standards leveled for attack, they could not withstand even the charge, but were put to flight at the first collision and made for the nearest forests.

SECTION 6.8.7
Labienus pursued them with the cavalry, killed a great number, captured many, and within a few days recovered the state. For the Germans who were coming to their aid, upon learning of the Treveri’s flight, returned home.

SECTION 6.8.8
The kinsmen of Indutiomarus, who had been the instigators of the revolt, accompanied them and withdrew from the state.

SECTION 6.8.9
The chief authority and command were entrusted to Cingetorix, who, as we have shown, had remained loyal from the beginning.

CHAPTER 6.9

SECTION 6.9.1
After Caesar came from the territory of the Menapii into that of the Treveri, he resolved to cross the Rhine for two reasons: one was that the Germans had sent auxiliaries against him to the Treveri;

SECTION 6.9.2
the other, that Ambiorix might not find refuge among them.

SECTION 6.9.3
Having formed this resolution, he began to build a bridge a little above the place where he had previously led his army across.

SECTION 6.9.4
By the familiar and established method, and through the soldiers’ great zeal, the work was completed within a few days.

SECTION 6.9.5
Leaving a strong garrison among the Treveri at the bridge, lest any sudden uprising arise among them, he led the rest of his forces and the cavalry across.

SECTION 6.9.6
The Ubii, who had previously given hostages and submitted, sent envoys to him to clear themselves, declaring that no auxiliaries had been sent from their state to the Treveri and that they had not violated their pledged faith.

SECTION 6.9.7
They begged and implored him to spare them, lest, through the general hatred of the Germans, the innocent should suffer punishment for the guilty; if he desired more hostages, they promised to give them.

SECTION 6.9.8
After investigating the matter, Caesar discovered that the auxiliaries had been sent by the Suebi. He accepted the satisfaction offered by the Ubii and made inquiries about the approaches and routes into the territory of the Suebi.

CHAPTER 6.10

SECTION 6.10.1
Meanwhile, a few days later, he was informed by the Ubii that all the Suebi were concentrating their forces in one place and ordering the nations under their dominion to send auxiliaries of infantry and cavalry.

SECTION 6.10.2
On learning this, he made provision for the grain supply and selected a suitable place for a camp. He ordered the Ubii to drive in their livestock and bring all their possessions from the countryside into the towns, hoping that the barbarians, being inexperienced, might through scarcity of provisions be induced to fight under unfavorable conditions.

SECTION 6.10.3
He instructed them to send frequent scouts among the Suebi and learn what was taking place there.

SECTION 6.10.4
They carried out his orders and, after an interval of a few days, reported that all the Suebi, once more definite news of the Roman army had reached them, had withdrawn with all their own forces and those of their allies, which they had assembled, far into the remotest parts of their territory.

SECTION 6.10.5
There was in that region, they said, a forest of boundless extent called Bacenis. It stretched far into the interior and, interposed like a natural wall, protected the Cherusci from the outrages and incursions of the Suebi, and the Suebi from those of the Cherusci. At the edge of that forest the Suebi had resolved to await the arrival of the Romans.

CHAPTER 6.11

SECTION 6.11.1
Since the narrative has reached this point, it does not seem out of place to set forth the customs of Gaul and Germany and the respects in which these nations differ from one another.

SECTION 6.11.2
In Gaul there are factions not only in every state and in every district and subdivision, but almost in every individual household; and the leaders of these factions are

SECTION 6.11.3
those who, in the judgment of their followers, are believed to possess the greatest influence, and to whose will and decision the final determination of all affairs and counsels is referred.

SECTION 6.11.4
This institution appears to have been established in ancient times so that no commoner should lack protection against a more powerful man; for each leader prevents his followers from being oppressed or circumvented, and if he acts otherwise, he has no influence among them.

SECTION 6.11.5
The same principle prevails throughout Gaul as a whole, for all the states are divided into two parties.

CHAPTER 6.12

SECTION 6.12.1
When Caesar came into Gaul, the Aedui were the leaders of one faction, the Sequani of the other.

SECTION 6.12.2
Since the Sequani were less powerful by themselves—because from ancient times the Aedui had possessed the highest authority and had numerous dependents—they had allied themselves with the Germans and Ariovistus and had brought them over to their side at the cost of great sacrifices and promises.

SECTION 6.12.3
But after fighting several successful battles and destroying the entire nobility of the Aedui, they had gained such a great ascendancy

SECTION 6.12.4
that they transferred a large part of the Aedui’s dependents to themselves, took the sons of their leading men as hostages, compelled the Aedui as a state to swear that they would form no design against the Sequani, forcibly occupied part of the neighboring territory they had seized, and obtained supremacy over all Gaul.

SECTION 6.12.5
Driven by this necessity, Diviciacus had gone to Rome to seek aid from the Senate, but had returned without accomplishing his purpose.

SECTION 6.12.6
With Caesar’s arrival, the situation changed: the hostages were restored to the Aedui, their former dependent alliances were reestablished, and new ones were secured through Caesar, because those who had joined themselves to the friendship of the Aedui

SECTION 6.12.7
saw that they enjoyed a better condition and a more equitable rule. As the Aedui’s influence and dignity were increased in all other respects, the Sequani lost their supremacy. The Remi succeeded to their place; and since it was understood that they enjoyed equal favor with Caesar, those who, because of ancient enmities, could in no way unite with the Aedui placed themselves under the protection of the Remi.

SECTION 6.12.8
The Remi carefully protected them, and thus maintained an authority that was both new and rapidly acquired.

SECTION 6.12.9
At that time the state of affairs was such that the Aedui were regarded as by far the foremost people, while the Remi held the second place in rank.

CHAPTER 6.13

SECTION 6.13.1
Throughout Gaul there are two classes of men who possess any standing and distinction. The common people are regarded as being almost in the condition of slaves; they venture nothing on their own and are admitted to no council.

SECTION 6.13.2
Most of them, when oppressed by debt, by the weight of taxation, or by the injustice of the powerful, surrender themselves into servitude to the nobles, who possess over them all the same rights that masters possess over slaves.

SECTION 6.13.3
Of these two privileged classes, one is that of the Druids, the other that of the knights.

SECTION 6.13.4
The Druids attend to religious matters, conduct public and private sacrifices, and interpret questions of religion. Great numbers of young men gather around them for instruction, and they are held in great honor among the Gauls.

SECTION 6.13.5
For they decide almost all disputes, public and private; and if any crime has been committed, if a murder has taken place, or if there is a dispute concerning an inheritance or boundaries, they likewise give judgment and determine rewards and punishments.

SECTION 6.13.6
If any individual or people refuses to abide by their decree, they forbid them to take part in sacrifices. Among the Gauls this is the most severe punishment.

SECTION 6.13.7
Those who have thus been interdicted are counted among the impious and criminal. Everyone gives way before them and avoids their approach and conversation, lest some harm befall him through contamination; justice is not granted to them when they seek it, nor is any office or distinction bestowed upon them.

SECTION 6.13.8
Over all these Druids one man presides, who possesses the highest authority among them.

SECTION 6.13.9
When he dies, either the man who excels the rest in rank succeeds him, or, if several are equal, the choice is made by a vote of the Druids; sometimes they even contend for the supremacy by force of arms.

SECTION 6.13.10
At a fixed season of the year they assemble in a consecrated place within the territory of the Carnutes, a region considered the center of all Gaul. All who have disputes gather there from every quarter and submit to their decrees and judgments.

SECTION 6.13.11
Their system of instruction is believed to have originated in Britain and to have been brought from there into Gaul;

SECTION 6.13.12
and even now those who wish to gain a more thorough knowledge of it generally travel there for the purpose of study.

CHAPTER 6.14

SECTION 6.14.1
The Druids customarily take no part in war, nor do they pay tribute together with the rest. They are exempt from military service and enjoy immunity from all other obligations.

SECTION 6.14.2
Attracted by such great privileges, many come to their instruction of their own accord, while others are sent by their parents and relatives.

SECTION 6.14.3
They are said to learn by heart a great number of verses there. Some therefore remain under instruction for twenty years.

SECTION 6.14.4
They consider it unlawful to commit these teachings to writing, although in almost all other matters, in their public and private accounts, they use Greek letters. They seem to me to have established this practice for two reasons: because they do not wish their teaching to be made known among the common people, and because they do not wish those who are learning to rely upon writing and so devote less effort to memory. For it generally happens to most men that, through dependence upon written texts, they relax their diligence in thorough learning and weaken their memory.

SECTION 6.14.5
Above all, they seek to persuade men that souls do not perish, but after death pass from one person to another; and they believe that this doctrine especially encourages courage, because the fear of death is thereby cast aside.

SECTION 6.14.6
They also discuss and impart to the young many teachings concerning the stars and their motions, the size of the universe and the earth, the nature of things, and the power and authority of the immortal gods.

CHAPTER 6.15

SECTION 6.15.1
The other class is that of the knights. Whenever the need arises and some war breaks out—as happened almost every year before Caesar’s arrival, whether they were themselves inflicting injuries or repelling those inflicted upon them—they all take part in war;

SECTION 6.15.2
and the more distinguished each man is by birth and wealth, the greater the number of retainers and dependents he has around him. This they recognize as the sole measure of influence and power.

CHAPTER 6.16

SECTION 6.16.1
The whole Gallic nation is exceedingly devoted to religious observances,

SECTION 6.16.2
and for that reason those afflicted by particularly severe illnesses and those engaged in battles and dangers either sacrifice human beings as victims or vow that they will sacrifice them, employing the Druids as ministers for these rites, because they believe that unless a human life is given in return for a human life,

SECTION 6.16.3
the majesty of the immortal gods cannot be appeased. They also have sacrifices of the same kind established for the public good. Some possess figures of enormous size,

SECTION 6.16.4
whose limbs, woven from wickerwork, they fill with living human beings. These figures are set on fire, and the people, surrounded by the flames, perish.

SECTION 6.16.5
They believe that the execution of those caught in theft, robbery, or some other crime is more pleasing to the immortal gods; but when the supply of such persons fails, they resort even to the execution of the innocent.

CHAPTER 6.17

SECTION 6.17.1
Of the gods they worship Mercury most of all. His images are the most numerous. They hold that he is the inventor of all the arts, the guide of roads and journeys, and the god possessing the greatest power over the acquisition of wealth and over commerce. After him they worship Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva.

SECTION 6.17.2
Concerning these gods they hold much the same opinions as other nations: that Apollo drives away diseases, that Minerva imparts the first principles of crafts and handiwork, that Jupiter holds sovereignty over the gods of heaven, and that Mars governs wars.

SECTION 6.17.3
When they have resolved to fight a battle, they generally consecrate to Mars whatever they may capture in war. When they are victorious, they sacrifice the captured animals and gather the remaining spoils together in one place.

SECTION 6.17.4
In many states it is possible to see mounds of these objects piled high in consecrated places;

SECTION 6.17.5
and it seldom happens that anyone, in disregard of religious scruple, dares either to conceal captured property in his own possession or to remove anything that has been deposited. For such an offense the most severe punishment, accompanied by torture, has been established.

CHAPTER 6.18

SECTION 6.18.1
All the Gauls proclaim that they are descended from Father Dis, and they say that this tradition has been handed down by the Druids.

SECTION 6.18.2
For that reason they measure every span of time not by the number of days but by nights. They observe birthdays and the beginnings of months and years in such a manner that the night precedes the day.

SECTION 6.18.3
In the other customs of life they differ from other peoples chiefly in this: they do not allow their sons to approach them openly until they have grown old enough to bear the burden of military service, and they consider it shameful for a son still of boyish age to stand in public in his father’s presence.

CHAPTER 6.19

SECTION 6.19.1
Whatever amount of money husbands have received from their wives as dowry, they add an equal amount from their own property, after its value has been assessed, and combine it with the dowry.

SECTION 6.19.2
A joint account is kept of all this money, and the profits are preserved. Whichever spouse survives the other receives both portions together with the profits accumulated in previous years.

SECTION 6.19.3
Husbands possess the power of life and death over their wives, as over their children; and when the head of a family of distinguished birth dies, his relatives assemble and, if the circumstances of his death arouse suspicion, examine his wives under torture in the manner used upon slaves. If guilt is established, they put them to death after tormenting them with fire and every kind of torture.

SECTION 6.19.4
Their funerals, considering the general manner of life among the Gauls, are magnificent and costly. They cast into the fire everything they believe was dear to the dead while living, even animals; and until a little before the present time, slaves and dependents who were known to have been beloved by them were burned with them after the customary funeral rites had been completed.

CHAPTER 6.20

SECTION 6.20.1
Those states thought to administer their public affairs more judiciously have a law ordaining that, if anyone receives from neighboring peoples by rumor or report any information concerning the state, he must report it to a magistrate and must not communicate it to anyone else,

SECTION 6.20.2
because it has been learned that rash and inexperienced men are often frightened by false rumors, driven to crime, and induced to make decisions on matters of the highest importance.

SECTION 6.20.3
The magistrates conceal whatever they think proper and disclose to the people whatever they judge advantageous. No one is permitted to speak about public affairs except in council.

CHAPTER 6.21

SECTION 6.21.1
The Germans differ greatly from these customs. For they have no Druids to preside over religious matters, nor are they devoted to sacrifices.

SECTION 6.21.2
They count as gods only those whom they can see and by whose manifest powers they are aided—the Sun, Fire, and the Moon. Of the other gods they have not even heard by report.

SECTION 6.21.3
Their whole life is spent in hunting and in the pursuit of military training. From childhood they devote themselves to toil and hardship. Those who remain chaste for the longest time

SECTION 6.21.4
win the highest praise among their people. Some believe that this increases stature; others, that it strengthens bodily powers and sinews.

SECTION 6.21.5
They consider it among the most shameful things for a man to have had knowledge of a woman before his twentieth year. Yet there is no concealment of such matters, since men and women bathe together indiscriminately in the rivers and wear skins or small coverings of hide, leaving a large part of the body bare.

CHAPTER 6.22

SECTION 6.22.1
They do not devote themselves to agriculture, and the greater part of their food consists of milk, cheese, and meat.

SECTION 6.22.2
No one possesses a fixed extent of land or boundaries of his own. Instead, each year the magistrates and leading men assign to tribes and groups of kinsmen who have joined together as much land, and in whatever locality, they think proper; and the following year they compel them to move elsewhere.

SECTION 6.22.3
They offer many reasons for this practice: lest, captivated by long-established habit, they exchange their zeal for warfare for agriculture; lest they strive to acquire broad estates and the more powerful drive the humbler from their holdings; lest they build their houses with too much care as protection against cold and heat; lest any desire for money arise, from which factions and dissensions are born;

SECTION 6.22.4
and so that they may keep the common people content when each man sees that his own wealth is equal to that of the most powerful.

CHAPTER 6.23

SECTION 6.23.1
Among the tribes, the highest distinction is to have the widest possible belt of devastated country and wilderness around their frontiers.

SECTION 6.23.2
They regard it as the special mark of valor that neighboring peoples, driven from their lands, should withdraw, and that no one should dare settle near them.

SECTION 6.23.3
At the same time, they believe that this will make them safer by removing the fear of sudden invasion.

SECTION 6.23.4
Whenever a tribe either defends itself against an attack or makes war upon another, magistrates are chosen to direct that war and are given the power of life and death.

SECTION 6.23.5
In time of peace there is no magistrate common to the whole people, but the chiefs of the districts and cantons administer justice among their own people and settle disputes.

SECTION 6.23.6
Raids committed beyond the borders of a man’s own tribe carry no disgrace, and they declare that these are undertaken to train the young men and diminish idleness.

SECTION 6.23.7
And whenever one of the chiefs announces in council that he will be the leader and calls upon those who wish to follow him to declare themselves, those who approve both the cause and the man rise, promise their assistance, and are loudly applauded by the assembly.

SECTION 6.23.8
Those among them who then fail to follow are counted as deserters and traitors, and afterward no trust whatever is placed in them.

SECTION 6.23.9
They consider it a sacrilege to violate the rights of a guest. Those who come among them for any reason whatsoever they protect from injury and regard as sacred; every house is open to them, and food is shared with them.

CHAPTER 6.24

SECTION 6.24.1
There was formerly a time when the Gauls surpassed the Germans in valor, carried war into their country unprovoked, and, because of their great population and scarcity of land, sent colonies across the Rhine.

SECTION 6.24.2
Thus the Volcae Tectosages occupied and settled in the most fertile regions of Germany around the Hercynian Forest, which I find was known by report to Eratosthenes and certain other Greeks, though they call it the Orcynian Forest.

SECTION 6.24.3
That people remains in those settlements to the present day and enjoys the highest reputation for justice and military prowess.

SECTION 6.24.4
They now continue in the same poverty, privation, and hardihood as the Germans, and follow the same manner of life and bodily regimen; but to the Gauls the nearness of the provinces and their acquaintance with goods from overseas afford many means of abundance and refinement.

SECTION 6.24.6
Gradually accustomed to defeat and vanquished in many battles, they no longer even compare themselves with the Germans in valor.

CHAPTER 6.25

SECTION 6.25.1
The breadth of this Hercynian Forest, mentioned above, extends to a journey of nine days for an unencumbered traveler; for it cannot be measured in any other way, and they know no measurements of distance.

SECTION 6.25.2
It begins at the borders of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and runs in a straight line along the course of the Danube River to the territories of the Dacians and Anartes.

SECTION 6.25.3
From there it bends to the left, away from the river, and because of its vast extent touches the borders of many peoples.

SECTION 6.25.4
Nor is there anyone in this part of Germany who can say that he has reached the beginning of that forest, even after traveling for sixty days, or who has learned where it begins.

SECTION 6.25.5
It is established that many species of wild animals are born there which are not seen elsewhere. Those that differ most from other animals and seem worthy of being recorded are the following.

CHAPTER 6.26

SECTION 6.26.1
There is an ox shaped like a stag, from the middle of whose forehead, between the ears, rises a single horn, taller and straighter than the horns known to us. From its summit broad projections spread out like palms and branches. The female and the male are of the same nature, and the shape and size of their horns are the same.

CHAPTER 6.27

SECTION 6.27.1
There are also animals called elks. Their shape and the mottling of their hides resemble those of goats, but they are somewhat larger, have no horns, and have legs without joints or articulations.

SECTION 6.27.2
They do not lie down to rest, and if by any accident they are thrown down, they cannot raise or lift themselves up.

SECTION 6.27.3
Trees serve them as resting places: they lean against them and, reclining only slightly, take their rest in that position.

SECTION 6.27.4
When hunters discover from their tracks where they are accustomed to retire, they either undermine all the trees in that place at the roots or cut into them just far enough to leave their outward appearance unchanged, as though they were still standing. When the animals lean against them there, as is their habit,

SECTION 6.27.5
they bring the weakened trees down with their weight and fall together with them.

CHAPTER 6.28

SECTION 6.28.1
A third species consists of the animals called aurochs. These are somewhat smaller than elephants and have the appearance, color, and shape of bulls.

SECTION 6.28.2
They possess great strength and great speed, and spare neither man nor beast once they have caught sight of them. The Germans eagerly trap them in pits and kill them.

SECTION 6.28.3
By this toil the young men harden themselves and train through this kind of hunting; and those who have killed the greatest number receive high praise after displaying the horns in public as evidence of their exploits.

SECTION 6.28.4
But even when captured very young, they cannot become accustomed to men or be tamed.

SECTION 6.28.5
The size, shape, and appearance of their horns differ greatly from the horns of our cattle.

SECTION 6.28.6
These horns are eagerly sought out, bound around the rims with silver, and used as drinking vessels at their most sumptuous feasts.

CHAPTER 6.29

SECTION 6.29.1
After Caesar learned through scouts of the Ubii that the Suebi had withdrawn into the forests, he feared a shortage of grain, since, as we have shown above, the Germans as a whole devote very little attention to agriculture, and decided not to advance any farther. But,

SECTION 6.29.2
so as not to relieve the barbarians entirely of their fear that he might return, and in order to delay their reinforcements, after withdrawing his army he demolished the far end of the bridge,

SECTION 6.29.3
which touched the bank of the Ubii, for a length of two hundred feet; at the end of the remaining bridge he erected a tower four stories high, stationed a garrison of twelve cohorts to defend it, and fortified the place with extensive works. He placed the young Gaius Volcatius Tullus in command of the position and its garrison.

SECTION 6.29.4
When the grain was beginning to ripen, Caesar himself set out to make war upon Ambiorix through the Ardennes Forest, the largest in all Gaul, which extends from the banks of the Rhine and the territory of the Treveri to the Nervii and stretches more than five hundred miles in length. He sent Lucius Minucius Basilus ahead with all the cavalry, in the hope that he might accomplish something by the speed of his march and the favorable moment.

SECTION 6.29.5
He warned him to forbid fires from being kindled in camp, lest any indication of his approach be visible from afar, and said that he himself would follow immediately.

CHAPTER 6.30

SECTION 6.30.1
Basilus did as he had been ordered. Completing the march swiftly and contrary to everyone’s expectation, he surprised many people scattered in the fields. Guided by information from them, he hastened toward Ambiorix himself, who was said to be at a certain place with a few horsemen.

SECTION 6.30.2
Fortune has great power in all affairs, but especially in war. For just as it happened by extraordinary chance that Basilus came upon Ambiorix himself while he was off his guard and unprepared, and that his arrival was seen with men’s own eyes before report or messenger brought word of it, so it was an extraordinary stroke of fortune for Ambiorix that, though all the military equipment he had around him was seized and his wagons and horses captured, he himself escaped death. But this also came about because

SECTION 6.30.3
the house was surrounded by woods, as the dwellings of the Gauls generally are, for they usually seek the vicinity of woods and rivers to escape the heat, and his companions and retainers held off the attack of our cavalry for a short time in a confined place.

SECTION 6.30.4
While they fought, one of his men mounted him on a horse, and the woods sheltered him in flight. Thus fortune had great power both in bringing him into danger and in enabling him to escape it.

CHAPTER 6.31

SECTION 6.31.1
It is uncertain whether Ambiorix deliberately failed to assemble his forces because he did not believe he should risk a battle, or whether he was prevented by lack of time and by the sudden arrival of the cavalry, since he believed that the rest of the army was following.

SECTION 6.31.2
At any rate, he sent messengers throughout the countryside and ordered every man to look to his own safety. Some fled into the Ardennes Forest, others into the unbroken marshes.

SECTION 6.31.3
Those who lived nearest the Ocean concealed themselves on islands that the tides regularly form.

SECTION 6.31.4
Many left their own territory and entrusted themselves and all their possessions to complete strangers.

SECTION 6.31.5
Catuvolcus, king of half the Eburones, who had joined with Ambiorix in forming the plan, was now worn out with age and unable to endure the hardship either of war or of flight. After cursing Ambiorix with every imprecation for having instigated the scheme, he killed himself with yew, which grows abundantly in Gaul and Germany.

CHAPTER 6.32

SECTION 6.32.1
The Segni and Condrusi, peoples of German origin and reckoned among the Germans, who live between the Eburones and Treveri, sent envoys to Caesar to beg him not to count them among his enemies or suppose that all the Germans on this side of the Rhine had made common cause. They declared that they had entertained no thought of war and had sent no assistance to Ambiorix.

SECTION 6.32.2
After investigating the matter by questioning prisoners, Caesar ordered them to bring back to him any Eburones who might have fled into their territory. If they did so, he declared, he would not violate their borders.

SECTION 6.32.3
He then divided his forces into three parts and brought the baggage of all the legions together at Aduatuca.

SECTION 6.32.4
That is the name of a fort. It stands nearly in the center of the territory of the Eburones, where Titurius and Aurunculeius had established their winter quarters.

SECTION 6.32.5
Among other advantages, Caesar approved of this place because the fortifications from the previous year remained intact and would spare the soldiers labor. He left the Fourteenth Legion to guard the baggage, one of the three legions he had recently raised and brought over from Italy.

SECTION 6.32.6
He placed Quintus Tullius Cicero in command of that legion and the camp and assigned him two hundred cavalry.

CHAPTER 6.33

SECTION 6.33.1
Having divided the army, he ordered Titus Labienus to set out with three legions toward the Ocean, into the regions bordering on the Menapii.

SECTION 6.33.2
He sent Gaius Trebonius with an equal number of legions to lay waste the region adjoining the Aduatuci.

SECTION 6.33.3
He himself resolved to march with the remaining three legions toward the Scheldt River, which flows into the Meuse, and the farthest reaches of the Ardennes, where he heard Ambiorix had gone with a few horsemen.

SECTION 6.33.4
As he departed, he gave assurance that he would return after seven days, knowing that on that date the grain ration was due to the legion left on guard.

SECTION 6.33.5
He urged Labienus and Trebonius to return by that day if they could do so without detriment to the public interest, so that, after once more sharing their counsels and examining the enemy’s plans, they might begin a new phase of the campaign.

CHAPTER 6.34

SECTION 6.34.1
There was, as we have shown above, no organized body of troops, no town, and no garrison to defend itself by force of arms, but a population scattered in every direction.

SECTION 6.34.2
Each man had settled wherever a hidden valley, a wooded place, or an impassable marsh offered some hope of protection or safety.

SECTION 6.34.3
These places were known to those who lived nearby, and the situation demanded great vigilance—not for the protection of the army as a whole, since no danger could come upon the entire force from a terrified and scattered enemy, but for the preservation of individual soldiers, a matter which nevertheless concerned the safety of the army to some degree.

SECTION 6.34.4
For greed for plunder drew many men too far away, while the dense forests, with their uncertain and hidden paths, prevented troops from entering in formation.

SECTION 6.34.5
If Caesar wished to finish the business and exterminate the race of these criminals, he had to send out numerous detachments and disperse his soldiers.

SECTION 6.34.6
If he wished to keep the companies close to the standards, as the established discipline and practice of the Roman army demanded, the terrain itself served as a protection for the barbarians; nor did they lack the daring to lay secret ambushes and surround isolated men.

SECTION 6.34.7
Amid difficulties of this kind, every precaution that vigilance could devise was taken: it was judged better to leave some opportunity of harming the enemy unused, although every heart burned for vengeance, than to inflict harm at the cost of any loss among the soldiers.

SECTION 6.34.8
Caesar sent messengers to the neighboring tribes and, by the hope of plunder, summoned everyone to join him in despoiling the Eburones. His purpose was that Gallic lives rather than legionary soldiers should be endangered in the forests, and at the same time that, through the great host poured around them, the race and name of the tribe should be extinguished for so great a crime.

SECTION 6.34.9
A great multitude quickly assembled from every direction.

CHAPTER 6.35

SECTION 6.35.1
These operations were being conducted throughout every part of the territory of the Eburones, and the seventh day was approaching, the day on which Caesar had resolved to return to the baggage and the legion.

SECTION 6.35.2
Here it could be seen how great is the power of fortune in war and how extraordinary the turns of chance it brings.

SECTION 6.35.3
Since the enemy had been scattered and terror-stricken, as we have shown, there was no organized force capable of causing even the slightest alarm.

SECTION 6.35.4
Across the Rhine word reached the Germans that the Eburones were being despoiled and that everyone was actually being invited to share in the plunder.

SECTION 6.35.5
The Sugambri, who live nearest the Rhine and by whom, as we related above, the Tencteri and Usipetes had been received in their flight, assembled two thousand cavalry.

SECTION 6.35.6
They crossed the Rhine in boats and rafts thirty miles below the place where the bridge had been built and the garrison left by Caesar. They entered the nearest territory of the Eburones, intercepted many who were scattered in flight, and seized a great number of cattle, for which barbarians are exceedingly eager.

SECTION 6.35.7
Enticed by the plunder, they advanced farther. Neither marshes nor forests delayed these men, born to warfare and brigandage. They asked their captives where Caesar was, discovered that he had gone farther away, and learned that the whole army had departed.

SECTION 6.35.8
Then one of the captives said, “Why do you pursue this wretched and paltry booty, when you may now become the most fortunate of men?

SECTION 6.35.9
In three hours you can reach Aduatuca. There the Roman army has gathered all its possessions. The garrison is so small that it cannot even man the whole circuit of the wall, and no one dares venture outside the fortifications.”

SECTION 6.35.10
Presented with this opportunity, the Germans left the booty they had already taken in a concealed place and hastened to Aduatuca, using as their guide the same man from whose information they had learned these facts.

CHAPTER 6.36

SECTION 6.36.1
Throughout all the preceding days Cicero had obeyed Caesar’s instructions and kept the soldiers within the camp with the utmost vigilance, not permitting even a single camp servant to go outside the fortifications. But on the seventh day he lost confidence that Caesar would keep to the appointed number of days, because he heard that Caesar had advanced farther and no report of his return was being brought. At the same time, he was influenced by the complaints of those

SECTION 6.36.2
who called his forbearance almost a state of siege, since they were not allowed to leave the camp. Expecting no such accident as could befall him within three miles, with nine legions and a very large cavalry force standing between him and danger and with the enemy scattered and almost destroyed, he sent five cohorts to gather grain in the nearest fields, between which and the camp there was only a single hill. A number of sick men from the legions had been left behind;

SECTION 6.36.3
Of these, those who had recovered during this interval, about three hundred men, were sent out together under a standard; besides them, a great crowd of camp servants and a large number of pack animals that had remained in camp followed, permission having been granted.

CHAPTER 6.37

SECTION 6.37.1
At this very time, and by chance, the German cavalry arrived and immediately, at the same pace at which they had come, attempted to burst into the camp through the rear gate.

SECTION 6.37.2
Because woods screened that side, they were not seen until they were close to the camp—so close that the merchants who had pitched their tents beneath the rampart had no opportunity to withdraw within it.

SECTION 6.37.3
Our men, taken unawares, were thrown into confusion by this unexpected turn, and the cohort on guard barely withstood the first assault.

SECTION 6.37.4
The enemy poured around the other sides, seeking some entrance they might find.

SECTION 6.37.5
Our men defended the gates with difficulty; the nature of the ground and the fortifications themselves protected the other approaches.

SECTION 6.37.6
Panic reigned throughout the camp, and each man asked another the cause of the uproar; no one foresaw where the standards should be carried or to what point each man should rally.

SECTION 6.37.7
One man declared that the camp was already taken; another insisted that the army and its commander had been destroyed and that the victorious barbarians had come upon them.

SECTION 6.37.8
Most devised fresh superstitious fears from the place itself and summoned before their eyes the disaster of Cotta and Titurius, who had perished in this same fort.

SECTION 6.37.9
With everyone terrified by such fear, the barbarians were confirmed in the belief, as they had heard from their prisoner, that there was no garrison within.

SECTION 6.37.10
They strove to break through and exhorted one another not to let so great a stroke of fortune slip from their hands.

CHAPTER 6.38

SECTION 6.38.1
Publius Sextius Baculus, who had served as chief centurion under Caesar and whom we have mentioned in earlier battles, had been left behind sick with the garrison and had now gone without food for five days.

SECTION 6.38.2
Despairing of his own safety and that of all the rest, he came unarmed from his tent. He saw the enemy pressing close and the situation at the utmost crisis; he seized weapons from the nearest men and took his stand in the gateway.

SECTION 6.38.3
The centurions of the cohort on guard followed him, and together they sustained the fight for a short time.

SECTION 6.38.4
After receiving severe wounds, Sextius lost consciousness; he was passed back from hand to hand and barely saved.

SECTION 6.38.5
The time thus gained allowed the others to recover their courage enough to dare to take their stand upon the fortifications and present the appearance of defenders.

CHAPTER 6.39

SECTION 6.39.1
Meanwhile our soldiers, having completed their foraging, heard the shouting. The cavalry galloped ahead and learned how grave the danger was.

SECTION 6.39.2
Here, however, there was no fortification to shelter them in their terror. Only recently enlisted and inexperienced in warfare, they turned their faces toward the military tribune and the centurions and waited for orders from them. No man was so brave as not to be shaken by the unexpectedness of the crisis.

SECTION 6.39.3
The barbarians, sighting the standards in the distance, abandoned their assault on the camp.

SECTION 6.39.4
At first they believed that the legions had returned, having learned from their prisoners that these had gone farther away; but afterward, scorning the smallness of the force, they attacked from every side.

CHAPTER 6.40

SECTION 6.40.1
The camp servants ran forward to the nearest hill. Quickly driven down from it, they threw themselves among the standards and maniples, and so terrified the already fearful soldiers still more.

SECTION 6.40.2
Some thought they should form a wedge and break through quickly, since the camp was so near; even if some part of their force were surrounded and fell, they trusted that the rest could still be saved.

SECTION 6.40.3
Others urged that they should take their stand on the ridge and all share the same fate.

SECTION 6.40.4
The veteran soldiers, whom we have stated had set out together under a standard, did not approve this plan. Accordingly, after encouraging one another, with Gaius Trebonius, the Roman knight placed in command of them, as their leader, they broke through the midst of the enemy and reached the camp safe, every man of them.

SECTION 6.40.5
The camp servants and cavalry who followed them were saved by the soldiers’ courage in the same charge.

SECTION 6.40.6
But those who had taken their stand on the ridge, having as yet gained no experience in warfare, could neither persist in the plan they had approved and defend themselves from the higher ground, nor imitate the force and speed they had seen profit the others. Instead, in attempting to withdraw into the camp, they descended into unfavorable ground.

SECTION 6.40.7
The centurions—some of whom, because of their valor, had been transferred from the lower ranks of the other legions to higher ranks in this legion—fought with the utmost courage and fell, lest they lose the military renown they had already won.

SECTION 6.40.8
Through the courage of these men, which drove the enemy back, part of the soldiers reached the camp unharmed beyond all hope; the rest were surrounded by the barbarians and perished.

CHAPTER 6.41

SECTION 6.41.1
The Germans, despairing of taking the camp because they saw that our men had now established themselves upon the fortifications, withdrew across the Rhine with the plunder they had deposited in the woods.

SECTION 6.41.2
Even after the enemy’s departure the terror remained so great that, when Gaius Volusenus, who had been sent out with the cavalry, reached the camp that night, he could not persuade the men that Caesar was close at hand with his army unharmed.

SECTION 6.41.3
Fear had so completely possessed their minds that, almost beside themselves, they said all the forces had been destroyed and the cavalry alone had escaped from the rout; they insisted that the Germans would never have attacked the camp if the army were unharmed.

SECTION 6.41.4
Caesar’s arrival dispelled this fear.

CHAPTER 6.42

SECTION 6.42.1
On his return, Caesar, well aware of the uncertainties of war, complained of only one thing: that the cohorts had been sent away from their guard posts and the garrison. He declared that the position ought not to have been abandoned even against the slightest contingency, and judged that fortune had played a great part in the enemy’s sudden arrival—

SECTION 6.42.2
and a far greater part still in turning the barbarians away almost from the very rampart and gates of the camp. Of all these circumstances, the most astonishing seemed to be this:

SECTION 6.42.3
the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with the purpose of laying waste Ambiorix’s territory, had been carried to the Roman camp and thereby rendered Ambiorix the service he most could have desired.

CHAPTER 6.43

SECTION 6.43.1
Caesar set out once more to harry the enemy and, after assembling a large force from the neighboring states, dispatched it in every direction.

SECTION 6.43.2
Every village and every building that anyone saw was set on fire; plunder was driven in from every quarter.

SECTION 6.43.3
The grain was not only consumed by so vast a multitude of men and pack animals, but had also been beaten down by the season and the rains, so that even if any men had concealed themselves for the present, it seemed that after the army’s withdrawal they must nevertheless perish from utter want.

SECTION 6.43.4
And with the cavalry divided among so many directions, matters often came to such a point that prisoners declared they had only just seen Ambiorix looking about him in flight and insisted that he had not yet entirely vanished from sight. Thus the hope of overtaking him was aroused and boundless exertions were undertaken;

SECTION 6.43.5
those who believed that they would earn Caesar’s highest favor almost overcame nature itself by their zeal, and it always seemed that only a little was lacking for complete success.

SECTION 6.43.6
But Ambiorix escaped through hiding places or forest fastnesses and, concealed by night, made for other districts and regions with an escort of no more than four horsemen, the only men to whom he dared entrust his life.

CHAPTER 6.44

SECTION 6.44.1
After laying waste the country in this fashion, Caesar led his army back, with the loss of two cohorts, to Durocortorum among the Remi. He summoned a council of Gaul to that place and began an inquiry into the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes and into the conduct of Acco, who had been the chief author of that design.

SECTION 6.44.2
After a sentence of exceptional severity had been pronounced, Caesar inflicted punishment upon him according to the custom of their ancestors.

SECTION 6.44.3
Some, fearing trial, fled. After forbidding them fire and water, Caesar stationed two legions in winter quarters on the borders of the Treveri, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six at Agedincum in the territory of the Senones. Having provided grain for the army, he set out, as he had determined, for Italy to hold the judicial assizes.

### Book 7

CHAPTER 7.1

SECTION 7.1.1
With Gaul at peace, Caesar set out, as he had determined, for Italy to hold the judicial assizes. There he learned of the murder of Clodius and, being informed of the Senate’s decree that all the younger men of Italy should take the military oath, he began to conduct a levy throughout the province.

SECTION 7.1.2
News of these events was quickly carried into Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls themselves added to the reports and invented what the situation seemed to require: that Caesar was being detained by the disorders at Rome and, amid such violent dissensions, could not come to his army.

SECTION 7.1.3
Prompted by this opportunity, those who had long resented their subjection to the rule of the Roman people began to form plans for war more freely and boldly.

SECTION 7.1.4
The leading men of Gaul appointed councils among themselves in wooded and remote places and complained of Acco’s death.

SECTION 7.1.5
They pointed out that the same fate might befall them; they lamented the common fortune of Gaul; and by every promise and reward they called for men who would begin the war and, at the risk of their own lives, reclaim Gaul’s liberty.

SECTION 7.1.6
Above all, they said, care must be taken to cut Caesar off from his army before their secret plans were divulged. This would be easy,

SECTION 7.1.7
because the legions would not dare to leave their winter quarters in the commander’s absence, nor could the commander reach the legions without an escort.

SECTION 7.1.8
Finally, it was better to be killed in battle than to fail to recover the ancient glory of war and the liberty they had received from their ancestors.

CHAPTER 7.2

SECTION 7.2.1
After these matters had been debated, the Carnutes declared that they would refuse no danger for the sake of the common safety and promised to be foremost among all in making war.

SECTION 7.2.2
Since for the present they could not give one another hostages as a guarantee that the affair would not be divulged, they asked that the compact be consecrated by oath and solemn pledge, with the military standards brought together—a rite that by their custom possesses the greatest sanctity—so that, once they had begun the war, they would not be abandoned by the rest.

SECTION 7.2.3
The Carnutes were then highly praised; the oath was taken by all who were present; a date was fixed for the undertaking; and the council dispersed.

CHAPTER 7.3

SECTION 7.3.1
When that day came, the Carnutes, led by Cotuatus and Conconnetodumnus, desperate men, rushed together at Cenabum upon a given signal and killed the Roman citizens who had settled there for purposes of trade, among them Gaius Fufius Cita, a respected Roman knight who, by Caesar’s order, was in charge of the grain supply; they then plundered their property.

SECTION 7.3.2
The report was quickly carried to all the states of Gaul. Whenever some event of greater importance and notoriety occurs, they announce it by shouts across the fields and districts; others in turn take up the cry and pass it on to their nearest neighbors, as happened then.

SECTION 7.3.3
For what had been done at Cenabum at sunrise was heard in the territory of the Arverni before the end of the first watch, a distance of about one hundred and sixty miles.

CHAPTER 7.4

SECTION 7.4.1
In the same manner, Vercingetorix, an Arvernian, the son of Celtillus, a young man of the highest power, whose father had held supremacy over all Gaul and had been put to death by his state because he sought kingship, summoned his dependents and easily inflamed them.

SECTION 7.4.2
When his design became known, there was a rush to arms. He was opposed by Gobannitio, his uncle, and by the other leading men, who did not think that such a venture should be attempted, and he was expelled from the town of Gergovia.

SECTION 7.4.3
He did not desist, however, but held a levy in the countryside among the destitute and desperate. After assembling this band, he brought over to his opinion everyone from the state whom he approached.

SECTION 7.4.4
He urged them to take up arms for the sake of their common liberty; and after gathering a large force, he expelled from the state the opponents who shortly before had expelled him.

SECTION 7.4.5
His followers proclaimed him king. He sent embassies in every direction and entreated the states to remain faithful.

SECTION 7.4.6
He quickly joined to himself the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turoni, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andes, and all the other peoples bordering the Ocean. By unanimous consent the supreme command was conferred upon him.

SECTION 7.4.7
Once this power had been offered him, he demanded hostages from all these states and ordered a fixed number of soldiers to be brought to him quickly.

SECTION 7.4.8
He determined how many weapons each state must manufacture at home and by what date; above all, he devoted his attention to the cavalry.

SECTION 7.4.9
To the utmost diligence he added the utmost severity of command, compelling the hesitant by the magnitude of his punishments.

SECTION 7.4.10
For a graver offense he put a man to death by fire and every kind of torture; for a lesser cause he sent the offender home with his ears cut off or one eye gouged out, so that he might serve as a warning to the rest and terrify others by the magnitude of the punishment.

CHAPTER 7.5

SECTION 7.5.1
Having quickly raised an army by these punishments, he sent Lucterius the Cadurcan, a man of the greatest daring, with part of his forces among the Ruteni; he himself set out for the Bituriges. At his approach the Bituriges sent ambassadors to the Aedui,

SECTION 7.5.2
under whose protection they were, to ask for assistance, so that they might more readily withstand the enemy’s forces.

SECTION 7.5.3
On the advice of the officers whom Caesar had left with the army, the Aedui sent forces of cavalry and infantry to assist the Bituriges.

SECTION 7.5.4
When these forces reached the river Loire, which separates the Bituriges from the Aedui, they remained there for a few days but did not cross the river.

SECTION 7.5.5
Not daring to cross, they returned home and reported to our officers that they had turned back because they feared the treachery of the Bituriges, whose plan, they had learned, was to surround them—on one side the Bituriges themselves and on the other the Arverni—if they crossed the river.

SECTION 7.5.6
Whether they acted for the reason they reported to the officers or were moved by treachery, since we have no certain knowledge, should not, it seems, be asserted as fact.

SECTION 7.5.7
Immediately after their departure, the Bituriges joined the Arverni.

CHAPTER 7.6

SECTION 7.6.1
When news of these events reached Caesar in Italy, and he understood that affairs at Rome had now been brought into a more favorable condition by the energy of Gnaeus Pompey, he set out for Transalpine Gaul.

SECTION 7.6.2
On arriving there, he faced great difficulty in determining how he could reach the army.

SECTION 7.6.3
For if he summoned the legions into the Province, he realized that in his absence they would have to fight a battle on the march.

SECTION 7.6.4
If he himself hastened to the army, he saw that at such a time he could not safely entrust his life even to those who appeared peaceful.

CHAPTER 7.7

SECTION 7.7.1
Meanwhile Lucterius the Cadurcan, who had been sent among the Ruteni, won that state over to the Arverni.

SECTION 7.7.2
Advancing among the Nitiobriges and Gabali, he received hostages from both peoples and, after gathering a large force, strove to break into the Province in the direction of Narbo.

SECTION 7.7.3
When this was reported, Caesar judged that every other plan must give way to setting out for Narbo.

SECTION 7.7.4
On arriving there, he reassured the fearful and stationed garrisons among the Ruteni of the Province, the Volcae Arecomici, the Tolosates, and around Narbo, all regions bordering upon the enemy.

SECTION 7.7.5
He ordered part of the forces from the Province, together with the reinforcements he had brought from Italy, to assemble among the Helvii, whose territory borders that of the Arverni.

CHAPTER 7.8

SECTION 7.8.1
After making these arrangements, with Lucterius now checked and driven back because he considered it dangerous to advance within the line of garrisons, Caesar set out for the territory of the Helvii.

SECTION 7.8.2
Although Mount Cevenna, which separates the Arverni from the Helvii, blocked the way at that harshest season of the year with very deep snow, Caesar nevertheless had the snow cleared to a depth of six feet, and, after the roads had thus been opened with the utmost exertion on the part of the soldiers, reached the borders of the Arverni.

SECTION 7.8.3
Taking them by surprise, since they believed themselves protected by the Cevenna as by a wall, and since at that season of the year not even the paths had ever been open to a solitary traveler, he ordered the cavalry to range as widely as possible and strike the greatest possible terror into the enemy.

SECTION 7.8.4
News of these events was swiftly carried by report and messengers to Vercingetorix. All the Arverni, terrified, crowded around him and implored him to protect their fortunes and not allow them to be plundered by the enemy, especially since he could see that the entire war had been transferred to their country.

SECTION 7.8.5
Moved by their entreaties, he marched his camp out of the territory of the Bituriges toward that of the Arverni.

CHAPTER 7.9

SECTION 7.9.1
But Caesar, after remaining in those parts for two days, because he had foreseen that this would happen with Vercingetorix, left the army on the pretext of gathering reinforcements and cavalry, and placed the young Brutus in command of these forces.

SECTION 7.9.2
He instructed him to have the cavalry range as widely as possible in every direction, saying that he would take care not to be absent from camp for more than three days.

SECTION 7.9.3
Having made these arrangements, Caesar, to the great surprise of his men, reached Vienna by the longest marches he could make.

SECTION 7.9.4
There he found fresh cavalry, which he had sent ahead to that place many days before, and, without interrupting his journey by day or night, hurried through the territory of the Aedui into that of the Lingones, where two legions were wintering, so that, if the Aedui should form any design even against his life, he might forestall it by his speed.

SECTION 7.9.5
On arriving there, he sent orders to the remaining legions and assembled them all in one place before word of his arrival could be carried to the Arverni.

SECTION 7.9.6
When Vercingetorix learned of this, he led his army back again into the territory of the Bituriges and, setting out from there, began to besiege Gorgobina, a town of the Boii, whom Caesar had settled there after their defeat in the Helvetian campaign and had placed under the protection of the Aedui.

CHAPTER 7.10

SECTION 7.10.1
This situation presented Caesar with great difficulty in deciding upon a course of action. If he kept the legions in one place for the remainder of the winter, he feared that, if the dependents of the Aedui were conquered, all Gaul would revolt, because it would appear that he afforded his allies no protection; but if he led the legions out of winter quarters too early, he feared that the difficult transport of supplies would cause him to suffer from a shortage of grain.

SECTION 7.10.2
Nevertheless, it seemed better to endure every hardship than, by submitting to so great an affront, to estrange the loyalty of all his allies.

SECTION 7.10.3
Accordingly, after urging the Aedui to bring up provisions, he sent messengers ahead to the Boii to inform them of his approach and exhort them to remain loyal and withstand the enemy’s assault with courage.

SECTION 7.10.4
Leaving two legions and the baggage of the entire army at Agedincum, he set out for the country of the Boii.

CHAPTER 7.11

SECTION 7.11.1
On the following day, when he reached Vellaunodunum, a town of the Senones, he resolved to besiege it, so that he might leave no enemy behind him and might obtain supplies more readily; and in two days he surrounded it with siegeworks.

SECTION 7.11.2
On the third day, when envoys came from the town to negotiate its surrender, he ordered them to collect their arms, bring out their draft animals, and give six hundred hostages.

SECTION 7.11.3
He left his lieutenant Gaius Trebonius to complete these arrangements. He himself, wishing to make the journey as quickly as possible, set out for Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes.

SECTION 7.11.4
The Carnutes had only then received news of the siege of Vellaunodunum and, believing that the operation would be prolonged, were preparing a garrison to send to Cenabum for its defense. Caesar reached the place in two days.

SECTION 7.11.5
After pitching camp before the town, he was prevented by the lateness of the day from beginning the attack and postponed it until the next day, while ordering the soldiers to prepare whatever was needed for the operation.

SECTION 7.11.6
And because a bridge over the River Liger joined the town of Cenabum, he feared that the inhabitants might escape from the town by night and ordered two legions to remain under arms on watch.

SECTION 7.11.7
A little before midnight, the people of Cenabum silently left the town and began to cross the river. When Caesar was informed of this by his scouts, he brought forward the legions

SECTION 7.11.8
which he had ordered to stand ready without baggage, set fire to the gates, led them into the town, and took possession of it. Very few of the enemy escaped capture, because the narrowness of the bridge and roads had blocked the multitude’s flight.

SECTION 7.11.9
He plundered and burned the town, gave the booty to the soldiers, led his army across the Liger, and entered the territory of the Bituriges.

CHAPTER 7.12

SECTION 7.12.1
When Vercingetorix learned of Caesar’s approach, he abandoned the siege and marched out to meet him.

SECTION 7.12.2
Caesar had begun to besiege Noviodunum, a town of the Bituriges situated on his route.

SECTION 7.12.3
When envoys came to him from the town to beg that he pardon them and spare their lives, Caesar, wishing to complete the remaining operations with the speed by which he had accomplished most of his successes, ordered their arms to be collected, their horses to be brought out, and hostages to be given.

SECTION 7.12.4
A portion of the hostages had already been delivered, and the remaining terms were being carried out; centurions and a few soldiers had been admitted to search for arms and draft animals, when the enemy cavalry, which had preceded Vercingetorix’s column, was sighted in the distance.

SECTION 7.12.5
As soon as the townspeople saw them and conceived the hope of rescue, they raised a shout and began to seize their weapons, shut the gates, and man the wall. The centurions within the town,

SECTION 7.12.6
understanding from the Gauls’ behavior that they were forming some new design, drew their swords, seized the gates, and brought all their men out unharmed.

CHAPTER 7.13

SECTION 7.13.1
Caesar ordered the cavalry to be led out of camp and engaged in a cavalry battle. When his men were already hard-pressed, he sent about four hundred German horsemen to support them, whom from the beginning he had made a practice of keeping with him.

SECTION 7.13.2
The Gauls could not withstand their charge and, being put to flight, lost many men before withdrawing to the main column. After their defeat, the townspeople, terrified once more, seized those whom they believed responsible for inciting the populace, brought them to Caesar, and surrendered to him.

SECTION 7.13.3
When these matters had been settled, Caesar set out for Avaricum, the largest and strongest town in the territory of the Bituriges, situated in the most fertile region of their country, because he was confident that by taking that town he would bring the nation of the Bituriges under his control.

CHAPTER 7.14

SECTION 7.14.1
After suffering so many successive reverses at Vellaunodunum, Cenabum, and Noviodunum, Vercingetorix summoned his men to a council.

SECTION 7.14.2
He explained that the war must be waged by a method far different from the one employed before. Every effort must be directed toward depriving the Romans of forage and provisions.

SECTION 7.14.3
This would be easy, because the Gauls possessed abundant cavalry and were aided by the season of the year.

SECTION 7.14.4
Grass could not be cut; the enemy would necessarily have to scatter in search of supplies from farm buildings, and every day the cavalry could destroy all such parties.

SECTION 7.14.5
Moreover, for the sake of their common safety, the advantages of private property must be disregarded. Villages and farm buildings should be burned in every direction within the distance from the road to which the Romans might seem capable of going in search of forage. The Gauls themselves would have an ample supply of such necessities,

SECTION 7.14.6
because they would be supported by the resources of those in whose territory the war was being waged.

SECTION 7.14.7
The Romans would either be unable to endure the scarcity or would advance too far from camp at great risk.

SECTION 7.14.8
Nor did it matter whether they killed the Romans themselves or stripped them of their baggage, since without it the war could not be carried on.

SECTION 7.14.9
Furthermore, those towns that were not made secure from every danger by fortifications and natural position ought to be burned, lest they serve as refuges for their own men who wished to evade military service or stand ready for the Romans to seize as stores of provisions and plunder.

SECTION 7.14.10
If these measures seemed harsh or cruel, they should regard it as far harsher for their children and wives to be dragged into slavery and for themselves to be killed—the fate that must befall the conquered.

CHAPTER 7.15

SECTION 7.15.1
This proposal was approved by unanimous consent, and in a single day more than twenty towns of the Bituriges were burned.

SECTION 7.15.2
The same was done in the other states. Fires were visible in every direction; and although all endured the sight with great anguish, they nevertheless set before themselves this consolation: that, with victory almost assured, they were confident they would quickly recover what they had lost.

SECTION 7.15.3
The general council debated whether Avaricum should be burned or defended.

SECTION 7.15.4
The Bituriges threw themselves at the feet of all the Gauls and begged not to be compelled to set fire with their own hands to almost the most beautiful city in all Gaul, which was both the safeguard and the ornament of their state.

SECTION 7.15.5
They said they could easily defend it because of its natural position: surrounded on almost every side by a river and marsh, it had only one approach, and that exceedingly narrow.

SECTION 7.15.6
Their request was granted. Vercingetorix at first opposed it, but afterward yielded both to their entreaties and to the compassion of the common people. Suitable defenders were selected for the town.

CHAPTER 7.16

SECTION 7.16.1
Vercingetorix followed Caesar by shorter marches and chose for his camp a place protected by marshes and woods, sixteen miles from Avaricum.

SECTION 7.16.2
There, through reliable scouts, he learned at every hour of the day what was being done at Avaricum and issued orders for what he wished carried out.

SECTION 7.16.3
He kept watch on all our foraging and grain-gathering parties, and when necessity compelled them to scatter and advance too far, he attacked them and inflicted serious losses, although our men took every precaution that reason could devise, going out at irregular times and by different routes.

CHAPTER 7.17

SECTION 7.17.1
Caesar pitched camp on that side of the town where the interval between the river and the marshes left the narrow approach already mentioned, and began to construct a siege terrace, advance covered galleries, and erect two towers; for the nature of the ground prevented a complete circumvallation.

SECTION 7.17.2
He never ceased urging the Boii and Aedui to supply grain. The Aedui, because they acted without zeal, gave little assistance; the Boii, whose resources were not great because their state was small and weak, quickly exhausted what they possessed.

SECTION 7.17.3
The army suffered extreme difficulty in obtaining grain because of the poverty of the Boii, the negligence of the Aedui, and the burning of the farm buildings—so much so that for several days the soldiers had no grain and warded off utter starvation with cattle driven in from more distant villages. Yet no word was heard from them unworthy of the majesty of the Roman people or of their former victories.

SECTION 7.17.4
Indeed, when Caesar addressed each legion at its work and said that he would abandon the siege if they found the scarcity too bitter to bear, they all begged him not to do so.

SECTION 7.17.5
They said that they had served under his command for many years in such a manner that they had suffered no disgrace and had nowhere withdrawn with a task unfinished.

SECTION 7.17.6
They would consider it a disgrace if they abandoned a siege they had begun.

SECTION 7.17.7
It was better to endure every hardship than fail to avenge the Roman citizens who had perished at Cenabum through the treachery of the Gauls.

SECTION 7.17.8
They gave the same message to the centurions and military tribunes, so that it might be conveyed through them to Caesar.

CHAPTER 7.18

SECTION 7.18.1
When the towers had already drawn near the wall, Caesar learned from prisoners that Vercingetorix, having exhausted his forage, had moved his camp nearer to Avaricum, and that he himself had set out with the cavalry and the lightly armed troops accustomed to fight among the horsemen, intending to lay an ambush at the place where he supposed our men would come to forage on the following day.

SECTION 7.18.2
On learning this, Caesar set out silently at midnight and reached the enemy’s camp in the morning.

SECTION 7.18.3
The Gauls quickly learned of Caesar’s approach through their scouts, concealed their wagons and baggage in the denser woods, and drew up all their forces on high, open ground.

SECTION 7.18.4
When this was reported, Caesar swiftly ordered the packs to be collected and the troops to make ready for battle.

CHAPTER 7.19

SECTION 7.19.1
There was a hill rising with a gentle slope from its base. On almost every side it was encircled by a difficult and obstructive marsh no more than fifty feet wide.

SECTION 7.19.2
The Gauls, confident in the strength of their position, held themselves on this hill after destroying the bridges; divided by tribes, they occupied every ford and passage through the marsh,

SECTION 7.19.3
prepared, if the Romans attempted to force their way across it, to assail them from higher ground while they were entangled. Thus anyone who saw only how close the two armies were would have believed the Gauls prepared to fight on nearly equal terms; but anyone who perceived the disadvantage of their position would have understood that they were merely making an empty show of confidence.

SECTION 7.19.4
The soldiers were indignant that the enemy could endure the sight of them with so small a space between and clamored for the signal to engage. Caesar explained how great a loss and the death of how many brave men such a victory must necessarily cost. Since he saw them so resolute in spirit

SECTION 7.19.5
that they refused no danger for the sake of his glory, he said he deserved to be condemned for the utmost injustice if he did not hold their lives dearer than his own safety.

SECTION 7.19.6
After thus reassuring the soldiers, he led them back to camp that same day and proceeded to arrange the remaining measures pertaining to the siege of the town.

CHAPTER 7.20

SECTION 7.20.1
When Vercingetorix returned to his men, he was accused of treachery: because he had moved his camp nearer the Romans; because he had departed with all the cavalry; because he had left so large a force behind without a commander; and because, after his departure, the Romans had arrived with such opportunity and speed.

SECTION 7.20.2
All this, they said, could not have happened by chance or without design; he preferred to hold the kingship of Gaul by Caesar’s grant rather than by their favor.

SECTION 7.20.3
Accused in this manner, he answered the charges as follows: He had moved camp because of the scarcity of forage, and at their own urging; he had approached nearer to the Romans because he had been persuaded by the advantage of a position that defended itself by its natural strength.

SECTION 7.20.4
As for the cavalry, their services ought not to have been needed in marshy ground and had been useful at the place to which they had gone.

SECTION 7.20.5
When departing, he had deliberately entrusted the supreme command to no one, lest such a man be driven by the multitude’s eagerness into giving battle. He saw that all desired battle because of their weakness of spirit, since they could not endure hardship any longer.

SECTION 7.20.6
If the Romans had appeared by chance, they should thank fortune; if they had been summoned by information from anyone, they should thank that informer, since from their higher ground they had been able both to learn how few the Romans were and to despise the courage of men who had not dared to fight but had shamefully withdrawn into camp.

SECTION 7.20.7
He desired no command from Caesar obtained through treachery, since he could gain it by victory—a victory already assured to him and to all the Gauls. Indeed, he would return the command to them if they believed that they were conferring honor upon him rather than receiving deliverance from him.

SECTION 7.20.8
“That you may understand,” he said, “that I speak these words in good faith, listen to Roman soldiers.” He brought forward slaves

SECTION 7.20.9
whom he had captured while they were foraging a few days before and had tortured with hunger and chains. They had already been instructed what answers to give when questioned.

SECTION 7.20.10
They declared that they were legionary soldiers; driven by hunger and want, they had secretly left camp in the hope of finding some grain or livestock in the fields:

SECTION 7.20.11
that the whole army was suffering from a like scarcity, that no man’s strength was now sufficient, and that none could endure the toil of the work; and therefore the commander had resolved to withdraw the army within three days if they made no progress in the assault upon the town. “These,” said Vercingetorix, “are the benefits you have received from me,

SECTION 7.20.12
whom you accuse of treason: through my efforts you see so great and victorious an army wasting away from hunger without the shedding of your blood; and I have taken measures that, when it retreats in disgrace, no state shall receive it within its borders.”

CHAPTER 7.21

SECTION 7.21.1
The entire multitude shouted its approval and, after its custom, clashed its weapons, as they are accustomed to do when they approve a speaker’s words. They declared that Vercingetorix was a commander of consummate ability, that his loyalty must not be doubted, and that the war could not be conducted with greater judgment.

SECTION 7.21.2
They resolved that ten thousand men, chosen from all their forces, should be sent into the town,

SECTION 7.21.3
and they judged that the common safety ought not to be entrusted to the Bituriges alone, because they understood that, if they held that town, the ultimate victory would rest almost entirely upon it.

CHAPTER 7.22

SECTION 7.22.1
Against the extraordinary valor of our soldiers the Gauls opposed devices of every kind, for theirs is a race of the greatest ingenuity, exceptionally adept at imitating and carrying out anything taught them by others.

SECTION 7.22.2
They caught our grappling hooks with nooses and pulled them aside, and once they had secured them, drew them inward with engines; they also undermined the siege mound with tunnels, a craft in which they were all the more skilled because there are extensive iron mines among them and every kind of tunneling is familiar and commonly practiced.

SECTION 7.22.3
Moreover, they had built wooden stories and towers along the whole circuit of the wall and had covered them with hides.

SECTION 7.22.4
Then, by frequent sallies both day and night, they either set fire to the siege mound or attacked our soldiers while they were occupied with the work; and as the daily rise of the mound brought our towers higher,

SECTION 7.22.5
they raised their own towers to the same level by joining additional timbers to their uprights; and they blocked our exposed tunnels with timbers charred and sharpened at the ends, boiling pitch, and stones of enormous weight, thus preventing them from approaching the walls.

CHAPTER 7.23

SECTION 7.23.1
All Gallic walls are generally built in the following manner. Long, straight beams are laid upon the ground at equal intervals throughout the length of the wall, two feet apart from one another.

SECTION 7.23.2
These are fastened together on the inner side and covered with a large mass of earth, while the intervals just mentioned are filled on the outer face with great stones.

SECTION 7.23.3
When these have been laid and firmly joined, another course is added above, with the same interval preserved. The beams do not touch one another, but, being separated by equal spaces, each is held firmly in place by a single stone set between them.

SECTION 7.23.4
In this way the whole structure is woven together course after course, until the wall has reached its proper height.

SECTION 7.23.5
This construction, with its alternating beams and stones preserving their courses in straight lines, is not unsightly in appearance or variety; at the same time it is admirably suited to the practical defense of towns, because the stone protects it from fire and the timber from the battering ram. The timber, generally braced together on the inner side by continuous beams forty feet long, can neither be broken through nor torn apart.

CHAPTER 7.24

SECTION 7.24.1
Though the siege was obstructed by all these devices, and though our soldiers were continually hampered by cold and unceasing rain, they nevertheless overcame every difficulty by uninterrupted labor and in twenty-five days constructed a siege mound three hundred and thirty feet wide and eighty feet high.

SECTION 7.24.2
When it had almost reached the enemy’s wall, and Caesar, according to his custom, was keeping watch over the work and urging the soldiers not to suspend their labor for even a moment, shortly before the third watch it was noticed that the mound was smoking, for the enemy had set it on fire through a tunnel;

SECTION 7.24.3
and at the same time, a shout rising from the whole circuit of the wall, they made a sally from two gates, one on either side of our towers.

SECTION 7.24.4
Others hurled torches and dry timber from the wall onto the mound at a distance and poured down pitch and everything else by which a fire could be kindled, so that it was scarcely possible to decide where to run first or to what point assistance should be carried.

SECTION 7.24.5
Nevertheless, because under Caesar’s established practice two legions always kept watch before the camp and many soldiers served on the works in shifts, it was quickly arranged that some should resist the sallies, others draw back the towers and cut a gap through the mound, while the entire mass of men from the camp rushed forward to extinguish the flames.

CHAPTER 7.25

SECTION 7.25.1
The fighting continued everywhere throughout the remainder of the night, and the enemy’s hope of victory was constantly renewed, especially because they saw that the protective screens of our towers had been burned away and perceived that our men could not easily approach the exposed works to bring assistance. Their fresh troops continually relieved the exhausted, and they believed that the whole salvation of Gaul rested upon that single moment. Then, as we looked on, an incident occurred that seemed so worthy of remembrance that we thought it ought not to be passed over.

SECTION 7.25.2
Before the gate of the town, a certain Gaul was taking lumps of tallow and pitch passed to him from hand to hand and hurling them into the fire opposite one of our towers. Pierced through his right side by a bolt from a scorpion, he fell dead.

SECTION 7.25.3
One of the men nearest him stepped across his fallen body and performed the same duty in his place;

SECTION 7.25.4
when he too was killed in the same manner by a shot from the scorpion, a third succeeded him, and a fourth succeeded the third. That position was not abandoned by its defenders until the mound had been extinguished, the enemy had been driven back at every point, and an end had been made to the fighting.

CHAPTER 7.26

SECTION 7.26.1
After trying every expedient without success, the Gauls on the following day adopted a plan to escape from the town, as Vercingetorix urged and commanded them to do.

SECTION 7.26.2
They hoped that by making the attempt in the silence of night they could accomplish it without great loss to their people, because Vercingetorix’s camp was not far from the town and the continuous marsh lying between would delay the Romans in pursuit.

SECTION 7.26.3
They were already preparing to do this by night when the matrons suddenly ran out into the public places and, weeping and throwing themselves at the feet of their men, begged with every entreaty that they should not surrender them and their common children to the enemy for execution, since the weakness of their nature and strength prevented them from undertaking flight.

SECTION 7.26.4
When they saw that the men persisted in their resolve—for in extreme danger fear generally leaves no room for pity—they began to cry out and signal the Romans that an escape was being attempted.

SECTION 7.26.5
Terrified by this, and fearing that the Roman cavalry would seize the roads in advance, the Gauls abandoned their plan.

CHAPTER 7.27

SECTION 7.27.1
On the following day Caesar moved his tower forward and completed the works he had planned. When a heavy rainstorm arose, he judged that the weather was not unfavorable for an attempt to take the town, because he saw that the guards on the wall had been posted with somewhat less care. He ordered his own men to work more languidly and explained what he wished done.

SECTION 7.27.2
He drew up the legions under cover within the siege sheds, exhorted them at last to reap the reward of victory for all their labors, offered prizes to those who first mounted the wall, and gave the signal to the soldiers.

SECTION 7.27.3
They suddenly rushed out from every quarter and quickly filled the wall.

CHAPTER 7.28

SECTION 7.28.1
The enemy, terrified by this unexpected development and driven from the wall and towers, formed in wedges in the forum and the more open places, intending, if an attack came against them from any direction, to fight it out in regular formation.

SECTION 7.28.2
When they saw that no one was descending to meet them on level ground, but that our troops were spreading all around them along the entire wall, they feared that every hope of escape would be taken away; and, throwing down their arms, they made in one continuous rush for the farthest parts of the town.

SECTION 7.28.3
There some were killed by our soldiers as they crushed one another in the narrow exits of the gates, while others, who had already passed through the gates, were killed by the cavalry;

SECTION 7.28.4
nor was there anyone who gave thought to plunder. Thus, enraged by the massacre at Cenabum and by the toil of the siege works, they spared neither the aged, nor women, nor infants.

SECTION 7.28.5
In the end, out of the whole number, which amounted to about forty thousand, scarcely eight hundred—those who had rushed out of the town upon hearing the first shout—reached Vercingetorix unharmed.

SECTION 7.28.6
It was already late at night when he quietly received them in their flight. Fearing that their arrival in a body and the compassion of the common people might cause a disturbance in the camp, he stationed his own retainers and the leading men of the states far out upon the road and arranged for the fugitives to be separated and escorted to their respective countrymen in that part of the camp which had been assigned to each state from the beginning.

CHAPTER 7.29

SECTION 7.29.1
On the following day he summoned a council, consoled and encouraged them, and urged them not to lose heart entirely or be shaken by their reverse.

SECTION 7.29.2
The Romans, he said, had conquered neither by courage nor in pitched battle, but by a certain skill and knowledge in conducting sieges, a field in which they themselves had been inexperienced.

SECTION 7.29.3
Anyone who expected every turn of fortune in war to be favorable was mistaken.

SECTION 7.29.4
It had never been his judgment that Avaricum should be defended, as they themselves could bear witness; but through the folly of the Bituriges and the excessive compliance of the others, this reverse had been suffered.

SECTION 7.29.5
Nevertheless, he would quickly repair it with greater advantages.

SECTION 7.29.6
For by his exertions he would win over those states that still stood apart from the rest of the Gauls and would bring all Gaul into a single purpose, against whose united will not even the whole world could stand; and he had already nearly accomplished this.

SECTION 7.29.7
Meanwhile, it was only fair that, for the sake of their common safety, they should grant his request and begin fortifying their camp, so that they might more easily withstand sudden attacks by the enemy.

CHAPTER 7.30

SECTION 7.30.1
This speech was not displeasing to the Gauls, especially because he himself had not lost heart after suffering so great a reverse, nor hidden himself away and avoided the sight of the multitude.

SECTION 7.30.2
Indeed, he was thought to have greater foresight and discernment because, while the situation was still intact, he had first advised that Avaricum be burned and later that it be abandoned.

SECTION 7.30.3
Thus, while adversity diminishes the authority of other commanders, his prestige, on the contrary, increased from day to day after this reverse.

SECTION 7.30.4
At the same time, his assurance that the remaining states would be won over filled them with hope. Then for the first time the Gauls began to fortify their camp, and though they were men unaccustomed to labor, they were so strengthened in spirit that they believed they must endure everything commanded of them.

CHAPTER 7.31

SECTION 7.31.1
Vercingetorix exerted himself no less earnestly than he had promised to win over the remaining states, enticing them with gifts and promises. For this purpose he selected suitable men,

SECTION 7.31.2
each of whom could most easily win them over either by subtle persuasion or through personal friendship. He took measures for those who had escaped after the capture of Avaricum

SECTION 7.31.3
to be armed and clothed;

SECTION 7.31.4
and at the same time, to restore his diminished forces, he imposed upon the states a fixed levy of soldiers, specifying how many he wished brought to the camp and by what date. He also ordered that all the archers, of whom there was a very great number in Gaul, be sought out and sent to him. By these measures the losses suffered at Avaricum were quickly replaced.

SECTION 7.31.5
Meanwhile Teutomatus, son of Ollovico and king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had been named a friend by our Senate, came to him with a large force of his own cavalry and of horsemen he had hired in Aquitania.

CHAPTER 7.32

SECTION 7.32.1
Caesar remained at Avaricum for several days and, finding there a very great supply of grain and other provisions, restored his army after its exertions and privations.

SECTION 7.32.2
Winter was now nearly over, and the season itself was calling him to resume the war. He had resolved to march against the enemy, in the hope that he might either draw him out of the marshes and forests or press him by siege, when envoys, leading men of the Aedui, came to beg him to assist their state at a moment of the utmost necessity.

SECTION 7.32.3
Their affairs, they said, were in the gravest danger because, although from ancient times it had been customary for a single magistrate to be elected and hold royal power for one year, two men were now exercising the magistracy, and each claimed to have been lawfully elected.

SECTION 7.32.4
One of these was Convictolitavis, a prosperous and distinguished young man; the other was Cotus, born of a most ancient family and himself a man of supreme influence and extensive kinship, whose brother Valetiacus had held the same magistracy the preceding year.

SECTION 7.32.5
The whole state was under arms; the senate was divided, the people divided, and each man had his own body of dependents. If the dispute were allowed to continue, one faction of the state would fight the other. It rested with Caesar’s vigilance and authority to prevent this from happening.

CHAPTER 7.33

SECTION 7.33.1
Although Caesar judged it harmful to withdraw from the war and the enemy, he was well aware of the disasters that commonly arose from dissensions. He therefore wished to prevent so great a state, so closely allied with the Roman people—a state he himself had always fostered and honored in every way—from resorting to violence and arms, and to prevent the faction that had less confidence in its own strength from summoning aid from Vercingetorix.

SECTION 7.33.2
He judged that this matter must take precedence. Since the laws of the Aedui forbade those who held the highest magistracy to leave their territory, Caesar, lest he appear to have infringed in any respect upon their rights or laws, decided to go in person into the country of the Aedui and summoned the entire senate, together with the two disputants, to meet him at Decetia.

SECTION 7.33.3
When nearly the whole state had assembled there, Caesar was informed that only a few men had been secretly summoned, at a different place and time from those prescribed, and that one brother had proclaimed the other elected, although the laws not only forbade two members of the same family, while both were alive, to be elected magistrates, but even prohibited them from sitting together in the senate. He therefore compelled Cotus to lay down his authority and ordered Convictolitavis,

SECTION 7.33.4
who had been elected by the priests according to the custom of the state during an intermission of the regular magistracies, to retain his office.

CHAPTER 7.34

SECTION 7.34.1
After delivering this decision, Caesar urged the Aedui to forget their disputes and dissensions, to lay all such matters aside and devote themselves to this war, and to expect from him, once Gaul had been conquered, the rewards they had earned. He ordered them to send him all their cavalry and ten thousand infantry without delay, whom he intended to distribute among garrisons to safeguard the grain supply. He then divided his army into two parts:

SECTION 7.34.2
he gave Labienus four legions to lead into the territories of the Senones and Parisii, while he himself led six legions against the Arverni toward the town of Gergovia, marching up the river Elaver. He assigned part of the cavalry to Labienus and retained part for himself.

SECTION 7.34.3
When Vercingetorix learned of this, he had all the bridges over that river destroyed and began to march along the opposite bank.

CHAPTER 7.35

SECTION 7.35.1
As the two armies advanced on opposite sides of the river, they generally pitched their camps within sight of one another and almost directly opposite. Vercingetorix posted scouts to prevent the Romans from constructing a bridge anywhere and carrying their forces across. Caesar’s position was one of great difficulty, for he risked being kept back by the river during the greater part of the summer, since the Elaver cannot ordinarily be crossed by a ford before autumn.

SECTION 7.35.2
Therefore, to prevent this, he pitched camp in a wooded place opposite one of the bridges Vercingetorix had caused to be destroyed, and on the following day remained there concealed with two legions.

SECTION 7.35.3
He sent the rest of his forces onward with all the baggage, as was his custom, dividing certain cohorts so that the number of legions might appear unchanged.

SECTION 7.35.4
After ordering these men to range as far afield as they could, Caesar, when from the time of day he judged that they had reached the camp, began rebuilding the bridge on the same piles, whose lower portions remained intact.

SECTION 7.35.5
The work was quickly completed; then, after leading the legions across and selecting a suitable site for a camp, he recalled the rest of his forces.

SECTION 7.35.6
When Vercingetorix learned what had happened, he hurried ahead by forced marches, so that he might not be compelled to fight against his will.

CHAPTER 7.36

SECTION 7.36.1
From that place Caesar reached Gergovia on the fifth day’s march. After a slight cavalry engagement that day, he examined the situation of the town, which stood upon a very lofty mountain and had difficult approaches on every side. He despaired of taking it by storm and decided that he must not undertake a blockade until he had secured his grain supply.

SECTION 7.36.2
Vercingetorix, however, had pitched his camp near the town and had stationed the forces of each state separately around him at moderate intervals. By occupying all the hilltops along that ridge from which the country below could be surveyed,

SECTION 7.36.3
he presented a formidable spectacle. He ordered the leading men of those states, whom he had chosen to take part in his councils, to assemble before him every day at dawn, whether some matter seemed to require deliberation or action;

SECTION 7.36.4
and scarcely a day passed on which he did not test the spirit and courage of each of his men in a cavalry engagement, with archers interspersed among the horsemen.

SECTION 7.36.5
Directly opposite the town, at the very foot of the mountain, stood a hill exceptionally well fortified and cut off on every side. If our men held it, they seemed likely to deprive the enemy both of a large part of their water supply and of free access to forage;

SECTION 7.36.6
but the enemy held this position with a garrison that was not very strong.

SECTION 7.36.7
Nevertheless, Caesar left camp in the silence of the night and, before reinforcements could come from the town, drove out the garrison and seized the position. He stationed two legions there and carried a double trench, each ditch twelve feet wide, from the larger camp to the smaller, so that even single men could pass safely between them without fear of a sudden enemy attack.

CHAPTER 7.37

SECTION 7.37.1
While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Aeduan Convictolitavis, to whom, as we have related, Caesar had awarded the chief magistracy, was bribed by the Arverni and entered into conference with certain young men. Their leader was Litaviccus, and among them were his brothers, young men born into a most distinguished family.

SECTION 7.37.2
He shared the reward with them and urged them to remember that they were free men, born to command.

SECTION 7.37.3
The Aedui, he said, were the one state that stood in the way of Gaul’s assured victory; by their authority the other states were held in check, but once they had been brought over, the Romans would have no foothold in Gaul.

SECTION 7.37.4
He himself had, it was true, received some favor from Caesar, though only after winning from him a perfectly just decision; but he set greater value upon their common liberty.

SECTION 7.37.5
For why should the Aedui go before Caesar to have him arbitrate concerning their rights and laws, rather than the Romans go before the Aedui?

SECTION 7.37.6
The young men were quickly won over both by the magistrate’s speech and by the reward, and declared that they would even take the lead in carrying out the plan. They then sought some means of accomplishing it, since they did not trust that the state could be rashly induced to undertake war.

SECTION 7.37.7
It was decided that Litaviccus should be placed in command of the ten thousand men who were to be sent to Caesar for the war and should undertake to lead them, while his brothers should hasten ahead to Caesar. They settled the method by which the rest of the plan was to be carried out.

CHAPTER 7.38

SECTION 7.38.1
After taking command of the army, Litaviccus, when he was about thirty miles from Gergovia, suddenly called the soldiers together and, weeping, said: “Where are we going, soldiers?

SECTION 7.38.2
All our cavalry, all our nobility, have perished. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, the foremost men of our state, have been accused of treason by the Romans and put to death without a hearing.

SECTION 7.38.3
Learn the facts from the very men who escaped from the massacre; for I, after the murder of my brothers and all my kinsmen, am prevented by grief

SECTION 7.38.4
from recounting what has happened.” The men whom he had instructed in what he wanted said were then brought forward, and they told the assembled multitude the same story Litaviccus had proclaimed: that many Aeduan horsemen had been killed

SECTION 7.38.5
because they were said to have held conferences with the Arverni, and that they themselves had hidden among the mass of soldiers and escaped from the midst of the slaughter.

SECTION 7.38.6
The Aedui cried out together and implored Litaviccus to advise them. “As though,” he replied, “the matter called for deliberation, and it were not necessary for us to hasten to Gergovia and unite ourselves with the Arverni.

SECTION 7.38.7
Can we doubt that, after committing so abominable a crime, the Romans are already rushing upon us to kill us? Therefore, if there is any courage in us,

SECTION 7.38.8
let us avenge the death of those who have perished so undeservedly, and let us kill these brigands.” He pointed out the Roman citizens who were traveling with them under the protection of his escort.

SECTION 7.38.9
He plundered a great quantity of grain and provisions, and after cruelly torturing the men, put them to death.

SECTION 7.38.10
He sent messengers throughout the territory of the Aedui and stirred the people with the same falsehood about the slaughter of their horsemen and leading men. He urged them to avenge their wrongs in the same manner as he had done.

CHAPTER 7.39

SECTION 7.39.1
Eporedorix, an Aeduan youth of the highest birth and the greatest influence in his own country, and Viridomarus, his equal in age and standing but of different birth, whom Caesar, after Diviciacus had entrusted him to his care, had raised from humble station to the highest rank, had joined the cavalry after being expressly summoned by Caesar.

SECTION 7.39.2
There was a rivalry between them for supremacy, and in the recent dispute over the magistracies one had exerted all his influence on behalf of Convictolitavis, the other on behalf of Cotus.

SECTION 7.39.3
Of the two, Eporedorix learned of Litaviccus’s plan and reported the matter to Caesar at about midnight. He begged Caesar not to allow the state to abandon its friendship with the Roman people through the corrupt designs of reckless young men. He foresaw that this would happen if so many thousands of men joined the enemy, since neither their relatives could disregard their safety nor the state treat it as a matter of slight importance.

CHAPTER 7.40

SECTION 7.40.1
Caesar was deeply troubled by this report, because he had always shown particular favor to the Aeduan state. Without a moment’s hesitation, he led four legions in light marching order and all the cavalry out of camp.

SECTION 7.40.2
At such a crisis there was no time to contract the camp, for success seemed to depend upon speed. He left his lieutenant Gaius Fabius with two legions to guard it.

SECTION 7.40.3
When he ordered Litaviccus’s brothers arrested, he discovered that they had fled to the enemy a short time before.

SECTION 7.40.4
He urged the soldiers not to be discouraged by the exertion of a march required at so critical a time; and with every man most eager to advance, he proceeded twenty-five miles. When he sighted the Aeduan column, he sent in the cavalry to delay and obstruct its march, and strictly forbade anyone to kill a man. He ordered Eporedorix and Viridomarus,

SECTION 7.40.5
whom the Aedui believed to have been killed, to move among the horsemen and call out to their countrymen.

SECTION 7.40.6
When the Aedui recognized them and perceived Litaviccus’s deception, they began to stretch out their hands in token of surrender, throw down their arms, and plead for their lives.

SECTION 7.40.7
Litaviccus fled to Gergovia with his retainers, who, by Gallic custom, hold it impious to desert their patrons even in the direst extremity.

CHAPTER 7.41

SECTION 7.41.1
Caesar sent messengers to the Aeduan state to inform them that through his clemency he had spared men whom by the law of war he could have put to death. Then, after allowing the army three hours of the night for rest, he marched back toward Gergovia.

SECTION 7.41.2
About halfway there, horsemen sent by Fabius met him and explained how great the danger had been. They reported that the camp had been attacked by the enemy’s full strength, fresh troops repeatedly relieving those who were exhausted and wearing down our men by incessant exertion; because of the camp’s great extent, the same men had been obliged to remain continually upon the rampart.

SECTION 7.41.3
Many had been wounded by the multitude of arrows and missiles of every kind; the artillery had been of great service in withstanding the attack.

SECTION 7.41.4
After Caesar’s departure, Fabius had blocked all the gates except two, added breastworks to the rampart, and prepared himself for the following day and a similar emergency.

SECTION 7.41.5
On learning these facts, Caesar, through the utmost exertions of the soldiers, reached the camp before sunrise.

CHAPTER 7.42

SECTION 7.42.1
While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Aedui, upon receiving the first reports from Litaviccus, allowed themselves no time to investigate.

SECTION 7.42.2
Some were driven by greed, others by anger and recklessness—a quality especially innate in that race of men—so that they accepted a vague report as an established fact.

SECTION 7.42.3
They plundered the property of Roman citizens, carried out massacres, and dragged men away into slavery.

SECTION 7.42.4
Convictolitavis promoted the movement once it had begun and drove the common people to such a frenzy that, after committing the crime, they would be ashamed to return to their senses.

SECTION 7.42.5
Marcus Aristius, a military tribune traveling to his legion, was escorted out of the town of Cabillonum under a pledge of safe conduct. They compelled those who had settled there for purposes of trade to do the same.

SECTION 7.42.6
They immediately attacked these men on the road and stripped them of all their baggage. When the Romans resisted, they besieged them for a day and a night; and after many had been killed on both sides, they summoned a larger body of armed men.

CHAPTER 7.43

SECTION 7.43.1
Meanwhile, when word arrived that all their soldiers were in Caesar’s power, they hurried to Aristius and declared that nothing had been done by public resolution. They decreed an inquiry into the plundering of the property,

SECTION 7.43.2
confiscated the property of Litaviccus and his brothers, and sent envoys to Caesar to clear themselves of blame.

SECTION 7.43.3
They did this to recover their men; but stained by their crime and captivated by the profit from the plundered property—a matter in which many were implicated—and terrified by the fear of punishment, they began secretly to form plans for war and to solicit the other states through embassies.

SECTION 7.43.4
Although Caesar understood what they were doing, he nevertheless addressed their envoys with all possible mildness. He said that because of the ignorance and fickleness of the common people, he formed no harsher judgment of their state and in no degree diminished his goodwill toward the Aedui.

SECTION 7.43.5
As for Caesar himself, expecting a wider uprising in Gaul and anxious not to be surrounded by all the states, he began considering how he might withdraw from Gergovia and reunite his entire army,

SECTION 7.43.6
without making a departure prompted by fear of revolt appear like a flight.

CHAPTER 7.44

SECTION 7.44.1
While he was considering these matters, an opportunity for successful action seemed to present itself. For when he came to the smaller camp to inspect the works, he noticed that a hill held by the enemy had been stripped of men, though on previous days it could scarcely be seen because of their multitude.

SECTION 7.44.2
Surprised, he asked the reason of the deserters, great numbers of whom flocked to him every day.

SECTION 7.44.3
They all agreed—as Caesar himself had already learned from his scouts—that the crest of the ridge was almost level, but was wooded and narrow where it gave access to the opposite side of the town. The Gauls were deeply concerned about this position and now believed that, since the Romans had occupied one hill, if they lost the other they would be almost completely surrounded and cut off from every means of escape and from all access to forage. Vercingetorix had summoned all of them to fortify this point.

CHAPTER 7.45

SECTION 7.45.1
On learning this, Caesar sent out several squadrons of cavalry. He ordered them, about midnight, to range about in every direction with rather more commotion than usual.

SECTION 7.45.2
At dawn he ordered a large number of pack animals and mules to be led out of camp, their packs to be removed, and the mule drivers, wearing helmets to resemble cavalrymen, to be taken around the hills.

SECTION 7.45.3
He added a few horsemen, who were to range more widely for the sake of display. He ordered them all to make for the same region by a long circuit.

SECTION 7.45.4
These movements could be seen from the town at a distance, since Gergovia commanded a view down into the camp, but at so great a distance it was impossible to determine exactly what they were.

SECTION 7.45.5
He sent one legion toward the same ridge and, after it had advanced a short distance, stationed it on lower ground and concealed it in the woods.

SECTION 7.45.6
The suspicions of the Gauls increased, and all their forces were transferred to that point to work on the fortifications.

SECTION 7.45.7
When Caesar saw that the enemy’s camps were empty, he concealed his men’s insignia and hid the military standards, then transferred soldiers in small groups from the larger camp to the smaller so that they would not be noticed from the town. He explained his intentions to the lieutenants whom he had placed in command of the several legions.

SECTION 7.45.8
Above all, he warned them to keep the soldiers under control and not allow them to advance too far in their eagerness to fight or their hope of plunder.

SECTION 7.45.9
He explained the disadvantages imposed by the unfavorable ground: these could be overcome by speed alone. The enterprise depended upon opportunity, not upon a pitched battle.

SECTION 7.45.10
After giving these instructions, he gave the signal and at the same time sent the Aedui by another ascent on the right.

CHAPTER 7.46

SECTION 7.46.1
The town wall was twelve hundred paces in a straight line from the plain and the foot of the ascent, if no winding of the route intervened;

SECTION 7.46.2
every circuit made to ease the slope increased the distance to be traveled.

SECTION 7.46.3
About halfway up the hill, following the natural line of the mountain, the Gauls had constructed lengthwise a six-foot wall of large stones to check the charge of our men. They had left all the lower ground unoccupied but had filled the upper part of the hill, as far as the town wall, with camps packed closely together.

SECTION 7.46.4
At the signal, the soldiers quickly reached the fortification, crossed it, and captured three camps.

SECTION 7.46.5
So swift was the capture of the camps that Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, who was suddenly surprised in his tent while resting at midday, barely escaped from the hands of the plundering soldiers, stripped to the waist and mounted on a wounded horse.

CHAPTER 7.47

SECTION 7.47.1
Having accomplished what he had intended, Caesar ordered the signal for retreat to be sounded and immediately halted the standards of the Tenth Legion, with which he was stationed.

SECTION 7.47.2
The soldiers of the other legions did not hear the trumpet, because a broad valley lay between them and Caesar; nevertheless, the military tribunes and lieutenants tried to hold them back, as Caesar had instructed.

SECTION 7.47.3
But, carried away by the hope of a swift victory, by the enemy’s flight, and by their own success in earlier battles, they believed that nothing was so difficult that their courage could not accomplish it. They did not cease their pursuit until they had approached the town wall and gates. Then indeed a shout arose from every quarter of the city,

SECTION 7.47.4
and those who were farther away, terrified by the sudden uproar and believing the enemy to be within the gates, hurled themselves out of the town.

SECTION 7.47.5
The matrons threw clothing and silver down from the wall and, leaning over bare-breasted with outstretched hands, implored the Romans to spare them and not, as they had done at Avaricum, refuse to spare even women and infants.

SECTION 7.47.6
Some were lowered hand to hand from the walls and surrendered themselves to the soldiers.

SECTION 7.47.7
Lucius Fabius, a centurion of the Eighth Legion, who was known to have declared among his comrades that day that he was inspired by the rewards won at Avaricum and would not allow anyone to scale the wall before him, found three men of his maniple and, lifted by them, mounted the wall; then, catching them one by one in turn, he pulled them up onto it.

CHAPTER 7.48

SECTION 7.48.1
Meanwhile those who, as explained above, had assembled on the other side of the town to defend the fortifications, first roused by hearing the shouting and then by repeated reports that the Romans had taken the town, sent their cavalry ahead and hurried there in a great rush.

SECTION 7.48.2
As each man arrived, he halted beneath the wall and increased the number of his countrymen engaged in the fighting.

SECTION 7.48.3
When a great multitude of them had gathered, the matrons, who shortly before had been stretching out their hands from the wall toward the Romans, began to implore their own men and, in the Gallic fashion, to display their loosened hair and bring their children into sight.

SECTION 7.48.4
The Romans were fighting on unequal terms both in position and in numbers; exhausted at once by their run and by the duration of the battle, they could not readily withstand troops who were fresh and unwearied.

CHAPTER 7.49

SECTION 7.49.1
When Caesar saw that the fighting was taking place on unfavorable ground and that the enemy’s forces were increasing, he grew anxious for his men and sent word to Titus Sextius, his lieutenant, whom he had left to guard the smaller camp, to lead the cohorts quickly out of camp and station them at the foot of the hill on the enemy’s right flank,

SECTION 7.49.2
so that, if he saw our men driven from their position, he might intimidate the enemy and prevent them from pursuing too freely.

SECTION 7.49.3
Caesar himself advanced a little way with his legion from the place where he had taken his stand and awaited the outcome of the battle.

CHAPTER 7.50

SECTION 7.50.1
While the fighting at close quarters was at its fiercest, the enemy relying on their position and numbers and our men on their courage, the Aedui suddenly appeared on our exposed flank. Caesar had sent them up by another ascent on the right to divide the enemy’s attention.

SECTION 7.50.2
Their similarity in arms greatly alarmed our men; and although they could be recognized by their bare right shoulders, the agreed sign of distinction, the soldiers nevertheless supposed that this very thing had been done by the enemy to deceive them.

SECTION 7.50.3
At the same time Lucius Fabius the centurion and the men who had mounted the wall with him were surrounded and killed, then hurled down from the wall.

SECTION 7.50.4
Marcus Petronius, a centurion of the same legion, after attempting to break down a gate, was overwhelmed by the multitude. Despairing of his own life, for he had already received many wounds, he said to the men of his maniple who had followed him: “Since I cannot save myself together with you, I shall at least provide for your lives—you whom, driven by my desire for glory, I have led into danger.

SECTION 7.50.5
Now that the opportunity is given you, look to your own safety.” At once he charged into the midst of the enemy, killed two, and drove the rest a short distance back from the gate.

SECTION 7.50.6
When his men tried to assist him, he said: “You try in vain to save my life; my blood and strength are already failing me. Go, then, while you still have the chance, and make your way back to the legion.” Thus he fought on, and a little later fell, but by his death saved his men.

CHAPTER 7.51

SECTION 7.51.1
Our men, pressed from every side, were driven from their position after losing forty-six centurions. But the Tenth Legion, which had taken its stand as a reserve on somewhat more favorable ground, checked the Gauls in their relentless pursuit.

SECTION 7.51.2
The Tenth in turn was relieved by the cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion, which had been led out of the smaller camp and had occupied higher ground with the lieutenant Titus Sextius.

SECTION 7.51.3
As soon as the legions reached the plain, they halted with their standards turned threateningly against the enemy.

SECTION 7.51.4
Vercingetorix withdrew his men from the foot of the hill within their defenses. On that day the soldiers lost numbered a little fewer than seven hundred.

CHAPTER 7.52

SECTION 7.52.1
The next day Caesar called an assembly and rebuked the soldiers for their recklessness and impetuosity, because they had decided for themselves how far they thought they should advance and what they should do, had not halted when the signal for recall was given, and could not be restrained by the military tribunes and lieutenants.

SECTION 7.52.2
He explained what the disadvantage of ground could accomplish and what his own judgment had been at Avaricum, when he had caught the enemy without commander or cavalry but had let an assured victory pass rather than suffer even a slight loss in the contest because of unfavorable ground.

SECTION 7.52.3
In proportion as he admired the greatness of spirit of men whom neither the camp’s defenses, nor the height of the mountain, nor the town’s wall had been able to delay, so strongly did he condemn their indiscipline and arrogance in supposing that they understood victory and the outcome of events better than their commander;

SECTION 7.52.4
nor did he require moderation and self-control from a soldier any less than courage and greatness of spirit.

CHAPTER 7.53

SECTION 7.53.1
After delivering this address, and at its conclusion reassuring the soldiers that they should not be disheartened by this reverse or attribute to the enemy’s courage what had been caused by unfavorable ground, Caesar, still contemplating the same departure he had previously intended, led the legions out of camp and drew up his battle line in a suitable position.

SECTION 7.53.2
When Vercingetorix proved no more willing to descend to level ground, Caesar fought a slight and successful cavalry action and led the army back into camp.

SECTION 7.53.3
After doing the same thing the following day, he judged that enough had been done to lessen the Gauls’ boasting and restore the soldiers’ confidence, and moved camp toward the territory of the Aedui.

SECTION 7.53.4
Even then the enemy did not pursue, and on the third day he reached the river Elaver, repaired the bridge, and led the army across.

CHAPTER 7.54

SECTION 7.54.1
There he was approached by the Aedui Viridomarus and Eporedorix and learned that Litaviccus had set out with all the cavalry to stir the Aedui to revolt; they said that they themselves must go on ahead to keep their state loyal.

SECTION 7.54.2
Although Caesar had already discerned the treachery of the Aedui in many matters and believed that the departure of these men would hasten the state’s revolt, he nevertheless decided not to detain them, lest he appear either to inflict an injustice or to betray any suspicion of fear. As they departed, he briefly recounted his services to the Aedui,

SECTION 7.54.3
reminding them of the condition in which he had found them and how humbled they had been—driven into their towns, deprived of their lands and all their resources, subjected to tribute, and forced with the deepest humiliation to surrender hostages—

SECTION 7.54.4
and to what fortune and eminence he had raised them, so that they had not only returned to their former condition but seemed to have surpassed the dignity and influence they had enjoyed in every previous age. With these instructions he dismissed them.

CHAPTER 7.55

SECTION 7.55.1
Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui, favorably situated on the banks of the Liger.

SECTION 7.55.2
Caesar had brought there all the hostages of Gaul, the grain, the public funds, and a large portion of his own baggage and that of the army;

SECTION 7.55.3
there too he had sent a great number of horses purchased in Italy and Spain for use in this war.

SECTION 7.55.4
When Eporedorix and Viridomarus arrived there and learned the state of affairs among their people—that Litaviccus had been received by the Aedui at Bibracte, the town that possessed the greatest authority among them; that Convictolitavis, their chief magistrate, and a large part of the senate had joined him; and that envoys had been officially sent to Vercingetorix to negotiate peace and friendship—they judged that so great an opportunity must not be allowed to pass.

SECTION 7.55.5
Accordingly, after killing the guards at Noviodunum and the merchants who had gathered there to conduct business, they divided the money and horses between themselves;

SECTION 7.55.6
they arranged for the hostages of the several states to be taken to the magistrate at Bibracte; and the town,

SECTION 7.55.7
which they judged they could not hold, they burned, lest it be of any use to the Romans;

SECTION 7.55.8
as much grain as they could carry away at once they transported by ship, and the rest they destroyed in the river or by fire.

SECTION 7.55.9
They themselves began to raise forces from the neighboring districts, to station garrisons and guards along the banks of the Liger, and to display their cavalry everywhere for the purpose of spreading fear, in the hope that they might cut the Romans off from their grain supply or, by reducing them to want, drive them back into the Province.

SECTION 7.55.10
They were greatly encouraged in this hope by the fact that the Liger had swollen with the melting snows, so that it appeared altogether impossible to cross by a ford.

CHAPTER 7.56

SECTION 7.56.1
When Caesar learned of these events, he decided that he must act swiftly: if he had to risk the attempt to construct bridges, he must fight before greater forces could be gathered there.

SECTION 7.56.2
For as to changing his plan and turning his march toward the Province, he did not think that this should be done even under the compulsion of fear. Not only did the disgrace and indignity of such a course deter him, as did Mount Cevenna, which barred the way, and the difficulty of the roads, but above all he felt grave anxiety for the isolated Labienus and the legions he had sent with him.

SECTION 7.56.3
Accordingly, after completing extremely long marches by day and night, he reached the Liger contrary to everyone’s expectation

SECTION 7.56.4
and, when the cavalry discovered a ford suitable enough for the emergency, though only the soldiers’ arms and shoulders could be kept above water to support their weapons, he stationed the cavalry so as to break the force of the current; and when the enemy were thrown into confusion at the first sight of them,

SECTION 7.56.5
he led his army across unharmed. Finding grain in the fields and an abundance of livestock, he replenished the army with these supplies and resolved to march into the territory of the Senones.

CHAPTER 7.57

SECTION 7.57.1
While these events were taking place around Caesar, Labienus left at Agedincum the reinforcements that had lately arrived from Italy, to guard the baggage, and set out with four legions for Lutetia. This was a town of the Parisii, situated on an island in the river Sequana.

SECTION 7.57.2
When the enemy learned of his approach, large forces assembled from the neighboring states.

SECTION 7.57.3
Supreme command was entrusted to Camulogenus the Aulercan, who, though nearly worn out with age, was called to that distinction because of his exceptional knowledge of military affairs.

SECTION 7.57.4
When he observed that there was a continuous marsh emptying into the Sequana and greatly obstructing the whole region, he took his position there and resolved to prevent our men from crossing.

CHAPTER 7.58

SECTION 7.58.1
At first Labienus attempted to advance covered galleries, fill the marsh with fascines and earthworks, and construct a roadway.

SECTION 7.58.2
When he saw that this was too difficult to accomplish, he left camp in silence during the third watch and, following the same route by which he had come, reached Metiosedum.

SECTION 7.58.3
This was a town of the Senones situated on an island in the Sequana, as we stated a little earlier of Lutetia. Seizing about fifty boats, quickly lashing them together, and putting soldiers aboard, he terrified the townspeople by the unexpectedness of the maneuver—for a large part of them had been called away to the war—and took possession of the town without a struggle.

SECTION 7.58.5
After repairing the bridge, which the enemy had demolished in the preceding days, he led the army across and began to march downstream toward Lutetia.

SECTION 7.58.6
The enemy, learning what had happened from those who had fled from Metiosedum, ordered Lutetia to be burned and the bridges belonging to that town to be demolished. They themselves left the marsh, marched to the banks of the Sequana opposite Lutetia, and encamped facing Labienus’ camp.

CHAPTER 7.59

SECTION 7.59.1
By now it was being reported that Caesar had departed from Gergovia; rumors were already arriving of the Aedui’s revolt and of the successful rising of Gaul, and the Gauls declared in their conversations that Caesar, cut off from his route and from the Liger, had been compelled by lack of grain to make for the Province.

SECTION 7.59.2
The Bellovaci, meanwhile, upon learning of the Aedui’s revolt, began to gather forces and openly prepare for war; they had been disloyal even before this, on their own account.

SECTION 7.59.3
Then Labienus understood that, amid so great a change in circumstances, he must adopt a plan far different from the one he had previously intended,

SECTION 7.59.4
and he was no longer thinking of making any conquest or provoking the enemy to battle, but of bringing the army safely back to Agedincum.

SECTION 7.59.5
For on one side the Bellovaci were pressing upon him, a state possessing the highest reputation for valor in Gaul; on the other, Camulogenus held the ground with an army prepared and fully equipped. Moreover, the legions were separated from their garrison and baggage by a great river.

SECTION 7.59.6
Confronted without warning by such formidable difficulties, he saw that he must seek help from courage and resolution.

CHAPTER 7.60

SECTION 7.60.1
Toward evening he called a council and urged his officers to carry out his commands carefully and energetically. He assigned the boats he had brought down from Metiosedum one apiece to Roman knights and ordered them, when the first watch was over, to proceed silently four miles downstream and wait for him there.

SECTION 7.60.2
He left five cohorts, which he considered the least reliable for fighting, to guard the camp;

SECTION 7.60.3
the remaining five cohorts of the same legion he ordered to set out at midnight with all the baggage and proceed upstream with a great commotion.

SECTION 7.60.4
He also collected small boats and sent them in the same direction, driven forward with a great clatter of oars. A little later he himself left in silence with three legions and made for the place where he had ordered the boats to put in.

CHAPTER 7.61

SECTION 7.61.1
When they arrived there, the enemy’s scouts, who had been posted all along the river, were taken by surprise and overpowered by our men, since a violent storm had suddenly arisen and they expected no attack;

SECTION 7.61.2
the army and cavalry were quickly ferried across under the direction of the Roman knights whom Labienus had placed in charge of the operation.

SECTION 7.61.3
At almost the same moment, near dawn, the enemy were informed that there was unusual commotion in the Roman camp, that a large column was marching upstream, that the sound of oars could be heard in the same direction, and that soldiers were being transported by boat a little way downstream.

SECTION 7.61.4
On hearing these reports, they believed that the legions were crossing at three places and that the Romans, all thrown into confusion by the Aedui’s revolt, were preparing to flee. They therefore divided their own forces into three parts.

SECTION 7.61.5
They left a garrison opposite the Roman camp and sent a small force toward Metiosedum, with orders to advance only as far as the boats proceeded; the rest of their forces they led against Labienus.

CHAPTER 7.62

SECTION 7.62.1
At daybreak all our men had crossed, and the enemy’s battle line could be seen.

SECTION 7.62.2
Labienus exhorted the soldiers to remember their former valor and their most successful battles, and to imagine that Caesar himself, under whose leadership they had so often defeated the enemy, was present among them. He then gave the signal for battle.

SECTION 7.62.3
At the first clash on the right wing, where the Seventh Legion had taken its position, the enemy were driven back and put to flight;

SECTION 7.62.4
on the left, held by the Twelfth Legion, although the enemy’s front ranks fell transfixed by javelins, the rest nevertheless resisted with the utmost ferocity, and not one man showed any sign of flight.

SECTION 7.62.5
Camulogenus, the enemy commander himself, stood among his men and urged them on.

SECTION 7.62.6
Even now the outcome of the victory remained uncertain; but when the tribunes of the Seventh Legion were informed of what was happening on the left wing, they brought their legion into view behind the enemy and advanced the standards.

SECTION 7.62.7
Not even then did anyone abandon his position; instead, they were all surrounded and killed.

SECTION 7.62.8
Camulogenus met the same fate. But the men who had been left as a garrison opposite Labienus’ camp, upon hearing that battle had been joined, went to reinforce their countrymen and seized a hill; yet they could not withstand the charge of our victorious soldiers.

SECTION 7.62.9
Thus, mingled with their own fleeing men, all whom the forests and mountains did not shelter were cut down by the cavalry.

SECTION 7.62.10
When this action was concluded, Labienus returned to Agedincum, where the baggage of the entire army had been left; from there he reached Caesar with all his forces.

CHAPTER 7.63

SECTION 7.63.1
When the defection of the Aedui became known, the war widened. Embassies were sent out in every direction.

SECTION 7.63.2
They exerted all the influence, authority, and wealth at their command to stir the states to revolt;

SECTION 7.63.3
and having gained possession of the hostages whom Caesar had entrusted to them, they terrified the wavering by putting these hostages to death.

SECTION 7.63.4
The Aedui asked Vercingetorix to come to them and confer on their plans for conducting the war.

SECTION 7.63.5
When this request was granted, they contended that supreme command should be entrusted to them; and when the matter became a subject of dispute, a council of all Gaul was summoned at Bibracte. Great numbers assembled there from every quarter.

SECTION 7.63.6
The question was submitted to the vote of the multitude: to a man they approved Vercingetorix as commander-in-chief.

SECTION 7.63.7
The Remi, Lingones, and Treveri were absent from this council: the first two because they remained faithful to the friendship of Rome; the Treveri because they were farther away and were hard pressed by the Germans, which was why they took no part in the entire war and sent assistance to neither side.

SECTION 7.63.8
The Aedui were deeply aggrieved at being cast down from their supremacy; they lamented the reversal of their fortune and longed for Caesar’s indulgence toward them. Yet, having undertaken the war, they did not dare separate their policy from that of the rest.

SECTION 7.63.9
Eporedorix and Viridomarus, young men of the highest promise, reluctantly obeyed Vercingetorix.

CHAPTER 7.64

SECTION 7.64.1
Vercingetorix commanded the remaining states to furnish hostages and fixed a date for their delivery. He ordered all the cavalry, fifteen thousand in number, to assemble quickly.

SECTION 7.64.2
He declared that he would be content with the infantry he had possessed before and would neither tempt fortune nor fight a pitched battle; but since he had cavalry in abundance, it would be very easy to prevent the Romans from gathering grain and forage,

SECTION 7.64.3
provided only that the Gauls themselves resolutely destroyed their own grain and burned their buildings, since by this sacrifice of private property they could see that they would gain everlasting dominion and freedom.

SECTION 7.64.4
Having settled these matters, he required ten thousand infantry from the Aedui and the Segusiavi, whose territory borders the Province, and added eight hundred cavalry to them.

SECTION 7.64.5
He placed the brother of Eporedorix in command of these troops and ordered him to make war upon the Allobroges.

SECTION 7.64.6
On the other side, he sent the Gabali and the neighboring districts of the Arverni against the Helvii, and likewise sent the Ruteni and Cadurci to ravage the territory of the Volcae Arecomici.

SECTION 7.64.7
At the same time, he sought to stir up the Allobroges by secret messages and embassies, hoping that their resentment from the former war had not yet subsided.

SECTION 7.64.8
He promised money to their leading men, and to the state itself dominion over the entire Province.

CHAPTER 7.65

SECTION 7.65.1
Against all these contingencies provision had been made in the form of garrisons totaling twenty-two cohorts, which the lieutenant Lucius Caesar drew from the Province itself and deployed in every quarter to meet the danger.

SECTION 7.65.2
The Helvii, of their own accord, engaged their neighbors in battle and were driven back; and after Gaius Valerius Donnotaurus, son of Caburus and chief man of the state, and several others had been killed, they were forced to take refuge within their towns and walls.

SECTION 7.65.3
The Allobroges posted garrisons at frequent intervals along the Rhône and defended their territory with the greatest care and diligence.

SECTION 7.65.4
Caesar, perceiving that the enemy was superior in cavalry and that, with every route cut off, he could receive no assistance of any kind from the Province or Italy, sent across the Rhine into Germany to those tribes he had pacified in previous years and summoned from them cavalry and light-armed infantry, who were accustomed to fight among the horsemen.

SECTION 7.65.5
When they arrived, since the horses they used were not sufficiently suitable, he took horses from the military tribunes, the other Roman cavalrymen, and the veterans recalled to service, and distributed them among the Germans.

CHAPTER 7.66

SECTION 7.66.1
Meanwhile, while these events were taking place, the enemy’s forces from the territory of the Arverni assembled, together with the cavalry that had been levied from all Gaul.

SECTION 7.66.2
When a great number of these had been gathered, and Caesar was marching toward the territory of the Sequani through the outermost borders of the Lingones so that assistance could more readily be brought to the Province, Vercingetorix established three camps about ten miles from the Romans.

SECTION 7.66.3
He summoned the cavalry commanders to a council and declared that the hour of victory had come. The Romans, he said, were fleeing to the Province and withdrawing from Gaul.

SECTION 7.66.4
That was enough to secure their freedom for the present, but did little to ensure peace and repose in the future; for the Romans would return with larger forces and never make an end of the war. They should therefore attack them while encumbered on the march.

SECTION 7.66.5
If the infantry came to the aid of their cavalry and were delayed in doing so, the Romans would be unable to continue their march; but if, as he more confidently expected, they abandoned their baggage and looked to their own safety, they would be stripped both of essential supplies and of their honor.

SECTION 7.66.6
As for the enemy’s cavalry, they surely could not doubt that none of them would dare even to advance beyond the marching column; and to give them greater courage for the attack, he would hold all his forces drawn up before the camp and strike terror into the enemy.

SECTION 7.66.7
The cavalrymen cried out that they should bind themselves by the most sacred oath: whoever failed to ride twice through the enemy’s column should be denied shelter beneath a roof and access to his children, his parents, and his wife.

CHAPTER 7.67

SECTION 7.67.1
The proposal was approved, and after all had been compelled to take the oath, the cavalry was divided into three bodies on the following day. Two battle lines appeared on the two flanks, while one began to obstruct the head of the column.

SECTION 7.67.2
When this was reported, Caesar likewise ordered his cavalry, divided into three bodies, to advance against the enemy. Fighting began simultaneously in every quarter.

SECTION 7.67.3
The column halted, and the baggage was taken in among the legions.

SECTION 7.67.4
Wherever our men seemed to be in difficulty or more heavily pressed, Caesar ordered the standards to advance to that point and a battle line to be formed. This both slowed the enemy’s pursuit and strengthened our men with the hope of support.

SECTION 7.67.5
At last the Germans on the right flank gained the summit of the ridge and drove the enemy from their position; they pursued the fugitives as far as the river, where Vercingetorix had taken up his position with the infantry, and killed many of them.

SECTION 7.67.6
When the rest saw this, they feared they would be surrounded and took to flight. Slaughter followed everywhere.

SECTION 7.67.7
Three Aedui of the highest rank were captured and brought before Caesar: Cotus, the cavalry commander who had disputed the election with Convictolitavis at the latest assembly; Cavarillus, who had commanded the infantry after the defection of Litaviccus; and Eporedorix, under whose leadership the Aedui had fought the Sequani before Caesar’s arrival.

CHAPTER 7.68

SECTION 7.68.1
When all his cavalry had been routed, Vercingetorix withdrew the forces he had drawn up before the camp and immediately began marching toward Alesia, a town of the Mandubii. He ordered the baggage to be brought out of the camp quickly and to follow him.

SECTION 7.68.2
Caesar had his baggage taken to the nearest hill and left two legions to guard it; then he pursued for as much of the day as time allowed, killed about three thousand of the enemy’s rearguard, and on the following day encamped at Alesia.

SECTION 7.68.3
After examining the position of the town and seeing that the enemy was terrified because its cavalry—the arm of its army in which it placed greatest confidence—had been defeated, he exhorted his soldiers to undertake the labor and began the investment of Alesia.

CHAPTER 7.69

SECTION 7.69.1
The town of Alesia itself stood on the summit of a hill in a very lofty position, so that it seemed impossible to take except by siege.

SECTION 7.69.2
Two rivers washed the base of this hill on two sides.

SECTION 7.69.3
Before the town stretched a plain about three miles in length.

SECTION 7.69.4
On all the remaining sides, hills of equal height surrounded the town, with a moderate interval between them and it.

SECTION 7.69.5
Beneath the wall, on the part of the hill facing east, the forces of the Gauls had filled this entire space and had drawn a ditch and a wall of rough stone six feet high across the front of it.

SECTION 7.69.6
The line of fortifications begun by the Romans extended for eleven miles.

SECTION 7.69.7
Camps were placed at suitable points, and twenty-three redoubts were built along the line. Guard detachments were stationed in these redoubts by day to prevent any sudden sortie, and at night the same positions were held by sentries and strong garrisons.

CHAPTER 7.70

SECTION 7.70.1
After work on the fortifications had begun, a cavalry battle took place on the plain which, as stated above, lay between the hills and extended for three miles. Both sides fought with the utmost force.

SECTION 7.70.2
When our men began to suffer, Caesar sent the Germans to their support and drew up the legions before the camp to prevent any sudden assault by the enemy’s infantry.

SECTION 7.70.3
The added support of the legions raised our men’s courage. The enemy was put to flight, hampered itself by its own numbers, and, since the gates had been made too narrow, became packed together.

SECTION 7.70.4
The Germans pursued more fiercely, all the way to the fortifications.

SECTION 7.70.5
A great slaughter followed. Some abandoned their horses and tried to cross the ditch and climb over the wall of rough stone. Caesar ordered the legions he had stationed before the rampart to advance a short distance.

SECTION 7.70.6
The Gauls within the fortifications were no less alarmed. Believing that an attack upon them was imminent, they shouted the call to arms; some, panic-stricken, rushed into the town.

SECTION 7.70.7
Vercingetorix ordered the gates closed, lest the camp be stripped of defenders. After killing many men and capturing a great many horses, the Germans withdrew.

CHAPTER 7.71

SECTION 7.71.1
Before the Romans could complete their fortifications, Vercingetorix resolved to send all his cavalry away by night.

SECTION 7.71.2
As they departed, he charged each of them to go to his own state and muster for war all who by reason of their age were able to bear arms.

SECTION 7.71.3
He set before them the services he had rendered and implored them to have regard for his safety and not surrender him, after he had served the cause of their common freedom so well, to be tortured by the enemy. If they proved negligent, he declared, eighty thousand chosen men would perish together with him.

SECTION 7.71.4
By his calculation, he had barely enough grain for thirty days, though by strict economy it could be made to last a little longer. After giving these instructions,

SECTION 7.71.5
he silently sent out the cavalry during the second watch, through the place where there was a gap in the works.

SECTION 7.71.6
He ordered all the grain to be brought to him and decreed death as the penalty for those who disobeyed.

SECTION 7.71.7
The livestock, of which the Mandubii had driven in a great quantity, he distributed man by man; he began to ration the grain sparingly and little by little.

SECTION 7.71.8
He withdrew into the town all the forces he had stationed before it.

SECTION 7.71.9
By these measures he prepared to await the relief forces of Gaul and conduct the war.

CHAPTER 7.72

SECTION 7.72.1
When Caesar learned of these measures from deserters and prisoners, he constructed the following kinds of fortifications. He dug a trench twenty feet wide, with vertical sides, so that the bottom of the trench was as wide as the distance between its upper edges.

SECTION 7.72.2
He set all the other fortifications four hundred feet back from this trench. His purpose was that, since he had necessarily embraced so large an area and the entire circuit could not easily be enclosed by a ring of soldiers, a mass of the enemy might not unexpectedly rush upon the fortifications by night, nor by day be able to hurl missiles at our men assigned to the work.

SECTION 7.72.3
Behind this interval he dug two trenches fifteen feet wide and of equal depth; the inner one, where the ground was level and low, he filled with water diverted from the river.

SECTION 7.72.4
Behind these he constructed an embankment and a rampart twelve feet high. To this he added a breastwork and battlements, with great forked branches projecting at the joints between the screens and the embankment to delay the enemy’s ascent; and all around the works he set towers eighty feet apart.

CHAPTER 7.73

SECTION 7.73.1
At the same time it was necessary to procure timber, gather grain, and construct fortifications of such extent, while our forces were reduced by the men who advanced some distance from the camp. Moreover, the Gauls sometimes attempted to attack our works and made sorties from the town through several gates with the utmost force.

SECTION 7.73.2
Caesar therefore decided that still more devices must be added to the works so that the fortifications could be defended by a smaller number of soldiers. Accordingly, tree trunks or very stout branches were cut, their tops stripped of bark and sharpened, and continuous trenches five feet deep were dug.

SECTION 7.73.3
These stakes were lowered into the trenches and fastened together at the bottom so that they could not be torn out, while their branches projected above.

SECTION 7.73.4
There were five rows, joined and intertwined with one another; whoever entered among them impaled himself upon extremely sharp stakes.

SECTION 7.73.5
The soldiers called these “boundary posts.” In front of them, pits three feet deep were dug in diagonal rows arranged in a quincunx, tapering gradually toward the bottom.

SECTION 7.73.6
Into these pits smooth stakes as thick as a man’s thigh, sharpened and fire-hardened at the top, were lowered so that they projected no more than four inches above the ground.

SECTION 7.73.7
At the same time, to secure and steady them, earth was trodden hard for one foot from the bottom around each stake; the remaining part of the pit was covered with osiers and brushwood to conceal the trap.

SECTION 7.73.8
Eight rows of this kind were laid out, three feet apart.

SECTION 7.73.9
Because of its resemblance to the flower, this device was called a “lily.” In front of these, foot-long blocks fitted with iron hooks were buried completely in the ground and scattered everywhere at moderate intervals; these were called “spurs.”

CHAPTER 7.74

SECTION 7.74.1
When these works were completed, Caesar followed the ground that was as level as the nature of the terrain allowed and, enclosing a circuit of fourteen miles, completed fortifications of the same kind, equal to the inner works but facing the opposite direction against an enemy from outside, so that even a great multitude, should such a thing occur, could not surround the garrisons of the fortifications.

SECTION 7.74.2
And to avoid being compelled to leave the camps at great risk, he ordered everyone to bring in a thirty-day supply of forage and grain.

CHAPTER 7.75

SECTION 7.75.1
While these events were taking place at Alesia, the Gauls summoned a council of their leading men and resolved not to call out every man able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix had proposed, but to require a fixed number from each state, lest, amid the confusion of so vast a multitude, they should be unable to maintain discipline, distinguish their own men, or make provision for grain.

SECTION 7.75.2
They required thirty-five thousand men from the Aedui and their dependents—the Segusiavi, Ambivareti, Aulerci Brannovices, and Blannovii; an equal number from the Arverni, together with the Eleuteti, Cadurci, Gabali, and Vellavii, who had long been under the dominion of the Arverni; from the Sequani,

SECTION 7.75.3
the Senones, Bituriges, Santones, Ruteni, and Carnutes, twelve thousand each; the Bellovaci, ten thousand; the Lemovices, the same number; the Pictones, Turoni, Parisii, and Helvetii, eight thousand each; the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, and Nitiobriges, five thousand each; the Aulerci Cenomani, the same number; the Atrebates, four thousand; the Veliocasses, Lexovii, and Aulerci Eburovices, three thousand each; the Rauraci and Boii, two thousand each;

SECTION 7.75.4
thirty thousand from all the states bordering on the Ocean that, according to their custom, are called the Armorican states, among which are numbered the Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibari, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lemovices, and Venelli.

SECTION 7.75.5
Of these, the Bellovaci did not furnish their full contingent, because they said that they would wage war against the Romans in their own name and at their own discretion and would obey no man’s command; nevertheless, at the request of Commius and in consideration of his ties of hospitality, they sent two thousand men along with him.

CHAPTER 7.76

SECTION 7.76.1
Caesar, as we have shown before, had made faithful and useful employment of this Commius’s services in Britain during the preceding years; in return for those merits he had ordered Commius’s state to be exempt from tribute, had restored its rights and laws, and had placed the Morini under his authority.

SECTION 7.76.2
Yet so complete was the accord throughout all Gaul for recovering liberty and regaining their former renown in war that they were moved neither by favors nor by the memory of friendship, and all devoted their whole hearts and resources to that war.

SECTION 7.76.3
When eight thousand cavalry and about two hundred and fifty thousand infantry had been assembled, these forces were reviewed in the territory of the Aedui, their number was reckoned, and commanders were appointed.

SECTION 7.76.4
The supreme command was entrusted to Commius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedorix of the Aedui, and Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian, a cousin of Vercingetorix. Men chosen from the several states were assigned to them, so that the war might be conducted by their counsel.

SECTION 7.76.5
All set out for Alesia eagerly and full of confidence,

SECTION 7.76.6
and there was not one among them who believed that the mere sight of so vast a multitude could be withstood, especially in a battle fought on two fronts, when a sally would be made from the town while outside so great a force of cavalry and infantry could be seen.

CHAPTER 7.77

SECTION 7.77.1
But those who were under siege in Alesia, after the day had passed on which they had expected the arrival of reinforcements from their countrymen, and after all the grain had been consumed, being ignorant of what was taking place among the Aedui, called a council

SECTION 7.77.2
and deliberated about the final issue of their fortunes. Various opinions were expressed: some favored surrender, others a sally while their strength still sufficed. Yet the speech of Critognatus ought not to be passed over, because of its extraordinary and abominable cruelty.

SECTION 7.77.3
This man, born to the highest rank among the Arverni and held in great authority, said: “I intend to say nothing about the proposal of those who call the most shameful slavery by the name of surrender; nor do I think that these men should be regarded as citizens or admitted to the council.

SECTION 7.77.4
My concern is with those who approve a sally; in their counsel, by the agreement of you all, there seems to remain some memory of our ancient courage. But to be unable to endure want for a little while is weakness of spirit,

SECTION 7.77.5
not valor. Men who willingly offer themselves to death are more readily found than men who patiently endure pain.

SECTION 7.77.6
And I would approve this proposal—so powerful is honor with me—if I saw that no loss would be incurred beyond that of our own lives.

SECTION 7.77.7
But in forming our decision, let us have regard for all Gaul, which we have roused to come to our aid.

SECTION 7.77.8
What spirit do you suppose our kinsmen and blood relations will have if, after eighty thousand men have been slain in one place, they are compelled to fight out the battle almost upon our very corpses?

SECTION 7.77.9
Do not strip of your aid those who, for the sake of your safety, have disregarded their own danger; and do not, by your folly and rashness or your feebleness of spirit, cast down all Gaul and subject it to perpetual slavery.

SECTION 7.77.10
Or do you doubt their faith and steadfastness because they have not arrived on the appointed day? What, then? Do you imagine that the Romans are laboring day after day upon those outer fortifications merely for amusement?

SECTION 7.77.11
If, with every approach barred, you cannot be reassured by messengers from them, then take the Romans themselves as witnesses that their arrival is drawing near; for the Romans, terrified by fear of that very event, labor night and day at their works.

SECTION 7.77.12
What, then, is my counsel? To do what our ancestors did in the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, a war by no means equal to this one: driven into their towns and reduced to similar want, they sustained life on the bodies of those who, because of their age, appeared unfit for war, and did not surrender themselves to the enemy.

SECTION 7.77.13
Even if we had no precedent for such a deed, I should still judge it a glorious thing to establish one for the sake of liberty and hand it down to posterity.

SECTION 7.77.14
For what resemblance was there between that war and this? After laying waste Gaul and inflicting great calamity, the Cimbri at least eventually departed from our territories and sought other lands; they left us our rights, our laws, our fields, and our liberty.

SECTION 7.77.15
But what else do the Romans seek or desire except, driven by envy, to settle in the lands and states of those whom they have learned by report to be renowned and powerful in war, and to fasten eternal slavery upon them? For they have never waged wars on any other terms.

SECTION 7.77.16
But if you are ignorant of what is being done among distant nations, look upon neighboring Gaul: reduced to a province, its rights and laws altered, subjected to the axes of Roman magistrates, it is crushed beneath perpetual slavery.”

CHAPTER 7.78

SECTION 7.78.1
After the opinions had been stated, they resolved that those who were unfit for war because of ill health or age should leave the town, and that they should try every expedient before resorting to the proposal of Critognatus;

SECTION 7.78.2
nevertheless, if circumstances compelled them and the reinforcements were delayed, they should adopt that plan rather than submit to terms of surrender or peace.

SECTION 7.78.3
The Mandubii, who had admitted them into the town, were compelled to leave with their children and wives. When they approached the Roman fortifications,

SECTION 7.78.4
they wept and begged with every entreaty that the Romans would take them into slavery and relieve their hunger with food.

SECTION 7.78.5
But Caesar posted guards along the rampart and forbade their admission.

CHAPTER 7.79

SECTION 7.79.1
Meanwhile Commius and the other commanders to whom the supreme command had been entrusted arrived at Alesia with all their forces and, occupying an outer hill, encamped no more than a mile from our fortifications.

SECTION 7.79.2
The next day they led the cavalry out of camp and filled the whole plain, which, as we have shown, extended three miles in length; they stationed their infantry a little distance from that place, concealed on the higher ground.

SECTION 7.79.3
From the town of Alesia there was a view down over the plain. At the sight of these reinforcements the townsmen rushed together; they congratulated one another, and the spirits of all were roused to joy.

SECTION 7.79.4
Accordingly, they led their forces out and took position before the town, covered the nearest trench with wickerwork, filled it with earth, and prepared themselves for a sally and for every contingency.

CHAPTER 7.80

SECTION 7.80.1
Caesar stationed his entire army along both lines of fortifications, so that, if the need arose, every man would know and hold his assigned place; then he ordered the cavalry to be led out of camp and battle to be joined.

SECTION 7.80.2
From all the camps, which occupied the crest of the ridge on every side, there was a view down upon the field, and all the soldiers waited intently for the outcome of the fighting.

SECTION 7.80.3
The Gauls had interspersed among their horsemen scattered archers and lightly armed infantry, who were to come to the aid of their men when they gave ground and withstand the charges of our cavalry. Many of our horsemen, unexpectedly wounded by these men, withdrew from the battle.

SECTION 7.80.4
Since the Gauls were confident that their men had the upper hand in the battle and saw that ours were being overborne by numbers, both those who were enclosed within the fortifications and those who had come to their relief encouraged their countrymen from every side with shouts and war cries.

SECTION 7.80.5
Because the action was taking place before the eyes of all, and neither an honorable nor a disgraceful deed could be concealed, both sides were spurred to valor by desire for glory and fear of dishonor.

SECTION 7.80.6
After the battle had continued with the victory in doubt from noon almost until sunset, the Germans massed their squadrons at one point, charged the enemy, and drove them back;

SECTION 7.80.7
when the cavalry had been put to flight, the archers were surrounded and killed.

SECTION 7.80.8
In the same way, from the other parts of the field our men pursued the retreating enemy all the way to their camp and gave them no opportunity to rally.

SECTION 7.80.9
But those who had advanced from Alesia withdrew sadly into the town, almost despairing of victory.

CHAPTER 7.81

SECTION 7.81.1
After allowing one day to pass, during which the Gauls made a great quantity of wickerwork, ladders, and grappling hooks, they silently left their camp at midnight and approached the fortifications on the plain.

SECTION 7.81.2
Suddenly raising a shout, as a signal by which those besieged in the town might learn of their arrival, they prepared to cast down their wickerwork, drive our men from the rampart with slings, arrows, and stones, and carry out all the other measures required for an assault.

SECTION 7.81.3
At the same time, when the shout was heard, Vercingetorix gave his men the signal by trumpet and led them out of the town.

SECTION 7.81.4
Our men went to the fortifications, each to the place assigned to him on the preceding days, and beat back the Gauls with slings casting one-pound stones, with the stakes they had set out along the works, and with leaden bullets.

SECTION 7.81.5
Since darkness took away their view, many wounds were received on both sides. Numerous missiles were discharged from the artillery.

SECTION 7.81.6
But the legates Marcus Antonius and Gaius Trebonius, to whom the defense of these sectors had fallen, drew men from the more distant redoubts and sent them as reinforcements wherever they perceived that our troops were hard-pressed.

CHAPTER 7.82

SECTION 7.82.1
So long as the Gauls remained at a greater distance from the fortifications, they gained more by the great number of their missiles; but after they came nearer, they either unwittingly impaled themselves upon the spikes, or fell into the pits and were pierced through, or were struck by the heavy rampart-javelins hurled from the wall and towers and killed.

SECTION 7.82.2
After suffering many wounds on every side without breaking through any part of the fortifications, and with daylight approaching, they feared that a sally from the upper camp might outflank and surround them on their exposed side; they therefore withdrew to their own lines.

SECTION 7.82.3
Meanwhile those within, while bringing forward the equipment Vercingetorix had prepared for the sally and filling the first trenches, spent so long in carrying out these operations that they learned their countrymen had withdrawn before they themselves could approach the fortifications. Thus, without accomplishing their purpose, they returned to the town.

CHAPTER 7.83

SECTION 7.83.1
Twice repulsed with heavy loss, the Gauls deliberated about what they should do. They called in men familiar with the terrain and learned from them the position and fortifications of the upper camp.

SECTION 7.83.2
On the northern side there was a hill which, because of the great extent of its circumference, our men had been unable to enclose within their works. They had therefore been compelled to establish their camp on ground that was almost unfavorable and sloped gently downward.

SECTION 7.83.3
The legates Gaius Antistius Reginus and Gaius Caninius Rebilus held this camp with two legions.

SECTION 7.83.4
After learning the terrain through their scouts, the enemy commanders selected sixty thousand men from their whole force, choosing them from the states that enjoyed the highest reputation for valor;

SECTION 7.83.5
they secretly agreed among themselves what should be done and how it should be carried out, and fixed the time for the approach when it should appear to be noon.

SECTION 7.83.6
They placed over these forces Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian, one of the four commanders and a kinsman of Vercingetorix.

SECTION 7.83.7
Leaving camp during the first watch, he had almost completed his march by daybreak; then he concealed himself behind the mountain and ordered his soldiers to recover from their exertions during the night.

SECTION 7.83.8
When noon now seemed to be drawing near, he hastened toward the camp mentioned above; at the same time the cavalry began to approach the fortifications on the plain, and the rest of the forces began to display themselves before their camp.

CHAPTER 7.84

SECTION 7.84.1
When Vercingetorix saw his countrymen from the citadel of Alesia, he came out of the town and brought forward the wickerwork, long poles, covered sheds, hooks, and the other equipment he had prepared for the sally.

SECTION 7.84.2
Battle was joined simultaneously at every point, and every means was tried; wherever a part of the defenses appeared least secure, there the enemy rushed.

SECTION 7.84.3
The Roman force was stretched thin along fortifications of such extent and could not easily meet the attacks at many points.

SECTION 7.84.4
The shouting that arose behind our men as they fought did much to terrify them, because they saw that their own danger depended upon the safety of others;

SECTION 7.84.5
for generally it is what lies beyond their sight that most violently disturbs men’s minds.

CHAPTER 7.85

SECTION 7.85.1
Caesar found a suitable position from which he could observe what was taking place in every quarter, and sent reinforcements to those who were hard-pressed.

SECTION 7.85.2
Both sides realized that this was the one moment when they must exert themselves to the utmost:

SECTION 7.85.3
the Gauls, unless they broke through the fortifications, despaired of all hope of safety; the Romans, if they prevailed, looked for an end to all their labors.

SECTION 7.85.4
The severest pressure fell upon the upper fortifications, to which, as we have shown, Vercassivellaunus had been sent. The unfavorable downward slope of the ground carried great weight in the struggle.

SECTION 7.85.5
Some hurled missiles, while others advanced under a formed tortoise; fresh men relieved the exhausted in turn.

SECTION 7.85.6
The earth cast by the whole host against the fortification both gave the Gauls a way up and covered the devices the Romans had concealed in the ground; and by now our men had neither weapons nor strength enough to hold out.

CHAPTER 7.86

SECTION 7.86.1
When Caesar learned of this situation, he sent Labienus with six cohorts to reinforce the hard-pressed troops;

SECTION 7.86.2
he ordered him, if he could not hold out, to withdraw the cohorts and fight by making a sally, but not to do so unless compelled by necessity.

SECTION 7.86.3
Caesar himself went among the rest and urged them not to yield to their exertions; he told them that the fruit of all their previous battles depended upon that day and hour.

SECTION 7.86.4
Those on the inside, despairing of success on the level ground because of the vast scale of the fortifications, attempted an ascent over the precipitous slopes; to this point they brought the equipment they had prepared.

SECTION 7.86.5
By the great number of their missiles they drove the defenders from the towers, filled the trenches with earth and wickerwork, and with hooks tore down the rampart and breastwork.

CHAPTER 7.87

SECTION 7.87.1
Caesar first sent the young Brutus with several cohorts, then the legate Gaius Fabius with others; finally, when the fighting grew fiercer, he himself brought fresh troops to their aid.

SECTION 7.87.2
After restoring the battle and repulsing the enemy, he hastened to the point to which he had sent Labienus. He drew four cohorts from the nearest redoubt and ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, while the rest were to ride around the outer fortifications and attack the enemy from the rear.

SECTION 7.87.3
When neither the embankments nor the trenches could withstand the enemy’s assault, Labienus gathered together in one place thirty-nine cohorts, which chance enabled him to draw from the nearest posts, and informed Caesar by messengers what he thought must be done. Caesar hastened forward to take part in the battle.

CHAPTER 7.88

SECTION 7.88.1
His arrival was recognized by the color of the cloak he was accustomed to wear as his distinguishing mark in battle; and when the squadrons of cavalry and the cohorts he had ordered to follow him came into view—for from the higher ground these slopes and descents could be seen—the enemy joined battle.

SECTION 7.88.2
A shout rises on both sides, and again a shout answers from the rampart and all the fortifications. Our men cast aside their javelins and fight with swords.

SECTION 7.88.3
Suddenly cavalry is seen in the enemy’s rear; other cohorts draw near. The enemy turn and flee; the cavalry meet them in their flight. A great slaughter follows. Sedulius, commander and chief of the Lemovices, is killed;

SECTION 7.88.4
Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian is captured alive as he flees; seventy-four military standards are brought back to Caesar. Of so vast a host, few reach their camp unharmed.

SECTION 7.88.5
When those in the town behold the slaughter and flight of their countrymen, they despair of deliverance and withdraw their forces from the fortifications.

SECTION 7.88.6
As soon as this news is heard, the Gauls flee from their camp. Had the soldiers not been exhausted by repeatedly going to the relief of their comrades and by the exertions of the entire day, all the enemy’s forces might have been destroyed.

SECTION 7.88.7
Around midnight the cavalry is sent out and overtakes the rear of the column. A great number are captured and killed; the rest escape to their several states.

CHAPTER 7.89

SECTION 7.89.1
The next day Vercingetorix calls a council and declares that he undertook this war not for his own private interests,

SECTION 7.89.2
but for the sake of their common liberty; and since they must yield to fortune, he offers himself to them for either course, whether they wish to satisfy the Romans by his death or surrender him alive. Envoys are sent to Caesar concerning these matters.

SECTION 7.89.3
He orders the arms to be surrendered and the chiefs brought before him.

SECTION 7.89.4
Caesar himself takes his seat in the fortifications before the camp. The leaders are brought there; Vercingetorix is surrendered, and the arms are cast down.

SECTION 7.89.5
He sets apart the Aedui and Arverni, in the hope that through them he may recover the allegiance of their states; from the remaining prisoners he distributes one captive to every soldier in the whole army as spoil.

CHAPTER 7.90

SECTION 7.90.1
When these matters are concluded, he sets out for the country of the Aedui and receives the state back into allegiance.

SECTION 7.90.2
Envoys sent there by the Arverni promise that they will do whatever he commands. He demands a large number of hostages.

SECTION 7.90.3
He sends the legions into winter quarters. He restores about twenty thousand captives to the Aedui and Arverni.

SECTION 7.90.4
He orders Titus Labienus to set out for the country of the Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and assigns Marcus Sempronius Rutilus to him.

SECTION 7.90.5
He stations his lieutenant Gaius Fabius and Lucius Minucius Basilus with two legions among the Remi, lest they suffer any injury from the neighboring Bellovaci.

SECTION 7.90.6
He sends Gaius Antistius Reginus among the Ambivareti, Titus Sextius among the Bituriges, and Gaius Caninius Rebilus among the Ruteni, each with one legion.

SECTION 7.90.7
He stations Quintus Tullius Cicero and Publius Sulpicius at Cabillonum and Matisco, in the territory of the Aedui along the Arar, to oversee the grain supply. He himself determines to winter at Bibracte. When this dispatch is received at Rome, a public thanksgiving of twenty days is decreed.

### Book 8

CHAPTER 8.0

SECTION 8.0.1
Compelled by your persistent urgings, Balbus, and because my daily refusal seemed to offer not an excuse based on the difficulty of the task but a plea born of indolence, I have undertaken a most difficult enterprise.

SECTION 8.0.2
I have linked Caesar’s commentaries on his achievements in Gaul, though my preceding and subsequent writings cannot compare with his, and I have completed his last, unfinished work, continuing from the events at Alexandria to the close—not, indeed, of the civil dissension, of which we see no end, but of Caesar’s life.

SECTION 8.0.3
Would that those who read these commentaries could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them; then I might more readily escape the charge of folly and arrogance for having interposed my work among Caesar’s writings.

SECTION 8.0.4
For all are agreed that nothing has ever been produced by others with such care that it is not surpassed by the elegance of these commentaries.

SECTION 8.0.5
They were published so that writers might not lack knowledge of such momentous events, and in the judgment of everyone they are so highly esteemed that Caesar seems to have taken away from writers the opportunity to treat the subject rather than furnished it to them.

SECTION 8.0.6
Yet our admiration for this achievement is greater than that of others; for others know how well and faultlessly he wrote them, but we know also how easily and swiftly he completed them.

SECTION 8.0.7
Caesar possessed not only the highest skill and elegance in writing, but also the most exact knowledge of how to explain his own designs.

SECTION 8.0.8
Nor did it even fall to my lot to take part in the Alexandrian and African wars. Although these wars are partly known to us from Caesar’s conversation, still we listen in one way to things that captivate us by their novelty or wonder, and in another to things that we intend to relate as testimony.

SECTION 8.0.9
But plainly, while I gather every possible excuse for not being compared with Caesar, I incur this very charge of arrogance by imagining that anyone could judge me capable of comparison with him. Farewell.

CHAPTER 8.1

SECTION 8.1.1
Although all Gaul had been subdued, Caesar had allowed no respite from warfare since the previous summer and wished his soldiers to recover from such great exertions in the repose of winter quarters; yet reports came that several states were at that very time reviving plans for war and forming conspiracies.

SECTION 8.1.2
A plausible reason for this was given: all the Gauls had learned that no multitude gathered in a single place could resist the Romans; but if several states began separate wars at the same time, the army of the Roman people would not have sufficient assistance, time, or forces to pursue them all. No state ought to refuse whatever hardship fell to its lot if, by causing such delay, it could enable the rest to reclaim their liberty.

CHAPTER 8.2

SECTION 8.2.1
To prevent this belief of the Gauls from becoming established, Caesar places his quaestor Marcus Antonius in command of his own winter quarters. On the day before the Kalends of January, he himself sets out from the town of Bibracte with a cavalry escort for the Thirteenth Legion, which he had stationed in the territory of the Bituriges not far from the borders of the Aedui, and joins to it the Eleventh Legion, which had been quartered nearest.

SECTION 8.2.2
Leaving two cohorts from each legion to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of the army into the most fertile districts of the Bituriges. Since they possessed an extensive territory and several towns, the winter quarters of a single legion had been unable to restrain them from preparing for war and forming conspiracies.

CHAPTER 8.3

SECTION 8.3.1
Caesar’s sudden arrival produced the inevitable result among people unprepared and scattered abroad: while they cultivated the countryside without any fear, they were overwhelmed by the cavalry before they could take refuge in the towns.

SECTION 8.3.2
For even the customary sign of an enemy incursion, ordinarily perceived from the burning of buildings, had been eliminated by Caesar’s prohibition, lest he lack abundant forage and grain if he wished to advance farther, or the enemy be alarmed by the fires.

SECTION 8.3.3
After many thousands of men had been captured, the terrified Bituriges who had managed to escape the Romans’ first arrival fled into neighboring states, trusting either in private ties of hospitality or in the partnership of their designs.

SECTION 8.3.4
In vain: by forced marches Caesar confronts them everywhere and gives no state time to consider the safety of others rather than its own. By such speed he both kept loyal allies steadfast and brought the wavering, through fear, to accept terms of peace.

SECTION 8.3.5
When such terms were offered, the Bituriges saw that Caesar’s clemency left open to them a return to his friendship, and that neighboring states had surrendered hostages without suffering any punishment and had been received under his protection; they therefore did the same.

CHAPTER 8.4

SECTION 8.4.1
In recognition of such great labor and endurance—for throughout the winter days the soldiers had persevered most zealously in their exertions amid the most difficult marches and intolerable cold—Caesar promises to grant each soldier two hundred sesterces and each centurion two thousand as prize money. He then sends the legions back into winter quarters and returns to Bibracte on the fortieth day.

SECTION 8.4.2
While he is there administering justice, the Bituriges send envoys to ask his aid against the Carnutes, whom they accuse of having made war upon them.

SECTION 8.4.3
On learning of this, although he had remained in winter quarters no more than eighteen days, he leads the Fourteenth and Sixth Legions out of their quarters on the Arar, where, as the preceding commentary has shown, they had been stationed to facilitate the grain supply. Thus he sets out with two legions to pursue the Carnutes.

CHAPTER 8.5

SECTION 8.5.1
When word of the army reaches the enemy, the Carnutes, warned by the disaster of the others, abandon the villages and towns where they had been living through the winter in small buildings hastily erected to meet immediate necessity—for, having recently been conquered, they had relinquished several towns—and flee in all directions.

SECTION 8.5.2
Because Caesar is unwilling to expose the soldiers to the exceedingly violent storms that broke out at that very time, he pitches camp in Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes, and crowds the soldiers partly into the houses of the Gauls and partly into shelters quickly built by laying thatch over the tents.

SECTION 8.5.3
Nevertheless, he sends the cavalry and auxiliary infantry in every direction in which the enemy are said to have gone—and not in vain;

SECTION 8.5.4
for our men usually return with great booty. Overwhelmed by the hardships of winter and the terror of danger, driven from shelter, afraid to remain long in any place, and unable to find protection from the most violent storms beneath the cover of the forests, the Carnutes scatter into neighboring states after losing a large part of their people.

CHAPTER 8.6

SECTION 8.6.1
At this most difficult season of the year, Caesar was content to disperse the bands that were assembling, so that no beginning of war might arise; and, so far as calculation could determine, he had ascertained that no major war could be organized before the summer campaign. He therefore stations Gaius Trebonius with the two legions he had with him in winter quarters at Cenabum;

SECTION 8.6.2
but Caesar himself was repeatedly informed by embassies from the Remi that the Bellovaci, who surpassed all the Gauls and Belgae in martial reputation, together with their neighboring states, were raising armies under the leadership of Correus the Bellovacan and Commius the Atrebatian and gathering them in one place, intending to invade in full force the territory of the Suessiones, who had been placed under the authority of the Remi. He judged it a matter not only of his honor but also of his security that allies who had rendered the republic outstanding service should suffer no disaster;

SECTION 8.6.3
he therefore summons the Eleventh Legion once more from winter quarters, sends a dispatch to Gaius Fabius directing him to bring the two legions under his command into the territory of the Suessiones, and calls for one of Labienus’s two legions.

SECTION 8.6.4
Thus, as the convenience of their winter quarters and the conduct of the war required, he imposed the burden of campaigning upon the legions in turn, while subjecting himself to unremitting exertion.

CHAPTER 8.7

SECTION 8.7.1
After assembling these forces, he marches against the Bellovaci and pitches camp in their territory. He sends cavalry squadrons in every direction to capture men from whom he might learn the enemy’s plans.

SECTION 8.7.2
The cavalry accomplish their task and report that only a few men have been found in the buildings, and that these had remained not for the purpose of cultivating the fields—for there had been a careful migration from every quarter—but had been sent back to act as scouts.

SECTION 8.7.3
When Caesar asked them where the main body of the Bellovaci was and what their design might be, he learned that all the Bellovaci capable of bearing arms had assembled in one place,

SECTION 8.7.4
as had the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Veliocasses, and Atrebates; that they had chosen for their camp a commanding position in a forest surrounded by marshland; and that they had carried all their baggage into the more distant woods.

SECTION 8.7.5
He learned that several chiefs were responsible for the war, but that the multitude obeyed Correus above all, because they knew that he held the name of the Roman people in the deepest hatred.

SECTION 8.7.6
A few days earlier, Commius the Atrebatian had departed from this camp to bring in German auxiliaries, whose territory was close at hand and whose numbers were boundless.

SECTION 8.7.7
The Bellovaci had resolved, with the consent of all their chiefs and the eager approval of the common people, that if Caesar came with three legions, as was reported, they would offer battle, lest they later be compelled to fight his whole army on harsher and more wretched terms;

SECTION 8.7.8
but if he brought larger forces, they would remain in the position they had chosen and, by ambushes, prevent the Romans from obtaining forage—which at that season was both scanty and widely scattered—grain, and all other supplies.

CHAPTER 8.8

SECTION 8.8.1
When Caesar learned this from several sources whose reports agreed, and judged that the plans described to him were full of prudence and far removed from the usual rashness of barbarians, he resolved to shape all his measures so that the enemy, despising the small size of his force, might come out to offer battle all the sooner.

SECTION 8.8.2
For he had the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth, veteran legions of extraordinary valor, and the Eleventh, composed of picked young men of the highest promise. Yet even though it was now in its eighth year of service, it had not, by comparison with the others, acquired the same reputation for long experience and valor.

SECTION 8.8.3
Accordingly, after summoning a council and laying before it all the reports that had reached him, he strengthens the confidence of the troops.

SECTION 8.8.4
In the hope that the number of three legions might perhaps entice the enemy into battle, he arranges the order of march so that the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions should go before all the baggage, while the Eleventh should close the column of the entire baggage train—which was nevertheless moderate, as is customary on active campaigns—so that the enemy might see no appearance of a larger force than they themselves had demanded.

SECTION 8.8.5
With his column thus arranged in a formation nearly square, he brings the army into the enemy’s sight sooner than they expected.

CHAPTER 8.9

SECTION 8.9.1
When the Gauls—whose plans had been reported to Caesar as full of confidence—suddenly saw the legions advancing in ordered ranks and at a measured pace as though already drawn up for battle, whether from fear of the encounter, surprise at his sudden arrival, or a desire to await the revelation of our plan, they drew up their forces before their camp and did not descend from the higher ground.

SECTION 8.9.2
Although Caesar had desired battle, he was nevertheless astonished at the enemy’s vast numbers and pitched his camp opposite theirs, with a valley between them that was deeper than it was broad.

SECTION 8.9.3
He orders this camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high and a parapet built upon it in proportion to its height; a double trench, each fifteen feet wide, to be sunk with perpendicular sides; and numerous towers, three stories high, to be erected and connected by bridges laid across and floored over, their fronts protected by wicker breastworks. Thus the defenses would be guarded against the enemy by a double trench and a double line of defenders,

SECTION 8.9.4
of whom one line, stationed upon the bridges, would be safer because of its height and could therefore hurl its missiles more boldly and to a greater distance, while the other, placed upon the rampart itself and nearer the enemy, would be protected by the bridge from falling missiles. He fitted the gates with doors and higher towers.

CHAPTER 8.10

SECTION 8.10.1
This fortification had a twofold purpose. Caesar hoped that the scale of the works and the appearance of his own fear would inspire confidence in the barbarians; and since it was necessary to travel some distance to obtain forage and grain, he saw that the camp could be defended by a small force through the strength of the fortifications alone.

SECTION 8.10.2
Meanwhile, small parties frequently dashed out from either side and skirmished between the two camps, with the marsh lying between them. Sometimes, however, our Gallic and German auxiliaries crossed this marsh and pressed the enemy more vigorously; at other times the enemy crossed it in turn and drove our men back some distance.

SECTION 8.10.3
Moreover, in the daily foraging expeditions—as was bound to happen when fodder had to be sought from scattered and widely separated farmsteads—the foragers, dispersed amid difficult ground, were surrounded;

SECTION 8.10.4
and although this caused our men only moderate losses in pack animals and servants, it encouraged the barbarians in their foolish designs, all the more because Commius, whom I have said had gone to summon aid from the Germans, had arrived with cavalry. Though they numbered no more than five hundred, the barbarians nevertheless drew confidence from the coming of the Germans.

CHAPTER 8.11

SECTION 8.11.1
When Caesar observed that for several days the enemy had remained in a camp protected by a marsh and the natural strength of the ground, that their camp could not be stormed without a ruinous battle, and that the position could not be enclosed by fortifications except by a larger army, he sent a letter to Trebonius, ordering him to summon with all possible speed the Thirteenth Legion, which was wintering among the Bituriges under the lieutenant Titus Sextius, and then to come to him by forced marches with three legions;

SECTION 8.11.2
he himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, Lingones, and the other states, a great number of whom he had called out, by turns to protect the foraging parties and withstand sudden attacks by the enemy.

CHAPTER 8.12

SECTION 8.12.1
As this happened every day, and vigilance had now been diminished by familiarity, as usually occurs with the passage of time, the Bellovaci, after learning the regular stations of our cavalry, selected a force of infantry

SECTION 8.12.2
and placed it in ambush among the woods; on the following day they sent cavalry to the same place, first to draw our men out, and then to attack them when they had been surrounded.

SECTION 8.12.3
The misfortune fell by lot upon the Remi, whose turn it was to perform that day’s duty. For when they suddenly caught sight of the enemy’s cavalry and, being superior in numbers, despised their small force, they pursued too eagerly and were surrounded on every side by infantry.

SECTION 8.12.4
Thrown into confusion by this, they retreated more rapidly than is customary in a cavalry engagement, after losing Vertiscus, the leading man of their state and commander of their cavalry;

SECTION 8.12.5
although on account of his age he could scarcely sit a horse, he had nevertheless, in accordance with Gallic custom, neither pleaded age as an excuse for declining the command nor been willing for the battle to be fought without him.

SECTION 8.12.6
The spirits of the enemy were swollen and inflamed by their success in the engagement and by the death of the chief and cavalry commander of the Remi,

SECTION 8.12.7
while our men were warned by their loss to reconnoiter the ground more carefully before posting their guards and to pursue a retreating enemy with greater restraint.

CHAPTER 8.13

SECTION 8.13.1
Meanwhile, the daily engagements fought at the fords and crossing places of the marsh, in sight of both camps, did not cease.

SECTION 8.13.2
In one of these encounters the Germans, whom Caesar had brought across the Rhine for the express purpose of fighting intermingled with the cavalry, crossed the marsh in a body with unusual resolution, killed the few who resisted, and pressed their pursuit of the remaining multitude with exceptional persistence. Not only those who were being overwhelmed at close quarters or wounded from a distance, but even those who had customarily remained farther back in reserve, took fright and fled disgracefully,

SECTION 8.13.3
nor, though they repeatedly lost the higher ground, did they end their flight until they had either reached their own camp or, in some cases, been driven by shame to escape still farther away.

SECTION 8.13.4
The danger in which these men were placed so disordered the entire force that it was hard to judge whether they were more insolent after the slightest success or more timid after a moderate reverse.

CHAPTER 8.14

SECTION 8.14.1
After spending several days in the same camp, the leaders of the Bellovaci learned that the legions and the lieutenant Gaius Trebonius had drawn nearer. Fearing a siege like that of Alesia, they sent away by night all whom they regarded as inferior in age or strength, or who were unarmed, together with the rest of their baggage.

SECTION 8.14.2
While they were disentangling this disordered and confused column—for even when the Gauls travel light, a great multitude of wagons customarily follows them—they were overtaken by daylight and drew up their armed forces before their camp, to prevent the Romans from beginning the pursuit before the long baggage train had moved farther ahead.

SECTION 8.14.3
But Caesar judged that the enemy should not be attacked while offering resistance upon so steep an ascent, yet that the legions should be brought close enough to make it impossible for the barbarians to leave the place without danger while his soldiers pressed upon them.

SECTION 8.14.4
Accordingly, seeing that the two camps were separated by a difficult marsh, whose troublesome crossing might delay the speed of pursuit, and observing that a ridge stretching beyond the marsh almost to the enemy’s camp was divided from their position by a shallow valley, he laid bridges across the marsh, led the legions over, and quickly reached the level summit of the ridge, which was protected on either flank by sloping ground.

SECTION 8.14.5
There he drew up the legions, reached the far end of the ridge, and established his battle line at a point from which missiles discharged by artillery could be hurled into the enemy’s massed formations.

CHAPTER 8.15

SECTION 8.15.1
The barbarians, trusting in the natural strength of their position and not refusing battle if the Romans should attempt to climb the hill, were unable to send their divided forces away little by little for fear that, once dispersed, they would be thrown into confusion; they therefore remained in battle formation.

SECTION 8.15.2
When Caesar perceived their obstinacy, he drew up twenty cohorts and, after marking out a camp on the spot, ordered it to be fortified.

SECTION 8.15.3
When the works were completed, he stationed the legions in formation before the rampart and posted the cavalry on guard with their horses bridled.

SECTION 8.15.4
When the Bellovaci saw that the Romans were ready to pursue, and realized that they could not pass the night or remain any longer in the same place without danger, they devised the following plan for retreating.

SECTION 8.15.5
They passed bundles of straw and brushwood from hand to hand—for these materials were exceedingly abundant in their camp—and placed them before the battle line where they had been sitting, since Caesar’s earlier commentaries have explained that the Gauls customarily sit while drawn up for battle. At the very end of the day, upon a signal announced throughout the ranks, they set them all on fire at once.

SECTION 8.15.6
Thus a continuous wall of flame suddenly concealed all their forces from the Romans’ sight. The moment this happened, the barbarians fled at full speed.

CHAPTER 8.16

SECTION 8.16.1
Although Caesar could not see the enemy’s departure because the fires stood between them, he nevertheless suspected that the plan had been adopted to cover a retreat. He advanced the legions and sent cavalry squadrons in pursuit; but he himself proceeded more slowly, fearing an ambush, lest the enemy perhaps remain in the same place and try to entice our men onto unfavorable ground.

SECTION 8.16.2
The cavalry were afraid to enter the thickest smoke and flames; and if any ventured in too eagerly, they could scarcely see even the heads of their own horses. Fearing an ambush, they therefore gave the Bellovaci every opportunity to retreat unmolested.

SECTION 8.16.3
Thus, by a flight equally full of fear and cunning, the enemy advanced no more than ten miles without any loss and pitched camp in a strongly fortified position.

SECTION 8.16.4
From there they frequently placed cavalry and infantry in ambush and inflicted heavy losses upon the Romans during their foraging expeditions.

CHAPTER 8.17

SECTION 8.17.1
When this happened repeatedly, Caesar learned from a prisoner that Correus, the leader of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of the bravest infantry and one thousand cavalry from the whole body, intending to place them in ambush at a location to which he suspected the Romans would send men because of its abundance of grain and fodder.

SECTION 8.17.2
Upon learning of this plan, Caesar led out more legions than usual and sent ahead the cavalry, which he customarily dispatched to protect the foragers. Among them he interspersed lightly armed auxiliaries, while he himself approached as closely as possible with the legions.

CHAPTER 8.18

SECTION 8.18.1
The enemy posted in ambush had chosen for the action a plain extending no more than a thousand paces in any direction and protected on every side by woods or by a river exceedingly difficult to cross; they surrounded it with their ambush as though with a hunting enclosure.

SECTION 8.18.2
Our men, having discovered the enemy’s plan, were ready in spirit and arms for battle. Since the legions were following behind, they would refuse no engagement, and so entered the place squadron by squadron.

SECTION 8.18.3
At their arrival, Correus thought that an opportunity for action had been offered him. He first showed himself with a few men and charged the nearest squadrons.

SECTION 8.18.4
Our men resolutely withstood the attackers’ charge and did not crowd together in large numbers at any one point, a thing that often happens in cavalry engagements through fear and causes losses by the very density of the men.

CHAPTER 8.19

SECTION 8.19.1
While our squadrons, posted at intervals, fought in turn and did not allow their comrades to be surrounded on the flanks, the rest burst from the woods as Correus continued the fight.

SECTION 8.19.2
A fierce and shifting battle followed. After it had continued for some time with the issue evenly balanced, the infantry gradually advanced from the woods in ordered ranks and forced our cavalry to give ground. They were swiftly aided by the lightly armed infantry whom I have said had been sent ahead of the legions; these men took their places among our squadrons and fought resolutely.

SECTION 8.19.3
For some time the struggle continued with equal intensity. Then, as the nature of the fighting required, those who had withstood the first assaults of the ambush began to gain the upper hand for the very reason that they had suffered no loss through being taken unawares by the ambushers.

SECTION 8.19.4
Meanwhile the legions drew nearer, and at the same moment repeated reports reached both our men and the enemy that the commander was at hand with his forces drawn up for battle.

SECTION 8.19.5
When our men learned this, they trusted in the support of the cohorts and fought with the utmost vigor, lest, if they acted too slowly, they should seem to have shared the glory of victory with the legions;

SECTION 8.19.6
the enemy lost heart and sought escape by different routes. In vain: they themselves were trapped by the very difficulties of the ground with which they had intended to confine the Romans.

SECTION 8.19.7
Defeated and shattered, with the greater part of their force lost, they nevertheless fled in panic, some seeking the woods and others the river; yet even in flight they were cut down by our men, who pursued them vigorously.

SECTION 8.19.8
Meanwhile Correus, unconquered by any disaster, could not be induced to leave the battle and seek the woods, or to surrender when our men called upon him to do so. Instead, by fighting with the utmost courage and wounding several men, he forced the victorious Romans, inflamed with anger, to shower their missiles upon him.

CHAPTER 8.20

SECTION 8.20.1
After the action had ended in this manner, Caesar advanced over the fresh traces of the battle. Believing that after so great a disaster the defeated enemy would abandon their camp as soon as the news arrived—a camp said to be no more than about eight miles from the scene of the slaughter—he led his army across the river and pressed onward, although he saw that the crossing presented an obstacle.

SECTION 8.20.2
But the Bellovaci and the other states suddenly received from the rout only a few survivors, and those wounded, who had escaped disaster under cover of the woods. With everything against them, their defeat known, Correus slain, their cavalry and bravest infantry lost, and the Romans believed to be approaching, they suddenly summoned a council by trumpet call and cried out with one voice that envoys and hostages should be sent to Caesar.

CHAPTER 8.21

SECTION 8.21.1
When all had approved this plan, Commius the Atrebatian fled to the Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries for that war.

SECTION 8.21.2
The others immediately sent envoys to Caesar and begged him to be satisfied with the punishment the enemy had suffered—a punishment which, in keeping with his clemency and humanity, he would certainly never have inflicted had he been able to impose it upon them while their strength was unimpaired and without a battle.

SECTION 8.21.3
The power of the Bellovaci, they said, had been crushed in the cavalry engagement; many thousands of their chosen infantry had perished, and scarcely even the bearers of the news of the slaughter had escaped.

SECTION 8.21.4
Yet amid so great a calamity the Bellovaci had gained one considerable advantage from the battle: Correus, the author of the war and instigator of the multitude, had been killed. For while he lived, the senate had never possessed as much power in the state as the ignorant common people.

CHAPTER 8.22

SECTION 8.22.1
In answer to the envoys’ entreaties, Caesar reminded them that at the same time in the previous year the Bellovaci and the other states of Gaul had undertaken war; that of them all, the Bellovaci had persisted most obstinately in their purpose and had not been brought to their senses by the surrender of the others.

SECTION 8.22.2
He knew and understood, he said, that the blame for wrongdoing was most easily laid upon the dead. But no man could wield such power that, against the will of the leading men, in the face of the senate’s opposition, and despite the resistance of every honorable citizen, he could incite and conduct a war with the feeble support of the common people. Nevertheless, he would be satisfied with the punishment they had brought upon themselves.

CHAPTER 8.23

SECTION 8.23.1
The following night the envoys carried his answer back to their people and assembled the hostages. Envoys came hurrying in from the other states that had been watching to see what fate would befall the Bellovaci;

SECTION 8.23.2
they gave hostages and carried out his commands, with the exception of Commius, whose fear prevented him from entrusting his safety to any man’s pledged word.

SECTION 8.23.3
For in the preceding year, while Caesar was administering justice in Cisalpine Gaul, Titus Labienus had learned that Commius was stirring up the states and forming a conspiracy against Caesar, and had judged that his treachery could be suppressed without any breach of faith.

SECTION 8.23.4
Since he did not think that Commius would come if summoned to the camp, and did not wish to make him more cautious by attempting it, he sent Gaius Volusenus Quadratus to arrange to have him killed under the pretense of a conference. For this purpose he assigned him centurions specially chosen as suitable for the task.

SECTION 8.23.5
When they came to the conference and Volusenus, as agreed, seized Commius by the hand, the centurion—either unnerved by the unfamiliar undertaking or quickly prevented by Commius’s attendants—was unable to kill him. With the first stroke of his sword, however, he dealt him a grievous wound in the head.

SECTION 8.23.6
Swords were drawn on both sides, but both parties intended less to fight than to scatter and escape: our men because they believed that Commius had received a mortal wound, and the Gauls because, now that they had discovered the ambush, they feared more than they could see. After this, Commius was said to have resolved never again to come within sight of any Roman.

CHAPTER 8.24

SECTION 8.24.1
After defeating the most warlike peoples, Caesar saw that no state now remained that was preparing war in order to resist him, though some people were leaving the towns and fleeing from the countryside to escape his authority for the moment. He therefore decided to disperse his army in several directions.

SECTION 8.24.2
He attached the quaestor Marcus Antonius to himself with the Twelfth Legion. He sent the lieutenant Gaius Fabius with twenty-five cohorts to the farthest opposite region of Gaul, because he heard that certain states there were under arms and believed that the two legions commanded by the lieutenant Gaius Caninius Rebilus, who was in those districts, were not sufficiently strong.

SECTION 8.24.3
He summoned Titus Labienus to join him, but sent the Fifteenth Legion, which had been wintering with Labienus, into Gallia Togata to protect the colonies of Roman citizens, lest some disaster like that which had befallen the people of Tergeste the previous summer should result from an incursion by the barbarians; for they had been overwhelmed by a sudden raid and assault.

SECTION 8.24.4
He himself set out to ravage and lay waste the territories of Ambiorix. Having abandoned hope of bringing the terrified fugitive into his power, he considered it the course most consistent with his dignity to devastate Ambiorix’s lands so thoroughly of inhabitants, buildings, and livestock that, hated by his own people, if fortune left any of them alive, Ambiorix would have no return to his state after such overwhelming calamities.

CHAPTER 8.25

SECTION 8.25.1
After dispatching either legions or auxiliary troops into every part of Ambiorix’s territory and laying waste to everything with slaughter, fire, and pillage, killing or capturing a great number of people, Caesar sent Labienus with two legions against the Treveri,

SECTION 8.25.2
whose state, hardened by daily warfare because of its proximity to Germany, differed little from the Germans in its way of life and savagery, and never carried out commands unless compelled by an army.

CHAPTER 8.26

SECTION 8.26.1
Meanwhile Gaius Caninius, Caesar’s lieutenant, learned from letters and messengers sent by Duratius—who had remained steadfastly loyal to Rome, although a certain part of his state had revolted—that a great host of the enemy had assembled in the territory of the Pictones; he therefore hastened to the town of Lemonum.

SECTION 8.26.2
As he approached it, he learned more certainly from prisoners that Duratius was shut up in Lemonum and besieged by many thousands of men under Dumnacus, leader of the Andes. Not daring to commit his understrength legions against the enemy, he pitched camp in a fortified position.

SECTION 8.26.3
When Dumnacus learned that Caninius was approaching, he turned all his forces against the legions and began an assault on the Roman camp.

SECTION 8.26.4
After spending several days in the assault and suffering heavy losses among his men without being able to tear down any part of the fortifications, he returned once more to the siege of Lemonum.

CHAPTER 8.27

SECTION 8.27.1
At the same time Gaius Fabius, Caesar’s lieutenant, received several states into allegiance, secured their loyalty with hostages, and was informed by a letter from Gaius Caninius Rebilus of what was taking place among the Pictones.

SECTION 8.27.2
On learning of these events, he set out to bring aid to Duratius. But when Dumnacus learned of Fabius’s approach, he despaired of escape if he should be forced at one and the same time to withstand the Roman enemy advancing from outside and to keep watch upon and fear the townspeople. He therefore withdrew suddenly from the place with his forces and did not consider himself safe unless he led them across the Loire, which, because of its size, had to be crossed by a bridge.

SECTION 8.27.3
Although Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy and had not joined Caninius, he had learned from men acquainted with the character of the country and felt certain that the frightened enemy would make for the place they were seeking.

SECTION 8.27.4
He therefore hastened with his forces toward the same bridge and ordered the cavalry to advance only so far ahead of the column of legions that, after going that distance, they could return to the same camp without exhausting their horses.

SECTION 8.27.5
In accordance with their orders, our cavalry overtook Dumnacus’s column and charged it. Attacking the enemy on the march as they fled in panic beneath the burden of their packs, they killed many and captured great booty. After this successful action they returned to camp.

CHAPTER 8.28

SECTION 8.28.1
The following night Fabius sent the cavalry ahead, prepared to engage the enemy and delay the entire column until he himself could overtake it.

SECTION 8.28.2
To ensure that the action was carried out according to his instructions, Quintus Atius Varus, the cavalry commander, a man of exceptional courage and judgment, exhorted his men; then, after overtaking the enemy column, he stationed some squadrons in suitable positions and joined battle with the remainder of the cavalry.

SECTION 8.28.3
The enemy cavalry fought with greater boldness because their infantry came up in support, halting throughout the column and bringing aid to their horsemen against ours. A fiercely contested battle followed.

SECTION 8.28.4
Our men despised an enemy they had defeated the day before, remembered that the legions were following, and, both from shame at yielding and from eagerness to finish the battle by themselves, fought with the utmost bravery against the infantry,

SECTION 8.28.5
while the enemy, believing from what they had observed the day before that no further Roman forces would arrive, thought they had found an opportunity to destroy our cavalry.

CHAPTER 8.29

SECTION 8.29.1
After the struggle had continued for some time with the greatest intensity, Dumnacus drew up a battle line that was to relieve his cavalry in turn, when suddenly the legions, marching in close formation, came within sight of the enemy.

SECTION 8.29.2
At the sight, the squadrons of the barbarians were stunned and the enemy line struck with terror. Their baggage column fell into confusion, and with loud cries they scattered in every direction and abandoned themselves to flight.

SECTION 8.29.3
But our cavalry, who shortly before had fought with the utmost bravery against an enemy still offering resistance, were now carried away by the joy of victory. Raising a great shout on every side, they surrounded the retreating foe and killed in that battle as many as the strength of their horses enabled them to pursue and the strength of their right arms to cut down.

SECTION 8.29.4
Thus more than twelve thousand men were killed, some still bearing arms and others who in their terror had thrown them away, and the entire mass of the baggage was captured.

CHAPTER 8.30

SECTION 8.30.1
It was learned from the survivors of this rout that Drappes the Senonian—who, as soon as Gaul had revolted, had gathered desperate men from every quarter, called slaves to freedom, enlisted exiles from every state, taken in brigands, and intercepted Roman baggage and supplies—had collected no more than two thousand men from the rout and was making for the Province. With him Lucterius the Cadurcan had formed the same design—the man who, as related in the preceding book, had intended at the beginning of the Gallic revolt to make an attack upon the Province.

SECTION 8.30.2
Caninius hastened after them with two legions, lest the brigandage of these desperate men should bring great disgrace upon Rome by inflicting injury or alarm upon the Province.

CHAPTER 8.31

SECTION 8.31.1
Gaius Fabius set out with the rest of the army for the territory of the Carnutes and the other states whose forces, as he knew, had been cut down in the battle he had fought against Dumnacus.

SECTION 8.31.2
He had no doubt that their recent disaster would make them more submissive; but if they were granted space and time, they might be roused again at the instigation of the same Dumnacus.

SECTION 8.31.3
In this undertaking Fabius enjoyed the greatest good fortune and speed in recovering the states.

SECTION 8.31.4
For the Carnutes, who, though often afflicted, had never made any mention of peace, gave hostages and surrendered. The other states situated at the farthest boundaries of Gaul along the Ocean, which are called the Armorican states, were influenced by the authority of the Carnutes and, upon the arrival of Fabius and the legions, carried out his commands without delay.

SECTION 8.31.5
Dumnacus, expelled from his own territory, was forced to wander and hide alone and to make for the remotest regions of Gaul.

CHAPTER 8.32

SECTION 8.32.1
But when Drappes and Lucterius learned that Caninius and the legions were close at hand, they judged that they could not enter the borders of the Province without certain destruction while an army pursued them, and that they no longer had the freedom to range about and commit acts of brigandage. They therefore halted in the territory of the Cadurci.

SECTION 8.32.2
There Lucterius, who in earlier and more prosperous days had possessed great influence among his fellow citizens and, as a constant advocate of revolutionary designs, still enjoyed great authority among the barbarians, occupied with his own and Drappes’s forces the town of Uxellodunum, which had been under his patronage and was exceptionally fortified by the nature of its position, and he brought the townspeople over to his side.

CHAPTER 8.33

SECTION 8.33.1
Gaius Caninius came there immediately and observed that every part of the town was protected by exceedingly steep cliffs, which would have been difficult for armed men to climb even if no one defended them. He also saw that the townspeople possessed a great quantity of baggage and that, if they attempted to remove it in a secret flight, they could not escape even the legions, much less the cavalry. He therefore divided his cohorts into three bodies and established three camps on a position of the greatest elevation;

SECTION 8.33.2
from these camps he began gradually, so far as his available forces permitted, to extend a rampart around the town.

CHAPTER 8.34

SECTION 8.34.1
When the townspeople observed this, they were disturbed by the wretched memory of Alesia and feared a similar fate from the siege. Lucterius above all, having experienced the peril of that disaster, warned them that provision must be made for their grain supply. By unanimous agreement they therefore resolved to leave part of their forces there while they themselves set out with the unencumbered troops to bring in grain.

SECTION 8.34.2
When this plan had been approved, Drappes and Lucterius left two thousand armed men behind and led the rest out of the town the following night.

SECTION 8.34.3
After remaining away for a few days, they obtained a large quantity of grain from the territory of the Cadurci, some of whom wished to assist them with provisions, while others could not prevent them from taking what they needed. At times, moreover, they attacked our forts in expeditions by night.

SECTION 8.34.4
For this reason Gaius Caninius delayed surrounding the entire town with fortifications, lest he should either be unable to defend the completed works or be forced to station weak garrisons at a great many points.

CHAPTER 8.35

SECTION 8.35.1
After collecting a large supply of grain, Drappes and Lucterius established themselves no more than ten miles from the town, from which place they intended gradually to carry the grain into it.

SECTION 8.35.2
They divided their duties between them: Drappes remained with part of the force to guard the camp, while Lucterius led the train of pack animals toward the town.

SECTION 8.35.3
After posting guards along the route, at about the tenth hour of the night he began transporting the grain into the town by narrow paths through the woods.

SECTION 8.35.4
When the sentries in the camps heard their noise and scouts who had been sent out reported what was taking place, Caninius swiftly led armed cohorts from the nearest forts and attacked the grain carriers at the first light of dawn.

SECTION 8.35.5
Terrified by this sudden calamity, they scattered and fled toward the troops posted to protect them. As soon as our men saw these armed forces, they were spurred to attack them with greater fury and allowed not a single man of their number to be taken alive. Lucterius escaped from the slaughter with a few followers but did not return to the camp.

CHAPTER 8.36

SECTION 8.36.1
After this successful action, Caninius learned from the prisoners that part of the enemy’s forces was with Drappes in a camp no more than twelve miles away.

SECTION 8.36.2
When this information had been confirmed by several men, he realized that, since one leader had been put to flight, the terrified survivors could easily be overwhelmed. He considered it a great stroke of fortune that no one had escaped the slaughter and returned to the camp to carry Drappes news of the disaster they had suffered.

SECTION 8.36.3
Since he saw no danger in making the attempt, he sent all the cavalry and the German infantry, men of the greatest speed, ahead to the enemy camp. He distributed one legion among his three camps and led the other with him, stripped for action.

SECTION 8.36.4
When he had drawn nearer to the enemy, he learned from the scouts he had sent ahead that their camp, as is generally the custom of barbarians, had been brought down from the higher ground and placed on the banks of a river; but the Germans and the cavalry, while all the enemy remained unaware, had swooped down upon them without warning and joined battle.

SECTION 8.36.5
On learning this, he brought up the legion under arms and drawn up for battle. Then, at a signal suddenly given on every side, the higher ground was seized.

SECTION 8.36.6
When this happened, the Germans and the cavalry, at the sight of the legion’s standards, fought with the utmost fury. The cohorts immediately attacked from every direction, killed or captured every one of the enemy, and secured great booty. Drappes himself was captured in that battle.

CHAPTER 8.37

SECTION 8.37.1
After this most successful action, in which scarcely a single soldier had been wounded, Caninius returned to besiege the townspeople;

SECTION 8.37.2
and now that the external enemy had been destroyed—the enemy whose threat had previously prevented him from dividing his garrisons and enclosing the townspeople with fortifications—he ordered the work to be carried forward on every side. Gaius Fabius arrived there with his forces the following day and undertook the siege of one section of the town.

CHAPTER 8.38

SECTION 8.38.1
Meanwhile Caesar left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, with fifteen cohorts among the Bellovaci, so that the Belgae might not again be given any opportunity to form revolutionary designs.

SECTION 8.38.2
He himself visited the remaining states, demanded a greater number of hostages, and soothed their universal fear with words of reassurance.

SECTION 8.38.3
When he came among the Carnutes, in whose state, as Caesar related in the preceding book, the outbreak of the war had originated, he perceived that their consciousness of guilt in the deed made them especially fearful. To free the state from fear as quickly as possible, he demanded that Gutruatus, the chief author of that crime and instigator of the war, be delivered up for punishment.

SECTION 8.38.4
Although Gutruatus did not entrust himself even to his own fellow citizens, he was quickly hunted down through the efforts of all and brought into the camp.

SECTION 8.38.5
Contrary to his own nature, Caesar was compelled to punish him by the great throng of soldiers, who held Gutruatus responsible for all the dangers and losses they had suffered in the war. He was scourged to death, and his lifeless body was then struck with the executioner’s ax.

CHAPTER 8.39

SECTION 8.39.1
While there, Caesar was informed by frequent letters from Caninius of what had been done concerning Drappes and Lucterius and of the resolution in which the townspeople persisted.

SECTION 8.39.2
Although he held their small numbers in contempt, he nevertheless judged that their obstinacy must be visited with severe punishment, lest all Gaul should believe that it had lacked not the strength to resist the Romans but only the constancy, and lest, encouraged by this example, the other states should trust in the advantages of their positions and assert their freedom,

SECTION 8.39.3
since he knew that all the Gauls were aware that only one summer remained in his term of command, and that, if they could endure through it, they need fear no further danger.

SECTION 8.39.4
He therefore left his lieutenant Quintus Calenus with the legions, with orders to follow by regular marches, while he himself hastened with all the cavalry to Caninius as swiftly as he could.

CHAPTER 8.40

SECTION 8.40.1
When Caesar arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary to everyone’s expectation, he saw that the town was enclosed by siegeworks and that the siege could not under any circumstances be abandoned. Learning from deserters that the townspeople possessed an abundant supply of grain, he began attempting to cut the enemy off from water.

SECTION 8.40.2
A river divided the bottom of the valley, which almost completely encircled the mountain on which Uxellodunum stood, steep and precipitous on every side.

SECTION 8.40.3
The nature of the ground prevented the river from being diverted: it flowed along the very foot of the mountain, so low that it could not be channeled away in any direction by digging trenches.

SECTION 8.40.4
But the descent to it was so difficult and steep for the townspeople that, if our men opposed them, they could neither reach the river nor withdraw up the arduous ascent without wounds and danger to their lives.

SECTION 8.40.5
When Caesar recognized their difficulty, he stationed archers and slingers at various points and even placed artillery opposite the easiest descents, thereby preventing the townspeople from drawing water from the river.

CHAPTER 8.41

SECTION 8.41.1
Thereafter the entire body of those who went to fetch water gathered at a single place directly beneath the town wall, where a great spring gushed forth on the one side left open by the river’s circuit, at a distance of about three hundred feet.

SECTION 8.41.2
While all the others wished that the townspeople might be cut off from this spring, Caesar alone saw how it could be done. Directly opposite it he began driving covered galleries up the slope and constructing a mound, amid great labor and continuous fighting.

SECTION 8.41.3
For the townspeople ran down from their higher position and fought from a distance without danger to themselves, wounding many of our men as they stubbornly pressed forward. Yet our soldiers were not deterred from extending the covered galleries and overcoming the difficulties of the ground through labor and siegeworks.

SECTION 8.41.4
At the same time they drove covered tunnels from the galleries toward the source of the spring, a kind of work that could be carried out without any danger and without arousing the enemy’s suspicion.

SECTION 8.41.5
A mound was raised to a height of sixty feet, and on it was placed a tower ten stories high—not indeed one that could equal the town walls, for no works could accomplish that, but one that could rise above the summit of the spring.

SECTION 8.41.6
When missiles were hurled from it by artillery upon the approach to the spring, the townspeople could no longer draw water without danger, and not only their cattle and pack animals but also a great multitude of the enemy were wasting away from thirst.

CHAPTER 8.42

SECTION 8.42.1
Terrified by this disaster, the townspeople filled barrels with tallow, pitch, and wooden shingles, set them on fire, and rolled them down upon the siegeworks; at the same time they fought with the utmost fury, hoping by the danger of combat to deter the Romans from extinguishing the blaze.

SECTION 8.42.2
Suddenly a great sheet of flame sprang up amid the siegeworks themselves. For everything hurled down the steep slope was caught beneath the sheds and the rampart and set fire to the very structures that had arrested its descent.

SECTION 8.42.3
Our soldiers, on the other hand, though hard pressed by the perilous nature of the fighting and the disadvantage of their position, nevertheless endured everything with the utmost courage.

SECTION 8.42.4
For the action was taking place both on high ground and in full view of our army, and a great shouting arose on either side.

SECTION 8.42.5
Thus each man, making himself as conspicuous as he could so that his valor might be the more widely known and clearly attested, exposed himself to the enemy’s missiles and the flames.

CHAPTER 8.43

SECTION 8.43.1
When Caesar saw that many of his men were being wounded, he ordered cohorts to climb the hill from every side of the town and, by pretending that they were about to seize the walls, to raise a shout from every quarter.

SECTION 8.43.2
At this the terrified townspeople, uncertain what was happening elsewhere, recalled their armed men from the attack on the siegeworks and stationed them along the walls.

SECTION 8.43.3
Thus, when the fighting had ceased, our men quickly extinguished some portions of the works that the fire had seized and cut away others.

SECTION 8.43.4
Although the townspeople continued their obstinate resistance and, even after losing a great part of their number to thirst, persisted in their resolve, at last the veins feeding the spring were severed by tunnels and diverted.

SECTION 8.43.5
Thereupon the never-failing spring suddenly dried up, and this plunged the townspeople into such despair of deliverance that they believed it had been brought about not by human design but by the will of the gods. Accordingly, compelled by necessity, they surrendered.

CHAPTER 8.44

SECTION 8.44.1
Caesar knew that his clemency was familiar to everyone and had no fear that some act of exceptional severity might be attributed to cruelty in his nature; but since he could see no end to such designs if larger numbers adopted similar plans in different places, he judged that the rest must be deterred by an exemplary punishment.

SECTION 8.44.2
Accordingly, he cut off the hands of all who had borne arms but spared their lives, so that the punishment of the wicked might be the more clearly attested.

SECTION 8.44.3
Drappes, whose capture by Caninius I have related, abstained from food for several days—whether from indignation and anguish at his imprisonment or from fear of a more grievous punishment—and so died.

SECTION 8.44.4
At the same time Lucterius, who, as I have written, had escaped from the battle, fell into the power of Epasnactus the Arvernian.

SECTION 8.44.5
For by constantly changing his abode he entrusted himself to the good faith of many men, since he believed that he could nowhere remain for long without danger, conscious as he was how bitter an enemy he must have in Caesar.

SECTION 8.44.6
Epasnactus the Arvernian, a devoted friend of the Roman people, without any hesitation put him in chains and brought him to Caesar.

CHAPTER 8.45

SECTION 8.45.1
Meanwhile Labienus fought a successful cavalry action in the country of the Treveri. After killing many Treveri and Germans, who denied assistance to no one against the Romans, he took their leaders alive into his power.

SECTION 8.45.2
Among them was Surus the Aeduan, a man of the highest distinction both for valor and for birth, and the only one of the Aedui who up to that time had remained under arms.

CHAPTER 8.46

SECTION 8.46.1
When Caesar learned of this, seeing that operations were proceeding well in every part of Gaul and judging that Gaul had been conquered and subdued in the campaigns of the preceding summers, he set out with two legions for Aquitania, which he had never visited but had partly conquered through Publius Crassus, intending to spend the remainder of the campaigning season in that part of Gaul.

SECTION 8.46.2
This undertaking, like all the rest, he completed swiftly and successfully. For every state in Aquitania sent envoys to Caesar and gave him hostages.

SECTION 8.46.3
After these operations, he himself set out for Narbo with an escort of cavalry, while he sent the army into winter quarters under his lieutenants.

SECTION 8.46.4
He stationed four legions in Belgium under his lieutenants Marcus Antonius, Gaius Trebonius, and Publius Vatinius; he sent two legions among the Aedui, whose authority he knew to be supreme throughout Gaul; he placed two among the Turones, on the borders of the Carnutes, to hold in check that entire region adjoining the Ocean; and the remaining two he stationed in the territory of the Lemovices, not far from the Arverni, so that no part of Gaul might be left without an army.

SECTION 8.46.5
He himself remained only a few days in the province, swiftly making the rounds of all the assize districts, hearing public disputes,

SECTION 8.46.6
and bestowing rewards upon those who had deserved well—for he had had the fullest opportunity to learn what spirit each man had shown during the revolt of all Gaul, which he had withstood through the loyalty and assistance of that province. When these matters were completed, he returned to the legions in Belgium and wintered at Nemetocenna.

CHAPTER 8.47

SECTION 8.47.1
There he learned that Commius the Atrebatian had fought an engagement against the Romans with his cavalry.

SECTION 8.47.2
For when Antonius had reached his winter quarters and the state of the Atrebates remained obedient, Commius—who ever since the wounding mentioned above had made it his practice to keep himself ready for every uprising among his countrymen, so that those seeking to renew the war might not lack an instigator and leader in arms—

SECTION 8.47.3
while his state obeyed the Romans, supported himself and his men by brigandage with his cavalry and, by making the roads unsafe, intercepted many convoys carrying supplies to the Roman winter quarters.

CHAPTER 8.48

SECTION 8.48.1
Gaius Volusenus Quadratus, a prefect of cavalry, had been assigned to Antonius and was wintering with him. Antonius sent him to pursue the enemy cavalry.

SECTION 8.48.2
Besides the remarkable courage native to him, Volusenus harbored a deep hatred of Commius, which made him the more willing to carry out his orders. Accordingly, by laying ambushes, he repeatedly attacked Commius’s horsemen and fought successful engagements.

SECTION 8.48.3
At last, when the struggle became more violent and Volusenus, in his eagerness to capture Commius himself, pursued him too obstinately with only a few men, while Commius by headlong flight had drawn Volusenus far away, Commius, in his hatred of the man, appealed to the honor and assistance of his followers, begging them not to allow the wounds treacherously inflicted upon him under a pledge of good faith to go unavenged; then, wheeling his horse, he recklessly charged ahead of the rest against the prefect.

SECTION 8.48.4
All his horsemen did the same, turned our small force, and pursued it.

SECTION 8.48.5
Driving his horse on with the spurs, Commius brought it alongside the horse of Quadratus and, with his lance leveled, pierced Volusenus through the middle of the thigh with tremendous force.

SECTION 8.48.6
When their prefect was wounded, our men did not hesitate to make a stand; wheeling their horses, they drove back the enemy.

SECTION 8.48.7
When this happened, many of the enemy, overwhelmed by the violent onset of our men, were wounded; some were trampled down in flight, others were captured. Their leader escaped this disaster through the speed of his horse. The prefect, so gravely wounded that his life appeared to be in danger, was carried back to camp.

SECTION 8.48.8
Commius, however, whether because his thirst for vengeance had been satisfied or because he had lost a great part of his men, sent envoys to Antonius and guaranteed with hostages that he would remain wherever Antonius prescribed and would do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 8.48.9
He asked only one concession to his fear: that he should not be required to come into the presence of any Roman. Antonius judged that this request arose from a well-founded fear, granted his petition, and accepted the hostages.

SECTION 8.48.10
I know that Caesar composed a separate commentary for each individual year. I did not think that I should do the same, because the following year, in the consulship of Lucius Paulus and Gaius Marcellus, contains no events of great importance in Gaul.

SECTION 8.48.11
Nevertheless, to prevent anyone from remaining ignorant of the places where Caesar and his army were at that time, I have determined to write a brief account and append it to this commentary.

CHAPTER 8.49

SECTION 8.49.1
While Caesar was wintering in Belgium, he had one purpose alone: to preserve the allegiance of the states and give no one either hope or cause for taking up arms.

SECTION 8.49.2
For nothing was less desirable to him than to have the necessity of waging war imposed upon him just as he was preparing to depart, lest, when he was about to withdraw his army, some war should be left behind that all Gaul would gladly undertake when there was no immediate danger.

SECTION 8.49.3
Accordingly, by addressing the states with honor, conferring the greatest rewards upon their leading men, and imposing no burdens, he easily kept Gaul—wearied by so many disastrous battles—at peace under more favorable terms of submission.

CHAPTER 8.50

SECTION 8.50.1
When the winter was over, Caesar, contrary to his custom, set out for Italy by the longest possible marches, so that he might personally appeal to the municipal towns and colonies to which he had commended the candidacy of his quaestor Marcus Antonius for a priesthood.

SECTION 8.50.2
He exerted his influence willingly on behalf of a man very closely connected with him, whom he had sent ahead a short time before to stand for election, but he also contended vigorously against the faction and power of the few who hoped, by defeating Marcus Antonius, to undermine Caesar’s influence as his command drew to its close.

SECTION 8.50.3
Although he had heard on his journey, before he reached Italy, that Antonius had already been elected augur, he nevertheless considered that he had no less valid a reason for visiting the municipal towns and colonies, in order to thank them for the numbers and devotion they had furnished in support of Antonius,

SECTION 8.50.4
and at the same time to commend himself and the office he sought for the following year. For his opponents were insolently boasting that Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus had been elected consuls to strip Caesar of every honor and dignity, and that Servius Galba had been denied the consulship, though he had possessed far greater influence and support among the voters, because he was connected with Caesar both by personal intimacy and by service as his lieutenant.

CHAPTER 8.51

SECTION 8.51.1
Caesar’s arrival was welcomed by every municipal town and colony with incredible honor and affection.

SECTION 8.51.2
For this was the first time he had returned since the great war of all Gaul. Nothing that ingenuity could devise was omitted from the adornment of the gates, roads, and every place through which Caesar was to pass.

SECTION 8.51.3
The entire population came out to meet him with their children; sacrificial victims were slaughtered everywhere; the forums and temples were filled with couches spread for banquets, so that the rejoicing of even the most eagerly awaited triumph seemed to be anticipated. Such was the magnificence displayed by the wealthier citizens and the eagerness shown by those of humbler means.

CHAPTER 8.52

SECTION 8.52.1
After traversing every region of Cisalpine Gaul, Caesar returned with the utmost speed to the army at Nemetocenna. Summoning the legions from all their winter quarters to the borders of the Treveri, he went there and held a ceremonial review and purification of the army.

SECTION 8.52.2
He placed Titus Labienus in command of Cisalpine Gaul so that the region might be won over through his stronger influence in support of Caesar’s candidacy for the consulship. Caesar himself made only as many marches as he judged sufficient to change the army’s quarters for reasons of health.

SECTION 8.52.3
There, although he often heard that Labienus was being approached by his enemies and was informed that a few men were plotting to use the authority of the Senate to deprive him of some part of his army, he neither believed anything against Labienus nor could be induced to act in opposition to the Senate’s authority. For he judged that, if the senators were free to express their opinions, his cause would easily prevail.

SECTION 8.52.4
For Gaius Curio, tribune of the plebs, having undertaken the defense of Caesar’s cause and dignity, had often promised the Senate that, if anyone was disturbed by fear of Caesar’s armed forces, and since Pompey’s domination and military power were causing no small terror in the Forum, both men should lay down their arms and dismiss their armies; if this were done, the state would be free and master of itself.

SECTION 8.52.5
He not only made this promise but even began on his own authority to call for a division of the Senate. The consuls and Pompey’s friends ordered that no division be taken and, by delaying the matter in this way, brought the proceedings to nothing.

CHAPTER 8.53

SECTION 8.53.1
This was powerful evidence of the sentiment of the Senate as a whole and accorded with its earlier action. For in the preceding year Marcellus, while attacking Caesar’s dignity, had in violation of the law of Pompey and Crassus brought Caesar’s provinces before the Senate prior to the appointed time. After the speeches had been delivered, Marcellus—who sought all his own distinction by arousing hatred against Caesar—called for a division, but a full Senate rejected his proposal.

SECTION 8.53.2
This did not break the spirit of Caesar’s enemies; instead, it warned them to devise stronger means of compulsion by which the Senate might be forced to approve what they themselves had determined.

CHAPTER 8.54

SECTION 8.54.1
A decree of the Senate was next passed that one legion should be sent by Gnaeus Pompey and another by Gaius Caesar for the war against the Parthians; yet it was perfectly clear that both legions were being taken from one man.

SECTION 8.54.2
For Gnaeus Pompey offered as though it belonged to his own establishment the First Legion, which he had sent to Caesar, though it had been raised by a levy in Caesar’s province.

SECTION 8.54.3
Nevertheless, although there could be no doubt about the intentions of his opponents, Caesar returned the legion to Pompey and ordered the Fifteenth, which he had kept in Cisalpine Gaul, to be handed over in his own name in accordance with the Senate’s decree. In its place he sent the Thirteenth Legion into Italy to guard the posts from which the Fifteenth was being withdrawn.

SECTION 8.54.4
He then assigned winter quarters to his army: he stationed Gaius Trebonius with four legions in Belgium and sent Gaius Fabius with the same number among the Aedui.

SECTION 8.54.5
For he believed that Gaul would be most secure if the Belgae, whose valor was greatest, and the Aedui, whose authority was supreme, were held in check by armies. He himself set out for Italy.

CHAPTER 8.55

SECTION 8.55.1
When he arrived there, he learned that the two legions he had sent back, which according to the Senate’s decree should have been dispatched to the Parthian war, had been handed over to Gnaeus Pompey by the consul Gaius Marcellus and retained in Italy.

SECTION 8.55.2
Although this action left no one in doubt about what was being prepared against Caesar, he nevertheless resolved to endure everything so long as any hope remained to him of settling the dispute by law rather than by waging war. He strove.

## Translation — Mouseia

> Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 8 Latin books, 404 chapters, and 2,150 sections.

### Book 1

CHAPTER 1.1

SECTION 1.1.1
All Gaul is divided into three parts, one inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and the third by those who in their own language are called Celts and in ours Gauls.

SECTION 1.1.2
All these peoples differ from one another in language, customs, and laws. The Garonne River separates the Gauls from the Aquitani, and the Marne and Seine separate them from the Belgae.

SECTION 1.1.3
Of all these peoples, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are farthest removed from the civilization and refinement of the Province, and merchants very rarely travel among them and import those things that tend to weaken courage.

SECTION 1.1.4
They are also nearest to the Germans, who live across the Rhine, and they wage war with them continually. For the same reason, the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in valor, because they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, either keeping them out of their own territory or themselves waging war within German territory.

SECTION 1.1.5
[The one part of these territories that, as has been stated, is occupied by the Gauls begins at the Rhône River and is bounded by the Garonne River, the Ocean, and the territory of the Belgae. On the side of the Sequani and Helvetii it also reaches the Rhine River and extends toward the north.

SECTION 1.1.6
The territory of the Belgae begins at the farthest borders of Gaul and extends to the lower part of the Rhine River; it faces north and east.

SECTION 1.1.7
Aquitania extends from the Garonne River to the Pyrenees Mountains and to that part of the Ocean bordering Spain; it faces northwest.]

CHAPTER 1.2

SECTION 1.2.1
Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the noblest and wealthiest man. In the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso, driven by a desire for kingship, he formed a conspiracy among the nobility and persuaded his people to leave their territory with all their forces.

SECTION 1.2.2
Since they surpassed everyone in valor, he said, it would be very easy for them to gain dominion over all Gaul.

SECTION 1.2.3
He persuaded them of this all the more easily because the Helvetii are hemmed in on every side by the nature of the terrain: on one side by the Rhine, a very broad and deep river that separates the Helvetian territory from the Germans; on another by the very high Jura Mountains, which lie between the Sequani and the Helvetii; and on a third by Lake Geneva and the Rhône River, which separate our Province from the Helvetii.

SECTION 1.2.4
These circumstances kept them from ranging widely and made it harder for them to wage war on their neighbors.

SECTION 1.2.5
In this respect, as men eager for war, they were deeply distressed.

SECTION 1.2.6
Considering the size of their population and their reputation for warfare and courage, they believed that their territory was too confined, though it extended 240 miles in length and 180 in width.

CHAPTER 1.3

SECTION 1.3.1
Prompted by these circumstances and influenced by the authority of Orgetorix, they resolved to prepare everything needed for their departure: to buy up as many pack animals and wagons as possible, to sow as much grain as possible so that an adequate supply would be available on the journey, and to establish peace and friendship with the neighboring states.

SECTION 1.3.2
They considered two years sufficient to complete these preparations; by law they fixed their departure for the third year.

SECTION 1.3.3
Orgetorix was chosen to carry out these plans. He took upon himself the diplomatic mission to the neighboring states. On this journey he persuaded Casticus, a Sequanian and the son of Catamantaloedes, whose father had held the kingship among the Sequani for many years and had been named a friend by the Senate of the Roman people, to seize in his own state the kingship his father had previously held.

SECTION 1.3.4
He likewise persuaded Dumnorix the Aeduan, the brother of Diviciacus, who at that time held the leading position in his state and was extremely popular with the common people, to make the same attempt, and he gave him his daughter in marriage.

SECTION 1.3.5
He convinced them that it would be very easy to accomplish their designs, because he himself was going to obtain supreme power in his own state.

SECTION 1.3.6
There was no doubt, he said, that the Helvetii were the most powerful people in all Gaul; he assured them that with his own resources and army he would secure their kingdoms for them.

SECTION 1.3.7
Persuaded by this argument, they pledged their word and swore an oath to one another, hoping that once they had seized their kingships, they could gain control of all Gaul through its three most powerful and steadfast peoples.

CHAPTER 1.4

SECTION 1.4.1
This scheme was revealed to the Helvetii by an informer. In accordance with their customs, they compelled Orgetorix to stand trial in chains; if convicted, the penalty he had to suffer was death by burning.

SECTION 1.4.2
On the appointed day of his trial, Orgetorix gathered from every quarter all the members of his household, numbering about ten thousand people, and assembled there all his dependents and debtors, of whom he had a great number. Through their intervention he escaped having to stand trial.

SECTION 1.4.3
While the state, enraged by this action, was attempting to enforce its law by arms, and the magistrates were gathering a large body of men from the countryside, Orgetorix died.

SECTION 1.4.4
Nor, as the Helvetii believe, is there any lack of suspicion that he took his own life.

CHAPTER 1.5

SECTION 1.5.1
After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless continued trying to do what they had resolved upon: to leave their territory.

SECTION 1.5.2
When they believed they were ready for this undertaking, they burned all their towns, about twelve in number, approximately four hundred villages, and all the remaining private buildings.

SECTION 1.5.3
They burned all the grain except what they intended to carry with them, so that, with all hope of returning home removed, they would be more prepared to face every danger. They ordered each person to carry from home a three-month supply of ground grain. They persuaded their neighbors, the Rauraci, Tulingi, and Latobrigi, to adopt the same plan, burn their towns and villages, and set out with them. They also admitted the Boii, who had lived across the Rhine, crossed into Norican territory, and attacked Noreia, and took them as allies.

CHAPTER 1.6

SECTION 1.6.1
There were only two routes by which they could leave their homeland. One passed through the territory of the Sequani and was narrow and difficult, lying between the Jura Mountains and the Rhône River, with scarcely enough room for wagons to be drawn through one at a time. A very high mountain overhung the route, so that a very small number of men could easily block it.

SECTION 1.6.2
The other route passed through our Province and was much easier and less obstructed, because the Rhône flows between the territory of the Helvetii and that of the Allobroges, who had recently been pacified, and in several places the river can be crossed by fords.

SECTION 1.6.3
Geneva is the farthest town of the Allobroges and the one nearest the territory of the Helvetii. A bridge extends from that town into Helvetian territory. They believed that they would either persuade the Allobroges, who did not yet appear well disposed toward the Roman people, or compel them by force to allow them to pass through their territory. When everything had been prepared for the departure, they appointed a day on which everyone was to assemble on the bank of the Rhône. That day was March 28, in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius.

CHAPTER 1.7

SECTION 1.7.1
When Caesar was informed that they were attempting to march through our Province, he hurried to leave Rome, proceeded by forced marches into Further Gaul, and reached Geneva.

SECTION 1.7.2
He ordered the entire Province to furnish as many soldiers as possible—there was only one legion in Further Gaul—and ordered the bridge at Geneva to be destroyed.

SECTION 1.7.3
When the Helvetii learned of his arrival, they sent as envoys to him the most distinguished men of their state. Nammeius and Verucloetius held the leading places in this delegation. They were to say that the Helvetii intended to march through the Province without causing any harm, because they had no other route; they asked to be permitted to do so with Caesar’s consent. Because Caesar remembered that the consul Lucius Cassius had been killed and that his army had been routed by the Helvetii and sent under the yoke, he did not think their request should be granted.

SECTION 1.7.4
Nor did he believe that men of hostile disposition, if given the opportunity to march through the Province, would refrain from injury and wrongdoing.

SECTION 1.7.5
Nevertheless, to allow time for the soldiers he had ordered to assemble, he replied to the envoys that he would take time to consider the matter. If they wanted an answer, they should return on April 13.

CHAPTER 1.8

SECTION 1.8.1
Meanwhile, with the legion he had with him and the soldiers who had assembled from the Province, he constructed a wall nineteen miles long and sixteen feet high, together with a trench, from Lake Geneva, which empties into the Rhône River, to the Jura Mountains, which separate the territory of the Sequani from that of the Helvetii.

SECTION 1.8.2
When this work was completed, he stationed garrisons and fortified redoubts so that he could more easily stop them if they attempted to cross against his wishes.

SECTION 1.8.3
When the day he had appointed with the envoys arrived and they returned to him, he said that, in accordance with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, he could not grant anyone passage through the Province, and he made it clear that if they attempted to use force, he would stop them.

SECTION 1.8.4
Disappointed in this hope, the Helvetii joined boats together, built a large number of rafts, and in other places attempted to cross by the fords of the Rhône, where the river was shallowest, sometimes by day but more often by night, to see whether they could break through. Repulsed by the fortifications, the soldiers’ rapid concentration, and their missiles, they abandoned the attempt.

CHAPTER 1.9

SECTION 1.9.1
Only one route remained, through the territory of the Sequani, but because of its narrowness they could not take it without the Sequani’s consent.

SECTION 1.9.2
Since they could not persuade the Sequani on their own, they sent envoys to Dumnorix the Aeduan so that through his intercession they might obtain permission from them.

SECTION 1.9.3
Through his influence and generosity, Dumnorix was extremely powerful among the Sequani, and he was friendly to the Helvetii because he had married the daughter of Orgetorix, a woman from their state. Driven by a desire for kingship, he favored revolution and wanted as many states as possible to be bound to him by personal obligation.

SECTION 1.9.4
He therefore undertook the matter and obtained the Sequani’s permission for the Helvetii to pass through their territory. He also arranged for them to exchange hostages: the Sequani as a guarantee that they would not prevent the Helvetii from passing, and the Helvetii as a guarantee that they would pass through without wrongdoing or injury.

CHAPTER 1.10

SECTION 1.10.1
Caesar was informed that the Helvetii intended to march through the territories of the Sequani and Aedui into the territory of the Santoni, who live not far from the territory of the Tolosates, a state within the Province.

SECTION 1.10.2
He understood that, if this happened, the Province would be in great danger from having a warlike people hostile to the Roman people as neighbors in an open and exceptionally fertile region.

SECTION 1.10.3
For these reasons, he placed his lieutenant Titus Labienus in command of the fortifications he had built. Caesar himself hurried to Italy by forced marches, enrolled two legions there, led out of winter quarters the three legions wintering around Aquileia, and with these five legions hurried by the shortest route through the Alps into Further Gaul.

SECTION 1.10.4
There the Ceutrones, Graioceli, and Caturiges occupied the higher ground and attempted to block the army’s march. After defeating them in several engagements, Caesar traveled from Ocelum, the farthest town of the Nearer Province, to the territory of the Vocontii in the Further Province in seven days. From there he led the army into the territory of the Allobroges, and from the Allobroges into that of the Segusiavi. These are the first people beyond the Rhône outside the Province.

CHAPTER 1.11

SECTION 1.11.1
The Helvetii had already led their forces through the narrow pass and the territory of the Sequani, reached the territory of the Aedui, and begun ravaging their lands.

SECTION 1.11.2
Since the Aedui could not defend themselves and their property against them, they sent envoys to Caesar to ask for help.

SECTION 1.11.3
They said that their services to the Roman people at all times had been such that their lands should not have been devastated, their children carried off into slavery, and their towns captured almost within sight of our army. At the same time, the Ambarri, close allies and kinsmen of the Aedui, informed Caesar that after their lands had been laid waste, they could not easily keep the enemy’s violence away from their towns.

SECTION 1.11.4
Likewise, the Allobroges, who had villages and property across the Rhône, fled to Caesar and told him that nothing remained to them except the bare soil of their land.

SECTION 1.11.5
Prompted by these events, Caesar decided that he must not wait until the Helvetii had consumed all the property of Rome’s allies and reached the territory of the Santoni.

CHAPTER 1.12

SECTION 1.12.1
There is a river called the Saône, which flows through the territories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhône. Its current is unbelievably gentle, so that the eye cannot determine in which direction it flows. The Helvetii were crossing it on rafts and boats lashed together.

SECTION 1.12.2
When Caesar was informed by scouts that the Helvetii had already led three-fourths of their forces across that river, while about one-fourth remained on the near side of the Saône, he left camp with three legions during the third watch and reached the division that had not yet crossed the river.

SECTION 1.12.3
Attacking them when they were burdened and taken by surprise, he killed a great number of them. The rest fled and concealed themselves in the nearest woods.

SECTION 1.12.4
This district was called the Tigurine district, for the entire Helvetian state is divided into four districts.

SECTION 1.12.5
Within the memory of our fathers, this single district had left its homeland, killed the consul Lucius Cassius, and sent his army under the yoke.

SECTION 1.12.6
Thus, whether by chance or by the design of the immortal gods, the part of the Helvetian state that had inflicted a notorious disaster upon the Roman people was the first to pay the penalty.

SECTION 1.12.7
In this matter Caesar avenged not only public but also private injuries, because in the same battle in which they had killed Cassius, the Tigurini had killed Lucius Piso, a lieutenant and the grandfather of Caesar’s father-in-law, Lucius Piso.

CHAPTER 1.13

SECTION 1.13.1
After this battle, so that he could overtake the Helvetii’s remaining forces, Caesar had a bridge built across the Saône and led his army over it.

SECTION 1.13.2
The Helvetii were alarmed by his sudden arrival. When they realized that he had accomplished in a single day what they themselves had completed only with the greatest difficulty in twenty days—the crossing of the river—they sent envoys to him. The leader of this delegation was Divico, who had been the Helvetii’s commander in the war against Cassius.

SECTION 1.13.3
He addressed Caesar as follows: if the Roman people made peace with the Helvetii, the Helvetii would go to and remain in whatever place Caesar assigned them and wished them to be.

SECTION 1.13.4
But if Caesar persisted in pursuing them with war, he should remember both the Roman people’s former defeat and the Helvetii’s traditional valor. Because Caesar had attacked one district by surprise when those who had crossed the river could not bring assistance to their countrymen, he should neither attribute too much to his own valor on that account nor despise the Helvetii. They had learned from their fathers and ancestors to contend by valor rather than rely on trickery or ambushes.

SECTION 1.13.5
He should therefore not bring it about that the place where they stood would take its name from a disaster to the Roman people and the destruction of a Roman army, or hand down the memory of such an event.

CHAPTER 1.14

SECTION 1.14.1
Caesar replied to them as follows: he had all the less uncertainty because he remembered the events the Helvetian envoys had mentioned, and he resented them all the more because they had happened without the Roman people’s deserving them.

SECTION 1.14.2
If the Roman people had been conscious of committing any wrong, it would not have been difficult for them to take precautions. But they had been deceived because they did not understand that they had done anything for which they should be afraid, and they did not think they should be afraid without cause.

SECTION 1.14.3
Even if he were willing to forget the former insult, could he also put aside the memory of their recent wrongs—their attempt, against his wishes, to force a passage through the Province, and their attacks upon the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges?

SECTION 1.14.4
Their insolent boasting about their victory and their amazement that they had borne their injuries for so long without punishment both pointed to the same conclusion.

SECTION 1.14.5
For the immortal gods were accustomed, in order that people might suffer more bitterly from a reversal of fortune, sometimes to grant greater success and longer immunity from punishment to those whom they intended to punish for their crimes.

SECTION 1.14.6
Even so, if they gave him hostages so that he could be sure they would do what they promised, and if they made amends to the Haedui for the injuries they had inflicted on them and their allies, and likewise to the Allobroges, he would make peace with them.

SECTION 1.14.7
Divico replied that the Helvetii had been taught by their ancestors to accept hostages, not to give them; the Roman people could bear witness to that. After giving this reply, he departed.

CHAPTER 1.15

SECTION 1.15.1
The next day the Helvetii broke camp and moved on. Caesar did the same and sent ahead all his cavalry, about four thousand men, which he had assembled from the entire province, from the Haedui, and from their allies, to see in what direction the enemy was marching. Eagerly pursuing the enemy’s rear guard, they engaged the Helvetian cavalry on unfavorable ground, and a few of our men fell.

SECTION 1.15.2
Elated by this engagement, because with five hundred horsemen they had driven back so large a force of cavalry, the Helvetii began at times to halt more boldly and to provoke our men into battle with their rear guard. Caesar kept his men from fighting and for the moment considered it enough to prevent the enemy from raiding, foraging, and laying waste the countryside.

SECTION 1.15.3
They marched in this way for about fifteen days, with no more than five or six miles separating the enemy’s rear guard from our vanguard.

CHAPTER 1.16

SECTION 1.16.1
Meanwhile Caesar demanded every day that the Haedui provide the grain they had officially promised.

SECTION 1.16.2
For because of the cold—Gaul, as stated before, lies toward the north—not only was the grain in the fields not yet ripe, but even a sufficient supply of fodder was unavailable.

SECTION 1.16.3
Moreover, he had less opportunity to use the grain he had transported by ship up the Saône, because the Helvetii had turned their route away from the Saône, and he did not want to break off his pursuit of them.

SECTION 1.16.4
The Haedui kept putting him off from one day to the next, saying that the grain was being collected, brought together, and was on its way.

SECTION 1.16.5
When he realized that he had been put off too long and that the day was approaching when grain had to be issued to the soldiers, he summoned their leading men, many of whom he had in camp. Among them were Diviciacus and Liscus, who held the highest magistracy, which the Haedui call the vergobret. This official is elected annually and has the power of life and death over his people. Caesar severely reproached them

SECTION 1.16.6
because, at so critical a time and with the enemy so near, they were not helping him, although grain could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, especially since he had undertaken the war largely in response to their appeals. He complained still more bitterly that he had been abandoned.

CHAPTER 1.17

SECTION 1.17.1
Only then, prompted by Caesar’s speech, did Liscus disclose what he had previously kept silent: there were certain men whose influence with the common people was very great and who, as private citizens, had more power than the magistrates themselves.

SECTION 1.17.2
By seditious and unscrupulous speeches, these men were intimidating the people and preventing them from contributing the grain they owed.

SECTION 1.17.3
They said that if the Haedui could no longer hold the leading position in Gaul, it was better to endure rule by Gauls than by Romans,

SECTION 1.17.4
and that they should have no doubt that if the Romans defeated the Helvetii, they would take away the freedom of the Haedui along with that of the rest of Gaul.

SECTION 1.17.5
The same men were reporting our plans and everything done in camp to the enemy, and Liscus was unable to restrain them.

SECTION 1.17.6
Indeed, he understood how much danger he had incurred by being compelled to reveal this critical matter to Caesar, and for that reason he had remained silent as long as he could.

CHAPTER 1.18

SECTION 1.18.1
From this statement by Liscus, Caesar realized that he was referring to Dumnorix, the brother of Diviciacus. But because he did not want these matters discussed in the presence of so many people, he quickly dismissed the council and detained Liscus.

SECTION 1.18.2
He questioned Liscus alone about what he had said at the meeting. Liscus spoke more freely and boldly. Caesar privately asked others about the same matters and found that the reports were true:

SECTION 1.18.3
the man was Dumnorix, a man of extraordinary boldness and great popularity among the common people because of his generosity, and one who was eager for revolution. For several years he had held the contracts for collecting customs duties and all the other Haeduan taxes at a low price, because when he bid, no one dared to bid against him.

SECTION 1.18.4
By these means he had both increased his personal fortune and acquired abundant resources for dispensing gifts.

SECTION 1.18.5
He always maintained a large body of cavalry at his own expense and kept them around him.

SECTION 1.18.6
He had great influence not only at home but also among neighboring states, and for the sake of this power he had arranged for his mother to marry a man among the Bituriges who was of the highest birth and influence there.

SECTION 1.18.7
He himself had a Helvetian wife, and he had arranged marriages for his maternal half-sisters and other female relatives in different states.

SECTION 1.18.8
Because of this marriage connection, he favored the Helvetii and wanted them to succeed. He also personally hated Caesar and the Romans because their arrival had diminished his power and restored his brother Diviciacus to his former position of influence and honor.

SECTION 1.18.9
If anything happened to the Romans, he had the highest hopes of gaining kingship through the Helvetii; under Roman rule, he despaired not only of becoming king but even of retaining the influence he already had.

SECTION 1.18.10
In the course of his investigation, Caesar also discovered that, in the unsuccessful cavalry engagement fought a few days earlier, Dumnorix and his horsemen had begun the retreat—for Dumnorix commanded the cavalry the Haedui had sent to assist Caesar—and that their flight had terrified the rest of the cavalry.

CHAPTER 1.19

SECTION 1.19.1
Once these facts were known, the strongest evidence was added to the earlier suspicions: Dumnorix had led the Helvetii through the territory of the Sequani; he had arranged for hostages to be exchanged between them; he had done all this not only without orders from Caesar or his own state but without their knowledge; and he was now being accused by the chief magistrate of the Haedui. Caesar believed there was sufficient reason either for him to punish Dumnorix himself or to order the Haeduan state to punish him.

SECTION 1.19.2
One consideration stood against all these facts: Caesar knew of Dumnorix’s brother Diviciacus’s profound devotion to the Roman people, his great goodwill toward Caesar personally, and his exceptional loyalty, justice, and self-control. Caesar feared that punishing Dumnorix would alienate Diviciacus.

SECTION 1.19.3
Therefore, before attempting anything, he ordered Diviciacus to be summoned. After dismissing the interpreters he ordinarily used, he spoke with him through Gaius Valerius Troucillus, a leading man of the province of Gaul, Caesar’s personal friend, in whom he had complete confidence in every matter.

SECTION 1.19.4
At the same time, he reminded Diviciacus of what had been said about Dumnorix at the council of the Gauls while Diviciacus himself was present, and showed him what each person had said about Dumnorix privately in Caesar’s presence.

SECTION 1.19.5
He asked and urged Diviciacus not to take offense if Caesar himself investigated and decided the case against Dumnorix, or ordered the Haeduan state to decide it.

CHAPTER 1.20

SECTION 1.20.1
Diviciacus embraced Caesar with many tears and began begging him not to pass too severe a judgment on his brother.

SECTION 1.20.2
He said that he knew the accusations were true and that no one suffered more pain from them than he did. For while he himself had held very great influence at home and throughout the rest of Gaul, and his brother, because of his youth, had held almost none, Dumnorix had risen through his support.

SECTION 1.20.3
Dumnorix was using the resources and power he had gained not only to diminish Diviciacus’s influence but almost to destroy him. Nevertheless, Diviciacus was moved both by brotherly love and by concern for his reputation among the people.

SECTION 1.20.4
If Caesar inflicted any severe punishment on Dumnorix, no one would believe it had been done against Diviciacus’s wishes, since Diviciacus held such a close place in Caesar’s friendship. As a result, the feelings of all Gaul would turn against him.

SECTION 1.20.5
As Diviciacus made this request at greater length, weeping, Caesar took his right hand. He consoled him and asked him to stop pleading. Caesar explained that Diviciacus’s influence with him was so great that, in response to his wishes and appeals, he would overlook both the injury done to the Roman state and his own personal grievance. He summoned Dumnorix and had his brother attend. He explained what he found blameworthy in Dumnorix, set out what he himself knew and what the state complained of, and warned Dumnorix to avoid all grounds for suspicion in the future. He said that he forgave his past conduct for the sake of his brother Diviciacus. He placed guards over Dumnorix so that he could learn what he was doing and with whom he was speaking.

CHAPTER 1.21

SECTION 1.21.1
That same day, scouts informed Caesar that the enemy had encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp. He sent men to determine the nature of the mountain and what the ascent around it was like.

SECTION 1.21.2
They reported that it was easy. During the third watch, Caesar ordered Titus Labienus, his lieutenant with propraetorian authority, to ascend to the summit of the mountain ridge with two legions and with the guides who had reconnoitered the route. He explained his plan to Labienus.

SECTION 1.21.3
He himself, during the fourth watch, hurried toward the enemy by the same route they had taken and sent all his cavalry ahead of him.

SECTION 1.21.4
Publius Considius, who was considered highly experienced in military affairs and had served in the army of Lucius Sulla and later in that of Marcus Crassus, was sent ahead with the scouts.

CHAPTER 1.22

SECTION 1.22.1
At daybreak, while the summit of the mountain was held by Lucius Labienus and Caesar himself was no more than a mile and a half from the enemy’s camp, neither his approach nor Labienus’s had been detected, as Caesar later learned from prisoners.

SECTION 1.22.2
Considius galloped up to him and said that the mountain Caesar had wanted Labienus to occupy was held by the enemy; he had recognized them by their Gallic weapons and insignia.

SECTION 1.22.3
Caesar withdrew his forces to the nearest hill and drew them up in battle formation. Labienus, in accordance with Caesar’s order not to engage unless Caesar’s forces were seen near the enemy’s camp, so that the attack on the enemy could be made from all sides at the same time, had occupied the mountain and was waiting for our men, refraining from battle.

SECTION 1.22.4
At last, well into the day, Caesar learned from his scouts that the mountain was held by his own men, that the Helvetii had broken camp, and that Considius, terrified by fear, had reported as seen something he had not seen. That day Caesar followed the enemy at his customary distance and pitched camp three miles from their camp.

CHAPTER 1.23

SECTION 1.23.1
The following day, since only two days remained before grain had to be issued to the army and since he was no more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and best-supplied town of the Haedui, Caesar thought he had to provide for his grain supply. He therefore turned away from the Helvetii and hurried toward Bibracte.

SECTION 1.23.2
This was reported to the enemy by deserters from the unit of Lucius Aemilius, a decurion of the Gallic cavalry.

SECTION 1.23.3
The Helvetii may have thought that the Romans were withdrawing because they were terrified, especially since the day before they had occupied higher ground but had not engaged in battle; or they may have been confident that they could cut the Romans off from their grain supply. In either case, they changed their plan, reversed their march, and began pursuing and harassing our rear guard.

CHAPTER 1.24

SECTION 1.24.1
When Caesar noticed this, he withdrew his forces to the nearest hill and sent the cavalry to hold off the enemy’s attack.

SECTION 1.24.2
Meanwhile, halfway up the hill, he drew up his four veteran legions in three lines. On the summit of the ridge he stationed the two legions he had most recently recruited in Cisalpine Gaul, together with all the auxiliary troops,

SECTION 1.24.3
so that he filled the entire hill above him with men. He ordered all the baggage and packs to be collected in one place and that position to be fortified by the troops stationed in the upper battle line.

SECTION 1.24.4
The Helvetii, who had followed with all their wagons, gathered their baggage in one place. They themselves drove back our cavalry, formed a phalanx in a very tightly packed battle line, and advanced to the foot of our first line.

CHAPTER 1.25

SECTION 1.25.1
Caesar first had his own horse, and then everyone else’s, removed from sight, so that by making the danger equal for all he would eliminate any hope of flight. After encouraging his men, he joined battle.

SECTION 1.25.2
Our soldiers, throwing their pila from higher ground, easily broke through the enemy’s phalanx. Once it was shattered, they drew their swords and charged.

SECTION 1.25.3
It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting that a single cast of the pila had pierced and fastened together several of their shields. Since the iron points had bent, they could neither pull them out nor fight effectively with their left arms obstructed,

SECTION 1.25.4
so that many, after shaking their arms for a long time, preferred to let their shields fall from their hands and fight with their bodies unprotected.

SECTION 1.25.5
At last, exhausted by wounds, they began to give ground and withdraw to a mountain about a mile away.

SECTION 1.25.6
After they had occupied the mountain and our men were advancing after them, the Boi and Tulingi, who numbered about fifteen thousand and had been closing the enemy’s column and guarding its rear, attacked our exposed flank from the line of march and began to surround our men. When the Helvetii who had withdrawn to the mountain saw this, they began to press forward again and renew the battle.

SECTION 1.25.7
The Romans turned their standards and advanced in two directions: the first and second lines resisted the enemy who had already been defeated and driven back, while the third held off the newly arriving forces.

CHAPTER 1.26

SECTION 1.26.1
Thus the battle continued for a long time, fiercely fought on two fronts. When the enemy could no longer withstand our attacks, one group withdrew to the mountain, as they had begun to do, while the other went to their baggage and wagons.

SECTION 1.26.2
Throughout this entire battle, although the fighting lasted from the seventh hour until evening, no one saw an enemy turn his back.

SECTION 1.26.3
The fighting around the baggage continued late into the night, because the enemy had placed their wagons in the way as a defensive wall and hurled missiles from higher ground at our men as they approached. Some, from between the wagons and wheels, thrust pikes and light javelins at our men and wounded them.

SECTION 1.26.4
After a long struggle, our men took possession of the baggage and the camp. There Orgetorix’s daughter and one of his sons were captured.

SECTION 1.26.5
About 130,000 people survived the battle. They marched continuously throughout the entire night, without interrupting their march for any part of it, and reached the territory of the Lingones on the fourth day. Because of the soldiers’ wounds and the need to bury the dead, our men were delayed for three days and had been unable to pursue them.

SECTION 1.26.6
Caesar sent letters and messengers to the Lingones ordering them not to assist the Helvetii with grain or anything else; if they did assist them, he would regard them in the same way as the Helvetii. After a three-day interval, he began pursuing them with all his forces.

CHAPTER 1.27

SECTION 1.27.1
Driven by a complete lack of supplies, the Helvetii sent envoys to Caesar to negotiate their surrender.

SECTION 1.27.2
They met him on the march, threw themselves at his feet, addressed him as suppliants, and tearfully asked for peace. He ordered them to wait for his arrival in the place where they then were, and they obeyed.

SECTION 1.27.3
After Caesar arrived there, he demanded hostages, their weapons, and the slaves who had deserted to them.

SECTION 1.27.4
While these things were being collected and brought together, after night had intervened, about 6,000 people from the canton called the Verbigenus left the Helvetian camp early in the night and hurried toward the Rhine and the territory of the Germans. Either they were terrified that, once they had surrendered their weapons, they would be put to death, or they were led on by the hope of escape, because they thought that amid such a great multitude of people surrendering, their flight could either be concealed or go entirely unnoticed.

CHAPTER 1.28

SECTION 1.28.1
When Caesar learned of this, he ordered the peoples through whose territories they had passed to search for them and bring them back, if they wished to clear themselves in his eyes. Those who were brought back he treated as enemies;

SECTION 1.28.2
all the rest he accepted in surrender after they had handed over hostages, weapons, and deserters.

SECTION 1.28.3
He ordered the Helvetii, Tulingi, and Latobrigi to return to their own territories, from which they had set out. Since all their crops had been lost and there was nothing at home with which they could stave off hunger, he ordered the Allobroges to provide them with a supply of grain; and he ordered the Helvetii themselves to rebuild the towns and villages they had burned. His chief reason for doing this was that he did not want the region from which the Helvetii had departed to remain empty, for fear that the Germans who lived across the Rhine, attracted by the quality of the land, might cross from their own territory into that of the Helvetii and become neighbors of the Roman province of Gaul and of the Allobroges.

SECTION 1.28.4
At the request of the Haedui, because the Boii were known for their outstanding courage, he allowed them to settle the Boii within their territory. The Haedui gave them land and later admitted them to the same legal rights and freedom that they themselves enjoyed.

CHAPTER 1.29

SECTION 1.29.1
In the camp of the Helvetii, records written in Greek characters were found and brought to Caesar. These records contained a detailed list by name of the number who had left home and were able to bear arms, and also, in separate totals, the number of children, old people, and women.

SECTION 1.29.2
The total of all these was 263,000 Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobrigi, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000 Boii. Of these, about 92,000 were able to bear arms.

SECTION 1.29.3
The total number of them all was about 368,000. When a census was taken of those who returned home, as Caesar had ordered, their number was found to be 110,000.

CHAPTER 1.30

SECTION 1.30.1
After the war with the Helvetii had been concluded, delegates from almost all of Gaul, the leading men of their states, came together to congratulate Caesar.

SECTION 1.30.2
They said that they understood that, although he had waged war to exact punishment from the Helvetii for their old injuries against the Roman people, the outcome had nevertheless served the interests of the land of Gaul no less than those of the Roman people,

SECTION 1.30.3
because the Helvetii had abandoned their homes at the height of their prosperity with the intention of making war on all Gaul and gaining mastery over it, choosing from a wide range of possibilities whatever place in all Gaul they judged the most suitable and productive for their settlement, and making the remaining states pay them tribute.

SECTION 1.30.4
They asked that they be permitted to call a council of all Gaul for a fixed date and to do so with Caesar’s approval. They said that there were certain requests they wished to make of him by common agreement.

SECTION 1.30.5
After permission was granted, they fixed a date for the council and bound one another by oath not to disclose its proceedings except to those authorized by their common decision.

CHAPTER 1.31

SECTION 1.31.1
When that council had been dismissed, the same leaders of the states who had visited Caesar before returned and asked to be allowed to speak with him privately and in secret about their own safety and that of them all.

SECTION 1.31.2
When this request was granted, they all threw themselves weeping at Caesar’s feet. They said that they were striving and laboring no less to keep what they said from being disclosed than to obtain what they wanted, because they saw that, if it were disclosed, they would be subjected to the most terrible torture.

SECTION 1.31.3
Diviciacus the Haeduan spoke on their behalf. He said that all Gaul was divided into two factions; the Haedui held the leadership of one, and the Arverni of the other.

SECTION 1.31.4
Because these peoples had struggled fiercely with one another for supremacy for many years, the result was that the Arverni and Sequani hired Germans as mercenaries.

SECTION 1.31.5
At first about 15,000 of them had crossed the Rhine. Later, after those fierce and barbarous men had come to love the lands, civilization, and resources of the Gauls, more were brought across. There were now about 120,000 of them in Gaul.

SECTION 1.31.6
The Haedui and their dependents had fought them in arms repeatedly. They had suffered a great disaster in defeat, losing all their nobility, all their senate, and all their cavalry.

SECTION 1.31.7
Broken by these battles and disasters, the Haedui, who previously had possessed the greatest influence in Gaul both through their own courage and through their ties of hospitality and friendship with the Roman people, had been forced to give the Sequani the most distinguished men of their state as hostages and to bind their state by oath neither to demand the hostages back, nor to appeal to the Roman people for aid, nor to refuse to remain perpetually under the Sequani’s rule and dominion.

SECTION 1.31.8
He himself was the only man in the entire state of the Haedui who could not be induced either to take the oath or to give his children as hostages.

SECTION 1.31.9
For that reason he had fled from his state and gone to Rome to ask the Senate for help, because he alone was bound by neither oath nor hostages.

SECTION 1.31.10
But a worse fate had befallen the victorious Sequani than the defeated Haedui, because Ariovistus, king of the Germans, had settled within their territory and seized one-third of the Sequanian land, which was the best in all Gaul. He was now ordering the Sequani to withdraw from another third, because a few months earlier 24,000 Harudes had come to him, for whom land and settlements had to be prepared.

SECTION 1.31.11
Within a few years, all the Gauls would be driven from the territory of Gaul and all the Germans would cross the Rhine; for Gallic land could not be compared with that of the Germans, nor could this way of life be compared with theirs.

SECTION 1.31.12
Ever since Ariovistus had defeated the forces of the Gauls in the battle fought at Magetobriga, he had ruled arrogantly and cruelly. He demanded the children of every leading noble as hostages and inflicted every kind of exemplary punishment and torture upon them if anything was not done at his nod or according to his wishes.

SECTION 1.31.13
He was a barbarous, hot-tempered, and reckless man. His commands could no longer be endured.

SECTION 1.31.14
Unless there was some help to be found in Caesar and the Roman people, all the Gauls would have to do what the Helvetii had done: emigrate from their homes, seek another country and other settlements far from the Germans, and face whatever fortune might befall them. If these statements were reported to Ariovistus, Diviciacus had no doubt that he would inflict the most terrible punishment on all the hostages in his possession.

SECTION 1.31.15
Caesar, either by his own authority and that of his army, by his recent victory, or by the name of the Roman people, could prevent a larger multitude of Germans from being brought across the Rhine and could defend all Gaul from Ariovistus’s violence.

CHAPTER 1.32

SECTION 1.32.1
After Diviciacus delivered this speech, all who were present began weeping bitterly and asking Caesar for help.

SECTION 1.32.2
Caesar noticed that the Sequani alone did none of the things the others were doing, but remained sad, their heads lowered and their eyes fixed on the ground. Wondering what the reason was, he questioned them directly.

SECTION 1.32.3
The Sequani made no reply but remained silent in the same state of dejection. When Caesar questioned them repeatedly but could not draw a single word from them, the same Diviciacus the Haeduan answered:

SECTION 1.32.4
the fate of the Sequani was more wretched and oppressive than that of the others, because they alone did not dare even in secret to complain or appeal for help, and they shuddered at Ariovistus’s cruelty even while he was absent,

SECTION 1.32.5
just as if he were there in person. The others, after all, still had the possibility of escape; but the Sequani, who had received Ariovistus within their own territory and whose towns were all under his control, had to endure every kind of torture.

CHAPTER 1.33

SECTION 1.33.1
After learning these facts, Caesar reassured the Gauls with his words and promised that he would take care of the matter. He said that he had great hope that Ariovistus, influenced by Caesar’s favor and authority, would put an end to his abuses. After making this speech, he dismissed the council.

SECTION 1.33.2
Besides these considerations, many circumstances urged him to believe that he should consider and undertake the matter. Most important, he saw that the Haedui, who had repeatedly been called brothers and kinsmen by the Senate, were being held in servitude and under the dominion of the Germans, and he understood that their hostages were in the hands of Ariovistus and the Sequani. Given the vast dominion of the Roman people, he considered this utterly disgraceful both to himself and to the Republic.

SECTION 1.33.3
Moreover, it seemed dangerous to the Roman people for the Germans gradually to become accustomed to crossing the Rhine and for a great multitude of them to enter Gaul. He did not believe that these fierce and barbarous people would restrain themselves after seizing all Gaul, but that, as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before, they would march into the province and from there advance into Italy, especially since only the Rhône separated the Sequani from the Roman province. He therefore believed these developments had to be stopped as quickly as possible.

SECTION 1.33.4
Ariovistus himself had assumed such pride and arrogance that he seemed intolerable.

CHAPTER 1.34

SECTION 1.34.1
For this reason Caesar decided to send delegates to Ariovistus to demand that he choose some place midway between them for a conference. Caesar wished to discuss matters of state and issues of the highest importance to them both.

SECTION 1.34.2
Ariovistus replied to this delegation that if he needed anything from Caesar, he would have gone to him; if Caesar wanted anything from him, Caesar ought to come to him.

SECTION 1.34.3
Furthermore, he did not dare to enter without an army those parts of Gaul that Caesar controlled, and he could not assemble his army in one place without great supplies and effort.

SECTION 1.34.4
He also found it strange that Caesar, or indeed the Roman people at all, had any business in his part of Gaul, which he had conquered in war.

CHAPTER 1.35

SECTION 1.35.1
When these replies were reported to Caesar, he again sent delegates to Ariovistus with the following instructions:

SECTION 1.35.2
since Ariovistus, despite having received so great a favor from Caesar and the Roman people when during Caesar’s consulship he had been named king and friend by the Senate, was showing his gratitude to Caesar and the Roman people by refusing an invitation to a conference and by not considering it necessary to discuss and learn about a matter of common concern, these were Caesar’s demands:

SECTION 1.35.3
first, that he no longer bring any body of people across the Rhine into Gaul; next, that he return the hostages he held from the Haedui and allow the Sequani, with his consent, to return the hostages they held; and that he not provoke the Haedui with acts of violence or make war on them or their allies.

SECTION 1.35.4
If he did this, Caesar and the Roman people would enjoy lasting goodwill and friendship with him. If Caesar did not obtain these demands, then, since in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso the Senate had decreed that whoever governed the province of Gaul should, insofar as he could do so without harm to the Republic, defend the Haedui and the other friends of the Roman people, Caesar would not ignore the wrongs inflicted on the Haedui.

CHAPTER 1.36

SECTION 1.36.1
Ariovistus replied to these demands that it was a right of war for victors to rule those they had defeated in whatever manner they wished. Likewise, the Roman people were accustomed to ruling the defeated according to their own judgment, not according to another’s instructions.

SECTION 1.36.2
If he did not dictate to the Roman people how they should exercise their rights, then the Roman people ought not to obstruct him in the exercise of his own rights.

SECTION 1.36.3
The Haedui had become his tributaries because they had tested the fortunes of war, met him in battle, and been defeated.

SECTION 1.36.4
Caesar was doing him a great wrong by coming there and reducing the revenues paid to him.

SECTION 1.36.5
He would not return the hostages to the Haedui. He would not wrongfully make war on them or their allies if they abided by the agreement and paid tribute every year; but if they did not, the Roman people’s title of “brothers” would be far from helping them.

SECTION 1.36.6
As for Caesar’s warning that he would not ignore the wrongs inflicted on the Haedui, no one had ever fought Ariovistus without bringing destruction upon himself.

SECTION 1.36.7
Caesar could engage him whenever he wished. He would then learn what courage the undefeated Germans were capable of—men highly trained in arms who had not been under a roof for fourteen years.

CHAPTER 1.37

SECTION 1.37.1
These messages were being reported to Caesar at the same time that delegates were arriving from the Haedui and the Treveri:

SECTION 1.37.2
the Haedui came to complain that the Harudes who had recently been transported into Gaul were ravaging their territory; they had been unable to purchase peace from Ariovistus even by giving hostages;

SECTION 1.37.3
the Treveri reported that one hundred cantons of the Suebi had settled on the banks of the Rhine and were attempting to cross it; the brothers Nasua and Cimberius were in command of them. Deeply alarmed by these developments, Caesar believed that he had to act quickly, for fear that, if the new force of Suebi joined Ariovistus’s existing troops, resistance would become more difficult.

SECTION 1.37.4
Accordingly, after securing grain supplies as quickly as he could, he advanced against Ariovistus by forced marches.

CHAPTER 1.38

SECTION 1.38.1
After he had advanced for three days, he was informed that Ariovistus was hurrying with all his forces to seize Vesontio, the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days’ march from his own territory. Caesar believed that he had to take the greatest care to prevent this. The town had an abundant supply of everything useful for war,

SECTION 1.38.2
and its natural position fortified it in such a way as to make it an excellent base for conducting a war, because the river Dubis, curving around as though drawn with a compass, almost completely surrounds the town.

SECTION 1.38.3
The remaining space, where the river leaves a gap, is no more than 1,600 feet wide and is enclosed by a mountain of great height, whose base reaches the riverbanks on both sides.

SECTION 1.38.4
A wall built around this mountain turns it into a citadel and connects it with the town.

SECTION 1.38.5
Caesar hurried there by long marches both night and day, seized the town, and stationed a garrison there.

CHAPTER 1.39

SECTION 1.39.1
While he remained at Vesontio for a few days to obtain grain and other supplies, the inquiries made by our men and the statements of Gauls and merchants—who declared that the Germans were of enormous physical size, possessed incredible courage, and were highly trained in arms, and who said that, although they had often met them, they had been unable to endure even the expression on their faces and the fierceness of their gaze—suddenly filled the entire army with such great fear that it seriously disturbed the minds and spirits of them all.

SECTION 1.39.2
This fear first arose among the military tribunes, prefects, and the others who had followed Caesar from Rome for the sake of friendship and had little experience in military affairs.

SECTION 1.39.3
Each of them offered a different reason that he claimed made it necessary for him to leave and asked Caesar’s permission to depart. Some, driven by shame and wishing to avoid the suspicion of fear, remained.

SECTION 1.39.4
They could neither control their expressions nor, at times, hold back their tears. Hiding in their tents, they either lamented their own fate or commiserated with their friends over the danger they all shared. Wills were being sealed everywhere throughout the camp.

SECTION 1.39.5
Their talk and fear gradually began to unsettle even those who had extensive experience in camp—the soldiers, centurions, and cavalry commanders.

SECTION 1.39.6
Those among them who wanted to be considered less afraid said that they did not fear the enemy, but were concerned about the narrow roads and the vast forests lying between themselves and Ariovistus, or about whether the grain supply could be transported adequately.

SECTION 1.39.7
Some even reported to Caesar that when he ordered the camp to be struck and the standards carried forward, the soldiers would not obey his command and, because of their fear, would refuse to carry the standards.

CHAPTER 1.40

SECTION 1.40.1
When Caesar became aware of this, he called a council, summoned centurions of every rank to attend it, and severely reprimanded them. First, he rebuked them for thinking that it was their place to ask or consider in what direction or for what purpose they were being led.

SECTION 1.40.2
During his consulship, Ariovistus had been extremely eager to obtain the friendship of the Roman people. Why should anyone so rashly suppose that he would abandon his obligations?

SECTION 1.40.3
For his own part, Caesar was convinced that once Ariovistus learned his demands and understood the fairness of the terms, he would reject neither Caesar’s goodwill nor that of the Roman people.

SECTION 1.40.4
But if, driven by rage and madness, he did make war, what, after all, were they afraid of? Why did they despair either of their own courage or of their commander’s vigilance?

SECTION 1.40.5
That enemy had been put to the test within the memory of their fathers, when the Cimbri and Teutones were defeated by Gaius Marius [and the army appeared to have earned no less glory than the commander himself]. The Germans had also been tested recently in Italy during the slave uprising, although the slaves had received some assistance from the experience and training they had acquired from the Romans.

SECTION 1.40.6
From this it could be judged how much strength there was in steadfastness: although for some time the Romans had been needlessly afraid of them while they were unarmed, they later defeated them when they were armed and victorious.

SECTION 1.40.7
Finally, these were the same Germans whom the Helvetii had often confronted and usually defeated, not only in their own territory but also in that of the Germans; yet the Helvetii had been unable to stand against our army.

SECTION 1.40.8
If anyone was disturbed by the Gauls’ defeat and flight, he could discover, if he investigated, that after the Gauls had been exhausted by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus had kept himself in his camp and among the marshes for many months without giving them an opportunity to fight. Then, when they had already despaired of battle and had dispersed, he attacked them suddenly and defeated them more by calculation and strategy than by courage.

SECTION 1.40.9
Although there had been an opportunity for such a strategy to succeed against barbarous and inexperienced men, not even Ariovistus himself could expect our armies to be caught by it.

SECTION 1.40.10
Those who concealed their fear behind the pretense of concern about the grain supply and the narrowness of the route were behaving arrogantly, since they appeared either to despair of their commander’s ability to perform his duty or to dictate to him.

SECTION 1.40.11
These matters were his responsibility. The Sequani, Leuci, and Lingones were supplying grain, and the grain in the fields was already ripe. As for the route, they themselves would soon be able to judge it.

SECTION 1.40.12
As for the claim that they would not obey his commands or carry the standards, he was not at all disturbed by it. He knew that whenever an army had not obeyed its commander, either he had suffered bad luck because the campaign had been badly conducted, or his greed had been exposed when some crime was discovered.

SECTION 1.40.13
His integrity had been demonstrated throughout his life, and his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii.

SECTION 1.40.14
He would therefore do immediately what he had intended to postpone until a later day, and would strike camp during the fourth watch of the coming night, so that he could learn as quickly as possible whether honor and duty or fear had more influence over them.

SECTION 1.40.15
Even if no one else followed him, he would still go with the Tenth Legion alone. He had no doubts about that legion, and it would serve as his bodyguard cohort. Caesar had shown this legion particular favor and, because of its courage, trusted it more than any other.

CHAPTER 1.41

SECTION 1.41.1
After this speech, everyone’s attitude changed remarkably, and the entire army was filled with the greatest enthusiasm and eagerness to wage war.

SECTION 1.41.2
The Tenth Legion was the first to thank him, through its military tribunes, for having formed such an excellent opinion of it, and declared that it was completely ready to wage war.

SECTION 1.41.3
Then the other legions approached their military tribunes and senior centurions to have them satisfy Caesar on their behalf. They said that they had never doubted or been afraid, and had never thought that judgment concerning the overall conduct of the war belonged to them rather than to their commander.

SECTION 1.41.4
After accepting their explanation, Caesar had Diviciacus, the Gaul he trusted more than any other, investigate a route by which he could lead the army through open country, even though it required a detour of more than fifty miles. He then set out during the fourth watch, as he had said he would.

SECTION 1.41.5
On the seventh day, during which he had continued the march without interruption, his scouts informed him that Ariovistus’ forces were twenty-four miles from ours.

CHAPTER 1.42

SECTION 1.42.1
When Ariovistus learned of Caesar’s arrival, he sent envoys to him. Since Caesar had previously requested a conference, Ariovistus said that it could now take place, because Caesar had come nearer and he believed he could attend it without danger.

SECTION 1.42.2
Caesar did not reject the proposal and now believed that Ariovistus was returning to his senses, since he was voluntarily offering what he had previously denied when Caesar requested it.

SECTION 1.42.3
Caesar became very hopeful that, in view of the great favors that he and the Roman people had conferred upon Ariovistus, the king would learn his demands and abandon his obstinacy.

SECTION 1.42.4
The conference was set for the fifth day from that day.

SECTION 1.42.5
Meanwhile, as envoys were frequently passing back and forth between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar bring no infantryman to the conference. He said that he was afraid Caesar might surround him in an ambush. Each of them should come with cavalry; otherwise, he would not come.

SECTION 1.42.6
Caesar did not want the conference to be canceled because of an imposed condition, but he did not dare entrust his safety to the Gallic cavalry. He therefore decided that the most practical course was to take all the horses away from the Gallic cavalrymen and mount on them legionary soldiers from the Tenth Legion, which he trusted most, so that if any action became necessary, he would have the most loyal possible guard.

SECTION 1.42.7
As this was being done, one of the soldiers of the Tenth Legion remarked, not without humor, that Caesar was doing more than he had promised. He had promised to treat the Tenth Legion as his bodyguard cohort, but now he was enrolling it in the cavalry.

CHAPTER 1.43

SECTION 1.43.1
There was a large plain, and on it stood a fairly large earthen mound. This place was at approximately the same distance from the camps of Ariovistus and Caesar. As agreed, they came there for the conference.

SECTION 1.43.2
Caesar stationed the legion he had brought on horseback two hundred paces from that mound. Ariovistus’ cavalry likewise halted at an equal distance.

SECTION 1.43.3
Ariovistus requested that they conduct the conference on horseback and that each of them bring ten men with him to the meeting.

SECTION 1.43.4
When they arrived there, Caesar began his speech by recounting the favors that he and the Senate had conferred upon Ariovistus: that the Senate had given him the title of king, that it had declared him a friend, and that magnificent gifts had been sent to him. Caesar explained that such distinctions had fallen to only a few men and were customarily granted in return for great services.

SECTION 1.43.5
Although Ariovistus had neither access to Rome nor any legitimate grounds for requesting these honors, he had received those rewards through Caesar’s and the Senate’s kindness and generosity.

SECTION 1.43.6
Caesar also explained how old and legitimate were the bonds of friendship between the Romans and the Haedui,

SECTION 1.43.7
how many decrees the Senate had passed concerning them and how honorable those decrees were, and how the Haedui had always held the leading position in all Gaul, even before they sought our friendship.

SECTION 1.43.8
It was the custom of the Roman people to want their allies and friends not only to lose none of what belonged to them, but also to increase in influence, standing, and honor. Who could permit them to be deprived of what they had possessed when they entered into friendship with the Roman people?

SECTION 1.43.9
Caesar then made the same demands that he had given his envoys: Ariovistus must not make war upon either the Haedui or their allies; he must return their hostages; and if he could not send any part of the Germans back home, he must at least permit no more of them to cross the Rhine.

CHAPTER 1.44

SECTION 1.44.1
Ariovistus said little in reply to Caesar’s demands but spoke at length about his own merits.

SECTION 1.44.2
He had crossed the Rhine not on his own initiative, but at the request and invitation of the Gauls. He had not left his home and relatives without great expectations and great rewards. He occupied settlements in Gaul that the Gauls themselves had granted him; they had given hostages voluntarily; and he collected tribute by the right of war, which victors customarily imposed upon the defeated.

SECTION 1.44.3
He had not made war upon the Gauls; the Gauls had made war upon him. All the states of Gaul had come to attack him and had camped against him, and he had routed and defeated all their forces in a single battle.

SECTION 1.44.4
If they wanted to try again, he was ready to fight it out again. If they wanted to enjoy peace, it was unjust for them to refuse the tribute that they had paid voluntarily up to that time.

SECTION 1.44.5
The friendship of the Roman people ought to bring him honor and protection, not harm, and he had sought it with that expectation. If, through the intervention of the Roman people, the tribute was canceled and his subjects were taken away from him, he would reject the friendship of the Roman people just as gladly as he had sought it.

SECTION 1.44.6
As for his bringing a large number of Germans into Gaul, he was doing this to protect himself, not to attack Gaul. The proof was that he had not come except at the Gauls’ request and had not started the war but had defended himself.

SECTION 1.44.7
He had come to Gaul before the Roman people. Never before that time had an army of the Roman people gone beyond the borders of the province of Gaul.

SECTION 1.44.8
What did Caesar want with him? Why was he coming into his possessions? This part of Gaul was his province, just as the other part was ours. Just as Ariovistus ought not to be permitted to invade our territory, so the Romans were equally unjust to interfere with him in the exercise of his rights.

SECTION 1.44.9
As for Caesar’s claim that the Senate had called the Haedui brothers, Ariovistus was not so barbarous or so ignorant of affairs that he did not know that in the recent war with the Allobroges the Haedui had neither brought assistance to the Romans nor themselves received assistance from the Roman people in the struggles they had waged against him and the Sequani.

SECTION 1.44.10
He had to suspect that Caesar was pretending friendship and maintaining an army in Gaul for the purpose of destroying him.

SECTION 1.44.11
Unless Caesar withdrew and led his army away from these regions, Ariovistus would regard him not as a friend but as an enemy.

SECTION 1.44.12
If he killed Caesar, he would be doing a favor to many nobles and leading men of the Roman people—something he had learned from them personally through their messengers—and by Caesar’s death he could purchase the favor and friendship of them all.

SECTION 1.44.13
But if Caesar withdrew and surrendered to him the unrestricted possession of Gaul, he would reward him generously and would conclude, without any effort or danger to Caesar, whatever wars Caesar wanted to have waged.

CHAPTER 1.45

SECTION 1.45.1
Caesar said much in reply to explain why he could not abandon the matter. Neither his own practice nor that of the Roman people permitted him to abandon allies who had rendered outstanding service, and he did not believe that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the Roman people.

SECTION 1.45.2
The Arverni and Ruteni had been defeated in war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, but the Roman people had pardoned them, had not reduced their territory to a province, and had not imposed tribute upon them.

SECTION 1.45.3
If the most ancient claim had to be considered, then the authority of the Roman people in Gaul was the most legitimate. If the judgment of the Senate had to be respected, then Gaul ought to be free, since the Senate had wished it, although conquered in war, to live under its own laws.

CHAPTER 1.46

SECTION 1.46.1
While this discussion was taking place at the conference, Caesar was informed that Ariovistus’ cavalry was approaching nearer to the mound, riding toward our men, and throwing stones and javelins at them.

SECTION 1.46.2
Caesar ended the discussion, withdrew to his men, and ordered them not to throw any weapon at all back at the enemy.

SECTION 1.46.3
Although he saw that a battle between his chosen legion and the enemy cavalry would involve no danger, he nevertheless thought he must not allow a situation in which, after the enemy had been defeated, it could be said that he had treacherously trapped them during a conference.

SECTION 1.46.4
After word spread among the common soldiers of the arrogance with which Ariovistus had barred the Romans from all Gaul during the conference, of the attack his cavalry had made upon our men, and of how that incident had broken off the conference, the army was filled with far greater enthusiasm and a much stronger desire to fight.

CHAPTER 1.47

SECTION 1.47.1
Two days later Ariovistus sent envoys to Caesar. He said that he wanted to discuss with him the matters they had begun but had not finished discussing. Caesar should either set another day for a conference or, if he was unwilling to do that, send one of his envoys to Ariovistus.

SECTION 1.47.2
Caesar saw no reason to hold another conference, especially because the day before, the Germans could not be restrained from throwing weapons at our men.

SECTION 1.47.3
He believed that sending one of his own envoys to Ariovistus would expose that man to great danger and place him at the mercy of savage men.

SECTION 1.47.4
He decided that the most practical course was to send Gaius Valerius Procillus, the son of Gaius Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and refinement whose father had been granted Roman citizenship by Gaius Valerius Flaccus. He chose Procillus both because of his loyalty and because of his knowledge of the Gallic language, in which Ariovistus, through long familiarity, was now quite fluent, and because the Germans had no reason to mistreat him. With him Caesar sent Marcus Metius, who had ties of hospitality with Ariovistus.

SECTION 1.47.5
Caesar instructed them to learn what Ariovistus said and report it to him. When Ariovistus saw them in his camp, he shouted in the presence of his army, “Why have you come to me? Is it to spy?” He prevented them from trying to speak and threw them into chains.

CHAPTER 1.48

SECTION 1.48.1
That same day Ariovistus moved his camp forward and established it beneath a mountain, six miles from Caesar’s camp.

SECTION 1.48.2
The following day he led his forces past Caesar’s camp and established a camp two miles beyond it, intending to cut Caesar off from the grain and supplies being transported from the Sequani and Haedui.

SECTION 1.48.3
For five consecutive days from that day onward, Caesar led his forces out in front of the camp and kept them drawn up in battle formation, so that if Ariovistus wanted to fight, he would have the opportunity.

SECTION 1.48.4
Throughout all these days Ariovistus kept his army inside the camp but engaged in cavalry combat every day. This was the method of fighting in which the Germans had trained themselves:

SECTION 1.48.5
there were six thousand cavalrymen and an equal number of extremely swift and courageous infantrymen, each of whom an individual cavalryman had selected from the entire force for his personal protection.

SECTION 1.48.6
The cavalrymen fought alongside them in battle and withdrew to them for safety. If the situation became especially difficult, the infantrymen rushed forward; if any cavalryman fell from his horse after receiving a serious wound, they surrounded him;

SECTION 1.48.7
If they had to advance farther than usual or withdraw more quickly, their training gave them such speed that, supporting themselves by the horses’ manes, they could keep pace with them at a gallop.

CHAPTER 1.49

SECTION 1.49.1
When Caesar realized that Ariovistus was remaining in his camp, Caesar chose a suitable site for a camp beyond the place where the Germans had settled, about six hundred paces from them, so that he would not be cut off from supplies any longer. He formed his army in three lines and advanced to that site.

SECTION 1.49.2
He ordered the first and second lines to remain under arms and the third to fortify the camp.

SECTION 1.49.3
[This site, as has been stated, was about six hundred paces from the enemy.] Ariovistus sent about sixteen thousand lightly equipped men there with all his cavalry to intimidate our men and prevent them from building the fortifications.

SECTION 1.49.4
Nevertheless, as Caesar had previously decided, he ordered two lines to drive back the enemy and the third to complete the work. Once the camp was fortified, he left two legions and part of the auxiliary forces there and led the other four legions back to the larger camp.

CHAPTER 1.50

SECTION 1.50.1
The next day, following his established plan, Caesar led his forces out of both camps, advanced a short distance from the larger camp, formed his battle line, and gave the enemy an opportunity to fight.

SECTION 1.50.2
When he realized that even then they would not come out, he led his army back into camp around noon. Only then did Ariovistus send part of his forces to attack the smaller camp. Both sides fought fiercely until evening. At sunset Ariovistus led his troops back into camp after many wounds had been both inflicted and received.

SECTION 1.50.3
When Caesar asked the prisoners why Ariovistus would not decide the issue in battle, he learned that the reason was a German custom under which their married women used lots and prophecies to declare whether or not it would be advantageous to engage in battle. The women said:

SECTION 1.50.4
The Germans were not destined to win if they fought a battle before the new moon.

CHAPTER 1.51

SECTION 1.51.1
The day after that, Caesar left what seemed to be an adequate garrison in each camp and stationed all the auxiliary troops in full view of the enemy in front of the smaller camp. Because he was at a disadvantage in the number of legionary soldiers compared with the enemy, he intended to use the auxiliaries to create the appearance of greater strength. He himself formed his army in three lines and advanced as far as the enemy’s camp.

SECTION 1.51.2
Only then, compelled by necessity, did the Germans lead their forces out of camp. They arranged them by tribe at equal intervals—the Harudes, Marcomani, Triboci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, and Suebi—and surrounded their entire battle line with wagons and carts so that no hope of escape would remain.

SECTION 1.51.3
They placed their women on the wagons, and as the soldiers set out for battle, the women stretched out their hands, weeping and begging them not to surrender them to slavery under the Romans.

CHAPTER 1.52

SECTION 1.52.1
Caesar placed one lieutenant or the quaestor in command of each legion, so that every man would have one of them as a witness to his courage.

SECTION 1.52.2
He himself began the battle from the right wing because he had noticed that this was the enemy’s weakest point.

SECTION 1.52.3
At the signal, our men charged the enemy so fiercely, and the enemy suddenly rushed forward so quickly, that there was no room to throw the javelins at them.

SECTION 1.52.4
The javelins were cast aside, and the fighting was carried on at close quarters with swords. But the Germans quickly formed a phalanx in their customary manner and met the assault of the swords.

SECTION 1.52.5
A considerable number of our men were found who leaped onto the phalanx, tore away the shields with their hands, and struck the enemy from above.

SECTION 1.52.6
Although the enemy’s line on the left wing had been driven back and put to flight, on their right wing they were pressing our line hard through the sheer weight of their numbers.

SECTION 1.52.7
When the young Publius Crassus, who commanded the cavalry, noticed this, he was freer to observe the battle than those engaged in the fighting and sent the third line to reinforce our hard-pressed men.

CHAPTER 1.53

SECTION 1.53.1
The battle was thus restored, and all the enemy turned their backs. They did not stop fleeing until they reached the Rhine, about fifty miles from that place.

SECTION 1.53.2
There, a very few trusted in their strength and tried to swim across, or found small boats and escaped.

SECTION 1.53.3
Among them was Ariovistus, who found a small boat tied to the bank and escaped in it. Our cavalry overtook and killed all the rest.

SECTION 1.53.4
Ariovistus had two wives: one was a Suebi by birth, whom he had brought with him from home; the other was a Norican, the sister of King Voccio, whom he had married in Gaul after her brother sent her there. Both died during the flight. He also had two daughters: one of them was killed and the other captured.

SECTION 1.53.5
Gaius Valerius Procillus, who was being dragged along by his guards during the flight, bound in three sets of chains, came upon Caesar himself as he pursued the enemy with the cavalry.

SECTION 1.53.6
This event gave Caesar no less pleasure than the victory itself, because he saw the most honorable man in the Province of Gaul, his personal friend and guest, rescued from the enemy’s hands and restored to him. Fortune had not diminished the pleasure and rejoicing of so great a victory by bringing disaster upon Procillus.

SECTION 1.53.7
Procillus said that, in his presence, the lots had been consulted three times to determine whether he should be burned to death immediately or kept for another time. By the favor of the lots, he was still alive.

SECTION 1.53.8
Marcus Metius was likewise found and brought back to Caesar.

CHAPTER 1.54

SECTION 1.54.1
When news of this battle was reported across the Rhine, the Suebi who had reached its banks began to return home. When the peoples living nearest the Rhine saw that they were terrified, they pursued them and killed a great number.

SECTION 1.54.2
Having concluded two very great wars in a single summer, Caesar led his army into winter quarters among the Sequani somewhat earlier than the season required. He placed Labienus in command of the winter quarters.

SECTION 1.54.3
He himself departed for Cisalpine Gaul to hold the judicial assemblies.

### Book 2

CHAPTER 2.1

SECTION 2.1.1
While Caesar was in Cisalpine Gaul [in winter quarters], as we have explained above, frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also informed by letters from Labienus, that all the Belgae—who, as we have said, made up one-third of Gaul—were conspiring against the Roman people and exchanging hostages with one another.

SECTION 2.1.2
The reasons for the conspiracy were these: first, they feared that once all Gaul had been pacified, our army would be led against them;

SECTION 2.1.3
second, they were being urged on by certain Gauls. Some of these, just as they had not wanted the Germans to remain in Gaul any longer, resented the Roman people’s army wintering in Gaul and establishing a permanent presence there. Others, because of their fickle and impulsive nature, were eager for new governments.

SECTION 2.1.4
Still others urged them on because, in Gaul, kingships were commonly seized by the more powerful men and by those who had the resources to hire retainers; under our rule, these men could not achieve that objective so easily.

CHAPTER 2.2

SECTION 2.2.1
Moved by these reports and letters, Caesar raised two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul and, at the beginning of summer, sent his lieutenant Quintus Pedius to lead them into Transalpine Gaul.

SECTION 2.2.2
He himself went to the army as soon as forage began to be available.

SECTION 2.2.3
He instructed the Senones and the other Gauls bordering the Belgae to find out what was happening among them and keep him informed of these matters.

SECTION 2.2.4
They all consistently reported that armed bands were being assembled and an army was being concentrated in one place. Caesar then concluded that he should have no hesitation about marching against them. After arranging for grain supplies, he broke camp and reached the borders of the Belgae in about fifteen days.

CHAPTER 2.3

SECTION 2.3.1
When he arrived there unexpectedly and sooner than anyone had anticipated, the Remi, the Belgic people nearest Gaul, sent Iccius and Andebrogius, the leading men of their state, as envoys to him.

SECTION 2.3.2
They said that they were entrusting themselves and all they possessed to the protection and authority of the Roman people; that they had neither joined the other Belgae nor conspired against the Roman people;

SECTION 2.3.3
and that they were prepared to give hostages, carry out his orders, receive him into their towns, and assist him with grain and other supplies.

SECTION 2.3.4
All the other Belgae were under arms, and the Germans living on this side of the Rhine had joined them.

SECTION 2.3.5
The frenzy of them all was so great that the Remi had been unable to deter even the Suessiones—their own brothers and blood relatives, who enjoyed the same rights and laws and shared one government and one chief magistrate with them—from joining the others.

CHAPTER 2.4

SECTION 2.4.1
When Caesar asked them which states were under arms, how large they were, and what military strength they possessed, he learned the following: most of the Belgae were descended from Germans, had crossed the Rhine long ago, had settled there because of the fertility of the land, and had driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions. They alone were the people who,

SECTION 2.4.2
within the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was being ravaged, had prevented the Teutones and Cimbri from entering their territory.

SECTION 2.4.3
As a result, the memory of those events led them to claim great authority and to have great confidence in their military ability.

SECTION 2.4.4
The Remi said that they had obtained complete information about the Belgae’s numbers because, being connected with them by ties of blood and marriage, they had learned how large a force each people had promised for that war at the general council of the Belgae.

SECTION 2.4.5
The Bellovaci were the strongest among them in courage, influence, and population. They could muster one hundred thousand armed men, had promised sixty thousand picked men from that number, and demanded supreme command of the entire war.

SECTION 2.4.6
The Suessiones were their neighbors and possessed a very extensive territory and extremely fertile fields.

SECTION 2.4.7
Within our own memory their king had been Diviciacus, the most powerful man in all Gaul, who had ruled not only a large part of these regions but also Britain. Galba was now their king. Because of his justice and exceptional judgment, the supreme command of the entire war was being conferred upon him by unanimous consent. They had twelve towns and promised fifty thousand armed men. The Nervii promised the same number,

SECTION 2.4.8
and were regarded as the fiercest of all the Belgae and lived farthest away.

SECTION 2.4.9
The Atrebates promised fifteen thousand, the Ambiani ten thousand, the Morini twenty-five thousand, the Menapii seven thousand, the Caleti ten thousand, the Veliocasses and Viromandui the same number, and the Atuatuci nineteen thousand.

SECTION 2.4.10
They estimated that the Condrusi, Eburones, Caerosi, and Paemani, who are collectively called Germans, would supply about forty thousand.

CHAPTER 2.5

SECTION 2.5.1
Caesar encouraged the Remi and addressed them graciously. He ordered their entire senate to assemble before him and the children of their leading men to be brought to him as hostages. They carefully fulfilled all these requirements by the appointed day.

SECTION 2.5.2
Caesar himself strongly urged Diviciacus the Haeduan to act, explaining how important it was to the Roman state and to their common security for the enemy’s forces to be kept apart, so that they would not have to fight so great a multitude at one time.

SECTION 2.5.3
This could be accomplished if the Haedui led their forces into the territory of the Bellovaci and began ravaging their fields.

SECTION 2.5.4
After giving him these instructions, Caesar sent him away. When Caesar saw that all the forces of the Belgae had been assembled in one place and were advancing against him, and learned from the scouts he had sent out and from the Remi that they were no longer far away, he hurried to lead his army across the Axona River, which lies at the farthest edge of the Remi’s territory, and pitched camp there.

SECTION 2.5.5
This position protected one side of the camp with the riverbanks, secured the area behind him against the enemy, and made it possible for supplies from the Remi and the other states to be brought to him without danger.

SECTION 2.5.6
There was a bridge over the river. Caesar stationed a garrison there and left his lieutenant Quintus Titurius Sabinus with six cohorts on the opposite side of the river. He ordered the camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high and a trench eighteen feet wide.

CHAPTER 2.6

SECTION 2.6.1
A town of the Remi called Bibrax was eight miles from this camp. On their march, the Belgae began to attack it with great force. It was defended with difficulty that day.

SECTION 2.6.2
The Gauls and the Belgae use the same method of attacking towns. After a great mass of men has surrounded the entire circuit of the walls, stones begin to be hurled against the wall from every direction. Once the wall has been stripped of defenders, the attackers form a testudo, advance to the gates, and undermine the wall. This was easily done on that occasion.

SECTION 2.6.3
For when so great a multitude was hurling stones and missiles, no one had any possibility of holding his position on the wall.

SECTION 2.6.4
When night brought the assault to an end, Iccius the Remian, a man of the highest birth and influence among his people, who was then in command of the town and was one of the envoys who had come to Caesar to discuss peace, sent him a message saying that unless reinforcements were sent to him, he could not hold out any longer.

CHAPTER 2.7

SECTION 2.7.1
Around midnight Caesar used as guides the same men who had brought the message from Iccius and sent Numidians, Cretan archers, and Balearic slingers to reinforce the townspeople.

SECTION 2.7.2
Their arrival gave the Remi both hope of successful defense and greater eagerness to resist, while for the same reason the enemy lost hope of capturing the town.

SECTION 2.7.3
Accordingly, after remaining near the town for a short time and devastating the fields of the Remi, the enemy burned every village and building they could reach, then marched with all their forces toward Caesar’s camp and pitched camp less than two miles away.

SECTION 2.7.4
Their camp, as the smoke and fires indicated, extended more than eight miles across.

CHAPTER 2.8

SECTION 2.8.1
At first Caesar decided to avoid battle, both because of the enemy’s great numbers and because of their exceptional reputation for courage.

SECTION 2.8.2
Nevertheless, through daily cavalry engagements he tested the enemy’s fighting ability and the boldness of our own men.

SECTION 2.8.3
When he realized that our men were not inferior, he chose the naturally advantageous and suitable ground in front of the camp for drawing up his battle line. The hill on which the camp stood rose slightly above the plain and extended across the front only as far as a deployed battle line could occupy. It had steep slopes on both flanks, while at the front it descended gently and gradually returned to the level of the plain. From each side of this hill Caesar dug a crosswise trench about four hundred paces long

SECTION 2.8.4
and built redoubts at the ends of the trenches, where he positioned artillery. Thus, when he had formed his battle line, the enemy, who were so powerful because of their numbers, would not be able to fight around the flanks and surround his men.

SECTION 2.8.5
After doing this, he left the two legions he had most recently raised in camp so that they could be brought up as reinforcements wherever they were needed, and formed the other six legions in battle line in front of the camp. The enemy likewise led their forces out of camp and formed their line.

CHAPTER 2.9

SECTION 2.9.1
There was a small marsh between our army and the enemy’s. The enemy waited to see whether our men would cross it, while our men remained under arms, ready to attack them while they were encumbered if they began crossing first.

SECTION 2.9.2
Meanwhile, a cavalry engagement was fought between the two battle lines. When neither side began to cross, Caesar, after the cavalry action had gone more favorably for our men, led his forces back into camp.

SECTION 2.9.3
The enemy immediately marched from that place to the Axona River, which, as has been explained, lay behind our camp.

SECTION 2.9.4
There, after finding fords, they tried to lead part of their forces across, intending, if they could, to storm the fort commanded by the lieutenant Quintus Titurius and destroy the bridge;

SECTION 2.9.5
or, if they could not, to ravage the lands of the Remi, who were of great assistance to us in conducting the war, and cut our men off from supplies.

CHAPTER 2.10

SECTION 2.10.1
When Titurius informed Caesar of this, Caesar led all the cavalry, the lightly armed Numidians, the slingers, and the archers across the bridge and hurried toward them. There was fierce fighting at that spot.

SECTION 2.10.2
Our men attacked the enemy while they were encumbered in the river and killed a great number of them;

SECTION 2.10.3
they drove back with a barrage of missiles the rest, who were making a most daring attempt to cross over the bodies of their comrades, and surrounded with cavalry and killed those who had crossed first.

SECTION 2.10.4
When the enemy realized that their hopes had failed both of storming the town and of crossing the river, saw that our men would not advance onto less favorable ground for the sake of fighting, and began themselves to run short of grain, they called a council and decided that the best course was for each people to return home and for them all to assemble from every direction to defend whichever people’s territory the Romans first invaded with their army. In this way they would fight in their own territory rather than another’s and use their domestic supplies of grain.

SECTION 2.10.5
Among the other reasons, this consideration also led them to that decision: they had learned that Diviciacus and the Haedui were approaching the territory of the Bellovaci. It was impossible to persuade the Bellovaci to delay any longer and not bring aid to their own people.

CHAPTER 2.11

SECTION 2.11.1
Once this decision had been made, they left camp during the second watch with great noise and confusion, without any fixed order or command. Since each man sought the first place on the march for himself and hurried to reach home, their departure looked very much like a rout.

SECTION 2.11.2
Caesar immediately learned of this from his scouts, but because he had not yet discovered why they were leaving, he feared an ambush and kept the army and cavalry in camp.

SECTION 2.11.3
At daybreak, after scouts confirmed the facts, he sent all the cavalry ahead to delay the enemy’s rear guard. He placed the lieutenants Quintus Pedius and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta in command of them and ordered the lieutenant Titus Labienus to follow with three legions.

SECTION 2.11.4
They attacked the rear guard, pursued it for many miles, and cut down a great multitude of the fleeing enemy. The men at the end of the column whom they overtook would halt and bravely withstand the attack of our soldiers,

SECTION 2.11.5
but those farther ahead, because they seemed removed from danger and were restrained by neither necessity nor command, broke ranks when they heard the shouting and all sought safety in flight.

SECTION 2.11.6
Thus, without any danger to themselves, our men killed as great a number of them as the daylight allowed. At sunset they stopped the pursuit and, as ordered, withdrew to camp.

CHAPTER 2.12

SECTION 2.12.1
The next day, before the enemy could recover from their panic and flight, Caesar led his army into the territory of the Suessiones, who were nearest to the Remi, and, after completing a forced march, hurried to the town of Noviodunum.

SECTION 2.12.2
He attempted to storm it directly from the march because he had heard that it was without defenders, but despite the small number defending it, he could not take it because of the width of the ditch and the height of the wall.

SECTION 2.12.3
After fortifying his camp, he began moving covered galleries forward and preparing everything needed for an assault.

SECTION 2.12.4
Meanwhile, during the following night, the entire host of Suessiones who had escaped the rout assembled in the town.

SECTION 2.12.5
The covered galleries were quickly brought up to the town, a siege ramp was built, and towers were erected. Shaken by the scale of these works, which the Gauls had neither seen nor heard of before, and by the speed of the Romans, they sent envoys to Caesar to negotiate their surrender and, at the request of the Remi, obtained permission for their lives to be spared.

CHAPTER 2.13

SECTION 2.13.1
After receiving as hostages the leading men of the state, along with two sons of King Galba himself, and after all the weapons in the town had been handed over, Caesar accepted the surrender of the Suessiones and led his army against the Bellovaci.

SECTION 2.13.2
They had taken themselves and all their possessions into the town of Bratuspantium. When Caesar and his army were about five miles from that town, all the older men came out, stretched out their hands toward Caesar, and began declaring aloud that they were placing themselves under his protection and authority and would not take up arms against the Roman people.

SECTION 2.13.3
Likewise, when he approached the town and began establishing his camp there, the boys and women, with outstretched hands, asked the Romans for peace from the wall in their customary manner.

CHAPTER 2.14

SECTION 2.14.1
Diviciacus spoke on their behalf—for after the Belgae’s departure, he had dismissed the forces of the Haedui and returned to Caesar:

SECTION 2.14.2
The Bellovaci had always been loyal to and on friendly terms with the Haeduan state;

SECTION 2.14.3
they had been incited by their leaders, who said that Caesar had reduced the Haedui to slavery and that they were enduring every kind of outrage and humiliation, and had therefore revolted from the Haedui and made war on the Roman people.

SECTION 2.14.4
The leaders responsible for that policy, realizing what a great disaster they had brought upon their state, had fled to Britain.

SECTION 2.14.5
Not only the Bellovaci but also the Haedui on their behalf were asking Caesar to treat them with his customary clemency and mercy.

SECTION 2.14.6
If he did so, he would increase the authority of the Haedui among all the Belgae, by whose military support and resources they were accustomed to sustain themselves whenever wars arose.

CHAPTER 2.15

SECTION 2.15.1
Out of regard for Diviciacus and the Haedui, Caesar said that he would accept the Bellovaci under his protection and spare them. Because their state possessed great authority among the Belgae and had a very large population, he demanded six hundred hostages.

SECTION 2.15.2
After these had been handed over and all the weapons had been brought out of the town, he proceeded from there into the territory of the Ambiani, who surrendered themselves and all their possessions without delay.

SECTION 2.15.3
The territory of the Nervii bordered theirs. When Caesar inquired into the character and customs of the Nervii, he learned the following:

SECTION 2.15.4
Merchants had no access to them; they permitted no wine or other articles associated with luxury to be imported because they believed that such things weakened their spirit and relaxed their courage;

SECTION 2.15.5
they were fierce people of great courage; they rebuked and condemned the other Belgae for surrendering to the Roman people and casting aside their ancestral valor;

SECTION 2.15.6
they declared emphatically that they would neither send envoys nor accept any terms of peace.

CHAPTER 2.16

SECTION 2.16.1
After marching through their territory for three days, Caesar learned from prisoners that the River Sabis was no more than ten miles from his camp;

SECTION 2.16.2
all the Nervii had taken up positions across that river and were awaiting the Romans’ arrival there together with the Atrebates and Viromandui, their neighbors

SECTION 2.16.3
(for they had persuaded both peoples to share the same fortunes in the war);

SECTION 2.16.4
the forces of the Atuatuci were also expected by them and were on the way;

SECTION 2.16.5
they had gathered the women and those who seemed too young or too old to be useful in battle at a place that an army could not approach because of the marshes.

CHAPTER 2.17

SECTION 2.17.1
After learning these facts, Caesar sent scouts and centurions ahead to select a suitable site for a camp.

SECTION 2.17.2
A number of the surrendered Belgae and other Gauls were accompanying Caesar and marching with him. Some of them, as was later learned from prisoners, had observed the army’s marching routine during those days and went to the Nervii by night. They explained that a large quantity of baggage came between each legion and the next and that it would be no difficult matter, once the first legion had entered camp and the remaining legions were still a long distance away, to attack it while it was burdened with its packs;

SECTION 2.17.3
once that legion had been routed and the baggage plundered, the others would not dare to stand against them.

SECTION 2.17.4
The plan of those bringing this intelligence was also assisted by the fact that from ancient times the Nervii, being powerless in cavalry—for even now they pay no attention to that arm but possess all their strength in infantry—had cut into young trees and bent them over so that numerous branches grew out sideways, then planted brambles and thornbushes among them. In this way they had made these hedges provide a fortification like a wall, which not only could not be penetrated but could not even be seen through, so that they could more easily obstruct the cavalry of neighboring peoples if it entered their territory to raid.

SECTION 2.17.5
Since these obstacles hindered the march of our column, the Nervii decided that they must not let this plan pass unused.

CHAPTER 2.18

SECTION 2.18.1
The terrain of the place our men had selected for the camp was as follows. A hill sloped evenly downward from its summit to the River Sabis, which we mentioned above.

SECTION 2.18.2
Across from and opposite this hill, another rose from the river with an equally steep slope. Its lower two hundred paces were open, but its upper part was wooded, so that it was not easy to see into it.

SECTION 2.18.3
The enemy kept themselves hidden within these woods; in the open ground along the river, only a few cavalry outposts could be seen. The river was about three feet deep.

CHAPTER 2.19

SECTION 2.19.1
Caesar sent the cavalry ahead and followed with all his forces, but the arrangement and order of the column differed from what the Belgae had reported to the Nervii.

SECTION 2.19.2
Since he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, following his customary practice, led six legions unencumbered by baggage;

SECTION 2.19.3
behind them he had placed the baggage of the entire army; then the two legions most recently raised brought up the rear of the whole column and guarded the baggage.

SECTION 2.19.4
Our cavalry, together with the slingers and archers, crossed the river and engaged the enemy’s cavalry.

SECTION 2.19.5
The enemy repeatedly withdrew into the woods to their own men and then charged our men again from the woods, while our men did not dare pursue them in retreat beyond the point to which the open ground extended. Meanwhile, the six legions that had arrived first marked out the work and began fortifying the camp.

SECTION 2.19.6
When the men concealed in the woods saw the first part of our army’s baggage—the moment they had agreed among themselves to begin the battle—they suddenly charged out with all their forces and attacked our cavalry, having drawn up their battle line and ranks within the woods and encouraged one another.

SECTION 2.19.7
After easily routing and driving them off, the enemy ran down to the river with incredible speed, so that almost at the same moment they appeared at the woods, in the river, and already at close quarters with our men.

SECTION 2.19.8
With the same speed, they charged uphill toward our camp and the men occupied with the fortification work.

CHAPTER 2.20

SECTION 2.20.1
Caesar had to do everything at once: display the flag, which was the signal that the men had to rush to arms; give the trumpet call; recall the soldiers from the work; summon those who had gone a little farther away to gather materials for the rampart; form the battle line; encourage the soldiers; and give the signal for battle.

SECTION 2.20.2
The shortage of time and the enemy’s assault prevented a large part of these measures.

SECTION 2.20.3
Two things provided support amid these difficulties: the soldiers’ knowledge and experience, because their training in previous battles enabled them to decide for themselves what needed to be done no less effectively than they could be instructed by others; and the fact that Caesar had forbidden each lieutenant to leave the work and his assigned legion until the camp had been fortified.

SECTION 2.20.4
Because the enemy was so close and moved so quickly, these officers no longer waited for Caesar’s commands but carried out on their own whatever measures seemed best.

CHAPTER 2.21

SECTION 2.21.1
After issuing the necessary orders, Caesar ran down to encourage the soldiers in whatever direction chance presented and came to the Tenth Legion.

SECTION 2.21.2
He encouraged the soldiers with no longer a speech than to remember their former courage, not to lose heart, and to withstand the enemy’s attack bravely;

SECTION 2.21.3
and because the enemy was no farther away than the distance a missile could be thrown, he gave the signal to begin battle.

SECTION 2.21.4
Then, as he set out in another direction to encourage the troops there as well, he found them already fighting.

SECTION 2.21.5
So little time was available and so ready was the enemy to fight that there was no time not only to attach their insignia but even to put on their helmets and remove the covers from their shields.

SECTION 2.21.6
Each man took his position wherever he happened to arrive from the work and beside whatever standards he first saw, so that he would not waste time for fighting by searching for his own unit.

CHAPTER 2.22

SECTION 2.22.1
The army was drawn up more as the nature of the ground, the choice of the hill, and the urgency of the moment demanded than as military method and order required. The separate legions were resisting the enemy in different sectors, and the extremely dense hedges lying between them, as described above, obstructed their view. Consequently, definite reserves could not be posted, what was needed in each sector could not be foreseen, and all commands could not be directed by one man.

SECTION 2.22.2
Therefore, amid such unfavorable circumstances, the outcomes produced by fortune also varied.

CHAPTER 2.23

SECTION 2.23.1
The soldiers of the Ninth and Tenth Legions, who had taken position on the left side of the battle line, threw their javelins and quickly drove the Atrebates—for that was the enemy assigned to their sector—down from the higher ground into the river, exhausted and out of breath from running and covered with wounds. They pursued them as they tried to cross and killed with their swords a large part of them while they were encumbered in the river.

SECTION 2.23.2
They did not hesitate to cross the river themselves, and after advancing onto unfavorable ground, they renewed the battle and put the enemy to flight when they resisted again.

SECTION 2.23.3
Likewise, in another sector, two separate legions, the Eleventh and the Eighth, routed the Viromandui, whom they had engaged, and fought from the higher ground along the riverbanks themselves.

SECTION 2.23.4
But almost the entire camp had been left exposed at the front and on the left side. The Twelfth Legion was positioned on the right wing, with the Seventh not far from it, and all the Nervii, massed in a very dense formation and led by Boduognatus, who held supreme command, hurried toward that point. Some of them began to outflank the legions on their exposed side, while others made for the highest point of the camp.

CHAPTER 2.24

SECTION 2.24.1
At the same time, our cavalry and lightly armed infantry who had been with them—the men I said had been routed by the enemy’s first assault—encountered the enemy head-on as they withdrew into camp and again fled in another direction;

SECTION 2.24.2
and the camp servants, who had gone out through the rear gate and from the crest of the hill after seeing our victorious men cross the river, intending to plunder, looked back and saw the enemy moving about in our camp, whereupon they threw themselves headlong into flight.

SECTION 2.24.3
At the same time, shouting and uproar arose among those arriving with the baggage, and in their terror they rushed off in different directions.

SECTION 2.24.4
Shaken by all these events, the Treveran cavalrymen, whose reputation for courage is outstanding among the Gauls and who had been sent by their state to Caesar as auxiliaries, saw our camp filling with enemy troops, the legions being hard-pressed and nearly surrounded, and the camp servants, cavalrymen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing in different directions and scattering everywhere. Despairing of our situation, they hurried home.

SECTION 2.24.5
They reported to their state that the Romans had been routed and defeated and that the enemy had taken possession of their camp and baggage.

CHAPTER 2.25

SECTION 2.25.1
After encouraging the Tenth Legion, Caesar went to the right wing. There he saw that his men were being hard-pressed and that, because the standards of the Twelfth Legion had been brought together in one place, the soldiers were packed so tightly that they hindered one another in fighting. All the centurions of the fourth cohort had been killed, its standard-bearer had been slain, and its standard had been lost. Nearly all the centurions of the remaining cohorts had either been wounded or killed, among them the chief centurion, Publius Sextius Baculus, a man of exceptional courage, who had been disabled by many severe wounds and could no longer support himself. Caesar saw that the other soldiers were losing momentum, that some in the rear were abandoning their positions, withdrawing from the battle, and trying to avoid the missiles, that the enemy coming up from lower ground did not let up their frontal attack and were pressing in from both sides, that the situation was desperate, and that there were no reserves available to send in.

SECTION 2.25.2
Since he himself had come there without a shield, he took one from a soldier in the rear and advanced to the front line. Calling the centurions by name and encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to advance the standards and spread out the maniples so that they could use their swords more easily.

SECTION 2.25.3
His arrival gave the soldiers hope and renewed their spirit. Since each man, even in this most desperate situation, wanted to do his best under the commander’s eyes, the enemy’s attack was slowed somewhat.

CHAPTER 2.26

SECTION 2.26.1
When Caesar saw that the Seventh Legion, which had taken its position nearby, was likewise being hard-pressed by the enemy, he instructed the military tribunes to have the two legions gradually join together, turn their standards, and advance against the enemy.

SECTION 2.26.2
Once this was done, the men could support one another and no longer feared being surrounded by the enemy from behind, so they began to resist more boldly and fight more fiercely.

SECTION 2.26.3
Meanwhile, the soldiers of the two legions that had been guarding the baggage at the rear of the column were informed of the battle, broke into a run, and came into view of the enemy on the crest of the hill.

SECTION 2.26.4
Titus Labienus had taken possession of the enemy’s camp and, after observing from the higher ground what was happening in our camp, sent the Tenth Legion to support our men.

SECTION 2.26.5
When its soldiers learned from the flight of the cavalry and camp servants what the situation was and how great a danger threatened the camp, the legions, and the commander, they made every possible effort to move quickly.

CHAPTER 2.27

SECTION 2.27.1
Their arrival produced such a complete reversal that even our men who had collapsed from their wounds leaned on their shields and resumed the fighting, while the camp servants, seeing the enemy terrified, attacked armed men even though they themselves were unarmed.

SECTION 2.27.2
The cavalrymen, meanwhile, wanting to erase the shame of their flight through courage, placed themselves ahead of the legionaries at every point in the battle.

SECTION 2.27.3
But even when their last hope of survival was gone, the enemy displayed such courage that, when the men in their front rank fell, those behind them stood on their bodies and fought from there.

SECTION 2.27.4
When these men too were struck down and the bodies were piled up, the survivors used the heap as a mound from which to hurl missiles at our men and catch our javelins and throw them back.

SECTION 2.27.5
It must therefore be judged that men of such courage had not acted without reason when they dared to cross a very broad river, climb its extremely high banks, and advance over the most unfavorable ground. Their greatness of spirit had turned the most difficult tasks into easy ones.

CHAPTER 2.28

SECTION 2.28.1
After this battle, the people and very name of the Nervii had nearly been annihilated. When news of the battle reached the elders, whom, as we said, they had sent with the children and women into the tidal marshes and swamps, they believed that nothing could obstruct the victors and that nowhere was safe for the defeated.

SECTION 2.28.2
With the unanimous consent of all the survivors, they sent envoys to Caesar and surrendered to him. In describing their state’s disaster, they said that their senators had been reduced from six hundred to three and that, out of sixty thousand men, barely five hundred remained capable of bearing arms.

SECTION 2.28.3
To show that he was treating these wretched suppliants with mercy, Caesar took the greatest care to preserve them. He ordered them to continue using their own territory and towns, and commanded their neighbors to refrain from injuring or mistreating them or their people.

CHAPTER 2.29

SECTION 2.29.1
The Atuatuci, whom we mentioned above, were coming with all their forces to assist the Nervii. When they received news of this battle, they turned around on the march and returned home.

SECTION 2.29.2
They abandoned all their towns and forts and brought everything they possessed into a single town exceptionally well fortified by nature.

SECTION 2.29.3
On every side around it, this town had very high cliffs and steep slopes. On only one side was there a gently rising approach no more than two hundred feet wide. They had fortified this place with a very high double wall and were now placing heavy stones and sharply pointed beams on the wall.

SECTION 2.29.4
They were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones. When those peoples were marching toward our province and Italy, they had left on this side of the Rhine the baggage that they could not drive or carry with them, together with six thousand of their own men to guard and defend it.

SECTION 2.29.5
For many years after the destruction of the Cimbri and Teutones, these men were continually harassed by neighboring peoples, sometimes attacking them and sometimes defending themselves against attack. At last, after making peace by common agreement with all of them, they chose this place as their home.

CHAPTER 2.30

SECTION 2.30.1
When our army first arrived, they made frequent sorties from the town and engaged our men in minor skirmishes.

SECTION 2.30.2
Later, after they had been surrounded by a rampart twelve feet high and fifteen miles in circumference, with forts at frequent intervals, they kept themselves inside the town.

SECTION 2.30.3
When they saw covered galleries being advanced, a siege ramp being constructed, and a tower being erected some distance away, they at first mocked us from the wall and shouted insults because such a massive piece of machinery was being set up so far away.

SECTION 2.30.4
With what hands or what strength, they asked, did men of such short stature expect to place a tower of such enormous weight against the wall? For because of their own great size, the Gauls generally regard our shortness with contempt.

CHAPTER 2.31

SECTION 2.31.1
But when they saw the tower moving and approaching the walls, they were shaken by this strange and unfamiliar sight and sent envoys to Caesar to negotiate peace. The envoys spoke as follows:

SECTION 2.31.2
They did not believe that the Romans were waging war without divine assistance, since they could move forward machines of such great height with such speed.

SECTION 2.31.3
They said that they entrusted themselves and everything they possessed to Roman power.

SECTION 2.31.4
They had only one request and plea: if Caesar, in keeping with the clemency and gentleness of which they had heard from others, decided to spare the Atuatuci, he should not strip them of their weapons.

SECTION 2.31.5
Nearly all their neighbors were their enemies and envied their courage, and they would be unable to defend themselves against them once they had surrendered their weapons.

SECTION 2.31.6
If they were reduced to that condition, it would be better for them to suffer any fate at the hands of the Roman people than to be tortured to death by those over whom they had been accustomed to rule.

CHAPTER 2.32

SECTION 2.32.1
Caesar replied that he would spare their state more because of his own customary practice than because they deserved it, provided that they surrendered before the battering ram touched their wall.

SECTION 2.32.2
But there could be no terms of surrender unless they handed over their weapons. He would do what he had done in the case of the Nervii and would order their neighbors not to inflict any injury on people who had surrendered to the Roman people.

SECTION 2.32.3
When this reply was reported to their people, they said that they would do as commanded.

SECTION 2.32.4
They threw such a great quantity of weapons from the wall into the ditch in front of the town that the piles of weapons almost reached the top of the wall and the siege ramp. Nevertheless, as was later discovered, they concealed and retained about one-third of them in the town. The gates were opened, and for that day they enjoyed peace.

CHAPTER 2.33

SECTION 2.33.1
Toward evening Caesar ordered the gates closed and the soldiers to leave the town, so that the townspeople would not suffer any abuse from them during the night.

SECTION 2.33.2
As was later learned, the townspeople had already formed a plan. They believed that, once their surrender had been accepted, our men would withdraw their guards or at least keep watch less carefully. Some armed themselves with the weapons they had retained and concealed; others used shields made of bark or woven from wicker, which, because time was short, they had hurriedly covered with hides. During the third watch, at the point where the climb to our fortifications appeared least steep, they suddenly made a sortie from the town with all their forces.

SECTION 2.33.3
As Caesar had previously ordered, a signal was quickly given with fires, and men rushed there from the nearest forts.

SECTION 2.33.4
The enemy fought as fiercely as brave men in their last hope of survival were bound to fight on unfavorable ground against troops hurling missiles from the rampart and towers, when all hope depended on courage alone.

SECTION 2.33.5
About four thousand of them were killed, and the rest were driven back into the town.

SECTION 2.33.6
The next day, since no one was now defending the gates, they were broken down and our soldiers were admitted. Caesar sold the entire population and property of the town at auction.

SECTION 2.33.7
The purchasers reported to him that the number of persons sold was fifty-three thousand.

CHAPTER 2.34

SECTION 2.34.1
At the same time, Caesar received a report from Publius Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion against the Veneti, Venelli, Osismi, Coriosolites, Esuvii, Aulerci, and Redones—the coastal states bordering the Ocean—that all those states had been brought under the dominion and authority of the Roman people.

CHAPTER 2.35

SECTION 2.35.1
After these achievements had brought peace to all Gaul, the fame of this war spread so widely among the barbarians that peoples living across the Rhine sent delegations to Caesar promising to give hostages and obey his commands.

SECTION 2.35.2
Because Caesar was hurrying to Italy and Illyricum, he ordered these delegations to return to him at the beginning of the following summer.

SECTION 2.35.3
After leading the legions into winter quarters among the Carnutes, Andes, Turoni, and the states near the regions where he had waged war, Caesar himself departed for Italy.

SECTION 2.35.4
As a result of these achievements, the Senate, upon receiving Caesar’s dispatches, decreed fifteen days of public thanksgiving, an honor that had never before been granted to anyone.

### Book 3

CHAPTER 3.1

SECTION 3.1.1
When Caesar was leaving for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the Twelfth Legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, whose territory extends from the borders of the Allobroges, Lake Geneva, and the Rhône River to the highest Alps.

SECTION 3.1.2
His reason for sending Galba was that he wanted to open the route through the Alps, along which merchants had been accustomed to travel at great risk and after paying heavy tolls.

SECTION 3.1.3
He authorized Galba, if he considered it necessary, to station the legion in that region for the winter.

SECTION 3.1.4
After fighting several successful battles and storming a number of their forts, Galba received envoys from every direction, accepted hostages, and made peace. He then decided to station two cohorts among the Nantuates and to spend the winter himself with the remaining cohorts of that legion in a village of the Veragri called Octodurus.

SECTION 3.1.5
This village lies in a fairly narrow valley with a small area of level ground adjoining it and is enclosed on every side by very high mountains.

SECTION 3.1.6
Since a river divided the village into two sections, Galba granted one section to the Gauls for their winter quarters and assigned the other, which they had vacated, to his cohorts. He fortified this position with a rampart and ditch.

CHAPTER 3.2

SECTION 3.2.1
Several days of the winter had passed, and Galba had ordered grain to be brought there, when his scouts suddenly informed him that all the Gauls had left during the night from the section of the village he had granted them and that a vast force of Seduni and Veragri held the mountains overlooking the village.

SECTION 3.2.2
The Gauls had suddenly decided to renew the war and overwhelm the legion for several reasons.

SECTION 3.2.3
First, they held the legion in contempt because of its small numbers, especially since it was not at full strength: two cohorts had been detached, and a number of individual soldiers sent out to obtain supplies were absent.

SECTION 3.2.4
They also believed that, because of the unfavorable terrain, when they charged down from the mountains into the valley and hurled their missiles, not even their first assault could be withstood.

SECTION 3.2.5
In addition, they resented having their children taken away from them as hostages and were convinced that the Romans were trying to occupy the summits of the Alps not merely to secure the roads but to hold them permanently and annex the region to the neighboring province.

CHAPTER 3.3

SECTION 3.3.1
On receiving these reports, Galba saw that the work on the winter camp and its fortifications was not yet fully completed and that insufficient provision had been made for grain and other supplies, since after the surrender and the acceptance of hostages he had believed there was no reason to fear war. He quickly called a council and began asking for opinions.

SECTION 3.3.2
In this council, since so great and unexpected a danger had arisen, nearly all the higher ground could already be seen covered by a mass of armed men, and neither reinforcements nor supplies could reach them because the roads had been cut off,

SECTION 3.3.3
some, almost despairing of survival, proposed that they abandon the baggage, break out of the camp, and seek safety by the same routes along which they had come.

SECTION 3.3.4
The majority, however, decided to reserve this plan for the last extremity and meanwhile await the outcome and defend the camp.

CHAPTER 3.4

SECTION 3.4.1
After a short interval, barely enough time for the men to arrange and carry out the measures they had decided upon, the signal was given and the enemy charged down from every direction, hurling stones and heavy Gallic javelins onto the rampart.

SECTION 3.4.2
At first our men, with their strength unimpaired, defended the fortifications bravely and threw no missile from their higher position without effect. Whenever any part of the camp seemed to be stripped of defenders and hard-pressed, they rushed there and brought assistance.

SECTION 3.4.3
But they were at a disadvantage because, as the battle continued, enemy soldiers who became tired withdrew from the fighting and others with fresh strength took their places.

SECTION 3.4.4
Because of their small numbers, our men could do none of these things. Not only was a soldier exhausted by fighting given no opportunity to withdraw, but even a wounded man could not leave the place where he stood and retire to safety.

CHAPTER 3.5

SECTION 3.5.1
The fighting had now continued without interruption for more than six hours, and our men were running out not only of strength but also of missiles. The enemy pressed their attack more fiercely and, as our men weakened, began tearing down the rampart and filling the ditches. The situation had now reached the ultimate crisis.

SECTION 3.5.2
Publius Sextius Baculus, the chief centurion whom we said had been disabled by numerous wounds in the battle against the Nervii, and Gaius Volusenus, a military tribune and a man of great judgment and courage, ran to Galba and told him that their one hope of survival was to break out and attempt this last resort.

SECTION 3.5.3
Accordingly, he quickly called the centurions together and instructed them to inform the soldiers to break off the fighting for a short time, merely intercept the missiles being thrown at them, and recover from their exertions; then, when the signal was given, they were to burst out of the camp and place all hope of safety in their courage.

CHAPTER 3.6

SECTION 3.6.1
They did as they were ordered, and by suddenly making a sortie from every gate, they left the enemy no opportunity either to understand what was happening or to regroup.

SECTION 3.6.2
With the situation thus reversed, they surrounded on every side and cut down the men who had come there hoping to take the camp. Of the more than thirty thousand barbarians known to have come to the camp, they killed over a third, threw the rest into panic and flight, and did not allow them to make a stand even on higher ground.

SECTION 3.6.3
Thus, after routing the entire enemy force and stripping them of their weapons, they withdrew within their own fortifications.

SECTION 3.6.4
After this battle, Galba was unwilling to test fortune too often. He remembered that he had come to winter quarters with a different plan and saw that he had encountered entirely different circumstances. Moved above all by the shortage of grain and supplies, on the following day he burned all the buildings of that village and hurried to return to the province.

SECTION 3.6.5
With no enemy obstructing or delaying his march, he brought the legion safely into the territory of the Nantuates, and from there into that of the Allobroges, where he spent the winter.

CHAPTER 3.7

SECTION 3.7.1
After these events, Caesar believed for every reason that Gaul had been pacified—the Belgae had been defeated, the Germans expelled, and the Seduni conquered in the Alps—and so, at the beginning of winter, he had departed for Illyricum because he also wished to visit those peoples and become acquainted with those regions. Then war suddenly broke out in Gaul.

SECTION 3.7.2
The cause of this war was as follows. The young Publius Crassus was wintering with the Seventh Legion among the Andes, near the Atlantic Ocean.

SECTION 3.7.3
Because grain was scarce in that area, he sent several prefects and military tribunes into the neighboring states to obtain it.

SECTION 3.7.4
Among them, Titus Terrasidius was sent to the Esuvii, Marcus Trebius Gallus to the Coriosolites, and Quintus Velanius with Titus Silius to the Veneti.

CHAPTER 3.8

SECTION 3.8.1
The state of the Veneti possessed by far the greatest authority along the entire coast of those regions. The Veneti had the largest number of ships, in which they regularly sailed to Britain; they surpassed all the others in their knowledge and experience of nautical matters; and, on a coast exposed to the violent open sea, where there were only a few scattered harbors, all of which they controlled, they made nearly everyone accustomed to sailing those waters pay them tribute.

SECTION 3.8.2
They began by detaining Silius and Velanius, believing that through them they would recover the hostages they had given to Crassus.

SECTION 3.8.3
Influenced by their authority, the neighboring peoples—with the sudden and impulsive decision-making characteristic of the Gauls—detained Trebius and Terrasidius for the same reason. They quickly exchanged envoys and, through their leading men, jointly swore that they would do nothing except by common agreement and that they would all accept the same outcome of fortune.

SECTION 3.8.4
They urged the remaining states to choose to retain the freedom inherited from their ancestors rather than endure slavery under Rome.

SECTION 3.8.5
After quickly bringing the entire coast over to their position, they sent a joint delegation to Publius Crassus, telling him that if he wished to recover his men, he must return their hostages to them.

CHAPTER 3.9

SECTION 3.9.1
When Crassus informed Caesar of these events, Caesar, because he himself was some distance away, meanwhile ordered warships to be built on the Liger River, which flows into the Atlantic Ocean, rowers to be recruited from the province, and sailors and pilots to be assembled.

SECTION 3.9.2
These arrangements were carried out quickly, and as soon as the season allowed, Caesar himself hurried to the army.

SECTION 3.9.3
When the Veneti and the other states learned of Caesar’s arrival, they also understood the enormity of the crime they had committed by detaining envoys—a title always regarded as sacred and inviolable among every nation—and throwing them into chains. They therefore began to prepare for war in proportion to the danger and, above all, to provide everything needed for the use of their ships. Their hopes were all the greater because they had great confidence in the natural character of the region.

SECTION 3.9.4
They knew that overland routes were broken up by tidal inlets and that navigation was obstructed by ignorance of the area and the small number of harbors.

SECTION 3.9.5
They were also confident that because of the shortage of grain, our armies could not remain among them very long.

SECTION 3.9.6
Even if everything should turn out contrary to their expectations, they were still far more powerful in ships, while the Romans had no supply of ships at all and were unfamiliar with the shallows, harbors, and islands of the regions where they would be fighting.

SECTION 3.9.7
They clearly understood that sailing in an enclosed sea was very different from sailing on the vast and completely open Atlantic Ocean.

SECTION 3.9.8
Having formed these plans, they fortified their towns.

SECTION 3.9.9
They transported grain from the countryside into the towns and gathered as many ships as they could in the territory of the Veneti, where it was known that Caesar would first conduct the war.

SECTION 3.9.10
They enlisted as allies for this war the Osismi, Lexovii, Namnetes, Ambiliati, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii, and summoned reinforcements from Britain, which lies opposite those regions.

CHAPTER 3.10

SECTION 3.10.1
These were the difficulties of conducting the war that we have described above, but nevertheless many considerations urged Caesar to undertake it:

SECTION 3.10.2
the outrage of detaining Roman knights, a revolt after surrender, rebellion after hostages had been given, and the conspiracy of so many states; above all, he feared that if he neglected this region, the remaining peoples would think themselves free to do the same.

SECTION 3.10.3
Accordingly, since he understood that nearly all the Gauls were eager for political change and were quickly and readily stirred to war, while all people naturally desire freedom and hate the condition of slavery, he thought that before more states could conspire together, he must divide his army and distribute it more widely.

CHAPTER 3.11

SECTION 3.11.1
He therefore sent his lieutenant Titus Labienus with the cavalry to the Treveri, who lived nearest the Rhine River.

SECTION 3.11.2
He instructed him to visit the Remi and the other Belgae and keep them loyal, and to prevent the Germans—who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae as reinforcements—from crossing the river by force in ships if they attempted to do so.

SECTION 3.11.3
He ordered Publius Crassus to depart for Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a large force of cavalry, to prevent reinforcements from being sent from those peoples into Gaul and such powerful nations from joining together.

SECTION 3.11.4
He sent his lieutenant Quintus Titurius Sabinus with three legions against the Venelli, Coriosolites, and Lexovii, to make sure that force was kept occupied.

SECTION 3.11.5
He placed the young Decimus Brutus in command of the fleet and of the Gallic ships that he had ordered to assemble from the Pictones, Santoni, and other pacified regions, and ordered him to set out against the Veneti as soon as he could. Caesar himself hurried there with the infantry forces.

CHAPTER 3.12

SECTION 3.12.1
The towns were generally situated in such a way that, built at the ends of narrow spits and promontories, they could not be reached on foot when the tide had risen from the open sea—something that always happened twice in a period of twelve hours—or by ship, because when the tide receded again, the ships would be stranded in the shallows.

SECTION 3.12.2
Thus both circumstances obstructed an assault on the towns.

SECTION 3.12.3
If at any time they happened to be overcome by the scale of our siege works, after the sea had been forced back by an embankment and massive earthworks and these had been raised to the level of the town walls, and they began to despair of their fortunes, they would bring in a large number of ships—which they had every ability to do—carry away all their possessions, and withdraw to the nearest towns.

SECTION 3.12.4
There they would again defend themselves with the same advantages of terrain.

SECTION 3.12.5
They were able to do this all the more easily during a large part of the summer because our ships were held back by storms, and navigation was extremely difficult on the vast and open sea, with its powerful tides and rare, almost nonexistent harbors.

CHAPTER 3.13

SECTION 3.13.1
Their ships were built and equipped as follows. Their hulls were considerably flatter than those of our ships, so that they could more easily handle the shallows and the ebbing tide.

SECTION 3.13.2
Their bows stood very high, as did their sterns, making them suitable for the size of the waves and the violence of the storms.

SECTION 3.13.3
The ships were built entirely of oak, enabling them to withstand any force or impact.

SECTION 3.13.4
Their crossbeams were made of timbers a foot thick and fastened with iron nails as thick as a man’s thumb.

SECTION 3.13.5
The anchors were secured with iron chains instead of ropes.

SECTION 3.13.6
They used hides and thinly dressed leather in place of sails, either because they lacked flax and did not know how to use it, or—more probably—because they believed that ordinary sails could not adequately withstand such violent Atlantic storms and powerful winds or control ships of such great weight.

SECTION 3.13.7
When our fleet encountered these ships, it was superior only in speed and the drive provided by its oars; in all other respects, the enemy’s ships were better suited and adapted to the nature of the region and the violence of the storms.

SECTION 3.13.8
Our ships could not damage them with their rams, so great was their strength; because of their height, a missile could not easily be hurled onto them, and for the same reason they could not readily be held fast with grappling hooks.

SECTION 3.13.9
Moreover, when the wind began to rage and they let themselves run before it, they could endure the storm more easily, settle more safely in the shallows, and, when left aground by the tide, had nothing to fear from rocks and reefs. Our ships had reason to fear every one of these dangers.

CHAPTER 3.14

SECTION 3.14.1
After storming several towns, Caesar realized that so much labor was being spent in vain, since taking the towns neither prevented the enemy’s escape nor enabled him to harm them. He therefore decided that he must wait for the fleet.

SECTION 3.14.2
When it assembled and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully prepared and equipped with every kind of weapon, sailed out of the harbor and took up a position opposite ours.

SECTION 3.14.3
Neither Brutus, who commanded the fleet, nor the military tribunes and centurions, each of whom had been assigned an individual ship, were at all certain what they should do or what method of fighting they should adopt.

SECTION 3.14.4
They knew that the enemy could not be damaged with the ram. Even after towers had been erected on our ships, the sterns of the barbarians’ ships still rose higher than they did, so that our missiles could not be thrown effectively from the lower position, while those thrown by the Gauls struck with greater force.

SECTION 3.14.5
One device prepared by our men proved extremely useful: very sharp hooks inserted into and fastened to long poles, similar in shape to the hooks used against walls.

SECTION 3.14.6
With these, they caught and pulled taut the ropes that fastened the yards to the masts; then, when our ship was driven forward by its oars, the ropes snapped.

SECTION 3.14.7
Once these ropes were cut, the yards necessarily fell. Since all the Gallic ships’ effectiveness depended on their sails and rigging, when these were taken away, the ships were rendered entirely useless in a single moment.

SECTION 3.14.8
The rest of the contest depended on courage, in which our soldiers easily surpassed them, especially because the action was taking place in sight of Caesar and the entire army, so that no particularly courageous deed could go unnoticed.

SECTION 3.14.9
The army occupied all the hills and higher ground from which there was a close view down onto the sea.

CHAPTER 3.15

SECTION 3.15.1
Once the yards had been brought down, as we have described, two or three of our ships would surround each enemy vessel, and the soldiers would strive with all their strength to board it.

SECTION 3.15.2
After the barbarians saw this happening and several of their ships had been stormed, they could find no remedy for the situation and attempted to seek safety in flight.

SECTION 3.15.3
Their ships had already turned in the direction the wind was carrying them when such a sudden calm and stillness arose that they could not move from the spot.

SECTION 3.15.4
This circumstance provided the greatest possible opportunity to finish the engagement.

SECTION 3.15.5
Our men pursued and stormed the ships one by one, so that only a very few of their entire number reached land under cover of night, although the fighting lasted from about the fourth hour until sunset.

CHAPTER 3.16

SECTION 3.16.1
That battle brought the war against the Veneti and the entire coast to an end.

SECTION 3.16.2
Not only had all their young men and all their older men who possessed any judgment or standing gathered there, but they had also assembled in one place every ship they had anywhere.

SECTION 3.16.3
After losing these, the survivors had neither anywhere to retreat nor any means of defending their towns.

SECTION 3.16.4
They therefore surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar. Caesar decided that they must be punished all the more severely so that in the future the barbarians would more carefully respect the rights of envoys. Accordingly, he executed their entire senate and sold the rest into slavery.

CHAPTER 3.17

SECTION 3.17.1
While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Quintus Titurius Sabinus reached the territory of the Venelli with the forces he had received from Caesar.

SECTION 3.17.2
They were commanded by Viridovix, who also held supreme command over all the states that had rebelled and from which he had assembled an army and large forces.

SECTION 3.17.3
During the preceding few days, the Aulerci Eburovices and the Lexovii had killed their own senates because they had been unwilling to support the war, closed their gates, and joined Viridovix.

SECTION 3.17.4
In addition, a great multitude of desperate men and brigands had gathered from all over Gaul, drawn away from farming and daily labor by the hope of plunder and enthusiasm for war.

SECTION 3.17.5
Sabinus remained in his camp at a location suitable in every respect, while Viridovix had encamped opposite him at a distance of two miles and, each day, led out his forces and offered him the opportunity to fight. As a result, Sabinus was now not only despised by the enemy but was also criticized to some extent in the remarks of our own soldiers.

SECTION 3.17.6
He created so strong an impression of fear that the enemy now dared to approach the rampart of the camp.

SECTION 3.17.7
He acted this way because he did not believe that a lieutenant should fight such a great multitude of enemies—especially in the absence of the man holding supreme command—unless he had level ground or some other favorable opportunity.

CHAPTER 3.18

SECTION 3.18.1
Once this impression of fear had become firmly established, he selected a suitable and cunning man, a Gaul from among those he had with him as auxiliaries.

SECTION 3.18.2
By promising him great rewards, he persuaded the man to go over to the enemy and instructed him in what he wanted done.

SECTION 3.18.3
When the man came to them pretending to be a deserter, he described the Romans’ fear and explained the desperate straits in which Caesar himself was being pressed by the Veneti.

SECTION 3.18.4
He said that no later than the following night, Sabinus would secretly lead his army out of camp and set out to bring assistance to Caesar.

SECTION 3.18.5
When they heard this, they all shouted that the opportunity for a successful operation must not be lost.

SECTION 3.18.6
They must march on the camp. Many considerations encouraged the Gauls to adopt this plan: Sabinus’s hesitation during the preceding days, the deserter’s assurance, their shortage of provisions, for which they had made insufficient preparations, their hopes concerning the war against the Veneti, and the fact that people generally like to believe what they want to believe.

SECTION 3.18.7
Persuaded by these arguments, they refused to dismiss Viridovix and the other commanders from the council until they had agreed to take up arms and march on the camp.

SECTION 3.18.8
Once this was agreed, they happily set out for the camp as though victory were assured, after gathering brushwood and branches with which to fill the Romans’ trenches.

CHAPTER 3.19

SECTION 3.19.1
The camp stood on high ground that rose gradually from the bottom of the slope for about a mile. They rushed up to it at full speed, to give the Romans as little time as possible to assemble and arm themselves, and arrived completely out of breath.

SECTION 3.19.2
Sabinus encouraged his men and, when they eagerly demanded it, gave the signal. Since the enemy were encumbered by the loads they were carrying, he ordered a sudden sortie through two gates.

SECTION 3.19.3
Because of the favorable terrain, the enemy’s lack of preparation and exhaustion, the soldiers’ courage, and the experience they had gained in earlier battles, the enemy could not withstand even a single charge by our men and immediately turned and fled.

SECTION 3.19.4
Our soldiers, still at full strength, overtook them while they were encumbered and killed a great many of them. The cavalry pursued the rest and allowed only a few who had escaped the rout to get away.

SECTION 3.19.5
Thus, at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of Sabinus’s victory, and all the states immediately surrendered to Titurius.

SECTION 3.19.6
For although the Gauls are eager and ready to undertake wars, their spirits are weak and not at all resilient when it comes to enduring disasters.

CHAPTER 3.20

SECTION 3.20.1
At about the same time, Publius Crassus reached Aquitania, which, as stated before, must be regarded as a third of Gaul in both geographical extent and population. He understood that he would have to wage war in the region where, only a few years earlier, the legate Lucius Valerius Praeconinus had been killed after his army was defeated, and from which the proconsul Lucius Manlius had fled after losing his baggage. He therefore realized that he would have to exercise exceptional care.

SECTION 3.20.2
Accordingly, after securing the grain supply, assembling auxiliary troops and cavalry, and personally summoning many brave men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo—communities in the Roman province of Gaul bordering those regions—he led his army into the territory of the Sotiates.

SECTION 3.20.3
When the Sotiates learned of his arrival, they assembled a large force and attacked our column on the march with their cavalry, in which their chief strength lay. They first engaged us in a cavalry battle,

SECTION 3.20.4
and then, after their cavalry had been driven back and ours were pursuing them, they suddenly revealed the infantry forces they had stationed in ambush in a valley. These attacked our scattered men and renewed the battle.

CHAPTER 3.21

SECTION 3.21.1
The fighting was long and fierce. The Sotiates, relying on their earlier victories, believed that the safety of all Aquitania depended on their courage, while our men wanted it to be seen what they could accomplish without their commander and the other legions, under the leadership of a young man. At last, worn down by wounds, the enemy turned and fled.

SECTION 3.21.2
After killing a great many of them, Crassus marched directly to the town of the Sotiates and began to besiege it. When they resisted bravely, he brought forward covered siege galleries and towers.

SECTION 3.21.3
At times they attempted sorties, and at others they drove tunnels toward the siege ramp and covered galleries. The Aquitani are by far the most skilled at this, because they have copper mines and quarries in many places. When they realized that the vigilance of our men made it impossible to accomplish anything by these methods, they sent envoys to Crassus and asked him to accept their surrender. Their request was granted, and when ordered to hand over their weapons, they did so.

CHAPTER 3.22

SECTION 3.22.1
While the attention of all our men was focused on this matter, Adiatunnus, who held supreme command, attempted from another part of the town, together with six hundred devoted retainers whom they call soldurii,

SECTION 3.22.2
whose condition is that they share all the benefits of life with those to whose friendship they have devoted themselves, but if anything violent happens to those men, they either suffer the same fate with them or take their own lives;

SECTION 3.22.3
and within living memory no one has yet been found who refused death after the man to whose friendship he had devoted himself was killed—

SECTION 3.22.4
Adiatunnus attempted to make a sortie with these men. A shout went up from that part of the fortifications, the soldiers rushed to arms, and a fierce battle was fought there. Although driven back into the town, he nevertheless obtained Crassus’s permission to surrender on the same terms.

CHAPTER 3.23

SECTION 3.23.1
After receiving their weapons and hostages, Crassus marched into the territories of the Vocates and Tarusates.

SECTION 3.23.2
The natives were now truly alarmed because they had learned that a town fortified both by its natural position and by human labor had been captured within a few days of the Romans’ arrival. They began sending envoys in every direction, swearing mutual oaths, exchanging hostages, and preparing forces.

SECTION 3.23.3
Envoys were also sent to the states of Nearer Spain bordering Aquitania, and auxiliary troops and commanders were summoned from there.

SECTION 3.23.4
With their arrival, the Aquitani attempted to wage war with great confidence and a large number of men.

SECTION 3.23.5
The commanders selected were men who had spent all those years with Quintus Sertorius and were believed to possess the highest degree of military expertise.

SECTION 3.23.6
Following Roman practice, they began occupying strategic positions, fortifying their camp, and cutting our men off from supplies.

SECTION 3.23.7
When Crassus observed that his forces were too small to be divided easily, while the enemy could roam freely, blockade the roads, and still leave a sufficient guard in camp; that for this reason grain and other supplies were reaching him only with difficulty; and that the enemy’s numbers were increasing daily, he decided that he must not delay giving battle.

SECTION 3.23.8
He brought the matter before a council of war, and when he saw that everyone held the same opinion, he set the following day for the battle.

CHAPTER 3.24

SECTION 3.24.1
At daybreak he led out all his forces, formed them in two battle lines, placed the auxiliaries in the center, and waited to see what plan the enemy would adopt.

SECTION 3.24.2
Although the enemy believed that, because of their numbers, their old military reputation, and the small size of our force, they could fight safely, they nevertheless considered it safer to blockade the roads, cut off supplies, and win a bloodless victory.

SECTION 3.24.3
If the Romans began to retreat because of a shortage of grain, they planned to attack them on the march, when encumbered and carrying their packs and therefore weaker in spirit.

SECTION 3.24.4
The commanders approved this plan, and though the Roman forces had been led out, they remained in their camp.

SECTION 3.24.5
When Crassus saw this, the enemy’s hesitation and apparent fear made our soldiers more eager to fight, and voices were heard everywhere saying that they should wait no longer before advancing on the camp. Crassus encouraged his men and, with everyone eager for battle, marched against the enemy camp.

CHAPTER 3.25

SECTION 3.25.1
There some filled the trenches, while others drove the defenders from the rampart and fortifications by hurling large numbers of missiles. The auxiliaries, in whom Crassus did not place much confidence as fighters, created the appearance and impression that they were taking part in the battle by supplying stones and missiles and carrying blocks of turf to the siege ramp. Meanwhile, the enemy also fought steadily and fearlessly, and the missiles thrown from their higher position did not fall without effect.

SECTION 3.25.2
After riding around the enemy camp, the cavalry reported to Crassus that the camp was not fortified with equal care at the rear gate and that access there was easy.

CHAPTER 3.26

SECTION 3.26.1
Crassus urged the cavalry commanders to inspire their men by promising great rewards, and explained what he wanted done.

SECTION 3.26.2
As ordered, they led out the cohorts that had been left to guard the camp and were still fresh and unworn by exertion. They took them around by a longer route so that they could not be seen from the enemy camp, and, while everyone’s eyes and attention were fixed on the battle, they quickly reached the fortifications already mentioned.

SECTION 3.26.3
They tore them down and entered the enemy camp before they could be clearly seen or the enemy could understand what was happening.

SECTION 3.26.4
Then, when a shout was heard from that quarter, our men renewed their strength, as usually happens when victory is in sight, and began to attack more fiercely.

SECTION 3.26.5
Surrounded on every side and despairing of everything, the enemy tried to throw themselves over the fortifications and seek safety in flight.

SECTION 3.26.6
The cavalry pursued them across completely open country. Of the fifty thousand men known to have assembled from Aquitania and among the Cantabri, scarcely a quarter were left alive when the cavalry returned to camp late at night.

CHAPTER 3.27

SECTION 3.27.1
When news of this battle was received, the greater part of Aquitania surrendered to Crassus and voluntarily sent hostages. Among these peoples were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, and Cocosates.

SECTION 3.27.2
A few remote tribes, relying on the season because winter was approaching, neglected to do so.

CHAPTER 3.28

SECTION 3.28.1
At about the same time, although summer was now nearly over, Caesar led his army against the Morini and Menapii. All the rest of Gaul had been pacified, but they remained under arms and had never sent him envoys to seek peace, so he believed that this war could be quickly concluded. They began to wage war in a completely different manner from the other Gauls.

SECTION 3.28.2
They understood that the greatest nations that had contested the issue in battle had been routed and defeated, and they had vast forests and marshes. They therefore withdrew there with all their possessions.

SECTION 3.28.3
When Caesar reached the edge of these forests and began fortifying his camp, without any enemy having been seen in the meantime, they suddenly burst out of the forest from every direction while our men were scattered at their work and attacked them.

SECTION 3.28.4
Our men quickly took up their weapons, drove them back into the forests, and killed a number of them. They pursued them too far into difficult terrain and lost a few of their own men.

CHAPTER 3.29

SECTION 3.29.1
During the following days Caesar began cutting down the forests. To prevent anyone from attacking the unarmed and unsuspecting soldiers from the flank, he placed all the felled timber facing the enemy and piled it up like a rampart on both sides.

SECTION 3.29.2
Within a few days an astonishingly large area had been cleared with incredible speed. Our men had already seized the enemy’s livestock and the rearmost parts of their baggage, while the enemy themselves were seeking denser forests, when such storms followed that the work necessarily had to be suspended, and the continuous rain made it impossible to keep the soldiers under canvas any longer.

SECTION 3.29.3
Accordingly, after devastating all their fields and burning their villages and buildings, Caesar withdrew his army and stationed it in winter quarters among the Aulerci, Lexovii, and the other states that had most recently made war.

### Book 4

CHAPTER 4.1

SECTION 4.1.1
During the following winter, in the year when Gnaeus Pompey and Marcus Crassus were consuls, the German Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine with a great multitude of people, not far from the sea into which the Rhine flows.

SECTION 4.1.2
Their reason for crossing was that the Suebi had harassed them for several years, oppressed them through warfare, and prevented them from cultivating their land.

SECTION 4.1.3
The nation of the Suebi is by far the largest and most warlike of all the Germans.

SECTION 4.1.4
They are said to have a hundred districts, from each of which they annually lead one thousand armed men out of their territory to wage war. The rest, who remain at home, support themselves and the fighting men.

SECTION 4.1.5
The following year these in turn bear arms, while the others remain at home.

SECTION 4.1.6
In this way, neither agriculture nor the theory and practice of war is interrupted.

SECTION 4.1.7
But among them there is no privately owned or separately allotted land, nor is anyone permitted to remain in one place for more than a year for the purpose of cultivation.

SECTION 4.1.8
They do not live much on grain, but mostly on milk and livestock, and they spend much of their time hunting.

SECTION 4.1.9
This way of life—their diet, daily exercise, and freedom, since from childhood they are accustomed to no duty or discipline and do absolutely nothing against their will—both maintains their strength and makes them people of enormous physical size.

SECTION 4.1.10
They have trained themselves to such habits that even in the coldest regions they wear nothing but skins, which are so small that a large part of the body remains exposed, and they bathe in rivers.

CHAPTER 4.2

SECTION 4.2.1
Merchants are allowed access to them more so that they may have buyers for what they capture in war than because they want anything imported.

SECTION 4.2.2
The Germans do not even use imported draft animals, which the Gauls especially prize and purchase at great expense. Instead, through daily exercise they train the animals bred among them, which are small and unattractive, to have the greatest endurance.

SECTION 4.2.3
In cavalry battles they often leap from their horses and fight on foot. They have trained their horses to remain in the same spot, and when necessary they quickly retreat to them.

SECTION 4.2.4
According to their customs, nothing is considered more shameful or cowardly than using saddles.

SECTION 4.2.5
Consequently, however few they may be, they dare to attack any number of saddled cavalrymen.

SECTION 4.2.6
They do not allow wine to be imported at all, because they believe that it makes men soft and effeminate and less able to endure hardship.

CHAPTER 4.3

SECTION 4.3.1
As a nation, they consider it their greatest glory to have the land around their borders remain uninhabited for as great a distance as possible. They believe that this demonstrates that a great number of states cannot withstand their power.

SECTION 4.3.2
Thus, on one side of the Suebi, the land is said to be uninhabited for about one hundred miles.

SECTION 4.3.3
On the other side live the Ubii, whose state was large and prosperous by German standards. Although they are of the same race, they are somewhat more civilized than the others because their territory reaches the Rhine, merchants frequently visit them, and their proximity to Gaul has accustomed them to Gallic customs.

SECTION 4.3.4
The Suebi had often tested them in many wars but had been unable to drive them from their territory because of the size and importance of their state. Nevertheless, they made them tributaries and reduced them to a much humbler and weaker condition.

CHAPTER 4.4

SECTION 4.4.1
The Usipetes and Tencteri, whom we mentioned above, were in the same situation. For several years they withstood the power of the Suebi,

SECTION 4.4.2
but in the end they were driven from their lands and, after wandering through many parts of Germany for three years, reached the Rhine in regions inhabited by the Menapii. The Menapii had fields, buildings, and villages on both banks of the river.

SECTION 4.4.3
Terrified by the arrival of so great a multitude, however, they had moved out of the buildings they possessed across the river and stationed guards on this side of the Rhine to prevent the Germans from crossing.

SECTION 4.4.4
After trying every possible means, the Germans found that they could neither force a crossing because they lacked boats nor cross secretly because of the Menapii’s guards.

SECTION 4.4.5
They pretended to return to their own homes and regions, marched away for three days, and then turned back. Their cavalry covered the entire return journey in a single night and overwhelmed the Menapii, who were unaware and expecting no attack.

SECTION 4.4.6
The Menapii had been informed of the Germans’ departure by scouts and had fearlessly moved back across the Rhine into their villages.

SECTION 4.4.7
After killing them and seizing their boats, the Germans crossed the river before the part of the Menapii living on this side of the Rhine could learn what had happened. They occupied all their buildings and supported themselves on the Menapii’s provisions for the rest of the winter.

CHAPTER 4.5

SECTION 4.5.1
When Caesar was informed of these events, he feared the fickleness of the Gauls, because they are changeable in forming plans and generally eager for political upheaval, and decided that he should entrust nothing to them.

SECTION 4.5.2
For it is a Gallic custom to compel travelers, even against their will, to stop and to ask what each of them has heard or learned about every matter. In the towns, the common people crowd around merchants and force them to state what regions they come from and what events they have learned about there.

SECTION 4.5.3
Influenced by such reports and hearsay, they often form plans concerning matters of the highest importance, only to be forced to regret them immediately afterward, since they are guided by uncertain rumors and most people give them invented answers designed to please them.

CHAPTER 4.6

SECTION 4.6.1
Knowing this custom, Caesar set out for the army earlier than usual, to avoid having to confront a more serious war.

SECTION 4.6.2
When he arrived there, he learned that what he had suspected would happen had in fact occurred:

SECTION 4.6.3
several states had sent delegations to the Germans, inviting them to leave the Rhine and promising that everything they requested would be made ready for them.

SECTION 4.6.4
Encouraged by this prospect, the Germans were already ranging more widely and had reached the territory of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are dependents of the Treveri.

SECTION 4.6.5
After summoning the Gallic leaders, Caesar decided that he should conceal what he had learned. He soothed and reassured them, ordered them to provide cavalry, and resolved to wage war against the Germans.

CHAPTER 4.7

SECTION 4.7.1
After securing provisions and selecting his cavalrymen, he began marching toward the places where he heard the Germans were located.

SECTION 4.7.2
When he was only a few days’ march from them, delegates came from them and spoke as follows:

SECTION 4.7.3
The Germans did not make war on the Roman people first, but neither did they refuse to fight with weapons if attacked, because the Germans had inherited from their ancestors the custom of resisting anyone who made war on them and never begging for mercy. They had nevertheless come to say that they were in Gaul against their will, driven from their homeland.

SECTION 4.7.4
If the Romans wanted their goodwill, they could be useful friends to them. The Romans should either assign them lands of their own or allow them to retain those they had taken by force of arms.

SECTION 4.7.5
They yielded only to the Suebi, whom not even the immortal gods could equal; as for everyone else on earth, there was no one they could not defeat.

CHAPTER 4.8

SECTION 4.8.1
Caesar gave the reply he thought appropriate, but the conclusion of his statement was that no friendship between him and them was possible if they remained in Gaul;

SECTION 4.8.2
that it was not right for men who had been unable to defend their own territory to seize that of others; and that no lands in Gaul were unoccupied and could be granted, especially to so great a multitude, without wronging others.

SECTION 4.8.3
But, if they wished, they could settle in the territory of the Ubii, whose delegates were then with him complaining about the injuries inflicted by the Suebi and requesting his assistance. He would order the Ubii to accept them.

CHAPTER 4.9

SECTION 4.9.1
The delegates said that they would report this reply to their people and, after deliberating on the matter, return to Caesar on the third day. Meanwhile, they asked him not to move his camp any closer to them.

SECTION 4.9.2
Caesar said that he could not grant even that request.

SECTION 4.9.3
For he had learned that several days before, they had sent a large part of their cavalry across the Meuse to the Ambivariti to plunder and obtain grain. He believed that they were waiting for these cavalrymen and were seeking a delay for that reason.

CHAPTER 4.10

SECTION 4.10.1
[The Meuse rises in the Vosges Mountains, which are in the territory of the Lingones, and, after receiving a branch of the Rhine called the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi and flows into the Atlantic Ocean.

SECTION 4.10.2
No more than eighty miles from the Atlantic, it flows into the Rhine.

SECTION 4.10.3
The Rhine, however, rises in the territory of the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and flows swiftly for a great distance through the territories of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci, and Treveri.

SECTION 4.10.4
As it approaches the Atlantic, it divides into several branches, forming many enormous islands, a large number of which are inhabited by fierce barbarian peoples,

SECTION 4.10.5
including some who are believed to live on fish and birds’ eggs, and it flows into the Atlantic through many mouths.]

CHAPTER 4.11

SECTION 4.11.1
When Caesar was no more than twelve miles from the enemy, their delegates returned to him as agreed. Meeting him on the march, they earnestly begged him not to advance any farther.

SECTION 4.11.2
When they failed to obtain this request, they asked him to send orders ahead to the cavalrymen who had advanced in front of the column and prevent them from fighting, and to give the Germans an opportunity to send delegates to the Ubii.

SECTION 4.11.3
They explained that if the leaders and senate of the Ubii guaranteed their good faith under oath, they would accept the terms offered by Caesar. They asked him to give them three days to settle these matters.

SECTION 4.11.4
Caesar believed that all these requests had the same purpose: to create a three-day delay in which their absent cavalry could return. Nevertheless, he said that he would advance no more than four miles that day in order to obtain water.

SECTION 4.11.5
He told them to assemble there the next day in the greatest possible numbers, so that he could consider their demands.

SECTION 4.11.6
Meanwhile, he sent messengers to the commanders who had gone ahead with all the cavalry, instructing them not to provoke the enemy into battle and, if they themselves were attacked, to hold their ground until he came closer with the army.

CHAPTER 4.12

SECTION 4.12.1
But as soon as the enemy saw our cavalry, which numbered five thousand, although they themselves had no more than eight hundred cavalrymen because those who had gone across the Meuse to obtain grain had not yet returned, they launched an attack and quickly threw our men into confusion. Our men suspected nothing, because the enemy’s delegates had left Caesar only a short time before and had requested a truce for that day.

SECTION 4.12.2
When our men resisted in turn, the Germans followed their usual practice and jumped down to fight on foot. They stabbed several of our horses from below, threw our riders down, put the rest to flight, and drove them on in such terror that they did not stop fleeing until they came within sight of our marching column.

SECTION 4.12.3
Seventy-four of our cavalrymen were killed in that battle.

SECTION 4.12.4
Among them was the exceptionally brave Aquitanian Piso, a man of the highest birth, whose grandfather had held royal power in his state and had been officially named a friend by our Senate.

SECTION 4.12.5
When Piso went to the assistance of his brother, who had been cut off by the enemy, he rescued him from danger. Piso himself was thrown when his horse was wounded, but he resisted with the greatest courage for as long as he could.

SECTION 4.12.6
After he had been surrounded, suffered many wounds, and fallen, his brother, who had already withdrawn from the battle, noticed this from a distance, spurred his horse forward, threw himself upon the enemy, and was killed.

CHAPTER 4.13

SECTION 4.13.1
After this battle, Caesar believed that he should no longer listen to delegates or accept terms from people who had sought peace as a trick and an ambush and then made an unprovoked attack.

SECTION 4.13.2
He judged that it would be the height of madness to wait until the enemy’s forces increased and their cavalry returned.

SECTION 4.13.3
Knowing the fickleness of the Gauls, he understood how much prestige the enemy had already gained among them through this single battle, and he believed that they should be given no time to form plans.

SECTION 4.13.4
After making these decisions and sharing his plan with his staff officers and quaestor, so that he would not let any opportunity for battle pass, an extremely favorable event occurred. On the morning of the following day, employing the same treachery and deception, the Germans came in great numbers to his camp, bringing all their leaders and elders with them.

SECTION 4.13.5
Their purpose, as they claimed, was partly to clear themselves of blame for having engaged in battle the day before, contrary to what had been said and to what they themselves had requested, and partly, if they could, to obtain a truce by deception.

SECTION 4.13.6
Caesar was pleased that they had placed themselves in his hands and ordered them detained. He then led all his forces out of camp and ordered the cavalry, which he believed had been badly frightened by the recent battle, to follow behind the column.

CHAPTER 4.14

SECTION 4.14.1
He formed his army in three lines and, after rapidly completing an eight-mile march, reached the enemy’s camp before the Germans could realize what was happening.

SECTION 4.14.2
Terrified by everything at once—by the speed of our arrival and by the absence of their leaders—and given no time either to form a plan or to take up arms, they were thrown into confusion over whether it would be better to lead their forces against the enemy, defend the camp, or seek safety in flight.

SECTION 4.14.3
When their fear became evident in their shouting and frantic rushing about, our soldiers, enraged by the treachery of the previous day, burst into the camp.

SECTION 4.14.4
There, those who had been able to take up arms quickly resisted our men for a short time and fought among the wagons and baggage.

SECTION 4.14.5
But the rest of the population, including the children and women—for they had left their homeland and crossed the Rhine with all their families—began to flee in every direction. Caesar sent the cavalry to pursue them.

CHAPTER 4.15

SECTION 4.15.1
When the Germans heard shouting behind them and saw their people being killed, they threw away their weapons, abandoned their military standards, and rushed out of the camp.

SECTION 4.15.2
When they reached the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine and despaired of escaping any farther, a great number were killed. The rest threw themselves into the river and perished there, overcome by fear, exhaustion, and the force of the current.

SECTION 4.15.3
Our men, every one of them safe and only a very few wounded, returned to camp freed from the fear of so great a war, although the enemy’s total population had numbered 430,000.

SECTION 4.15.4
Caesar gave those whom he had detained in camp permission to leave.

SECTION 4.15.5
Fearing punishment and torture at the hands of the Gauls whose lands they had devastated, they said that they wished to remain with him. Caesar granted them their freedom.

CHAPTER 4.16

SECTION 4.16.1
After the German war was concluded, Caesar decided for many reasons that he had to cross the Rhine. The strongest of these was that, since he saw how easily the Germans could be induced to enter Gaul, he wanted them to fear for their own possessions as well, when they understood that an army of the Roman people both could and would dare to cross the Rhine.

SECTION 4.16.2
Another consideration was that the part of the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri which, as I mentioned above, had crossed the Meuse to plunder and obtain grain and had not taken part in the battle, had retreated after the flight of their people across the Rhine into the territory of the Sugambri and had joined them.

SECTION 4.16.3
Caesar sent messengers to the Sugambri demanding that they surrender to him those who had made war on him and on Gaul. They replied:

SECTION 4.16.4
“The Rhine marks the limit of the Roman people’s rule. If Caesar thinks it unjust for Germans to cross into Gaul against his wishes, why does he claim any rule or authority beyond the Rhine?”

SECTION 4.16.5
The Ubii, however, who alone among the peoples across the Rhine had sent delegates to Caesar, established friendship with him, and given hostages, urgently begged him to assist them because they were being severely oppressed by the Suebi.

SECTION 4.16.6
Or, if the affairs of the Republic prevented him from doing so, they asked him merely to transport his army across the Rhine. That would be enough to help them and give them hope for the future.

SECTION 4.16.7
They said that, after the defeat of Ariovistus and this latest battle, the fame and reputation of Caesar’s army were so great, even among the most distant German peoples, that the Ubii could remain safe through the prestige and friendship of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.16.8
They promised a large number of boats for transporting the army.

CHAPTER 4.17

SECTION 4.17.1
For the reasons I have mentioned, Caesar had decided to cross the Rhine. But he believed that crossing in boats would not be sufficiently safe and considered it inconsistent with both his own dignity and that of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.17.2
Therefore, although the width, swiftness, and depth of the river presented the greatest difficulty in building a bridge, he nevertheless believed that he must make the attempt or else not take the army across at all.

SECTION 4.17.3
He designed the bridge as follows. He joined pairs of timbers, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened slightly at the lower end and cut to match the depth of the river, fastening them two feet apart.

SECTION 4.17.4
He had these pairs lowered into the river by machinery, planted in the riverbed, and driven in with pile drivers—not straight down vertically like ordinary pilings, but slanting forward at an incline, so that they leaned in the direction of the current.

SECTION 4.17.5
Opposite each pair, forty feet downstream, he placed two more timbers joined in the same way, angled against the force and impact of the current.

SECTION 4.17.6
The two pairs were held apart by beams two feet thick inserted across their tops, matching the distance between the joined timbers, and were secured by two clamps, one on each side, at the outer ends.

SECTION 4.17.7
With the pairs held apart and fastened in opposite directions, the structure had such strength, and its design was such, that the greater the force with which the water drove against it, the more tightly its components were locked together.

SECTION 4.17.8
These supports were connected by laying timbers lengthwise across them, and these were covered with poles and wickerwork.

SECTION 4.17.9
In addition, pilings were driven obliquely into the riverbed downstream. These were set beneath the bridge like buttresses and connected with the entire structure so that they would absorb the force of the current.

SECTION 4.17.10
Other pilings were likewise driven a moderate distance upstream from the bridge, so that if the barbarians sent tree trunks or boats downstream to demolish the structure, these defenses would lessen the force of such objects and prevent them from damaging the bridge.

CHAPTER 4.18

SECTION 4.18.1
Within ten days from the time the gathering of timber began, the entire structure was completed and the army was taken across.

SECTION 4.18.2
Caesar left strong guards at both ends of the bridge and hurried into the territory of the Sugambri.

SECTION 4.18.3
Meanwhile, delegates came to him from several states. When they asked for peace and friendship, he answered them generously and ordered them to bring him hostages.

SECTION 4.18.4
But from the moment construction of the bridge began, the Sugambri had prepared to flee. At the urging of the Tencteri and Usipetes whom they had among them, they had left their territory, carried away all their possessions, and hidden themselves in the wilderness and forests.

CHAPTER 4.19

SECTION 4.19.1
Caesar remained in their territory for a few days, burned all their villages and buildings, cut down their grain, and then withdrew into the territory of the Ubii. He promised them his assistance if they were oppressed by the Suebi and learned the following from them:

SECTION 4.19.2
After the Suebi learned from scouts that a bridge was being built, they held a council according to their custom and sent messengers in every direction, ordering the people to leave their towns, place their children, wives, and all their possessions in the forests, and have every man capable of bearing arms assemble in one place.

SECTION 4.19.3
The place selected was approximately at the center of the regions occupied by the Suebi. There they had decided to await the Romans’ arrival and fight a decisive battle.

SECTION 4.19.4
When Caesar learned this, having accomplished everything for which he had decided to lead his army across—to strike fear into the Germans, punish the Sugambri, and free the Ubii from siege—and having spent a total of eighteen days across the Rhine, he considered that he had achieved enough for both honor and practical advantage. He therefore withdrew into Gaul and destroyed the bridge.

CHAPTER 4.20

SECTION 4.20.1
Although only a small part of the summer remained, and although winters come early in these regions because all Gaul lies toward the north, Caesar nevertheless made determined preparations to set out for Britain, because he understood that in nearly all the Gallic wars assistance had been supplied to our enemies from there.

SECTION 4.20.2
Even if there were not enough time left in the year to conduct a war, he still thought it would be of great use to him if he merely visited the island, observed what kind of people lived there, and learned about the terrain, harbors, and approaches—all of which were almost entirely unknown to the Gauls.

SECTION 4.20.3
For hardly anyone except merchants goes there without good reason, and even they know nothing beyond the seacoast and the regions facing Gaul.

SECTION 4.20.4
Accordingly, he summoned merchants from every quarter, but he could not discover how large the island was, what peoples inhabited it or how numerous they were, what experience they had in warfare or what customs they followed, or which harbors were suitable for a large number of ships.

CHAPTER 4.21

SECTION 4.21.1
To learn these things before taking the risk himself, Caesar considered Gaius Volusenus a suitable man and sent him ahead in a warship.

SECTION 4.21.2
He instructed him to investigate everything and return to him as quickly as possible.

SECTION 4.21.3
Caesar himself set out with all his forces for the territory of the Morini, because the crossing from there to Britain was the shortest.

SECTION 4.21.4
He ordered ships from all the neighboring regions to assemble there from every direction, along with the fleet he had built the previous summer for the war against the Veneti.

SECTION 4.21.5
Meanwhile, after his plan became known and was reported to the Britons by merchants, envoys came to him from several states of the island, promising to give hostages and submit to the authority of the Roman people.

SECTION 4.21.6
After hearing them, Caesar made generous promises and urged them to remain of that mind.

SECTION 4.21.7
He sent them home and dispatched Commius with them. After defeating the Atrebates, Caesar himself had appointed Commius king over them; he approved of his courage and judgment, believed him loyal to himself, and knew that his authority was highly regarded in those regions.

SECTION 4.21.8
He ordered Commius to visit as many states as he could, urge them to place themselves under the protection of the Roman people, and announce that Caesar would soon arrive there.

SECTION 4.21.9
Volusenus surveyed all the regions as far as he had the opportunity, since he did not dare leave his ship and entrust himself to the barbarians. On the fifth day he returned to Caesar and reported what he had observed there.

CHAPTER 4.22

SECTION 4.22.1
While Caesar remained in that area to prepare the ships, envoys came to him from a large part of the Morini. They offered excuses for their conduct in the recent past, saying that, as barbarous people unfamiliar with our customs, they had made war on the Roman people, and they promised to do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 4.22.2
Caesar considered their arrival quite timely, because he did not want to leave an enemy behind him, had no opportunity to wage war because of the season, and did not think that dealing with such minor matters should take precedence over Britain. He demanded a large number of hostages from them.

SECTION 4.22.3
When the hostages were brought, he accepted the Morini under his protection. After gathering and assembling about eighty transports, as many as he considered sufficient to carry two legions across, he distributed the warships he had in addition among his quaestor, legates, and prefects.

SECTION 4.22.4
There were also eighteen transports that were being prevented by the wind from reaching the same harbor from a place eight miles away. These he assigned to the cavalry.

SECTION 4.22.5
He placed the rest of the army under his legates Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta, with orders to lead it against the Menapii and those districts of the Morini from which no envoys had come to him.

SECTION 4.22.6
He ordered his legate Sulpicius Rufus to hold the harbor with the garrison he considered sufficient.

CHAPTER 4.23

SECTION 4.23.1
After making these arrangements, Caesar found weather suitable for sailing and put to sea at about the third watch. He ordered the cavalry to proceed to the farther harbor, board their ships, and follow him.

SECTION 4.23.2
Because they carried this out somewhat slowly, Caesar himself reached Britain with the leading ships at about the fourth hour of the day and saw the enemy’s armed forces drawn up on all the hills there.

SECTION 4.23.3
The nature of the place was such, and the sea was so closely confined by steep hills, that a weapon could be hurled from the higher ground onto the shore.

SECTION 4.23.4
Considering this place completely unsuitable for landing, he waited at anchor until the ninth hour for the remaining ships to assemble there.

SECTION 4.23.5
Meanwhile, he summoned his legates and military tribunes, explained what he had learned from Volusenus and what he wanted done, and warned them that, as military practice—and especially naval operations—required, since conditions at sea involved rapid and unstable movement, they must carry out every action at his signal and at the proper moment.

SECTION 4.23.6
After dismissing them, Caesar took advantage of a favorable wind and tide occurring at the same time. He gave the signal, raised anchor, advanced about seven miles from that place, and stationed his ships off an open, level beach.

CHAPTER 4.24

SECTION 4.24.1
But the barbarians, understanding the Romans’ plan, sent their cavalry and chariot fighters ahead—the kind of force they generally used in battle—and followed with the rest of their troops, preventing our men from disembarking from the ships.

SECTION 4.24.2
The difficulty was extreme for these reasons: because of their size, the ships could not be stationed except in deep water, while the soldiers, in unfamiliar surroundings, with their hands encumbered and weighed down by the great, heavy burden of their armor, had to jump down from the ships, keep their footing in the waves, and fight the enemy all at the same time.

SECTION 4.24.3
The enemy, meanwhile, either stood on dry ground or advanced only a short distance into the water. With all their limbs unencumbered and in terrain completely familiar to them, they boldly hurled their weapons and spurred forward horses accustomed to such conditions.

SECTION 4.24.4
Terrified by these circumstances and completely inexperienced in this kind of fighting, our men did not display the same energy and enthusiasm they usually showed in battles on land.

CHAPTER 4.25

SECTION 4.25.1
When Caesar noticed this, he ordered the warships, whose appearance was more unfamiliar to the barbarians and whose maneuverability made them better suited for the purpose, to move a short distance away from the transports, be driven forward by their oars, and take up positions against the enemy’s exposed flank. From there the enemy was to be driven back and dislodged with slings, arrows, and artillery. This was of great assistance to our men.

SECTION 4.25.2
For the barbarians, alarmed by the shape of the ships, the movement of the oars, and the unfamiliar kind of artillery, halted and drew back only a little.

SECTION 4.25.3
While our soldiers were hesitating, chiefly because of the depth of the water, the man who carried the eagle of the Tenth Legion called upon the gods to make his action turn out successfully for the legion. “Jump down, soldiers,” he said, “unless you want to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, at least, will have done my duty to the republic and to my commander.”

SECTION 4.25.4
After saying this in a loud voice, he threw himself from the ship and began carrying the eagle toward the enemy.

SECTION 4.25.5
Then our men urged one another not to allow so great a disgrace, and all jumped down from the ship.

SECTION 4.25.6
When the soldiers in the nearest ships saw them, the first among them followed and advanced toward the enemy.

CHAPTER 4.26

SECTION 4.26.1
Both sides fought fiercely. Our men, however, were greatly disordered because they could neither keep their ranks, maintain a firm footing, nor follow their own standards; instead, each man joined whatever standard he happened to encounter after leaving his particular ship.

SECTION 4.26.2
The enemy, by contrast, knew all the shallows, and whenever they saw individuals leaving a ship separately, they spurred their horses forward and attacked them while they were encumbered.

SECTION 4.26.3
Many surrounded a few, while others hurled weapons against the whole body of our men from their exposed flank.

SECTION 4.26.4
When Caesar noticed this, he ordered the boats belonging to the warships, as well as the scout vessels, to be filled with soldiers, and sent reinforcements to those he saw in difficulty.

SECTION 4.26.5
As soon as our men gained a firm position on dry ground and all their comrades had joined them, they charged the enemy and put them to flight. They could not pursue them any farther, however, because the cavalry had been unable to maintain its course and reach the island. This alone was lacking from Caesar’s customary good fortune.

CHAPTER 4.27

SECTION 4.27.1
After being defeated in battle, the enemy, as soon as they recovered from their flight, immediately sent envoys to Caesar to seek peace. They promised to give hostages and do whatever he commanded.

SECTION 4.27.2
Commius the Atrebate came with these envoys—the man I explained above had been sent ahead to Britain by Caesar.

SECTION 4.27.3
When Commius disembarked and delivered Caesar’s instructions to them in the capacity of an envoy, they had seized him and put him in chains.

SECTION 4.27.4
After the battle, they released him. In seeking peace, they blamed the general population for this act and asked to be pardoned because of their ignorance.

SECTION 4.27.5
Caesar complained that, although they had voluntarily sent envoys to the mainland to ask him for peace, they had made war without cause. He said that he would pardon their ignorance and demanded hostages.

SECTION 4.27.6
They gave some of these at once and said that they would send for the rest from more distant places and deliver them within a few days.

SECTION 4.27.7
Meanwhile, they ordered their people to return to their farms, and their leading men began assembling from every direction and entrusting themselves and their states to Caesar.

CHAPTER 4.28

SECTION 4.28.1
With peace established by these actions, on the fourth day after the arrival in Britain, the eighteen ships mentioned above, which had taken the cavalry aboard, put to sea from the farther harbor in a gentle wind.

SECTION 4.28.2
As they approached Britain and came into view from the camp, so violent a storm suddenly arose that none of them could maintain its course. Some were carried back to the same place from which they had departed, while others were driven, at great danger to themselves, toward the lower part of the island, which lies closer to the setting sun.

SECTION 4.28.3
Although they dropped anchor, the ships began filling with water from the waves. They were therefore forced to put out to sea during the adverse night and make for the mainland.

CHAPTER 4.29

SECTION 4.29.1
That same night there was a full moon, the phase that usually produces the highest ocean tides, a fact unknown to our men.

SECTION 4.29.2
Thus, at the same time, the tide flooded the warships [in which Caesar had arranged for the army to be transported], which Caesar had hauled onto dry land, while the storm battered the transports that were secured at anchor. Our men had no opportunity either to handle the ships or to assist them.

SECTION 4.29.3
Several ships were wrecked, and the rest, having lost their ropes, anchors, and other equipment, were unfit for sailing. As was inevitable, this caused great alarm throughout the entire army.

SECTION 4.29.4
There were no other ships in which they could be carried back, everything needed to repair the ships was lacking, and because everyone knew that they had to winter in Gaul, no grain had been provided in that region for the winter.

CHAPTER 4.30

SECTION 4.30.1
When the leading men of Britain who had come to Caesar after the battle learned of these circumstances, they conferred among themselves. They understood that the Romans had no cavalry, ships, or grain, and they recognized the small number of soldiers from the limited size of the camp, which was even smaller because Caesar had transported the legions without baggage.

SECTION 4.30.2
They concluded that the best course was to renew the rebellion, prevent our men from obtaining grain and other supplies, and prolong the affair into the winter, because they were confident that, if this force were defeated or prevented from returning, no one would afterward cross into Britain to make war.

SECTION 4.30.3
Accordingly, they formed another conspiracy and began gradually leaving the camp and secretly bringing their people in from the countryside.

CHAPTER 4.31

SECTION 4.31.1
Although Caesar did not yet know their plans, he nevertheless suspected, both from the fate of his ships and from the fact that they had stopped delivering hostages, that what did happen was going to happen.

SECTION 4.31.2
He therefore prepared safeguards against every possibility. Each day he brought grain from the countryside into the camp, used the timber and bronze from the ships that had been most seriously damaged to repair the others, and ordered the materials needed for this work to be brought over from the mainland.

SECTION 4.31.3
Accordingly, because the soldiers carried out the work with the greatest effort, he lost twelve ships but made the others sufficiently seaworthy for reasonably convenient navigation.

CHAPTER 4.32

SECTION 4.32.1
While this work was being done, one legion, called the Seventh, was sent out as usual to gather grain. Up to that time there had been no suspicion of war: some of the people remained in the countryside, while others continued visiting the camp. The men stationed on guard before the camp gates reported to Caesar that an unusually large cloud of dust could be seen in the direction in which the legion had marched.

SECTION 4.32.2
Caesar suspected—correctly—that the barbarians had begun some new plan. He ordered the cohorts on guard to set out with him in that direction, two of the remaining cohorts to take their place on guard, and the rest to arm themselves and follow him immediately.

SECTION 4.32.3
When he had advanced a little distance from the camp, he saw that our men were being hard-pressed by the enemy and were barely holding out, and that, with the legion packed tightly together, weapons were being hurled at it from every direction.

SECTION 4.32.4
Since all the grain in the other areas had been harvested and only one section remained, the enemy, suspecting that our men would come there, had hidden in the woods during the night.

SECTION 4.32.5
They then made a sudden attack on our men while they were scattered, had laid down their weapons, and were occupied with reaping. After killing a few, they threw the rest into disorder before they could form definite ranks, while at the same time surrounding them with cavalry and chariots.

CHAPTER 4.33

SECTION 4.33.1
This is their method of fighting from chariots. First they drive in every direction, hurling weapons, and generally disrupt the ranks by the very terror inspired by the horses and by the noise of the wheels. Once they have worked their way in among the cavalry squadrons, they leap down from their chariots and fight on foot.

SECTION 4.33.2
Meanwhile, the drivers gradually withdraw from the battle and position their chariots so that, if the fighters are hard-pressed by a large number of enemies, they have an unobstructed retreat to their own men.

SECTION 4.33.3
Thus in battle they combine the mobility of cavalry with the steadiness of infantry. Through daily experience and training they acquire such skill that, even on a sloping and precipitous site, they can check their horses at full gallop, control and turn them in a short distance, run along the chariot pole, stand on the yoke, and then return from there to their chariots with the greatest speed.

CHAPTER 4.34

SECTION 4.34.1
While our men were disordered by these circumstances [and by the unfamiliar kind of fighting], Caesar brought assistance at the most opportune moment. At his arrival the enemy halted, and our men recovered from their fear.

SECTION 4.34.2
After this, Caesar considered the time unsuitable for provoking the enemy and beginning a battle, so he held his position and, after a short interval, led the legions back to camp.

SECTION 4.34.3
While this was taking place and all our men were occupied, the rest of the enemy who were in the fields withdrew.

SECTION 4.34.4
Several days of storms followed without interruption, keeping our men in camp and preventing the enemy from fighting.

SECTION 4.34.5
Meanwhile, the barbarians sent messengers in every direction, proclaimed to their people how few our soldiers were, and showed them what an opportunity they had to obtain plunder and free themselves forever if they drove the Romans from their camp. In this way they quickly assembled a large force of infantry and cavalry and came to the camp.

CHAPTER 4.35

SECTION 4.35.1
Although Caesar foresaw that the same thing would happen as on the preceding days—that if the enemy were driven back, they would escape danger by their speed—he nevertheless formed the legions in battle line before the camp, having obtained about thirty cavalrymen whom Commius the Atrebatian, mentioned above, had brought across with him.

SECTION 4.35.2
When battle was joined, the enemy could not withstand the attack of our soldiers for long and turned and fled.

SECTION 4.35.3
Our men pursued them as far as their speed and strength allowed and killed many of them. Then, after setting fire to every building over a wide area, they returned to camp.

CHAPTER 4.36

SECTION 4.36.1
That same day, envoys sent by the enemy came to Caesar to ask for peace.

SECTION 4.36.2
Caesar doubled the number of hostages he had previously demanded from them and ordered them to be brought to the mainland, because the day of the equinox was near and he did not think that his damaged ships should be exposed to winter sailing.

SECTION 4.36.3
When he obtained suitable weather, he himself set sail shortly after midnight,

SECTION 4.36.4
and all the ships reached the mainland safely. Two of the transports, however, could not make the same harbors as the others and were carried a little farther down the coast.

CHAPTER 4.37

SECTION 4.37.1
About three hundred soldiers disembarked from these ships and were making for the camp when the Morini, whom Caesar had left at peace when he departed for Britain, were drawn by the hope of plunder. At first, they surrounded the soldiers with a force of their own that was not very large and ordered them to lay down their arms if they did not want to be killed.

SECTION 4.37.2
When the soldiers formed a circle and defended themselves, about six thousand men quickly gathered at the shouting. When this was reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry from the camp to assist his men.

SECTION 4.37.3
Meanwhile, our soldiers withstood the enemy’s attack and fought with the greatest courage for more than four hours. They suffered only a few wounds and killed many of the enemy.

SECTION 4.37.4
But when our cavalry came into sight, the enemy threw down their weapons, turned and fled, and a great number of them were killed.

CHAPTER 4.38

SECTION 4.38.1
The next day Caesar sent his lieutenant Titus Labienus, with the legions he had brought back from Britain, against the Morini who had rebelled.

SECTION 4.38.2
Because the marshes had dried up, the Morini had no place to retreat to—the refuge they had used the previous year—and almost all of them fell into Labienus’s power.

SECTION 4.38.3
But the lieutenants Quintus Titurius and Lucius Cotta, who had led their legions into the territory of the Menapii, returned to Caesar after ravaging all their fields, cutting down their grain, and burning their buildings, since the Menapii had all hidden themselves in the densest forests.

SECTION 4.38.4
Caesar established the winter quarters of all the legions among the Belgae. Only two states in Britain sent hostages there; the rest failed to do so.

SECTION 4.38.5
After these achievements, the Senate, upon receiving Caesar’s dispatch, decreed a public thanksgiving of twenty days.

### Book 5

CHAPTER 5.1

SECTION 5.1.1
In the consulship of Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius, Caesar left winter quarters for Italy, as he had made a practice of doing every year. He ordered the lieutenants whom he had placed in command of the legions to see that as many ships as possible were built during the winter and that the old ones were repaired. He specified their dimensions and design.

SECTION 5.1.2
To make loading and hauling ashore faster, he had them built somewhat lower than the ships we normally use on our own sea. He did this all the more because he had learned that the frequent changes of the tides made the waves there less high. To carry cargo and large numbers of draft animals, he had them built somewhat broader than the ships we use on other seas.

SECTION 5.1.3
He ordered all of them to be built for sailing and rowing, a purpose for which their low profile was a great advantage.

SECTION 5.1.4
He ordered the equipment needed to outfit the ships to be brought from Spain.

SECTION 5.1.5
After completing his judicial sessions in Cisalpine Gaul, he himself left for Illyricum because he heard that the Pirustae were raiding and ravaging a neighboring part of the province.

SECTION 5.1.6
When he arrived there, he ordered the states to provide soldiers and directed them to assemble at a specified place.

SECTION 5.1.7
When this was reported to them, the Pirustae sent envoys to tell him that none of these acts had been committed by public decision, and they declared that they were ready to make full compensation for the injuries by every means.

SECTION 5.1.8
After hearing their statement, Caesar demanded hostages and ordered them to be brought by a specified day. He informed them that unless they did so, he would wage war against their state.

SECTION 5.1.9
When the hostages were brought on the appointed day as he had ordered, he appointed arbitrators between the states to assess the damages and determine the penalty.

CHAPTER 5.2

SECTION 5.2.1
After settling these matters and completing his judicial sessions, he returned to Cisalpine Gaul and from there departed for the army.

SECTION 5.2.2
When he arrived, he toured all the winter quarters and found that, through the extraordinary zeal of the soldiers and despite an extreme shortage of all supplies, about six hundred ships of the kind described above and twenty-eight warships had been fully equipped and were not far from being ready to launch within a few days.

SECTION 5.2.3
After warmly praising the soldiers and those who had supervised the work, he explained what he wanted done and ordered everyone to assemble at Portus Itius, from which he had learned that the crossing to Britain was most convenient, a passage of about thirty miles from the mainland. He left behind as many soldiers as seemed sufficient for this task;

SECTION 5.2.4
he himself set out for the territory of the Treveri with four lightly equipped legions and eight hundred cavalry, because they neither attended the councils nor obeyed his authority and were said to be soliciting the Germans across the Rhine.

CHAPTER 5.3

SECTION 5.3.1
This state has by far the strongest cavalry in all Gaul, possesses large infantry forces, and borders the Rhine, as we explained above.

SECTION 5.3.2
In that state, two men, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were competing with each other for supremacy.

SECTION 5.3.3
One of them, as soon as Caesar’s approach with the legions became known, came to him and assured him that he and all his people would remain loyal and would not abandon their friendship with the Roman people. He also informed Caesar of what was taking place among the Treveri.

SECTION 5.3.4
Indutiomarus, however, began assembling cavalry and infantry and preparing for war. He concealed in the Ardennes Forest those who were too old or too young to bear arms. This forest is immense and extends through the middle of the territory of the Treveri from the Rhine to the borders of the Remi.

SECTION 5.3.5
But afterward, when several leading men of that state, influenced by their friendship with Cingetorix and alarmed by the arrival of our army, came to Caesar and began making personal requests of him concerning their own affairs, since they could not provide for the welfare of their state, Indutiomarus, fearing that everyone would desert him, sent envoys to Caesar:

SECTION 5.3.6
he had refused to leave his people and come to Caesar so that he could more easily keep the state loyal and prevent the common people, through their lack of judgment, from going astray when all the nobles had departed;

SECTION 5.3.7
the state was therefore under his control, and, if Caesar permitted it, he would come to him in camp and entrust his own fortunes and those of his state to Caesar’s protection.

CHAPTER 5.4

SECTION 5.4.1
Although Caesar understood why these statements were being made and what circumstance was deterring Indutiomarus from his original plan, he did not want to be forced to spend the summer among the Treveri when all preparations had been made for the war in Britain. He therefore ordered Indutiomarus to come to him with two hundred hostages.

SECTION 5.4.2
When these were brought, including his son and all his relatives, whom Caesar had summoned by name, Caesar reassured Indutiomarus and urged him to remain loyal.

SECTION 5.4.3
Nevertheless, Caesar summoned the leading men of the Treveri and individually reconciled them with Cingetorix. He understood that Cingetorix’s conduct deserved this treatment from him, and he also considered it highly important that the influence among his own people of a man whose exceptional goodwill toward Caesar he had recognized should become as great as possible.

SECTION 5.4.4
Indutiomarus deeply resented this action because it diminished his influence among his own people. Though he had already been hostile toward us, this humiliation made his resentment flare up much more fiercely.

CHAPTER 5.5

SECTION 5.5.1
After settling these matters, Caesar reached Portus Itius with the legions.

SECTION 5.5.2
There he learned that sixty ships built in the territory of the Meldi had been driven back by a storm, had been unable to hold their course, and had returned to the place from which they had departed. He found the rest ready to sail and fully equipped with everything necessary.

SECTION 5.5.3
The cavalry of all Gaul, numbering four thousand, assembled there as well, together with the leading men from every state.

SECTION 5.5.4
Caesar had decided to leave in Gaul only a very few whose loyalty toward him he had verified, and to take the rest with him as hostages, because he feared an uprising in Gaul while he was away.

CHAPTER 5.6

SECTION 5.6.1
Among the others was the Aeduan Dumnorix, whom we have mentioned before. Caesar was especially determined to take him along because he knew that Dumnorix was eager for revolution, eager for power, bold in spirit, and highly influential among the Gauls.

SECTION 5.6.2
There was the additional fact that Dumnorix had said in the council of the Aedui that Caesar was offering him the kingship of the state. The Aedui bitterly resented this statement, but did not dare send envoys to Caesar to object or appeal against it.

SECTION 5.6.3
Caesar had learned of this from his own guest-friends among them. At first Dumnorix urgently begged in every possible way to be left in Gaul, partly because he was unaccustomed to sailing and feared the sea, and partly because, as he claimed, religious obligations prevented him from going.

SECTION 5.6.4
After he saw that his request was being firmly refused and all hope of obtaining it had been taken away, he began to solicit the leading men of Gaul, take them aside one by one, and urge them to remain on the mainland.

SECTION 5.6.5
He tried to frighten them by saying that it was not without reason that Gaul was being stripped of its entire nobility; that Caesar’s plan was to transport to Britain and kill all those whom he was afraid to execute in full view of Gaul.

SECTION 5.6.6
He pledged his word to the others and demanded an oath from them that they would jointly carry out whatever they judged to be in Gaul’s interest. Many people reported these activities to Caesar.

CHAPTER 5.7

SECTION 5.7.1
When Caesar learned of this, because he attached such great importance to the standing of the Aeduan state, he decided that Dumnorix must be restrained and deterred by any means available.

SECTION 5.7.2
Since he saw that Dumnorix’s recklessness was going too far, he believed precautions must be taken to prevent him from harming Caesar himself or the Republic. Caesar therefore remained in that place for about twenty-five days,

SECTION 5.7.3
because the northwest wind, which usually blows in this region for a large part of the time, was preventing the voyage. He made every effort to keep Dumnorix loyal, while nevertheless continuing to learn of all his plans.

SECTION 5.7.4
At last, when he obtained suitable weather, he ordered the soldiers and cavalry to board the ships.

SECTION 5.7.5
But while everyone was preoccupied, Dumnorix left the camp with the Aeduan cavalry and began making his way home without Caesar’s knowledge.

SECTION 5.7.6
When this was reported, Caesar halted the departure, set everything else aside, and sent a large part of the cavalry in pursuit of Dumnorix, ordering them to bring him back.

SECTION 5.7.7
He ordered them to kill Dumnorix if he used force and refused to obey, judging that a man who had disregarded his command while he was present would do nothing rational while he was away.

SECTION 5.7.8
When called back, Dumnorix began to resist, defend himself by force, and appeal to his followers to keep faith with him, repeatedly shouting that he was a free man and belonged to a free state.

SECTION 5.7.9
As they had been ordered, the cavalry surrounded and killed him. All the Aeduan cavalry then returned to Caesar.

CHAPTER 5.8

SECTION 5.8.1
After this was done, Caesar left Labienus on the mainland with three legions and two thousand cavalry to defend the harbors, secure the grain supply, learn what was happening in Gaul, and make decisions according to the circumstances and the situation.

SECTION 5.8.2
Caesar himself set sail at sunset with five legions and the same number of cavalry as he had left on the mainland. Carried forward by a gentle southwest wind, he failed to hold his course when the wind died around midnight. Swept too far by the tide, at daybreak he saw that he had left Britain behind on his left.

SECTION 5.8.3
Then, following the tide as it reversed, he pressed forward under oars to reach the part of the island where he had learned the previous summer that landing was best.

SECTION 5.8.4
In this effort, the soldiers’ courage was especially deserving of praise: without pausing in their labor at the oars, they made the transports and heavily laden vessels match the speed of the warships.

SECTION 5.8.5
All the ships reached Britain at about noon, and no enemy was seen at that place.

SECTION 5.8.6
But, as Caesar later learned from prisoners, although large forces had assembled there, they had been frightened by the great number of ships. More than eight hundred vessels, including those from the previous year and the privately owned ships that individuals had built for their own convenience, had appeared there at one time. The enemy had therefore withdrawn from the shore and concealed themselves on higher ground.

CHAPTER 5.9

SECTION 5.9.1
Caesar disembarked the army and selected a suitable site for the camp. When he learned from prisoners where the enemy’s forces had taken position, he left ten cohorts and three hundred cavalry by the sea to guard the ships and marched against the enemy during the third watch. He was less concerned about the ships because he was leaving them tied at anchor on a soft, open beach,

SECTION 5.9.2
and he placed Quintus Atrius in command of the guard for the ships. Advancing by night for about twelve miles, Caesar sighted the enemy’s forces.

SECTION 5.9.3
The enemy advanced to the river with cavalry and chariots and, from higher ground, began trying to block our men and engaging them in battle.

SECTION 5.9.4
Driven back by our cavalry, they concealed themselves in the woods, where they had found a place exceptionally well fortified both by nature and by construction. They appeared to have prepared it earlier for use in a war among themselves,

SECTION 5.9.5
for all the entrances had been blocked by felling trees at close intervals.

SECTION 5.9.6
Scattered individuals fought from the woods and prevented our men from entering the defenses.

SECTION 5.9.7
But the soldiers of the Seventh Legion formed a tortoise, built a ramp against the fortifications, and captured the position. They drove the enemy from the woods while suffering only a few wounds.

SECTION 5.9.8
Caesar, however, forbade his men to pursue the fugitives very far, both because he did not know the terrain and because much of the day had been spent and he wanted to leave time for fortifying the camp.

CHAPTER 5.10

SECTION 5.10.1
Early the next morning, he sent the infantry and cavalry out in three divisions to pursue those who had fled.

SECTION 5.10.2
After they had advanced some distance, when the rear of the column was still in sight, cavalrymen came to Caesar from Quintus Atrius to report that a tremendous storm had arisen the previous night and that almost all the ships had been damaged and cast ashore, because neither the anchors nor the cables had held, and the sailors and helmsmen had been unable to withstand the force of the storm;

SECTION 5.10.3
and so the ships’ collisions with one another had caused extensive damage.

CHAPTER 5.11

SECTION 5.11.1
When Caesar learned of these events, he ordered the legions and cavalry to be recalled and to halt on the march, while he himself returned to the ships;

SECTION 5.11.2
there he saw in person almost exactly what he had learned from the messengers and dispatches: about forty ships had been lost, but it appeared that the rest could still be repaired, though only with great difficulty.

SECTION 5.11.3
He therefore selected craftsmen from the legions and ordered others to be summoned from the mainland;

SECTION 5.11.4
he wrote to Labienus instructing him to build as many ships as he could with the legions under his command.

SECTION 5.11.5
For his own part, although the undertaking required a great deal of effort and labor, he decided that the best course was to haul all the ships ashore and connect them with the camp inside a single fortification.

SECTION 5.11.6
He spent about ten days on these operations, without interrupting the soldiers’ work even at night.

SECTION 5.11.7
After the ships had been hauled ashore and the camp had been exceptionally well fortified, he left the same forces as before to guard the ships and set out himself for the place from which he had returned.

SECTION 5.11.8
When he arrived there, larger British forces had already assembled at that place from every direction, and by common agreement supreme command and direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose territory is separated from the coastal states by a river called the Thames, about eighty miles from the sea.

SECTION 5.11.9
In earlier times Cassivellaunus had been continually at war with the other states, but the Britons, alarmed by our arrival, had placed him in command of the entire war and all their forces.

CHAPTER 5.12

SECTION 5.12.1
The interior of Britain is inhabited by people who say that their own tradition records that they were born on the island,

SECTION 5.12.2
while the coastal region is inhabited by people who crossed over from Belgium for the sake of plunder and warfare. Nearly all of them are called by the names of the states from which they originated before coming there, and after making war they remained and began to cultivate the land.

SECTION 5.12.3
The population is immense, the buildings are extremely numerous and generally resemble those of Gaul, and there are great numbers of livestock.

SECTION 5.12.4
They use bronze, gold coins, or iron bars weighed to a fixed standard as currency.

SECTION 5.12.5
Tin is found there in the inland regions and iron along the coast, though only in small quantities; the bronze they use is imported. Timber of every kind is found there, as in Gaul, except for beech and fir.

SECTION 5.12.6
They consider it unlawful to eat hare, chicken, or goose, though they raise them for pleasure and amusement. The climate is milder than in Gaul, with less severe cold.

CHAPTER 5.13

SECTION 5.13.1
The island is naturally triangular, with one side facing Gaul. Of the two corners of this side, the one by Kent, where almost all ships from Gaul make landfall, faces east, while the lower corner faces south. This side extends for about five hundred miles.

SECTION 5.13.2
The second side runs toward Spain and the west. On that side lies Ireland, which is estimated to be half the size of Britain, but the crossing to it from Britain is the same distance as the crossing from Gaul to Britain.

SECTION 5.13.3
Midway across this passage is an island called Mona. In addition, a number of smaller islands are believed to lie nearby, and some writers have stated that at the winter solstice there is continuous night on these islands for thirty days.

SECTION 5.13.4
We could discover nothing about this through inquiry, except that by precise measurements with a water clock we observed that the nights were shorter than on the mainland.

SECTION 5.13.5
According to the inhabitants’ estimate, the length of this side is seven hundred miles.

SECTION 5.13.6
The third side faces north. No land lies opposite this part, but the corner of that side points mainly toward Germany. It is estimated to be eight hundred miles long.

SECTION 5.13.7
Thus the entire island has a circumference of two thousand miles.

CHAPTER 5.14

SECTION 5.14.1
Of all these inhabitants, by far the most civilized are those who live in Kent, an entirely coastal region, and their customs differ little from those of the Gauls.

SECTION 5.14.2
Most of the people of the interior do not sow grain but live on milk and meat and wear animal skins. All the Britons, however, stain themselves with woad, which produces a blue color, and this makes them more terrifying in appearance in battle;

SECTION 5.14.3
they wear their hair long and shave every part of the body except the head and upper lip.

SECTION 5.14.4
Groups of ten or twelve men share wives in common, especially brothers with brothers and fathers with sons; but children born from these unions are regarded as the children of the man to whose household each woman was first brought as a virgin.

CHAPTER 5.15

SECTION 5.15.1
The enemy’s cavalry and chariot warriors fought fiercely with our cavalry along the route, but our men proved superior in every sector and drove them into the woods and hills.

SECTION 5.15.2
But after killing a number of them, our men pursued too eagerly and lost some of their own.

SECTION 5.15.3
After an interval, however, while our men were off guard and occupied with fortifying the camp, the enemy suddenly rushed out of the woods, attacked the men posted on guard in front of the camp,

SECTION 5.15.4
and fought fiercely. Caesar sent two cohorts to reinforce them—the leading cohorts of two legions—but although these took position with only a very small space between them, the enemy, after terrifying our men with this unfamiliar kind of fighting, broke through between them with great daring and withdrew safely.

SECTION 5.15.5
That day Quintus Laberius Durus, a military tribune, was killed. The enemy was driven back when more cohorts were sent forward.

CHAPTER 5.16

SECTION 5.16.1
Throughout this entire action, which was fought in full view of everyone and in front of the camp, it became clear that because of the weight of their armor, since they could neither pursue the enemy when they retreated nor dared leave the standards, our men were poorly suited to fighting this kind of enemy,

SECTION 5.16.2
while the cavalry fought at great risk because the enemy usually retreated deliberately and, once they had drawn our men a short distance away from the legions, leaped down from their chariots and fought on foot under unequal conditions.

SECTION 5.16.3
The nature of the cavalry action, moreover, exposed both those retreating and those pursuing to the same degree and kind of danger.

SECTION 5.16.4
Another factor was that the enemy never fought in close formation but were spread out with wide intervals between them, and they had relief forces stationed at various points, so that one group after another could receive them and fresh, rested men could replace those who were exhausted.

CHAPTER 5.17

SECTION 5.17.1
The next day the enemy took position on the hills some distance from the camp, showed themselves only in scattered groups, and began to challenge our cavalry to battle less aggressively than the day before.

SECTION 5.17.2
But at midday, when Caesar had sent three legions and all the cavalry under his lieutenant Gaius Trebonius to gather forage, the enemy suddenly rushed at the foragers from every direction, pressing so close that they did not keep away from the standards and legions.

SECTION 5.17.3
Our men attacked them fiercely, drove them back, and did not stop pursuing until the cavalry, relying on the support of the legions they saw behind them,

SECTION 5.17.4
drove the enemy headlong, killed a great number of them, and gave them no opportunity to rally, make a stand, or leap down from their chariots.

SECTION 5.17.5
Immediately after this rout, the auxiliary forces that had assembled from every direction dispersed, and from that time onward the enemy never again engaged us with their full strength.

CHAPTER 5.18

SECTION 5.18.1
After learning of their plan, Caesar led his army to the River Thames, into the territory of Cassivellaunus. The river can be crossed on foot at only one place, and even there only with difficulty.

SECTION 5.18.2
When he arrived, he observed that large enemy forces had drawn up on the opposite bank of the river;

SECTION 5.18.3
the bank had been fortified with sharpened stakes fixed along its edge, and stakes of the same kind had been driven into the riverbed and were concealed beneath the water.

SECTION 5.18.4
After learning these details from prisoners and deserters, Caesar sent the cavalry ahead and ordered the legions to follow immediately.

SECTION 5.18.5
The soldiers advanced with such speed and force, although only their heads remained above the water, that the enemy could not withstand the assault of the legions and cavalry, abandoned the banks, and fled.

CHAPTER 5.19

SECTION 5.19.1
Cassivellaunus, as explained above, gave up all hope of fighting a pitched battle, dismissed his larger forces, and kept about four thousand chariot warriors. He watched our line of march, moved a short distance away from the road, and concealed himself in difficult, wooded country. In the districts through which he had learned that we intended to march, he drove the livestock and people from the fields into the woods, and,

SECTION 5.19.2
whenever our cavalry spread out more freely across the countryside to plunder and devastate it, he sent his chariot warriors out of the woods by every road and path. They engaged our cavalry at great risk to our men, and the fear of these attacks prevented them from ranging very far.

SECTION 5.19.3
The result was that Caesar would not allow the cavalry to move far from the marching column of legions, and the enemy could be harmed by the devastation of their fields and the burning of their property only to the extent that the legionaries could accomplish through their labor and marching.

CHAPTER 5.20

SECTION 5.20.1
Meanwhile the Trinovantes, nearly the strongest state in that region, sent envoys to Caesar and promised to surrender to him and obey his commands. From this state the young Mandubracius had come to Caesar on the mainland of Gaul and placed himself under his protection. Mandubracius’s father had held the kingship in that state and had been killed by Cassivellaunus, while Mandubracius himself had escaped death by fleeing;

SECTION 5.20.2
they asked Caesar to protect Mandubracius from injury by Cassivellaunus and send him back to the state to rule and hold supreme authority.

SECTION 5.20.3
Caesar ordered them to provide forty hostages and grain for the army, and he sent Mandubracius to them.

SECTION 5.20.4
They quickly carried out his commands and sent the required number of hostages and the grain.

CHAPTER 5.21

SECTION 5.21.1
After the Trinovantes had been protected and secured against any mistreatment by the soldiers, the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, and Cassi sent delegations and surrendered to Caesar.

SECTION 5.21.2
From them he learned that Cassivellaunus’s stronghold was not far from that place, that it was protected by woods and marshes, and that a fairly large number of people and livestock had gathered there.

SECTION 5.21.3
The Britons call it a stronghold when they fortify a dense woodland with a rampart and ditch and use it as their customary place of refuge from enemy raids.

SECTION 5.21.4
Caesar marched there with the legions and found the place exceptionally well fortified both by nature and by human construction. Nevertheless, he attempted to assault it from two sides.

SECTION 5.21.5
The enemy held out for a short time, but could not withstand our soldiers’ assault and rushed out through another side of the stronghold.

SECTION 5.21.6
A great number of livestock was found there, and many of the enemy were caught and killed as they fled.

CHAPTER 5.22

SECTION 5.22.1
While these events were taking place in that region, Cassivellaunus sent messengers to Kent, which, as explained above, lies by the sea. Four kings ruled that region—Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax—and Cassivellaunus ordered them to assemble all their forces and launch a surprise assault on the naval camp.

SECTION 5.22.2
When they reached the camp, our men made a sortie, killed many of them, captured even their distinguished leader Lugotorix, and brought their own men back safely.

SECTION 5.22.3
When Cassivellaunus received news of this battle, after suffering so many losses and seeing his territory devastated, and especially because he was alarmed by the defection of the states, he sent envoys through Commius the Atrebatian to negotiate his surrender to Caesar.

SECTION 5.22.4
Caesar had decided to winter on the mainland because of the sudden unrest in Gaul. Since little of the summer remained and he understood that the negotiations could easily be prolonged, he demanded hostages and fixed the annual tribute Britain was to pay the Roman people;

SECTION 5.22.5
he strictly ordered Cassivellaunus not to harm Mandubracius or the Trinovantes.

CHAPTER 5.23

SECTION 5.23.1
After receiving the hostages, Caesar led the army back to the sea and found the ships repaired.

SECTION 5.23.2
After the ships had been launched, because he had a large number of prisoners and some ships had been lost in the storm, he decided to transport the army back in two voyages.

SECTION 5.23.3
And so it happened that, despite the great number of ships and all the voyages made, neither in this year nor in the previous one was any ship carrying soldiers lost at all;

SECTION 5.23.4
but of the ships sent back to him empty from the mainland—both those that had landed the soldiers of the first crossing and the sixty that Labienus had later arranged to have built—very few reached their destination, and almost all the rest were driven back.

SECTION 5.23.5
After Caesar had waited for them in vain for some time, he feared that the season would prevent him from sailing,

SECTION 5.23.6
because the equinox was approaching. He therefore had no choice but to pack the soldiers more tightly aboard the ships. When the sea became completely calm, he set sail at the beginning of the second watch, reached land at first light, and brought every ship safely ashore.

CHAPTER 5.24

SECTION 5.24.1
After the ships had been hauled ashore and a council of the Gauls had been held at Samarobriva, Caesar was compelled to station his army in winter quarters differently from previous years and to distribute the legions among a greater number of states, because the grain harvest in Gaul that year had been unusually poor because of drought;

SECTION 5.24.2
of these legions, he assigned one to his lieutenant Gaius Fabius to lead into the territory of the Morini, another to Quintus Cicero to lead into the territory of the Nervii, and a third to Lucius Roscius to lead into the territory of the Essuvii. He ordered a fourth to winter among the Remi under Titus Labienus, on the border of the Treveri. He stationed three among the Belgae;

SECTION 5.24.3
he placed these under the command of the quaestor Marcus Crassus and the lieutenants Lucius Munatius Plancus and Gaius Trebonius.

SECTION 5.24.4
He sent one legion, which he had most recently raised north of the Po, and five cohorts into the territory of the Eburones, most of whom live between the Meuse and the Rhine and were under the rule of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus.

SECTION 5.24.5
He ordered his lieutenants Quintus Titurius Sabinus and Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta to command these troops.

SECTION 5.24.6
He believed that by distributing the legions in this way he could most easily deal with the shortage of grain.

SECTION 5.24.7
Nevertheless, the winter quarters of all these legions, except the one he had assigned to Lucius Roscius to lead into an entirely peaceful and quiet region, were contained within a radius of one hundred miles.

SECTION 5.24.8
Meanwhile, Caesar decided to remain in Gaul until he had received confirmation that the legions were in position and their winter quarters fortified.

CHAPTER 5.25

SECTION 5.25.1
Among the Carnutes there was a man of the highest birth named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had held the kingship in their state.

SECTION 5.25.2
Because of his courage and goodwill toward Caesar, whose exceptional service Caesar had employed in all his wars, Caesar had restored him to the rank his ancestors had held.

SECTION 5.25.3
He had now been king for three years when his enemies killed him, with many members of his state openly supporting them.

SECTION 5.25.4
The matter was reported to Caesar. Fearing that, because many people were involved, their tribe might revolt at their instigation, he ordered Lucius Plancus to set out quickly from Belgium with his legion for the territory of the Carnutes and spend the winter there, and to arrest those whom he learned had been responsible for Tasgetius’s murder and send them to him.

SECTION 5.25.5
Meanwhile, all the legates and the quaestor to whom he had entrusted the legions informed him that they had reached their winter quarters and that the sites had been fortified.

CHAPTER 5.26

SECTION 5.26.1
About fifteen days after the troops had entered winter quarters, a sudden uprising and revolt began under Ambiorix and Catuvolcus.

SECTION 5.26.2
Although they had met Sabinus and Cotta at the borders of their kingdom and had brought grain into the winter quarters, they were incited by messengers from Indutiomarus of the Treveri and stirred up their people. Then, after suddenly overpowering some soldiers who were out gathering wood, they came in great force to attack the camp.

SECTION 5.26.3
Our men quickly took up arms and mounted the rampart, and after Spanish cavalry had been sent out from one side, they gained the advantage in a cavalry engagement. The enemy, abandoning hope of success, withdrew their men from the attack.

SECTION 5.26.4
Then, in their usual way, they called out for one of our men to come forward for a conference. They said that they had matters of common concern to discuss and hoped that what they had to say could reduce the points in dispute.

CHAPTER 5.27

SECTION 5.27.1
Gaius Arpineius, a Roman knight and close friend of Quintus Titurius, and a certain Quintus Junius from Spain were sent to confer with them. Junius had already been accustomed to visit Ambiorix on Caesar’s instructions. Ambiorix spoke to them as follows:

SECTION 5.27.2
He acknowledged that he owed Caesar a very great debt for the favors Caesar had done him: through Caesar’s intervention he had been freed from the tribute that he had regularly paid to the Aduatuci, his neighbors, and Caesar had returned to him both his son and his brother’s son, whom the Aduatuci had held among their hostages in slavery and chains.

SECTION 5.27.3
As for his attack on the camp, he had not acted by his own judgment or inclination but under compulsion from his tribe. His authority was such that the people had no less power over him than he had over the people.

SECTION 5.27.4
The reason the tribe had gone to war was that it could not resist the sudden conspiracy of the Gauls. He could easily prove this from his own humble position, since he was not so inexperienced as to believe that the Roman people could be defeated by his forces.

SECTION 5.27.5
But it was the common plan of all Gaul: this day had been appointed for attacks on all Caesar’s winter quarters, so that no legion could come to the aid of another.

SECTION 5.27.6
It had not been easy for Gauls to refuse other Gauls, especially when the plan appeared to concern the recovery of their common freedom.

SECTION 5.27.7
Since he had now satisfied the demands of patriotism, he was taking account of his duty in return for Caesar’s favors. Because of their bond of hospitality, he warned and begged Titurius to provide for his own safety and that of his soldiers.

SECTION 5.27.8
A large force of hired Germans had crossed the Rhine and would arrive in two days.

SECTION 5.27.9
It was for the Romans themselves to decide whether, before the neighboring peoples learned of it, they wished to lead their soldiers out of winter quarters and march either to Cicero or to Labienus, one of whom was about fifty miles away and the other a little farther.

SECTION 5.27.10
He promised, and confirmed by oath, that he would grant them safe passage through his territory.

SECTION 5.27.11
In doing so, he was both helping his own tribe by relieving it of the winter quarters and repaying Caesar for his favors. After delivering this speech, Ambiorix departed.

CHAPTER 5.28

SECTION 5.28.1
Arpineius and Junius reported to the legates what they had heard. Though deeply disturbed by the sudden development, the legates still thought that the warning should not be disregarded, even though it came from an enemy. They were especially troubled because it was scarcely believable that the obscure and insignificant tribe of the Eburones would have dared to make war on the Roman people on its own initiative.

SECTION 5.28.2
They therefore referred the matter to a council of war, and a great dispute arose among them.

SECTION 5.28.3
Lucius Aurunculeius, several military tribunes, and the senior centurions believed that nothing should be done rashly and that they should not leave winter quarters without Caesar’s orders. They pointed out that however large the forces—even German forces—fortified winter quarters could withstand them. The facts were proof: they had held out with the greatest courage against the enemy’s first assault while inflicting many wounds on them into the bargain. They were not suffering from any shortage of grain. Meanwhile, reinforcements would arrive both from the nearest winter quarters and from Caesar. Finally, what could be more irresponsible or more disgraceful than to make a decision on matters of the greatest importance on the advice of an enemy?

CHAPTER 5.29

SECTION 5.29.1
Against this, Titurius kept shouting that they would act too late once larger enemy forces had assembled with the Germans added to them, or once some disaster had been suffered in the nearest winter quarters. Their opportunity for making a decision was brief. He believed that Caesar had left for Italy.

SECTION 5.29.2
Otherwise, the Carnutes would not have formed their plan to murder Tasgetius, nor, if Caesar were present, would the Eburones have come against the camp with such contempt for us.

SECTION 5.29.3
He was not considering the enemy as an adviser, but the facts themselves: the Rhine was close at hand; the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories caused the Germans great pain.

SECTION 5.29.4
Gaul was burning with resentment at the many humiliations it had suffered in being brought under the rule of the Roman people, with its former military glory extinguished.

SECTION 5.29.5
Finally, who could persuade himself that Ambiorix had adopted such a plan without reliable information?

SECTION 5.29.6
His own proposal was safe under either possibility. If there were no greater danger, they would reach the nearest legion without any risk; but if all Gaul were acting in concert with the Germans, their only hope of safety lay in speed.

SECTION 5.29.7
What outcome could Cotta’s plan and that of those who disagreed offer? Even if it involved no immediate danger, they would certainly have to fear starvation during a prolonged siege.

CHAPTER 5.30

SECTION 5.30.1
After the arguments had been presented on both sides, and Cotta and the senior centurions continued to resist fiercely, Sabinus said, “Have it your way, if that is what you want,” speaking loudly enough for a large part of the soldiers to hear.

SECTION 5.30.2
“I am not the man among you who is most terrified by the danger of death,” he said. “These men will understand. If any serious disaster occurs, they will demand an accounting from you,

SECTION 5.30.3
because, if you allowed it, they could join the nearest winter quarters the day after tomorrow and face the common fortunes of war together with the others, instead of being cast off and isolated far from everyone else to die by the sword or from starvation.”

CHAPTER 5.31

SECTION 5.31.1
The council rose. The officers took hold of both men and begged them not to bring the situation into the greatest danger through their disagreement and stubbornness.

SECTION 5.31.2
The matter was easy, whether they remained or departed, provided only that they all held and approved one opinion. In disagreement, by contrast, they could see no hope of safety. The debate continued until midnight.

SECTION 5.31.3
At last Cotta yielded under the pressure. Sabinus’s proposal prevailed. It was announced that they would leave at daybreak.

SECTION 5.31.4
The rest of the night was spent awake, as every soldier looked over his possessions to see what he could carry with him and what equipment from the winter quarters he would be forced to leave behind.

SECTION 5.31.5
Every reason was devised to show that they could not remain without danger, while the danger was increased by the soldiers’ exhaustion and lack of sleep.

SECTION 5.31.6
At daybreak they left the camp as though they were convinced that the advice had come not from an enemy but from their closest friend, Ambiorix. They marched in an extremely long column with an enormous amount of baggage.

CHAPTER 5.32

SECTION 5.32.1
But after the enemy realized from the nighttime noise and wakefulness that the Romans intended to depart, they divided into two groups and set an ambush in the woods at a suitable, concealed place about two miles away, where they waited for the Romans to arrive.

SECTION 5.32.2
When the greater part of the column had descended into a broad valley, they suddenly revealed themselves on both sides of it and began pressing the rear of the column, preventing the front from climbing out, and engaging our men on ground that was extremely unfavorable to them.

CHAPTER 5.33

SECTION 5.33.1
Only then did Titurius, who had foreseen nothing, become agitated, run about, and arrange the cohorts—and even these actions he performed timidly and in a way that made him appear at a complete loss, as commonly happens to those who are forced to make their plans in the midst of the action itself.

SECTION 5.33.2
Cotta, however, who had considered that these things might happen on the march and for that reason had not advocated departure, failed in no duty to their common safety. In addressing and encouraging the soldiers he performed the duties of a commander, and in battle those of a soldier.

SECTION 5.33.3
Because the length of the column made it difficult for them personally to be everywhere and determine what had to be done at each point, they ordered an announcement that the soldiers should abandon the baggage and form a circle.

SECTION 5.33.4
Although this decision cannot be criticized in such circumstances, it nevertheless had unfortunate consequences.

SECTION 5.33.5
It both reduced the confidence of our soldiers and made the enemy more eager to fight, since it appeared that the measure had not been taken without the greatest fear and desperation. In addition, what was inevitable happened: soldiers everywhere left their standards, hurried to the baggage to seek out and seize whatever each of them held most dear, and filled the whole place with shouting and weeping.

CHAPTER 5.34

SECTION 5.34.1
But the barbarians knew what to do. Their commanders ordered it proclaimed throughout the battle line that no one was to leave his position: the plunder belonged to them, and whatever the Romans abandoned was being reserved for them. They should therefore consider that everything depended on victory.

SECTION 5.34.2
The two sides were equal in courage and eagerness to fight. Although our men were being abandoned by their commander and by fortune, they nevertheless placed all their hope of safety in courage, and whenever any cohort charged forward, a large number of the enemy fell in that sector.

SECTION 5.34.3
Noticing this, Ambiorix ordered it proclaimed that his men should throw their weapons from a distance and not come closer, and that they should give way in whatever direction the Romans charged, since their light equipment and daily training would keep them from suffering any harm.

SECTION 5.34.4
When the Romans withdrew again to their standards, they were to pursue them.

CHAPTER 5.35

SECTION 5.35.1
The enemy followed this instruction with the greatest care. Whenever a cohort left the circle and made a charge, the enemy retreated with the utmost speed.

SECTION 5.35.2
Meanwhile, that part of the circle was necessarily left unprotected and exposed to missiles on its open flank.

SECTION 5.35.3
Then, when the Romans began returning to the position from which they had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had retreated and by those who had remained nearby.

SECTION 5.35.4
But if they chose to hold their position, there was no opportunity for courage, and packed closely together, they could not evade the missiles thrown by so great a multitude.

SECTION 5.35.5
Nevertheless, though struggling against so many disadvantages and suffering many wounds, they continued to resist. After a large part of the day had passed, with the fighting lasting from daybreak until the eighth hour, they did nothing unworthy of themselves.

SECTION 5.35.6
Then Titus Balventius, a brave man of great authority who had served as chief centurion the previous year, had both thighs pierced by a heavy javelin.

SECTION 5.35.7
Quintus Lucanius, a centurion of the same rank, was killed while fighting with the greatest courage as he went to the aid of his surrounded son.

SECTION 5.35.8
The legate Lucius Cotta was wounded full in the face by a sling stone while encouraging all the cohorts and ranks.

CHAPTER 5.36

SECTION 5.36.1
Deeply affected by these events, Quintus Titurius saw Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men and sent his interpreter, Gnaeus Pompeius, to ask him to spare Titurius and the soldiers.

SECTION 5.36.2
When approached, Ambiorix replied that if Titurius wished to confer with him, he was free to do so. He hoped that he could persuade his people to grant what concerned the soldiers’ safety; Titurius himself would certainly not be harmed, and on this point he pledged his own word. Titurius then consulted the wounded Cotta,

SECTION 5.36.3
proposing that, if Cotta approved, they should withdraw from the fighting and confer with Ambiorix together. He hoped that they could persuade Ambiorix to spare them and the soldiers. Cotta said that he would not go to an armed enemy, and he persisted in that decision.

CHAPTER 5.37

SECTION 5.37.1
Sabinus ordered the military tribunes and senior centurions whom he happened to have around him to follow. When he came closer to Ambiorix, he was ordered to throw down his weapons. He obeyed and ordered his men to do the same.

SECTION 5.37.2
Meanwhile, as they discussed terms, Ambiorix deliberately prolonged the conversation. Sabinus was gradually surrounded and killed.

SECTION 5.37.3
Then the enemy, in their usual way, shouted out their victory, raised a howling cry, charged our men, and threw the ranks into confusion.

SECTION 5.37.4
There Lucius Cotta was killed fighting, along with the greater part of the soldiers. The rest withdrew into the camp from which they had set out.

SECTION 5.37.5
Among them, Lucius Petrosidius, the eagle-bearer, when he was being overwhelmed by a great mass of the enemy, threw the eagle inside the rampart. He himself was killed while fighting with the greatest courage in front of the camp. The survivors barely held out against the attack until nightfall.

SECTION 5.37.6
During the night, despairing of survival, every last one of them killed himself.

SECTION 5.37.7
A few escaped from the battle and, traveling by uncertain routes through the woods, reached the winter quarters of the legate Titus Labienus and informed him of what had happened.

CHAPTER 5.38

SECTION 5.38.1
Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediately set out with his cavalry for the Aduatuci, whose territory bordered his kingdom. He traveled without stopping by night or day and ordered the infantry to follow him.

SECTION 5.38.2
After explaining what had happened and rousing the Aduatuci, he reached the Nervii the next day and urged them not to let slip the opportunity to free themselves forever and take revenge on the Romans for the injuries they had suffered.

SECTION 5.38.3
He pointed out that two legates had been killed and a large part of the army destroyed.

SECTION 5.38.4
There would be no difficulty in suddenly overwhelming and destroying the legion wintering with Cicero; he declared himself ready to assist in the undertaking. With this speech he easily persuaded the Nervii.

CHAPTER 5.39

SECTION 5.39.1
They therefore immediately sent messengers to the Ceutrones, Grudii, Levaci, Pleumoxii, and Geidumni, all of whom were under their rule. They gathered the largest forces they could and rushed unexpectedly to Cicero’s winter quarters, before news of Titurius’s death had yet reached him.

SECTION 5.39.2
The inevitable happened to him as well: some soldiers who had gone into the woods to gather timber and materials for fortifications were intercepted by the cavalry’s sudden arrival.

SECTION 5.39.3
After surrounding them, the Eburones, Nervii, Aduatuci, and all their allies and dependents began attacking the legion in great force. Our men quickly rushed to arms and mounted the rampart.

SECTION 5.39.4
They barely held out that day, because the enemy placed all their hope in speed and were confident that, if they gained this victory, they would remain victorious forever.

CHAPTER 5.40

SECTION 5.40.1
Cicero immediately sent letters to Caesar, offering large rewards to the messengers if they delivered them. Since every road was under blockade, all those sent were intercepted.

SECTION 5.40.2
During the night, using the timber they had brought in for the fortifications, they erected about 120 towers with incredible speed. Whatever appeared to be lacking in the defensive works was completed.

SECTION 5.40.3
The next day the enemy assembled much larger forces, attacked the camp, and filled in the ditch. Our men resisted in the same way as the day before.

SECTION 5.40.4
The same thing continued to happen on each of the following days.

SECTION 5.40.5
No part of the night was left free from work; neither the sick nor the wounded were given any chance to rest.

SECTION 5.40.6
Everything needed to meet the next day’s attack was prepared at night. Large numbers of stakes were sharpened and charred at the tips, and a great quantity of heavy fortification javelins was made; the towers were fitted with platforms, and battlements and breastworks were woven from wicker.

SECTION 5.40.7
Cicero himself, though in extremely poor health, did not reserve even the nighttime for his own rest, so that the soldiers had to gather around him of their own accord and insist that he spare himself.

CHAPTER 5.41

SECTION 5.41.1
Then the leaders and chiefs of the Nervii who had some basis for speaking with Cicero and some claim to his friendship said that they wished to confer with him.

SECTION 5.41.2
When permission was granted, they repeated the same claims that Ambiorix had made to Titurius: all Gaul was under arms;

SECTION 5.41.3
the Germans had crossed the Rhine; and Caesar’s winter quarters and those of the other commanders were under attack.

SECTION 5.41.4
They also reported Sabinus’s death and produced Ambiorix as proof of the truth of their statement.

SECTION 5.41.5
They said the Romans were mistaken if they expected any help from men who had no confidence in their own position. Nevertheless, they claimed that their attitude toward Cicero and the Roman people was such that they objected only to the winter quarters and did not want this practice to become permanent:

SECTION 5.41.6
the Romans might, with their permission, leave their winter quarters unharmed and set out without fear in whatever direction they wished.

SECTION 5.41.7
Cicero gave only one answer to these proposals: it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept terms from an enemy under arms.

SECTION 5.41.8
If they were willing to lay down their arms, they could use him as an intermediary and send envoys to Caesar; he hoped that, in view of Caesar’s sense of justice, they would obtain what they requested.

CHAPTER 5.42

SECTION 5.42.1
Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surrounded the winter quarters with a nine-foot rampart and a fifteen-foot ditch.

SECTION 5.42.2
They had learned these methods from us through their experience in previous years, and they were also instructed by some prisoners they held from our army.

SECTION 5.42.3
But because they had no supply of iron tools suitable for this purpose, they had to cut out the turf with their swords and remove the earth with their hands and cloaks.

SECTION 5.42.4
This very fact showed how great their numbers were, for in less than three hours they completed a fortification fifteen thousand feet in circumference,

SECTION 5.42.5
and on the following days they began to prepare and construct towers as high as the rampart, as well as grappling hooks and covered assault sheds, which the same prisoners had taught them to make.

CHAPTER 5.43

SECTION 5.43.1
On the seventh day of the attack, when a very strong wind arose, they began slinging red-hot bullets of molded clay and throwing heated javelins onto the huts, which in the Gallic fashion were roofed with thatch.

SECTION 5.43.2
The huts quickly caught fire, and the force of the wind spread the flames throughout the camp.

SECTION 5.43.3
With tremendous shouting, as though victory were already won and assured, the enemy began moving forward their towers and covered assault sheds and climbing the rampart with ladders.

SECTION 5.43.4
But the soldiers showed such courage and such presence of mind that, although they were scorched by flames on every side, were overwhelmed by an enormous quantity of missiles, and understood that all their baggage and every possession they owned were burning, not only did no one leave the rampart to move away, but hardly anyone even looked back; instead, they all fought then with the utmost determination and bravery.

SECTION 5.43.5
This was by far the hardest day for our men. Nevertheless, its outcome was that on that day the greatest number of the enemy were wounded and killed, because they had packed themselves together directly beneath the rampart, and those in the rear gave those in front no room to withdraw.

SECTION 5.43.6
When the flames had subsided a little and a tower had been pushed forward at one point until it touched the rampart, the centurions of the third cohort withdrew from the position where they were standing and removed all their men. Then, with gestures and shouts, they began inviting the enemy to come in if they wished; but not one of them dared advance.

SECTION 5.43.7
Then stones were hurled from every direction and drove them off, and the tower was set on fire.

CHAPTER 5.44

SECTION 5.44.1
In that legion there were two exceptionally brave centurions, Titus Pullo and Lucius Vorenus, who were approaching promotion to the highest ranks.

SECTION 5.44.2
They were constantly disputing between themselves over which should take precedence, and every year they competed for the highest positions with intense personal rivalry.

SECTION 5.44.3
While the fighting at the fortifications was at its fiercest, Pullo said, “Why are you hesitating, Vorenus? What opportunity are you waiting for to prove your courage?

SECTION 5.44.4
This day will decide our dispute.” Having said this, he went outside the fortifications and charged into the point where the enemy’s line appeared most densely packed.

SECTION 5.44.5
Vorenus also did not remain behind the rampart but, fearing what everyone would think of him, followed close behind.

SECTION 5.44.6
When he was a short distance away, Pullo threw his heavy javelin at the enemy and pierced one man who was running forward from the crowd. After the man was struck and killed, the enemy covered his body with their shields, all hurled missiles at Pullo, and gave him no opportunity to retreat.

SECTION 5.44.7
Pullo’s shield was pierced, and a light javelin lodged in his sword belt.

SECTION 5.44.8
This mishap twisted his scabbard aside and obstructed his right hand as he tried to draw his sword, and the enemy surrounded him while he was entangled.

SECTION 5.44.9
His rival Vorenus came to his aid and assisted him in his difficulty.

SECTION 5.44.10
The entire crowd immediately turned away from Pullo against Vorenus,

SECTION 5.44.11
because they thought Pullo had been killed by the javelin. Vorenus fought them at close quarters with his sword, killed one, and drove the others back a short distance.

SECTION 5.44.12
But as he pressed forward too eagerly, he stumbled down into a lower place and fell. When he in turn was surrounded, Pullo came to his aid,

SECTION 5.44.13
and after killing several of the enemy, both men withdrew unharmed inside the fortifications, covered with the highest distinction.

SECTION 5.44.14
Thus fortune treated each of them in their rivalry and contest in such a way that each rival saved and assisted the other, and it was impossible to decide which of the two appeared superior in courage.

CHAPTER 5.45

SECTION 5.45.1
As the attack became more difficult and severe day by day—and especially since a large proportion of the soldiers had been disabled by wounds, leaving only a small number of defenders—letters and messengers were sent to Caesar more and more frequently. Some of the messengers were caught and tortured to death in full view of our soldiers.

SECTION 5.45.2
Inside the camp was a Nervian named Vertico, a man of distinguished birth, who at the beginning of the siege had fled to Cicero for protection and had demonstrated his loyalty to him.

SECTION 5.45.3
By promising one of his slaves freedom and great rewards, he persuaded him to carry a letter to Caesar.

SECTION 5.45.4
The slave carried it out tied to a javelin and, moving among the Gauls as one Gaul among others without arousing any suspicion, reached Caesar.

SECTION 5.45.5
From him Caesar learned of the danger facing Cicero and the legion.

CHAPTER 5.46

SECTION 5.46.1
On receiving the letter at about the eleventh hour of the day, Caesar immediately sent a messenger into the territory of the Bellovaci to Marcus Crassus, his quaestor, whose winter quarters were twenty-five miles away.

SECTION 5.46.2
He ordered him to march with his legion at midnight and come to him quickly.

SECTION 5.46.3
Crassus set out with the messenger. Caesar sent another messenger to his lieutenant Gaius Fabius, instructing him to bring his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, through which Caesar knew he would have to march.

SECTION 5.46.4
He wrote to Labienus to come with his legion to the borders of the Nervii if he could do so without harming the public interest. He did not think he should wait for the rest of the army because it was somewhat farther away, and he assembled about four hundred cavalrymen from the nearest winter quarters.

CHAPTER 5.47

SECTION 5.47.1
At about the third hour, Caesar was informed by his advance scouts of Crassus’s approach, and that day he advanced twenty miles.

SECTION 5.47.2
He placed Crassus in command at Samarobriva and assigned him a legion, because he was leaving there the army’s baggage, the hostages given by the Gallic states, the official records, and all the grain he had brought there to sustain the army through the winter.

SECTION 5.47.3
Fabius, as ordered, delayed little and met Caesar on the march with his legion.

SECTION 5.47.4
Labienus had learned of Sabinus’s death and the massacre of the cohorts, and all the forces of the Treveri had come against him. He feared that if he departed from his winter quarters in a way that resembled flight, he would be unable to withstand an enemy attack, especially since he knew that their recent victory had made them overconfident. He therefore sent a letter back to Caesar explaining how dangerous it would be to lead his legion out of its winter quarters. He gave a full account of what had happened among the Eburones and informed Caesar that all the cavalry and infantry forces of the Treveri had encamped three miles from his own camp.

CHAPTER 5.48

SECTION 5.48.1
Caesar approved his decision. Although his expectation of having three legions had fallen to two, he still placed the sole hope of their common safety in speed. He reached the territory of the Nervii by forced marches.

SECTION 5.48.2
There he learned from prisoners what was happening at Cicero’s camp and how dangerous the situation was.

SECTION 5.48.3
He then persuaded one of his Gallic cavalrymen, with the promise of great rewards, to carry a letter to Cicero.

SECTION 5.48.4
He sent the letter written in Greek characters so that, if it were intercepted, the enemy would not discover our plans.

SECTION 5.48.5
If the cavalryman could not approach the camp, Caesar instructed him to throw a spear with the letter tied to its throwing strap inside the camp’s fortifications.

SECTION 5.48.6
In the letter he wrote that he had set out with the legions and would soon be there; he urged Cicero to maintain his former courage.

SECTION 5.48.7
The Gaul was afraid of the danger and, as instructed, threw the spear.

SECTION 5.48.8
By chance it stuck in a tower and went unnoticed by our men for two days. On the third day a soldier spotted it, removed it, and took it to Cicero.

SECTION 5.48.9
After reading the letter through, Cicero read it aloud to an assembly of the soldiers and filled them all with the greatest joy.

SECTION 5.48.10
Then the smoke of fires could be seen in the distance, and this removed all doubt that the legions were approaching.

CHAPTER 5.49

SECTION 5.49.1
When the Gauls learned of this from their scouts, they abandoned the siege and hurried against Caesar with all their forces. These numbered about sixty thousand armed men.

SECTION 5.49.2
Given the opportunity, Cicero once again asked the same Vertico mentioned above to provide a Gaul to carry a letter to Caesar. He warned the man to make the journey cautiously and carefully.

SECTION 5.49.3
In the letter he gave a full report that the enemy had withdrawn from him and had turned their entire host against Caesar.

SECTION 5.49.4
The letter was delivered to Caesar at about midnight. He informed his men of its contents and encouraged them to prepare mentally for battle.

SECTION 5.49.5
At first light the next day he broke camp, and after advancing about four miles, he sighted the enemy host across a valley and stream.

SECTION 5.49.6
It was extremely dangerous to fight with such a small force on unfavorable ground. Since he now knew that Cicero had been freed from the siege, he believed he could safely relax the speed of his advance.

SECTION 5.49.7
He halted and fortified a camp on the most favorable ground he could find. Although the camp was already small in itself for barely seven thousand men, especially since they had no baggage, he made it as cramped as possible by narrowing its streets. His purpose was to make the enemy hold him in the greatest possible contempt.

SECTION 5.49.8
Meanwhile, he sent scouts in every direction to discover the most convenient route by which he could cross the valley.

CHAPTER 5.50

SECTION 5.50.1
That day, after a few minor cavalry skirmishes near the water, both sides remained in their positions:

SECTION 5.50.2
the Gauls because they were waiting for larger forces

SECTION 5.50.3
that had not yet assembled; Caesar because he hoped that by pretending to be afraid he might lure the enemy onto his own ground and fight a battle in front of his camp on this side of the valley, or, if he could not accomplish this,

SECTION 5.50.4
that after reconnoitering the routes he might cross the valley and stream with less danger. At first light the enemy cavalry approached the camp and engaged our cavalry in battle.

SECTION 5.50.5
Caesar deliberately ordered his cavalry to give way and withdraw into the camp. At the same time, he ordered the rampart around the camp to be raised on every side and the gates to be barricaded, and he instructed the men to rush about as much as possible while carrying out these tasks and to act as though they were afraid.

CHAPTER 5.51

SECTION 5.51.1
Encouraged by all this, the enemy brought their forces across the valley and formed their battle line on unfavorable ground. When our men were even withdrawn from the rampart, they came closer and threw missiles from every direction inside the fortifications.

SECTION 5.51.2
They sent heralds around and ordered them to proclaim that any Gaul or Roman who wished to come over to them before the third hour could do so without danger; after that time there would be no further opportunity.

SECTION 5.51.3
They held our men in such contempt that, because the gates had been barricaded for appearance’s sake with only a single row of turf blocks and they did not think they could force their way through them, some began tearing down the rampart with their hands while others began filling the ditches.

SECTION 5.51.4
Then Caesar launched a sortie from every gate and sent out the cavalry, quickly putting the enemy to flight so completely that not one of them made any attempt to stand and fight. He killed a great number of them and stripped them all of their weapons.

CHAPTER 5.52

SECTION 5.52.1
Caesar was afraid to pursue them farther because woods and marshes lay in the way, and he saw no opportunity to inflict even slight additional losses on them. With all his forces unharmed, he reached Cicero that same day.

SECTION 5.52.2
He was astonished by the towers, covered assault sheds, and fortifications the enemy had constructed. When the legion was paraded before him, he found that not one soldier in ten remained unwounded.

SECTION 5.52.3
From all these facts he judged how great the danger had been and how courageously the operation had been conducted.

SECTION 5.52.4
He praised Cicero as his achievement deserved and highly commended the legion. He addressed individually the centurions and military tribunes whose exceptional courage he had learned of from Cicero’s testimony. From prisoners he obtained more definite information about the fate of Sabinus and Cotta.

SECTION 5.52.5
The next day he called an assembly, presented an account of what had happened, and consoled and encouraged the soldiers.

SECTION 5.52.6
He explained that the loss caused by the lieutenant’s error and recklessness should be borne with greater composure because, through the favor of the immortal gods and their own courage, the disaster had been avenged, leaving the enemy no lasting joy and themselves no prolonged grief.

CHAPTER 5.53

SECTION 5.53.1
Meanwhile, news of Caesar’s victory was carried through the Remi to Labienus with incredible speed. Although he was about sixty miles from Cicero’s winter quarters and Caesar had not reached Cicero until after the ninth hour of the day, before midnight shouting arose at the gates of Labienus’s camp, by which the Remi announced the victory and offered him their congratulations.

SECTION 5.53.2
When this report reached the Treveri, Indutiomarus, who had decided to attack Labienus’s camp the next day, fled during the night and led all his forces back into the territory of the Treveri.

SECTION 5.53.3
Caesar sent Fabius and his legion back to their winter quarters. He himself decided to winter with three legions in three separate winter camps around Samarobriva, and because such great disturbances had arisen throughout Gaul, he determined to remain personally with the army for the entire winter.

SECTION 5.53.4
For when the news of the disaster and Sabinus’s death reached them, nearly all the states of Gaul were deliberating about war, sending messengers and delegations in every direction, investigating what further course they should take and where the war should begin, and holding councils at night in isolated places.

SECTION 5.53.5
Almost no part of the entire winter passed without causing Caesar anxiety, for he was constantly receiving some report about the plans and movements of the Gauls.

SECTION 5.53.6
Among these reports, Lucius Roscius, whom Caesar had placed in command of the Thirteenth Legion, informed him that large forces of Gauls from the states called the Armorican states had assembled to attack him

SECTION 5.53.7
and had been no more than eight miles from his winter quarters, but that, when news arrived of Caesar’s victory, they had withdrawn so rapidly that their departure looked like a rout.

CHAPTER 5.54

SECTION 5.54.1
But Caesar summoned the leading men of each state to meet with him and kept a large part of Gaul obedient, in some cases by frightening them when he warned them that he knew what was going on, and in others by encouraging them.

SECTION 5.54.2
Nevertheless, the Senones, a state that was among the strongest and possessed great authority among the Gauls, made a public decision to attempt to kill Cavarinus, whom Caesar had appointed king over them. Cavarinus’s brother Moritasgus had held the kingship when Caesar arrived in Gaul, as had his ancestors. When Cavarinus discovered the plot and fled, they pursued him all the way to the borders of their territory,

SECTION 5.54.3
drove him from his kingdom and home, and sent envoys to Caesar to make amends; but when Caesar ordered their entire senate to come before him, they did not obey his command.

SECTION 5.54.4
Among these barbarous people, the mere fact that some leaders had been found willing to begin a war had such influence and produced such a complete change in everyone’s attitude that, apart from the Aedui and Remi, whom Caesar had always treated with special honor—the former because of their old and unbroken loyalty to the Roman people, the latter because of their recent services in the Gallic War—there was hardly a state that we did not regard with suspicion.

SECTION 5.54.5
I hardly know whether this should be considered surprising. There were many other reasons, but the chief one was that these men, who were ranked above all other peoples for courage in war, deeply resented having lost so much of that reputation that they now had to submit to the commands of the Roman people.

CHAPTER 5.55

SECTION 5.55.1
The Treveri and Indutiomarus, however, let no part of the entire winter pass without sending envoys across the Rhine, stirring up the states there, promising money, and declaring that, since a large part of our army had been destroyed, only a much smaller part remained.

SECTION 5.55.2
Nevertheless, no German state could be persuaded to cross the Rhine. They said that they had tried their luck twice, in the war of Ariovistus and during the crossing of the Tencteri, and would not test fortune again. Though disappointed in this hope, Indutiomarus nevertheless began to gather forces,

SECTION 5.55.3
train them, obtain horses from neighboring peoples, and attract exiles and condemned men from all over Gaul by offering them large rewards.

SECTION 5.55.4
By these measures he had already acquired such authority in Gaul that delegations came to him from every direction, publicly and privately seeking his favor and friendship.

CHAPTER 5.56

SECTION 5.56.1
When he realized that people were coming to him of their own accord, that the Senones and Carnutes were being driven on by their guilty awareness of what they had done, that the Nervii and Aduatuci were preparing for war against the Romans, and that he would have no shortage of volunteers if he began to advance beyond his own territory, he summoned an armed council. By Gallic custom, this marks the beginning of a war,

SECTION 5.56.2
and under their common law all adult males customarily assemble there under arms. The last of them to arrive is tortured to death in sight of the assembled crowd.

SECTION 5.56.3
At this council Indutiomarus declared Cingetorix—his own son-in-law and the leader of the opposing faction, who, as stated above, had remained loyal to Caesar and had not deserted him—a public enemy, and confiscated his property.

SECTION 5.56.4
After completing these measures, he announced in the council that the Senones, Carnutes, and many other Gallic states had summoned him;

SECTION 5.56.5
that he would go to them through the territory of the Remi and ravage their lands; and that before doing so he would attack Labienus’s camp. He issued orders for what he wanted done.

CHAPTER 5.57

SECTION 5.57.1
Because the natural position of his camp and its fortifications made it extremely secure, Labienus had no fear for either himself or his legion. Instead, he was considering how not to let any opportunity for a successful action escape him.

SECTION 5.57.2
Accordingly, after learning from Cingetorix and his relatives what Indutiomarus had said in the council, he sent messengers to the neighboring states and summoned cavalry from every direction, setting a definite day for them to assemble.

SECTION 5.57.3
Meanwhile, Indutiomarus roamed around beneath his camp almost every day with all his cavalry, sometimes to examine the camp’s position and sometimes to seek a conference or intimidate the Romans. Usually all his cavalrymen hurled missiles inside the rampart.

SECTION 5.57.4
Labienus kept his men inside the fortifications and did everything he could to strengthen the impression that he was afraid.

CHAPTER 5.58

SECTION 5.58.1
As Indutiomarus approached the camp each day with increasing contempt, Labienus admitted during a single night the cavalrymen from all the neighboring states whom he had arranged to summon. He then kept all his men inside the camp under guard with such care that there was no possible way for the matter to be reported or the news to reach the Treveri.

SECTION 5.58.2
Meanwhile, following his daily custom, Indutiomarus approached the camp and spent a large part of the day there. His cavalrymen hurled missiles and, with highly insulting language, challenged our men to fight.

SECTION 5.58.3
When our men made no reply, the enemy, when they thought it appropriate, withdrew toward evening, scattered and dispersed.

SECTION 5.58.4
Suddenly Labienus sent all his cavalry out through two gates. He gave strict orders that, once the terrified enemy had been put to flight—which he foresaw would happen, just as it did—they must all make for Indutiomarus alone, and that no one was to wound anyone else before seeing him killed. Labienus did not want Indutiomarus to gain time to escape because of a delay caused by pursuit of the others. He offered large rewards to those who killed him

SECTION 5.58.5
and sent cohorts forward to support the cavalry.

SECTION 5.58.6
Fortune confirmed the wisdom of his plan. Since everyone made for Indutiomarus alone, he was caught and killed at the very ford of the river, and his head was carried back to the camp. On their return, the cavalrymen pursued and killed all those they could.

SECTION 5.58.7
When this became known, all the forces of the Eburones and Nervii that had assembled withdrew, and for a short time after this event Caesar found Gaul somewhat quieter.

### Book 6

CHAPTER 6.1

SECTION 6.1.1
For many reasons Caesar expected a greater uprising in Gaul, and he instructed his legates Marcus Silanus, Gaius Antistius Reginus, and Titus Sextius to conduct a levy.

SECTION 6.1.2
At the same time he asked the proconsul Gnaeus Pompey, who, for reasons of state, was remaining near Rome while retaining military command, to order the men from Cisalpine Gaul whom he had sworn into service as consul

SECTION 6.1.3
to assemble under the standards and march to Caesar. Caesar believed that, with a view to what the Gauls would think in the future as well, it was very important that Italy’s resources appear so great that, if any loss were suffered in war, it could not only be repaired quickly but could even be made good with a larger force.

SECTION 6.1.4
Pompey granted this request both for the sake of the state and out of friendship. The levy was quickly completed by his officers, and before winter had ended three legions were formed and brought to Caesar. By doubling the number of cohorts he had lost with Quintus Titurius, Caesar demonstrated, through both the speed and the size of the mobilization, what the discipline and resources of the Roman people could accomplish.

CHAPTER 6.2

SECTION 6.2.1
After Indutiomarus was killed, as we have related, the Treveri transferred command to his relatives. They did not stop trying to stir up the neighboring Germans and promising them money. When they could not persuade those nearest to them,

SECTION 6.2.2
they approached more distant peoples. After finding several states willing to join them, they bound one another by oath and gave hostages as security for payment. They also joined Ambiorix to themselves by an alliance and treaty.

SECTION 6.2.3
When Caesar learned of these developments, he saw that war was being prepared everywhere: the Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii, together with all the Germans on this side of the Rhine, were under arms; the Senones were not appearing as ordered and were coordinating their plans with the Carnutes and neighboring states; and the Treveri were trying to stir up the Germans by sending repeated delegations. He therefore thought that he had to make preparations for war earlier than usual.

CHAPTER 6.3

SECTION 6.3.1
Accordingly, before winter was over, he assembled the four nearest legions and unexpectedly hurried into the territory of the Nervii.

SECTION 6.3.2
Before they could either assemble or flee, he captured a large number of livestock and people, gave that plunder to the soldiers, devastated the fields, and forced the Nervii to surrender and give him hostages.

SECTION 6.3.3
After quickly completing this operation, he led the legions back to winter quarters.

SECTION 6.3.4
At the beginning of spring he summoned a council of Gaul, as he had determined. When all the others came except the Senones, Carnutes, and Treveri, he considered their absence the beginning of war and rebellion. To show that he was putting everything else aside, he transferred the council to Lutetia, a town of the Parisii.

SECTION 6.3.5
The Parisii bordered the Senones and within living memory had formed a single state with them, but they were believed to have had no part in this plan.

SECTION 6.3.6
After announcing this decision from the tribunal, Caesar set out that same day with the legions against the Senones and reached their territory by forced marches.

CHAPTER 6.4

SECTION 6.4.1
When Acco, who had been the chief author of this plan, learned of Caesar’s arrival, he ordered the population to assemble in the fortified towns. While they were attempting to do so, before it could be accomplished, word came that the Romans were already there.

SECTION 6.4.2
They were forced to abandon their plan and sent envoys to Caesar to beg for mercy. They approached him through the Aedui, under whose protection their state had been since ancient times.

SECTION 6.4.3
At the Aedui’s request Caesar willingly pardoned them and accepted their excuses, because he believed that the summer season was a time for the impending war, not for conducting an investigation.

SECTION 6.4.4
He demanded one hundred hostages and handed them over to the Aedui for safekeeping.

SECTION 6.4.5
The Carnutes also sent envoys and hostages to the same place, employing the Remi, whose clients they were, as intercessors. They received the same answer.

SECTION 6.4.6
Caesar concluded the council and ordered the states to provide cavalry.

CHAPTER 6.5

SECTION 6.5.1
With this part of Gaul pacified, Caesar directed his whole mind and attention to the war against the Treveri and Ambiorix.

SECTION 6.5.2
He ordered Cavarinus to accompany him with the cavalry of the Senones, to prevent any uprising from occurring because of Cavarinus’s irascibility or because of the hatred his conduct had earned him among his people.

SECTION 6.5.3
After making these arrangements, Caesar took it as certain that Ambiorix would not fight a pitched battle, and he considered what other plans Ambiorix might adopt.

SECTION 6.5.4
The Menapii lived near the territory of the Eburones and were protected by endless marshes and forests. They alone among the Gauls had never sent envoys to Caesar to negotiate peace. Caesar knew that Ambiorix had ties of hospitality with them, and he had also learned that Ambiorix had entered into friendship with the Germans through the Treveri.

SECTION 6.5.5
He believed that these sources of assistance had to be taken away from Ambiorix before he attacked the man himself, so that, despairing of his safety, Ambiorix would not either hide among the Menapii or be driven to join the peoples across the Rhine.

SECTION 6.5.6
Having adopted this plan, Caesar sent the baggage of the entire army to Labienus in the territory of the Treveri and ordered two legions to march to him. Caesar himself set out against the Menapii with five legions unencumbered by baggage.

SECTION 6.5.7
The Menapii assembled no army but, relying on the protection afforded by the terrain, fled into the forests and marshes and carried their possessions there as well.

CHAPTER 6.6

SECTION 6.6.1
Caesar divided his forces with the legate Gaius Fabius and the quaestor Marcus Crassus and, after bridges had quickly been constructed, advanced in three divisions. He burned houses and villages and captured a large number of livestock and people.

SECTION 6.6.2
Compelled by these actions, the Menapii sent envoys to him to ask for peace.

SECTION 6.6.3
After receiving hostages, Caesar declared that he would treat them as enemies if they admitted either Ambiorix or his envoys into their territory. Once these arrangements were confirmed, he left Commius the Atrebatian among the Menapii with cavalry to serve as a guard, while he himself set out for the territory of the Treveri.

CHAPTER 6.7

SECTION 6.7.1
While Caesar was carrying out these operations, the Treveri assembled large forces of infantry and cavalry and prepared to attack Labienus, who had wintered in their territory with a single legion.

SECTION 6.7.2
They were already no more than a two-day march from him when they learned that two legions sent by Caesar had arrived.

SECTION 6.7.3
They established a camp fifteen miles away and decided to wait for German reinforcements.

SECTION 6.7.4
When Labienus learned of the enemy’s plan, he hoped their recklessness would provide an opportunity to fight. Leaving five cohorts to guard the baggage, he advanced against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts and a large force of cavalry, and fortified a camp with a distance of one mile between the two armies.

SECTION 6.7.5
Between Labienus and the enemy was a river that was difficult to cross and had steep banks. He had no intention of crossing it himself and did not think that the enemy would cross it either.

SECTION 6.7.6
Their hope of receiving reinforcements grew daily. Labienus openly declared at a council that, since the Germans were said to be approaching, he would not place his own fortunes and those of the army at risk, and that he would break camp at first light the next day. This information was quickly carried to the enemy,

SECTION 6.7.7
since, given the large number of Gallic cavalrymen, it was natural that some of them would favor the Gallic cause.

SECTION 6.7.8
During the night Labienus summoned the military tribunes and senior centurions, explained his plan, and, to make the enemy more readily suspect that the Romans were afraid, ordered the camp to be broken with more noise and confusion than was customary in the Roman army. By these measures he made their departure look like a rout.

SECTION 6.7.9
Because the camps were so close together, this information too was carried by scouts to the enemy before dawn.

CHAPTER 6.8

SECTION 6.8.1
The rear of the column had scarcely passed beyond the fortifications when the Gauls urged one another not to let the plunder they had hoped for slip from their hands. They said that it would take too long to wait for German reinforcements when the Romans were terrified, and that their honor did not permit them, with such large forces, to hesitate to attack so small a body of men, especially when they were fleeing and encumbered. They therefore did not hesitate to cross the river and begin battle on unfavorable ground.

SECTION 6.8.2
Labienus had anticipated this. To lure them all across to his side of the river, he continued the same pretense of marching away and advanced slowly.

SECTION 6.8.3
Then, after sending the baggage a short distance ahead and positioning it on a hill, he said, “Soldiers, you have the opportunity you wanted. You have the enemy trapped on difficult and unfavorable ground.

SECTION 6.8.4
Show us, your commanders, the same courage you have so often shown your commander-in-chief, and imagine that he is here and is witnessing these events in person.”

SECTION 6.8.5
At the same time he ordered the standards to be turned toward the enemy and the battle line to be formed. He detached a few squadrons to guard the baggage and stationed the rest of the cavalry on the flanks.

SECTION 6.8.6
Our men quickly raised a shout and hurled their javelins at the enemy. When the Gauls unexpectedly saw the men they had believed were fleeing advancing against them with hostile standards, they could not withstand even the charge. They were put to flight at the first clash and made for the nearest woods.

SECTION 6.8.7
Labienus pursued them with the cavalry, killed a great number, captured several, and within a few days regained control of the state. For when the Germans who were coming to their aid learned of the Treveri’s flight, they returned home.

SECTION 6.8.8
The relatives of Indutiomarus, who had been the instigators of the revolt, accompanied them and left the state.

SECTION 6.8.9
The chief position and governing authority were handed over to Cingetorix, who, as we have shown, had remained loyal from the beginning.

CHAPTER 6.9

SECTION 6.9.1
After Caesar came from the territory of the Menapii into that of the Treveri, he decided to cross the Rhine for two reasons. One was that the Germans had sent reinforcements to the Treveri against him;

SECTION 6.9.2
the other was to prevent Ambiorix from finding refuge among them.

SECTION 6.9.3
Having made these decisions, he began building a bridge a little above the place where he had previously taken his army across.

SECTION 6.9.4
Because the method was known and established, and the soldiers worked with great enthusiasm, the project was completed within a few days.

SECTION 6.9.5
He left a strong garrison among the Treveri at the bridge, to prevent any sudden uprising by them, and took the rest of his forces and the cavalry across.

SECTION 6.9.6
The Ubii, who had previously given hostages and surrendered, sent envoys to him to clear themselves of blame. They explained that no reinforcements had been sent from their state to the Treveri and that they had not broken faith.

SECTION 6.9.7
They begged and implored him to spare them, so that in the general hatred of the Germans the innocent would not suffer punishment for the guilty. If he wanted more hostages, they promised to provide them.

SECTION 6.9.8
After investigating the matter, Caesar discovered that the reinforcements had been sent by the Suebi. He accepted the Ubii’s explanation and began making inquiries about the approaches and routes into the territory of the Suebi.

CHAPTER 6.10

SECTION 6.10.1
Meanwhile, a few days later, the Ubii informed him that all the Suebi were concentrating their forces in one place and ordering the peoples under their rule to send reinforcements of infantry and cavalry.

SECTION 6.10.2
On learning this, he made provisions for the grain supply and selected a suitable place for a camp. He ordered the Ubii to drive in their livestock and bring all their possessions from the countryside into their towns, hoping that these barbarous and inexperienced men, driven by a shortage of food, could be induced to fight under unfavorable conditions.

SECTION 6.10.3
He instructed them to send frequent scouts among the Suebi and learn what was happening there.

SECTION 6.10.4
They carried out his orders and, after a few days had passed, reported that when more definite news of the Roman army arrived, all the Suebi, with all their own forces and those of their allies that they had assembled, had withdrawn far into the remotest parts of their territory.

SECTION 6.10.5
There was, they said, a forest of immense size there called Bacenis. It extended far into the interior and, standing like a natural wall, protected the Cherusci from the Suebi and the Suebi from the Cherusci, preventing injuries and raids by either side. The Suebi had decided to await the Romans’ arrival at the edge of this forest.

CHAPTER 6.11

SECTION 6.11.1
Since the narrative has reached this point, it does not seem inappropriate to describe the customs of Gaul and Germany and how these peoples differ from one another.

SECTION 6.11.2
In Gaul there are factions not only in every state and in every district and subdivision, but almost even in individual households. The leaders of these factions are

SECTION 6.11.3
those who are considered, in the judgment of their people, to possess the greatest authority, and it is to their decision and judgment that the final determination of all affairs and policies is referred.

SECTION 6.11.4
This arrangement appears to have been established in ancient times so that no one among the common people would lack assistance against someone more powerful. For no leader allows his own followers to be oppressed or defrauded, and if he acts otherwise, he has no authority at all among them.

SECTION 6.11.5
The same system exists at the highest level throughout all Gaul, for all the states are divided into two parties.

CHAPTER 6.12

SECTION 6.12.1
When Caesar came into Gaul, the leaders of one faction were the Aedui, and those of the other were the Sequani.

SECTION 6.12.2
Because the Sequani were weaker by themselves, since supreme authority had traditionally belonged to the Aedui and their network of dependents was extensive, they had allied themselves with the Germans and Ariovistus and had brought them over by making great sacrifices and promises.

SECTION 6.12.3
But after fighting several successful battles and killing all the Aeduan nobility, they had so far surpassed the Aedui in power

SECTION 6.12.4
that they transferred a large proportion of the Aedui’s dependents to themselves, took the sons of their leading men as hostages, forced the Aedui as a state to swear that they would undertake no action against the Sequani, seized by force and retained part of the neighboring territory, and gained supremacy over all Gaul.

SECTION 6.12.5
Driven by this desperate situation, Diviciacus had gone to Rome to seek assistance from the Senate, but had returned without accomplishing his purpose.

SECTION 6.12.6
Caesar’s arrival brought about a reversal of circumstances: the hostages were returned to the Aedui, their old dependent relationships were restored, and new ones were acquired through Caesar, because those who had joined themselves in friendship to the Aedui

SECTION 6.12.7
saw that they enjoyed better conditions and more just government. Since in other respects as well the Aedui’s influence and standing had increased, the Sequani had lost their supremacy. The Remi had taken their place. Because it was understood that they possessed influence with Caesar equal to that of the Aedui, those who could not possibly unite with the Aedui because of long-standing hostilities placed themselves under the patronage of the Remi.

SECTION 6.12.8
The Remi carefully protected them, and in this way maintained their new and suddenly acquired authority.

SECTION 6.12.9
The situation at that time was that the Aedui were considered by far the foremost people, while the Remi held the second-highest position in standing.

CHAPTER 6.13

SECTION 6.13.1
Throughout Gaul there are two classes of people who possess any standing and honor. The common people are regarded as little better than slaves: they dare do nothing on their own and are consulted on no matter.

SECTION 6.13.2
Most of them, when burdened by debt, heavy taxation, or oppression by the powerful, bind themselves in servitude to nobles, who then have all the same rights over them that masters have over slaves.

SECTION 6.13.3
Of these two privileged classes, one is that of the Druids and the other that of the knights.

SECTION 6.13.4
The Druids take part in religious matters, supervise public and private sacrifices, and interpret religious doctrine. Large numbers of young men come to them for instruction, and they are held in great honor among the Gauls.

SECTION 6.13.5
For they decide almost all public and private disputes. If a crime has been committed, if a killing has occurred, or if there is a dispute about an inheritance or boundaries, they too make the decision and determine rewards and penalties.

SECTION 6.13.6
If any individual or community refuses to abide by their ruling, they ban them from participating in sacrifices. Among the Gauls this is the most severe punishment.

SECTION 6.13.7
Those who have been placed under such a ban are regarded as godless criminals. Everyone avoids them and shuns contact and conversation with them, for fear of suffering some harm from the contagion. They receive no justice when they seek it, nor are they allowed to share in any public honor.

SECTION 6.13.8
One man presides over all these Druids and possesses supreme authority among them.

SECTION 6.13.9
When he dies, he is succeeded either by whoever among the others is preeminent in standing or, if several are equal, by the vote of the Druids. Sometimes they even fight with weapons for the supreme position.

SECTION 6.13.10
At a fixed time of year, they assemble at a consecrated place in the territory of the Carnutes, a region regarded as the center of all Gaul. Everyone who has a dispute gathers there from every direction and submits to their decisions and judgments.

SECTION 6.13.11
Their system of instruction is thought to have originated in Britain and to have been brought from there into Gaul,

SECTION 6.13.12
and even now those who wish to acquire a more thorough knowledge of it generally travel there to study.

CHAPTER 6.14

SECTION 6.14.1
The Druids customarily take no part in war and do not pay taxes along with the rest. They are exempt from military service and from all other obligations.

SECTION 6.14.2
Attracted by such great privileges, many come to receive their instruction of their own accord, while others are sent by their parents and relatives.

SECTION 6.14.3
They are said to memorize a great number of verses there. As a result, some remain under instruction for twenty years.

SECTION 6.14.4
They do not consider it religiously permissible to commit these teachings to writing, although in nearly all other matters, both public and private accounts, they use Greek letters. They seem to me to have established this practice for two reasons: because they do not want their teachings to be made public, and because they do not want students who rely on writing to devote less effort to memory. That generally happens to most people: with the support of written texts, they relax their diligence in learning thoroughly and weaken their memory.

SECTION 6.14.5
Above all, they seek to persuade people that souls do not die but pass after death from one person to another, and they believe that this doctrine especially inspires courage because it causes people to disregard the fear of death.

SECTION 6.14.6
They also discuss and teach the young many things concerning the stars and their movements, the size of the universe and the earth, the nature of things, and the strength and power of the immortal gods.

CHAPTER 6.15

SECTION 6.15.1
The other class is that of the knights. Whenever the need arises and a war occurs—which before Caesar’s arrival used to happen almost every year, either because the Gauls themselves were inflicting injuries or because they were repelling injuries inflicted on them—they all take part in the war.

SECTION 6.15.2
The more distinguished any one of them is by birth and wealth, the more retainers and dependents he has around him. This is the only form of influence and power they recognize.

CHAPTER 6.16

SECTION 6.16.1
The entire Gallic people is extremely devoted to religious observances,

SECTION 6.16.2
and for that reason those afflicted with severe illnesses, as well as those engaged in battles and dangers, either sacrifice human beings as victims or vow that they will sacrifice them, and they employ the Druids to conduct these sacrifices, because they believe that unless a human life is given in return for a human life,

SECTION 6.16.3
the divine power of the immortal gods cannot be appeased. They also have state-sponsored sacrifices of the same kind. Some have figures of enormous size

SECTION 6.16.4
whose limbs, woven from branches, they fill with living people. These are set on fire, and the people enclosed within them die surrounded by the flames.

SECTION 6.16.5
They believe that the execution of people caught committing theft, robbery, or some other crime is more pleasing to the immortal gods; but when they have no supply of such people, they resort even to executing the innocent.

CHAPTER 6.17

SECTION 6.17.1
The god they worship most is Mercury. They have very many images of him. They declare that he invented all the arts, regard him as the guide of roads and journeys, and believe that he has the greatest power over making money and conducting trade. After him they worship Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva.

SECTION 6.17.2
Their beliefs about these gods are much the same as those of other peoples: Apollo drives away diseases, Minerva teaches the foundations of crafts and trades, Jupiter rules the heavens, and Mars governs wars.

SECTION 6.17.3
When they have decided to fight a battle, they generally dedicate to Mars whatever they capture in war. When they are victorious, they sacrifice the captured animals and collect the remaining spoils in one place.

SECTION 6.17.4
In many states, piles of these objects can be seen heaped up in consecrated places.

SECTION 6.17.5
It rarely happens that anyone dares, in defiance of religious obligation, either to conceal captured property in his home or to remove anything from the piles. The severest punishment, accompanied by torture, has been established for such an offense.

CHAPTER 6.18

SECTION 6.18.1
All the Gauls proclaim that they are descended from Dis Pater, and they say this tradition has been handed down by the Druids.

SECTION 6.18.2
For this reason they measure every period of time not by the number of days but by the number of nights. They observe birthdays and the beginnings of months and years in such a way that night is followed by day.

SECTION 6.18.3
In their other customs of life they differ from most other peoples chiefly in this: they do not allow their sons to approach them openly until the boys have grown old enough to bear the obligations of military service, and they consider it shameful for a son still of boyish age to stand in public in his father’s sight.

CHAPTER 6.19

SECTION 6.19.1
Whatever amount of money husbands receive from their wives as dowries, they assess an equal amount from their own property and add it to the dowry.

SECTION 6.19.2
A joint account is kept of all this money, and the profits are saved. Whichever spouse outlives the other receives both shares together with the profits accumulated in previous years.

SECTION 6.19.3
Husbands have the power of life and death over their wives, just as they do over their children. When the head of a distinguished family dies, his relatives gather and, if the circumstances of his death arouse suspicion, interrogate his wives under torture as they would slaves. If guilt is established, they kill the wives after subjecting them to excruciating torture by fire and every other means.

SECTION 6.19.4
Gallic funerals are magnificent and costly by Gallic standards. They throw into the fire everything they believe was dear to the dead while they were alive, even animals; and until shortly before our own time, slaves and dependents known to have been loved by the dead were cremated with them after the regular funeral rites had been completed.

CHAPTER 6.20

SECTION 6.20.1
The states considered to conduct their public affairs more effectively have a law requiring that if anyone hears anything concerning the state from neighbors, whether by rumor or report, he must convey it to a magistrate and not communicate it to anyone else,

SECTION 6.20.2
because experience has shown that rash and ignorant people are often frightened by false rumors, driven to criminal action, and induced to make decisions about matters of the greatest importance.

SECTION 6.20.3
The magistrates conceal whatever information they think should be concealed and disclose to the people whatever they judge useful. No one is permitted to speak about public affairs except in an assembly.

CHAPTER 6.21

SECTION 6.21.1
The Germans differ greatly from this way of life. They have no Druids to preside over religious matters and show no particular interest in sacrifices.

SECTION 6.21.2
They count among the gods only those they can see and by whose powers they are plainly helped: the Sun, Vulcan, and the Moon. Of the other gods they have not even heard by report.

SECTION 6.21.3
Their whole life consists of hunting and the pursuit of military training. From childhood they apply themselves to labor and hardship. Those who remain sexually abstinent the longest

SECTION 6.21.4
receive the greatest praise among their people. Some believe that this increases height, while others believe it strengthens physical power and sinews.

SECTION 6.21.5
They regard it as utterly shameful for a man to have had sexual relations with a woman before the age of twenty. There is no concealment of such matters, because men and women bathe together indiscriminately in rivers and use animal skins or small coverings of fur, leaving a large part of the body naked.

CHAPTER 6.22

SECTION 6.22.1
They do not devote themselves to agriculture, and the greater part of their food consists of milk, cheese, and meat.

SECTION 6.22.2
No one possesses a fixed amount of land or private boundaries. Instead, each year the magistrates and leading men assign as much land as they think appropriate, and in whatever location they choose, to tribes and kinship groups that have assembled together, and the following year they compel them to move elsewhere.

SECTION 6.22.3
They offer many reasons for this practice: to prevent people from becoming attached through long habit and exchanging their enthusiasm for warfare for agriculture; to prevent them from seeking to acquire extensive territories and the more powerful from driving the weaker from their holdings; to prevent them from building houses too carefully designed to avoid cold and heat; to prevent any desire for money from arising, since that gives birth to factions and dissensions;

SECTION 6.22.4
and to keep the common people contented, since each man sees that his wealth is equal to that of the most powerful.

CHAPTER 6.23

SECTION 6.23.1
For a tribe, the greatest distinction is to have as broad an uninhabited region as possible around its borders after laying waste the neighboring lands.

SECTION 6.23.2
They regard it as a special mark of courage when their neighbors, driven from their lands, withdraw and no one dares settle nearby.

SECTION 6.23.3
At the same time, they believe that they will be safer because the fear of a sudden incursion has been removed.

SECTION 6.23.4
When a tribe either defends itself against an attack or wages an offensive war, officials are chosen to command that war and are given power of life and death.

SECTION 6.23.5
In peacetime there is no common magistrate, but the leading men of the regions and districts administer justice among their own people and settle disputes.

SECTION 6.23.6
Raids carried out beyond the borders of one’s own tribe bring no disgrace, and they declare that these are conducted to train the young men and reduce idleness.

SECTION 6.23.7
And whenever one of the leading men announces in an assembly that he will be the leader and calls on those willing to follow him to declare themselves, those who approve both the cause and the man rise, promise their assistance, and are loudly praised by the crowd.

SECTION 6.23.8
Those among them who then fail to follow are regarded as deserters and traitors, and afterward no one trusts them in any matter.

SECTION 6.23.9
They consider it a sacrilege to harm a guest. Those who come to them for any reason are protected from injury and regarded as sacred; every home is open to them, and food is shared with them.

CHAPTER 6.24

SECTION 6.24.1
There was once a time when the Gauls surpassed the Germans in courage, launched wars against them unprovoked, and, because of their large population and shortage of land, sent colonies across the Rhine.

SECTION 6.24.2
Accordingly, the Volcae Tectosages occupied and settled the most fertile regions of Germany around the Hercynian Forest, which I find was known by report to Eratosthenes and certain other Greeks, who call it the Orcynian Forest.

SECTION 6.24.3
That people has remained in these settlements down to the present time and has the highest reputation for justice and military prowess.

SECTION 6.24.4
Now, because the Germans remain in the same poverty, privation, and endurance, and use the same food and care of the body, while proximity to the provinces and knowledge of goods from overseas provide the Gauls with many luxuries and conveniences,

SECTION 6.24.6
the Gauls have gradually become accustomed to defeat, and after being beaten in many battles, they do not even compare themselves with the Germans in courage.

CHAPTER 6.25

SECTION 6.25.1
The breadth of this Hercynian Forest, which was mentioned above, extends across a nine-day journey for a traveler without baggage; it cannot be measured in any other way, since they do not know measurements of distance.

SECTION 6.25.2
It begins at the borders of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci and extends in a straight line along the course of the Danube to the borders of the Dacians and Anartes.

SECTION 6.25.3
From there it turns left, away from the river into different regions, and because of its great size it reaches the borders of many peoples.

SECTION 6.25.4
There is no one in this part of Germany who can say that he has reached the beginning of that forest even after traveling for sixty days, or who has learned where it begins.

SECTION 6.25.5
It is well established that many kinds of wild animals are found there that have not been seen elsewhere. The following are those that differ most from other animals and seem worthy of being recorded.

CHAPTER 6.26

SECTION 6.26.1
There is an ox shaped like a deer, from the middle of whose forehead, between the ears, rises a single horn, taller and straighter than the horns known to us. From its top, projections spread widely like the leaves and branches of a palm tree. The female and male have the same characteristics, and their horns are identical in shape and size.

CHAPTER 6.27

SECTION 6.27.1
There are also animals called elks. In shape and the mottling of their hides they resemble goats, but they are somewhat larger, have no horns, and have legs without joints or articulations.

SECTION 6.27.2
They do not lie down to rest, and if they are knocked down by some accident, they cannot rise or lift themselves up.

SECTION 6.27.3
Trees serve as their beds: they lean against them and, reclining only slightly in this way, take their rest.

SECTION 6.27.4
When hunters discover from their tracks where they are accustomed to retreat, they either undermine all the trees in that place at the roots or cut into them just enough to leave them looking as though they were still standing. When the elks lean against them out of habit,

SECTION 6.27.5
they knock down the weakened trees with their weight and fall along with them.

CHAPTER 6.28

SECTION 6.28.1
A third kind of animal is the one called the aurochs. These are slightly smaller than elephants and have the appearance, color, and shape of a bull.

SECTION 6.28.2
They possess great strength and great speed, and they spare neither any person nor any wild animal they see. The Germans diligently trap them in pits and kill them.

SECTION 6.28.3
The young men toughen themselves through this exertion and train themselves by this kind of hunting. Those who have killed the greatest number of them bring the horns forward in public as evidence and receive great praise.

SECTION 6.28.4
But even when captured as calves, they cannot become accustomed to human beings or be tamed.

SECTION 6.28.5
The size, shape, and appearance of their horns differ greatly from the horns of our cattle.

SECTION 6.28.6
They carefully seek out these horns, bind their rims with silver, and use them as drinking cups at their most lavish banquets.

CHAPTER 6.29

SECTION 6.29.1
After Caesar learned through Ubii scouts that the Suebi had withdrawn into the forests, he feared a shortage of grain because, as we explained above, the Germans as a whole have very little interest in agriculture, and decided not to advance any farther. But

SECTION 6.29.2
to avoid entirely relieving the barbarians of their fear that he might return, and to delay their reinforcements, he withdrew his army and demolished the last section of the bridge,

SECTION 6.29.3
which touched the bank of the Ubii, for a length of two hundred feet. At the end of the bridge he built a four-story tower, stationed a guard of twelve cohorts to defend the bridge, and fortified the position with extensive defenses. He placed the young Gaius Volcatius Tullus in command of the position and its garrison.

SECTION 6.29.4
When the grain began to ripen, Caesar himself set out for the war against Ambiorix through the Ardennes Forest, which is the largest in all Gaul, extends from the banks of the Rhine and the borders of the Treveri to the Nervii, and stretches for more than five hundred miles. He sent Lucius Minucius Basilus ahead with all the cavalry to see whether he could accomplish anything through the speed of his march and the favorable timing.

SECTION 6.29.5
He warned him to forbid fires from being lit in camp, so that no indication of his approach could be seen from a distance, and said that he himself would follow immediately.

CHAPTER 6.30

SECTION 6.30.1
Basilus did as ordered. After completing the march quickly and contrary to everyone’s expectations, he caught many people in the fields by surprise. On information from them, he hurried toward Ambiorix himself, who was said to be at a certain place with a few cavalrymen.

SECTION 6.30.2
Fortune has great power in every sphere, but especially in war. Just as it was by a remarkable accident that Basilus came upon Ambiorix himself when he was off his guard and unprepared, and that his arrival was seen by everyone before rumor or a messenger reported it, so it was a stroke of great good fortune that Ambiorix escaped death after all the military equipment he had around him was seized and his wagons and horses were captured. But this escape also occurred because

SECTION 6.30.3
the building was surrounded by woods, as Gallic homes generally are, since the Gauls usually seek the vicinity of forests and rivers to avoid the heat, and his companions and close associates held off the force of our cavalry for a short time in a narrow place.

SECTION 6.30.4
While they were fighting, one of his men put him on a horse, and the woods concealed him as he fled. Thus fortune played a great part both in bringing him into danger and in allowing him to escape it.

CHAPTER 6.31

SECTION 6.31.1
It is uncertain whether Ambiorix deliberately did not assemble his forces because he did not think he should fight a pitched battle, or whether he lacked the time and was prevented by the cavalry’s sudden arrival, since he believed that the rest of the army was following.

SECTION 6.31.2
But in any case, he sent messengers throughout the countryside and ordered every man to look after himself. Some of them fled into the Ardennes Forest and others into the vast marshes.

SECTION 6.31.3
Those nearest the Ocean concealed themselves on the islands that the tides regularly form.

SECTION 6.31.4
Many left their own territory and entrusted themselves and all their possessions to complete strangers.

SECTION 6.31.5
Catuvolcus, king of half the Eburones, who had joined Ambiorix in forming the plan, was now worn out by age and could not endure the hardships either of war or of flight. After cursing Ambiorix with every imprecation for having devised the plan, he killed himself with yew, which is abundant in Gaul and Germany.

CHAPTER 6.32

SECTION 6.32.1
The Segni and Condrusi, peoples of German origin and number who live between the Eburones and Treveri, sent envoys to Caesar to beg him not to regard them as enemies or judge that all the Germans on this side of the Rhine had a common cause. They said that they had entertained no thought of war and had sent no reinforcements to Ambiorix.

SECTION 6.32.2
Caesar investigated the matter by questioning prisoners and ordered them to bring back to him any Eburones who might have come to them in flight. He declared that if they did so, he would not violate their territory.

SECTION 6.32.3
Then he divided his forces into three parts and brought the baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca.

SECTION 6.32.4
That is the name of a fort. It lies approximately in the center of the Eburones’ territory, where Titurius and Aurunculeius had established their winter quarters.

SECTION 6.32.5
Among other advantages, Caesar approved of this location because the previous year’s fortifications remained intact, which would spare the soldiers labor. He left the Fourteenth Legion to guard the baggage, one of the three legions that he had recently raised and brought over from Italy.

SECTION 6.32.6
He placed Quintus Tullius Cicero in command of that legion and the camp and assigned him two hundred cavalrymen.

CHAPTER 6.33

SECTION 6.33.1
After dividing the army, Caesar ordered Titus Labienus to march with three legions toward the Ocean into the regions bordering the Menapii.

SECTION 6.33.2
He sent Gaius Trebonius with an equal number of legions to lay waste the region adjoining the Aduatuci.

SECTION 6.33.3
He himself decided to go with the remaining three legions to the Scheldt River, which flows into the Meuse, and to the farthest parts of the Ardennes, where he heard Ambiorix had gone with a few cavalrymen.

SECTION 6.33.4
As he departed, he gave his assurance that he would return seven days later, knowing that grain was due to be issued on that date to the legion being left on guard duty.

SECTION 6.33.5
He urged Labienus and Trebonius to return by that date if they could do so without harming the public interest, so that, after again consulting together and investigating the enemy’s plans, they could begin a new phase of the war.

CHAPTER 6.34

SECTION 6.34.1
As we explained above, there was no organized body of troops, no fortified town, and no garrison to defend itself by force of arms, but only a population scattered in every direction.

SECTION 6.34.2
Each person had settled wherever a hidden valley, a wooded place, or an impassable marsh offered him some hope of protection or safety.

SECTION 6.34.3
These places were known to the people living nearby, and the situation required great care, not in protecting the army as a whole—for no danger could come to the combined army from a terrified and scattered enemy—but in preserving the lives of individual soldiers, a matter that nevertheless concerned the army’s safety to some extent.

SECTION 6.34.4
The desire for plunder drew many men too far away, while the dense forests, with their uncertain and hidden paths, prevented troops from entering in formation.

SECTION 6.34.5
If Caesar wished to complete the operation and exterminate this race of criminals, he had to send out numerous detachments and separate the soldiers.

SECTION 6.34.6
If he wished to keep the companies gathered around their standards, as the established system and practice of the Roman army required, the terrain itself protected the barbarians, and individual men did not lack the audacity to ambush troops from concealment and surround them while they were scattered.

SECTION 6.34.7
Under difficulties of this kind, every precaution was taken that vigilance could devise, so that Caesar would rather miss some opportunity to harm the enemy, although everyone’s heart burned for revenge, than inflict harm at the cost of any loss among the soldiers.

SECTION 6.34.8
Caesar sent messengers to the neighboring tribes and summoned everyone to plunder the Eburones with the prospect of booty, so that the lives of Gauls rather than legionary soldiers would be endangered in the forests, and at the same time so that, with a great multitude surrounding them, the race and name of the tribe might be destroyed for such a crime.

SECTION 6.34.9
A great number quickly assembled from every direction.

CHAPTER 6.35

SECTION 6.35.1
These operations were being conducted in every part of the Eburones’ territory, and the seventh day was approaching, the day by which Caesar had decided to return to the baggage and the legion.

SECTION 6.35.2
At this point it was possible to see how great fortune’s power is in war and what great accidents it can produce.

SECTION 6.35.3
Since the enemy had been scattered and terrified, as we have explained, there was no body of troops that could cause even the slightest fear.

SECTION 6.35.4
Across the Rhine, word reached the Germans that the Eburones were being plundered and that everyone was actually being invited to share in the booty.

SECTION 6.35.5
The Sugambri, who live nearest the Rhine and by whom, as we explained above, the Tencteri and Usipetes had been received after their flight, assembled two thousand cavalrymen.

SECTION 6.35.6
They crossed the Rhine in boats and rafts thirty miles below the place where the bridge had been completed and Caesar had left a garrison. They entered the nearest part of the Eburones’ territory, caught many of the fugitives while they were scattered, and took possession of a large number of livestock, for which barbarians have an intense desire.

SECTION 6.35.7
Enticed by the booty, they advanced farther. Neither marshes nor forests delayed men born to warfare and raiding. They asked their prisoners where Caesar was, learned that he had gone farther away, and discovered that the entire army had departed.

SECTION 6.35.8
Then one of the prisoners said, “Why are you chasing this wretched and meager booty when you now have the chance to become extremely rich?

SECTION 6.35.9
You can reach Aduatuca in three hours. The Roman army has brought all its possessions there. The garrison is so small that it cannot even man the entire wall, and no one dares go outside the fortifications.”

SECTION 6.35.10
Presented with this opportunity, the Germans left the booty they had acquired in a concealed place and hurried toward Aduatuca, using as their guide the same man from whose information they had learned these facts.

CHAPTER 6.36

SECTION 6.36.1
Throughout all the preceding days Cicero had obeyed Caesar’s instructions and kept the soldiers in camp with the utmost diligence, not even allowing a single camp servant to go outside the fortifications. But on the seventh day, he began to doubt that Caesar would keep his promise concerning the number of days, because he heard that Caesar had advanced farther and no report of his return was arriving. At the same time, he was influenced by the complaints of those

SECTION 6.36.2
who called his restraint almost a state of siege, since no one was permitted to leave the camp. Expecting no such accident as could cause harm within three miles when nine legions and a very large cavalry force stood between him and the enemy, who had been scattered and almost destroyed, he sent five cohorts to gather grain in the nearest fields, between which and the camp there was only one hill. A number of sick men from the legions had been left behind;

SECTION 6.36.3
Of these, those who had recovered during this interval of days, about three hundred men, were sent out together under a single standard. In addition, a great crowd of camp followers and a large number of pack animals that had remained in camp followed after permission was granted.

CHAPTER 6.37

SECTION 6.37.1
At precisely this time and by chance, the German cavalry arrived and immediately, at the same gallop by which they had come, tried to break into the camp through the rear gate.

SECTION 6.37.2
Because woods blocked the view on that side, they were not seen until they had approached the camp, so that the merchants who had pitched their tents beneath the rampart had no opportunity to get inside.

SECTION 6.37.3
Our men, taken completely by surprise, were thrown into confusion by this unexpected development, and the cohort on guard barely withstood the first assault.

SECTION 6.37.4
The enemy poured around the camp on the other sides to see whether they could find any entrance.

SECTION 6.37.5
Our men defended the gates with difficulty; the terrain itself and the fortifications protected the other approaches.

SECTION 6.37.6
Panic spread throughout the camp, and each man asked another the cause of the commotion. No one could determine where the standards should be carried or where each man should assemble.

SECTION 6.37.7
One man declared that the camp had already been taken; another insisted that the army and its commander had been destroyed and that the victorious barbarians had come from the battle.

SECTION 6.37.8
Most imagined new religious omens for themselves because of the place and pictured before their eyes the disaster of Cotta and Titurius, who had been killed in this same fort.

SECTION 6.37.9
With everyone terrified by such fear, the barbarians were confirmed in the belief, based on what they had heard from their prisoner, that there was no garrison inside.

SECTION 6.37.10
They tried to break through and urged one another not to let such great good fortune slip from their hands.

CHAPTER 6.38

SECTION 6.38.1
Publius Sextius Baculus, who had served as chief centurion under Caesar and whom we mentioned in connection with earlier battles, had been left sick with the garrison and had now gone without food for five days.

SECTION 6.38.2
Despairing of his own safety and everyone else’s, he came out of his tent unarmed. He saw that the enemy was closing in and that the situation had reached the greatest possible crisis. He took weapons from the men nearest him and took his stand at the gate.

SECTION 6.38.3
The centurions of the cohort that was on guard joined him, and together they sustained the battle for a short time.

SECTION 6.38.4
After receiving severe wounds, Sextius lost consciousness. He was passed from hand to hand and was rescued with difficulty.

SECTION 6.38.5
The time this gained allowed the others to recover their courage enough to take their stand on the fortifications and present the appearance of defenders.

CHAPTER 6.39

SECTION 6.39.1
Meanwhile, after completing the foraging expedition, our soldiers heard the shouting. The cavalry rode ahead and learned how great the danger was.

SECTION 6.39.2
Out there, however, there was no fortification to shelter the terrified men. They had only recently been recruited and were inexperienced in warfare, so they turned their faces toward the military tribune and the centurions and waited for orders from them. No one was so brave that he was not disturbed by the unexpected situation.

SECTION 6.39.3
When the barbarians sighted the standards in the distance, they abandoned their attack on the camp.

SECTION 6.39.4
At first they believed that the legions had returned, though they had learned from their prisoners that these had gone farther away. Afterward, when they saw how few men there were, they attacked from every side.

CHAPTER 6.40

SECTION 6.40.1
The camp followers ran forward to the nearest hill. Quickly driven down from it, they threw themselves among the standards and the companies and made the already frightened soldiers even more terrified.

SECTION 6.40.2
Some thought that they should form a wedge and break through quickly, since the camp was so near. They were confident that even if some part of their force was surrounded and killed, the rest could still be saved.

SECTION 6.40.3
Others thought that they should take their stand on the ridge and all share the same fate.

SECTION 6.40.4
The veteran soldiers whom, as we have explained, had set out together under a single standard did not approve of this. Encouraging one another, therefore, and led by Gaius Trebonius, the Roman knight placed in command of them, they broke through the middle of the enemy and reached the camp safely, every last one of them.

SECTION 6.40.5
The camp followers and cavalry who followed them were saved by the soldiers’ courage in the same charge.

SECTION 6.40.6
But those who had taken their stand on the ridge had not yet acquired any experience of warfare. They could neither persist in the plan they had approved and defend themselves from the higher ground, nor imitate the force and speed that they had seen benefit the others. Instead, in trying to withdraw into camp, they descended into unfavorable terrain.

SECTION 6.40.7
The centurions, some of whom had been transferred for their courage from lower ranks in the other legions to higher ranks in this legion, fought with the greatest bravery and fell rather than lose the military reputation they had previously earned.

SECTION 6.40.8
Through the courage of these men, part of the soldiers reached the camp safely, contrary to all expectation, after the enemy had been driven back; the rest were surrounded and killed by the barbarians.

CHAPTER 6.41

SECTION 6.41.1
The Germans, despairing of taking the camp because they saw that our men had now taken their positions on the fortifications, withdrew across the Rhine with the plunder they had left in the woods.

SECTION 6.41.2
Even after the enemy’s departure the terror was so great that, when Gaius Volusenus, who had been sent out with the cavalry, arrived at the camp that night, he could not convince them that Caesar was close at hand with his army unharmed.

SECTION 6.41.3
Fear had so completely taken possession of their minds that, almost out of their senses, they said that all the forces had been destroyed and that the cavalry had escaped from the rout. They insisted that the Germans would not have attacked the camp if the army had remained unharmed.

SECTION 6.41.4
Caesar’s arrival dispelled this fear.

CHAPTER 6.42

SECTION 6.42.1
When Caesar returned, he showed that he understood the uncertainties of war. He complained of only one thing: that the cohorts had been sent away from their guard posts and the garrison, since their position should not have been abandoned even in the least possible emergency. He judged that chance had played a great role in the enemy’s sudden arrival,

SECTION 6.42.2
and a far greater role in turning the barbarians away when they were almost on the very rampart and at the gates of the camp. Of all these circumstances, the most astonishing seemed to be

SECTION 6.42.3
that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with the intention of ravaging Ambiorix’s territory, had been carried to the Roman camp and thereby rendered Ambiorix the service he desired most.

CHAPTER 6.43

SECTION 6.43.1
Caesar set out again to harass the enemy, assembled a large number of men from the neighboring states, and sent them out in every direction.

SECTION 6.43.2
Every village and every building that anyone saw was burned, and plunder was carried off from every place.

SECTION 6.43.3
The crops were not only consumed by so great a multitude of pack animals and people, but had also been flattened by the season and the rains. Consequently, even if some people had managed to hide for the present, it seemed that after the army withdrew they would nevertheless have to die from lack of every necessity.

SECTION 6.43.4
With the cavalry divided and sent in so many directions, it often came so close that prisoners declared they had just seen Ambiorix looking around as he fled and insisted that he had not yet completely disappeared from sight. This gave the men hope of catching him and led them to undertake unending exertions.

SECTION 6.43.5
Those who believed that they would win Caesar’s highest favor almost surpassed the limits of human endurance in their eagerness, and it always seemed that they had fallen only a little short of complete success.

SECTION 6.43.6
But Ambiorix escaped through hiding places or forests and, concealed by night, made for other regions and districts with a guard of no more than four horsemen, the only men to whom he dared entrust his life.

CHAPTER 6.44

SECTION 6.44.1
After ravaging the regions in this manner, Caesar led his army back to Durocortorum in the territory of the Remi, having lost two cohorts. He summoned a council of Gaul to meet there and began an inquiry into the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes and into the conduct of Acco, who had been the chief instigator of that plan.

SECTION 6.44.2
After pronouncing the more severe sentence against Acco, Caesar executed him according to the custom of their ancestors.

SECTION 6.44.3
Some fled because they feared trial. After forbidding them fire and water, Caesar stationed two legions in winter quarters on the borders of the Treveri, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six at Agedincum in the territory of the Senones. He then secured the army’s grain supply and, as he had intended, left for Italy to hold the provincial assizes.

### Book 7

CHAPTER 7.1

SECTION 7.1.1
With Gaul quiet, Caesar set out for Italy, as he had decided, to hold the provincial assizes. There he learned of the murder of Clodius, and, after being informed of the Senate’s decree that all the younger men of Italy were to take the military oath, he decided to hold a levy throughout the province.

SECTION 7.1.2
News of these events quickly reached Transalpine Gaul. The Gauls themselves added to the reports and invented what the situation seemed to require: that the civil disorder was keeping Caesar in Rome and that, amid such great political divisions, he could not come to his army.

SECTION 7.1.3
Spurred on by this opportunity, those who had long resented being subjected to the rule of the Roman people began to make plans for war more openly and boldly.

SECTION 7.1.4
The leading men of Gaul arranged councils among themselves in wooded and remote places and complained about Acco’s death.

SECTION 7.1.5
They pointed out that the same fate could befall them. They lamented the common misfortune of Gaul and, with every kind of promise and reward, called for men who would begin the war and, at the risk of their own lives, reclaim freedom for Gaul.

SECTION 7.1.6
They said that above all, before their secret plans became known, they had to consider how Caesar could be cut off from his army. This would be easy,

SECTION 7.1.7
because the legions would not dare leave their winter quarters in the commander’s absence, while the commander could not reach the legions without an escort.

SECTION 7.1.8
Finally, it was better to be killed in battle than to fail to recover their former military glory and the freedom they had inherited from their ancestors.

CHAPTER 7.2

SECTION 7.2.1
After these matters had been discussed, the Carnutes declared that they would refuse no danger for the sake of the common safety and promised to be the first of all to make war.

SECTION 7.2.2
Because they could not at present guarantee one another’s secrecy by exchanging hostages, they asked that the commitment be ratified by oath and solemn pledge, so that once the war had begun they would not be abandoned by the others. The military standards were brought together, an act that in their custom constitutes their most solemn religious ceremony.

SECTION 7.2.3
The Carnutes were then warmly praised, everyone present took the oath, a date was fixed for the undertaking, and the council adjourned.

CHAPTER 7.3

SECTION 7.3.1
When that day came, the Carnutes, led by Cotuatus and Conconnetodumnus, two desperate men, rushed together at Cenabum at the given signal. They killed the Roman citizens who had settled there to conduct business, including Gaius Fufius Cita, a respected Roman knight who, on Caesar’s orders, was in charge of the grain supply, and plundered their property.

SECTION 7.3.2
News was quickly carried to every state in Gaul. Whenever a particularly important and notable event occurs, they announce it by shouting across the fields and regions. Others take up the shout in succession and pass it on to their neighbors, as happened then.

SECTION 7.3.3
What had been done at Cenabum at sunrise was heard in the territory of the Arverni before the end of the first watch that night, a distance of about 160 miles.

CHAPTER 7.4

SECTION 7.4.1
In the same way, Vercingetorix, an Arvernian and the son of Celtillus, a young man of the greatest influence, whose father had held supremacy over all Gaul but had been killed by his own state because he was seeking kingship, summoned his dependents and easily inflamed them.

SECTION 7.4.2
When his plan became known, people rushed to arms against him. He was opposed by his uncle Gobannitio and the other leading men, who did not think such a hazardous undertaking should be attempted, and he was expelled from the town of Gergovia.

SECTION 7.4.3
Nevertheless, he did not give up. In the countryside he held a levy of the poor and the desperate. After gathering this band, he persuaded every member of the state whom he approached to adopt his position.

SECTION 7.4.4
He urged them to take up arms for the sake of their common freedom. After assembling large forces, he expelled from the state the opponents who had driven him out shortly before.

SECTION 7.4.5
His followers proclaimed him king. He sent embassies in every direction and implored the states to remain loyal.

SECTION 7.4.6
He quickly brought the Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turoni, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andes, and all the other peoples bordering the Ocean into alliance with him. By unanimous consent, supreme command was conferred upon him.

SECTION 7.4.7
Once this authority had been given to him, he demanded hostages from all these states and ordered a fixed number of soldiers to be brought to him quickly.

SECTION 7.4.8
He determined how many weapons each state was to manufacture at home and by what date. Above all, he devoted his attention to the cavalry.

SECTION 7.4.9
He combined the greatest strictness in command with the greatest diligence and compelled the hesitant by the severity of his punishments.

SECTION 7.4.10
For a more serious offense, he killed the offender by fire and every kind of torture. For a less serious charge, he sent a man home after cutting off his ears or gouging out one of his eyes, so that these men would serve as examples to the rest and terrify others by the severity of their punishment.

CHAPTER 7.5

SECTION 7.5.1
After quickly assembling an army by these punishments, he sent Lucterius the Cadurcan, a man of the greatest boldness, with part of his forces into the territory of the Ruteni. He himself set out for the Bituriges. On his arrival, the Bituriges sent ambassadors to the Aedui,

SECTION 7.5.2
under whose protection they were, to ask for reinforcements that would enable them to resist the enemy forces more easily.

SECTION 7.5.3
On the advice of the officers Caesar had left with the army, the Aedui sent forces of cavalry and infantry to reinforce the Bituriges.

SECTION 7.5.4
When these forces reached the Loire River, which separates the Bituriges from the Aedui, they remained there for a few days and, not daring to cross the river,

SECTION 7.5.5
returned home. They reported to our officers that they had turned back because they feared treachery by the Bituriges. They had learned that the Bituriges’ plan was, if they crossed the river, to surround them on one side while the Arverni did so on the other.

SECTION 7.5.6
Whether they acted for the reason they gave our officers or were themselves motivated by treachery cannot, since we have no definite information, be stated as certain.

SECTION 7.5.7
Immediately after their departure, the Bituriges joined the Arverni.

CHAPTER 7.6

SECTION 7.6.1
When news of these events reached Caesar in Italy, he had already learned that conditions at Rome had been brought into a more favorable state by the energetic action of Gnaeus Pompey, and he set out for Transalpine Gaul.

SECTION 7.6.2
When he arrived there, he faced great difficulty in determining how he could reach his army.

SECTION 7.6.3
For if he summoned the legions into the province, he understood that in his absence they would have to fight a battle on the march.

SECTION 7.6.4
But if he himself hurried to the army, he saw that at that time he could not safely entrust his life even to those who appeared to be peaceful.

CHAPTER 7.7

SECTION 7.7.1
Meanwhile, Lucterius the Cadurcan, who had been sent into the territory of the Ruteni, won that state over to the Arverni.

SECTION 7.7.2
Advancing into the territories of the Nitiobriges and Gabali, he received hostages from both and, after assembling a large force, attempted to break into the province in the direction of Narbo.

SECTION 7.7.3
When this was reported, Caesar concluded that every other plan had to be set aside so that he could go to Narbo.

SECTION 7.7.4
When he arrived there, he reassured those who were afraid and stationed garrisons among the Ruteni of the province, the Volcae Arecomici, the Tolosates, and around Narbo, all places bordering on the enemy.

SECTION 7.7.5
He ordered part of the forces from the province, along with the reinforcements he had brought from Italy, to assemble in the territory of the Helvii, whose borders adjoin those of the Arverni.

CHAPTER 7.8

SECTION 7.8.1
After making these arrangements, with Lucterius now driven back and forced away because he considered it dangerous to enter the area inside the garrisons, Caesar set out for the territory of the Helvii.

SECTION 7.8.2
Although the Cevennes Mountains, which separate the Arverni from the Helvii, blocked the route at that harshest season of the year with very deep snow, Caesar nevertheless had the snow cleared to a depth of six feet, and after the roads had thus been opened, reached the territory of the Arverni through the soldiers’ tremendous exertions.

SECTION 7.8.3
He caught them completely by surprise, because they believed that the Cevennes protected them like a wall, and at that season of the year the paths had never been open even to a solitary traveler. He ordered the cavalry to range as widely as possible and strike the greatest possible terror into the enemy.

SECTION 7.8.4
News of these events was quickly carried to Vercingetorix by report and by messengers. All the Arverni, terrified, crowded around him and begged him to protect their property and not allow the enemy to plunder them, especially since he could see that the entire war had been transferred to their country.

SECTION 7.8.5
Moved by their pleas, he moved his camp out of the territory of the Bituriges and headed toward that of the Arverni.

CHAPTER 7.9

SECTION 7.9.1
Caesar, however, remained in that region for two days because he had anticipated that this would happen with Vercingetorix. Then, on the pretext of gathering reinforcements and cavalry, he left the army and placed the young Brutus in command of these forces.

SECTION 7.9.2
He instructed him to have the cavalry range as widely as possible in every direction, and said that he would make every effort not to be away from camp for more than three days.

SECTION 7.9.3
After making these arrangements, Caesar reached Vienne by the longest forced marches he could manage, taking his own men completely by surprise.

SECTION 7.9.4
There he obtained fresh cavalry, which he had sent there many days before, and without interrupting his march by day or night, hurried through the territory of the Aedui to that of the Lingones, where two legions were wintering, so that if the Aedui were forming any plan against his personal safety, he could forestall it by his speed.

SECTION 7.9.5
When he arrived there, he sent orders to the other legions and assembled them all in one place before news of his arrival could reach the Arverni.

SECTION 7.9.6
When Vercingetorix learned of this, he led his army back into the territory of the Bituriges. Setting out from there, he began an attack on Gorgobina, a town of the Boii, whom Caesar had settled there after defeating them in the Helvetian campaign and had placed under the authority of the Aedui.

CHAPTER 7.10

SECTION 7.10.1
This situation presented Caesar with a serious difficulty in deciding what to do. If he kept his legions in one place for the remainder of the winter, he feared that all Gaul would revolt if the dependents of the Aedui were conquered, since it would appear that he offered his friends no protection at all. But if he led the legions out of winter quarters too early, he feared that difficult transport conditions would create problems with the grain supply.

SECTION 7.10.2
Nevertheless, it seemed better to endure every hardship than, by accepting so great an insult, to alienate the goodwill of all his allies.

SECTION 7.10.3
He therefore urged the Aedui to bring in provisions and sent men ahead to the Boii to inform them of his approach and encourage them to remain loyal and withstand the enemy’s attack with courage.

SECTION 7.10.4
Leaving two legions and the baggage of the entire army at Agedincum, he set out for the territory of the Boii.

CHAPTER 7.11

SECTION 7.11.1
On the following day he reached Vellaunodunum, a town of the Senones. To avoid leaving an enemy behind him and to ensure a more secure supply of grain, he began to attack it and completed a circumvallation around it in two days.

SECTION 7.11.2
On the third day, when envoys came from the town to discuss surrender, he ordered them to collect their weapons, bring out their draft animals, and provide six hundred hostages.

SECTION 7.11.3
He left his lieutenant Gaius Trebonius behind to carry out these arrangements. Caesar himself, wishing to advance as quickly as possible, set out for Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes.

SECTION 7.11.4
The Carnutes had only then received news of the attack on Vellaunodunum. Believing that the operation would take a considerable time, they were preparing a garrison to send to Cenabum for its defense. Caesar reached the town in two days.

SECTION 7.11.5
He established camp before the town, but because little daylight remained, postponed the attack until the next day and ordered the soldiers to prepare everything needed for it.

SECTION 7.11.6
Because a bridge over the Loire connected directly with the town of Cenabum, he feared that the inhabitants might escape from the town during the night and ordered two legions to remain awake under arms.

SECTION 7.11.7
Shortly before midnight the people of Cenabum silently left the town and began to cross the river. When scouts reported this, Caesar brought forward the legions

SECTION 7.11.8
that he had ordered to stand ready without their baggage, burned the gates, sent the troops in, and took possession of the town. Very few of the enemy escaped capture, because the narrowness of the bridge and roads had blocked the multitude’s flight.

SECTION 7.11.9
He plundered and burned the town, gave the spoils to the soldiers, led the army across the Loire, and entered the territory of the Bituriges.

CHAPTER 7.12

SECTION 7.12.1
When Vercingetorix learned of Caesar’s arrival, he abandoned the siege and set out to meet Caesar.

SECTION 7.12.2
Caesar had begun an attack on Noviodunum, a town of the Bituriges situated along his route.

SECTION 7.12.3
When envoys came from the town to beg him to pardon them and spare their lives, Caesar, in order to complete the rest of his operations with the speed by which he had accomplished most of his successes, ordered them to collect their weapons, bring out their horses, and provide hostages.

SECTION 7.12.4
Some of the hostages had already been handed over, and the remaining terms were being carried out. Centurions and a few soldiers had been admitted into the town to collect the weapons and draft animals when enemy cavalry was seen in the distance, advancing ahead of Vercingetorix’s column.

SECTION 7.12.5
As soon as the townspeople saw them and conceived the hope of rescue, they raised a shout and began to take up arms, close the gates, and man the wall. The centurions inside the town,

SECTION 7.12.6
realizing from the Gauls’ behavior that they were forming some new plan, drew their swords, seized the gates, and brought all their men safely back.

CHAPTER 7.13

SECTION 7.13.1
Caesar ordered the cavalry to be led out of camp and engaged in a cavalry battle. When his men were already under pressure, he sent about four hundred German horsemen to support them, whom from the beginning he had made a practice of keeping with him.

SECTION 7.13.2
The Gauls could not withstand their charge. They were put to flight and, after losing many men, withdrew to the main column. After their defeat, the townspeople were terrified again. They seized the men whom they believed responsible for inciting the common people, brought them to Caesar, and surrendered to him.

SECTION 7.13.3
After completing these operations, Caesar set out for Avaricum, the largest and best-fortified town in the territory of the Bituriges, situated in an extremely fertile region. He was confident that by taking this town he would bring the state of the Bituriges under his control.

CHAPTER 7.14

SECTION 7.14.1
After suffering so many successive reverses at Vellaunodunum, Cenabum, and Noviodunum, Vercingetorix summoned his men to a council.

SECTION 7.14.2
He explained that the war must be conducted according to a very different plan from the one previously followed. Every effort must be directed toward preventing the Romans from obtaining fodder and provisions.

SECTION 7.14.3
This would be easy, because the Gauls had plenty of cavalry and were aided by the season of the year.

SECTION 7.14.4
Grass could not be cut, so the enemy would necessarily have to scatter and seek fodder from farm buildings. The cavalry could pick off all such men every day.

SECTION 7.14.5
Moreover, for the sake of their common safety, they must disregard the advantages of private property. Villages and farm buildings must be burned in every direction from the road, as far as the Romans appeared capable of reaching in search of fodder. The Gauls themselves would have an ample supply of these necessities,

SECTION 7.14.6
because they would be supported by the resources of whatever people’s territory the war was being fought in.

SECTION 7.14.7
The Romans would either be unable to endure the shortage or would venture farther from camp at great risk.

SECTION 7.14.8
It made no difference whether they killed the Romans themselves or stripped them of their baggage, since without it they could not carry on the war.

SECTION 7.14.9
In addition, they must burn every town that was not protected from all danger by fortifications and natural position, so that these towns would neither provide their own men with refuges for evading military service nor offer the Romans a ready opportunity to obtain abundant provisions and plunder.

SECTION 7.14.10
If these measures seemed harsh or cruel, they should consider it much harsher for their children and wives to be dragged away into slavery and for themselves to be killed, which must necessarily happen to the defeated.

CHAPTER 7.15

SECTION 7.15.1
This proposal was unanimously approved, and in a single day more than twenty towns of the Bituriges were burned.

SECTION 7.15.2
The same was done in the territories of the other states. Fires could be seen in every direction. Although everyone endured this with great pain, they nevertheless consoled themselves with the thought that victory was almost certain and that they would quickly recover what they had lost.

SECTION 7.15.3
At a general council they debated whether Avaricum should be burned or defended.

SECTION 7.15.4
The Bituriges threw themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, begging not to be forced to set fire with their own hands to nearly the most beautiful city in all Gaul, which was both a protection and an ornament to their state.

SECTION 7.15.5
They said that they could easily defend it because of its natural position: surrounded on nearly every side by a river and a marsh, it had only one approach, and that a very narrow one.

SECTION 7.15.6
Their request was granted. Vercingetorix at first opposed it but later yielded both to their entreaties and to the compassion of the common people. Suitable defenders were selected for the town.

CHAPTER 7.16

SECTION 7.16.1
Vercingetorix followed Caesar by shorter marches and selected a site for his camp protected by marshes and woods, sixteen miles from Avaricum.

SECTION 7.16.2
There, through reliable scouts, he learned at every period of the day what was happening at Avaricum and issued orders for what he wanted done.

SECTION 7.16.3
He watched all our foraging and grain-gathering expeditions and attacked our men when they were scattered and had necessarily advanced too far, inflicting heavy losses on them. Nevertheless, our men countered this tactic as far as foresight could provide by going out at irregular times and by different routes.

CHAPTER 7.17

SECTION 7.17.1
Caesar established camp on the side of the town that, being unprotected by the river and marshes, had the narrow approach mentioned above. He began to prepare a siege ramp, move covered galleries forward, and erect two towers, since the nature of the terrain prevented him from surrounding the town with a circumvallation.

SECTION 7.17.2
He constantly urged the Boii and Aedui to supply grain. The Aedui, because they acted without any enthusiasm, provided little assistance. The Boii, because their state was small and weak and they did not possess great resources, quickly used up what they had.

SECTION 7.17.3
The army suffered extreme difficulty in obtaining grain because of the poverty of the Boii, the negligence of the Aedui, and the burning of the farm buildings. For several days the soldiers had no grain and held off the worst of their hunger with livestock driven in from more distant villages. Nevertheless, not a word was heard from them unworthy of the majesty of the Roman people or of their previous victories.

SECTION 7.17.4
Indeed, when Caesar addressed the legions one by one while they were at work and said that he would abandon the siege if they found the shortage too painful to endure, they unanimously begged him not to do so.

SECTION 7.17.5
They said that they had served under his command for many years without suffering any disgrace or ever withdrawing from any place with their task unfinished.

SECTION 7.17.6
They would regard it as a disgrace if they abandoned a siege they had begun.

SECTION 7.17.7
It was better to endure every hardship than to fail to avenge the Roman citizens who had perished at Cenabum through the treachery of the Gauls.

SECTION 7.17.8
They gave the same message to the centurions and military tribunes to deliver to Caesar.

CHAPTER 7.18

SECTION 7.18.1
When the towers had already approached the wall, Caesar learned from prisoners that Vercingetorix, having exhausted the supply of fodder, had moved his camp closer to Avaricum. He himself had set out with the cavalry and the light-armed troops who were accustomed to fight among the horsemen, intending to lay an ambush at the place where he believed our men would come to forage the next day.

SECTION 7.18.2
After learning this, Caesar set out silently at midnight and reached the enemy camp in the morning.

SECTION 7.18.3
The Gauls quickly learned of Caesar’s approach through their scouts, concealed their wagons and baggage in the thicker woods, and drew up all their forces on high, open ground.

SECTION 7.18.4
When this was reported, Caesar quickly ordered the packs to be piled together and the troops to ready their weapons.

CHAPTER 7.19

SECTION 7.19.1
A hill rose with a gentle slope from its base. On nearly every side it was surrounded by a difficult and obstructive marsh no more than fifty feet wide.

SECTION 7.19.2
Relying on the strength of this position, the Gauls held the hill after destroying the crossings. Divided by tribes, they occupied every ford and passage through the marsh,

SECTION 7.19.3
prepared so that if the Romans tried to force their way through the marsh, they could press them from higher ground while they were struggling in it. Anyone who saw only how close the two sides were would have thought the Gauls prepared to fight on almost equal terms, but anyone who understood the disadvantage of the conditions would have recognized that they were merely putting on an empty display.

SECTION 7.19.4
The soldiers were indignant that the enemy could endure the sight of them with so little space between the two armies, and demanded the signal for battle. Caesar explained how great a price in losses and in the deaths of brave men would necessarily have to be paid for victory. Since he saw them so determined

SECTION 7.19.5
that they would refuse no danger for the sake of his glory, he said that he ought to be condemned for the greatest injustice unless he valued their lives more highly than his own safety.

SECTION 7.19.6
After reassuring the soldiers in this way, he led them back to camp that same day and proceeded to arrange the other matters connected with the siege of the town.

CHAPTER 7.20

SECTION 7.20.1
When Vercingetorix returned to his men, he was accused of treason: he had moved his camp closer to the Romans, had departed with all the cavalry, had left such a large force behind without a commander, and, after his departure, the Romans had arrived with such remarkable timeliness and speed.

SECTION 7.20.2
They claimed that all these things could not have happened by chance or without a plan, and that he preferred to possess the kingship of Gaul by Caesar’s permission rather than through their favor.

SECTION 7.20.3
Accused in this manner, he replied to these charges as follows: He had moved the camp because of the shortage of fodder, and they themselves had urged him to do so. He had approached closer to the Romans because he had been persuaded by the advantage of a position that protected itself by its natural defenses.

SECTION 7.20.4
The cavalry’s services had not been needed in marshy terrain, but had been useful in the place to which they had gone.

SECTION 7.20.5
When he departed, he had deliberately entrusted supreme command to no one, to prevent any commander from being driven by the crowd’s eagerness into giving battle. He saw that everyone wanted battle because of their weakness of spirit, since they could not endure hardship any longer.

SECTION 7.20.6
If the Romans had appeared by chance, they should thank fortune; if they had been summoned by information from someone, they should thank that man, since from their higher position they had been able to recognize the Romans’ small numbers and hold in contempt the courage of men who had not dared to fight and had shamefully withdrawn into camp.

SECTION 7.20.7
He desired no command from Caesar gained through treachery, since he could obtain it by victory, which was already assured for him and for all the Gauls. Indeed, he would return his command to them if they thought they were granting him an honor rather than receiving their safety from him.

SECTION 7.20.8
“To understand,” he said, “that I am speaking these words sincerely, listen to Roman soldiers.” He brought forward slaves

SECTION 7.20.9
whom he had captured while they were foraging a few days before and had tortured with hunger and chains. They had already been instructed what to say when questioned.

SECTION 7.20.10
They said that they were legionary soldiers and that hunger and deprivation had driven them to leave camp secretly in the hope of finding some grain or livestock in the countryside:

SECTION 7.20.11
that the entire army was suffering from the same scarcity, that no one’s strength was now sufficient and no one could endure the strain of the work; the commander had therefore resolved to withdraw the army within three days if they made no progress in attacking the town. “These,” said Vercingetorix, “are the benefits you have received from me,

SECTION 7.20.12
the man you accuse of treason. Through my efforts you see this great victorious army wasting away from hunger without the shedding of your blood; and I have taken care that, when it retreats in disgrace, no state will receive it within its territory.”

CHAPTER 7.21

SECTION 7.21.1
The whole assembly shouted its approval and, in its customary manner, clashed its weapons, as they are accustomed to do when they approve a speaker’s words. They declared that Vercingetorix was a supreme commander, that his loyalty must not be questioned, and that the war could not be conducted with greater judgment.

SECTION 7.21.2
They resolved that ten thousand men selected from all their forces should be sent into the town,

SECTION 7.21.3
and they did not think the common safety should be entrusted to the Bituriges alone, because they understood that if they held that town, almost the whole outcome of victory depended on it.

CHAPTER 7.22

SECTION 7.22.1
The Gauls countered the exceptional courage of our soldiers with every kind of device, for they are an extremely ingenious people, highly skilled at copying and carrying out anything shown to them by others.

SECTION 7.22.2
They deflected our wall hooks with nooses, and once they had caught them, they pulled them inside with machines. They also undermined the ramp with tunnels, a technique they knew particularly well because they have large iron mines and are familiar and experienced with every kind of tunneling.

SECTION 7.22.3
Moreover, they had built wooden stories and towers along the entire wall on every side and covered them with hides.

SECTION 7.22.4
Then, by frequent sorties both day and night, they either set fire to the ramp or attacked the soldiers while they were occupied with the work. As our ramp rose each day and increased the height of our towers,

SECTION 7.22.5
they matched that height by joining additional timbers to their own towers. They blocked our open tunnels with timbers charred and sharpened at the ends, boiling pitch, and stones of enormous weight, and so prevented them from approaching the walls.

CHAPTER 7.23

SECTION 7.23.1
Gallic walls are generally constructed in the following way. Continuous horizontal beams are laid on the ground lengthwise in straight lines, at equal intervals of two feet from one another.

SECTION 7.23.2
These are fastened together on the inner side and covered with a large quantity of earth, while the spaces between them that I have mentioned are packed at the front with large stones.

SECTION 7.23.3
After these have been placed and fitted together, another course is added on top, with the same interval maintained. The beams do not touch one another but are separated by equal spaces, and each is firmly held in place by a single stone set between them.

SECTION 7.23.4
The whole structure is woven together in this way, course after course, until the wall reaches its proper height.

SECTION 7.23.5
This type of construction is not unattractive in appearance and variety, with alternating beams and stones maintaining their courses in straight lines. At the same time, it is extremely well suited to the practical defense of towns, because the stone protects against fire and the timber against the battering ram. The timber is usually fastened together by continuous beams extending forty feet inward and can neither be broken through nor pulled apart.

CHAPTER 7.24

SECTION 7.24.1
Although the assault was hindered by all these obstacles, and although the soldiers were delayed throughout the entire period by cold and constant rain, they nevertheless overcame them all by continuous labor and in twenty-five days constructed a ramp 330 feet wide and 80 feet high.

SECTION 7.24.2
When it had almost reached the enemy’s wall, Caesar, as was his custom, was keeping watch over the work and urging the soldiers not to interrupt it for even a moment. Shortly before the third watch, it was noticed that the ramp was smoking, for the enemy had set it on fire from a tunnel,

SECTION 7.24.3
and at the same time a shout went up all along the wall, while sorties were made from two gates, one on either side of the towers.

SECTION 7.24.4
Others threw torches and dry material from the wall onto the ramp at a distance and poured down pitch and everything else that could feed the fire, so that it was hardly possible to determine where to run first or what emergency to deal with.

SECTION 7.24.5
Nevertheless, because Caesar’s standing practice was always to have two legions on guard in front of the camp, while several others worked in shifts, some men quickly resisted the sorties, others pulled back the towers and cut gaps through the ramp, while the entire mass of troops rushed out of the camp to extinguish the fire.

CHAPTER 7.25

SECTION 7.25.1
The fighting continued everywhere through what remained of the night, and the enemy’s hope of victory was continually renewed. This was all the more so because they saw that the protective screens of our towers had been burned away and realized that our men could not easily approach over exposed ground to bring assistance; they themselves constantly replaced their exhausted men with fresh ones, and believed that the safety of all Gaul depended on this critical moment. While we were watching, something happened that seemed so memorable that I did not think it should be passed over.

SECTION 7.25.2
In front of the town gate, a certain Gaul was taking lumps of tallow and pitch passed to him from hand to hand and throwing them into the fire opposite one of our towers. A bolt from a scorpion pierced him through the right side, and he fell dead.

SECTION 7.25.3
One of the men nearest him stepped over his body and took up the same task.

SECTION 7.25.4
When he too was killed in the same way by a bolt from a scorpion, a third man took the second man’s place, and a fourth took the third’s. The defenders did not leave that position unoccupied until the fire on the ramp had been extinguished, the enemy had been driven back on every side, and the fighting had ended.

CHAPTER 7.26

SECTION 7.26.1
After trying everything without success, the Gauls decided the next day to flee from the town, as Vercingetorix urged and ordered them to do.

SECTION 7.26.2
They hoped to accomplish this in the silence of the night without suffering heavy losses, because Vercingetorix’s camp was not far from the town and the unbroken marsh lying between them would slow the Romans’ pursuit.

SECTION 7.26.3
They were already preparing to do this at night when the married women suddenly ran out into the public places, weeping and throwing themselves at the feet of their men. With every plea, they begged them not to surrender them and their children, shared by them both, to the enemy for execution, since the weakness of their nature and strength prevented them from escaping.

SECTION 7.26.4
When they saw that the men remained fixed in their decision—for fear usually leaves no room for pity in the face of extreme danger—they began to shout and signal to the Romans that an escape was being attempted.

SECTION 7.26.5
Terrified by this, and afraid that the Roman cavalry would seize the roads ahead of them, the Gauls abandoned their plan.

CHAPTER 7.27

SECTION 7.27.1
The next day, after the tower had been moved forward and the works he had planned were completed, a heavy rainstorm arose. Caesar judged that this weather was not unfavorable for an attempt to capture the town, because he saw that the guards had been posted somewhat less carefully on the wall. He ordered his own men to go about their work more slowly and explained what he wanted done.

SECTION 7.27.2
He kept the legions ready for action and concealed within the covered approaches, urged them at last to reap the reward of victory for all their great labors, offered prizes to those who first climbed the wall, and gave the signal to the soldiers.

SECTION 7.27.3
They suddenly rushed out from every direction and quickly filled the wall.

CHAPTER 7.28

SECTION 7.28.1
The enemy, terrified by this unexpected development and driven from the wall and towers, formed into wedge-shaped groups in the forum and the more open spaces, intending to fight in battle formation if attacked from any direction on level ground.

SECTION 7.28.2
When they saw that no one was coming down to meet them on level ground, but that the Romans were spreading around the entire wall on every side, they feared that every hope of escape would be cut off. Throwing away their weapons, they rushed without stopping toward the farthest parts of the town.

SECTION 7.28.3
Some were killed there by the soldiers as they crushed one another in the narrow exits of the gates, while others who had already passed through the gates were killed by the cavalry.

SECTION 7.28.4
No one showed any interest in plunder. So enraged were they by the massacre at Cenabum and by the strain of the siege works that they spared neither the elderly, nor women, nor infants.

SECTION 7.28.5
In the end, out of a total population of about forty thousand, scarcely eight hundred—those who had rushed out of the town when they first heard the shouting—reached Vercingetorix safely.

SECTION 7.28.6
He received the fugitives in silence late at night. Fearing that their arrival together and the common people’s pity for them might provoke a disturbance in the camp, he had his own followers and the leading men of the states stationed far down the road to separate them and escort each group to the section of camp that had originally been assigned to its respective state.

CHAPTER 7.29

SECTION 7.29.1
The next day he called an assembly, consoled and encouraged them, and urged them not to lose heart or become dismayed by this setback.

SECTION 7.29.2
The Romans, he said, had won neither through courage nor in open battle, but by a certain technical skill and knowledge of siege warfare, in which the Gauls themselves had been inexperienced.

SECTION 7.29.3
Anyone who expected every outcome in war to be favorable was mistaken.

SECTION 7.29.4
It had never been his own wish to defend Avaricum, as they themselves could testify. But because of the Bituriges’ lack of judgment and the excessive compliance of the others, they had suffered this setback.

SECTION 7.29.5
Nevertheless, he would quickly make good the loss with greater advantages.

SECTION 7.29.6
Through his own efforts, he would bring over those states that still disagreed with the rest of the Gauls, and he would create a single common policy for all Gaul, whose united will not even the whole world could resist. He had already nearly accomplished this.

SECTION 7.29.7
Meanwhile, it was reasonable to ask them, for the sake of their common safety, to begin fortifying their camp so that they could more easily withstand sudden attacks by the enemy.

CHAPTER 7.30

SECTION 7.30.1
This speech was not unwelcome to the Gauls, especially because Vercingetorix himself had not lost heart after suffering so great a setback, nor had he hidden himself away and avoided appearing before the assembly.

SECTION 7.30.2
They believed he possessed greater foresight and anticipation than others because, while the situation was still intact, he had first advised burning Avaricum and later abandoning it.

SECTION 7.30.3
Thus, while adversity diminishes the authority of other commanders, his prestige, on the contrary, increased day by day after the setback.

SECTION 7.30.4
At the same time, his assurance that the remaining states would join them gave them hope. Then, for the first time, the Gauls began fortifying their camp, and these men, unaccustomed to labor, were so encouraged that they believed they must endure everything ordered of them.

CHAPTER 7.31

SECTION 7.31.1
Vercingetorix worked no less earnestly than he had promised to bring the remaining states into the alliance, and he tried to win them over with gifts and promises. For this task he selected suitable men,

SECTION 7.31.2
each of whom could most easily win them over either by deceptive argument or through personal friendship. As for those who had escaped after the capture of Avaricum,

SECTION 7.31.3
he saw that they were armed and clothed.

SECTION 7.31.4
At the same time, to restore his reduced forces, he ordered each state to furnish a fixed number of soldiers, specifying how many he wanted and the deadline by which they were to be brought to camp. He also ordered that all the archers, of whom there were a very large number in Gaul, be sought out and sent to him. By these measures, the forces lost at Avaricum were quickly replaced.

SECTION 7.31.5
Meanwhile Teutomatus, son of Ollovico and king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had been formally recognized as a friend by our Senate, reached Vercingetorix with a large force of his own cavalry and troops he had hired in Aquitania.

CHAPTER 7.32

SECTION 7.32.1
Caesar remained at Avaricum for several days and, having found an abundant supply of grain and other provisions there, allowed the army to recover from its exertions and deprivation.

SECTION 7.32.2
Winter was now nearly over, and the season itself was calling him to resume the war. He had decided to march against the enemy, whether he could draw him out of the marshes and forests or press him by siege, when a delegation of leading Aedui came to beg him to assist their state at a most critical moment.

SECTION 7.32.3
They said that their government was in extreme danger because, although from ancient times it had been customary to elect a single magistrate who held royal power for one year, two men were now exercising the office, and each claimed to have been elected in accordance with the laws.

SECTION 7.32.4
One was Convictolitavis, a prosperous and distinguished young man; the other was Cotus, born into a very ancient family and himself a man of supreme influence and extensive family connections. His brother Valetiacus had held the same office the previous year.

SECTION 7.32.5
The entire state was in arms. The senate was divided, the people were divided, and each man had his own dependents. If the dispute were allowed to continue, one part of the state would fight the other. Preventing that outcome depended on Caesar’s diligence and authority.

CHAPTER 7.33

SECTION 7.33.1
Although Caesar believed it would be harmful to leave the war and the enemy, he also knew how serious the consequences that commonly arose from internal dissension could be. He was determined to prevent so great a state, so closely allied with the Roman people—a state he himself had always supported and honored in every way—from resorting to violence and arms, and to prevent the faction with less confidence in its own strength from calling on Vercingetorix for assistance.

SECTION 7.33.2
He therefore decided that this matter must take priority. Because Aeduan law did not permit those who held the highest office to leave Aeduan territory, Caesar did not want to appear to diminish any of their rights or laws. He therefore decided to go into Aeduan territory himself and summoned the entire senate, together with the two disputants, to meet him at Decetia.

SECTION 7.33.3
When nearly the entire state had assembled there, he was informed that Cotus had been proclaimed elected by his own brother after only a few men had been summoned secretly, at a different place and time from those prescribed. Since the laws not only prohibited two members of the same family, while both were alive, from being elected magistrates, but even forbade both from sitting in the senate, Caesar compelled Cotus to relinquish his authority and ordered Convictolitavis,

SECTION 7.33.4
who had been elected by the priests in accordance with the custom of the state during an interval in the magistracy, to retain the office.

CHAPTER 7.34

SECTION 7.34.1
After issuing this decision, Caesar urged the Aedui to forget their disputes and dissension, set all such matters aside, and devote themselves to this war. Once Gaul was conquered, they could expect from him the rewards they had earned. He told them to send him all their cavalry and ten thousand infantry as quickly as possible, so that he could distribute them among garrisons to safeguard the grain supply. He then divided the army into two parts.

SECTION 7.34.2
He gave Labienus four legions to lead into the territories of the Senones and Parisii, while he himself led six into the territory of the Arverni toward the town of Gergovia, following the Elaver River. He assigned part of the cavalry to Labienus and kept the rest with himself.

SECTION 7.34.3
When Vercingetorix learned of this, he destroyed all the bridges over the river and began marching along the opposite bank.

CHAPTER 7.35

SECTION 7.35.1
As the two armies advanced on opposite sides, they generally pitched their camps within sight of and almost directly across from each other. Vercingetorix stationed scouts to make sure the Romans did not build a bridge somewhere and take their forces across. Caesar faced a very serious difficulty: he might be kept from crossing the river for the greater part of the summer, since the Elaver can generally not be forded before autumn.

SECTION 7.35.2
To prevent this, he pitched camp in a wooded location opposite one of the bridges Vercingetorix had ordered destroyed. The next day he secretly remained behind with two legions.

SECTION 7.35.3
As usual, he sent the rest of the forces ahead with all the baggage, but split up some of the cohorts so that the number of legions would appear unchanged.

SECTION 7.35.4
After ordering them to advance as far as they could, Caesar calculated from the time of day that they had reached the camp and began rebuilding the bridge on the same piles, whose lower portions remained intact.

SECTION 7.35.5
The work was quickly completed, and after leading the legions across and selecting a suitable place for a camp, he recalled the rest of his forces.

SECTION 7.35.6
When Vercingetorix learned of this, he hurried ahead by forced marches so that he would not be compelled to fight against his will.

CHAPTER 7.36

SECTION 7.36.1
Caesar reached Gergovia from that place after five days’ marches. A minor cavalry engagement took place that day, and after examining the position of the town, which stood on a very high mountain and had difficult approaches on every side, he gave up hope of taking it by assault and decided that he should not undertake a siege until he had secured his grain supply.

SECTION 7.36.2
Vercingetorix, however, had pitched his camp near the town and had stationed the forces of each state separately around himself at moderate intervals. By occupying all the hills along that ridge from which the surrounding country could be viewed,

SECTION 7.36.3
he presented a terrifying sight. He ordered the leaders of those states whom he had chosen to join him in making decisions to meet with him every day at dawn, whether some information needed to be shared or some action taken;

SECTION 7.36.4
and he let hardly a day pass without testing, in a cavalry engagement with archers interspersed among the horsemen, the spirit and courage of each of his men.

SECTION 7.36.5
Directly opposite the town, at the very foot of the mountain, was a hill exceptionally well fortified by nature and cut off on every side. If our men held it, they seemed likely to deprive the enemy both of a large part of their water supply and of unrestricted foraging;

SECTION 7.36.6
but the enemy held this position with a garrison that was not very strong.

SECTION 7.36.7
Nevertheless, Caesar left camp in the silence of the night and, before reinforcements could come from the town, drove out the garrison and seized the position. He stationed two legions there and ran a double trench, each trench twelve feet wide, from the larger camp to the smaller one, so that even individual soldiers could pass safely between them without danger from a sudden enemy attack.

CHAPTER 7.37

SECTION 7.37.1
While these events were taking place at Gergovia, Convictolitavis the Aeduan, to whom, as stated above, Caesar had awarded the chief magistracy, was bribed by the Arverni and entered into discussions with certain young men. The foremost among them were Litaviccus and his brothers, young men born into a very distinguished family.

SECTION 7.37.2
He shared the payment with them and urged them to remember that they were free men, born to rule.

SECTION 7.37.3
The Aedui, he said, were the one state holding back Gaul’s certain victory; their authority was keeping the other states in line, but once the Aedui changed sides, the Romans would have no place to stand in Gaul.

SECTION 7.37.4
He had, to some extent, benefited from Caesar, though only because he had won a completely just case before him; but he placed greater value on the freedom of them all.

SECTION 7.37.5
For why should the Aedui come before Caesar to have him decide questions concerning their rights and laws, rather than the Romans coming before the Aedui?

SECTION 7.37.6
The young men were quickly won over both by the magistrate’s speech and by the payment, and declared that they would even take the lead in carrying out the plan. They then sought a means of accomplishing it, because they were not confident that the state could be induced to undertake war rashly.

SECTION 7.37.7
They decided that Litaviccus should be placed in command of the ten thousand men who were to be sent to Caesar for the war and should take charge of leading them, while his brothers should hurry ahead to Caesar. They also settled how the rest of the plan was to be carried out.

CHAPTER 7.38

SECTION 7.38.1
After taking command of the army, Litaviccus had reached a point about thirty miles from Gergovia when he suddenly called the soldiers together and said with tears in his eyes, “Where are we going, soldiers?

SECTION 7.38.2
All our cavalry and all our nobility have been killed. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, leaders of our state, have been accused of treason by the Romans and put to death without a hearing.

SECTION 7.38.3
Learn the facts from the men who escaped from the massacre itself, for grief prevents me from describing what happened, since my brothers and all my relatives have been killed.”

SECTION 7.38.4
The men whom he had coached in what he wanted them to say were brought forward, and they told the crowd the same story Litaviccus had announced: that many Aeduan cavalrymen had been killed

SECTION 7.38.5
because they were said to have held talks with the Arverni; and that they themselves had hidden among the mass of soldiers and escaped from the midst of the slaughter.

SECTION 7.38.6
The Aedui cried out together and begged Litaviccus to decide what they should do. “As though,” he said, “this were a matter for deliberation, and it were not necessary for us to march to Gergovia and join the Arverni ourselves.

SECTION 7.38.7
Can we doubt that, after committing this unspeakable crime, the Romans are already rushing here to kill us? Therefore, if we have any courage in us,

SECTION 7.38.8
let us avenge the deaths of those who have been so shamefully killed, and let us kill these robbers.” He pointed out the Roman citizens who were traveling with them under the protection of his escort.

SECTION 7.38.9
He seized a large quantity of grain and other provisions and, after subjecting the men themselves to cruel torture, killed them.

SECTION 7.38.10
He sent messengers throughout the entire Aeduan state and stirred the people up with the same lie about the massacre of the cavalrymen and leaders. He urged them to avenge their wrongs in the same way he had done.

CHAPTER 7.39

SECTION 7.39.1
Eporedorix, an Aeduan young man of the highest birth and very great influence in his own country, and Viridomarus, his equal in age and prestige but of different social origin, whom Caesar had raised from humble rank to the highest distinction after Diviciacus entrusted him to Caesar, had joined the cavalry after being personally summoned by him.

SECTION 7.39.2
They were rivals for supremacy, and in the recent dispute over the magistracy one had fought with all his resources for Convictolitavis and the other for Cotus.

SECTION 7.39.3
When Eporedorix learned of Litaviccus’s plan, he reported the matter to Caesar at about midnight. He begged Caesar not to allow the state to abandon its friendship with the Roman people because of the corrupt schemes of young men. He foresaw that this would happen if so many thousands of men joined the enemy, since neither their relatives could disregard their safety nor the state treat it as a matter of little importance.

CHAPTER 7.40

SECTION 7.40.1
Caesar was greatly alarmed by this report because he had always shown special favor to the Aeduan state. Without any hesitation, he led four legions in light marching order and all the cavalry out of camp.

SECTION 7.40.2
In such circumstances there was no time to draw the camp’s defenses into a smaller perimeter, since success seemed to depend on speed. He left his lieutenant Gaius Fabius with two legions to guard the camp.

SECTION 7.40.3
When he ordered Litaviccus’s brothers arrested, he discovered that they had fled to the enemy shortly before.

SECTION 7.40.4
He encouraged the soldiers not to be discouraged by the strain of a march at such a critical time. All were extremely eager, and after advancing twenty-five miles, he sighted the Aeduan column. He sent in the cavalry to delay and obstruct its march and strictly ordered everyone not to kill anyone. He commanded Eporedorix and Viridomarus,

SECTION 7.40.5
whom the Aeduans believed had been killed, to move about among the cavalry and call out to their own people.

SECTION 7.40.6
When they recognized the two men and understood Litaviccus’s deception, the Aeduans began stretching out their hands, signaling their surrender, throwing down their weapons, and begging to be spared from death.

SECTION 7.40.7
Litaviccus fled to Gergovia with his retainers, for according to Gallic custom it is a sacrilege for retainers to abandon their patrons even in the most desperate circumstances.

CHAPTER 7.41

SECTION 7.41.1
Caesar sent messengers to the Aeduan state to explain that, as an act of favor, he had spared men whom he could lawfully have killed under the laws of war. He then allowed the army three hours of the night for rest and set out for the camp at Gergovia.

SECTION 7.41.2
About halfway there, cavalrymen sent by Fabius explained how dangerous the situation had been. They reported that the camp had been attacked by very powerful forces, with fresh troops repeatedly replacing tired ones and wearing down our men through continuous exertion, since the size of the camp required the same men to remain constantly on the rampart.

SECTION 7.41.3
Many had been wounded by the large number of arrows and every kind of missile; the artillery had been extremely useful in holding off these attacks.

SECTION 7.41.4
After Caesar’s departure, Fabius had blocked all but two gates, added protective screens to the rampart, and prepared himself for the next day and another similar emergency.

SECTION 7.41.5
When Caesar learned this, the soldiers exerted themselves to the utmost, and he reached the camp before sunrise.

CHAPTER 7.42

SECTION 7.42.1
While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Aedui received the first messages from Litaviccus and allowed themselves no time to investigate.

SECTION 7.42.2
Some were driven by greed, others by anger and recklessness—a trait especially innate in that race of people—to treat a groundless report as an established fact.

SECTION 7.42.3
They plundered the property of Roman citizens, carried out massacres, and dragged people away into slavery.

SECTION 7.42.4
Convictolitavis encouraged the course events had taken and drove the common people to such madness that, once they had committed the crime, they would be ashamed to return to their senses.

SECTION 7.42.5
They gave Marcus Aristius, a military tribune traveling to his legion, a guarantee of safety and escorted him out of the town of Cabillonum. They forced those who had settled there for business purposes to do the same.

SECTION 7.42.6
They immediately attacked these men on the road and stripped them of all their baggage. When the men resisted, they besieged them throughout the day and night; after many had been killed on both sides, they summoned a larger body of armed men.

CHAPTER 7.43

SECTION 7.43.1
Meanwhile, when word arrived that all their soldiers were being held in Caesar’s power, they hurried to Aristius and asserted that nothing had been done by public authority. They ordered an inquiry into the property that had been plundered,

SECTION 7.43.2
confiscated the property of Litaviccus and his brothers, and sent envoys to Caesar to clear themselves of blame.

SECTION 7.43.3
They did this to recover their men. But because they had been tainted by the crime and profited from the plundered property—a matter implicating many people—and were terrified of punishment, they began secretly forming plans for war and used embassies to stir up the other states.

SECTION 7.43.4
Although Caesar understood this, he nevertheless addressed the envoys as mildly as he could. He said that because of the ignorance and fickleness of the common people, he was not judging their state too harshly or diminishing his goodwill toward the Aedui.

SECTION 7.43.5
Expecting a greater uprising in Gaul and wishing to avoid being surrounded by all the states, he began considering how he might withdraw from Gergovia and reunite his entire army,

SECTION 7.43.6
without making a departure prompted by fear of revolt look like a retreat.

CHAPTER 7.44

SECTION 7.44.1
While Caesar was considering this, an opportunity for a successful operation seemed to present itself. When he came to the smaller camp to inspect the defensive works, he noticed that a hill held by the enemy had been stripped of men, although on previous days the multitude there had made the ground itself almost impossible to see.

SECTION 7.44.2
Surprised, he asked the reason from deserters, a great number of whom came to him every day.

SECTION 7.44.3
They all agreed on what Caesar himself had already learned through scouts: the crest of the ridge was nearly level, but the point giving access to the other side of the town was wooded and narrow. The Gauls were extremely concerned about this position and now believed that, after the Romans had occupied one hill, if they lost the other they would be almost completely surrounded and cut off from every route of escape and from foraging. Vercingetorix had summoned all the troops away to fortify this position.

CHAPTER 7.45

SECTION 7.45.1
After learning this, Caesar sent out several squadrons of cavalry and ordered them, beginning around midnight, to range about in all directions with somewhat more commotion than usual.

SECTION 7.45.2
At dawn he ordered a large number of pack animals and mules to be led out of camp, their packs removed, and the mule drivers, wearing helmets so that they looked like cavalrymen, to be taken around the hills.

SECTION 7.45.3
He added a few cavalrymen to them, who were to range more widely for the sake of display. He ordered them all to make for the same area by a long, circuitous route.

SECTION 7.45.4
These movements could be seen from the town at a distance, since Gergovia overlooked the camp, but from so far away it was impossible to determine exactly what they were.

SECTION 7.45.5
He sent one legion toward the same ridge, and after it had advanced a short distance, he stationed it on lower ground and concealed it in the woods.

SECTION 7.45.6
The Gauls’ suspicions increased, and all their forces were transferred there to the fortifications.

SECTION 7.45.7
When Caesar saw that the enemy camps were empty, he concealed his men’s distinctive equipment and hid the military standards, then transferred soldiers in small groups from the larger camp to the smaller one so that they would not be noticed from the town. He explained what he wanted done to the lieutenants whom he had placed in command of the individual legions.

SECTION 7.45.8
Above all, he warned them to keep the soldiers under control and not let them advance too far in their eagerness to fight or hope of plunder.

SECTION 7.45.9
He explained the disadvantages created by the difficult terrain: these could be overcome only by speed. This was a matter of seizing an opportunity, not of fighting a battle.

SECTION 7.45.10
After giving these instructions, he gave the signal and at the same time sent the Aeduans up by a different route on the right.

CHAPTER 7.46

SECTION 7.46.1
The town wall was twelve hundred paces in a straight line from the plain and the beginning of the ascent, if no bends in the route intervened.

SECTION 7.46.2
Every detour made to reduce the steepness of the slope increased the distance that had to be traveled.

SECTION 7.46.3
About halfway up the hill, the Gauls had built a wall six feet high out of large stones, extending lengthwise along the contour of the mountain, to slow our men’s attack. They had left the entire lower area empty but had filled the upper part of the hill, all the way to the town wall, with very closely packed camps.

SECTION 7.46.4
When the signal was given, the soldiers quickly reached the fortification, crossed it, and captured three camps.

SECTION 7.46.5
So swift was the capture of the camps that Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, who was suddenly surprised in his tent while resting at midday, barely escaped from the hands of the plundering soldiers with the upper part of his body uncovered and his horse wounded.

CHAPTER 7.47

SECTION 7.47.1
Having accomplished what he had intended, Caesar ordered the signal for retreat to be sounded and immediately halted the standards of the Tenth Legion, with which he was serving.

SECTION 7.47.2
The soldiers of the other legions did not hear the trumpet because a fairly large valley lay between them and Caesar. Nevertheless, the military tribunes and lieutenants tried to hold them back, as Caesar had ordered.

SECTION 7.47.3
But carried away by the hope of a swift victory, by the enemy’s flight, and by their successful battles in earlier years, they believed that nothing was so difficult that they could not accomplish it through courage. They did not stop their pursuit until they had approached the town wall and gates. Then a shout arose from every part of the town,

SECTION 7.47.4
and those who were farther away, terrified by the sudden commotion and believing that the enemy was already inside the gates, rushed out of the town.

SECTION 7.47.5
The married women threw clothing and silver down from the wall, and leaning over it with bare breasts and outstretched hands, they begged the Romans to spare them and not, as they had done at Avaricum, refuse to spare even women and infants.

SECTION 7.47.6
Some women were lowered hand to hand from the walls and surrendered themselves to the soldiers.

SECTION 7.47.7
Lucius Fabius, a centurion of the Eighth Legion, who was known to have told his comrades that day that he was inspired by the rewards won at Avaricum and would not allow anyone to scale the wall before him, found three soldiers from his maniple and, lifted up by them, climbed onto the wall. Then, in turn, he took hold of each of them and pulled them up onto the wall.

CHAPTER 7.48

SECTION 7.48.1
Meanwhile, those who, as explained above, had assembled on the other side of the town to work on the fortifications were spurred into action first by hearing the shouting and then by repeated reports that the Romans had taken the town. Sending the cavalry ahead, they hurried there in a great rush.

SECTION 7.48.2
As each man arrived, he took his position beneath the wall and increased the number of his countrymen engaged in the fighting.

SECTION 7.48.3
When a great crowd of them had assembled, the married women, who shortly before had been stretching out their hands from the wall toward the Romans, began imploring their own men, displaying their unbound hair in the Gallic manner, and bringing their children out where they could be seen.

SECTION 7.48.4
The struggle was unequal for the Romans both in position and in numbers. At the same time, exhausted by their run and by the duration of the fighting, they could not easily withstand fresh and uninjured troops.

CHAPTER 7.49

SECTION 7.49.1
When Caesar saw that the fighting was taking place on unfavorable ground and that the enemy’s forces were increasing, he grew anxious for his men and sent word to his lieutenant Titus Sextius, whom he had left to guard the smaller camp, to lead the cohorts quickly out of the camp and station them at the foot of the hill on the enemy’s right flank,

SECTION 7.49.2
so that, if he saw our men driven from their position, he could intimidate the enemy and prevent them from pursuing too freely.

SECTION 7.49.3
Caesar himself advanced a short distance with a legion from the place where he had been stationed and waited for the outcome of the battle.

CHAPTER 7.50

SECTION 7.50.1
While the fighting at close quarters was at its fiercest, with the enemy relying on their position and numbers and our men on their courage, the Aedui suddenly appeared on our exposed flank. Caesar had sent them by another ascent on the right to divide the enemy’s forces.

SECTION 7.50.2
Because their weapons were similar, they badly frightened our men. Although they could be identified by their exposed right shoulders, which had been agreed upon as their distinguishing sign, the soldiers nevertheless thought that the enemy had done this very thing to deceive them.

SECTION 7.50.3
At the same time, the centurion Lucius Fabius and those who had climbed the wall with him were surrounded, killed, and thrown down from the wall.

SECTION 7.50.4
Marcus Petronius, a centurion of the same legion, after attempting to break down a gate, was overwhelmed by the crowd. Despairing of his own survival after already receiving many wounds, he said to the soldiers of his maniple who had followed him, “Since I cannot save myself together with you, I will at least make sure that your lives are protected, for it was my desire for glory that led you into danger.

SECTION 7.50.5
Now that you have the opportunity, look to your own safety.” At once he charged into the midst of the enemy, killed two of them, and drove the rest a short distance back from the gate.

SECTION 7.50.6
When his men tried to help him, he said, “You are trying in vain to save my life, for my blood and strength are already failing. Go, therefore, while you have the chance, and make your way back to the legion.” He continued fighting, fell a short time later, and so saved his men.

CHAPTER 7.51

SECTION 7.51.1
Our men, under pressure from every direction, lost forty-six centurions and were driven from their position. But the Tenth Legion, which had taken position as a reserve on somewhat more favorable ground, checked the Gauls when they pursued too aggressively.

SECTION 7.51.2
The Tenth was in turn supported by cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion, which had been led out of the smaller camp with the lieutenant Titus Sextius and had occupied higher ground.

SECTION 7.51.3
As soon as the legions reached level ground, they halted with their standards turned threateningly toward the enemy.

SECTION 7.51.4
Vercingetorix withdrew his men from the foot of the hill into their fortifications. On that day, just under seven hundred soldiers were lost.

CHAPTER 7.52

SECTION 7.52.1
The next day Caesar called an assembly and reprimanded the soldiers for their recklessness and eagerness. They had decided for themselves how far they should advance and what action should be taken, had not halted when the signal to withdraw was given, and could not be restrained by the military tribunes and lieutenants.

SECTION 7.52.2
He explained what unfavorable ground could do and what his own judgment had been at Avaricum, when he had caught the enemy without a commander and without cavalry but had let a certain victory go rather than suffer even a small loss in battle because of unfavorable ground.

SECTION 7.52.3
He said that, as greatly as he admired the courage of men whom neither the camp’s fortifications, nor the height of the mountain, nor the town wall had been able to delay, he equally condemned their lack of discipline and arrogance in thinking that they understood victory and the outcome of events better than their commander did;

SECTION 7.52.4
and that he required self-control and restraint from a soldier no less than courage and greatness of spirit.

CHAPTER 7.53

SECTION 7.53.1
After giving this address and, at its conclusion, reassuring the soldiers that they should not be disheartened by what had happened or attribute to the enemy’s courage what had resulted from unfavorable ground, Caesar, still holding the same view about departure that he had held before, led the legions out of camp and drew up the battle line in a suitable position.

SECTION 7.53.2
Since Vercingetorix was no more willing than before to come down onto level ground, Caesar fought a minor and successful cavalry engagement and led the army back into camp.

SECTION 7.53.3
When he did the same thing the following day, he considered that enough had been done to diminish Gallic boasting and restore his soldiers’ confidence, and he moved camp toward the territory of the Aedui.

SECTION 7.53.4
Even then the enemy did not pursue. On the third day he reached the Elaver River, repaired the bridge, and led the army across.

CHAPTER 7.54

SECTION 7.54.1
There he was approached by the Aedui Viridomarus and Eporedorix and learned that Litaviccus had departed with all the cavalry to stir up the Aedui. They said that they themselves needed to go on ahead to keep their state loyal.

SECTION 7.54.2
Although Caesar had already seen evidence of Aeduan treachery in many matters and believed that their departure would hasten their state’s revolt, he nevertheless decided not to detain them, for fear that he might appear either to be wronging them or to show some sign of fear. As they were leaving, he briefly recounted his services to the Aedui,

SECTION 7.54.3
reminding them of the people he had found them to be and how humiliated they had been: driven into their towns, fined, stripped of all their lands and military forces, subjected to tribute, and compelled with the utmost indignity to surrender hostages;

SECTION 7.54.4
and to what fortune and what greatness he had raised them, so that they had not merely returned to their former condition but seemed to have surpassed the prestige and influence they had possessed at any time in the past. After giving them these instructions, he dismissed them.

CHAPTER 7.55

SECTION 7.55.1
Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui, favorably situated on the banks of the Liger.

SECTION 7.55.2
Caesar had brought there all the hostages from Gaul, grain, public funds, and a large part of his own baggage and that of the army;

SECTION 7.55.3
he had also sent there a large number of horses purchased in Italy and Spain for use in this war.

SECTION 7.55.4
When Eporedorix and Viridomarus arrived there and learned the condition of their state—that Litaviccus had been received by the Aedui at Bibracte, the town that possessed the greatest authority among them; that the chief magistrate Convictolitavis and a large part of the senate had joined him; and that official envoys had been sent to Vercingetorix to negotiate peace and friendship—they decided that so great an opportunity must not be missed.

SECTION 7.55.5
They therefore killed the guards at Noviodunum and those who had gathered there to conduct business, and divided the money and horses among themselves;

SECTION 7.55.6
they arranged for the hostages from the various states to be taken to the chief magistrate at Bibracte; the town,

SECTION 7.55.7
which they judged they could not hold, they burned so that it could be of no use to the Romans;

SECTION 7.55.8
they carried away by boat as much grain as they could on short notice and destroyed the rest by throwing it into the river and burning it.

SECTION 7.55.9
They themselves began raising forces from the neighboring regions, stationing garrisons and guards along the banks of the Liger, and displaying their cavalry everywhere to spread fear, in the hope that they could cut the Romans off from grain or, by reducing them to want, drive them into the Province.

SECTION 7.55.10
Their hopes were greatly strengthened by the fact that the Liger had risen because of melting snow and seemed wholly impossible to cross by a ford.

CHAPTER 7.56

SECTION 7.56.1
When Caesar learned of these events, he decided that he must act quickly. If he had to risk an attempt to construct bridges, he must fight before larger forces were gathered there.

SECTION 7.56.2
As for changing his plan and turning his march toward the Province, he thought that not even necessity arising from fear should make him do that. He was hindered both by the disgrace and indignity of such a course and by the Cevenna mountain range standing in the way and the difficulty of the roads, but above all he was extremely concerned because Labienus and the legions he had sent with him were separated from him.

SECTION 7.56.3
Accordingly, after covering very long distances by day and night, he reached the Liger contrary to everyone’s expectations

SECTION 7.56.4
and found through his cavalry a ford that was as suitable as the circumstances required, so that only the soldiers’ arms and shoulders could remain above water to hold up their weapons. He stationed the cavalry to break the river’s current, and, while the enemy were thrown into confusion at the first sight of them,

SECTION 7.56.5
he led the army across unharmed. Finding grain in the fields and an abundance of livestock, he replenished the army with these supplies and decided to march into the territory of the Senones.

CHAPTER 7.57

SECTION 7.57.1
While these events were taking place with Caesar, Labienus left at Agedincum the reinforcements that had recently arrived from Italy, so that they could guard the baggage, and set out with four legions for Lutetia. This was a town of the Parisii situated on an island in the Sequana River.

SECTION 7.57.2
When the enemy learned of his arrival, large forces assembled from the neighboring states.

SECTION 7.57.3
Supreme command was entrusted to Camulogenus the Aulercan, who, though almost worn out by age, was called to this honor because of his exceptional knowledge of military affairs.

SECTION 7.57.4
When he observed that an unbroken marsh emptied into the Sequana and made that whole area extremely difficult to cross, he took position there and determined to prevent our men from passing.

CHAPTER 7.58

SECTION 7.58.1
At first Labienus tried to advance covered sheds, fill in the marsh with fascines and earthworks, and construct a road across it.

SECTION 7.58.2
After realizing that this was too difficult to accomplish, he silently left camp during the third watch and returned by the same route on which he had come to Metiosedum.

SECTION 7.58.3
This was a town of the Senones situated on an island in the Sequana, as was said shortly before of Lutetia. He seized about fifty boats, quickly fastened them together, and put soldiers aboard. The townspeople, most of whom had been called away to war, were terrified by the unexpected development, and he took possession of the town without a struggle.

SECTION 7.58.5
He repaired the bridge, which the enemy had broken down in the preceding days, led the army across, and began marching downstream toward Lutetia.

SECTION 7.58.6
When the enemy learned what had happened from those who had fled from Metiosedum, they ordered Lutetia burned and the bridges belonging to that town destroyed. They themselves left the marsh and took position on the banks of the Sequana opposite Lutetia and facing Labienus’s camp.

CHAPTER 7.59

SECTION 7.59.1
By now it was being reported that Caesar had left Gergovia; rumors were already arriving of the Aeduan revolt and the successful Gallic uprising; and the Gauls declared in their conversations that Caesar, cut off from his route and from the Liger, had been forced by lack of grain to hurry toward the Province.

SECTION 7.59.2
The Bellovaci, moreover, when they learned of the Aeduan revolt, began assembling bands and openly preparing for war. They had already been disloyal on their own initiative.

SECTION 7.59.3
Labienus then understood that, with circumstances so greatly changed, he had to adopt a plan entirely different from the one he had previously intended,

SECTION 7.59.4
and he was no longer thinking of making any gains or challenging the enemy to battle, but of bringing the army safely back to Agedincum.

SECTION 7.59.5
For on one side the Bellovaci, the state with the highest reputation for courage in Gaul, were closing in; on the other Camulogenus blocked him with a prepared and fully equipped army. Moreover, a very large river separated the legions from their garrison and baggage.

SECTION 7.59.6
Confronted suddenly with such great difficulties, he saw that he must look for help to courage and determination.

CHAPTER 7.60

SECTION 7.60.1
Toward evening he called a council, urged his officers to carry out his orders carefully and energetically, assigned each of the boats he had brought down from Metiosedum to Roman cavalrymen, and ordered them, after the first watch had ended, to proceed silently four miles downstream and wait for him there.

SECTION 7.60.2
He left five cohorts, which he considered the least reliable for battle, to guard the camp;

SECTION 7.60.3
he ordered the remaining five cohorts of the same legion to set out upstream at midnight with all the baggage, making a great commotion.

SECTION 7.60.4
He also gathered small boats and sent them in the same direction, driven forward with a great noise of oars. A little later he himself silently left with three legions and made for the place where he had ordered the boats to put in.

CHAPTER 7.61

SECTION 7.61.1
When they arrived there, the enemy scouts, who had been stationed along every part of the river, were caught off guard because a violent storm had suddenly arisen and were overpowered by our men;

SECTION 7.61.2
the army and cavalry were quickly ferried across under the direction of the Roman cavalrymen whom Labienus had placed in charge of the operation.

SECTION 7.61.3
At almost the same moment, just before dawn, the enemy were informed that there was unusual commotion in the Roman camp, that a large column was moving upstream, that the sound of oars could be heard in the same direction, and that soldiers were being carried across in boats a little way downstream.

SECTION 7.61.4
When they heard these reports, they thought that the legions were crossing at three places and that all the Romans, thrown into confusion by the Aeduan revolt, were preparing to flee. They therefore divided their own forces into three parts as well.

SECTION 7.61.5
They left a garrison opposite the Roman camp and sent a small force toward Metiosedum with orders to advance only as far as the boats had gone, while they led the rest of their forces against Labienus.

CHAPTER 7.62

SECTION 7.62.1
At first light all our men had been transported across, and the enemy’s battle line could be seen.

SECTION 7.62.2
Labienus urged the soldiers to preserve the memory of their former courage and their most successful battles, and to imagine that Caesar himself, under whose command they had so often defeated the enemy, was present among them. He then gave the signal for battle.

SECTION 7.62.3
At the first clash, the enemy were driven back and put to flight on the right wing, where the Seventh Legion had taken position;

SECTION 7.62.4
on the left, which was held by the Twelfth Legion, the enemy’s front ranks fell pierced by javelins, but the rest nevertheless resisted with extreme determination, and not one of them gave any indication of flight.

SECTION 7.62.5
The enemy commander Camulogenus himself stood beside his men and encouraged them.

SECTION 7.62.6
Even now the outcome of the victory was uncertain. When the tribunes of the Seventh Legion were informed of what was happening on the left wing, they brought the legion into view behind the enemy and advanced the standards against them.

SECTION 7.62.7
Not even then did anyone abandon his position; instead, they were all surrounded and killed.

SECTION 7.62.8
Camulogenus met the same fate. But those who had been left as a garrison opposite Labienus’s camp, when they heard that battle had been joined, went to support their men and occupied a hill, but they could not withstand the charge of our victorious soldiers.

SECTION 7.62.9
Thus, mingled with their own fleeing men, those who were not sheltered by the woods and mountains were killed by the cavalry.

SECTION 7.62.10
After completing this operation, Labienus returned to Agedincum, where the baggage of the entire army had been left. From there he reached Caesar with all his forces.

CHAPTER 7.63

SECTION 7.63.1
When the defection of the Aedui became known, the war expanded. Embassies were sent out in every direction.

SECTION 7.63.2
They used all the influence, authority, and money at their disposal to induce the states to revolt.

SECTION 7.63.3
Having obtained possession of the hostages whom Caesar had entrusted to them, they terrified those who hesitated by executing these hostages.

SECTION 7.63.4
The Aedui asked Vercingetorix to come to them and confer about plans for conducting the war.

SECTION 7.63.5
When their request was granted, they insisted that supreme command be given to them. Since the matter became disputed, a council of all Gaul was summoned at Bibracte. Large numbers came there from every direction.

SECTION 7.63.6
The matter was put to a vote of the assembly, and every man without exception approved Vercingetorix as commander.

SECTION 7.63.7
The Remi, Lingones, and Treveri were absent from this council: the first two because they remained loyal to their friendship with Rome, and the Treveri because they were farther away and were under pressure from the Germans. This was why they took no part in the entire war and sent assistance to neither side.

SECTION 7.63.8
The Aedui were deeply distressed at having been deprived of their preeminence. They complained of the change in their fortunes and missed Caesar’s indulgent treatment of them. Nevertheless, now that they had undertaken the war, they did not dare separate their policy from that of the others.

SECTION 7.63.9
Eporedorix and Viridomarus, young men of the highest promise, submitted reluctantly to Vercingetorix.

CHAPTER 7.64

SECTION 7.64.1
Vercingetorix ordered the remaining states to provide hostages and fixed a date for doing so. He ordered all the cavalry, numbering fifteen thousand, to assemble quickly.

SECTION 7.64.2
He said that he would be satisfied with the infantry he had previously had and would not test fortune or fight a pitched battle. Instead, since he had abundant cavalry, it would be very easy to prevent the Romans from gathering grain and forage,

SECTION 7.64.3
provided only that they themselves had the resolve to destroy their own grain and burn their buildings, since by this sacrifice of private property they could see that they were obtaining lasting sovereignty and freedom.

SECTION 7.64.4
After making these arrangements, he ordered the Aedui and the Segusiavi, who border the Province, to provide ten thousand infantry, to whom he added eight hundred cavalry.

SECTION 7.64.5
He placed the brother of Eporedorix in command of them and ordered him to make war on the Allobroges.

SECTION 7.64.6
On the other side, he sent the Gabali and the districts of the Arverni nearest them against the Helvii, and likewise sent the Ruteni and Cadurci to ravage the territory of the Volcae Arecomici.

SECTION 7.64.7
Nevertheless, through secret messages and embassies he also tried to win over the Allobroges, whose resentment, he hoped, had not yet subsided since the previous war.

SECTION 7.64.8
He promised money to their leaders and sovereignty over the entire Province to their state.

CHAPTER 7.65

SECTION 7.65.1
Provision had been made against all these dangers by garrisons totaling twenty-two cohorts, which the legate Lucius Caesar drew from the Province itself and deployed in every direction to meet them.

SECTION 7.65.2
The Helvii voluntarily engaged their neighbors in battle but were defeated. After Gaius Valerius Donnotaurus, son of Caburus and chief man of the state, and several others were killed, they were driven back inside their towns and walls.

SECTION 7.65.3
The Allobroges posted garrisons at frequent intervals along the Rhône and defended their territory with great care and diligence.

SECTION 7.65.4
Caesar, realizing that the enemy was superior in cavalry and that, with every route blocked, he could obtain no assistance from the Province or Italy, sent men across the Rhine into Germany to the states he had pacified in previous years. From them he summoned cavalry and light-armed infantry, who were accustomed to fight among the horsemen.

SECTION 7.65.5
When they arrived, because they were using horses of inferior quality, he took horses from the military tribunes, the other Roman cavalrymen, and the recalled veterans, and distributed them among the Germans.

CHAPTER 7.66

SECTION 7.66.1
Meanwhile, while these events were taking place, the enemy forces from the territory of the Arverni assembled, along with the cavalry that had been levied from all Gaul.

SECTION 7.66.2
After gathering a large number of them, Vercingetorix established three camps about ten miles from the Romans while Caesar was marching toward the Sequani through the outermost territory of the Lingones, so that he could more easily bring assistance to the Province.

SECTION 7.66.3
He summoned the cavalry commanders to a council and explained that the time for victory had come. The Romans, he said, were fleeing to the Province and leaving Gaul.

SECTION 7.66.4
That was enough to secure their freedom for the present, but did little to ensure peace and quiet in the future, since the Romans would return after assembling larger forces and would never stop making war. They should therefore attack them while their marching column was encumbered.

SECTION 7.66.5
If the infantry came to the aid of their own cavalry and were delayed by doing so, the Romans would be unable to continue their march. But if, as he was more confident would happen, they abandoned their baggage and looked after their own safety, they would be stripped both of essential supplies and of their honor.

SECTION 7.66.6
As for the enemy cavalry, they themselves ought not to doubt that none of them would dare even to advance outside the column. To make them attack with greater courage, he would station all his forces in front of the camp and strike terror into the enemy.

SECTION 7.66.7
The cavalrymen cried out that they should bind themselves by the most sacred oath: no one who had not ridden twice through the enemy column was to be received under a roof or allowed access to his children, his parents, or his wife.

CHAPTER 7.67

SECTION 7.67.1
The proposal was approved, and after all had been compelled to take the oath, the cavalry was divided into three parts on the following day. Two battle lines appeared on the two flanks, while one began to obstruct the head of the column.

SECTION 7.67.2
When this was reported, Caesar likewise ordered his own cavalry, divided into three parts, to advance against the enemy. Fighting began simultaneously in every sector.

SECTION 7.67.3
The column halted, and the baggage was brought inside the lines of the legions.

SECTION 7.67.4
Wherever our men appeared to be in difficulty or under unusually heavy pressure, Caesar ordered the standards to be advanced there and a battle line to be formed. This both slowed the enemy’s pursuit and encouraged our men with the hope of assistance.

SECTION 7.67.5
At last, on the right flank, the Germans gained the top of a ridge and drove the enemy from their position. They pursued the fugitives as far as the river where Vercingetorix had taken up his position with the infantry, and killed many of them.

SECTION 7.67.6
When the rest saw this, they feared being surrounded and fled. Slaughter took place everywhere.

SECTION 7.67.7
Three very distinguished Aedui were captured and brought to Caesar: Cotus, the cavalry commander who had disputed the office with Convictolitavis at the most recent election; Cavarillus, who had commanded the infantry after Litaviccus’s defection; and Eporedorix, under whose leadership the Aedui had fought a war against the Sequani before Caesar’s arrival.

CHAPTER 7.68

SECTION 7.68.1
After all his cavalry had been routed, Vercingetorix withdrew the forces he had stationed in front of his camp and immediately began marching toward Alesia, a town of the Mandubii. He ordered the baggage to be brought quickly out of camp and to follow him.

SECTION 7.68.2
Caesar moved his baggage to the nearest hill and left two legions to guard it. He then pursued for as much of the day as time allowed, killed about three thousand of the enemy’s rearguard, and on the following day encamped near Alesia.

SECTION 7.68.3
After examining the town’s position, and seeing that the enemy was terrified because they had been defeated in the cavalry arm, the part of their army in which they had placed the greatest confidence, Caesar encouraged his soldiers to undertake the labor and began to blockade the town.

CHAPTER 7.69

SECTION 7.69.1
The town of Alesia itself stood at the summit of a very high hill, in a position that seemed impossible to capture except by siege.

SECTION 7.69.2
Two rivers washed the base of this hill on two sides.

SECTION 7.69.3
In front of the town extended a plain about three miles long.

SECTION 7.69.4
On all the remaining sides, hills of equal height surrounded the town, with a moderate space between them and it.

SECTION 7.69.5
Below the wall, on the side of the hill facing east, the Gallic forces had filled this entire area and had built a ditch and a dry-stone wall six feet high across it.

SECTION 7.69.6
The circumference of the fortifications begun by the Romans extended eleven miles.

SECTION 7.69.7
Camps were placed at suitable locations, and twenty-three redoubts were built there. Guard detachments occupied these redoubts by day to prevent any sudden sortie, and at night the same positions were held by sentries and strong garrisons.

CHAPTER 7.70

SECTION 7.70.1
Once work had begun, a cavalry battle took place on the plain which, as explained above, stretched three miles in length between the hills. Both sides fought with the utmost force.

SECTION 7.70.2
When our men came under pressure, Caesar sent the Germans to support them and drew up the legions in front of the camp, to prevent any sudden attack by the enemy infantry.

SECTION 7.70.3
The added protection of the legions increased our men’s courage. The enemy were put to flight, but their own numbers hampered them, and because the gates had been made too narrow, they piled up against one another.

SECTION 7.70.4
The Germans pursued them more fiercely all the way to their defenses.

SECTION 7.70.5
A great slaughter followed. Some abandoned their horses and tried to cross the ditch and climb over the dry-stone wall. Caesar ordered the legions he had stationed in front of the rampart to advance a short distance.

SECTION 7.70.6
The Gauls inside the defenses were thrown into no less confusion. Believing that the Romans were coming against them immediately, they shouted for everyone to take up arms. Some, terrified, rushed into the town.

SECTION 7.70.7
Vercingetorix ordered the gates closed so that the camp would not be stripped of its defenders. After killing many men and capturing a large number of horses, the Germans withdrew.

CHAPTER 7.71

SECTION 7.71.1
Before the Romans completed their fortifications, Vercingetorix decided to send all his cavalry away at night.

SECTION 7.71.2
As they departed, he instructed each of them to go to his own state and compel to join the war everyone of military age who could bear arms.

SECTION 7.71.3
He reminded them of his services to them and implored them to consider his safety and not surrender him to the enemy for torture after he had rendered the greatest service to their common freedom. He pointed out that, if they were negligent, eighty thousand picked men would perish together with him.

SECTION 7.71.4
By his calculation, he had barely enough grain for thirty days, though by rationing it could be made to last somewhat longer. After giving these instructions,

SECTION 7.71.5
he silently sent the cavalry out during the second watch, through the gap where the fortifications had not yet been completed.

SECTION 7.71.6
He ordered all the grain to be brought to him and established the death penalty for those who did not obey.

SECTION 7.71.7
He distributed among the men individually the livestock, a great quantity of which had been driven in by the Mandubii, and began issuing the grain sparingly and in small quantities.

SECTION 7.71.8
He withdrew into the town all the forces he had stationed in front of it.

SECTION 7.71.9
By these measures he prepared to await relief from Gaul and conduct the war.

CHAPTER 7.72

SECTION 7.72.1
After learning of these measures from deserters and prisoners, Caesar established the following kinds of fortifications. He dug a trench twenty feet wide with vertical sides, so that the bottom of the trench was as wide as the distance between its upper edges.

SECTION 7.72.2
He set all the remaining fortifications four hundred feet back from that trench. His purpose was this: since he had necessarily enclosed such a vast area, and the entire circuit could not easily be surrounded by a ring of soldiers, he wanted to prevent a large enemy force from suddenly rushing upon the fortifications without warning or at night, or from being able during the day to hurl missiles at our men assigned to the work.

SECTION 7.72.3
Leaving this space between them, he dug two trenches fifteen feet wide and equally deep. In the level, low-lying ground he filled the inner trench with water diverted from the river.

SECTION 7.72.4
Behind them he constructed an earthwork and rampart twelve feet high. He added a breastwork and battlements, with large forked branches projecting from the joints between the parapets and the earthwork to slow the enemy’s ascent, and placed towers around the entire work at intervals of eighty feet.

CHAPTER 7.73

SECTION 7.73.1
At the same time it was necessary to obtain timber and grain and to build such extensive fortifications, although our forces were reduced because detachments were advancing some distance from the camp. The Gauls also sometimes tried to attack our works and attempted to make sorties from the town through several gates with the utmost force.

SECTION 7.73.2
Caesar therefore thought that still more defenses should be added to these works so that the fortifications could be defended by a smaller number of soldiers. Accordingly, tree trunks or very stout branches were cut, their tops stripped of bark and sharpened to a point, and continuous trenches five feet deep were dug.

SECTION 7.73.3
These stakes were lowered into the trenches and fastened together at the bottom so that they could not be pulled out, while their branches projected above them.

SECTION 7.73.4
There were five rows, joined and intertwined with one another. Anyone who entered them impaled himself on the extremely sharp stakes.

SECTION 7.73.5
They called these “boundary posts.” In front of them, pits three feet deep were dug in diagonal rows arranged in a quincunx, gradually tapering toward the bottom.

SECTION 7.73.6
Smooth stakes as thick as a man’s thigh, sharpened and fire-hardened at the top, were lowered into these pits so that they projected no more than four inches above the ground.

SECTION 7.73.7
At the same time, to secure and stabilize them, one foot of earth at the bottom of each pit was stamped down firmly. The remaining part of the pit was covered with willow branches and brushwood to conceal the trap.

SECTION 7.73.8
Eight rows of this type were constructed, three feet apart.

SECTION 7.73.9
Because of their resemblance to the flower, they were called “lilies.” In front of these, foot-long stakes fitted with iron hooks were buried completely in the ground and scattered everywhere at moderate intervals. They called these “spurs.”

CHAPTER 7.74

SECTION 7.74.1
After completing these works, Caesar followed the most level ground he could find, given the nature of the terrain, and enclosed a circuit of fourteen miles. He completed matching fortifications of the same type, but facing in the opposite direction, against an enemy coming from outside, so that the garrisons of the fortifications could not be surrounded even by a large force, if that should happen.

SECTION 7.74.2
To avoid being forced to leave camp at his own peril, he ordered everyone to bring in a thirty-day supply of forage and grain.

CHAPTER 7.75

SECTION 7.75.1
While these events were taking place at Alesia, the Gauls summoned a council of their leading men. They decided not to call out everyone able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix had proposed, but to levy a fixed number from each state, for fear that, with so vast a multitude thrown into confusion, they would be unable to control them, distinguish their own men, or make adequate provision for grain.

SECTION 7.75.2
They levied thirty-five thousand from the Aedui and their client states—the Segusiavi, Ambivareti, Aulerci Brannovices, and Blannovii—and an equal number from the Arverni, together with the Eleuteti, Cadurci, Gabali, and Vellavii, who had traditionally been under the rule of the Arverni; from the Sequani,

SECTION 7.75.3
The Senones, Bituriges, Santones, Ruteni, and Carnutes were each to furnish twelve thousand; the Bellovaci, ten thousand; the Lemovices, the same number; the Pictones, Turones, Parisii, and Helvetii, eight thousand each; the Suessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, and Nitiobriges, five thousand each; the Aulerci Cenomani, the same number; the Atrebates, four thousand; the Veliocasses, Lexovii, and Aulerci Eburovices, three thousand each; and the Rauraci and Boii, two thousand each;

SECTION 7.75.4
and thirty thousand from all the states bordering the Ocean that, according to Gallic usage, are called the Armorican states, including the Curiosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lemovices, and Venelli.

SECTION 7.75.5
Of these, the Bellovaci did not furnish their full quota, because they said that they would wage war against the Romans in their own name and at their own discretion and would obey no one’s orders. Nevertheless, at the request of Commius and in consideration of their ties of hospitality with him, they sent two thousand along with the others.

CHAPTER 7.76

SECTION 7.76.1
As we have shown above, Caesar had made faithful and useful use of this Commius’s services in Britain during the preceding years. In return for his merits, Caesar had ordered that his state be exempt from tribute, had restored its rights and laws, and had placed the Morini under his authority.

SECTION 7.76.2
Nevertheless, the determination of all Gaul to reclaim its liberty and recover its former military glory was so great that neither favors nor the memory of friendship influenced them, and they all devoted themselves heart and resources to that war.

SECTION 7.76.3
After eight thousand cavalry and about two hundred and fifty thousand infantry had been assembled, they were reviewed in the territory of the Aedui, the total was counted, and commanders were appointed.

SECTION 7.76.4
Supreme command was entrusted to Commius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedorix of the Aedui, and Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian, a cousin of Vercingetorix. Men chosen from the states were assigned to them, so that the war might be conducted with their advice.

SECTION 7.76.5
All of them set out for Alesia eagerly and full of confidence,

SECTION 7.76.6
and there was not one among them who believed that even the sight of so great a force could be withstood, especially in a battle on two fronts, when a sortie was being made from the town while such vast forces of cavalry and infantry could be seen outside.

CHAPTER 7.77

SECTION 7.77.1
But those under siege at Alesia, after the day on which they had expected relief from their countrymen had passed, had consumed all their grain. Not knowing what was happening among the Aedui, they called a council

SECTION 7.77.2
and deliberated about the outcome of their fortunes. Various opinions were expressed, some advocating surrender and others a sortie while their strength still held out. The speech of Critognatus must not be passed over because of its extraordinary and monstrous cruelty.

SECTION 7.77.3
This man, who came from a very high-ranking Arvernian family and was regarded as a man of great authority, said: “I intend to say nothing about the proposal of those who give the name ‘surrender’ to the most shameful slavery. In my judgment, they should not be regarded as citizens or admitted to this council.

SECTION 7.77.4
My concern is with those who approve a sortie. In their proposal, as all of you agree, there seems to remain some memory of our former courage. Yet this inability to endure deprivation for a short time is weakness of spirit,

SECTION 7.77.5
not courage. It is easier to find men who offer themselves voluntarily to death than men who endure suffering patiently.

SECTION 7.77.6
And I would approve this proposal—so much influence does honor have with me—if I saw that no loss would result except that of our own lives.

SECTION 7.77.7
But in reaching our decision, let us consider all Gaul, which we have roused to come to our aid.

SECTION 7.77.8
What spirit do you think our relatives and kinsmen will have if eighty thousand men are killed in this one place and they are forced to fight out the battle almost on top of our corpses?

SECTION 7.77.9
Do not deprive of your aid those who, for the sake of your safety, have disregarded their own danger. Do not, through your own folly and recklessness or weakness of spirit, bring all Gaul to ruin and subject it to perpetual slavery.

SECTION 7.77.10
Or do you doubt their loyalty and steadfastness because they did not arrive on the appointed day? What, then? Do you think the Romans are working every day on those outer fortifications merely for amusement?

SECTION 7.77.11
If you cannot receive confirmation from their messengers because every approach has been blocked, use these fortifications as evidence that their arrival is drawing near. Terrified by the prospect of it, the Romans work day and night.

SECTION 7.77.12
What, then, is my proposal? To do what our ancestors did in their war with the Cimbri and Teutones, though that war was by no means comparable to this one. Driven into their towns and reduced to similar deprivation, they sustained their lives with the bodies of those who, because of their age, seemed unfit for war, and they did not surrender to the enemy.

SECTION 7.77.13
Even if we had no precedent for such an act, I would still judge it a glorious thing to establish one for the sake of liberty and hand it down to posterity.

SECTION 7.77.14
For how was that war anything like this one? After ravaging Gaul and inflicting a great disaster, the Cimbri eventually left our territory and sought other lands. They left us our rights, laws, fields, and liberty.

SECTION 7.77.15
But what else do the Romans seek or want except, driven by envy, to settle in the lands and states of those whom they have learned through report are distinguished and powerful in war, and to impose perpetual slavery upon them? They have never waged wars on any other terms.

SECTION 7.77.16
But if you do not know what is happening among distant nations, look at neighboring Gaul. It has been reduced to a province, its rights and laws have been changed, it has been subjected to the axes of Roman officials, and it is oppressed by perpetual slavery.”

CHAPTER 7.78

SECTION 7.78.1
After the opinions had been expressed, they decided that those who were unfit for war because of health or age should leave the town, and that they should try everything else before resorting to the proposal of Critognatus.

SECTION 7.78.2
Nevertheless, if circumstances forced them and the relief force was delayed, they should adopt that plan rather than accept terms of surrender or peace.

SECTION 7.78.3
The Mandubii, who had admitted them into the town, were forced to leave with their children and wives. When they reached the Roman fortifications,

SECTION 7.78.4
they wept and begged with every appeal to be taken in as slaves and given food.

SECTION 7.78.5
But Caesar posted guards along the rampart and forbade them to be admitted.

CHAPTER 7.79

SECTION 7.79.1
Meanwhile Commius and the other commanders to whom supreme command had been entrusted reached Alesia with all their forces. They occupied an outlying hill and established their camp no more than a mile from our fortifications.

SECTION 7.79.2
The next day they led the cavalry out of camp and filled the entire plain, which, as we have shown, extended three miles in length. They stationed their infantry a short distance away, concealed on higher ground.

SECTION 7.79.3
From the town of Alesia there was a view down onto the plain. At the sight of these relief forces, the besieged came rushing together. They congratulated one another, and everyone’s spirits rose with joy.

SECTION 7.79.4
They therefore led their forces out and took up a position before the town. They covered the nearest trench with hurdles, filled it with earth, and prepared themselves for a sortie and for every possible outcome.

CHAPTER 7.80

SECTION 7.80.1
Caesar stationed his entire army along both sides of the fortifications so that, if the need arose, every man would know and hold his assigned position. He then ordered the cavalry to be led out of camp and the battle to begin.

SECTION 7.80.2
There was a view down onto the field from all the camps, which occupied the crest of the ridge on every side, and all the soldiers watched intently for the battle’s outcome.

SECTION 7.80.3
The Gauls had interspersed a few archers and lightly armed infantry among their cavalry. These men were to come to the aid of their comrades when they gave ground and withstand the charges of our cavalry. Many of our men, unexpectedly wounded by them, withdrew from the fighting.

SECTION 7.80.4
Because the Gauls were confident that their men were gaining the advantage in the battle and saw that ours were being overwhelmed by superior numbers, both those enclosed within the fortifications and those who had come to their relief encouraged their comrades from every side with shouts and war cries.

SECTION 7.80.5
Because the action was taking place in full view of everyone and neither brave nor shameful conduct could be concealed, both sides were inspired to courage by their desire for praise and their fear of disgrace.

SECTION 7.80.6
The battle remained undecided from noon almost until sunset. Then, at one point, the Germans formed their squadrons into a compact body, charged the enemy, and drove them back.

SECTION 7.80.7
When the cavalry had been put to flight, the archers were surrounded and killed.

SECTION 7.80.8
Likewise, in the other sectors, our men pursued the retreating enemy all the way to their camp and gave them no opportunity to regroup.

SECTION 7.80.9
But those who had come out from Alesia withdrew sadly into the town, having almost given up hope of victory.

CHAPTER 7.81

SECTION 7.81.1
After allowing one day to pass and using that interval to make a great number of hurdles, ladders, and grappling hooks, the Gauls silently left their camp at midnight and approached the fortifications on the plain.

SECTION 7.81.2
They suddenly raised a shout so that those under siege in the town could know of their arrival. They prepared to throw down hurdles, drive our men from the rampart with slings, arrows, and stones, and carry out all the other operations required for an assault.

SECTION 7.81.3
At the same time, when he heard the shouting, Vercingetorix gave his men the signal with a trumpet and led them out of the town.

SECTION 7.81.4
Our men went to the fortifications, each to the position assigned to him on the preceding days, and terrified the Gauls with heavy slings, sharpened stakes they had placed along the works, and sling bullets.

SECTION 7.81.5
Because the darkness made it impossible to see, many wounds were suffered on both sides. A great many missiles were fired by artillery.

SECTION 7.81.6
The lieutenants Mark Antony and Gaius Trebonius, to whom the defense of these sectors had fallen, brought men down from the more distant redoubts and sent them to reinforce any point where they understood that our men were under pressure.

CHAPTER 7.82

SECTION 7.82.1
As long as the Gauls remained some distance from the fortifications, they gained more advantage from the sheer number of their missiles. Once they came nearer, however, they either unknowingly impaled themselves on the spikes, fell into the pits and were run through, or were pierced by heavy rampart javelins from the wall and towers and killed.

SECTION 7.82.2
After suffering many wounds on every side without breaking through any fortification, they withdrew to their own men as dawn approached, fearing that a sortie from the upper camp might surround them on their exposed flank.

SECTION 7.82.3
Meanwhile, the men on the inside were bringing forward the equipment Vercingetorix had prepared for the sortie and filling the forward trenches. They spent so long carrying out these operations that they learned that their comrades had withdrawn before they themselves could approach the fortifications. Thus, without accomplishing their objective, they returned to the town.

CHAPTER 7.83

SECTION 7.83.1
Twice repulsed with heavy losses, the Gauls deliberated about what to do. They consulted men familiar with the terrain and learned from them the position and fortifications of the upper camp.

SECTION 7.83.2
On the northern side there was a hill that our men had been unable to enclose within their works because its circumference was so great. They had therefore been forced to establish a camp on ground that was almost unfavorable and sloped gently downward.

SECTION 7.83.3
The lieutenants Gaius Antistius Reginus and Gaius Caninius Rebilus held this camp with two legions.

SECTION 7.83.4
After scouts had surveyed the terrain, the enemy commanders selected sixty thousand men from their entire force, choosing them from the states with the highest reputation for courage.

SECTION 7.83.5
They secretly agreed among themselves on what they wanted done and how it should be carried out. They set the time for the approach at about noon.

SECTION 7.83.6
They placed these troops under the command of Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian, one of the four commanders and a relative of Vercingetorix.

SECTION 7.83.7
He left camp during the first watch, nearly completed his march by dawn, concealed himself behind the mountain, and ordered his soldiers to recover from their exertions during the night.

SECTION 7.83.8
When noon seemed to be approaching, he hurried toward the camp mentioned above. At the same time, the cavalry began approaching the fortifications on the plain, while the rest of the forces began showing themselves in front of their camp.

CHAPTER 7.84

SECTION 7.84.1
When Vercingetorix saw his men from the citadel of Alesia, he left the town and brought forward the hurdles, poles, covered assault shelters, hooks, and other equipment he had prepared for the sortie.

SECTION 7.84.2
Fighting took place simultaneously at every point, and every method was tried. Wherever a section appeared weakest, men rushed to it.

SECTION 7.84.3
The Roman force was stretched thin by fortifications of such extent and could not readily respond at several points.

SECTION 7.84.4
The shouting that arose behind our men as they fought did much to terrify them, because they saw that their own danger depended on the safety of others.

SECTION 7.84.5
For things that are out of sight generally disturb people’s minds more intensely.

CHAPTER 7.85

SECTION 7.85.1
Caesar found a suitable position from which he could see what was happening in every sector, and he sent reinforcements to those under pressure.

SECTION 7.85.2
Both sides realized that this was the one moment when they must make their greatest effort:

SECTION 7.85.3
the Gauls despaired of any chance of survival unless they broke through the fortifications; the Romans, if they held their ground, expected an end to all their hardships.

SECTION 7.85.4
The greatest pressure was on the upper fortifications, where, as we have shown, Vercassivellaunus had been sent. The unfavorable downward slope of the ground had a major effect.

SECTION 7.85.5
Some hurled missiles, while others formed a shield wall and advanced. Fresh troops took the place of those who became exhausted.

SECTION 7.85.6
The earth thrown against the fortification by the entire Gallic force both gave the Gauls a way up and covered the obstacles the Romans had concealed in the ground. By now our men had neither weapons nor strength enough to continue.

CHAPTER 7.86

SECTION 7.86.1
When Caesar learned of these developments, he sent Labienus with six cohorts to reinforce the men under pressure.

SECTION 7.86.2
He ordered him, if he could not hold out, to withdraw the cohorts from the fortifications and fight by making a sortie, but not to do this unless absolutely necessary.

SECTION 7.86.3
Caesar himself went to the other troops and urged them not to give in to exhaustion. He explained that the reward for all their previous battles depended on that day and that hour.

SECTION 7.86.4
The men on the inside, despairing of success on the level ground because of the immense fortifications, attempted to climb the steep slopes. They brought there the equipment they had prepared.

SECTION 7.86.5
With a mass of missiles they drove the defenders from the towers, filled the trenches with earth and hurdles, and used hooks to tear down the palisade and breastwork.

CHAPTER 7.87

SECTION 7.87.1
Caesar first sent the young Brutus with several cohorts, and afterward sent the lieutenant Gaius Fabius with others. Finally, when the fighting became more intense, he himself brought up fresh troops as reinforcements.

SECTION 7.87.2
After restoring the battle and driving back the enemy, he hurried to the place where he had sent Labienus. He brought four cohorts down from the nearest redoubt and ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, while the rest rode around the outer fortifications and attacked the enemy from the rear.

SECTION 7.87.3
When neither the embankments nor the trenches could withstand the enemy’s assault, Labienus assembled forty cohorts that chance had made available from the nearest guard posts and sent messengers to inform Caesar of what he thought had to be done. Caesar hurried so that he could take part in the battle.

CHAPTER 7.88

SECTION 7.88.1
The enemy recognized Caesar’s approach by the color of the cloak he customarily wore as his distinguishing mark in battle. Seeing also the cavalry squadrons and cohorts he had ordered to follow him, since the downward slopes could be seen from the higher ground, they joined battle.

SECTION 7.88.2
A shout rises on both sides, and another shout answers it from the rampart and all the fortifications. Our men lay aside their javelins and fight with their swords.

SECTION 7.88.3
Suddenly the cavalry is seen behind the enemy; other cohorts are approaching. The enemy turns and flees, only to be met by the cavalry. A great slaughter follows. Sedulius, commander and chief of the Lemovices, is killed;

SECTION 7.88.4
Vercassivellaunus the Arvernian is captured alive while fleeing; seventy-four military standards are brought back to Caesar. Out of that vast number, only a few reach their camp unharmed.

SECTION 7.88.5
When those in the town see the slaughter and flight of their countrymen, they despair of being saved and withdraw their forces from the fortifications.

SECTION 7.88.6
As soon as this news is heard, the Gauls flee from their camp. If our soldiers had not been exhausted by repeated relief duties and the exertions of the entire day, all the enemy’s forces could have been destroyed.

SECTION 7.88.7
Around midnight the cavalry is sent out and overtakes the rear of the column. A great number are captured and killed; the rest escape and disperse to their states.

CHAPTER 7.89

SECTION 7.89.1
The next day Vercingetorix calls a council and explains that he undertook that war not for his own personal interests,

SECTION 7.89.2
but for the sake of their common freedom, and that, since they must yield to fortune, he offers himself to them for either course: whether they wish to satisfy the Romans by his death or surrender him alive. Envoys are sent to Caesar about these matters.

SECTION 7.89.3
He orders the weapons to be surrendered and the chiefs brought forward.

SECTION 7.89.4
Caesar himself takes his seat in the fortifications before the camp. The leaders are brought before him; Vercingetorix is surrendered, and the weapons are thrown down.

SECTION 7.89.5
He keeps the Aedui and Arverni apart, in case he can use them to regain the allegiance of their states, and distributes the remaining prisoners throughout the entire army, one to each soldier as plunder.

CHAPTER 7.90

SECTION 7.90.1
After completing these arrangements, he sets out for the territory of the Aedui and restores the state to his allegiance.

SECTION 7.90.2
Envoys sent there by the Arverni promise that they will do whatever he commands. He demands a large number of hostages.

SECTION 7.90.3
He sends the legions into winter quarters. He returns about twenty thousand prisoners to the Aedui and Arverni.

SECTION 7.90.4
He orders Titus Labienus to set out for the territory of the Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and assigns Marcus Sempronius Rutilus to him.

SECTION 7.90.5
He stations the legate Gaius Fabius and Lucius Minucius Basilus with two legions among the Remi, to prevent them from suffering any harm from the neighboring Bellovaci.

SECTION 7.90.6
He sends Gaius Antistius Reginus to the Ambivareti, Titus Sextius to the Bituriges, and Gaius Caninius Rebilus to the Ruteni, each with one legion.

SECTION 7.90.7
He stations Quintus Tullius Cicero and Publius Sulpicius at Cabillonum and Matisco in the territory of the Aedui along the Arar, to oversee the grain supply. He himself decides to winter at Bibracte. When these dispatches become known at Rome, a public thanksgiving of twenty days is decreed.

### Book 8

CHAPTER 8.0

SECTION 8.0.1
Compelled by your persistent urging, Balbus, and because my daily refusal seemed to offer a plea not of difficulty but of laziness, I have undertaken a most difficult task.

SECTION 8.0.2
I have connected the earlier and later writings of our Caesar’s account of his campaigns in Gaul, and I have completed his final, unfinished work, continuing from the events at Alexandria to the end—not, indeed, of the civil conflict, whose end we cannot see, but of Caesar’s life.

SECTION 8.0.3
I only wish that those who read these works could know how reluctantly I undertook to write them, so that I might more easily escape the charge of stupidity and arrogance for having inserted myself among Caesar’s writings.

SECTION 8.0.4
For everyone agrees that nothing has ever been completed by others with such labor that it is not surpassed by the elegance of these commentaries.

SECTION 8.0.5
They were published so that writers would not lack knowledge of such great events, and in everyone’s judgment they are so highly praised that they seem to have taken away rather than provided writers with the opportunity to write about them.

SECTION 8.0.6
Yet our admiration for this achievement is greater than everyone else’s. Others know how well and flawlessly he wrote them; we also know how easily and quickly he completed them.

SECTION 8.0.7
Caesar possessed not only the greatest skill and elegance in writing, but also the most accurate knowledge for explaining his own plans.

SECTION 8.0.8
I did not even have the advantage of taking part in the Alexandrian and African wars. Although these wars are partly known to me from Caesar’s own conversation, we listen in one way to things that captivate us by their novelty or wonder, and in another to things that we intend to report as testimony.

SECTION 8.0.9
But of course, while gathering every possible excuse not to be compared with Caesar, I incur the very charge of arrogance by imagining that in anyone’s judgment I could be compared with Caesar. Farewell.

CHAPTER 8.1

SECTION 8.1.1
After all Gaul had been conquered, Caesar, who had allowed no break in military operations since the previous summer, wanted his soldiers to recover from such great exertions by resting in winter quarters. Yet reports came that several states were simultaneously reviving plans for war and forming conspiracies.

SECTION 8.1.2
A plausible reason for this was given: all the Gauls had learned that no force, however large, could resist the Romans when concentrated in one place; but if several states began separate wars at the same time, the army of the Roman people would not have enough assistance, time, or troops to deal with them all. No state should refuse to accept its share of hardship if, through such a delay, the rest could recover their freedom.

CHAPTER 8.2

SECTION 8.2.1
To prevent this belief from becoming firmly established among the Gauls, Caesar puts the quaestor Marcus Antonius in command of his winter quarters. On December 31, he himself sets out from the town of Bibracte with a cavalry escort for the Thirteenth Legion, which he had stationed in the territory of the Bituriges not far from the borders of the Aedui, and joins to it the Eleventh Legion, which was quartered nearest.

SECTION 8.2.2
Leaving two cohorts from each legion to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of the army into the most fertile parts of the Bituriges’ territory. Because they had extensive lands and several towns, they could not be kept under control by the winter quarters of a single legion or prevented from preparing for war and forming conspiracies.

CHAPTER 8.3

SECTION 8.3.1
Caesar’s sudden arrival produced the result that was inevitable among people who were unprepared and scattered: while they were cultivating the countryside without any fear, they were overwhelmed by the cavalry before they could take refuge in the towns.

SECTION 8.3.2
Even the usual sign of an enemy raid, ordinarily revealed by the burning of buildings, had been eliminated by Caesar’s prohibition, so that he would not run short of fodder and grain if he wished to advance farther, and so that the enemy would not be warned by the fires.

SECTION 8.3.3
After many thousands of people had been captured, the terrified Bituriges who had managed to escape the Romans’ first arrival fled into neighboring states, relying either on private ties of hospitality or on a shared commitment to their plans.

SECTION 8.3.4
They fled in vain. By forced marches Caesar reached every place before them and gave no state time to think about the safety of others rather than its own. By this speed he both kept his loyal friends faithful and frightened the wavering into accepting terms of peace.

SECTION 8.3.5
With such terms offered, the Bituriges saw that Caesar’s clemency left open a return to his friendship, and that neighboring states had surrendered hostages without suffering any punishment and had been accepted under his protection. They therefore did the same.

CHAPTER 8.4

SECTION 8.4.1
In recognition of such great exertion and endurance, since the soldiers had worked with exceptional devotion during the days of midwinter, on extremely difficult marches and in intolerable cold, Caesar promises to award each soldier two hundred sesterces and each centurion two thousand as prize money. After sending the legions back to winter quarters, he himself returns to Bibracte on the fortieth day.

SECTION 8.4.2
While he is administering justice there, the Bituriges send envoys to ask him for help against the Carnutes, whom they accuse of making war on them.

SECTION 8.4.3
On learning this, although he had remained in winter quarters no more than eighteen days, he leads the Fourteenth and Sixth Legions out of their winter quarters by the Arar, where, as explained in the preceding commentary, they had been stationed to facilitate the grain supply. He then sets out with two legions to pursue the Carnutes.

CHAPTER 8.5

SECTION 8.5.1
When news of the army’s approach reaches the enemy, the Carnutes, warned by the disaster suffered by the others, abandon the villages and towns where they had been living in hastily constructed, makeshift buildings erected to endure the winter—for, having recently been defeated, they had abandoned several towns—and flee in all directions.

SECTION 8.5.2
Because Caesar does not want his soldiers exposed to the extremely violent storms that broke out at that very time, he establishes camp in Cenabum, a town of the Carnutes. He crowds the soldiers partly into the houses of the Gauls and partly into shelters quickly built by piling thatch over the tents to cover them.

SECTION 8.5.3
Nevertheless, he sends the cavalry and auxiliary infantry in every direction in which the enemy are said to have gone, and not without success.

SECTION 8.5.4
Our men generally return with a great deal of plunder. Overwhelmed by the hardships of winter and by fear of danger, driven from shelter and not daring to remain long in any one place, and unable to protect themselves from the extremely severe weather by taking refuge in the forests, the Carnutes disperse into neighboring states after losing a large part of their people.

CHAPTER 8.6

SECTION 8.6.1
At the most difficult season of the year, Caesar considered it enough to scatter the forces that were assembling so that no fresh war could begin, and he knew that, so far as could reasonably be calculated, no major war could be organized before the beginning of the summer campaign. He therefore stations Gaius Trebonius with the two legions he had with him in winter quarters at Cenabum.

SECTION 8.6.2
Meanwhile, repeated embassies from the Remi informed him that the Bellovaci, who surpassed all the Gauls and Belgae in military reputation, and their neighboring states, under the leadership of Correus the Bellovacan and Commius the Atrebatian, were raising armies and concentrating them in one place, intending to invade with their entire force the territory of the Suessiones, who had been placed under the protection of the Remi. Caesar judged that it concerned not only his honor but also his security that allies who had rendered the Roman people outstanding service should suffer no disaster,

SECTION 8.6.3
so he again summons the Eleventh Legion from winter quarters. He sends orders to Gaius Fabius to bring the two legions under his command into the territory of the Suessiones, and sends for one of the two legions under Labienus.

SECTION 8.6.4
Thus, as the locations of the winter quarters and the requirements of the war demanded, through his own unremitting exertions he assigned the burden of active campaigning to the legions in turn.

CHAPTER 8.7

SECTION 8.7.1
After assembling these forces, he sets out against the Bellovaci. He establishes camp in their territory and sends squadrons of cavalry in every direction to intercept people from whom he might learn the enemy’s plans.

SECTION 8.7.2
After carrying out their assignment, the cavalry reports that only a few people have been found in the houses, and that these had remained not to cultivate the fields—for everyone had carefully moved away from all parts of the area—but had been sent back to spy.

SECTION 8.7.3
When Caesar asked them where the main force of the Bellovaci was and what their plan was, he learned that all the Bellovaci capable of bearing arms had assembled in one place,

SECTION 8.7.4
along with the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caleti, Veliocasses, and Atrebates. They had chosen for their camp an elevated position in a forest surrounded by marshland, and had moved all their baggage into the more distant forests.

SECTION 8.7.5
Several chiefs were responsible for starting the war, but the main body obeyed Correus above all because they knew that he felt the deepest hatred for the name of the Roman people.

SECTION 8.7.6
A few days earlier, Commius the Atrebatian had left this camp to bring in German reinforcements, since the Germans were close neighbors and their numbers were limitless.

SECTION 8.7.7
With the agreement of all their chiefs and the strongest enthusiasm of the common people, the Bellovaci had decided that if Caesar came with three legions, as was reported, they would offer battle, so that they would not later be forced to fight his entire army under more miserable and difficult conditions.

SECTION 8.7.8
If he brought larger forces, they would remain in the position they had chosen and use ambushes to prevent the Romans from gathering fodder—which, because of the season, was both scarce and widely scattered—collecting grain, and obtaining all other supplies.

CHAPTER 8.8

SECTION 8.8.1
When Caesar learned these facts from several people whose reports agreed, and judged that the plans described to him were full of prudence and far removed from the usual recklessness of barbarians, he decided to adapt everything to the goal of making the enemy despise the small size of his force and come out to offer battle as quickly as possible.

SECTION 8.8.2
He had the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions, veteran units of exceptional courage, and the Eleventh, composed of carefully selected young men of the highest promise. Although it was already in its eighth year of service, in comparison with the other legions it had not yet acquired the same reputation for experience and courage.

SECTION 8.8.3
He therefore calls a council, explains everything that has been reported to him, and strengthens the resolve of the whole army.

SECTION 8.8.4
In the hope that he might lure the enemy into battle by appearing to have only three legions, he arranges the order of march so that the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions go ahead of all the baggage. The Eleventh then brings up the rear behind the entire baggage train, which was not very large, as is usual on an active campaign, so that the enemy would see no appearance of a larger force than the one they themselves had demanded.

SECTION 8.8.5
With the column arranged in this way, in an almost square formation, he brings the army into the enemy’s sight sooner than they had expected.

CHAPTER 8.9

SECTION 8.9.1
When the Gauls, whose confidently conceived plans had been reported to Caesar, suddenly see the legions approaching at a steady pace and drawn up as if in battle line, they deploy their forces in front of their camp and do not leave the higher ground—whether because of the danger of battle, the suddenness of his arrival, or uncertainty about our plan.

SECTION 8.9.2
Although Caesar had wanted to fight, he is nevertheless astonished by the enemy’s great numbers and establishes his camp opposite theirs, with a valley between them that was more deeply sunken than broad.

SECTION 8.9.3
He orders this camp to be fortified with a rampart twelve feet high, with a breastwork built on top in proportion to its height; a double ditch, each fifteen feet wide, to be sunk with straight sides; and numerous towers, three stories high, to be raised and connected by bridges laid between them and covered with flooring, their fronts protected by wicker breastworks. In this way the camp would be defended against the enemy by a double ditch and two lines of defenders,

SECTION 8.9.4
one of which, from the bridges, could throw missiles more boldly and to a greater distance because it was safer due to its height, while the other, stationed on the rampart itself and nearer the enemy, would be protected by the bridge from falling missiles. He fitted the gates with doors and taller towers.

CHAPTER 8.10

SECTION 8.10.1
This fortification had a double purpose. Caesar hoped that the massive scale of the works and the appearance of his own fear would give the barbarians confidence; and because the army had to travel farther to gather fodder and grain, he saw that the fortifications themselves would allow the camp to be defended by a small force.

SECTION 8.10.2
Meanwhile, small groups frequently ran forward from both sides and fought between the two camps, with the marsh lying between them. Sometimes, however, our Gallic and German auxiliaries crossed the marsh and pursued the enemy more aggressively; at other times, the enemy crossed it in turn and drove our men back a considerable distance.

SECTION 8.10.3
Moreover, during the daily foraging, as was bound to happen when forage had to be gathered from isolated buildings scattered far apart, foragers who had dispersed through difficult terrain were being surrounded;

SECTION 8.10.4
although this caused our men only moderate losses of pack animals and servants, it encouraged the barbarians in their foolish hopes, all the more because Commius, whom I have said had gone to summon assistance from the Germans, had arrived with cavalry. Though they numbered no more than five hundred, the barbarians nevertheless took confidence from the arrival of the Germans.

CHAPTER 8.11

SECTION 8.11.1
When Caesar observed that the enemy had remained for several days in a camp protected by a marsh and the natural terrain, that their camp could not be attacked without a costly battle, and that the position could not be enclosed with fortifications except by a larger army, he sent a letter to Trebonius ordering him to summon as quickly as possible the Thirteenth Legion, which was wintering among the Bituriges with the lieutenant Titus Sextius, and then to come to him by forced marches with three legions.

SECTION 8.11.2
Meanwhile, he sent the cavalry of the Remi, the Lingones, and the other states, a large number of whom he had called out, to guard the foraging parties in rotation and withstand sudden enemy attacks.

CHAPTER 8.12

SECTION 8.12.1
As this happened every day, carefulness was already declining through familiarity, as usually occurs when something continues for a long time. The Bellovaci, after learning the regular positions occupied each day by our cavalry,

SECTION 8.12.2
placed a picked force of infantry in ambush in wooded areas and sent cavalry there the next day, first to draw our men out and then to attack them after they had been surrounded.

SECTION 8.12.3
This misfortune fell to the Remi, whose turn it was to perform that duty on that day. When they suddenly noticed the enemy cavalry, they were superior in number and therefore despised the enemy’s small force; but after pursuing too eagerly, they were surrounded on every side by infantry.

SECTION 8.12.4
Thrown into confusion by this, they withdrew more quickly than is usual in a cavalry battle, after losing Vertiscus, the leading man of their state and commander of their cavalry.

SECTION 8.12.5
Although his age made him scarcely able to ride a horse, in accordance with Gallic custom he had neither used his age as an excuse for declining the command nor been willing for the battle to be fought without him.

SECTION 8.12.6
The enemy’s spirits were raised and encouraged by their success in the battle and by the death of the chief and cavalry commander of the Remi,

SECTION 8.12.7
while our men were warned by the loss to reconnoiter positions more carefully before posting guards and to show more restraint when pursuing an enemy who was retreating.

CHAPTER 8.13

SECTION 8.13.1
Meanwhile, the daily fighting within sight of both camps continued without interruption at the fords and crossing places of the marsh.

SECTION 8.13.2
During this struggle, the Germans, whom Caesar had brought across the Rhine for the specific purpose of fighting interspersed among the cavalry, crossed the marsh together with greater determination, killed the few who resisted, and pursued the rest of the force too persistently. Not only those who were being overwhelmed at close quarters or wounded from a distance, but even those who had normally remained farther back as a reserve, were terrified and disgracefully fled.

SECTION 8.13.3
Repeatedly abandoning higher ground, they did not stop fleeing until they had either taken refuge in their own camp or, in some cases, had been driven by shame to flee still farther.

SECTION 8.13.4
The danger they faced threw all their forces into such confusion that it was hard to judge whether they were more arrogant after even the smallest success or more timid after a moderate setback.

CHAPTER 8.14

SECTION 8.14.1
After spending several days in the same camp, the commanders of the Bellovaci learned that the legions and the lieutenant Gaius Trebonius had drawn nearer. Fearing a siege like the one at Alesia, they sent away by night everyone they considered inferior in age or strength or who was unarmed, together with the rest of their baggage.

SECTION 8.14.2
While they were sorting out this disordered and confused column—for a great mass of wagons normally accompanies even Gallic forces traveling without baggage—they were overtaken by daylight and drew up their armed forces in front of their camp, so that the Romans would not begin pursuing them before their long baggage column had advanced farther.

SECTION 8.14.3
Caesar judged that the enemy should not be attacked while resisting at the top of so steep a hill, but also that the legions should be brought close enough to prevent the barbarians from leaving the position without danger while his soldiers pressed them.

SECTION 8.14.4
He saw that the two camps were separated by a difficult marsh whose hard crossing could slow the speed of pursuit. He also noticed that a ridge extending across the marsh almost to the enemy camp was separated from their position by a shallow valley. He therefore laid bridges over the marsh, led the legions across, and quickly reached the flat summit of the ridge, which was protected on both sides by downward slopes.

SECTION 8.14.5
After drawing up the legions there, he reached the farthest end of the ridge and stationed his battle line at a point from which missiles launched by artillery could be hurled into the enemy’s packed formations.

CHAPTER 8.15

SECTION 8.15.1
The barbarians trusted in the natural strength of their position and would not have refused battle if the Romans happened to attempt the ascent of the hill. Since they could not gradually dismiss their divided forces for fear that they would be thrown into confusion once dispersed, they remained in battle formation.

SECTION 8.15.2
When Caesar recognized their determination, he drew up twenty cohorts, marked out a camp in that position, and ordered it to be fortified.

SECTION 8.15.3
When the works were completed, he stationed the legions in formation before the rampart and posted the cavalry on guard with their horses bridled.

SECTION 8.15.4
When the Bellovaci saw that the Romans were ready to pursue and realized that they could neither spend the night nor remain longer in the same position without danger, they adopted the following plan for retreating.

SECTION 8.15.5
At the places where they had been sitting—for Caesar’s earlier commentaries have explained that the Gauls customarily sit while in battle formation—they placed bundles of straw and brushwood, of which there was a vast quantity in the camp, in front of their line after passing them from hand to hand among themselves. At the very end of the day, when the signal was given, they set them all on fire at once.

SECTION 8.15.6
The continuous sheet of flame suddenly concealed all their forces from the Romans’ sight. As soon as this happened, the barbarians fled at full speed.

CHAPTER 8.16

SECTION 8.16.1
Although Caesar could not observe the enemy’s departure because the fires blocked his view, he suspected that the plan had been devised to cover a retreat. He advanced the legions and sent cavalry squadrons in pursuit; but because he feared an ambush, in case the enemy might have halted in the same area and be trying to draw our men onto unfavorable ground, he himself advanced more slowly.

SECTION 8.16.2
The cavalry were afraid to enter the extremely dense smoke and flames, and any who entered too eagerly could scarcely see even the front parts of their own horses. Fearing an ambush, they therefore gave the Bellovaci a free opportunity to withdraw.

SECTION 8.16.3
Thus, by a retreat full of both fear and cunning, the enemy advanced no more than ten miles without any loss and pitched camp in an exceptionally well-fortified position.

SECTION 8.16.4
From there they frequently placed cavalry and infantry in ambush and inflicted heavy losses on the Romans during foraging operations.

CHAPTER 8.17

SECTION 8.17.1
After this happened repeatedly, Caesar learned from a prisoner that Correus, commander of the Bellovaci, had selected six thousand of the bravest infantry and one thousand cavalry from their entire force to place in ambush at a location where he suspected the Romans would send men because of the abundance of grain and forage.

SECTION 8.17.2
When Caesar learned of this plan, he led out more legions than usual and sent ahead the cavalry he customarily assigned to protect the foragers. He interspersed lightly armed auxiliary infantry among them and himself approached as closely as possible with the legions.

CHAPTER 8.18

SECTION 8.18.1
The enemy lying in ambush had chosen for the operation a plain extending no more than a thousand paces in any direction and protected on every side by woods or by an extremely difficult river. They surrounded it with their ambush as though with a hunting enclosure.

SECTION 8.18.2
Our men had discovered the enemy’s plan and were prepared in spirit and arms for battle. Since the legions were following behind, they refused no engagement and entered the area squadron by squadron.

SECTION 8.18.3
At their arrival, Correus thought that an opportunity for action had been offered to him. He first showed himself with a few men and charged the nearest squadrons.

SECTION 8.18.4
Our men firmly withstood the ambushers’ charge and did not mass too many men in one place. When that usually happens in cavalry battles because of fear, the troops suffer losses from their very numbers.

CHAPTER 8.19

SECTION 8.19.1
While the squadrons, arranged in position, fought in small groups by turns and did not allow their men to be surrounded on the flanks, the rest burst out of the woods as Correus continued fighting.

SECTION 8.19.2
A fierce battle developed between the opposing forces. After it had continued for a considerable time with evenly balanced success, the massed infantry gradually advanced from the woods and forced our cavalry to give ground. The lightly armed infantry, whom I have said had been sent ahead of the legions, quickly came to their aid and, interspersed among our squadrons, fought resolutely.

SECTION 8.19.3
For some time the fighting continued with equal intensity. Then, as the nature of the battle dictated, those who had withstood the ambush’s first attacks gained the advantage for the very reason that they had suffered no unexpected loss at the hands of the ambushers.

SECTION 8.19.4
Meanwhile, the legions drew nearer, and frequent reports reached both our men and the enemy at the same time that the commander was approaching with his forces drawn up for battle.

SECTION 8.19.5
When our men learned this, they trusted in the support of the cohorts and fought with the greatest vigor, fearing that if they acted too slowly they would appear to have shared the glory of victory with the legions.

SECTION 8.19.6
The enemy lost heart and sought escape by different routes. It was useless, for they themselves were trapped by the same obstacles in the terrain with which they had intended to confine the Romans.

SECTION 8.19.7
Nevertheless, defeated and shattered after losing the greater part of their force, they fled in panic, some seeking the woods and others the river. Yet during their flight they were cut down by our men, who pursued them fiercely.

SECTION 8.19.8
Meanwhile, Correus, unconquered by any disaster, could not be induced to leave the battle and seek the woods or to surrender when our men invited him to do so. Instead, by fighting with the greatest bravery and wounding many men, he forced the victorious Romans, now inflamed with anger, to shower him with missiles.

CHAPTER 8.20

SECTION 8.20.1
After the action had ended in this way, Caesar followed over the fresh traces of the battle. He believed that after suffering so great a disaster the defeated enemy would abandon their camp upon receiving the news; it was said to be no more than about eight miles from the scene of the slaughter. Although he saw that the river obstructed his crossing, he led his army across and advanced.

SECTION 8.20.2
The Bellovaci and the other states received from the flight only a few survivors, and those wounded, who had escaped disaster under cover of the woods. With everything against them, once they learned of the calamity, the death of Correus, and the loss of their cavalry and bravest infantry, they believed that the Romans were approaching. They immediately summoned a council by trumpet call and unanimously demanded that envoys and hostages be sent to Caesar.

CHAPTER 8.21

SECTION 8.21.1
When everyone approved this plan, Commius the Atrebatian fled to the Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliary forces for that war.

SECTION 8.21.2
The others immediately sent envoys to Caesar and asked him to be satisfied with the punishment the enemy had already suffered—a punishment that, if he had been able to inflict it without battle while their strength was still intact, he certainly would never have imposed, given his customary mercy and humanity.

SECTION 8.21.3
They said that the resources of the Bellovaci had been shattered in the cavalry battle, that many thousands of picked infantrymen had perished, and that the messengers who reported the slaughter had barely escaped.

SECTION 8.21.4
Nevertheless, amid so great a disaster the Bellovaci had gained one great advantage from the battle: Correus, the instigator of the war and agitator of the populace, had been killed. For while he was alive, the senate had never possessed as much influence in the state as the ignorant common people.

CHAPTER 8.22

SECTION 8.22.1
In response to the envoys’ pleas, Caesar reminded them that the Bellovaci and the other states of Gaul had undertaken war at the same time the previous year; that of all of them, the Bellovaci had persisted most stubbornly in their decision; and that they had not been brought back to their senses by the surrender of the others.

SECTION 8.22.2
He knew and understood, he said, that responsibility for wrongdoing was very easily shifted onto the dead. Yet no one could truly possess so much power that, against the will of the leading men, in the face of the senate’s resistance, and despite the opposition of all respectable citizens, he could incite and wage war with only the weak support of the common people. Nevertheless, he would be satisfied with the punishment they had brought upon themselves.

CHAPTER 8.23

SECTION 8.23.1
The following night the envoys carried his reply back to their people and assembled the hostages. Envoys from the remaining states, which had been watching to see what happened to the Bellovaci, gathered there.

SECTION 8.23.2
They gave hostages and carried out his commands, with the exception of Commius, whose fear prevented him from entrusting his safety to anyone’s word.

SECTION 8.23.3
The previous year, while Caesar was administering justice in Cisalpine Gaul, Titus Labienus had discovered that Commius was stirring up the states and forming a conspiracy against Caesar. Labienus judged that his disloyalty could be suppressed without any breach of faith.

SECTION 8.23.4
Because he did not think Commius would come to the camp if summoned, and did not wish to make him more cautious by attempting it, he sent Gaius Volusenus Quadratus to arrange to kill him under the pretense of a conference. For this purpose he assigned Volusenus centurions specially selected as suitable for the task.

SECTION 8.23.5
When they came to the conference and Volusenus, as arranged, seized Commius by the hand, the centurion—either unsettled by the unfamiliar assignment or quickly prevented by Commius’s companions—was unable to kill him. He nevertheless struck him a severe first blow on the head with his sword.

SECTION 8.23.6
Both sides drew their swords, but each was thinking more of scattering than of fighting: our men because they believed Commius had received a fatal wound, and the Gauls because, once they discovered the ambush, they feared more dangers than they could see. After this, Commius was said to have resolved never again to come into the presence of any Roman.

CHAPTER 8.24

SECTION 8.24.1
After defeating the most warlike peoples, Caesar saw that no state was now preparing a war with which to resist him, although some people were leaving the towns and scattering from the countryside to avoid submitting to his authority for the present. He therefore decided to send his army in several directions.

SECTION 8.24.2
He brought the quaestor Mark Antony with the Twelfth Legion to join him. He sent the lieutenant Gaius Fabius with twenty-five cohorts to the most distant part of Gaul, because he heard that certain states there were under arms and believed that the lieutenant Gaius Caninius Rebilus, who was in those regions, did not have sufficient strength in his two legions.

SECTION 8.24.3
He summoned Titus Labienus to join him, but sent the Fifteenth Legion, which had been wintering with Labienus, into Gallia Togata to protect the colonies of Roman citizens, so that they would not suffer a disaster from a barbarian raid like the one that had befallen the people of Tergeste the previous summer, when they had been overwhelmed by the barbarians’ sudden incursion and attack.

SECTION 8.24.4
Caesar himself set out to ravage and lay waste the territory of Ambiorix. Since he had given up hope of bringing the terrified fugitive under his control, he considered it the course most consistent with his honor to devastate Ambiorix’s territory so completely—its inhabitants, buildings, and livestock—that Ambiorix would incur the hatred of his own people and, if fortune left any of them alive, would have no way to return to his state after such terrible disasters.

CHAPTER 8.25

SECTION 8.25.1
After dispatching either legions or auxiliary troops into every part of Ambiorix’s territory and devastating everything with slaughter, fire, and plunder, killing or capturing a great number of people, Caesar sent Labienus with two legions against the Treveri,

SECTION 8.25.2
whose state, hardened by daily wars because of its proximity to Germany, differed little from the Germans in its way of life and savagery and never obeyed orders unless compelled by an army.

CHAPTER 8.26

SECTION 8.26.1
Meanwhile, when Gaius Caninius, Caesar’s lieutenant, learned from letters and messengers sent by Duratius that a large force of the enemy had assembled in the territory of the Pictones, he hurried to the town of Lemonum. Duratius had remained steadfastly loyal to the Romans even though a certain faction of his state had revolted.

SECTION 8.26.2
As he approached and learned more definitely from prisoners that Duratius was shut up in Lemonum and being besieged by many thousands of men under Dumnacus, leader of the Andes, he did not dare expose his understrength legions to the enemy and pitched camp in a fortified position.

SECTION 8.26.3
When Dumnacus learned that Caninius was approaching, he turned all his forces against the legions and began attacking the Roman camp.

SECTION 8.26.4
After spending several days on the assault and suffering heavy losses among his own men without being able to tear down any part of the fortifications, he returned to the siege of Lemonum.

CHAPTER 8.27

SECTION 8.27.1
At the same time, Gaius Fabius, Caesar’s lieutenant, received several states into Roman protection, secured their loyalty with hostages, and was informed by a letter from Gaius Caninius Rebilus of what was happening among the Pictones.

SECTION 8.27.2
On learning this, he set out to bring aid to Duratius. But when Dumnacus learned of Fabius’s approach, he despaired of escaping if he were forced at the same time both to withstand the external enemy, the Romans, and to watch and fear the townspeople. He therefore suddenly withdrew his forces from that place and did not think he would be sufficiently safe until he had led them across the Loire, which because of its size had to be crossed by a bridge.

SECTION 8.27.3
Although Fabius had not yet come within sight of the enemy or joined Caninius, he had learned the nature of the country from those who knew it and thought it most likely that the frightened enemy would make for the place they were seeking to reach.

SECTION 8.27.4
He therefore hurried with his forces toward the same bridge and ordered the cavalry to advance only so far ahead of the legionary column that they could return to the same camp without exhausting their horses.

SECTION 8.27.5
Our cavalry caught up with them as ordered and attacked Dumnacus’s column. They fell upon the fleeing and terrified men while they were burdened with their packs on the march, killed many, and took a large amount of plunder. After this success they returned to camp.

CHAPTER 8.28

SECTION 8.28.1
The following night Fabius sent the cavalry ahead, prepared to engage the enemy and delay the entire column until he himself caught up.

SECTION 8.28.2
To ensure that his instructions were carried out, Quintus Atius Varus, the cavalry commander, a man of exceptional courage and judgment, encouraged his men and, after catching up with the enemy column, stationed some squadrons in suitable positions and began the battle with the rest of the cavalry.

SECTION 8.28.3
The enemy cavalry fought more boldly because their infantry came to their support. The infantry halted along the entire column and went to the aid of their horsemen against ours. A fiercely contested battle followed.

SECTION 8.28.4
Our men had learned to despise the enemy whom they had defeated the day before, and, remembering that the legions were following, they fought with the greatest courage against the infantry, both because they were ashamed to give way and because they desired to finish the battle by themselves,

SECTION 8.28.5
while the enemy, believing from what they had seen the day before that no additional Roman forces would arrive, thought that they had found an opportunity to destroy our cavalry.

CHAPTER 8.29

SECTION 8.29.1
After the fighting had continued for some time with the greatest intensity, Dumnacus drew up a battle line to support his cavalry in turn, when suddenly the legions appeared in close formation within sight of the enemy.

SECTION 8.29.2
At the sight of them, the barbarian cavalry squadrons were stunned and the enemy battle line thrown into panic. Their baggage column fell into confusion, and with loud shouting they scattered in every direction and fled.

SECTION 8.29.3
But our cavalry, who shortly before had fought with the greatest courage against an enemy that stood its ground, were now carried away by the joy of victory. Raising a loud shout on every side, they surrounded the retreating enemy and killed as many in that battle as their horses had strength to pursue and their right arms to cut down.

SECTION 8.29.4
More than twelve thousand men were therefore killed, either while armed or after throwing away their weapons in terror, and the entire baggage train was captured.

CHAPTER 8.30

SECTION 8.30.1
It was established from reports of the rout that Drappes the Senonian had gathered no more than two thousand men from the fugitives and was heading for the Province. As soon as Gaul had revolted, Drappes had collected desperate men from every quarter, summoned slaves to freedom, recruited exiles from every state, taken in bandits, and intercepted Roman baggage and supplies. Lucterius the Cadurcan had joined him in this plan—the man who, as related in the preceding book, had attempted to attack the Province at the beginning of Gaul’s first revolt.

SECTION 8.30.2
Caninius hurried after them with two legions, so that the disgrace caused by the banditry of these desperate men would not become great through damage to the Province or fear for its safety.

CHAPTER 8.31

SECTION 8.31.1
Gaius Fabius set out with the rest of the army for the territory of the Carnutes and the other states whose forces he knew had been cut down in the battle he had fought against Dumnacus.

SECTION 8.31.2
He had no doubt that their recent disaster would make them more submissive, but that, if they were given time and opportunity, they might be stirred up again at the instigation of the same Dumnacus.

SECTION 8.31.3
In this operation Fabius enjoyed the greatest good fortune and speed in bringing the states back into submission.

SECTION 8.31.4
The Carnutes, who despite frequent punishment had never mentioned peace, gave hostages and surrendered. The other states situated at the farthest limits of Gaul along the Ocean, which are called the Armorican states, were influenced by the authority of the Carnutes and obeyed Fabius’s orders without delay when he and the legions arrived.

SECTION 8.31.5
Driven from his own territory, Dumnacus was forced to wander and hide alone and make for the most remote regions of Gaul.

CHAPTER 8.32

SECTION 8.32.1
But when Drappes and Lucterius learned that Caninius and the legions were near, they realized that they could not enter the borders of the Province without certain destruction while an army was pursuing them, and that they no longer had the freedom to roam and conduct raids. They therefore halted in the territory of the Cadurci.

SECTION 8.32.2
There Lucterius, who had once possessed great influence among his fellow citizens when his fortunes were still intact and who, as a constant advocate of revolutionary plans, still had great authority among the barbarians, occupied the town of Uxellodunum with his own and Drappes’s forces and brought its inhabitants over to his side. The town had formerly been under his patronage and was exceptionally well fortified by the nature of its position.

CHAPTER 8.33

SECTION 8.33.1
Gaius Caninius immediately came there and observed that every side of the town was protected by extremely steep cliffs, which would have been difficult for armed men to climb even if no one were defending them. He also saw that the townspeople had a large baggage train which, if they tried to remove it in a secret flight, could not escape either the cavalry or even the legions. He therefore divided his cohorts into three groups and established three camps on very high ground;

SECTION 8.33.2
from these camps he began gradually, as far as the number of his troops permitted, to extend a line of fortification around the town.

CHAPTER 8.34

SECTION 8.34.1
When the townspeople noticed this, they became anxious at the dreadful memory of Alesia and feared a similar fate under siege. Lucterius most of all, since he had experienced the danger of that disaster, warned them that they must take thought for their grain supply. They therefore unanimously decided to leave part of their forces there while they themselves set out with lightly equipped troops to bring in grain.

SECTION 8.34.2
After this plan was approved, Drappes and Lucterius left two thousand armed men behind and led the rest out of the town the following night.

SECTION 8.34.3
After spending a few days in the territory of the Cadurci, some of whom wanted to help them with grain while others were unable to prevent them from taking it, they obtained a large quantity of grain. From time to time they also attacked our forts in nighttime raids.

SECTION 8.34.4
For this reason Gaius Caninius delayed surrounding the entire town with fortifications, fearing that he might either be unable to defend the completed works or have to station weak garrisons in a great many places.

CHAPTER 8.35

SECTION 8.35.1
After obtaining a large supply of grain, Drappes and Lucterius took up a position no more than ten miles from the town, from which they could gradually transport the grain into it.

SECTION 8.35.2
They divided their responsibilities between them: Drappes remained with part of the force to guard the camp, while Lucterius led the train of pack animals toward the town.

SECTION 8.35.3
After stationing guards along the route, at about the tenth hour of the night he began transporting the grain into the town along narrow, wooded paths.

SECTION 8.35.4
When the camp sentries heard their noise and scouts who had been sent out reported what was happening, Caninius quickly took armed cohorts from the nearest forts and attacked the men transporting the grain just before dawn.

SECTION 8.35.5
Terrified by this sudden disaster, they scattered and fled toward their armed guards. When our men saw these, they were roused to attack the armed men more fiercely and allowed no one in that body to be taken alive. Lucterius escaped from there with a few men and did not return to the camp.

CHAPTER 8.36

SECTION 8.36.1
After this successful action, Caninius learned from the prisoners that part of the forces was with Drappes in a camp no more than twelve miles away.

SECTION 8.36.2
When several prisoners confirmed this information, he understood that, with one leader driven off, the rest were terrified and could easily be overwhelmed. He considered it extremely fortunate that no one had escaped the slaughter and returned to the camp to bring Drappes news of the disaster they had suffered.

SECTION 8.36.3
Since he saw no danger in making the attempt, he sent all the cavalry and the German infantry, men of the greatest speed, ahead to the enemy camp. He distributed one legion among the three camps and led the other with him without its baggage.

SECTION 8.36.4
When he had come closer to the enemy, he learned from the scouts he had sent ahead that their camp, as is generally the custom among barbarians, had been brought down from the higher ground and placed on the banks of a river, and that the Germans and cavalry had suddenly rushed upon them while they were all unprepared and had begun the battle.

SECTION 8.36.5
On learning this, he brought up the legion armed and drawn up for battle. Then, at a signal suddenly given on every side, the higher ground was seized.

SECTION 8.36.6
When this happened, the Germans and cavalry, on seeing the legion’s standards, fought with the greatest intensity. The cohorts immediately attacked from every direction, killed or captured everyone, and took a large amount of plunder. Drappes himself was captured in that battle.

CHAPTER 8.37

SECTION 8.37.1
After achieving this success with scarcely a single soldier wounded, Caninius returned to besiege the townspeople

SECTION 8.37.2
and, now that the external enemy had been destroyed—the enemy whose threat had previously prevented him from dividing his garrisons and surrounding the townspeople with fortifications—he ordered the work to be carried on from every side. Gaius Fabius arrived there with his forces the following day and undertook the siege of one part of the town.

CHAPTER 8.38

SECTION 8.38.1
Meanwhile Caesar left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, with fifteen cohorts among the Bellovaci, to prevent the Belgae from again being given any opportunity to adopt revolutionary plans.

SECTION 8.38.2
He himself visited the remaining states, demanded a greater number of hostages, and reassured everyone’s frightened minds with words of consolation.

SECTION 8.38.3
When he came among the Carnutes, in whose state Caesar explained in the preceding book that the war had begun, he saw that consciousness of their deed made them especially afraid. To free the state from fear more quickly, he demanded that Gutruatus, the chief author of that crime and instigator of the war, be delivered for punishment.

SECTION 8.38.4
Although Gutruatus did not entrust himself even to his own fellow citizens, he was quickly sought out through everyone’s efforts and brought to the camp.

SECTION 8.38.5
Contrary to his own nature, Caesar was compelled to execute him by the great crowd of soldiers who gathered and blamed him for all the dangers and losses they had suffered in the war. His body was beaten until he was dead and then struck with the executioner’s ax.

CHAPTER 8.39

SECTION 8.39.1
There Caesar was informed by frequent letters from Caninius of what had been done concerning Drappes and Lucterius and of the plan in which the townspeople persisted.

SECTION 8.39.2
Although he regarded their small numbers with contempt, he nevertheless judged that their stubbornness must be punished severely, so that all Gaul would not think that it had lacked not the strength to resist the Romans but the determination, and so that the other states, following this example and relying on the advantages of their positions, would not assert their freedom,

SECTION 8.39.3
since he knew that all the Gauls were aware that only one summer remained in his provincial command and believed that, if they could hold out through it, they would have no further danger to fear.

SECTION 8.39.4
He therefore left Quintus Calenus, his lieutenant, with the legions to follow at regular marching pace, while he himself hurried with all the cavalry to Caninius as quickly as he could.

CHAPTER 8.40

SECTION 8.40.1
When Caesar arrived at Uxellodunum contrary to everyone’s expectations, he saw that the town had been enclosed by siege works and that the siege could not be abandoned under any circumstances. After learning from deserters that the townspeople had an abundant supply of grain, he began trying to cut the enemy off from water.

SECTION 8.40.2
A river divided the valley at the foot of the heights, which almost completely encircled the mountain on which Uxellodunum stood, a town with precipitous approaches on every side.

SECTION 8.40.3
The nature of the ground made it impossible to divert this river, for it flowed so close to the very base of the mountain that it could not be channeled away in any direction by digging trenches below it.

SECTION 8.40.4
But the descent to the river was difficult and steep for the townspeople, so that, if our men tried to stop them, they could neither reach the river nor make their way back up the steep ascent without wounds and danger to their lives.

SECTION 8.40.5
When Caesar learned of their difficulty, he stationed archers and slingers and also placed artillery at certain points opposite the easiest descents, thereby preventing the townspeople from drawing water from the river.

CHAPTER 8.41

SECTION 8.41.1
After that, everyone from the town who went to fetch water gathered at a single place directly beneath the town wall, where a large spring gushed out on the side that the river’s circuit left open for a distance of about three hundred feet.

SECTION 8.41.2
Although all the others wished that the townspeople could be cut off from this spring, Caesar alone saw how it could be done. Directly opposite it, he began advancing covered galleries up the slope and constructing a mound, with great labor and continuous fighting.

SECTION 8.41.3
The townspeople ran down from their higher position and fought from a distance without danger to themselves, wounding many of our men as they stubbornly advanced. Nevertheless, our soldiers were not deterred from pushing the covered galleries forward and overcoming the difficulties of the terrain by their labor and siege works.

SECTION 8.41.4
At the same time, they drove covered tunnels from the galleries toward the source of the spring, a type of work that could be done without any danger and without arousing the enemy’s suspicion.

SECTION 8.41.5
A mound was built to a height of sixty feet, and on it was placed a ten-story tower—not high enough to equal the town walls, since no siege works could accomplish that, but high enough to overlook the source of the spring.

SECTION 8.41.6
When artillery began hurling missiles from the tower toward the approach to the spring, the townspeople could no longer draw water without danger, and not only their cattle and pack animals but also a great many of the enemy were wasting away from thirst.

CHAPTER 8.42

SECTION 8.42.1
Terrified by this disaster, the townspeople filled barrels with tallow, pitch, and wooden shingles, set them on fire, and rolled them down onto the siegeworks. At the same time they fought with the utmost ferocity, to deter the Romans from extinguishing the fire by the danger of battle.

SECTION 8.42.2
A great blaze suddenly broke out within the siegeworks themselves. Everything sent down the steep slope was caught and held by the covered galleries and the siege ramp, and set fire to the very structures that stopped it.

SECTION 8.42.3
Our soldiers, on the other hand, although hard-pressed by the dangerous kind of fighting and the unfavorable ground, nevertheless endured everything with the greatest courage.

SECTION 8.42.4
For the action was taking place both on high ground and in full view of our army, and a great shout arose from both sides.

SECTION 8.42.5
Accordingly, each man made himself as conspicuous as he could and exposed himself to the enemy’s missiles and the flames, so that his courage might be more widely known and clearly attested.

CHAPTER 8.43

SECTION 8.43.1
When Caesar saw that many of his men were being wounded, he ordered cohorts to climb the hill from every side of the town and raise a shout everywhere, pretending that they were about to seize the walls.

SECTION 8.43.2
This action terrified the townspeople, and, uncertain about what was happening elsewhere, they recalled the armed men from their attack on the siegeworks and stationed them along the walls.

SECTION 8.43.3
Thus, when the fighting had ended, our men quickly extinguished some of the siegeworks that had caught fire and cut away other parts.

SECTION 8.43.4
Although the townspeople continued to resist stubbornly and, even after losing a large number of their men to thirst, persisted in their resolve, in the end the channels feeding the spring were cut by tunnels and diverted.

SECTION 8.43.5
When this was done, the spring, though previously unfailing, suddenly dried up. This brought the townspeople such despair of being saved that they believed it had happened not through human planning but by the will of the gods. And so, compelled by necessity, they surrendered.

CHAPTER 8.44

SECTION 8.44.1
Caesar knew that his clemency was known to everyone and did not fear that an unusually harsh action would be attributed to cruelty in his nature. But since he could see no end to his measures if several men in different places undertook plans of this kind, he concluded that the others must be deterred by an exemplary punishment.

SECTION 8.44.2
He therefore cut off the hands of everyone who had borne arms but spared their lives, so that the punishment of criminals might be all the more clearly demonstrated.

SECTION 8.44.3
Drappes, whose capture by Caninius I have reported, abstained from food for several days, whether because of the humiliation and pain of his chains or from fear of a more severe punishment, and so died.

SECTION 8.44.4
At the same time Lucterius, who, as I wrote, had escaped from the battle, fell into the hands of Epasnactus the Arvernian.

SECTION 8.44.5
For by frequently changing locations he entrusted himself to the protection of many men, because he believed he could not remain anywhere for long without danger, conscious as he was of how bitter an enemy Caesar was bound to be to him.

SECTION 8.44.6
Epasnactus the Arvernian, a very close friend of the Roman people, without any hesitation put him in chains and brought him to Caesar.

CHAPTER 8.45

SECTION 8.45.1
Meanwhile Labienus fought and won a cavalry battle in the territory of the Treveri. After killing many Treveri and Germans, who never refused assistance against the Romans, he took their leaders alive into his power.

SECTION 8.45.2
Among them was Surus the Aeduan, a man of the highest distinction in both courage and birth and the only one of the Aedui who had remained under arms up to that time.

CHAPTER 8.46

SECTION 8.46.1
When Caesar learned of this, he saw that operations were going well in every part of Gaul and judged that Gaul had been defeated and subdued in the previous summer’s campaign. Since he had never visited Aquitania, though he had partially conquered it through Publius Crassus, he set out for that part of Gaul with two legions, intending to spend the final portion of the campaigning season there.

SECTION 8.46.2
He completed this task, like the others, quickly and successfully. For all the states of Aquitania sent envoys to Caesar and gave him hostages.

SECTION 8.46.3
After accomplishing these things, he himself set out for Narbo with a cavalry escort and had his army led into winter quarters by his legates.

SECTION 8.46.4
He stationed four legions in Belgium under the legates Marcus Antonius, Gaius Trebonius, and Publius Vatinius. He led two legions into the territory of the Aedui, whose influence he knew to be supreme throughout Gaul. He placed two among the Turoni, near the borders of the Carnutes, to hold in check that entire region adjoining the Ocean, and the remaining two in the territory of the Lemovices, not far from the Arverni, so that no part of Gaul would be left without troops.

SECTION 8.46.5
Caesar himself remained only a few days in the province. He quickly made the rounds of all the judicial districts, heard public disputes,

SECTION 8.46.6
and gave rewards to those who had served him well. For he had had the fullest opportunity to learn what attitude each man had taken during the revolt of all Gaul, which he had withstood through the loyalty and assistance of that province. When he had completed these matters, he returned to the legions in Belgium and spent the winter at Nemetocenna.

CHAPTER 8.47

SECTION 8.47.1
There he learned that Commius the Atrebatian had fought a battle with his cavalry.

SECTION 8.47.2
For when Antonius had arrived in winter quarters and the state of the Atrebates was remaining obedient, Commius—who, after the wounding I described above, had always been accustomed to keep himself ready to support any uprising among his people, so that those seeking plans for war would not lack an advocate and leader of armed resistance—

SECTION 8.47.3
supported himself and his men by raiding while his state obeyed the Romans, and, by making the roads unsafe, intercepted many supplies being carried to the Romans’ winter quarters.

CHAPTER 8.48

SECTION 8.48.1
Gaius Volusenus Quadratus, a cavalry commander, had been assigned to Antonius to spend the winter with him. Antonius sent him to pursue the enemy cavalry.

SECTION 8.48.2
In addition to his exceptional courage, Volusenus felt a deep hatred for Commius, and so he carried out his orders all the more willingly. He therefore arranged ambushes, repeatedly attacked Commius’s cavalrymen, and fought successful engagements.

SECTION 8.48.3
Finally, when the struggle became more intense and Volusenus, in his desire to capture Commius himself, pursued him too persistently with only a few men, Commius drew Volusenus a considerable distance away by fleeing at full speed. Then, because of his personal hatred for the man, he called on the loyalty and assistance of his followers, begging them not to allow the wounds treacherously inflicted on him to go unpunished, and, wheeling his horse around, recklessly broke away from the others and charged the commander.

SECTION 8.48.4
All his cavalrymen did the same, forced our few men to turn, and pursued them.

SECTION 8.48.5
Commius drove his horse forward with his spurs, brought it alongside Quadratus’s horse, and with his lance leveled struck Volusenus with great force through the middle of the thigh.

SECTION 8.48.6
When their commander was wounded, our men did not hesitate to make a stand; they turned their horses and drove the enemy back.

SECTION 8.48.7
When this happened, many of the enemy, thrown into confusion by the powerful charge of our men, were wounded; some were trampled down in flight, while others were captured. Their leader escaped this fate through the speed of his horse. The commander, so severely wounded that his life appeared to be in danger, was carried back to camp.

SECTION 8.48.8
Commius, however, whether because his desire for vengeance had been satisfied or because he had lost a large part of his men, sent envoys to Antonius and guaranteed with hostages that he would remain wherever Antonius directed and would do whatever he ordered.

SECTION 8.48.9
He asked only one thing: that allowance be made for his fear and that he not be required to come into the presence of any Roman. Antonius judged that this request arose from a well-founded fear, granted his petition, and accepted the hostages.

SECTION 8.48.10
I know that Caesar composed a separate commentary for each individual year. I did not think I should do the same, because the following year, when Lucius Paulus and Gaius Marcellus were consuls, contains no particularly important operations in Gaul.

SECTION 8.48.11
Nevertheless, so that no one would remain ignorant of the places where Caesar and his army were at that time, I decided that I should write a brief account and attach it to this commentary.

CHAPTER 8.49

SECTION 8.49.1
While Caesar was wintering in Belgium, he had one objective: to keep the states on friendly terms and to give no one either hope or cause for taking up arms.

SECTION 8.49.2
For nothing was less desirable to him than to have some necessity for waging war forced on him as his departure approached, so that, when he was about to withdraw his army, no war would be left behind that all Gaul would gladly undertake when there was no immediate danger.

SECTION 8.49.3
And so, by addressing the states with honor, rewarding their leading men most generously, and imposing no burdens, he easily kept Gaul—exhausted by so many unsuccessful battles—at peace under more favorable terms of submission.

CHAPTER 8.50

SECTION 8.50.1
When the winter was over, Caesar himself, contrary to his usual practice, set out for Italy by the longest possible daily marches, so that he could address the towns and colonies to which he had recommended the candidacy of his quaestor Marcus Antonius for the priesthood.

SECTION 8.50.2
He exerted his influence both willingly on behalf of a man very closely connected to him, whom he had sent ahead shortly before to conduct his campaign, and vigorously against the faction and power of the few who hoped, by defeating Marcus Antonius, to undermine Caesar’s influence as he left his command.

SECTION 8.50.3
Although he had learned on the journey, before he reached Italy, that Antonius had already been elected augur, he nevertheless considered that he still had good reason to visit the towns and colonies, so that he could thank them for turning out in large numbers and fulfilling their obligations to Antonius on his behalf,

SECTION 8.50.4
and at the same time recommend to them himself and his claim to office for the following year. For his opponents were boasting arrogantly that Lucius Lentulus and Gaius Marcellus had been elected consuls to strip Caesar of every office and distinction, and that Servius Galba had been deprived of the consulship, although he had enjoyed far greater influence and electoral support, because he was connected with Caesar both by personal friendship and by long association as his legate.

CHAPTER 8.51

SECTION 8.51.1
Caesar’s arrival was greeted by every town and colony with incredible honor and affection.

SECTION 8.51.2
For this was the first time he had returned since the war involving all Gaul. Nothing that could be devised to decorate the gates, roads, and every place through which Caesar was to pass was left undone.

SECTION 8.51.3
The entire population came out to meet him with their children. Sacrificial victims were slaughtered everywhere, and dining couches were spread out in the forums and temples, so that the rejoicing of a triumph, even one most eagerly awaited, seemed to be enjoyed in advance. Such was the magnificence displayed by the wealthier people and the enthusiasm shown by those of humbler means.

CHAPTER 8.52

SECTION 8.52.1
After Caesar had rapidly passed through every region of Roman Gaul, he returned with the utmost speed to the army at Nemetocenna. He summoned the legions from all their winter quarters to the borders of the Treveri, proceeded there, and reviewed and purified the army.

SECTION 8.52.2
He placed Titus Labienus in command of Roman Gaul, so that this greater distinction might help him win support in his campaign for the consulship. Caesar himself made only as many marches as he considered sufficient to change locations for reasons of health.

SECTION 8.52.3
Although Caesar frequently heard there that Labienus was being approached by his enemies and was informed that a few men were planning to use the Senate’s authority to deprive him of some part of his army, he neither believed anything against Labienus nor could be induced to do anything contrary to the Senate’s authority. For he judged that his case would easily prevail if the senators were free to express their opinions.

SECTION 8.52.4
For Gaius Curio, a tribune of the plebs, after undertaking the defense of Caesar’s cause and rank, had often promised the Senate that, if anyone was troubled by fear of Caesar’s armed forces—and since Pompey’s domination and armed forces were also bringing no small terror to the Forum—both men should give up their arms and disband their armies. If that were done, he said, the state would be free and independent.

SECTION 8.52.5
He not only made this promise but also began on his own initiative to call for a division of the Senate. To prevent it, the consuls and Pompey’s friends ordered him to stop, and by delaying the matter in this way they caused the proposal to fail.

CHAPTER 8.53

SECTION 8.53.1
This was powerful evidence of the position of the Senate as a whole, and it agreed with its previous action. For in the preceding year Marcellus, while attacking Caesar’s rank, had, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, brought Caesar’s provinces before the Senate prior to the appointed time. After the senators had expressed their opinions and Marcellus called for a division—he was seeking all his own distinction by exploiting hostility toward Caesar—a full Senate voted unanimously against his proposal.

SECTION 8.53.2
These actions did not break the spirit of Caesar’s enemies, but warned them to prepare more powerful pressures by which the Senate could be compelled to approve what they themselves had decided.

CHAPTER 8.54

SECTION 8.54.1
The Senate then passed a decree that one legion should be sent by Gnaeus Pompey and another by Gaius Caesar for the war against the Parthians. Yet it was perfectly clear that both legions were being taken away from one man.

SECTION 8.54.2
For Gnaeus Pompey offered as if it were one of his own the First Legion, which he had sent to Caesar but which had been formed by a levy in Caesar’s province.

SECTION 8.54.3
Nevertheless, although there could be no doubt at all about his opponents’ intentions, Caesar returned the legion to Pompey and, in accordance with the Senate’s decree, ordered the Fifteenth, which he had kept in Cisalpine Gaul, to be handed over in his own name. In its place he sent the Thirteenth Legion into Italy to protect the garrisons from which the Fifteenth was being withdrawn.

SECTION 8.54.4
He then assigned winter quarters to the army. He stationed Gaius Trebonius with four legions in Belgium and sent Gaius Fabius with the same number into the territory of the Aedui.

SECTION 8.54.5
For he believed that Gaul would be safest if the Belgae, whose courage was greatest, and the Aedui, whose influence was supreme, were held in check by armies. He himself set out for Italy.

CHAPTER 8.55

SECTION 8.55.1
When he arrived there, he learned that the two legions he had returned, which according to the Senate’s decree were supposed to be sent to the war against the Parthians, had been handed over to Gnaeus Pompey by the consul Gaius Marcellus and retained in Italy.

SECTION 8.55.2
Although after this action no one could doubt what was being prepared against Caesar, Caesar nevertheless decided that he must endure everything as long as any hope remained to him of resolving the dispute by law rather than waging war. He pressed on.