Book 3

CHAPTER 3.1

SECTION 3.1.1 When Caesar was departing for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the Twelfth Legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, whose territory extends from the frontiers of the Allobroges, Lake Geneva, and the Rhône River to the highest Alps.

SECTION 3.1.2 His reason for sending him was that he wished the route through the Alps—by which merchants had been accustomed to travel at great risk and under heavy tolls—to be opened.

SECTION 3.1.3 He authorized Galba, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion in that region for the winter.

SECTION 3.1.4 After fighting several successful engagements and storming a number of their strongholds, Galba received envoys from every quarter, accepted hostages, and concluded peace. He then decided to station two cohorts among the Nantuates and to winter in a village of the Veragri called Octodurus with the remaining cohorts of that legion.

SECTION 3.1.5 This village lies in a valley of no great extent, with a small plain adjoining it, and is enclosed on every side by exceedingly high mountains.

SECTION 3.1.6 Since a river divided the village into two parts, Galba granted one part to the Gauls for their winter quarters and assigned to his cohorts the other, which they had vacated. He fortified this position with a rampart and ditch.

CHAPTER 3.2

SECTION 3.2.1 After a number of days had passed in winter quarters and Galba had ordered grain to be brought there, scouts suddenly informed him that during the night all the Gauls had departed from the part of the village he had granted them, and that the overhanging mountains were occupied by an immense multitude of Seduni and Veragri.

SECTION 3.2.2 Several reasons had led the Gauls suddenly to form a plan to renew the war and overwhelm the legion.

SECTION 3.2.3 First, they despised the legion because of its small numbers: it was not even at full strength, since two cohorts had been detached and many individual soldiers sent out to obtain supplies were absent.

SECTION 3.2.4 Furthermore, owing to the disadvantage of the Romans’ position, they believed that when they themselves rushed down from the mountains into the valley and hurled their missiles, not even their first assault could be withstood.

SECTION 3.2.5 In addition, they resented that their children had been taken from them under the name of hostages, and they were convinced that the Romans were attempting to occupy the summits of the Alps not merely to secure passage but to possess them permanently and annex that region to the neighboring Province.

CHAPTER 3.3

SECTION 3.3.1 Upon receiving this information, Galba found that neither the construction of the winter camp nor its fortifications had been fully completed, and that no adequate provision had been made for grain and other supplies, because, after the surrender and the acceptance of hostages, he had believed there was no reason to fear war. He therefore summoned a council without delay and began asking for opinions.

SECTION 3.3.2 In this council, since so great and sudden a danger had arisen contrary to all expectation, nearly all the higher ground could already be seen filled with a multitude of armed men, and, because the roads had been cut off, neither reinforcements could reach them nor supplies be brought in,

SECTION 3.3.3 their safety was almost despaired of, and some proposed that they abandon the baggage, make a sortie, and strive to escape by the same roads along which they had come.

SECTION 3.3.4 The majority, however, favored reserving this plan for the last extremity and meanwhile awaiting the outcome of events and defending the camp.

CHAPTER 3.4

SECTION 3.4.1 After only a brief interval—scarcely enough time to arrange and carry out the measures they had decided upon—the enemy, at a given signal, rushed down from every direction and hurled stones and javelins against the rampart.

SECTION 3.4.2 At first, while their strength was unimpaired, our men defended the fortifications bravely and hurled no missile ineffectually from their higher position. Whenever any part of the camp, stripped of defenders, appeared to be under pressure, they hurried there and brought assistance.

SECTION 3.4.3 But in this respect they were at a disadvantage: whenever the enemy grew weary in the long struggle, they withdrew from the battle and others took their place with strength unimpaired.

SECTION 3.4.4 Because of their small numbers, our men could do nothing of the kind. Not only was the weary soldier given no opportunity to withdraw from the fight, but even the wounded man was unable to leave the place where he had taken his stand and retire to safety.

CHAPTER 3.5

SECTION 3.5.1 By now the fighting had continued without interruption for more than six hours, and our men were running short not only of strength but also of missiles. The enemy pressed their attack more fiercely and, as our men grew weaker, began to tear down the rampart and fill the ditches. The situation had now been brought to the last extremity.

SECTION 3.5.2 Publius Sextius Baculus, chief centurion—the man whom we have said was disabled by numerous wounds in the battle against the Nervii—and Gaius Volusenus, a military tribune of great judgment and courage, hurried to Galba and told him that there was only one hope of safety: they must make a sortie and try this last resort.

SECTION 3.5.3Accordingly, he quickly summoned the centurions and instructed the soldiers to break off the fighting for a short time, merely intercept the missiles hurled at them, and recover from their exertions; then, when the signal was given, they were to burst from the camp and place all hope of safety in their courage.

CHAPTER 3.6

SECTION 3.6.1They did as they were ordered, and, suddenly sallying from every gate, left the enemy no chance either to understand what was happening or to rally.

SECTION 3.6.2Thus, with fortune reversed, they surrounded on every side and cut down the men who had come in the hope of taking the camp; and of the more than thirty thousand barbarians known to have approached it, they killed over a third, threw the rest into a panic and routed them, and did not allow them to make a stand even on the higher ground.

SECTION 3.6.3Thus, after routing the enemy’s entire force and stripping it of its arms, they withdrew within their own fortifications.

SECTION 3.6.4After this battle, Galba was unwilling to put fortune to the test again and remembered that he had entered winter quarters with a different plan, only to find himself confronted by different circumstances. Moved above all by the shortage of grain and provisions, he burned every building in that village the next day and hastened to return to the Province;

SECTION 3.6.5and with no enemy barring or delaying his march, he led the legion safely into the territory of the Nantuates, and from there into that of the Allobroges, where he wintered.

CHAPTER 3.7

SECTION 3.7.1After these events, Caesar believed for every reason that Gaul had been pacified—the Belgae had been overcome, the Germans driven out, and the Seduni defeated in the Alps—and so, at the beginning of winter, he had departed for Illyricum, wishing to visit those peoples also and become acquainted with their countries, when war suddenly broke out in Gaul.

SECTION 3.7.2The cause of this war was as follows. The young Publius Crassus was wintering with the Seventh Legion among the Andes, near the Ocean.

SECTION 3.7.3Because grain was scarce in those parts, he sent several prefects and military tribunes into the neighboring states to obtain it;

SECTION 3.7.4among them Titus Terrasidius was sent to the Esuvii, Marcus Trebius Gallus to the Coriosolites, and Quintus Velanius together with Titus Silius to the Veneti.

CHAPTER 3.8

SECTION 3.8.1The state of the Veneti possessed by far the greatest authority along the entire seacoast of those regions, both because they had more ships than any other people, in which they were accustomed to sail to Britain, and because they surpassed all others in their knowledge and experience of seamanship. Moreover, along that stormy and exposed coast, where harbors were few and far between and all were in their possession, they made tributaries of nearly everyone accustomed to navigate those waters.

SECTION 3.8.2They took the initiative by detaining Silius and Velanius, believing that through them they would recover the hostages they had given Crassus.

SECTION 3.8.3Influenced by their authority, the neighboring peoples—with the sudden and impulsive decision characteristic of the Gauls—detained Trebius and Terrasidius for the same reason. They swiftly sent envoys through their leading men and swore among themselves that they would act only by common agreement and would all endure the same outcome of fortune;

SECTION 3.8.4and they urged the remaining states to choose to preserve the liberty inherited from their ancestors rather than endure servitude to Rome.

SECTION 3.8.5When they had quickly brought the entire seacoast over to their view, they sent a joint embassy to Publius Crassus: if he wished to recover his men, he must return their hostages to them.

CHAPTER 3.9

SECTION 3.9.1When Caesar was informed of these events by Crassus, he was himself at a considerable distance; in the meantime, therefore, he ordered warships to be built on the Liger, which flows into the Ocean, rowers to be levied from the Province, and sailors and helmsmen to be procured.

SECTION 3.9.2These arrangements were carried out rapidly, and as soon as the season permitted, Caesar himself hastened to the army.

SECTION 3.9.3When the Veneti and the other states learned of Caesar’s arrival, they understood at the same time the enormity of the crime they had committed: they had detained envoys—a title always held sacred and inviolable among every nation—and cast them into chains. They therefore began to prepare for war in proportion to the magnitude of the danger and, above all, to provide everything required for the use of their ships, with all the greater hope because they placed great confidence in the natural character of their country.

SECTION 3.9.4They knew that the land routes were broken by tidal inlets and that navigation was hindered by unfamiliarity with the region and by the scarcity of harbors;

SECTION 3.9.5and they were confident that our armies could not remain long among them because of the shortage of grain.

SECTION 3.9.6Even if everything should turn out contrary to their expectations, they were nevertheless very powerful in ships, while the Romans had no fleet at all and knew neither the shallows, harbors, nor islands of the region where they were about to wage war;

SECTION 3.9.7and they clearly understood that navigation on an enclosed sea was far different from navigation on the vast and wholly exposed Ocean.

SECTION 3.9.8Having adopted these plans, they fortified their towns,

SECTION 3.9.9carried grain from the fields into the towns, and assembled as many ships as they could in the country of the Veneti, where it was known that Caesar would first wage war.

SECTION 3.9.10They enlisted as allies for that war the Osismi, Lexovii, Namnetes, Ambiliati, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii, and summoned reinforcements from Britain, which lies opposite those regions.

CHAPTER 3.10

SECTION 3.10.1These were the difficulties of conducting the war that we have described above; nevertheless, many considerations impelled Caesar to undertake it:

SECTION 3.10.2the outrage of detaining Roman knights, the renewal of rebellion after surrender, the revolt after hostages had been given, the conspiracy of so many states, and, above all, the fear that if he neglected this quarter, the remaining nations would suppose that they too were free to act in the same way.

SECTION 3.10.3Accordingly, since he understood that nearly all the Gauls were eager for revolution and were readily and swiftly roused to war—and that all men by nature desire liberty and hate the condition of servitude—he thought that, before more states could conspire together, he must divide his army and distribute it more widely.

CHAPTER 3.11

SECTION 3.11.1Accordingly, he sent his lieutenant Titus Labienus with the cavalry to the Treveri, who live nearest the Rhine.

SECTION 3.11.2He instructed him to visit the Remi and the other Belgae and keep them loyal, and to prevent the Germans—who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae as reinforcements—from crossing the river in boats by force, should they attempt it.

SECTION 3.11.3He ordered Publius Crassus to depart for Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a large body of cavalry, to prevent reinforcements from those nations from being sent into Gaul and such powerful peoples from joining together.

SECTION 3.11.4He sent his lieutenant Quintus Titurius Sabinus with three legions among the Venelli, Coriosolites, and Lexovii, to see that their forces were kept occupied.

SECTION 3.11.5He placed the young Decimus Brutus in command of the fleet and of the Gallic ships he had ordered to assemble from the Pictones, Santoni, and the other pacified regions, and instructed him to set out against the Veneti as soon as he could. Caesar himself hastened there with the land forces.

CHAPTER 3.12

SECTION 3.12.1The towns were generally situated in such a manner that, built at the extremities of narrow spits and promontories, they could not be approached on foot when the tide had surged in from the open sea—an event that always occurs twice in the space of twelve hours—nor by ships, because when the tide ebbed again, the vessels would be stranded in the shallows.

SECTION 3.12.2Thus in both ways the assault upon the towns was obstructed.

SECTION 3.12.3And if at any time they happened to be overcome by the magnitude of our works—when the sea had been shut out by a causeway and massive embankments, and these had been raised to the height of the town walls—and began to despair of their fortunes, they brought in a great number of ships, of which they had the utmost abundance, carried away all their possessions, and withdrew to the nearest towns.

SECTION 3.12.4There they once more defended themselves with the same advantages of position.

SECTION 3.12.5They were able to do this more readily through a great part of the summer because our ships were held back by storms, and navigation on that vast and exposed sea, with its powerful tides and its rare and almost nonexistent harbors, was exceedingly difficult.

CHAPTER 3.13

SECTION 3.13.1Their own ships were built and equipped in the following manner: the keels were considerably flatter than those of our vessels, so that they could more readily endure the shallows and the ebbing tide;

SECTION 3.13.2the prows were extremely high, and the sterns likewise, adapted to the great size of the waves and the violence of the storms;

SECTION 3.13.3the ships were built entirely of oak, to withstand any degree of force and battering;

SECTION 3.13.4the crossbeams were made of timbers a foot thick and fastened with iron spikes as thick as a man’s thumb;

SECTION 3.13.5the anchors were secured with iron chains instead of ropes;

SECTION 3.13.6and in place of sails they used hides and thin, finely dressed leather—whether from a scarcity of flax and ignorance of its use, or, more probably, because they believed that ordinary sails could not conveniently withstand such fierce storms of the Ocean and such violent blasts of wind, or control ships of such great weight.

SECTION 3.13.7When our fleet encountered these ships, it held the advantage only in speed and in the impulse of the oars; in all other respects, the enemy’s vessels were better suited and adapted to the nature of the waters and the violence of the storms.

SECTION 3.13.8Our ships could not damage them with their rams, so great was their strength; because of their height, a missile could not easily be hurled onto them; and for the same reason they were less easily held by grappling hooks.

SECTION 3.13.9Moreover, when the wind began to rage and they yielded themselves to it, they could weather the storm more easily, rest more safely in the shallows, and, when left aground by the tide, had nothing to fear from rocks and reefs—all hazards that our ships had to dread.

CHAPTER 3.14

SECTION 3.14.1After capturing several towns, Caesar realized that so much toil was being spent in vain: the enemy’s flight could not be checked by taking their towns, nor could any injury be done to them. He therefore resolved to wait for the fleet.

SECTION 3.14.2When it had assembled and was first sighted by the enemy, about two hundred and twenty of their ships, fully prepared and splendidly equipped with every kind of armament, sailed out of the harbor and took position facing ours.

SECTION 3.14.3Neither Brutus, who commanded the fleet, nor the military tribunes and centurions to whom individual ships had been assigned were entirely certain what to do or what method of battle to adopt.

SECTION 3.14.4They knew that the enemy could not be harmed by the ram; and although towers had been raised on our ships, these were still overtopped by the lofty sterns of the barbarians’ vessels, so that our missiles could not conveniently be hurled from the lower position, while those cast by the Gauls struck with greater force.

SECTION 3.14.5One device prepared by our men proved highly useful: extremely sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon long poles, resembling in form the hooks used in attacking walls.

SECTION 3.14.6With these, they caught and pulled taut the ropes that bound the yards to the masts; then, as the ship was driven forward by the oars, the ropes were snapped.

SECTION 3.14.7Once they were severed, the yards necessarily fell, and since all the hope of the Gallic ships depended upon their sails and rigging, when these were torn away, the ships were rendered entirely useless in an instant.

SECTION 3.14.8The rest of the contest depended upon courage, in which our soldiers easily held the advantage, all the more because the action was fought in full view of Caesar and the entire army, so that no deed of exceptional bravery could pass unnoticed;

SECTION 3.14.9for the army occupied all the hills and higher ground from which there was a close view down upon the sea.

CHAPTER 3.15

SECTION 3.15.1Once the yards had been brought down, as we have described, two or three of our ships surrounded each enemy vessel, and the soldiers strove with all their might to board it.

SECTION 3.15.2When the barbarians saw what was happening, and several of their ships had been captured, they could find no remedy for the danger and endeavored to seek safety in flight.

SECTION 3.15.3But just as they had turned their ships in the direction toward which the wind was carrying them, so sudden a calm and stillness arose that they could not move from the spot.

SECTION 3.15.4This circumstance afforded the greatest possible opportunity to finish the action;

SECTION 3.15.5for our men pursued and captured the ships one by one, so that only a very few of the entire number reached land under cover of night, although the battle had lasted from about the fourth hour until sunset.

CHAPTER 3.16

SECTION 3.16.1By this battle the war with the Veneti and the entire seacoast was brought to an end.

SECTION 3.16.2For not only had all the young men assembled there, but also all the older men who possessed any judgment or distinction; and they had gathered in one place every ship they had anywhere possessed.

SECTION 3.16.3With these lost, the survivors had neither any place to which they could retreat nor any means of defending their towns.

SECTION 3.16.4Accordingly, they surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar. He resolved to punish them with particular severity, so that in the future the rights of envoys might be observed more scrupulously by the barbarians. He therefore put the entire senate to death and sold the rest at auction.

CHAPTER 3.17

SECTION 3.17.1While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Quintus Titurius Sabinus reached the territory of the Venelli with the forces he had received from Caesar.

SECTION 3.17.2Viridovix commanded them and held supreme authority over all the states that had revolted, from which he had raised an army and powerful forces.

SECTION 3.17.3Within the past few days, moreover, the Aulerci Eburovices and the Lexovii had killed their own senates because they had refused to support the war, closed their gates, and joined Viridovix.

SECTION 3.17.4In addition, a great multitude of desperate men and brigands had assembled from every part of Gaul, drawn away from agriculture and their daily labor by the hope of plunder and eagerness for war.

SECTION 3.17.5Sabinus kept within his camp, which occupied a position advantageous in every respect, while Viridovix had encamped opposite him at a distance of two miles and daily led out his forces and offered battle. Thus Sabinus had by now not only fallen into contempt among the enemy, but was also subjected to some reproach in the talk of our own soldiers;

SECTION 3.17.6and he created so strong an impression of fear that the enemy now dared to approach the very rampart of the camp.

SECTION 3.17.7He acted in this way because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage so great a multitude of enemies—especially in the absence of the commander holding supreme authority—unless he could fight on equal ground or some favorable opportunity arose.

CHAPTER 3.18

SECTION 3.18.1When this impression of fear had become firmly established, he selected a suitable and shrewd man, a Gaul, from among those whom he had with him as auxiliaries.

SECTION 3.18.2By promises of great rewards, he persuaded this man to go over to the enemy and instructed him in what he wished done.

SECTION 3.18.3When the man came among them posing as a deserter, he described the Romans’ fear and explained the desperate straits in which Caesar himself was being pressed by the Veneti;

SECTION 3.18.4and he declared that no later than the following night Sabinus would secretly lead his army out of camp and set off to bring aid to Caesar.

SECTION 3.18.5When this was heard, they all cried out that the opportunity for a successful action must not be allowed to escape:

SECTION 3.18.6they must march upon the camp. Many considerations urged the Gauls toward this decision: Sabinus’s hesitation during the preceding days, the deserter’s assurance, the shortage of provisions, for which they had made insufficient preparation, their hopes concerning the war against the Veneti, and the fact that men generally are eager to believe what they desire.

SECTION 3.18.7Influenced by these arguments, they refused to dismiss Viridovix and the other leaders from the council until they had agreed to take up arms and march against the camp.

SECTION 3.18.8When this was granted, they joyfully set out for the camp, as though victory were already assured, gathering bundles of brushwood and twigs with which to fill the Roman trenches.

CHAPTER 3.19

SECTION 3.19.1The camp stood on high ground, rising gradually from the plain for about a mile. They rushed toward it at full speed, so as to give the Romans as little time as possible to assemble and arm themselves, and arrived utterly exhausted.

SECTION 3.19.2Sabinus exhorted his men and, eager as they were, gave the signal. While the enemy were encumbered by the loads they carried, he ordered a sudden sortie from two gates.

SECTION 3.19.3The advantage of the ground, the enemy’s ignorance and exhaustion, the courage of our soldiers, and the experience they had gained in earlier battles combined to make the enemy unable to withstand even our first charge; they immediately turned and fled.

SECTION 3.19.4Our soldiers, still fresh and unencumbered, overtook them and killed a great number; the cavalry pursued the rest and left only a few who escaped from the rout.

SECTION 3.19.5Thus at the same time Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of Sabinus’s victory, and all the states immediately surrendered to Titurius.

SECTION 3.19.6For just as the spirit of the Gauls is ardent and eager in undertaking wars, so their resolution is weak and offers scarcely any resistance when they must endure disaster.

CHAPTER 3.20

SECTION 3.20.1At about the same time, Publius Crassus reached Aquitania, which, as stated before, must be reckoned—both from the extent of its territory and from the number of its inhabitants—as a third part of Gaul. He understood that he would have to wage war in the very regions where, a few years earlier, the lieutenant Lucius Valerius Praeconinus had been killed after his army was routed, and from which the proconsul Lucius Manlius had fled after losing his baggage. He therefore realized that no ordinary degree of care would be required of him.

SECTION 3.20.2Accordingly, after securing the grain supply and assembling auxiliaries and cavalry, he also summoned by name many brave men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, communities of the Roman province bordering those regions, and led his army into the territory of the Sotiates.

SECTION 3.20.3When the Sotiates learned of his approach, they assembled a large force and, with the cavalry in which their chief strength lay, attacked our column on the march, first engaging us in a cavalry battle.

SECTION 3.20.4Then, after their cavalry had been routed and ours were pursuing, they suddenly revealed the infantry forces they had posted in ambush in a hollow. These attacked our scattered men and renewed the battle.

CHAPTER 3.21

SECTION 3.21.1The fighting was long and fierce. The Sotiates, confident from their former victories, believed that the safety of all Aquitania rested upon their valor; while our men wished it to be seen what they could accomplish under a youthful commander, without Caesar and without the other legions. At last the enemy, worn down by wounds, turned and fled.

SECTION 3.21.2After killing a great number of them, Crassus continued his march and began to assault the stronghold of the Sotiates. When they resisted bravely, he brought forward covered galleries and towers.

SECTION 3.21.3At one time they attempted a sortie, at another they drove tunnels toward the siege mound and covered galleries—a craft in which the Aquitani are by far the most expert, because in many places among them there are copper mines and excavations. When they realized that the vigilance of our men made all these efforts useless, they sent envoys to Crassus and begged him to accept their surrender. Their request was granted, and, when ordered to hand over their arms, they did so.

CHAPTER 3.22

SECTION 3.22.1While the attention of all our men was fixed upon this business, Adiatunnus, who held supreme command, appeared at another part of the stronghold with six hundred devoted retainers, whom they call soldurii.

SECTION 3.22.2The condition of these men is that they share all the comforts of life with those to whose friendship they have pledged themselves; but if any violent fate befalls those men, they must either suffer the same fate with them or take their own lives.

SECTION 3.22.3And within living memory no one has yet been found who, after the death of the man to whose friendship he had devoted himself, refused to die.

SECTION 3.22.4With these men Adiatunnus attempted a sortie. A shout arose from that part of the fortifications, the soldiers rushed to arms, and a fierce battle was fought there. He was driven back into the stronghold, but nevertheless obtained from Crassus permission to surrender on the same terms.

CHAPTER 3.23

SECTION 3.23.1After receiving their arms and hostages, Crassus marched into the territories of the Vocates and Tarusates.

SECTION 3.23.2Then the barbarians were thoroughly alarmed, because they learned that a stronghold fortified both by nature and by human skill had been captured within a few days of our arrival. They began sending envoys in every direction, swearing mutual oaths, exchanging hostages, and preparing forces.

SECTION 3.23.3Envoys were also sent to those states of Nearer Spain that bordered Aquitania, and auxiliaries and commanders were summoned from there.

SECTION 3.23.4Upon their arrival, the Aquitani attempted to wage war with great confidence and an immense multitude of men.

SECTION 3.23.5As their commanders they chose men who had served throughout all the years with Quintus Sertorius and were believed to possess the highest knowledge of warfare.

SECTION 3.23.6Following the practice of the Roman people, these men began to seize advantageous positions, fortify camps, and cut our forces off from supplies.

SECTION 3.23.7When Crassus observed that, because of their small numbers, his own forces could not easily be divided, while the enemy could range freely, block the roads, and still leave a sufficient guard in camp; that for this reason grain and other provisions could not conveniently be brought to him; and that the enemy’s numbers were increasing daily, he decided that he must not delay in bringing the matter to a decisive battle.

SECTION 3.23.8He laid the matter before a council of war, and when he found that all held the same opinion, he appointed the following day for battle.

CHAPTER 3.24

SECTION 3.24.1At daybreak he led out all his forces, drew them up in two lines, and placed the auxiliaries in the center. He then waited to see what plan the enemy would adopt.

SECTION 3.24.2Although the enemy believed that, because of their great numbers, their ancient military renown, and the small size of our force, they could fight without danger, they nevertheless thought it safer to block the roads, cut off our supplies, and gain victory without suffering wounds.

SECTION 3.24.3If the Romans began to retreat because of a shortage of grain, they intended to attack them while they were encumbered on the march and burdened with packs, and therefore weaker in spirit.

SECTION 3.24.4Their commanders approved this plan, and although the Roman forces had been led out, they remained within their camp.

SECTION 3.24.5When Crassus perceived this, and saw that the enemy’s hesitation and apparent fear had made our soldiers still more eager to fight, while voices rose from every quarter declaring that they ought to wait no longer before advancing against the camp, he exhorted his men and, amid the enthusiasm of all, marched upon the enemy’s camp.

CHAPTER 3.25

SECTION 3.25.1There some filled the trenches, while others discharged volleys of missiles and drove the defenders from the rampart and fortifications. The auxiliaries, in whom Crassus placed little confidence as fighting troops, nevertheless conveyed the appearance and impression of combatants by supplying stones and missiles and carrying sods to the siege mound. The enemy likewise fought steadily and without fear, and the missiles cast from their higher position did not fall without effect.

SECTION 3.25.2Meanwhile, cavalrymen who had ridden around the enemy’s camp reported to Crassus that the defenses at the rear gate had not been constructed with equal care and offered an easy approach.

CHAPTER 3.26

SECTION 3.26.1Crassus urged the cavalry commanders to rouse their men with promises of great rewards, and explained what he wished to be done.

SECTION 3.26.2As ordered, they led out the cohorts that had been left to guard the camp and were still fresh from lack of exertion. They took them around by a longer route so that they could not be seen from the enemy’s camp, and while every eye and every thought was fixed upon the fighting, they swiftly reached the fortifications already mentioned.

SECTION 3.26.3They demolished these defenses and established themselves inside the enemy’s camp before they could be clearly seen or the enemy could understand what was happening.

SECTION 3.26.4Then, when the shouting was heard from that quarter, our men renewed their strength—as commonly happens when victory is in sight—and began to press the attack more fiercely.

SECTION 3.26.5The enemy, surrounded on every side and despairing of everything, strove to throw themselves over the fortifications and seek safety in flight.

SECTION 3.26.6The cavalry pursued them over entirely open ground and, of the fifty thousand men known to have assembled from Aquitania and the country of the Cantabri, left scarcely a quarter alive before returning to camp late in the night.

CHAPTER 3.27

SECTION 3.27.1When news of this battle was heard, the greater part of Aquitania surrendered to Crassus and voluntarily sent hostages. Among these peoples were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, and Cocosates.

SECTION 3.27.2A few of the most remote tribes, trusting to the season because winter was at hand, neglected to do so.

CHAPTER 3.28

SECTION 3.28.1At about the same time Caesar, although summer was now nearly over, nevertheless led his army against the Morini and Menapii. For while all the rest of Gaul had been pacified, these alone remained under arms and had never sent envoys to him to seek peace. He believed that this war could be swiftly concluded; but they began to conduct it in a manner altogether different from the rest of the Gauls.

SECTION 3.28.2For they understood that the greatest nations, which had met the Romans in battle, had been driven back and defeated; and since they possessed unbroken forests and marshes, they withdrew into them with all their possessions.

SECTION 3.28.3When Caesar reached the edge of these forests and began fortifying his camp, without any enemy having been seen in the meantime, they suddenly burst from every part of the woods while our men were scattered at their work and launched an attack upon them.

SECTION 3.28.4Our men quickly seized their weapons, drove them back into the forests, and killed a considerable number. They pursued them too far into difficult ground, however, and lost a few of their own men.

CHAPTER 3.29

SECTION 3.29.1During the days that followed, Caesar began cutting down the forests. To prevent any attack from being made against the flank of soldiers who were unarmed and unsuspecting, he placed all the felled timber facing the enemy and piled it up on both sides as a rampart.

SECTION 3.29.2With incredible speed a great extent of ground was cleared within a few days. Our men had already secured the enemy’s cattle and the rearmost part of their baggage, while the enemy themselves were seeking the denser forests, when storms of such severity followed that the work had to be suspended; and because the rains continued, the soldiers could no longer be kept under tents.

SECTION 3.29.3Accordingly, after devastating all their fields and burning their villages and buildings, Caesar led his army back and placed it in winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lexovii, and likewise among the other states that had most recently made war.

CHAPTER 3.1

SECTION 3.1.1When Caesar was leaving for Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the Twelfth Legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, whose territory extends from the borders of the Allobroges, Lake Geneva, and the Rhône River to the highest Alps.

SECTION 3.1.2His reason for sending Galba was that he wanted to open the route through the Alps, along which merchants had been accustomed to travel at great risk and after paying heavy tolls.

SECTION 3.1.3He authorized Galba, if he considered it necessary, to station the legion in that region for the winter.

SECTION 3.1.4After fighting several successful battles and storming a number of their forts, Galba received envoys from every direction, accepted hostages, and made peace. He then decided to station two cohorts among the Nantuates and to spend the winter himself with the remaining cohorts of that legion in a village of the Veragri called Octodurus.

SECTION 3.1.5This village lies in a fairly narrow valley with a small area of level ground adjoining it and is enclosed on every side by very high mountains.

SECTION 3.1.6Since a river divided the village into two sections, Galba granted one section to the Gauls for their winter quarters and assigned the other, which they had vacated, to his cohorts. He fortified this position with a rampart and ditch.

CHAPTER 3.2

SECTION 3.2.1Several days of the winter had passed, and Galba had ordered grain to be brought there, when his scouts suddenly informed him that all the Gauls had left during the night from the section of the village he had granted them and that a vast force of Seduni and Veragri held the mountains overlooking the village.

SECTION 3.2.2The Gauls had suddenly decided to renew the war and overwhelm the legion for several reasons.

SECTION 3.2.3First, they held the legion in contempt because of its small numbers, especially since it was not at full strength: two cohorts had been detached, and a number of individual soldiers sent out to obtain supplies were absent.

SECTION 3.2.4They also believed that, because of the unfavorable terrain, when they charged down from the mountains into the valley and hurled their missiles, not even their first assault could be withstood.

SECTION 3.2.5In addition, they resented having their children taken away from them as hostages and were convinced that the Romans were trying to occupy the summits of the Alps not merely to secure the roads but to hold them permanently and annex the region to the neighboring province.

CHAPTER 3.3

SECTION 3.3.1On receiving these reports, Galba saw that the work on the winter camp and its fortifications was not yet fully completed and that insufficient provision had been made for grain and other supplies, since after the surrender and the acceptance of hostages he had believed there was no reason to fear war. He quickly called a council and began asking for opinions.

SECTION 3.3.2In this council, since so great and unexpected a danger had arisen, nearly all the higher ground could already be seen covered by a mass of armed men, and neither reinforcements nor supplies could reach them because the roads had been cut off,

SECTION 3.3.3some, almost despairing of survival, proposed that they abandon the baggage, break out of the camp, and seek safety by the same routes along which they had come.

SECTION 3.3.4The majority, however, decided to reserve this plan for the last extremity and meanwhile await the outcome and defend the camp.

CHAPTER 3.4

SECTION 3.4.1After a short interval, barely enough time for the men to arrange and carry out the measures they had decided upon, the signal was given and the enemy charged down from every direction, hurling stones and heavy Gallic javelins onto the rampart.

SECTION 3.4.2At first our men, with their strength unimpaired, defended the fortifications bravely and threw no missile from their higher position without effect. Whenever any part of the camp seemed to be stripped of defenders and hard-pressed, they rushed there and brought assistance.

SECTION 3.4.3But they were at a disadvantage because, as the battle continued, enemy soldiers who became tired withdrew from the fighting and others with fresh strength took their places.

SECTION 3.4.4Because of their small numbers, our men could do none of these things. Not only was a soldier exhausted by fighting given no opportunity to withdraw, but even a wounded man could not leave the place where he stood and retire to safety.

CHAPTER 3.5

SECTION 3.5.1The fighting had now continued without interruption for more than six hours, and our men were running out not only of strength but also of missiles. The enemy pressed their attack more fiercely and, as our men weakened, began tearing down the rampart and filling the ditches. The situation had now reached the ultimate crisis.

SECTION 3.5.2Publius Sextius Baculus, the chief centurion whom we said had been disabled by numerous wounds in the battle against the Nervii, and Gaius Volusenus, a military tribune and a man of great judgment and courage, ran to Galba and told him that their one hope of survival was to break out and attempt this last resort.

SECTION 3.5.3Accordingly, he quickly called the centurions together and instructed them to inform the soldiers to break off the fighting for a short time, merely intercept the missiles being thrown at them, and recover from their exertions; then, when the signal was given, they were to burst out of the camp and place all hope of safety in their courage.

CHAPTER 3.6

SECTION 3.6.1They did as they were ordered, and by suddenly making a sortie from every gate, they left the enemy no opportunity either to understand what was happening or to regroup.

SECTION 3.6.2With the situation thus reversed, they surrounded on every side and cut down the men who had come there hoping to take the camp. Of the more than thirty thousand barbarians known to have come to the camp, they killed over a third, threw the rest into panic and flight, and did not allow them to make a stand even on higher ground.

SECTION 3.6.3Thus, after routing the entire enemy force and stripping them of their weapons, they withdrew within their own fortifications.

SECTION 3.6.4After this battle, Galba was unwilling to test fortune too often. He remembered that he had come to winter quarters with a different plan and saw that he had encountered entirely different circumstances. Moved above all by the shortage of grain and supplies, on the following day he burned all the buildings of that village and hurried to return to the province.

SECTION 3.6.5With no enemy obstructing or delaying his march, he brought the legion safely into the territory of the Nantuates, and from there into that of the Allobroges, where he spent the winter.

CHAPTER 3.7

SECTION 3.7.1After these events, Caesar believed for every reason that Gaul had been pacified—the Belgae had been defeated, the Germans expelled, and the Seduni conquered in the Alps—and so, at the beginning of winter, he had departed for Illyricum because he also wished to visit those peoples and become acquainted with those regions. Then war suddenly broke out in Gaul.

SECTION 3.7.2The cause of this war was as follows. The young Publius Crassus was wintering with the Seventh Legion among the Andes, near the Atlantic Ocean.

SECTION 3.7.3Because grain was scarce in that area, he sent several prefects and military tribunes into the neighboring states to obtain it.

SECTION 3.7.4Among them, Titus Terrasidius was sent to the Esuvii, Marcus Trebius Gallus to the Coriosolites, and Quintus Velanius with Titus Silius to the Veneti.

CHAPTER 3.8

SECTION 3.8.1The state of the Veneti possessed by far the greatest authority along the entire coast of those regions. The Veneti had the largest number of ships, in which they regularly sailed to Britain; they surpassed all the others in their knowledge and experience of nautical matters; and, on a coast exposed to the violent open sea, where there were only a few scattered harbors, all of which they controlled, they made nearly everyone accustomed to sailing those waters pay them tribute.

SECTION 3.8.2They began by detaining Silius and Velanius, believing that through them they would recover the hostages they had given to Crassus.

SECTION 3.8.3Influenced by their authority, the neighboring peoples—with the sudden and impulsive decision-making characteristic of the Gauls—detained Trebius and Terrasidius for the same reason. They quickly exchanged envoys and, through their leading men, jointly swore that they would do nothing except by common agreement and that they would all accept the same outcome of fortune.

SECTION 3.8.4They urged the remaining states to choose to retain the freedom inherited from their ancestors rather than endure slavery under Rome.

SECTION 3.8.5After quickly bringing the entire coast over to their position, they sent a joint delegation to Publius Crassus, telling him that if he wished to recover his men, he must return their hostages to them.

CHAPTER 3.9

SECTION 3.9.1When Crassus informed Caesar of these events, Caesar, because he himself was some distance away, meanwhile ordered warships to be built on the Liger River, which flows into the Atlantic Ocean, rowers to be recruited from the province, and sailors and pilots to be assembled.

SECTION 3.9.2These arrangements were carried out quickly, and as soon as the season allowed, Caesar himself hurried to the army.

SECTION 3.9.3When the Veneti and the other states learned of Caesar’s arrival, they also understood the enormity of the crime they had committed by detaining envoys—a title always regarded as sacred and inviolable among every nation—and throwing them into chains. They therefore began to prepare for war in proportion to the danger and, above all, to provide everything needed for the use of their ships. Their hopes were all the greater because they had great confidence in the natural character of the region.

SECTION 3.9.4They knew that overland routes were broken up by tidal inlets and that navigation was obstructed by ignorance of the area and the small number of harbors.

SECTION 3.9.5They were also confident that because of the shortage of grain, our armies could not remain among them very long.

SECTION 3.9.6Even if everything should turn out contrary to their expectations, they were still far more powerful in ships, while the Romans had no supply of ships at all and were unfamiliar with the shallows, harbors, and islands of the regions where they would be fighting.

SECTION 3.9.7They clearly understood that sailing in an enclosed sea was very different from sailing on the vast and completely open Atlantic Ocean.

SECTION 3.9.8Having formed these plans, they fortified their towns.

SECTION 3.9.9They transported grain from the countryside into the towns and gathered as many ships as they could in the territory of the Veneti, where it was known that Caesar would first conduct the war.

SECTION 3.9.10They enlisted as allies for this war the Osismi, Lexovii, Namnetes, Ambiliati, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii, and summoned reinforcements from Britain, which lies opposite those regions.

CHAPTER 3.10

SECTION 3.10.1These were the difficulties of conducting the war that we have described above, but nevertheless many considerations urged Caesar to undertake it:

SECTION 3.10.2the outrage of detaining Roman knights, a revolt after surrender, rebellion after hostages had been given, and the conspiracy of so many states; above all, he feared that if he neglected this region, the remaining peoples would think themselves free to do the same.

SECTION 3.10.3Accordingly, since he understood that nearly all the Gauls were eager for political change and were quickly and readily stirred to war, while all people naturally desire freedom and hate the condition of slavery, he thought that before more states could conspire together, he must divide his army and distribute it more widely.

CHAPTER 3.11

SECTION 3.11.1He therefore sent his lieutenant Titus Labienus with the cavalry to the Treveri, who lived nearest the Rhine River.

SECTION 3.11.2He instructed him to visit the Remi and the other Belgae and keep them loyal, and to prevent the Germans—who were said to have been summoned by the Belgae as reinforcements—from crossing the river by force in ships if they attempted to do so.

SECTION 3.11.3He ordered Publius Crassus to depart for Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts and a large force of cavalry, to prevent reinforcements from being sent from those peoples into Gaul and such powerful nations from joining together.

SECTION 3.11.4He sent his lieutenant Quintus Titurius Sabinus with three legions against the Venelli, Coriosolites, and Lexovii, to make sure that force was kept occupied.

SECTION 3.11.5He placed the young Decimus Brutus in command of the fleet and of the Gallic ships that he had ordered to assemble from the Pictones, Santoni, and other pacified regions, and ordered him to set out against the Veneti as soon as he could. Caesar himself hurried there with the infantry forces.

CHAPTER 3.12

SECTION 3.12.1The towns were generally situated in such a way that, built at the ends of narrow spits and promontories, they could not be reached on foot when the tide had risen from the open sea—something that always happened twice in a period of twelve hours—or by ship, because when the tide receded again, the ships would be stranded in the shallows.

SECTION 3.12.2Thus both circumstances obstructed an assault on the towns.

SECTION 3.12.3If at any time they happened to be overcome by the scale of our siege works, after the sea had been forced back by an embankment and massive earthworks and these had been raised to the level of the town walls, and they began to despair of their fortunes, they would bring in a large number of ships—which they had every ability to do—carry away all their possessions, and withdraw to the nearest towns.

SECTION 3.12.4There they would again defend themselves with the same advantages of terrain.

SECTION 3.12.5They were able to do this all the more easily during a large part of the summer because our ships were held back by storms, and navigation was extremely difficult on the vast and open sea, with its powerful tides and rare, almost nonexistent harbors.

CHAPTER 3.13

SECTION 3.13.1Their ships were built and equipped as follows. Their hulls were considerably flatter than those of our ships, so that they could more easily handle the shallows and the ebbing tide.

SECTION 3.13.2Their bows stood very high, as did their sterns, making them suitable for the size of the waves and the violence of the storms.

SECTION 3.13.3The ships were built entirely of oak, enabling them to withstand any force or impact.

SECTION 3.13.4Their crossbeams were made of timbers a foot thick and fastened with iron nails as thick as a man’s thumb.

SECTION 3.13.5The anchors were secured with iron chains instead of ropes.

SECTION 3.13.6They used hides and thinly dressed leather in place of sails, either because they lacked flax and did not know how to use it, or—more probably—because they believed that ordinary sails could not adequately withstand such violent Atlantic storms and powerful winds or control ships of such great weight.

SECTION 3.13.7When our fleet encountered these ships, it was superior only in speed and the drive provided by its oars; in all other respects, the enemy’s ships were better suited and adapted to the nature of the region and the violence of the storms.

SECTION 3.13.8Our ships could not damage them with their rams, so great was their strength; because of their height, a missile could not easily be hurled onto them, and for the same reason they could not readily be held fast with grappling hooks.

SECTION 3.13.9Moreover, when the wind began to rage and they let themselves run before it, they could endure the storm more easily, settle more safely in the shallows, and, when left aground by the tide, had nothing to fear from rocks and reefs. Our ships had reason to fear every one of these dangers.

CHAPTER 3.14

SECTION 3.14.1After storming several towns, Caesar realized that so much labor was being spent in vain, since taking the towns neither prevented the enemy’s escape nor enabled him to harm them. He therefore decided that he must wait for the fleet.

SECTION 3.14.2When it assembled and was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully prepared and equipped with every kind of weapon, sailed out of the harbor and took up a position opposite ours.

SECTION 3.14.3Neither Brutus, who commanded the fleet, nor the military tribunes and centurions, each of whom had been assigned an individual ship, were at all certain what they should do or what method of fighting they should adopt.

SECTION 3.14.4They knew that the enemy could not be damaged with the ram. Even after towers had been erected on our ships, the sterns of the barbarians’ ships still rose higher than they did, so that our missiles could not be thrown effectively from the lower position, while those thrown by the Gauls struck with greater force.

SECTION 3.14.5One device prepared by our men proved extremely useful: very sharp hooks inserted into and fastened to long poles, similar in shape to the hooks used against walls.

SECTION 3.14.6With these, they caught and pulled taut the ropes that fastened the yards to the masts; then, when our ship was driven forward by its oars, the ropes snapped.

SECTION 3.14.7Once these ropes were cut, the yards necessarily fell. Since all the Gallic ships’ effectiveness depended on their sails and rigging, when these were taken away, the ships were rendered entirely useless in a single moment.

SECTION 3.14.8The rest of the contest depended on courage, in which our soldiers easily surpassed them, especially because the action was taking place in sight of Caesar and the entire army, so that no particularly courageous deed could go unnoticed.

SECTION 3.14.9The army occupied all the hills and higher ground from which there was a close view down onto the sea.

CHAPTER 3.15

SECTION 3.15.1Once the yards had been brought down, as we have described, two or three of our ships would surround each enemy vessel, and the soldiers would strive with all their strength to board it.

SECTION 3.15.2After the barbarians saw this happening and several of their ships had been stormed, they could find no remedy for the situation and attempted to seek safety in flight.

SECTION 3.15.3Their ships had already turned in the direction the wind was carrying them when such a sudden calm and stillness arose that they could not move from the spot.

SECTION 3.15.4This circumstance provided the greatest possible opportunity to finish the engagement.

SECTION 3.15.5Our men pursued and stormed the ships one by one, so that only a very few of their entire number reached land under cover of night, although the fighting lasted from about the fourth hour until sunset.

CHAPTER 3.16

SECTION 3.16.1That battle brought the war against the Veneti and the entire coast to an end.

SECTION 3.16.2Not only had all their young men and all their older men who possessed any judgment or standing gathered there, but they had also assembled in one place every ship they had anywhere.

SECTION 3.16.3After losing these, the survivors had neither anywhere to retreat nor any means of defending their towns.

SECTION 3.16.4They therefore surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar. Caesar decided that they must be punished all the more severely so that in the future the barbarians would more carefully respect the rights of envoys. Accordingly, he executed their entire senate and sold the rest into slavery.

CHAPTER 3.17

SECTION 3.17.1While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Quintus Titurius Sabinus reached the territory of the Venelli with the forces he had received from Caesar.

SECTION 3.17.2They were commanded by Viridovix, who also held supreme command over all the states that had rebelled and from which he had assembled an army and large forces.

SECTION 3.17.3During the preceding few days, the Aulerci Eburovices and the Lexovii had killed their own senates because they had been unwilling to support the war, closed their gates, and joined Viridovix.

SECTION 3.17.4In addition, a great multitude of desperate men and brigands had gathered from all over Gaul, drawn away from farming and daily labor by the hope of plunder and enthusiasm for war.

SECTION 3.17.5Sabinus remained in his camp at a location suitable in every respect, while Viridovix had encamped opposite him at a distance of two miles and, each day, led out his forces and offered him the opportunity to fight. As a result, Sabinus was now not only despised by the enemy but was also criticized to some extent in the remarks of our own soldiers.

SECTION 3.17.6He created so strong an impression of fear that the enemy now dared to approach the rampart of the camp.

SECTION 3.17.7He acted this way because he did not believe that a lieutenant should fight such a great multitude of enemies—especially in the absence of the man holding supreme command—unless he had level ground or some other favorable opportunity.

CHAPTER 3.18

SECTION 3.18.1Once this impression of fear had become firmly established, he selected a suitable and cunning man, a Gaul from among those he had with him as auxiliaries.

SECTION 3.18.2By promising him great rewards, he persuaded the man to go over to the enemy and instructed him in what he wanted done.

SECTION 3.18.3When the man came to them pretending to be a deserter, he described the Romans’ fear and explained the desperate straits in which Caesar himself was being pressed by the Veneti.

SECTION 3.18.4He said that no later than the following night, Sabinus would secretly lead his army out of camp and set out to bring assistance to Caesar.

SECTION 3.18.5When they heard this, they all shouted that the opportunity for a successful operation must not be lost.

SECTION 3.18.6They must march on the camp. Many considerations encouraged the Gauls to adopt this plan: Sabinus’s hesitation during the preceding days, the deserter’s assurance, their shortage of provisions, for which they had made insufficient preparations, their hopes concerning the war against the Veneti, and the fact that people generally like to believe what they want to believe.

SECTION 3.18.7Persuaded by these arguments, they refused to dismiss Viridovix and the other commanders from the council until they had agreed to take up arms and march on the camp.

SECTION 3.18.8Once this was agreed, they happily set out for the camp as though victory were assured, after gathering brushwood and branches with which to fill the Romans’ trenches.

CHAPTER 3.19

SECTION 3.19.1The camp stood on high ground that rose gradually from the bottom of the slope for about a mile. They rushed up to it at full speed, to give the Romans as little time as possible to assemble and arm themselves, and arrived completely out of breath.

SECTION 3.19.2Sabinus encouraged his men and, when they eagerly demanded it, gave the signal. Since the enemy were encumbered by the loads they were carrying, he ordered a sudden sortie through two gates.

SECTION 3.19.3Because of the favorable terrain, the enemy’s lack of preparation and exhaustion, the soldiers’ courage, and the experience they had gained in earlier battles, the enemy could not withstand even a single charge by our men and immediately turned and fled.

SECTION 3.19.4Our soldiers, still at full strength, overtook them while they were encumbered and killed a great many of them. The cavalry pursued the rest and allowed only a few who had escaped the rout to get away.

SECTION 3.19.5Thus, at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and Caesar of Sabinus’s victory, and all the states immediately surrendered to Titurius.

SECTION 3.19.6For although the Gauls are eager and ready to undertake wars, their spirits are weak and not at all resilient when it comes to enduring disasters.

CHAPTER 3.20

SECTION 3.20.1At about the same time, Publius Crassus reached Aquitania, which, as stated before, must be regarded as a third of Gaul in both geographical extent and population. He understood that he would have to wage war in the region where, only a few years earlier, the legate Lucius Valerius Praeconinus had been killed after his army was defeated, and from which the proconsul Lucius Manlius had fled after losing his baggage. He therefore realized that he would have to exercise exceptional care.

SECTION 3.20.2Accordingly, after securing the grain supply, assembling auxiliary troops and cavalry, and personally summoning many brave men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo—communities in the Roman province of Gaul bordering those regions—he led his army into the territory of the Sotiates.

SECTION 3.20.3When the Sotiates learned of his arrival, they assembled a large force and attacked our column on the march with their cavalry, in which their chief strength lay. They first engaged us in a cavalry battle,

SECTION 3.20.4and then, after their cavalry had been driven back and ours were pursuing them, they suddenly revealed the infantry forces they had stationed in ambush in a valley. These attacked our scattered men and renewed the battle.

CHAPTER 3.21

SECTION 3.21.1The fighting was long and fierce. The Sotiates, relying on their earlier victories, believed that the safety of all Aquitania depended on their courage, while our men wanted it to be seen what they could accomplish without their commander and the other legions, under the leadership of a young man. At last, worn down by wounds, the enemy turned and fled.

SECTION 3.21.2After killing a great many of them, Crassus marched directly to the town of the Sotiates and began to besiege it. When they resisted bravely, he brought forward covered siege galleries and towers.

SECTION 3.21.3At times they attempted sorties, and at others they drove tunnels toward the siege ramp and covered galleries. The Aquitani are by far the most skilled at this, because they have copper mines and quarries in many places. When they realized that the vigilance of our men made it impossible to accomplish anything by these methods, they sent envoys to Crassus and asked him to accept their surrender. Their request was granted, and when ordered to hand over their weapons, they did so.

CHAPTER 3.22

SECTION 3.22.1While the attention of all our men was focused on this matter, Adiatunnus, who held supreme command, attempted from another part of the town, together with six hundred devoted retainers whom they call soldurii,

SECTION 3.22.2whose condition is that they share all the benefits of life with those to whose friendship they have devoted themselves, but if anything violent happens to those men, they either suffer the same fate with them or take their own lives;

SECTION 3.22.3and within living memory no one has yet been found who refused death after the man to whose friendship he had devoted himself was killed—

SECTION 3.22.4Adiatunnus attempted to make a sortie with these men. A shout went up from that part of the fortifications, the soldiers rushed to arms, and a fierce battle was fought there. Although driven back into the town, he nevertheless obtained Crassus’s permission to surrender on the same terms.

CHAPTER 3.23

SECTION 3.23.1After receiving their weapons and hostages, Crassus marched into the territories of the Vocates and Tarusates.

SECTION 3.23.2The natives were now truly alarmed because they had learned that a town fortified both by its natural position and by human labor had been captured within a few days of the Romans’ arrival. They began sending envoys in every direction, swearing mutual oaths, exchanging hostages, and preparing forces.

SECTION 3.23.3Envoys were also sent to the states of Nearer Spain bordering Aquitania, and auxiliary troops and commanders were summoned from there.

SECTION 3.23.4With their arrival, the Aquitani attempted to wage war with great confidence and a large number of men.

SECTION 3.23.5The commanders selected were men who had spent all those years with Quintus Sertorius and were believed to possess the highest degree of military expertise.

SECTION 3.23.6Following Roman practice, they began occupying strategic positions, fortifying their camp, and cutting our men off from supplies.

SECTION 3.23.7When Crassus observed that his forces were too small to be divided easily, while the enemy could roam freely, blockade the roads, and still leave a sufficient guard in camp; that for this reason grain and other supplies were reaching him only with difficulty; and that the enemy’s numbers were increasing daily, he decided that he must not delay giving battle.

SECTION 3.23.8He brought the matter before a council of war, and when he saw that everyone held the same opinion, he set the following day for the battle.

CHAPTER 3.24

SECTION 3.24.1At daybreak he led out all his forces, formed them in two battle lines, placed the auxiliaries in the center, and waited to see what plan the enemy would adopt.

SECTION 3.24.2Although the enemy believed that, because of their numbers, their old military reputation, and the small size of our force, they could fight safely, they nevertheless considered it safer to blockade the roads, cut off supplies, and win a bloodless victory.

SECTION 3.24.3If the Romans began to retreat because of a shortage of grain, they planned to attack them on the march, when encumbered and carrying their packs and therefore weaker in spirit.

SECTION 3.24.4The commanders approved this plan, and though the Roman forces had been led out, they remained in their camp.

SECTION 3.24.5When Crassus saw this, the enemy’s hesitation and apparent fear made our soldiers more eager to fight, and voices were heard everywhere saying that they should wait no longer before advancing on the camp. Crassus encouraged his men and, with everyone eager for battle, marched against the enemy camp.

CHAPTER 3.25

SECTION 3.25.1There some filled the trenches, while others drove the defenders from the rampart and fortifications by hurling large numbers of missiles. The auxiliaries, in whom Crassus did not place much confidence as fighters, created the appearance and impression that they were taking part in the battle by supplying stones and missiles and carrying blocks of turf to the siege ramp. Meanwhile, the enemy also fought steadily and fearlessly, and the missiles thrown from their higher position did not fall without effect.

SECTION 3.25.2After riding around the enemy camp, the cavalry reported to Crassus that the camp was not fortified with equal care at the rear gate and that access there was easy.

CHAPTER 3.26

SECTION 3.26.1Crassus urged the cavalry commanders to inspire their men by promising great rewards, and explained what he wanted done.

SECTION 3.26.2As ordered, they led out the cohorts that had been left to guard the camp and were still fresh and unworn by exertion. They took them around by a longer route so that they could not be seen from the enemy camp, and, while everyone’s eyes and attention were fixed on the battle, they quickly reached the fortifications already mentioned.

SECTION 3.26.3They tore them down and entered the enemy camp before they could be clearly seen or the enemy could understand what was happening.

SECTION 3.26.4Then, when a shout was heard from that quarter, our men renewed their strength, as usually happens when victory is in sight, and began to attack more fiercely.

SECTION 3.26.5Surrounded on every side and despairing of everything, the enemy tried to throw themselves over the fortifications and seek safety in flight.

SECTION 3.26.6The cavalry pursued them across completely open country. Of the fifty thousand men known to have assembled from Aquitania and among the Cantabri, scarcely a quarter were left alive when the cavalry returned to camp late at night.

CHAPTER 3.27

SECTION 3.27.1When news of this battle was received, the greater part of Aquitania surrendered to Crassus and voluntarily sent hostages. Among these peoples were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Ptianii, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Gates, Ausci, Garumni, Sibusates, and Cocosates.

SECTION 3.27.2A few remote tribes, relying on the season because winter was approaching, neglected to do so.

CHAPTER 3.28

SECTION 3.28.1At about the same time, although summer was now nearly over, Caesar led his army against the Morini and Menapii. All the rest of Gaul had been pacified, but they remained under arms and had never sent him envoys to seek peace, so he believed that this war could be quickly concluded. They began to wage war in a completely different manner from the other Gauls.

SECTION 3.28.2They understood that the greatest nations that had contested the issue in battle had been routed and defeated, and they had vast forests and marshes. They therefore withdrew there with all their possessions.

SECTION 3.28.3When Caesar reached the edge of these forests and began fortifying his camp, without any enemy having been seen in the meantime, they suddenly burst out of the forest from every direction while our men were scattered at their work and attacked them.

SECTION 3.28.4Our men quickly took up their weapons, drove them back into the forests, and killed a number of them. They pursued them too far into difficult terrain and lost a few of their own men.

CHAPTER 3.29

SECTION 3.29.1During the following days Caesar began cutting down the forests. To prevent anyone from attacking the unarmed and unsuspecting soldiers from the flank, he placed all the felled timber facing the enemy and piled it up like a rampart on both sides.

SECTION 3.29.2Within a few days an astonishingly large area had been cleared with incredible speed. Our men had already seized the enemy’s livestock and the rearmost parts of their baggage, while the enemy themselves were seeking denser forests, when such storms followed that the work necessarily had to be suspended, and the continuous rain made it impossible to keep the soldiers under canvas any longer.

SECTION 3.29.3Accordingly, after devastating all their fields and burning their villages and buildings, Caesar withdrew his army and stationed it in winter quarters among the Aulerci, Lexovii, and the other states that had most recently made war.