Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book I, Chapter 9
Book I, Chapter 9 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Du domaine réel.
Chaque membre de la communauté se donne à elle au moment qu’elle se forme, tel qu’il se trouve actuellement, lui & toutes ses forces, dont les biens qu’il possede font partie. Ce n’est pas que par cet acte la possession change de nature en changeant de mains, & devienne propriété dans celles du Souverain: Mais comme les forces de la Cité sont incomparablement plus grandes que celles d’un particulier, la possession publique est aussi dans le fait plus forte & plus irrévocable, sans être plus légitime, au moins pour les étrangers. Car l’Etat à l’égard de ses membres est maitre de tous leurs biens par le contract social, qui dans l’Etat sert de base à tous les droits; mais il ne l’est à l’égard des autres Puissances que par le droit de premier occupant qu’il tient des particuliers.
Le droit de premier occupant, quoique plus réel que celui du plus fort, ne devient un vrai droit qu’après l’établissement de celui de propriété. Tout homme a naturellement droit à tout ce qui lui est nécessaire; mais l’acte positif qui le rend propriétaire de quelque bien l’exclud de tout le reste. Sa part étant faite il doit s’y borner, & n’a plus aucun droit à la communauté. Voilà pourquoi le droit de premier occupant, si foible dans l’état de nature, est respectable à tout homme civil. On respecte moins dans ce droit ce qui est à autrui que ce qui n’est pas à soi.
En general, pour autoriser sur un terrain quelconque le droit de premier occupant, il faut les conditions suivantes. Premierement que ce terrain ne soit encore habité par personne; secondement, qu’on n’en occupe que la quantité dont on a besoin pour subsister: En troisieme lieu qu’on en prenne possession, non par une vaine cérémonie, mais par le travail & la culture, seul signe de propriété qui au défaut de titres juridiques doive être respecté d’autrui.
En effet, accorder au besoin & au travail le droit de premier occupant, n’est-ce pas l’étendre aussi loin qu’il peut aller? Peut-on ne pas donner des bornes à ce droit? Suffira-t-il de mettre le pied sur un terrain commun pour s’en prétendre aussi-tôt le maitre? Suffira-t-il d’avoir la force d’en écarter un moment les autres hommes pour leur ôter le droit d’y jamais revenir? Comment un homme ou un peuple peut-il s’emparer d’un territoire immense & en priver tout le genre humain autrement que par une usurpation punissable, puisqu’elle ôte au reste des hommes le séjour & les alimens que la nature leur donne en commun? Quand Nuñez Balbao prenoit sur le rivage possession de la mer du sud & de toute l’Amérique méridionale au nom de la couronne de Castille, étoit-ce assez pour en déposséder tous les habitans & en exclurre tous les Princes du monde? Sur ce pied-là ces cérémonies se multiplioient assez vainement, & le Roi catholique n’avoit tout d’un coup qu’à prendre de son cabinet possession de tout l’univers; sauf à retrancher ensuite de son empire ce qui étoit auparavant possédé par les autres Princes.
On conçoit comment les terres des particuliers réunies & contigues deviennent le territoire public, & comment le droit de souveraineté s’étendant des sujets au terrain qu’ils occupent, devient à la fois réel & personnel; ce qui met les possesseurs dans une plus grande dépendance, & fait de leurs forces mêmes les garants de leur fidélité. Avantage qui ne paroît pas avoir été bien senti des anciens monarques qui ne s’appellant que Rois des Perses, des Scithes, des Macédoniens, sembloient se regarder comme les chefs des hommes plutôt que comme les maitres du pays. Ceux d’aujourd’hui s’appellent plus habilement Rois de France, d’Espagne, d’Angleterre, &c. En tenant ainsi le terrain, ils sont bien sûrs d’en tenir les habitans.
Ce qu’il y a de singulier dans cette aliénation, c’est que, loin qu’en acceptant les biens des particuliers la communauté les en dépouille, elle ne fait que leur en assurer la légitime possession, changer l’usurpation en un véritable droit, & la jouissance en propriété. Alors les possesseurs étant considérés comme dépositaires du bien public, leurs droits étant respectés de tous les membres de l’Etat & maintenus de toutes ses forces contre l’étranger, par une cession avantageuse au public & plus encore à eux-mêmes, ils ont, pour ainsi dire, acquis tout ce qu’ils ont donné: Paradoxe qui s’explique aisément par la distinction des droits que le souverain & le propriétaire ont sur le même fond, comme on verra ci-après.
Il peut arriver aussi que les hommes commencent à s’unir avant que de rien posséder, & que, s’emparant ensuite d’un terrain suffisant pour tous, ils en jouissent en commun, ou qu’ils le partagent entre eux, soit également soit selon des proportions établies par le Souverain. De quelque maniere que se fasse cette acquisition, le droit que chaque particulier a sur son propre fond est toujours subordonné au droit que la communauté a sur tous, sans quoi il n’y auroit ni solidité dans le lien social, ni force réelle dans l’exercice de la Souveraineté.
Je terminerai ce chapitre & ce livre par une remarque qui doit servir de base à tout sistême social; c’est qu’au lieu de détruire l’égalité naturelle, le pacte fondamental substitue au contraire une égalité morale & légitime à ce que la nature avoit pu mettre d’inégalité physique entre les hommes, & que, pouvant être inégaux en force ou en génie, ils deviennent tous égaux par convention & de droit.
Fin du Livre premier.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Of Real Property.
Each member of the community gives himself to it at the moment it is formed, as he then stands, himself and all his powers, including the goods he possesses. This does not mean that by this act possession changes its nature when it changes hands and becomes property in the hands of the Sovereign. But since the forces of the City are incomparably greater than those of an individual, public possession is in fact stronger and more irrevocable, though not more legitimate, at least in the eyes of foreigners. For in relation to its members the State is master of all their goods through the social pact, which within the State is the foundation of all rights; but in relation to other Powers it holds them only by the right of the first occupant, which it derives from individuals.
The right of the first occupant, though more real than the right of the strongest, becomes a true right only after the establishment of property rights. Every man has a natural right to everything he needs, but the positive act that makes him the owner of some good excludes him from everything else. Once his share has been allotted, he must confine himself to it, and has no further right to what is held in common. This is why the right of the first occupant, so weak in the state of nature, commands the respect of every civilized man. What one respects in this right is less what belongs to another than what does not belong to oneself.
In general, to justify the right of the first occupant over any piece of land, the following conditions are necessary. First, the land must not yet be inhabited by anyone; second, one must occupy only as much as one needs for subsistence; third, one must take possession not through an empty ceremony, but through labor and cultivation, the only mark of property that, in the absence of legal titles, others should respect.
Indeed, in granting the right of the first occupant to need and labor, are we not extending it as far as it can go? Can this right be left without limits? Will setting foot on common ground be enough to claim immediate mastery over it? Will having the force to drive others from it for a moment be enough to deprive them of the right ever to return? How can a man or a people seize an immense territory and deny it to all humankind except by an act of punishable usurpation, since it deprives the rest of mankind of the dwelling place and food that nature gives them in common? When Nuñez Balbao stood on the shore and took possession of the South Sea and the whole of southern America in the name of the crown of Castile, was that enough to dispossess all its inhabitants and exclude all the princes of the world? On that basis, such ceremonies were multiplied to little purpose, and the Catholic King had only to take possession of the whole universe at once from his study, later subtracting from his empire what the other princes already possessed.
We can understand how the lands of individuals, joined together and lying side by side, become public territory, and how the right of sovereignty, extending from subjects to the land they occupy, becomes at once a right over things and over persons. This places possessors in greater dependence and makes their very strength a guarantee of their fidelity. The ancient monarchs do not seem to have appreciated this advantage: calling themselves only Kings of the Persians, the Scythians, and the Macedonians, they seemed to see themselves as leaders of men rather than masters of the country. Today's monarchs more astutely call themselves Kings of France, Spain, England, and so on. Holding the land in this way, they are quite sure of holding its inhabitants.
What is striking about this alienation is that, far from stripping individuals of their goods when it accepts them, the community merely secures their legitimate possession, turns usurpation into a true right, and enjoyment into property. Possessors are then regarded as custodians of the public good; their rights are respected by every member of the State and upheld by all its forces against foreigners. By a cession advantageous to the public and still more to themselves, they have, so to speak, acquired everything they gave. This paradox is easily explained by the distinction between the rights the sovereign and the owner have over the same land, as we shall see later.
It may also happen that men begin to unite before they possess anything, then take possession of enough land for all and enjoy it in common, or divide it among themselves, either equally or in proportions fixed by the Sovereign. However this acquisition takes place, each individual's right over his own land is always subordinate to the community's right over all of it; otherwise the social bond would have no stability, nor the exercise of Sovereignty any real force.
I shall end this chapter and this book with a remark that must serve as the basis of every social system: far from destroying natural equality, the fundamental pact replaces whatever physical inequality nature may have established among men with a moral and legitimate equality; and though they may be unequal in strength or intelligence, they all become equal by convention and by right.
End of the First Book.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On Property in Land.
Each member of the community gives himself to it at the moment it is formed, just as he is, along with all his powers. These include the goods he possesses. This act does not mean that possession changes its nature when it changes hands and becomes ownership in the hands of the sovereign. But the City's powers are far greater than those of an individual. In practice, public possession is therefore stronger and harder to overturn, though no more legitimate, at least in the eyes of foreigners. For through the social pact the State is master of all the goods of its members, and that pact is the basis of all rights within the State. In relation to other powers, however, its claim rests only on the right of first occupancy inherited from those individuals.
The right of first occupancy is more real than the right of the strongest, but it does not become a true right until the right of ownership has been established. Every person naturally has a right to everything necessary for survival. But once a formal act makes him the owner of some property, he is excluded from the rest. Having received his share, he must keep within its limits and has no further right to what belongs to everyone. That is why every person in civil society respects the right of first occupancy, though it is so weak in the state of nature. In respecting this right, we respect not so much what belongs to someone else as what does not belong to us.
In general, three conditions must be met to justify a claim based on first occupancy over any piece of land. First, no one must already live on it. Second, the claimant must take only as much as is needed for survival. Third, the claim must be made through work and cultivation, not an empty ceremony. Without legal titles, work and cultivation are the only signs of ownership that others should respect.
Indeed, when we grant the right of first occupancy to need and work, do we not extend it as far as it can go? Can this right be left without limits? Is stepping onto common land enough to claim at once to be its master? Is having the strength to keep others off it for a moment enough to take away their right ever to return? How can a person or a people seize a huge territory and deprive the whole human race of it without committing a punishable theft? Such a seizure takes from other people the places to live and the food that nature gives to everyone in common. When Nuñez Balbao stood on the shore and took possession of the southern sea and all of South America for the crown of Castile, was that enough to dispossess all its inhabitants and shut out every other ruler in the world? On that basis, all these ceremonies served little purpose. The Catholic King could simply have claimed the entire universe from his office, then removed from his empire whatever other rulers already possessed.
It is easy to understand how neighboring lands held by individuals become public territory when joined together. The right of sovereignty then extends from the subjects to the land they occupy and becomes a right over both land and persons. This makes the landholders more dependent and turns their own strength into a guarantee of their loyalty. Ancient monarchs seem not to have fully understood this advantage. They called themselves Kings of the Persians, the Scythians, and the Macedonians, as if they considered themselves leaders of people rather than masters of the country. Today's monarchs more skillfully call themselves Kings of France, Spain, England, and so on. By holding the land, they can be sure of holding its inhabitants.
The striking thing about this transfer is that when the community accepts individuals' goods, it does not take those goods away from them. Instead, it secures their legitimate possession of them, turns an unlawful claim into a true right, and turns use into ownership. The people holding the goods are then seen as trustees of public property. All members of the State respect their rights, and the State uses its full strength to defend those rights against foreigners. By giving up their goods in a way that benefits the public and benefits themselves even more, the owners have, so to speak, gained everything they gave. This apparent contradiction is easy to explain once we distinguish the sovereign's rights over a piece of land from the owner's rights over the same land, as we will see later.
It may also happen that people begin to unite before owning anything. They then take enough land for all and either use it in common or divide it among themselves, equally or in shares fixed by the sovereign. However the land is acquired, each individual's right to his own piece of land is always subordinate to the community's right to all the land. Otherwise the social bond would not hold firm, and the exercise of sovereignty would have no real power.
I will end this chapter and this book with an observation that should be the basis of every social system. The basic pact does not destroy natural equality. Instead, it replaces whatever physical inequality nature may have given people with a moral and legitimate equality. Though they may be unequal in strength or intelligence, they all become equal by agreement and by right.
End of the First Book.