Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book II, Chapter 1
Book II, Chapter 1 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Que la souveraineté est inaliénable
La premiere & la plus importante conséquence des principes ci-devant établis est que la volonté générale peut seule diriger les forces de l’Etat selon la fin de son institution, qui est le bien commun: car si l’opposition des intérêts particuliers a rendu nécessaire l’établissement des sociétés, c’est l’accord de ces mêmes intérêts qui l’a rendu possible. C’est ce qu’il y a de commun dans ces différens intérêts qui forme le lien social, & s’il n’y avoit pas quelque point dans lequel tous les intérêts s’accordent, nulle société ne sauroit exister. Or c’est uniquement sur cet intérêt commun que la société doit être gouvernée.
Je dis donc que la souveraineté n’étant que l’exercice de la volonté générale ne peut jamais s’aliéner, & que le souverain, qui n’est qu’un être collectif, ne peut être représenté que par lui-même; le pouvoir peut bien se transmettre, mais non pas la volonté.
En effet, s’il n’est pas impossible qu’une volonté particuliere s’accorde sur quelque point avec la volonté générale; il est impossible au moins que cet accord soit durable & constant; car la volonté particuliere tend par sa nature aux préférences, & la volonté générale à l’égalité. Il est plus impossible encore qu’on ait un garant de cet accord quand même il devroit toujours exister; ce ne seroit pas un effet de l’art mais du hazard. Le Souverain peut bien dire, je veux actuellement ce que veut un tel homme ou du moins ce qu’il dit vouloir; mais il ne peut pas dire; ce que cet homme voudra demain, je le voudrai encore; puisqu’il est absurde que la volonté se donne des chaines pour l’avenir, & puisqu’il ne dépend d’aucune volonté de consentir à rien de contraire au bien de l’être qui veut. Si donc le peuple promet simplement d’obéir, il se dissout par cet acte, il perd sa qualité de peuple; à l’instant qu’il y a un maitre il n’y a plus de Souverain, & dès lors le corps politique est détruit.
Ce n’est point à dire que les ordres des chefs ne puissent passer pour des volontés générales, tant que le Souverain libre de s’y opposer ne le fait pas. En pareil cas, du silence universel on doit présumer le consentement du peuple. Ceci s’expliquera plus au long.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
That Sovereignty Is Inalienable
The first and most important consequence of the principles established above is that the general will alone can direct the forces of the State toward the end for which it was founded: the common good. For if the opposition of private interests made the establishment of societies necessary, the agreement of those same interests made it possible. What these different interests have in common forms the social bond; and if there were no point on which all interests agreed, no society could exist. It is solely in accordance with this common interest that society must be governed.
I say, then, that sovereignty, being nothing but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the sovereign, being nothing but a collective being, can be represented only by itself. Power can certainly be transmitted, but not the will.
Indeed, while it is not impossible for a private will to agree with the general will on some point, it is at least impossible for this agreement to be lasting and constant: the private will naturally tends toward preferences, the general will toward equality. Still less is it possible to have any guarantee of such agreement, even if it were always to exist; it would be the work not of design but of chance. The Sovereign may well say, "At this moment I want what a certain man wants, or at least what he says he wants"; but it cannot say, "What this man wants tomorrow, I shall want as well." For it is absurd for the will to shackle itself for the future, and no will can consent to anything contrary to the good of the being whose will it is. If, then, the people simply promises to obey, it dissolves itself by that act and loses its character as a people. The moment there is a master, there is no longer a Sovereign, and from that moment the body politic is destroyed.
This is not to say that the orders of leaders cannot count as expressions of the general will so long as the Sovereign, free to oppose them, does not do so. In such a case, the universal silence should be taken as the people's consent. This will be explained at greater length.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
Sovereignty Cannot Be Given Away
The first and most important result of the principles set out above is that only the general will can direct the forces of the State toward the purpose for which it was founded: the common good. Conflict between private interests made societies necessary, but agreement among those same interests made them possible. The social bond is formed by what those different interests have in common. If there were no point on which they agreed, no society could exist. Society must therefore be governed solely in the common interest.
I say, then, that sovereignty is only the exercise of the general will and can never be given away. The sovereign is a collective being and can be represented only by itself. Power can be passed on, but will cannot.
A private will may sometimes agree on a point with the general will. But that agreement cannot be lasting and constant. A private will naturally favors some over others, whereas the general will tends toward equality. It is even less possible to guarantee that agreement, even if it were bound to last forever. Any such agreement would be a matter of chance, not careful design. The sovereign can say, “Right now I want what this particular man wants, or at least what he says he wants.” But it cannot say, “I will also want tomorrow whatever that man wants then.” It makes no sense for a will to tie itself down for the future. Nor can any will consent to something contrary to the good of the being whose will it is. So if the people simply promise to obey, they dissolve themselves by that act. They cease to be a people. The moment there is a master, there is no longer a sovereign, and the political body is destroyed.
This does not mean that the orders of leaders cannot count as expressions of the general will so long as the sovereign is free to oppose them and does not do so. In that case we should take everyone's silence as the people's consent. I will explain this more fully later.