Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book I, Chapter 7
Book I, Chapter 7 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Du Souverain.
On voit par cette formule que l’acte d’association renferme un engagement réciproque du public avec les particuliers, & que chaque individu, contractant, pour ainsi dire, avec lui-même, se trouve engagé sous un double rapport; savoir, comme membre du Souverain envers les particuliers, & comme membre de l’Etat envers le Souverain. Mais on ne peut appliquer ici la maxime du droit civil que nul n’est tenu aux engagemens pris avec lui-même; car il y a bien de la différence entre s’obliger envers soi, ou envers un tout dont on fait partie.
Il faut remarquer encore que la délibération publique, qui peut obliger tous les sujets envers le Souverain, à cause des deux différens rapports sous lesquels chacun d’eux est envisagé, ne peut, par la raison contraire, obliger le Souverain envers lui-même, & que, par conséquent, il est contre la nature du corps politique que le Souverain s’impose une loi qu’il ne puisse enfreindre. Ne pouvant se considérer que sous un seul & même rapport il est alors dans le cas d’un particulier contractant avec soi-même: par où l’on voit qu’il n’y a ni ne peut y avoir nulle espece de loi fondamentale obligatoire pour le corps du peuple, pas même le contract social. Ce qui ne signifie pas que ce corps ne puisse fort bien s’engager envers autrui en ce qui ne déroge point à ce contract; car à l’égard de l’étranger, il devient un être simple, un individu.
Mais le corps politique ou le Souverain ne tirant son être que de la sainteté du contract ne peut jamais s’obliger, même envers autrui, à rien qui déroge à cet acte primitif, comme d’aliéner quelque portion de lui-même ou de se soumettre à un autre Souverain. Violer l’acte par lequel il existe seroit s’anéantir, & ce qui n’est rien ne produit rien.
Sitot que cette multitude est ainsi réunie en un corps, on ne peut offenser un des membres sans attaquer le corps; encore moins offenser le corps sans que les membres s’en ressentent. Ainsi le devoir & l’intérêt obligent également les deux parties contractantes à s’entre-aider mutuellement, & les mêmes hommes doivent chercher à réunir sous ce double rapport tous les avantages qui en dépendent.
Or le Souverain n’étant formé que des particuliers qui le composent n’a ni ne peut avoir d’intérêt contraire au leur; par conséquent la puissance Souveraine n’a nul besoin de garant envers les sujets, parce qu’il est impossible que le corps veuille nuire à tous ses membres, & nous verrons ci-après qu’il ne peut nuire à aucun en particulier. Le Souverain, par cela seul qu’il est, est toujours ce qu’il doit être.
Mais il n’en est pas ainsi des sujets envers le Souverain, auquel malgré l’intérêt commun, rien ne répondroit de leurs engagemens s’il ne trouvoit des moyens de s’assurer de leur fidélité.
En effet chaque individu peut comme homme avoir une volonté particuliere contraire ou dissemblable à la volonté générale qu’il a comme Citoyen. Son intérêt particulier peut lui parler tout autrement que l’intérêt commun; son existence absolue & naturellement indépendante peut lui faire envisager ce qu’il doit à la cause commune comme une contribution gratuite, dont la perte sera moins nuisible aux autres que le payement n’en sera onéreux pour lui, & regardant la personne morale qui constitue l’Etat comme un être de raison parce que ce n’est pas un homme, il jouiroit des droits du citoyen sans vouloir remplir les devoirs du sujet; injustice dont le progrès causeroit la ruine du corps politique.
Afin donc que ce pacte social ne soit pas un vain formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet engagement qui seul peut donner de la force aux autres, que quiconque refusera d’obéir à la volonté générale, y sera contraint par tout le corps: ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu’on le forcera d’être libre; car telle est la condition qui donnant chaque Citoyen à la Patrie le garantit de toute dépendance personnelle; condition qui fait l’artifice & le jeu de la machine politique, & qui seule rend légitimes les engagemens civils, lesquels, sans cela seroient absurdes, tyranniques, & sujets aux plus énormes abus.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Of the Sovereign.
We see from this formula that the act of association contains a reciprocal commitment between the public and individuals, and that each individual, contracting, so to speak, with himself, is bound in a double capacity: as a member of the Sovereign toward individuals, and as a member of the State toward the Sovereign. But we cannot apply here the maxim of civil law that no one is bound by commitments made to himself, for there is a great difference between undertaking an obligation toward oneself and undertaking one toward a whole of which one is a part.
We should also note that a public deliberation can bind all subjects toward the Sovereign, because of the two different capacities in which each of them is considered, but cannot, for the opposite reason, bind the Sovereign toward itself. Consequently, it is contrary to the nature of the body politic for the Sovereign to impose upon itself a law it cannot break. Since it can consider itself only in one and the same capacity, it is then in the position of an individual contracting with himself: hence there is not, and cannot be, any kind of fundamental law binding upon the body of the people, not even the social pact. This does not mean that this body cannot perfectly well commit itself toward others in matters that do not infringe the pact; for in relation to foreigners it becomes a single being, an individual.
But the body politic, or Sovereign, derives its very existence from the sanctity of the pact, and can never bind itself, even toward others, to anything that infringes this original act, such as alienating a part of itself or submitting to another Sovereign. To violate the act by which it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing can produce nothing.
As soon as this multitude is thus united into a body, one cannot injure one of its members without attacking the body, still less injure the body without its members feeling the harm. Thus duty and interest equally oblige the two contracting parties to help one another; and these same men must seek to bring together, in their double capacity, all the advantages that follow from it.
Now, since the Sovereign is formed solely of the individuals who compose it, it neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs. Sovereign power therefore needs no guarantor against its subjects, since it is impossible for the body to wish to harm all its members, and we shall see later that it cannot harm any one of them in particular. The Sovereign, simply by being what it is, is always what it ought to be.
But the case of the subjects in relation to the Sovereign is different: despite their common interest, nothing would guarantee their commitments to it if it could not find means to ensure their fidelity.
Indeed, each individual may, as a man, have a private will contrary to or different from the general will he has as a Citizen. His private interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest. His independent existence, absolute by nature, may lead him to regard what he owes the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, whose loss would harm others less than its payment would burden him. Regarding the moral person that constitutes the State as a mere abstraction, because it is not a man, he would enjoy the rights of a citizen without wishing to fulfill the duties of a subject—an injustice which, if allowed to spread, would bring ruin to the body politic.
In order, then, that the social pact should not be an empty formula, it tacitly contains this commitment, which alone can give force to the others: whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving every Citizen to his Country, secures him against all personal dependence. It is the secret and the working principle of the political machine, and alone makes civil commitments legitimate; without it, they would be absurd, tyrannical, and open to the most enormous abuses.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On the Sovereign.
This formula shows that the act of association involves a two-way commitment between the public and individuals. Each individual, entering into an agreement with himself, so to speak, is bound in two ways: as a member of the sovereign, he is bound to individuals, and as a member of the State, he is bound to the sovereign. But we cannot apply the rule of civil law that no one is bound by agreements with himself. There is a real difference between binding oneself to oneself and binding oneself to a whole of which one is a part.
There is another point to note. A public decision can bind all subjects to the sovereign because each subject has those two different roles. But for the opposite reason, it cannot bind the sovereign to itself. So it goes against the nature of the political body for the sovereign to impose a law on itself that it cannot break. The sovereign can see itself in only one role, and in that case it is like an individual entering into an agreement with himself. We can see from this that there is not, and cannot be, any fundamental law binding on the whole people, not even the social pact. This does not mean that the body cannot enter into commitments with others that do not go against the pact. In relation to foreigners, it becomes a single being, an individual.
But the political body, or sovereign, owes its existence entirely to the sanctity of the pact. It can never commit itself, even to others, to anything that goes against that original act. It cannot, for example, give away a part of itself or submit to another sovereign. To violate the act through which it exists would be to destroy itself. What no longer exists can produce nothing.
Once this multitude has come together as one body, no one can harm a member without attacking the body. Still less can anyone harm the body without its members feeling it. Thus both duty and interest require the two parties to help each other. The same people, in both their roles, must try to bring together all the benefits those roles provide.
Now the sovereign is made up only of the individuals who form it. It does not and cannot have an interest opposed to theirs. Sovereign power therefore needs no guarantee against its subjects, because the body cannot wish to harm all its members. We will see later that it cannot harm any one member in particular. The sovereign, simply by existing, is always what it should be.
Subjects, however, are not in the same position in relation to the sovereign. Despite their shared interest, nothing would guarantee that they keep their commitments unless the sovereign found ways to secure their loyalty.
In fact, each individual, as a human being, can have a private will that conflicts with, or differs from, the general will he has as a citizen. His personal interest can speak to him very differently from the common interest. His independent existence may make him see what he owes the common cause as a contribution he can choose to give or withhold. He may think that withholding it will harm others less than paying it will cost him. Because the moral person that makes up the State is not a human being, he may see it as only an idea. He would then enjoy the rights of a citizen without taking on the duties of a subject. If this injustice spread, it would destroy the political body.
For the social pact to be more than an empty form, then, it silently contains the one commitment that can give force to the others. Anyone who refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means only that he will be forced to be free. This is the condition that, by giving each citizen to the country, protects him against dependence on any individual. It is the device that makes the political system work. It alone makes civil obligations legitimate; without it, they would be absurd, tyrannical, and open to the worst abuses.