Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book I, Chapter 6
Book I, Chapter 6 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Du pacte Social.
Je suppose les hommes parvenus à ce point où les obstacles qui nuisent à leur conservation dans l’état de nature, l’emportent par leur résistance sur les forces que chaque individu peut employer pour se maintenir dans cet état. Alors cet état primitif ne peut plus subsister, & le genre humain périroit s’il ne changeoit sa maniere d’être.
Or comme les hommes ne peuvent engendrer de nouvelles forces, mais seulement unir & diriger celles qui existent, ils n’ont plus d’autre moyen pour se conserver, que de former par aggrégation une somme de forces qui puisse l’emporter sur la résistance, de les mettre en jeu par un seul mobile & de les faire agir de concert.
Cette somme de forces ne peut naitre que du concours de plusieurs: mais la force & la liberté de chaque homme étant les premiers instrumens de sa conservation, comment les engagera-t-il sans se nuire, & sans négliger les soins qu’il se doit? Cette difficulté ramenée à mon sujet peut s’énoncer en ces termes.
« Trouver une forme d’association qui défende & protege de toute la force commune la personne & les biens de chaque associé, & par laquelle chacun s’unissant à tous n’obéisse pourtant qu’à lui-même & reste aussi libre qu’auparavant? » Tel est le problême fondamental dont le contract social donne la solution.
Les clauses de ce contract sont tellement déterminées par la nature de l’acte, que la moindre modification les rendroit vaines & de nul effet; en sorte que, bien qu’elles n’aient peut-être jamais été formellement énoncées, elles sont par-tout les mêmes, par-tout tacitement admises & reconnües; jusqu’à ce que, le pacte social étant violé, chacun rentre alors dans ses premiers droits & reprenne sa liberté naturelle, en perdant la liberté conventionnelle pour laquelle il y renonça.
Ces clauses bien entendues se réduisent toutes à une seule, savoir l’aliénation totale de chaque associé avec tous ses droits à toute la communauté: Car premierement, chacun se donnant tout entier, la condition est égale pour tous, & la condition étant égale pour tous, nul n’a intérêt de la rendre onéreuse aux autres.
De plus, l’aliénation se faisant sans reserve, l’union est aussi parfaite qu’elle peut l’être & nul associé n’a plus rien à réclamer: Car s’il restoit quelques droits aux particuliers, comme il n’y auroit aucun supérieur commun qui put prononcer entre eux & le public, chacun étant en quelque point son propre juge prétendroit bientôt l’être en tous, l’état de nature subsisteroit, & l’association deviendroit nécessairement tyrannique ou vaine.
Enfin chacun se donnant à tous ne se donne à personne, & comme il n’y a pas un associé sur lequel on n’acquiere le même droit qu’on lui cede sur soi, on gagne l’équivalent de tout ce qu’on perd, & plus de force pour conserver ce qu’on a.
Si donc on écarte du pacte social ce qui n’est pas de son essence, on trouvera qu’il se réduit aux termes suivans. Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne & toute sa puissance sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale; & nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout.
A l’instant, au lieu de la personne particuliere de chaque contractant, cet acte d’association produit un corps moral & collectif composé d’autant de membres que l’assemblée a de voix, lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son moi commun, sa vie & sa volonté. Cette personne publique qui se forme ainsi par l’union de toutes les autres prenoit autrefois le nom de Cité, & prend maintenant celui de République ou de corps politique, lequel est appelé par ses membres État quand il est passif, Souverain quand il est actif, Puissance en le comparant à ses semblables. À l’égard des associés ils prennent collectivement le nom de peuple, & s’appellent en particulier Citoyens comme participans à l’autorité souveraine, & Sujets comme soumis aux loix de l’Etat. Mais ces termes se confondent souvent & se prennent l’un pour l’autre; il suffit de les savoir distinguer quand ils sont employés dans toute leur précision.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
Of the Social Pact.
I suppose that men have reached the point where the obstacles to their preservation in the state of nature, by their resistance, outweigh the forces each individual can employ to maintain himself in that state. The original state can then no longer endure, and humankind would perish unless it changed its way of life.
Now, since men cannot create new forces but can only unite and direct existing ones, the only means they have left to preserve themselves is to combine into a sum of forces capable of overcoming the resistance, set those forces in motion by a single impulse, and make them act in concert.
This sum of forces can arise only through the cooperation of several people. But each man's strength and freedom are the primary instruments of his preservation; how can he commit them without harming himself and neglecting the care he owes himself? This difficulty, applied to my subject, can be stated as follows:
"Find a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with the full common force, and in which each, though joining with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before." This is the fundamental problem to which the social pact provides the solution.
The clauses of this pact are so precisely determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would render them vain and ineffective. Thus, although they may never have been formally stated, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized—until the social pact is violated, when each person recovers his original rights and takes back his natural freedom, losing the conventional freedom for which he gave it up.
Properly understood, all these clauses come down to one: the total alienation of each associate, with all his rights, to the whole community. For, first, since each gives himself entirely, the condition is the same for all; and since it is the same for all, no one has an interest in making it burdensome to others.
Moreover, because this alienation is made without reservation, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything left to claim. For if individuals retained certain rights, there would be no common superior able to judge between them and the public; each, being his own judge on some point, would soon claim to be so on every point. The state of nature would persist, and the association would necessarily become tyrannical or futile.
Finally, each person who gives himself to all gives himself to no one; and since there is no associate over whom one does not acquire the same right one yields to him over oneself, one gains the equivalent of everything one loses, and greater strength to preserve what one has.
If, then, we strip away from the social pact what is not essential to it, we shall find it reduced to these terms: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
At once, in place of the separate person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body made up of as many members as the assembly has votes; from the same act it receives its unity, its common self, its life, and its will. This public person, formed in this way by the union of all the others, was once called the City, and is now called the Republic or body politic. Its members call it the State when it is passive, the Sovereign when it is active, and a Power when comparing it with others like it. As for the associates, collectively they take the name of people, and individually are called Citizens as participants in sovereign authority, and Subjects as subject to the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and used in place of one another; it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are used in their precise senses.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On the Social Pact.
I assume that people have reached a point where the obstacles to their survival in the state of nature are stronger than the resources each individual can use to remain in that state. Then their original condition can no longer continue. Humanity would perish unless it changed its way of life.
People cannot create new forces; they can only join and direct forces that already exist. So their only way to survive is to join together and build up enough combined force to overcome the resistance they face. They must set these forces in motion through a single driving power and make them work together.
This combined force can arise only if several people cooperate. But each person's strength and freedom are the first tools of his survival. How can he commit them without harming himself or neglecting the care he owes himself? Applied to my subject, this difficulty can be stated as follows.
“Find a form of association that uses all its shared strength to protect the person and property of each member. In it, each person joins everyone else yet obeys only himself and remains as free as before.” This is the basic problem solved by the social pact.
The terms of this pact are so strictly set by the nature of the act that the slightest change would make them empty and ineffective. Even if they have perhaps never been formally stated, they are the same everywhere and are silently accepted and recognized everywhere. This remains so until the social pact is broken. Then each person returns to his original rights and takes back his natural freedom, losing the freedom established by agreement that he had given it up for.
Properly understood, all these terms come down to one: each member gives himself and all his rights entirely to the whole community. First, because each person gives himself completely, the terms are equal for all. And because they are equal for all, no one has an interest in making them burdensome for others.
What is more, because this surrender has no exceptions, the union is as complete as it can be, and no member has anything left to demand. If individuals kept some rights, there would be no common authority to decide disputes between them and the public. Each person, being his own judge in some matters, would soon claim to judge every matter. The state of nature would continue, and the association would inevitably become tyrannical or pointless.
Finally, when each person gives himself to everyone, he gives himself to no one in particular. There is not one member over whom we do not gain the same right that we grant that member over ourselves. So we gain the equivalent of everything we lose, as well as greater strength to keep what we have.
If we remove from the social pact everything that is not essential to it, its terms come down to this: Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will. And together, as one body, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
At once, instead of the separate person of each party to the pact, this act of association creates a collective moral body with as many members as the assembly has votes. From this same act it receives its unity, its shared identity, its life, and its will. This public person, formed by the union of all the others, was once called the City. It is now called the Republic or the political body. Its members call it the State when it is passive, the Sovereign when it is active, and a Power when comparing it with others like it. The members together are called the people. Individually, they are called Citizens when they take part in sovereign authority and Subjects when they obey the laws of the State. These terms are often confused and used interchangeably. It is enough to know how to tell them apart when they are used precisely.