Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book IV, Chapter 1
Book IV, Chapter 1 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
Open the complete readerOriginal French
Que la volonté générale est indestructible.
Tant que plusieurs hommes réunis se considerent comme un seul corps, ils n’ont qu’une seule volonté, qui se rapporte à la commune conservation, & au bien-être général. Alors tous les ressorts de l’Etat sont vigoureux & simples, ses maximes sont claires & lumineuses, il n’a point d’intérêts embrouillés, contradictoires, le bien commun se montre par tout avec évidence, & ne demande que du bon sens pour être apperçu. La paix l’union l’égalité sont ennemies des subtilités politiques. Les hommes droits & simples sont difficiles à tromper à cause de leur simplicité, les leurres les prétextes rafinés ne leur en imposent point; ils ne sont pas même assez fins pour être dupes. Quand on voit chez le plus heureux peuple du monde des troupes de paysans regler les affaires de l’Etat sous un chêne & se conduire toujours sagement, peut-on s’empêcher de mépriser les rafinemens des autres nations, qui se rendent illustres & misérables avec tant d’art & de misteres?
Un État ainsi gouverné a besoin de très peu de Loix, & à mésure qu’il devient nécessaire d’en promulguer de nouvelles, cette nécessité se voit universellement. Le premier qui les propose ne fait que dire ce que tous ont déjà senti, & il n’est question ni de brigues ni d’éloquence pour faire passer en loi ce que chacun a déjà résolu de faire, sitôt qu’il sera sûr que les autres le feront comme lui.
Ce qui trompe les raisonneurs c’est que ne voyant que des États mal constitués dès leur origine, ils sont frappés de l’impossibilité d’y maintenir une semblable police. Ils rient d’imaginer toutes les sotises qu’un fourbe adroit, un parleur insinuant pourroit persuader au peuple de Paris ou de Londres. Ils ne savent pas que Cromwel eut été mis aux sonnêtes par le peuple de Berne, & le Duc de Beaufort à la discipline par les Génevois.
Mais quand le nœud social commence à se relâcher & l’Etat à s’affoiblir; quand les intérêts particuliers commencent à se faire sentir & les petites sociétés à influer sur la grande, l’intérêt commun s’altere & trouve des opposans, l’unanimité ne regne plus dans les voix, la volonté générale n’est plus la volonté de tous, il s’élêve des contradictions des débats, & le meilleur avis ne passe point sans disputes.
Enfin quand l’Etat, près de sa ruine ne subsiste plus que par une forme illusoire & vaine, que le lien social est rompu dans tous les cœurs, que le plus vil intérêt se pare effrontément du nom sacré du bien public; alors la volonté générale devient muette, tous guidés par des motifs secrets n’opinent pas plus comme Citoyens que si l’Etat n’eut jamais existé, & l’on fait passer faussement sous le nom de Loix des décrets iniques qui n’ont pour but que l’intérêt particulier.
S’ensuit-il de-là que la volonté générale soit anéantie ou corrompue? Non, elle est toujours constante, inaltérable & pure; mais elle est subordonnée à d’autres qui l’emportent sur elle. Chacun, détachant son intérêt de l’intérêt commun, voit bien qu’il ne peut l’en séparer tout-à-fait, mais sa part du mal public ne lui paroit rien, auprès du bien exclusif qu’il prétend s’approprier. Ce bien particulier excepté, il veut le bien général pour son propre intérêt tout aussi fortement qu’aucun autre. Même en vendant son suffrage à prix d’argent il n’éteint pas en lui la volonté générale, il l’élude. La faute qu’il commet est de changer l’état de la question & de répondre autre chose que ce qu’on lui demande: En sorte qu’au lieu de dire par son suffrage, il est avantageux à l’Etat, il dit, il est avantageux à tel homme ou à tel parti que tel ou tel avis passe. Ainsi la loi de l’ordre public dans les assemblées n’est pas tant d’y maintenir la volonté générale, que de faire qu’elle soit toujours interrogée & qu’elle réponde toujours.
J’aurois ici bien des réflexions à faire sur le simple droit de voter dans tout acte de souveraineté; droit que rien ne peut ôter aux Citoyens; & sur celui d’opiner, de proposer, de diviser, de discuter, que le Gouvernement a toujours grand soin de ne laisser qu’à ses membres; mais cette importante matiere demanderoit un traité à part, & je ne puis tout dire dans celui-ci.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
That the General Will Is Indestructible.
So long as several men united consider themselves a single body, they have only a single will, directed toward their common preservation and general well-being. Then all the springs of the state are vigorous and simple, its principles clear and luminous; it has no tangled, conflicting interests. The common good is evident everywhere, and requires only good sense to be perceived. Peace, union, and equality are enemies of political subtleties. Upright and simple men are hard to deceive because of their simplicity; ingenious lures and pretexts make no impression on them; they are not even clever enough to be duped. When we see, among the happiest people in the world, bands of peasants settling the affairs of state beneath an oak and always acting wisely, can we help but despise the refinements of other nations, which make themselves illustrious and miserable with so much art and mystery?
A state governed in this way needs very few laws, and as it becomes necessary to promulgate new ones, everyone sees the necessity. The first person to propose them only says what all have already felt; neither intrigue nor eloquence is needed to turn into law what each has already resolved to do as soon as he is certain the others will do likewise.
What misleads the theorists is that, seeing only states badly constituted from the outset, they are struck by the impossibility of maintaining such an order in them. They laugh at the thought of all the nonsense a skillful trickster or persuasive speaker could make the people of Paris or London believe. They do not know that Cromwell would have been put in the stocks by the people of Bern, and the Duke of Beaufort brought to heel by the people of Geneva.
But when the social bond begins to slacken and the state to weaken; when private interests begin to make themselves felt and small societies to influence the larger one, the common interest is corrupted and meets opposition. Unanimity no longer reigns in the votes, the general will is no longer the will of all, contradictions and disputes arise, and the soundest proposal does not pass without contention.
At last, when the state, close to ruin, survives only as an empty, illusory form, when the social bond has broken in every heart, when the basest interest brazenly adorns itself with the sacred name of the public good, then the general will falls silent. All, guided by secret motives, vote no more as citizens than if the state had never existed; and under the false name of laws, unjust decrees are passed that aim solely at private interest.
Does it follow that the general will is destroyed or corrupted? No: it remains constant, unalterable, and pure; but it is subordinated to other wills that prevail over it. Each person, detaching his interest from the common interest, sees clearly that he cannot separate them entirely; but his share of the public harm seems nothing beside the exclusive benefit he hopes to seize for himself. Apart from that particular benefit, he wills the general good in his own interest as strongly as anyone else. Even when he sells his vote for money, he does not extinguish the general will within him; he evades it. His fault lies in changing the question and answering something other than what is asked of him. Instead of saying by his vote, “This is advantageous to the state,” he says, “It is advantageous to this man or that party that this or that proposal should pass.” Thus the rule of public order in assemblies is not so much to preserve the general will there as to ensure that it is always asked the question and always gives the answer.
I could offer many reflections here on the simple right to vote in every act of sovereignty, a right of which nothing can deprive citizens; and on the right to speak, propose, divide a question, and debate, which the government always takes great care to reserve for its own members. But this important subject would require a treatise of its own, and I cannot say everything in this one.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
Why the General Will Cannot Be Destroyed.
As long as people joined together see themselves as a single body, they have only one will. It concerns their common survival and general well-being. Then all the state's mechanisms are strong and simple. Its guiding principles are clear and easy to see. It has no tangled, conflicting interests. The common good is obvious everywhere, and it takes only common sense to recognize it. Peace, unity, and equality are enemies of political subtleties. Honest, straightforward people are hard to fool precisely because they are straightforward. Clever traps and excuses do not deceive them. They are not even sophisticated enough to be taken in. When we see groups of peasants among the happiest people in the world managing state affairs beneath an oak tree and always acting wisely, how can we help looking down on the refinements of other nations? With all their art and secrecy, those nations make themselves famous and miserable.
A state governed in this way needs very few laws. When new laws become necessary, everyone can see the need. Whoever proposes them first is only saying what everyone has already felt. There is no need for scheming or eloquence to make into law what everyone has already decided to do, as soon as they know others will do the same.
What misleads theorists is that they see only states badly organized from their beginnings. They are struck by the impossibility of maintaining such a system there. They laugh at the thought of all the foolish things a skillful trickster or a persuasive speaker could get the people of Paris or London to believe. They do not know that the people of Bern would have put Cromwell on the warning bells, and the Genevans would have put the Duke of Beaufort under discipline.
But when the social bond begins to loosen and the state to weaken, private interests begin to make themselves felt and small groups begin to influence the larger community. The common interest changes and meets opposition. Votes are no longer unanimous, and the general will is no longer the will of everyone. Contradictions and debates arise. Even the best proposal cannot pass without argument.
Finally, the state is close to ruin and survives only as an empty, misleading form. The social bond has broken in every heart, and the lowest self-interest shamelessly dresses itself in the sacred name of the public good. Then the general will falls silent. Everyone is guided by hidden motives and no longer votes as a citizen, just as if the state had never existed. Unjust decrees aimed only at private interests are falsely passed off as laws.
Does it follow that the general will has been destroyed or corrupted? No. It remains constant, unchangeable, and pure, but other wills take priority over it. Each person separates their own interest from the common interest. They know they cannot separate it completely, but the share they bear of public harm seems like nothing next to the exclusive benefit they hope to claim for themselves. Apart from that private benefit, they want the general good for their own sake as strongly as anyone else. Even when they sell their vote for money, they do not extinguish the general will within themselves; they evade it. Their mistake is to change the question and answer something other than what they were asked. Instead of saying with their vote, "This benefits the state," they say, "It benefits this person or that party for this or that proposal to pass." So the rule for public order in assemblies is not so much to preserve the general will there as to make sure that it is always asked the question and always gives the answer.
I could say a great deal here about the basic right to vote in every act of sovereignty, a right that no one can take away from citizens. I could also discuss the right to express an opinion, make proposals, divide a question, and debate it, which the government always takes great care to reserve for its own members. But this important subject would require a work of its own, and I cannot say everything in this one.