Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book III, Chapter 18
Book III, Chapter 18 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Moyen de prévenir les usurpations du Gouvernement.
De ces éclaircissemens il résulte en confirmation du chapitre XVI. que l’acte qui institue le Gouvernement n’est point un contract mais une Loi, que les dépositaires de la puissance exécutive ne sont point les maitres du peuple mais ses officiers, qu’il peut les établir & les destituer quand il lui plait, qu’il n’est point question pour eux de contracter mais d’obéir, & qu’en se chargeant des fonctions que l’Etat leur impose ils ne font que remplir leur devoir de Citoyens, sans avoir en aucune sorte le droit de disputer sur les conditions.
Quand donc il arrive que le Peuple institue un Gouvernement héréditaire, soit monarchique dans une famille, soit aristocratique dans un ordre de Citoyens, ce n’est point un engagement qu’il prend; c’est une forme provisionnelle qu’il donne à l’administration, jusqu’à ce qu’il lui plaise d’en ordonner autrement.
Il est vrai que ces changemens sont toujours dangereux, & qu’il ne faut jamais toucher au Gouvernement établi que lors qu’il devient incompatible avec le bien public; mais cette circonspection est une maxime de politique & non pas une regle de droit, & l’Etat n’est pas plus tenu de laisser l’autorité civile à ses chefs, que l’autorité militaire à ses Généraux.
Il est vrai encore qu’on ne sauroit en pareil cas observer avec trop de soin toutes les formalités requises pour distinguer un acte régulier & légitime d’un tumulte séditieux, & la volonté de tout un peuple des clameurs d’une faction. C’est ici sur-tout qu’il ne faut donner au cas odieux que ce qu’on ne peut lui refuser dans toute la rigueur du droit, & c’est aussi de cette obligation que le Prince tire un grand avantage pour conserver sa puissance malgré le peuple, sans qu’on puisse dire qu’il l’ait usurpée: Car en paroissant n’user que de ses droits il lui est fort aisé de les étendre, & d’empêcher sous le prétexte du repos public les assemblées destinées à rétablir le bon ordre; de sorte qu’il se prévaut d’un silence qu’il empêche de rompre, ou des irrégularités qu’il fait commettre, pour supposer en sa faveur l’aveu de ceux que la crainte fait taire, & pour punir ceux qui osent parler. C’est ainsi que les Décemvirs ayant été d’abord élus pour un an, puis continués pour une autre année, tenterent de retenir à perpétuité leur pouvoir, en ne permettant plus aux comices de s’assembler; & c’est par ce facile moyen que tous les gouvernemens du monde, une fois revétus de la force publique, usurpent tôt ou tard l’autorité Souveraine.
Les assemblées périodiques dont j’ai parlé ci-devant sont propres à prévenir ou différer ce malheur, sur-tout quand elles n’ont pas besoin de convocation formelle: car alors le Prince ne sauroit les empêcher sans se déclarer ouvertement infracteur des loix & ennemi de l’Etat.
L’ouverture de ces assemblées qui n’ont pour objet que le maintien du traité social, doit toujours se faire par deux propositions qu’on ne puisse jamais supprimer, & qui passent separément par les suffrages.
La premiere; s’il plait au Souverain de conserver la présente forme de Gouvernement.
La seconde; s’il plait au Peuple d’en laisser l’administration à ceux qui en sont actuellement chargés.
Je suppose ici ce que je crois avoir démontré, savoir qu’il n’y a dans l’Etat aucune loi fondamentale qui ne se puisse révoquer, non pas même le pacte social; car si tous les Citoyens s’assembloient pour rompre ce pacte d’un commun accord, on ne peut douter qu’il ne fût très-légitimement rompu. Grotius pense même que chacun peut renoncer à l’Etat dont il est membre, & reprendre sa liberté naturelle & ses biens en sortant du pays. Or il seroit absurde que tous les Citoyens réunis ne pussent pas ce que peut séparément chacun d’eux.
Fin du Livre Troisieme.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
How to Prevent the Usurpations of Government.
These clarifications confirm what was said in chapter XVI: the act instituting government is not a contract but a law; the holders of executive power are not the people's masters but their officers; the people may appoint and dismiss them whenever it pleases; their task is not to contract but to obey; and in undertaking the duties the state imposes on them they merely fulfill their duty as citizens, without having any right whatever to bargain over the terms.
Thus, when the people institute a hereditary government, whether monarchical within a family or aristocratic within an order of citizens, they undertake no binding commitment. They give the administration a provisional form, until it pleases them to order otherwise.
It is true that such changes are always dangerous, and that an established government should never be touched unless it becomes incompatible with the public good; but this caution is a maxim of policy, not a rule of right, and the state is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its chiefs than military authority in the hands of its generals.
It is also true that in such a case no care is too great in observing every formality required to distinguish a regular, lawful act from a seditious tumult, and the will of an entire people from the cries of a faction. Here above all one must concede to the objectionable case only what cannot be denied it under the strictest interpretation of right. It is from this very obligation that the prince gains a great advantage in retaining his power against the people, without anyone being able to say that he has usurped it. For by appearing merely to exercise his rights, he can easily extend them and, on the pretext of public peace, prevent assemblies intended to restore good order. Thus he uses a silence he himself prevents anyone from breaking, or irregularities he himself causes, to claim the assent of those silenced by fear and to punish those who dare to speak. In this way the decemvirs, first elected for one year and then continued for another, tried to retain their power forever by no longer allowing the comitia to assemble. And by this simple means every government in the world, once vested with public force, sooner or later usurps sovereign authority.
The periodic assemblies of which I spoke above are suited to preventing or delaying this calamity, especially when they need no formal summons; for the prince cannot then prevent them without openly declaring himself a violator of the laws and an enemy of the state.
These assemblies, whose sole purpose is to maintain the social pact, should always open with two motions that can never be suppressed and that are put separately to the vote.
The first: whether it pleases the sovereign to retain the present form of government.
The second: whether it pleases the people to leave its administration to those currently entrusted with it.
I assume here what I believe I have demonstrated: that no fundamental law in the state is beyond repeal, not even the social pact itself; for if all the citizens assembled to dissolve that pact by common agreement, no one could doubt that it would be dissolved with complete legitimacy. Grotius even thinks that each person can renounce the state of which he is a member and recover his natural liberty and his goods by leaving the country. It would be absurd, then, if all the citizens together could not do what each can do separately.
End of the Third Book.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
How to Prevent the Government from Usurping Power.
These explanations confirm what I said in chapter XVI: the act establishing the government is a law, not a contract. Those entrusted with executive power are not the people's masters but their officers. The people may appoint and dismiss them whenever they please. Their task is not to make a contract but to obey. When they take on the duties assigned to them by the state, they are only doing their duty as citizens. They have no right at all to argue about the terms.
So when the people establish a hereditary government, whether a monarchy within one family or an aristocracy within one order of citizens, they do not make a binding commitment. They give the administration a provisional form until they choose to arrange things differently.
It is true that such changes are always dangerous. An established government should never be touched unless it becomes incompatible with the public good. But this caution is a rule of political prudence, not a rule of law. The state has no more obligation to leave civil authority with its leaders than to leave military authority with its generals.
It is also true that, in such a case, every required formality must be followed with the greatest care. This is needed to distinguish a regular, lawful act from a seditious disturbance, and the will of an entire people from the shouting of a faction. Above all, no more must be granted to an objectionable case than the strictest interpretation of law requires. This very obligation also gives the prince a great advantage: he can keep his power despite the people without anyone being able to say he has usurped it. By appearing merely to exercise his rights, he can easily extend them. He can prevent assemblies meant to restore good order, claiming he is protecting public peace. Then he uses a silence he has prevented people from breaking, or procedural faults he has led them to commit, to assume that those silenced by fear approve of him, and to punish those who dare to speak. That is how the Decemvirs, first elected for one year and then kept on for another, tried to keep their power forever by no longer allowing the voting assemblies to meet. By this simple means, every government in the world, once it has public force at its disposal, sooner or later usurps sovereign authority.
The periodic assemblies I mentioned earlier can prevent or delay this misfortune, especially when they need no formal summons. The prince then cannot stop them without openly declaring himself a breaker of the laws and an enemy of the state.
These assemblies, whose only purpose is to uphold the social pact, must always open with two proposals. Neither may ever be omitted, and each must be voted on separately.
The first: whether the sovereign wishes to keep the present form of government.
The second: whether the people wish to leave its administration in the hands of those currently in charge.
I assume here something I believe I have proved: no fundamental law in the state is beyond repeal, not even the social pact. If all the citizens came together and agreed to break that pact, there is no doubt that they would do so quite legitimately. Grotius even thinks that each person can leave the state of which he is a member and recover his natural freedom and his property by leaving the country. It would be absurd if all the citizens together could not do what each one can do separately.
End of Book Three.