Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book II, Chapter 6
Book II, Chapter 6 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
Open the complete readerOriginal French
De la loi.
Par le pacte social nous avons donné l’existence & la vie au corps politique: il s’agit maintenant de lui donner le mouvement & la volonté par la législation. Car l’acte primitif par lequel ce corps se forme & s’unit ne détermine rien encore de ce qu’il doit faire pour se conserver.
Ce qui est bien & conforme à l’ordre est tel par la nature des choses & indépendamment des conventions humaines. Toute justice vient de Dieu, lui seul en est la source; mais si nous savions la recevoir de si haut nous n’aurions besoin ni de gouvernement ni de loix. Sans doute il est une justice universelle émanée de la raison seule; mais cette justice pour être admise entre nous doit être réciproque. A considérer humainement les choses, faute de sanction naturelle les loix de la justice sont vaines parmi les hommes; elles ne font que le bien du méchant & le mal du juste, quand celui-ci les observe avec tout le monde sans que personne les observe avec lui. Il faut donc des conventions & des loix pour unir les droits aux devoirs & ramener la justice à son objet. Dans l’état de nature, où tout est commun, je ne dois rien à ceux à qui je n’ai rien promis, je ne reconnois pour être à autrui que ce qui m’est inutile. Il n’en est pas ainsi dans l’état civil où tous les droits sont fixés par la loi.
Mais qu’est-ce donc enfin qu’une loi? Tant qu’on se contentera de n’attacher à ce mot que des idées métaphysiques, on continuera de raisonner sans s’entendre, & quand on aura dit ce que c’est qu’une loi de la nature on n’en saura pas mieux ce que c’est qu’une loi de l’Etat.
J’ai déjà dit qu’il n’y avoit point de volonté générale sur un objet particulier. En effet cet objet particulier est dans l’Etat ou hors de l’Etat. S’il est hors de l’Etat, une volonté qui lui est étrangere n’est point générale par rapport à lui; & si cet objet est dans l’Etat, il en fait partie: Alors il se forme entre le tout & sa partie une rélation qui en fait deux êtres séparés, dont la partie est l’un, & le tout moins cette même partie est l’autre. Mais le tout moins une partie n’est point le tout, & tant que ce rapport subsiste il n’y a plus de tout mais deux parties inégales; d’où il suit que la volonté de l’une n’est point non plus générale par rapport à l’autre.
Mais quand tout le peuple statue sur tout le peuple il ne considere que lui-même, & s’il se forme alors un rapport, c’est de l’objet entier sous un point-de-vue à l’objet entier sous un autre point de vue, sans aucune division du tout. Alors la matiere sur laquelle on statue est générale comme la volonté qui statue. C’est cet acte que j’appelle une loi.
Quand je dis que l’objet des loix est toujours général, j’entends que la loi considere les sujets en corps & les actions comme abstraites, jamais un homme comme individu ni une action particuliére. Ainsi la loi peut bien statuer qu’il y aura des privileges, mais elle n’en peut donner nommément à personne; la loi peut faire plusieurs Classes de Citoyens, assigner même les qualités qui donneront droit à ces classes, mais elle ne peut nommer tels & tels pour y être admis; elle peut établir un Gouvernement royal & une succession héréditaire, mais elle ne peut élire un roi ni nommer une famille royale; en un mot toute fonction qui se rapporte à un objet individuel n’appartient point à la puissance législative.
Sur cette idée on voit à l’instant qu’il ne faut plus demander à qui il appartient de faire des loix, puisqu’elles sont des actes de la volonté générale; ni si le Prince est au dessus des loix, puisqu’il est membre de l’Etat; ni si la loi peut être injuste, puisque nul n’est injuste envers lui-même; ni comment on est libre & soumis aux loix, puisqu’elles ne sont que des régistres de nos volontés.
On voit encore que la loi réunissant l’universalité de la volonté & celle de l’objet, ce qu’un homme, quel qu’il puisse être, ordonne de son chef n’est point une loi; ce qu’ordonne même le Souverain sur un objet particulier n’est pas non plus une loi mais un décret, ni un acte de souveraineté mais de magistrature.
J’appelle donc République tout État régi par des loix, sous quelque forme d’administration que ce puisse être: car alors seulement l’intérêt public gouverne, & la chose publique est quelque chose. Tout Gouvernement légitime est républicain: j’expliquerai ci-après ce que c’est que Gouvernement.
Les loix ne sont proprement que les conditions de l’association civile. Le Peuple soumis aux loix en doit être l’auteur; il n’appartient qu’à ceux qui s’associent de regler les conditions de la société: mais comment les régleront-ils? Sera-ce d’un commun accord, par une inspiration subite? Le corps politique a-t-il un organe pour énoncer ses volontés? Qui lui donnera la prévoyance nécessaire pour en former les actes & les publier d’avance, ou comment les prononcera-t-il au moment du besoin? Comment une multitude aveugle qui souvent ne sait ce qu’elle veut, parce qu’elle sait rarement ce qui lui est bon, exécuteroit-elle d’elle-même une entreprise aussi grande aussi difficile qu’un sistême de législation? De lui-même le peuple veut toujours le bien, mais de lui-même il ne le voit pas toujours. La volonté générale est toujours droite, mais le jugement qui la guide n’est pas toujours éclairé. Il faut lui faire voir les objets tels qu’ils sont, quelquefois tels qu’ils doivent lui paroitre, lui montrer le bon chemin qu’elle cherche, la garantir de la séduction des volontés particulieres, rapprocher à ses yeux les lieux & les tems, balancer l’attrait des avantages présens & sensibles, par le danger des maux éloignés & cachés. Les particuliers voyent le bien qu’ils rejettent: le public veut le bien qu’il ne voit pas. Tous ont également besoin de guides: Il faut obliger les uns à conformer leurs volontés à leur raison; il faut apprendre à l’autre à connoitre ce qu’il veut. Alors des lumieres publiques résulte l’union de l’entendement & de la volonté dans le corps social, de-là l’exact concours des parties, & enfin la plus grande force du tout. Voilà d’où naît la nécessité d’un Législateur.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On Law.
Through the social pact we have given the body politic existence and life; now legislation must give it motion and will. For the original act by which this body is formed and united has not yet determined anything it must do to preserve itself.
What is good and in accord with order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions. All justice comes from God; God alone is its source. But if we knew how to receive it from so great a height, we should need neither government nor laws. There is, no doubt, a universal justice emanating from reason alone; but for this justice to be accepted among us it must be reciprocal. Considered in human terms, without a natural sanction the laws of justice are vain among men: they bring good to the wicked and harm to the just, when the just man observes them toward everyone and no one observes them toward him. Conventions and laws are therefore needed to unite rights with duties and restore justice to its proper object. In the state of nature, where all things are held in common, I owe nothing to those to whom I have promised nothing; I recognize as belonging to another only what is of no use to me. It is otherwise in the civil state, where all rights are fixed by law.
What, then, is a law after all? So long as people are content to attach only metaphysical ideas to this word, they will go on arguing without understanding one another; and even when they have said what a law of nature is, they will know no better what a law of the State is.
I have already said that there is no general will concerning a particular object. That particular object lies either within the State or outside it. If it lies outside the State, a will foreign to it is not general in relation to it; and if this object lies within the State, it is part of the State. A relation then arises between the whole and its part which makes them two separate beings: the part is one, and the whole less that same part is the other. But the whole less one part is not the whole; as long as this relation persists there is no longer a whole but two unequal parts. It follows that the will of either is no more general in relation to the other.
But when the whole people legislates for the whole people, it considers only itself; if a relation then arises, it is between the entire object viewed from one perspective and the entire object viewed from another, without any division of the whole. The matter legislated upon is then as general as the will that legislates. This is the act that I call a law.
When I say that the object of laws is always general, I mean that law considers subjects as a body and actions in the abstract, never a man as an individual or an action as a particular case. Thus the law may indeed decree that there shall be privileges, but it cannot grant them to anyone by name; the law may establish several classes of citizens, and even designate the qualifications for entry into these classes, but it cannot name this person or that for admission; it may establish a royal government and hereditary succession, but it cannot elect a king or designate a royal family. In a word, no function relating to an individual object belongs to the legislative power.
From this conception one sees at once that it is no longer necessary to ask who has the right to make laws, since they are acts of the general will; or whether the prince is above the laws, since he is a member of the State; or whether a law can be unjust, since no one is unjust to himself; or how one can be free and subject to the laws, since they are only records of our own wills.
One sees, furthermore, that since law combines the universality of the will with that of its object, whatever any man, whoever he may be, commands on his own authority is not a law; even what the sovereign commands concerning a particular object is not a law but a decree, not an act of sovereignty but of magistracy.
I therefore call any State governed by laws a republic, whatever the form of its administration may be: for only then does the public interest govern, and the public thing become something real. Every legitimate government is republican: I shall explain later what government is.
Laws, properly speaking, are only the conditions of civil association. The people subject to the laws must be their author; only those who associate may settle the conditions of society. But how will they settle them? By common agreement, in a sudden flash of inspiration? Has the body politic an organ for expressing its will? Who will give it the foresight needed to formulate its acts and publish them in advance, or how will it pronounce them when the need arises? How could a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wants because it seldom knows what is good for it, carry out by itself an enterprise as great and difficult as a system of legislation? Of itself the people always wills the good, but of itself it does not always see it. The general will is always right, but the judgment that guides it is not always enlightened. It must be made to see things as they are, sometimes as they ought to appear to it; it must be shown the good path it seeks, guarded against the seduction of particular wills, brought to see distant places and times as if near, and taught to weigh the allure of present and palpable advantages against the danger of remote and hidden evils. Individuals see the good they reject; the public wills the good it does not see. All alike need guides: the former must be compelled to bring their wills into accord with their reason; the latter must be taught to recognize what it wants. Then public enlightenment brings about a union of understanding and will in the social body, from this the harmonious cooperation of its parts, and finally the greatest strength of the whole. This is the source of the need for a legislator.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On Law.
Through the social pact, we have given the body politic its existence and life. We must now give it movement and will through legislation. For the original act that forms and unites this body does not yet determine what it must do to survive.
What is good and orderly is so by the nature of things, independently of human agreements. All justice comes from God; God alone is its source. But if we knew how to receive it from so high a source, we would need neither government nor laws. There is certainly a universal justice that comes from reason alone. But for this justice to be accepted among us, it must work both ways. From a human point of view, without a natural sanction, the laws of justice are useless among people. They benefit the bad and harm the just when the just person observes them toward everyone but no one observes them toward that person. We therefore need agreements and laws to join rights to duties and restore justice to its proper purpose. In the state of nature, where everything is shared, I owe nothing to people to whom I have promised nothing. I recognize as belonging to someone else only what is of no use to me. That is not how it is in civil society, where all rights are settled by law.
But what exactly is a law? As long as people attach only metaphysical ideas to that word, they will keep arguing without understanding one another. Even after they explain what a law of nature is, they will know no better what a law of the state is.
I have already said that there is no general will concerning a particular object. That particular object is either inside or outside the state. If it is outside, a will alien to it is not general in relation to it. If the object is inside the state, it is a part of the state. A relationship then arises between the whole and its part, making them two separate entities: one is the part, and the other is the whole minus that part. But the whole minus a part is not the whole. As long as this relationship lasts, there is no longer a whole, only two unequal parts. It follows that the will of either part is not general in relation to the other.
But when the entire people makes a decision about the entire people, it considers only itself. If a relationship arises then, it is between the whole considered from one viewpoint and the whole considered from another, without any division of the whole. The matter being decided is then as general as the will making the decision. This act is what I call a law.
When I say that the subject of laws is always general, I mean that the law considers subjects as a body and actions in the abstract. It never considers an individual person or a particular action. Thus the law may provide for privileges, but it cannot give them to anyone by name. It may establish several classes of citizens and even specify the qualifications for entering them, but it cannot name the people who are to enter. It may establish royal government and hereditary succession, but it cannot elect a king or name a royal family. In short, any task involving an individual object lies outside legislative power.
With this in mind, we can immediately see that there is no reason to ask who has the right to make laws, since laws are acts of the general will. Nor should we ask whether the prince is above the laws, since the prince is a member of the state; whether a law can be unjust, since no one is unjust to themselves; or how we can be both free and subject to the laws, since laws are only records of our own wills.
We can also see that a law combines a general will with a general subject. Whatever a person orders on their own authority, whoever they may be, is not a law. Even an order from the sovereign on a particular matter is not a law but a decree. It is an act not of sovereignty but of government.
I therefore call any state governed by laws a republic, whatever form its administration takes. For only then does the public interest govern, and the public good truly counts. Every legitimate government is republican. I will explain below what I mean by government.
Laws are, properly speaking, just the terms of civil association. The people subject to the laws must be their authors. Only those who join together can set the terms of their society. But how will they do it? Will they agree unanimously through a sudden flash of inspiration? Does the body politic have an organ with which to express its wishes? Who will give it the foresight needed to put its decisions into words and publish them in advance? Or how will it announce them when they are needed? How could a blind crowd, which often does not know what it wants because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out on its own a task as great and difficult as a system of legislation? On its own, the people always want what is good, but on their own they do not always see it. The general will is always right, but the judgment guiding it is not always informed. It must be shown things as they are and sometimes as they ought to appear to it. It must be shown the right path it seeks and protected from the pull of private interests. Distant places and times must be brought closer to its view. The appeal of present, visible benefits must be weighed against the danger of distant, hidden harms. Individuals see the good that they reject; the public wants the good that it does not see. Both need guides equally. Individuals must be made to bring their wills into line with their reason; the public must be taught to understand what it wants. Then public understanding will unite intellect and will in the social body. Its parts will work together properly, and the whole will attain its greatest strength. This is why a legislator is needed.