Jean-Jacques Rousseau · Complete work
Book II, Chapter 5
Book II, Chapter 5 of 49. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Du droit de vie & de mort.
On demande comment les particuliers n’ayant point droit de disposer de leur propre vie peuvent transmettre au Souverain ce même droit qu’ils n’ont pas? Cette question ne paroit difficile à résoudre que parce qu’elle est mal posée. Tout homme a droit de risquer sa propre vie pour la conserver. A-t-on jamais dit que celui qui se jette par une fenêtre pour échapper à un incendie, soit coupable de suicide? A-t-on même jamais imputé ce crime à celui qui périt dans une tempête dont en s’embarquant il n’ignoroit pas le danger?
Le traité social a pour fin la conservation des contractans. Qui veut la fin veut aussi les moyens, & ces moyens sont inséparables de quelques risques, même de quelques pertes. Qui veut conserver sa vie aux dépends des autres, doit la donner aussi pour eux quand il faut. Or le Citoyen n’est plus juge du péril auquel la loi veut qu’il s’expose, & quand le Prince lui a dit, il est expédient à l’Etat que tu meures, il doit mourir; puisque ce n’est qu’à cette condition qu’il a vécu en sureté jusqu’alors, & que sa vie n’est plus seulement un bienfait de la nature, mais un don conditionnel de l’Etat.
La peine de mort infligée aux criminels peut être envisagée à peu près sous le même point de vue: c’est pour n’être pas la victime d’un assassin que l’on consent à mourir si on le devient. Dans ce traité, loin de disposer de sa propre vie on ne songe qu’à la garantir, & il n’est pas à présumer qu’aucun des contractans prémédite alors de se faire pendre.
D’ailleurs tout malfaiteur attaquant le droit social devient par ses forfaits rebelle & traître à la patrie, il cesse d’en être membre en violant ses loix, & même il lui fait la guerre. Alors la conservation de l’Etat est incompatible avec la sienne, il faut qu’un des deux périsse, & quand on fait mourir le coupable, c’est moins comme Citoyen que comme ennemi. Les procédures, le jugement, sont les preuves & la déclaration qu’il a rompu le traité social, & par conséquent qu’il n’est plus membre de l’Etat. Or comme il s’est reconnu tel, tout au moins par son séjour, il en doit être retranché par l’exil comme infracteur du pacte, ou par la mort comme ennemi public; car un tel ennemi n’est pas une personne morale, c’est un homme, & c’est alors que le droit de la guerre est de tuer le vaincu.
Mais dira-t-on, la condannation d’un Criminel est un acte particulier. D’accord; aussi cette condannation n’appartient-elle point au Souverain; c’est un droit qu’il peut conférer sans pouvoir l’exercer lui-même. Toutes mes idées se tiennent, mais je ne saurois les exposer toutes à la fois.
Au reste la fréquence des supplices est toujours un signe de foiblesse ou de paresse dans le Gouvernement. Il n’y a point de méchant qu’on ne pût rendre bon à quelque chose. On n’a droit de faire mourir, même pour l’exemple, que celui qu’on ne peut conserver sans danger.
A l’egard du droit de faire grace, ou d’exempter un coupable de la peine portée par la loi & prononcée par le juge, il n’appartient qu’à celui qui est au dessus du juge & de la loi, c’est-à-dire au Souverain: Encore son droit en ceci n’est-il pas bien net, & les cas d’en user sont-ils très rares. Dans un État bien gouverné il y a peu de punitions, non parce qu’on fait beaucoup de graces, mais parce qu’il y a peu de criminels: la multitude des crimes en assure l’impunité lorsque l’État dépérit. Sous la République Romaine jamais le Sénat ni les Consuls ne tenterent de faire grace; le peuple même n’en faisoit pas, quoiqu’il révocât quelquefois son propre jugement. Les fréquentes graces annoncent que bientôt les forfaits n’en auront plus besoin, & chacun voit où cela mene. Mais je sens que mon cœur murmure & retient ma plume; laissons discuter ces questions à l’homme juste qui n’a point failli, & qui jamais n’eût lui-même besoin de grace.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On the Right of Life and Death.
It is asked how individuals, having no right to dispose of their own lives, can transfer to the sovereign that same right which they do not possess. This question seems difficult to resolve only because it is wrongly posed. Every man has the right to risk his life to preserve it. Has anyone ever said that a man who leaps from a window to escape a fire is guilty of suicide? Has that crime ever been charged even against a man who perishes in a storm whose danger he knew when he embarked?
The social pact has the preservation of its contracting parties as its end. Whoever wills the end also wills the means, and these means cannot be separated from certain risks, even certain losses. Whoever wishes to preserve his life at the expense of others must also give it up for them when necessary. Now the citizen is no longer the judge of the danger to which the law requires him to expose himself, and when the prince has told him, “It is expedient for the State that you die,” he must die; for it is only on this condition that he has lived in safety until then, and his life is no longer merely a gift of nature but a conditional gift of the State.
The death penalty imposed on criminals may be viewed in much the same light: one consents to die if one becomes a murderer so as not to be the victim of one. In this pact, far from disposing of one's own life, one thinks only of securing it, and there is no reason to presume that any of the contracting parties then intends to get himself hanged.
Moreover, every wrongdoer who attacks social right becomes, through his crimes, a rebel and traitor to his country. By violating its laws he ceases to be a member of it, and even wages war against it. The preservation of the State is then incompatible with his own; one of the two must perish, and when the guilty man is put to death, it is less as a citizen than as an enemy. The proceedings and the judgment are the proof and declaration that he has broken the social pact and consequently is no longer a member of the State. Since he has acknowledged himself to be such a member, at least by residing there, he must be cut off from it by exile as a violator of the pact, or by death as a public enemy; for such an enemy is not a corporate person but a man, and then the right of war allows the victor to kill the vanquished.
But, it will be said, the condemnation of a criminal is a particular act. Agreed; and so this condemnation does not belong to the sovereign. It is a right that the sovereign can confer without being able to exercise it itself. All my ideas are connected, but I cannot set them all out at once.
Besides, the frequency of executions is always a sign of weakness or indolence in the government. There is no villain who could not be made useful for something. One has a right to put to death, even as an example, only a person who cannot be kept alive without danger.
As for the right to grant a pardon, or to exempt a guilty person from a penalty established by law and pronounced by the judge, it belongs only to the one who stands above the judge and the law, that is, the sovereign. Even here its right is far from clear, and occasions for exercising it are very rare. In a well-governed State punishments are few, not because pardons are plentiful, but because criminals are few: when the State declines, the multitude of crimes secures their impunity. Under the Roman Republic neither the Senate nor the Consuls ever attempted to grant a pardon; even the people did not do so, although they sometimes revoked their own judgment. Frequent pardons announce that crimes will soon have no need of them, and everyone can see where that leads. But I feel my heart protest and restrain my pen; let us leave these questions for the just man who has never transgressed, and who has never himself had need of pardon.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete French text of the 1762 edition, all four books and the appendix.
On the Right of Life and Death.
People ask how individuals, who have no right to dispose of their own lives, can transfer to the sovereign a right they do not have. The question seems hard to answer only because it is badly put. Everyone has the right to risk their life to save it. Has anyone ever said that a person who jumps out a window to escape a fire is guilty of suicide? Has anyone even blamed that crime on a person who dies in a storm, though they knew the danger when boarding the ship?
The social pact aims to preserve those who enter it. Whoever wants the end also wants the means, and those means involve some risks and even some losses. Whoever wants others to preserve their life must also give their life for others when needed. Now a citizen no longer judges the danger to which the law requires them to expose themselves. When the prince says to a citizen, "The state needs you to die," that citizen must die. For only on that condition have they lived safely until then, and their life is no longer only a gift of nature but a conditional gift of the state.
The death penalty imposed on criminals can be seen in much the same way. We agree to die if we become murderers so that we will not become victims of murderers. In this agreement, far from disposing of our lives, we think only of protecting them. We should not suppose that any of those making the agreement already plans to get hanged.
Besides, anyone who breaks the law and attacks society's rights becomes a rebel and a traitor to their country through their crimes. By breaking its laws, they cease to be a member of it; indeed, they make war on it. The state's survival is then incompatible with theirs. One of the two must perish. When the guilty person is put to death, they are treated less as a citizen than as an enemy. The proceedings and the judgment are the proof and the declaration that they have broken the social pact, and so are no longer a member of the state. Since they acknowledged themselves as a member, at least by living there, they must be removed: by exile as a breaker of the pact, or by death as a public enemy. Such an enemy is not a corporate body but a human being, and in this case the right of war permits the killing of the defeated person.
But someone will say that the sentencing of a criminal is a particular act. Agreed. That is why sentencing does not belong to the sovereign. It is a right the sovereign may grant but cannot exercise itself. All my ideas are connected, but I cannot set them all out at once.
In any case, frequent executions are always a sign of weakness or laziness in government. There is no bad person who could not be made useful in some way. We have a right to put someone to death, even as an example, only if we cannot keep that person alive without danger.
As for the right to pardon someone, or to exempt a guilty person from the penalty set by law and pronounced by a judge, that belongs only to whoever is above the judge and the law: the sovereign. Even here the sovereign's right is not very clear, and there are very few occasions to use it. In a well-governed state there are few punishments, not because pardons are common, but because there are few criminals. As the state decays, the sheer number of crimes ensures that they go unpunished. Under the Roman Republic, neither the Senate nor the consuls ever tried to grant pardons. Even the people did not do so, though they sometimes overturned their own judgment. Frequent pardons signal that crimes will soon no longer need pardons, and everyone can see where that leads. But I feel my heart protesting and holding back my pen. Let us leave these questions to be debated by a just person who has never done wrong and has never needed a pardon.