Book 1

SECTION 1

Chapter 1

[…] had freed them from the assault; nor would Gaius Duilius, Aulus Atilius, and Lucius Metellus have freed them from the terror of Carthage; nor would the two Scipios have quenched with their own blood the rising blaze of the Second Punic War; nor, when it flared up with greater force, would Quintus Maximus have sapped its strength or Marcus Marcellus have crushed it, or Publius Africanus have torn it from this city’s gates and driven it within the enemy’s walls. Marcus Cato, an unknown man of no distinguished ancestry, whose example guides all of us with the same pursuits toward industry and virtue, certainly could have enjoyed his leisure at Tusculum, a healthy place close at hand. Yet this madman, as those thinkers consider him, though driven by no necessity, preferred to be tossed on these waves and storms to the very end of his old age rather than live most pleasantly in that peace and leisure. I pass over countless men, each of whom brought salvation to this state; and since they are not far beyond the memory of our own age, I refrain from naming them, lest anyone complain that he or one of his family has been overlooked. I assert only this: nature has given the human race so great a need for virtue, so great a love of defending the common safety, that its force has conquered every lure of pleasure and leisure.

SECTION 2

Chapter 2

Nor is it enough to possess virtue as though it were some art, unless you practice it. An art, even when you do not practice it, can still be retained through knowledge alone; virtue rests entirely in its practice. Its highest practice is the government of a state, and the accomplishment in deed, not in words, of the very things these men proclaim in their corners. For philosophers say nothing, at least nothing rightly and honorably said, that was not brought into being and established by those who laid down laws for states. From where, and from whom, came devotion to duty or religious observance? From where came the law of nations, or this very law we call civil? From where justice, good faith, fairness? From where a sense of shame, self-restraint, the avoidance of disgrace, the pursuit of praise and honor? From where courage amid hardship and danger? Surely from those who, having shaped these things through instruction, established some by custom and sanctioned others by law.

SECTION 3

Indeed, they say that Xenocrates, among the most distinguished of philosophers, when asked what his pupils gained, answered, “They do of their own accord what the laws would compel them to do.” Therefore the citizen who, by his authority and the penalties of law, compels everyone to do what philosophers can scarcely persuade a few to do by argument, deserves preference even over the teachers who discuss these subjects. What discourse of theirs is so exquisite that it should rank above a state well ordered by public law and custom? For my part, just as I think that “great and commanding cities,” as Ennius calls them, deserve preference over hamlets and forts, so I hold that those who preside over these cities by their wisdom and authority far surpass in wisdom itself those who take no part in public business. And since we are drawn above all to increase the resources of the human race, and strive by our judgment and labor to make human life safer and more prosperous, and nature’s own spur urges us toward this pleasure, let us hold to the course that has always belonged to the best of men. Let us not listen to the signals sounding the retreat, seeking to call back even those who have already advanced.

SECTION 4

Chapter 3

Against these arguments, so certain and so clear, our opponents set first the hardships that must be endured in defending the commonwealth—a slight obstacle indeed for a vigilant and industrious man, and one to be disregarded not only in affairs of such importance but even in more modest pursuits or duties, or indeed in business. They add the dangers to life, confronting brave men with a shameful fear of death. Such men generally think it more wretched to waste away through nature and old age than to be granted an occasion to give back, above all for their country, the life that must in any case be given back to nature. But they think their argument rich and eloquent when they gather the disasters of illustrious men and the wrongs inflicted on them by ungrateful citizens.

SECTION 5

From this come those examples among the Greeks: Miltiades, the conqueror and subduer of the Persians, whose wounds, received facing the enemy in his glorious victory, were not yet healed when he poured out in his fellow citizens’ chains the life he had saved from enemy weapons; and Themistocles, driven and frightened from the country he had freed, who fled not to the harbors of Greece he himself had saved, but to the shelter of the foreign land he had laid low. Nor is there any shortage of examples of Athenian fickleness and cruelty toward their greatest citizens. These evils, born and often repeated among them, are said to have spilled over even into our own most steadfast state;

SECTION 6

for they recall the exile of Camillus, the hostility toward Ahala, the resentment of Nasica, the expulsion of Laenas, the condemnation of Opimius, the flight of Metellus, or the bitter disaster of Gaius Marius and the slaughter of the leading citizens, or the destruction of the many others that followed soon afterward. Nor do they now spare my own name. Indeed, I believe that because they think my judgment and my peril preserved them in that life of leisure, they lament my fate still more gravely and affectionately. Yet I could not easily say why, when they themselves cross the seas to learn or to see the world […]

SECTION 7

Chapter 4

[…] when, on leaving the consulship, I had sworn before the assembled people that it was safe, and the Roman people had sworn the same, I could easily have offset the distress and vexation of every wrong. Yet my misfortunes brought more honor than hardship, less vexation than glory; and I felt greater joy in the longing of good men for me than grief at the rejoicing of the wicked. But if things had turned out otherwise, as I have said, how could I complain, when nothing had befallen me that was unforeseen or more grievous than I had expected in return for such great deeds? For I was a man who could either have reaped richer fruits from leisure than others, through the varied delights of the studies in which I had lived since childhood, or, if some bitter fate befell us all, have borne no exceptional lot but the same as everyone else. Yet I did not hesitate to face the fiercest storms, almost the thunderbolts themselves, to save my fellow citizens, and through dangers of my own to win peace shared by all the rest.

SECTION 8

For our country did not bring us to birth or nurture us on the understanding that she should expect no sustenance, so to speak, from us in return, and merely serve our advantage, providing a safe refuge for our leisure and a tranquil place for our rest. Rather, she claimed as her pledge the largest and greatest part of our spirit, talent, and judgment for her own use, leaving us for our private use only as much as she herself could spare.

SECTION 9

Chapter 5

As for the refuges they take in excuses to enjoy their leisure more readily, these certainly deserve no hearing. They say that most who enter public life are men worthy of nothing good; to be ranked with them is degrading, while to contend with them, especially when the crowd has been stirred up, is wretched and dangerous. Therefore, they say, it is not for a wise man to take the reins when he cannot curb the wild and untamed impulses of the multitude, nor for a free man, struggling against foul and savage opponents, to endure the lash of insults or await wrongs that a wise man ought not to bear. As though good and brave men of great spirit could have any more just cause for entering public life than to avoid submission to the wicked, and to prevent those same men from tearing the commonwealth apart when they themselves would be powerless to bring help, however much they wished!

SECTION 10

Chapter 6

And who, I ask, could approve their proviso, when they deny that the wise man will take any part in public affairs unless circumstances and necessity compel him? As though anyone could encounter a greater necessity than the one I encountered! What could I have done in it if I had not been consul at the time? And how could I have been consul unless from childhood I had held to the course of life that enabled me, born to equestrian rank, to reach the highest office? You do not, then, have the power to help the commonwealth on the spur of the moment, or whenever you please, however hard danger presses upon it, unless you are in a position that allows you to do so.

SECTION 11

What usually strikes me as most astonishing in the arguments of learned men is this: the same men who deny that they can steer on a calm sea, because they have neither learned how nor ever cared to know, declare that they will take the helm when the greatest waves have risen. For these men commonly say openly, and even take great pride in saying, that they have never learned and do not teach anything about the principles of founding or preserving states. They think knowledge of such matters should be conceded not to learned and wise men, but to those practiced in that field. How, then, is it consistent to promise their services to the commonwealth only when necessity compels them, when they do not know how to govern it under no pressure of necessity, a far easier task? For my part, even if it were true that the wise man does not ordinarily enter public affairs of his own accord, but refuses that duty no longer when circumstances compel him, I would still think that a wise man should by no means neglect this knowledge of civic life. He must prepare himself in everything he may, for all he knows, someday be obliged to use.

SECTION 12

Chapter 7

I have spoken at some length about this because in these books I have undertaken and embarked upon a discussion of the commonwealth. If that discussion was not to be fruitless, I had above all to remove any hesitation about entering public life. Yet if there are any who are swayed by the authority of philosophers, let them attend for a moment and listen to those whose authority and renown stand highest among the most learned men. Even those of them who did not themselves administer the commonwealth I consider to have performed some public service, since they investigated and wrote much about it. As for the seven whom the Greeks named wise men, I find that almost all were immersed in public life. For there is nothing in which human virtue approaches closer to the power of the gods than founding new states or preserving those already founded.

SECTION 13

Chapter 8

On these matters, since it has been our good fortune both to achieve something worthy of remembrance in conducting public affairs and, in explaining the principles of civic life, a certain facility not only through experience but also through devotion to learning and teaching † we were authorities, whereas among our predecessors some had been highly polished in debate but had no deeds to show, while others were estimable in action but unskilled in discussion. Nor must we establish some new system invented by ourselves. Rather, we must recall a discussion among the most illustrious and wisest men of our state in a single generation. Publius Rutilius Rufus once recounted it to you and me, when you were a very young man and we were together at Smyrna for several days. In it almost nothing of great importance to the principles underlying the whole subject was passed over.

SECTION 14

Chapter 9

For when Publius Africanus, the son of Paulus, had decided to spend the Latin Festival in his gardens, in the consulship of Tuditanus and Aquilius, and his closest friends had said they would visit him often during those days, the first to come to him on the morning of the festival itself was his sister’s son, Quintus Tubero. Scipio greeted him warmly and was glad to see him. “What brings you here so early, Tubero?” he said. “These holidays offered you a fine opportunity to work through your books.” Then Tubero said, “All my time is free for my books; they are never busy. But to find you at leisure is a great thing, especially amid this turmoil in public affairs.” Then Scipio said, “Well, you have found me so, but, by Hercules, freer from work than from thought.” Tubero replied, “But you ought to relax your mind as well. Many of us, as we arranged, are ready to make full use of this leisure with you, if it suits your convenience.” SC. “Very willingly: let us at last be reminded of something to do with learned pursuits.”

SECTION 15

Chapter 10

Then Tubero said, “Since you give me a kind of invitation and hold out the prospect of your company, shall we first consider, Africanus, before the others come, what there is to that report made in the Senate about a second sun? Those who say they have seen two suns are neither few nor frivolous; it is not so much their credibility we must question as the explanation we must seek.” Here Scipio said, “How I wish we had our friend Panaetius with us! Among his other interests, he is particularly devoted to investigating these celestial matters. But, Tubero—to tell you frankly what I think—I do not altogether agree with that friend of ours on this entire subject. He makes assertions about things whose nature we can scarcely guess at by conjecture as though he saw them with his own eyes or positively handled them. This is why I generally judge Socrates the wiser: he set aside all concern of this sort, and said that inquiries into nature were either beyond the reach of human reason or had no bearing at all on human life.”

SECTION 16

Then Tubero said, “I do not know, Africanus, why tradition has handed down that Socrates rejected all such discussion and habitually investigated only life and morals. For what more reliable authority on him can we cite than Plato? In many passages of his books, Socrates speaks in such a way that, even when discussing morals, virtues, and finally the commonwealth, he still tries to bring in numbers, geometry, and harmony in the manner of Pythagoras.” Then Scipio said, “It is as you say. But I believe you have heard, Tubero, that after Socrates’ death Plato went first to Egypt to learn, and afterward to Italy and Sicily to master the discoveries of Pythagoras; that he spent much time with Archytas of Tarentum and Timaeus of Locri, and obtained the writings of Philolaus; and that, since Pythagoras’ name flourished in those regions at that time, he devoted himself both to the Pythagoreans and to their studies. And so, since he had loved Socrates above all others and wished to credit him with everything, he wove Socrates’ charm and subtlety of conversation together with Pythagoras’ obscurity and his profound mastery of so many arts.”

SECTION 17

Chapter 11

When Scipio had said this, he suddenly caught sight of Lucius Furius approaching. He greeted him, took him affectionately by the hand, and gave him a place on his own couch. Publius Rutilius, our source for this conversation, had arrived at the same time; after greeting him too, Scipio asked him to sit beside Tubero. Then Furius said, “What are you doing? Have we interrupted some conversation by coming in?” “Not at all,” Africanus replied, “for you are an eager investigator of matters in the very field Tubero began asking about a little while ago. Our friend Rutilius, indeed, used sometimes to inquire into something of the kind with me even beneath the very walls of Numantia.” “What subject had come up?” asked Philus. Scipio answered, “Those two suns. I am eager to hear what you think of them, Philus.”

SECTION 18

Chapter 12

He had said this when a slave boy announced that Laelius was coming to see him and had already left home. Then Scipio put on his shoes and outer clothing and left his bedroom. After walking a little in the portico, he greeted Laelius as he arrived, and those who came with him: Spurius Mummius, whom he loved especially, and Gaius Fannius and Quintus Scaevola, Laelius’ sons-in-law, learned young men already old enough for the quaestorship. Having greeted them all, he turned back along the portico and placed Laelius in the middle. For there was a kind of settled rule in their friendship: on campaign, because of his exceptional military glory, Laelius revered Africanus like a god; at home, in turn, Scipio honored Laelius, who was his elder, as a father. After they had exchanged a very few words in one or two turns of their walk, their arrival having given Scipio great pleasure and delight, they decided to sit in the sunniest spot of a little meadow, since it was winter. As they were about to do so, Manius Manilius arrived, a wise man, delightful and dear to them all. Warmly greeted by Scipio and the others, he sat down next to Laelius.

SECTION 19

Chapter 13

Then Philus said, “I do not think their arrival requires us to find another subject. Instead, we should pursue this one more carefully and say something worthy of their hearing.” Here Laelius said, “What were you doing, then? What conversation have we interrupted?” PH. “Scipio had asked me what I thought about the fact that two suns had certainly been seen.” L. “Really, Philus? Have we already thoroughly explored what concerns our homes and our commonwealth, if we are now investigating what goes on in the sky?” Philus replied, “Do you not think it concerns our homes to know what is going on and what is happening at home? Our home is not what our walls enclose, but this whole universe, which the gods have given us as a dwelling and a country shared with themselves. Especially since, if we remain ignorant of these things, we must remain ignorant of many great matters. For my part—and, by Hercules, the same is true of you, Laelius, and of everyone eager for wisdom—it is the very knowledge and contemplation of things that delights me.”

SECTION 20

Then Laelius said, “I raise no objection, especially since we are on holiday. But may we hear something, or have we come too late?” PH. “Nothing has yet been discussed, and since the ground is untouched, I shall gladly yield to you, Laelius, to discourse on it.” L. “No, let us hear you—unless perhaps Manilius thinks some injunction should be drawn up between the two suns, allowing each to hold the sky as each has held it.” Then Manilius said, “Will you go on mocking that art, Laelius, in which, first, you yourself excel, and without which, second, no one can know what is his own and what belongs to another? But more of that later. Now let us hear Philus, whom I see being consulted on greater matters than either I or Publius Mucius.”

SECTION 21

Chapter 14

Then Philus said, “I shall offer you nothing new, nor anything I have thought out or discovered myself. For I remember that Gaius Sulpicius Gallus—a very learned man, as you know—when this same sight was reported, happened to be visiting Marcus Marcellus, who had been his colleague as consul. He ordered a sphere to be brought out, which Marcus Marcellus’ grandfather had carried away from Syracuse after its capture, though from that most wealthy and splendid city he had brought nothing else of all the spoils into his own house. I had very often heard this sphere mentioned because of Archimedes’ fame, but its actual appearance did not strike me with much wonder. For the other sphere, also made by Archimedes, which the same Marcellus had placed in the temple of Virtue, was more graceful and better known to the public.”

SECTION 22

“But when Gallus began to explain the workings of this device with the greatest knowledge, I judged that the Sicilian had possessed more genius than human nature seemed capable of bearing. Gallus said that the invention of that other sphere, solid throughout, was ancient: Thales of Miletus had first turned one on a lathe, and afterward Eudoxus of Cnidus, a pupil of Plato, as he was said to be, had marked on that same sphere the constellations and stars fixed in the sky. Many years later, Aratus had taken its whole arrangement and design from Eudoxus and set it out in verse, not through a knowledge of astronomy but through a certain poetic gift. This kind of sphere, however, containing the motions of the sun and moon and of the five stars called wandering, or roving, could not have been represented on that solid sphere. In this lay the marvel of Archimedes’ invention: he had devised a way for one rotation to preserve the unequal and varied courses of bodies whose motions were utterly unlike. When Gallus moved this sphere, the moon followed the sun in the bronze through as many rotations as it took days to do so in the sky itself. Thus the same eclipse of the sun occurred on the sphere, and the moon then fell into that cone which was the earth’s shadow, when the sun, directly opposite […]”

SECTION 23

Chapter 15

“[…] was, because I loved the man myself and knew that he had been especially esteemed and dear to my father Paulus. I remember, when I was very young, my father was consul in Macedonia and we were in camp, that our army was shaken by religious dread and fear because on a clear night the bright full moon had suddenly been eclipsed. Then Gallus, who was serving as our legate about a year before he was elected consul, did not hesitate the next day to explain openly in the camp that this was no portent; it had happened then and would always happen at fixed times, when the sun was so positioned that it could not touch the moon with its light.” “Really?” said Tubero. “Could he teach this to men who were almost peasants, and did he dare say such things before the uneducated?” S. “He certainly did, and with great […] […]”

SECTION 24

“neither an arrogant display nor language unsuited to a man of the greatest dignity. For he accomplished something great in dispelling empty religious dread and fear from troubled men.”

SECTION 25

Chapter 16

“Something of the same kind is said to have been done by the great Pericles in that tremendous war the Athenians and Spartans waged against one another with all their strength. The foremost man of his state in authority, eloquence, and judgment, when the sun was obscured and darkness suddenly fell and the Athenians’ minds were seized by the greatest fear, he explained to his fellow citizens what he himself had learned from Anaxagoras, whose pupil he had been: this happened at a fixed time and by necessity, when the whole moon passed beneath the sun’s disk. Thus, though it did not happen at every new moon, it could happen only at the appointed time of a new moon. By explaining this through argument and reasoning, he freed the people from fear. For the explanation was then new and unknown: that the sun is eclipsed when the moon comes in front of it. They say Thales of Miletus was the first to see this. Later, it did not escape even our own Ennius, who writes that about the three hundred and fiftieth year after Rome’s foundation,On the Nones of June, the moon blocked the sun, and night fell.And so much reasoning and ingenuity are involved in this matter that, from this day, which we find recorded in Ennius and in the Great Annals, earlier eclipses of the sun have been calculated backward as far as the one on the Nones of July in the reign of Romulus. Even if in that darkness nature carried Romulus away to a human death, his virtue is nevertheless said to have raised him to heaven.”

SECTION 26

Chapter 17

Then Tubero said, “Do you see, Africanus, what a little while ago seemed otherwise to you, […]” […], which others see. Besides, what could a man think splendid in human affairs if he has looked into these kingdoms of the gods? Or lasting, if he has learned what eternity is? Or glorious, if he has seen how small the earth is—first the whole of it, then that portion inhabited by human beings—and how, fixed in a tiny part of it, utterly unknown to most nations, we nevertheless hope that our name will fly and range as widely as possible?

SECTION 27

“How fortunate we must consider the man who does not regard or describe as goods fields and buildings and herds and an immeasurable weight of silver and gold, because their yield seems to him slight, their use limited, their ownership uncertain, and their possession often immense even among the worst of men! He alone may truly claim everything as his own, not by the law of Roman citizens but by the law of the wise, not through a civil bond but through the common law of nature, which forbids anything to belong to anyone except the man who knows how to manage and use it. He counts our commands and consulships among the necessities, not the objects of desire: things to be undertaken to fulfill a duty, not sought for rewards or glory. Finally, as Cato writes that my grandfather Africanus used to say, he can declare of himself that he is never doing more than when he is doing nothing, never less alone than when he is alone.”

SECTION 28

“For who can truly think that Dionysius achieved more when, by every contrivance, he robbed his fellow citizens of their freedom, than his fellow citizen Archimedes did when, seeming to do nothing, he made that very sphere? And who would not think those men more alone who, in the forum and the crowd, have no one with whom they care to speak, than those who, with no witness present, either speak with themselves or seem to be in a council of the most learned men as they delight in their discoveries and writings? Who would think anyone richer than a man who lacks nothing that nature actually desires, or more powerful than one who obtains everything he seeks, or happier than one freed from every disturbance of the mind, or more secure in fortune than one whose possessions he can, as they say, carry with him even out of a shipwreck? What command, what magistracy, what kingship can be more excellent than to look down on all human things, judging them inferior to wisdom, and never turn over in one’s mind anything but the eternal and divine? Such a man is convinced that others are called human beings, but that only those really are so who have been refined by the arts proper to humanity;

SECTION 29

“so that I find that remark of Plato’s—or whoever else said it—exceedingly apt. They say that when a storm had carried him from the open sea to an unknown land and a deserted shore, and the others were frightened because they did not know the place, he noticed some geometrical figures drawn in the sand. On seeing them he cried out that they should take heart, for he could see the traces of human beings. Evidently he interpreted those traces not from the cultivation of the land he saw but from signs of learning. For this reason, Tubero, learning and learned men and those pursuits of yours have always delighted me.”

SECTION 30

Chapter 18

Then Laelius said, “I do not, indeed, venture to speak against that, Scipio, nor so much you or Philus or Manilius. […]

“[…] in his own paternal family was that friend of ours, a worthy example for him to imitate,Sextus Aelius, a man of rare good sense, shrewd,who was of ‘rare good sense’ and ‘shrewd,’ and was so called by Ennius, not because he investigated things he would never discover, but because he gave answers that freed his questioners from anxiety and trouble. When arguing against Gallus’ pursuits, he always had on his lips those words of Achilles in the Iphigenia:What comes of watching astrologers’ signs in the sky,

“When a Goat or Scorpion rises, or some beast’s name?

“No one looks at what lies at his feet; they scan the tracts of sky.The same man—I heard him often and gladly—used to say that Pacuvius’ Zethus was too hostile to learning. He took greater pleasure in Ennius’ Neoptolemus, who says that he ‘wants to philosophize, but only a little; for giving himself to it entirely is not to his taste.’ But if Greek studies delight you so much, there are others of freer scope and wider reach that we can bring to bear on the conduct of life or indeed on the commonwealth itself. Those arts of yours, if they have any value at all, serve only to sharpen and, so to speak, stimulate the minds of boys a little, so that they can more easily learn greater things.”

SECTION 31

Chapter 19

Then Tubero said, “I do not disagree with you, Laelius, but I ask what you understand those greater things to be.” L. “I shall tell you, by Hercules, and perhaps earn your contempt, since you asked Scipio about those celestial matters, while I think we should rather investigate what seems to lie before our eyes. For why, I ask, does a grandson of Lucius Paulus, with such an uncle, born into a most noble family and into this glorious commonwealth, ask how two suns have been seen, and not ask why in one commonwealth there are two senates and already almost two peoples? For, as you see, the death of Tiberius Gracchus, and even earlier the whole course of his tribunate, divided one people into two factions. Scipio’s detractors and enemies, following the lead first given by Publius Crassus and Appius Claudius, still hold one part of the Senate apart from you, even after those men’s deaths, under the leadership of Metellus and Publius Mucius. Nor do they allow this man, who alone has the power, to remedy these grave dangers, while our allies and the Latin people are stirred up, treaties are violated, the three commissioners, bent on sedition, devise something new each day, and good men are thrown into confusion.”

SECTION 32

“Therefore, young men, if you will listen to me, do not fear a second sun. Either there cannot be one, or let there be one, as it has been seen, provided it does no harm; or we can know nothing of such matters, or, even if we know them perfectly, we can be neither better nor happier for that knowledge. But that we should have one Senate and one people is possible, and it is most distressing if we do not. We know it is otherwise, and we see that if this unity is achieved we shall live both better and happier lives.”

SECTION 33

Chapter 20

Then Mucius said, “What, then, Laelius, do you think we should learn to accomplish the very thing you demand?” L. “Those arts that will enable us to be of service to the state. For I consider this the noblest task of wisdom and the greatest proof or duty of virtue. Therefore, so that these holidays may be devoted above all to conversations most useful to the commonwealth, let us ask Scipio to explain what he considers the best constitution of a state. Then we shall inquire into other things. Once we understand them, I hope we shall arrive by a clear path at these very questions and work out the principles of the matters now pressing upon us.”

SECTION 34

Chapter 21

When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had warmly approved this […]

SECTION 34(fr1)

(Diom. GL I, p. 365 Keil) “There is no example to which we would rather liken the commonwealth.”

(Non. p. 85M, p. 289M) “Therefore, if you please, bring your discourse down from heaven to these nearer matters.”

“[…] I wished this to be done not only because it was right that the foremost man of the commonwealth should be the one to speak about it, but also because I remembered that you very often used to argue with Panaetius in the presence of Polybius—two Greeks deeply versed in civic affairs—and bring together many arguments to show that by far the best constitution of a state was the one our ancestors had left us. Since you are better prepared for this discussion, you will do us all a favor—and let me speak for these men too—if you explain what you think about the commonwealth.”

SECTION 35

Chapter 22

Then Scipio said, “I can indeed say that there is no subject on which I habitually reflect more keenly or carefully than the very one you set before me, Laelius. For I see that every craftsman who excels at his work thinks, considers, and cares about nothing except becoming better in his own field. Since my parents and ancestors have left me this one task, the care and administration of the commonwealth, should I not confess myself more idle than any craftsman if I devoted less effort to the greatest art than they devote to the smallest?”

SECTION 36

“But I am neither satisfied with what the greatest and wisest men of Greece have left us in writing on this question, nor do I dare prefer my own views to theirs. Therefore I ask you to listen to me neither as someone wholly unacquainted with Greek thought, nor as someone who ranks it above our own, especially in this field. Listen to me as one of the men of the toga, given a liberal education through his father’s care and aflame since childhood with a passion for learning, but far more thoroughly schooled by experience and the teachings of his own country than by books.”

SECTION 37

Chapter 23

Here Philus said, “By Hercules, Scipio, I do not doubt that no one has surpassed you in natural ability; and in experience of the greatest public affairs you easily surpass everyone. We know, too, what your studies have always been. Therefore, if, as you say, you have also turned your mind to this system, this art, as it were, I am deeply grateful to Laelius. For I hope that what you say will be far richer than all that the Greeks have written.” Then Scipio said, “You lay a very great expectation on my discourse—the heaviest burden for anyone about to speak on great matters.” Philus replied, “However great it is, you will exceed it, as you always do. There is no danger that words will fail you when you discuss the commonwealth.”

SECTION 38

Chapter 24

Here Scipio said, “I shall do as you wish, as well as I can, and enter the discussion on the principle that I believe should be used in discussing any subject if we wish to avoid error: once we agree on the name of the thing we are investigating, we must explain what that name means. When we agree on that, and only then, will it be right to begin the conversation. For we can never understand the character of what we are discussing unless we first understand what it is. Therefore, since we are investigating the commonwealth, let us first consider what exactly it is that we are investigating.” When Laelius had approved, Africanus said, “But in discussing so familiar and well-known a matter, I shall not go back to the elements that learned men commonly employ in these questions, beginning with the first union of male and female, then offspring and kinship, and repeatedly defining in words what each thing is and in how many senses it is spoken of. Since I am speaking among wise men who have served with the greatest distinction in war and peace in the greatest commonwealth, I shall ensure that the very subject I discuss outshines my discourse. I have not undertaken to pursue everything like a schoolmaster, nor do I promise to ensure that not the smallest point is passed over in this conversation.” Then Laelius said, “It is precisely the kind of discourse you promise that I look forward to.”

SECTION 39

Chapter 25

“The commonwealth, then,” Africanus said, “is the people’s affair. But a people is not every collection of human beings gathered in any fashion; it is a numerous gathering united in fellowship by agreement on right and a sharing of advantage. The first cause of their coming together is not so much weakness as a certain natural impulse in human beings to gather, as it were. For ours is not a solitary or a lonely wandering race, but one so formed that not even amid an abundance of everything […]”

SECTION 40fr

(August. epist. 138.10) “In a short time a scattered and wandering multitude had, through concord, become a state.”

SECTION 41

Chapter 26

“[…] certain seeds, as it were, nor can any foundation be found for the other virtues or for the commonwealth itself. These gatherings, then, formed for the reason I have explained, first established a settlement in a definite place to provide homes. When they had enclosed it with natural defenses and their own labor, they called such a grouping of dwellings a town or city, distinguished by shrines and common spaces. Every people, therefore, which is such a gathering of a multitude as I have described, every state, which is the organized body of a people, every commonwealth, which, as I said, is the people’s affair, must be governed by some deliberative authority if it is to endure. That authority must first and always be referred to the cause that brought the state into being.”

SECTION 42

“Next, it must either be entrusted to one man, or to certain chosen men, or undertaken by the multitude, by everyone. Thus, when supreme control of all affairs rests with one man, we call that one man a king, and the constitution of that commonwealth a kingship. But when it rests with chosen men, the state is said to be ruled at the discretion of its best men. A popular state—as they call it—is one in which all power lies with the people. Any of these three kinds, if it preserves the bond that first bound human beings to one another in the fellowship of a commonwealth, is, though not perfect or in my judgment the best, nevertheless tolerable; yet one may be better than another. For a just and wise king, or chosen and leading citizens, or the people itself—though that is the least commendable—can, it seems, maintain a certain stable order, provided no injustices or passions intrude.”

SECTION 43

Chapter 27

“But under kings the rest have too little share in common rights and deliberation; under the rule of the best men the multitude can scarcely partake of freedom, since it is excluded from all common deliberation and power; and when everything is conducted by the people, however just and moderate, that very equality is unjust, since it recognizes no degrees of worth. Thus, even if the Persian Cyrus was a most just and wise king, the people’s affair—for that, as I said before, is what a commonwealth is—does not seem to me to have been most desirable there, since it was governed by the will and measure of one man. If the people of Massilia, our clients, are governed with the greatest justice by chosen and leading citizens, there is nevertheless in that condition of the people a certain likeness to slavery. If the Athenians, at certain times, after setting aside the Areopagus, conducted everything solely by the people’s resolutions and decrees, their state did not retain its proper dignity, since they recognized no distinct degrees of worth.”

SECTION 44

Chapter 28

“And I am speaking of these three kinds of commonwealth not in disorder or confusion, but each maintaining its own form. First, each of these kinds has the defects I mentioned before; then they have other, deadly defects. For there is no kind of commonwealth that does not have a steep and slippery path to a neighboring evil. Beneath that tolerable or, if you wish, even lovable king Cyrus—to name him above all others—lies the utterly cruel Phalaris, if Cyrus is free to change his disposition. The rule of one man slides easily down a sloping course into his likeness. Close beside the government of the state by the few leading men of Massilia stands the concert and faction of the thirty men who once ruled at Athens. Now the power of the Athenian people over all affairs, having been turned to the frenzy and license of the multitude—the Athenians themselves, so that we need not seek other examples— […]”

SECTION 45

Chapter 29

“[…] the worst, and from this either a government of the best men, or that factional tyranny, or a royal government, or even, very often, a popular one; and from that, in turn, some one of the forms I mentioned before commonly springs into bloom. Marvelous are the circles, the circuits, as it were, of changes and turns in commonwealths. To understand them is the work of a wise man; but to foresee them as they threaten, while governing the commonwealth, moderating its course and keeping it in one’s power, belongs to a great citizen, an almost divine man. And so I judge most worthy of approval a certain fourth kind of commonwealth, balanced and blended from the three I first described.”

SECTION 46

Chapter 30

Here Laelius said, “I know that is your view, Africanus; I have often heard you say so. Still, if it is no trouble, I should like to know which of those three forms of government you judge best. For it might contribute something toward […]”

SECTION 47

Chapter 31

“[…] and every commonwealth takes its character from the nature or will of whoever governs it. And so freedom has no home in any state except one in which the people hold supreme power. Certainly nothing can be sweeter than freedom; and if it is not equal, it is not even freedom. Yet how can it be equal—I say nothing of a kingdom, where slavery is neither concealed nor doubtful—even in those states where everyone is free in name? They cast their votes, confer commands and magistracies, are courted and petitioned; but they give what they must give even against their will, and what they do not possess themselves, though others seek it from them. For they have no share in command, public deliberation, or the judgment of selected jurors: these are weighed out according to ancient pedigrees or wealth. But among a free people, as at Rhodes or Athens, there is no citizen who […]”

SECTION 48

Chapter 32

“[…] one or more men had emerged among the people, richer and more powerful than the rest; then, they say, these governments arose from those men’s scorn and pride, while the spiritless and weak gave way and bowed beneath the arrogance of the rich. But if peoples hold fast to their rights, they declare that nothing is more excellent, freer, or happier: for they are masters of laws, trials, war, peace, treaties, each individual’s life, and property. This alone, they think, is rightly called a commonwealth—that is, the people’s concern. Thus the people’s concern is commonly reclaimed for freedom from the domination of kings and senators; free peoples do not seek kings, or the power and wealth of an aristocracy.”

SECTION 49

“Nor, they maintain, should this whole form of free popular government be rejected because of the failings of an unruly people. Nothing is more unchangeable, nothing firmer, than a people united and directing everything toward its own security and freedom. Concord comes most readily in a commonwealth where the same thing benefits everyone; differences of interest, when different things suit different people, give rise to dissension. Thus, when the senators held power, the state’s condition was never stable; still less under kings, among whom, as Ennius says, ‘No fellowship is sacred, nor is there faith.’ Since law is the bond of civil society, and the right established by law is equal, by what right can a society of citizens be held together when the citizens’ condition is unequal? If we do not choose to equalize wealth, if everyone’s abilities cannot be equal, surely the rights of those who are citizens in the same commonwealth ought to be equal among them. For what is a state but a partnership under law? […] […]”

SECTION 50

Chapter 33

“[…] Indeed, they think the other commonwealths should not even be called by the names they wish to bear. Why should I call a man who hungers for domination or sole command, who rules over an oppressed people, a king—the title of Jupiter the Best—instead of a tyrant? A tyrant can be as merciful as he can be harsh; so the peoples’ only concern is whether they serve a kindly master or a cruel one. That they should not serve at all is impossible. And how could Sparta, even when it was thought preeminent in constitutional discipline, contrive to have good and just kings, when whoever was born of the royal line had to be accepted as king? As for the aristocrats, who could endure men who have arrogated to themselves this title of ‘the best,’ not by the people’s grant, but by votes among themselves? For how is this ‘best’ man judged? By learning, accomplishments, pursuits […] […]”

SECTION 51

Chapter 34

“[…] if it does this at random, it will be overturned as quickly as a ship whose helm is taken by a passenger chosen by lot. But if a free people chooses those to whom it will entrust itself—and, if it wishes to survive, it will choose the best—then surely the safety of states rests on the counsels of the best men. Especially so, since nature has ordained not only that those highest in virtue and spirit should lead the weaker, but that the weaker should willingly obey the highest. Yet this best of constitutions, they say, has been overturned by people’s perverse opinions. Ignorant of virtue, which is possessed by few and discerned and judged by few, they think the rich and well supplied, and those of noble birth, are the best. When, through this popular error, the resources of a few, rather than their virtues, began to control the commonwealth, those leaders clung tooth and nail to the title of ‘the best,’ while lacking the reality. For riches, a name, and power, without sound judgment or a proper way of living and governing others, are full of disgrace and insolent pride; nor is any form of state uglier than one in which the wealthiest are thought the best.”

SECTION 52

“But what can be more splendid than a commonwealth steered by virtue? Its ruler is himself a slave to no desire; he has embraced all the principles to which he schools and summons his fellow citizens. He imposes no laws on the people that he does not obey himself, but holds his own life before his fellow citizens as their law. If one man could adequately accomplish everything, there would be no need for more; if everyone could see what was best and agree upon it, no one would seek chosen leaders. The difficulty of reaching a decision transferred government from a king to several men; the people’s errors and rashness transferred it from the multitude to a few. Thus the best men have taken the middle ground between one man’s weakness and the rashness of the many, and nothing could be more balanced. With them protecting the commonwealth, the people must be supremely happy, free from every care and thought, having entrusted their peace to others. Those others must safeguard it, and must never allow the people to suppose that their leaders neglect their interests.”

SECTION 53

“For the equality of rights that free peoples embrace cannot be maintained: even peoples wholly unrestrained and unbridled grant many special privileges to many men, and among them there are great distinctions of persons and rank. And this so-called equality is profoundly unjust. For when equal honor is accorded to the highest and the lowest, who must exist in every people, that very equality is most unequal. This cannot happen in states governed by the best. Such, Laelius, in broad outline, are the arguments, along with others of the same kind, commonly advanced by those who most praise that form of commonwealth.”

SECTION 54

Chapter 35

Then Laelius said, “And you, Scipio? Which of those three do you most approve?” S. “You are right to ask which I most approve of the three, since I do not approve of any of them separately, in itself, and prefer to each the form compounded of them all. But if a single and simple form had to be approved, I would approve the royal one […] […] […] is called in this place, the name of king presents itself as, so to speak, a father’s name: that of one who looks after his citizens as he would those born of him, and preserves them more zealously than […] […] […] […] […] to be supported by the care of a single man, the best and highest.”

SECTION 55

“The best men are at hand, professing that they do this same thing better: several, they say, will have more judgment than one, yet the same fairness and good faith. But look—the people shouts at the top of its voice that it will obey neither one man nor a few; that nothing is sweeter than freedom, even to wild beasts; that everyone lacks it who serves either a king or an aristocracy. Thus kings captivate us with affection, aristocrats with judgment, peoples with freedom, so that, when we compare them, it is hard to choose what we most desire.” L. “I believe it,” he said, “but we shall scarcely be able to disentangle what remains if you leave this beginning unfinished.”

SECTION 56

Chapter 36

S. “Then let us imitate Aratus, who, as he begins to speak of great matters, thinks we must begin with Jupiter.” L. “Which Jupiter? And what has this discussion in common with that poem?” S. “Only this much,” he said: “that we may duly take the beginnings of our speaking from him whom all, learned and unlearned—†to be polished—agree to be the one king of all gods and men.” “What do you mean?” said Laelius. And he replied, “What do you suppose, except what lies before our eyes? If these beliefs were established for the benefit of human life by the leaders of commonwealths—that there should be thought to be one king in heaven, who with a nod, as Homer says, would shake all Olympus, and who was held to be both king and father of all—then it is a weighty authority, with many witnesses, if we may call everyone ‘many,’ that the nations, evidently at their leaders’ direction, have agreed that nothing is better than a king, since they believe all gods are governed by the will of one. Or, if we have learned that these beliefs rest on the errors of the ignorant and resemble fables, let us hear those who are, as it were, the common teachers of educated men: men who have seen, as if with their own eyes, what we can scarcely learn by hearing.” “Who are these men?” said Laelius. And he replied, “Those who, by searching deeply into the nature of all things, perceived that this whole universe by a mind […] […]”

SECTION 58

Chapter 37

“[…] But if you like, Laelius, I shall give you witnesses neither excessively ancient nor in any sense barbarous.” L. “Those are the ones I want,” he said. S. “Do you see, then, that this city has been without kings for less than four hundred years?” L. “Less, indeed.” S. “Well then, is that span of four hundred years a very long life for a city and a state?” L. “It is scarcely adulthood,” he said. S. “Then four hundred years ago there was a king at Rome?” L. “Yes, and a proud one.” S. “And before him?” L. “A most just one, and so on backward to Romulus, who was king six hundred years before our time.” S. “Then even he is not so very ancient?” L. “Not at all; Greece was already almost growing old.” S. “Tell me, Scipio: was Romulus king of barbarians?” L. “If, as the Greeks say, everyone is either Greek or barbarian, I fear he was king of barbarians. But if that name is to be assigned by character rather than language, I think the Greeks no less barbarous than the Romans.” And Scipio said, “Yet for our present inquiry we are asking about dispositions, not nationality. For if men both sensible and not ancient wished to have kings, the witnesses I employ are neither exceedingly old nor uncivilized and savage.”

SECTION 59

Chapter 38

Then Laelius said, “I see you are well supplied with testimony, Scipio; but with me, as with a good judge, arguments carry more weight than witnesses.” Then Scipio said, “Use an argument, then, Laelius, from your own experience.” “What experience?” he asked. S. “If ever, by chance, you have found yourself angry with someone.” L. “More often, indeed, than I would wish.” S. “Well? When you are angry, do you permit that anger to rule your mind?” L. “Certainly not, by Hercules,” he said. “I imitate the famous Archytas of Tarentum. When he came to his country estate and found everything otherwise than he had ordered, he said to his overseer, ‘You wretch! I would have beaten you to death by now, if I were not angry.’” “Excellent,” said Scipio.

SECTION 60

“So Archytas evidently, and rightly, regarded anger in rebellion against reason as a kind of insurrection in the mind, and wished to quell it by judgment. Add greed, add hunger for power and glory, add lusts: you see that if there is royal government in human minds, one thing will rule—judgment, of course, for that is the mind’s best part. When judgment rules, there is no room for lust, none for anger, none for rashness.” L. “That is so,” he said. S. “Then you approve of a mind so disposed?” L. “Nothing more,” he said. S. “Then you would not approve if judgment were driven out and lusts, which are innumerable, or fits of anger controlled everything?” L. “I should consider nothing more miserable than that mind, or a person with such a mind.” S. “Then you wish all the parts of the mind to live under kingship, governed by judgment?” L. “That is certainly my wish.” S. “Why, then, do you hesitate over your opinion of the commonwealth? For we can now understand that if its management is transferred to several men, there will be no sovereign command; and unless that command is one, there can be none.”

SECTION 61

Chapter 39

Then Laelius said, “What difference, I ask you, is there between one and several, if the several possess justice?” And Scipio said, “Since I have seen, Laelius, that my witnesses do not greatly move you, I shall keep using you as a witness to prove my claim.” “Me?” he said. “How?” S. “Because I noticed recently, when we were at your place at Formiae, that you strictly enjoined your household slaves to obey one man’s orders.” L. “The overseer’s, of course.” S. “Well? At home, do several men manage your affairs?” L. “On the contrary, one,” he said. S. “Well? Does anyone other than you rule the whole household?” L. “Certainly not.” S. “Why, then, do you not concede the same in the commonwealth: that the rule of single men, provided they are just, is best?” L. “I am being brought almost to agreement,” he said.

SECTION 62

Chapter 40

And Scipio said, “You will agree all the more, Laelius, if I pass to greater matters, leaving aside the comparisons: that it is better to entrust a ship to one helmsman and a patient to one physician than to many, provided each is worthy of his craft.” L. “What are those greater matters?” S. “Well? Do you not see that the violence and pride of Tarquin alone made the royal title hateful to this people?” L. “I certainly do,” he said. S. “Then you also see something on which I expect to say more as our discussion proceeds: after Tarquin’s expulsion the people exulted in a strange excess of unaccustomed freedom. Then innocent men were driven into exile, then the property of many was plundered, then came annual consuls, then the lowering of the fasces before the people, then appeals in all cases, then the secessions of the plebs; in short, most things were managed so that everything lay in the people’s hands.” L. “It is as you say,” he said.

SECTION 63

“Yes,” said Scipio, “in peace and leisure; for we may run wild while we have nothing to fear, as on a ship, or often even in a slight illness. But just as a voyager, when the sea suddenly begins to bristle, and a patient, when his illness grows worse, implore one man’s aid, so our people in peace and at home gives orders and threatens its very magistrates, resists, appeals, seeks the people’s judgment; in war it obeys as it would a king. Safety carries more weight than pleasure. In more serious wars, indeed, our ancestors wished all command to rest with single men, without even a colleague; their very title indicates the force of their authority. For a dictator takes his name from being ‘named’; but in our books, Laelius, you see him called ‘master of the people.’” L. “I do,” he said. And Scipio said, “Wisely, then, those men of old […]”

[…]

SECTION 64

Chapter 41

“[…] When a people has lost a just king, ‘long does longing possess their hearts,’ as Ennius says, ‘after the death of the best of kings’;at the same time among

“Themselves they speak thus: ‘O Romulus, godlike Romulus,’

“‘What a guardian of your country the gods begot in you!’

“‘O father, O begetter, O blood sprung from the gods!’They called those whom they had justly obeyed neither owners nor masters, nor, finally, even kings, but guardians of their country, fathers, gods—and not without reason. For what do they add?You brought us forth within the bounds of light.They thought their life, honor, and glory had been given them by the king’s justice. The same feeling would have remained in their descendants if the kings had remained alike. But you see that one man’s injustice brought down that entire form of commonwealth.” L. “I do indeed,” he said, “and I am eager to learn those cycles of change, no less in every commonwealth than in our own.”

SECTION 65

Chapter 42

And Scipio said, “Certainly, when I have given my views on the form of commonwealth I most approve, I must discuss constitutional changes more closely, although I think they will by no means readily occur in that commonwealth. But the first and surest change in this royal form is this: when the king begins to be unjust, that form perishes at once, and that same man is a tyrant—the worst form of government, and the closest neighbor of the best. If the best men overthrow him, as commonly happens, the commonwealth has the second of the three constitutions: for there is a kind of royal, that is, paternal, council of leading men who care well for the people. But if the people itself kills or expels the tyrant, it is fairly restrained so long as it retains feeling and sense, rejoices in its achievement, and wishes to preserve the commonwealth it has established for itself. If ever, however, the people has assaulted a just king or stripped him of his kingdom, or, as happens more often, has tasted the blood of the best men and subjected the whole commonwealth to its pleasure—do not imagine that any sea or fire is so great that it is not easier to calm than a multitude unbridled by insolence—then comes about what Plato has so vividly described, if only I can express it in Latin. It is difficult, but I shall try.”

SECTION 66

Chapter 43

“For he says, ‘When the people’s insatiable throat is parched with thirst for freedom, and, served by bad cupbearers, it thirstily drinks freedom not mixed in due measure but excessively undiluted, then, unless its magistrates and leaders are very mild and yielding, and serve it freedom lavishly, it pursues, accuses, and arraigns them, calling them overmighty men, kings, tyrants.’ I think these words are familiar to you.” L. “Very familiar indeed,” he said.

SECTION 67

S. “Then these follow: ‘Those who obey their leaders are harassed by that people and called willing slaves; but those who, while holding office, wish to be like private citizens, and private citizens who make sure that no distinction remains between citizen and magistrate, they exalt with praises and heap with honors. In a commonwealth of this sort everything must be full of freedom, every private household must be free of authority, and this evil must extend even to the beasts. Finally a father must fear his son, a son disregard his father, and all shame be absent, so that they may be entirely free; it must make no difference whether one is a citizen or a foreigner. The teacher must fear and flatter his pupils, and the pupils scorn their teachers; young men must assume the gravity of the old, and the old descend to the young men’s games, so as not to be disagreeable or oppressive to them. As a result, even slaves behave with greater freedom, wives have the same rights as husbands, and amid such freedom even dogs and horses, and finally donkeys, run into people so freely that one must step out of their way. Thus,’ he says, ‘from this boundless license the result is that the citizens’ minds grow so fastidious and delicate that they become angry and cannot bear the slightest exercise of authority. From this they begin to disregard even the laws, so that they may be entirely without a master.’”

SECTION 68

Chapter 44

Then Laelius said, “You have rendered precisely what he said.” S. “And to return now to the author from whom my account comes: he says that out of this excessive license, which they think the only freedom, a tyrant springs and is, as it were, born from a root. For just as the excessive power of leaders brings about their destruction, so freedom itself brings slavery upon this excessively free people. Thus all excesses, whether they have flourished in the weather, in the fields, or in bodies, generally turn into their opposites. This happens especially in commonwealths, and that excessive freedom collapses into excessive slavery for peoples and individuals alike. And so out of this utmost freedom a tyrant is born, and that most unjust and harshest slavery. For from this unruly, or rather savage, people there is usually chosen some bold, unprincipled leader against those leading men already crushed and driven from their places. He brazenly persecutes men who have often served the commonwealth well, showering the people with gifts from others’ property and his own. Since threats confront him as a private citizen, he is given commands, and these are renewed; such men are even surrounded with bodyguards, like Pisistratus at Athens. At last they become tyrants over the very men who have raised them up. If good men overthrow them, as often happens, the state revives. But if reckless men do so, there arises that faction, a different breed of tyrants; and the same often springs from that splendid rule of the best, when some depravity has turned the leaders themselves from their course. Thus they snatch the government of the commonwealth from one another like a ball: tyrants from kings, leaders or peoples from tyrants, and factions or tyrants from these. The same form of commonwealth is never retained for long.”

SECTION 69

Chapter 45

“Since this is so, of the three original forms the royal is far superior in my judgment; but superior even to the royal will be the form balanced and blended from the three best kinds of commonwealth. For I approve of having something preeminent and royal in the commonwealth, something else assigned and allotted to the authority of its leading men, and certain matters reserved for the multitude’s judgment and will. This constitution has, first, a great measure of equality, which free men can scarcely do without for long; next, stability. For those original forms readily turn into their corresponding vices, so that a king becomes a master, the best men a faction, the people a mob and a chaos; and the forms themselves are often exchanged for new forms. But in this united and moderately blended constitution of the commonwealth, that scarcely happens without great faults in the leading men. For there is no cause for revolution where each is firmly established in his own rank, and beneath him there is no place into which he may plunge and fall.”

SECTION 70

Chapter 46

“But I fear, Laelius, and you, my dearest and wisest friends, that if I remain longer with this kind of discussion, my speech may seem that of someone instructing and teaching, rather than considering the matter together with you. I shall therefore enter upon things known to everyone, but long studied by us. For this is my judgment, my conviction, my assertion: no commonwealth of them all, in its constitution, distribution of powers, or discipline, can be compared with the one our fathers left us, having themselves received it from their ancestors. If you agree, then, since you wished to hear from me too what you already understood yourselves, I shall show both what it is like and that it is the best. Having set out our commonwealth as a model, I shall, if I can, fit to it the whole discussion I must undertake concerning the best condition of a state. If I can keep to this and accomplish it, I shall, in my opinion, have amply fulfilled the task Laelius has assigned me.”

SECTION 71

Chapter 47

Then Laelius said, “It is truly your task, Scipio, and yours alone. For who could speak better than you about our ancestors’ institutions, when your own ancestors are so distinguished? Or about the best condition of a state? If we possess it, who could then be more eminent than you—though no one is even now? Or about counsels that provide for the future, when, by driving off two terrors of this city, you have provided for all time?”

SECTION 1

Chapter 1

[…] would have freed it from the attack. Nor would C. Duelius, A. Atilius, and L. Metellus have freed it from the terror of Carthage. The two Scipios wouldn’t have put out the spreading fire of the Second Punic War with their own blood. When it flared up again with greater forces, Q. Maximus wouldn’t have weakened it, M. Marcellus wouldn’t have crushed it, and P. Africanus wouldn’t have torn it away from this city’s gates and driven it inside the enemy’s walls. As for M. Cato, a man without a famous name or family background in high office, he certainly could have enjoyed a quiet life at Tusculum, a healthy spot close by. All of us with the same aims look to him as a model of hard work and good conduct. But this madman, as those people think him, preferred to be tossed about in these waves and storms into extreme old age, though nothing forced him to. He could instead have enjoyed a wonderfully pleasant life of peace and leisure. I’m leaving out countless men, each of whom saved this country. And since they aren’t far removed from living memory, I’ll stop naming them, so no one complains that I’ve left out either him or someone in his family. I insist on just this one point: nature has given human beings such a strong need to do good, and such a strong love of protecting everyone’s safety, that this force has overcome every attraction of pleasure and leisure.

SECTION 2

Chapter 2

Nor is it enough to possess virtue, as if it were some skill, without using it. A skill can still be kept through knowledge alone even when you do not use it. Virtue, however, consists entirely in its use. Its greatest use is governing a state and carrying out in practice, not just in words, the very things these people preach in their corners. No sound and honorable statement made by philosophers fails to have its origin and confirmation in the people who established laws for communities. Where did devotion to duty come from, and who gave us religious practice? Where did the law of nations come from, or what we call civil law? Where did justice, trustworthiness, and fairness come from? What about decency, self-control, avoiding disgrace, and seeking praise and honor? What about courage in hardship and danger? Surely these came from the people who first shaped them through teaching, then reinforced some through custom and gave others the force of law.

SECTION 3

They even tell us that Xenocrates, a particularly distinguished philosopher, was asked what his students gained from him. He answered that they learned to do willingly what the laws would force them to do. So the citizen who uses his authority and the penalties of law to make everyone do what philosophers can barely persuade a few people to do deserves preference even over the teachers who discuss these questions. What lecture of theirs is so polished that it should be ranked above a state well organized through public law and custom? Just as I think “great and powerful cities,” as Ennius calls them, should rank above little villages and forts, so I think the people who guide those cities with their judgment and authority rank far above people with no part in public affairs, even in wisdom itself. We feel a particularly strong drive to increase the resources of the human race. We work through our planning and effort to make human life safer and richer, and nature itself spurs us toward this satisfaction. So let us keep to the course that the best people have always followed. Let us not listen to the signals sounding a retreat, which aim to call back even those who have already advanced.

SECTION 4

Chapter 3

Opponents answer these clear, solid arguments by first pointing to the hard work needed to defend the country. That's hardly an obstacle for anyone alert and hardworking. Even in ordinary studies, duties, or business, it should count for nothing, let alone in such great matters. Next they add the risks to life. They confront brave men with a shameful fear of death. Brave men usually think it's worse to let nature and old age wear them away. They'd rather have the chance to give their lives for their country above all. After all, they must give those lives back to nature anyway. But our opponents think they have plenty to say, and say it well, when they list famous men's misfortunes. They recount the wrongs these men suffered from ungrateful fellow citizens.

SECTION 5

That's why they bring up these Greek examples. Miltiades defeated and crushed the Persians, yet died in chains among his own citizens. He had survived the enemy's weapons. The wounds on the front of his body, received in that glorious victory, hadn't yet healed. Themistocles was driven out of the country he'd freed and frightened into flight. He didn't escape to the Greek harbors he'd saved. Instead, he sought shelter in the foreign lands he'd devastated. Examples aren't lacking of how fickle and cruel the Athenians were to their greatest citizens. These practices began and became common among them. We're told they even spilled over into our own very steady country;

SECTION 6

people point to Camillus’s exile, the hostility Ahala faced, the resentment against Nasica, Laenas’s expulsion, Opimius’s conviction, Metellus’s flight, the terrible disaster that struck C. Marius and the killing of leading citizens, or the deaths of many of those men that followed soon afterward. And now they don’t even leave my name out. I suppose it’s because they think my judgment and the risks I took kept them alive and at peace that they complain about me even more bitterly—and more lovingly. But I couldn’t easily say why, when they themselves cross seas to study or see the sights […]

SECTION 7

Chapter 4

[…] I’d sworn it was safe, as I left office as consul, at a public meeting where the Roman people took the same oath. I could easily offset all the worry and distress caused by the wrongs done to me. In fact, my troubles brought more honor than hardship, and less distress than glory. The good people’s longing for me gave me more joy than the bad people’s delight gave me pain. But if things had turned out otherwise, as I said, how could I complain? In return for my great achievements, nothing had happened to me that I hadn’t foreseen or that was worse than I’d expected. I could have gained more from a quiet life than other people, because of the varied pleasures of the studies I’d pursued since childhood. Or, if something especially harsh happened to everyone, I could have faced the same fate as the rest, rather than being singled out. Yet I didn’t hesitate to face the fiercest storms, almost the lightning bolts themselves, to save my fellow citizens. By putting myself in danger, I won a peaceful life for everyone else.

SECTION 8

Our country did not give us birth and bring us up on the understanding that it would expect no support from us in return. It was not simply to serve our interests, providing a safe refuge for our leisure and a peaceful place to rest. Instead, it claims for its own use the greatest and largest share of our spirit, ability, and judgment. It leaves us for private use only as much as it can spare.

SECTION 9

Chapter 5

Then there are the excuses they fall back on to enjoy their leisure more easily. These certainly do not deserve a hearing. They say that the people who enter public life are generally worthless. Being compared with them is degrading, while fighting them is painful and dangerous, especially when the crowd has been stirred up. So, they say, a wise person should not take the reins when he cannot restrain the crowd’s wild and uncontrolled impulses. Nor should a free person struggle against filthy, savage opponents and suffer the blows of their insults, or expose himself to wrongs that a wise person should not have to bear. As if good, brave, high-spirited people could have any better reason to enter public life than to avoid being ruled by the wicked, or having to watch those same people tear the state apart when they themselves cannot help it, however much they might wish to!

SECTION 10

Chapter 6

And who could ever accept this exception? They say a wise person won't take any part in government unless events and necessity force them. As if anyone could face a greater emergency than I did! What could I have done then if I hadn't been consul? And how could I have become consul without following the path I'd taken since childhood? That path took me, born into the equestrian class, to the highest office. So you can't help your country on the spot, or whenever you like, however great its danger. You must already hold a position that lets you do it.

SECTION 11

There’s something I always find especially strange in what educated people say. They claim they can’t steer a ship on a calm sea, because they’ve never learned and have never bothered to find out how. Yet these same people announce that they’ll take the helm when the biggest waves rise. They openly say, and even take great pride in saying, that they’ve never learned and don’t teach anything about how to set up or preserve governments. They think knowledge of these matters should be left to people with practical experience in that field, not to scholars and wise people. So how does it make sense for them to promise their services to the country only when necessity forces them to? They don’t know how to govern when no emergency is pressing, which is much easier. Even if it were true that a wise person doesn’t normally choose to take part in civic affairs, but would nevertheless accept that duty when circumstances forced them to, I’d still think they must not neglect this knowledge of public affairs. They need to have everything ready that they might someday have to use.

SECTION 12

Chapter 7

I have discussed this at some length because in these books I have undertaken a discussion of the state. To keep that discussion from being pointless, I had first to remove people’s hesitation about entering public life. Still, if anyone is influenced by the authority of philosophers, let them pay attention for a moment and listen to those with the greatest authority and reputation among the most learned people. Even those who took no part in government, I think, nevertheless performed a public service by their extensive inquiries and writings about the state. As for the seven whom the Greeks called wise men, I find that nearly all of them were deeply involved in public affairs. For there is no activity in which human virtue comes closer to divine power than founding new communities or preserving those already founded.

SECTION 13

Chapter 8

On these matters, since we ourselves have had the good fortune both to achieve something worth remembering in public life and, in explaining political principles, a certain ability, not just through experience but also through a love of learning and teaching † we were authorities. By contrast, some earlier men were expert debaters but had no achievements to show. Others did well in public life but were poor at explaining things. Still, we aren't to introduce some new theory of our own invention. Instead, we must recall a discussion among our country's most distinguished and wisest men, all from one generation. Publius Rutilius Rufus once described it to you and me, when you were still a young man. We were together at Smyrna for several days. That discussion left out almost nothing of great importance for understanding matters of every kind.

SECTION 14

Chapter 9

This Publius Africanus, Paulus's son, had decided to stay in his gardens during the Latin Festival. Tuditanus and Aquilius were consuls. His closest friends had said they'd visit him often during those days. On the festival morning, Quintus Tubero, his sister's son, arrived first. Scipio greeted him warmly and was pleased to see him. “What brings you here so early, Tubero?” he asked. “This holiday gave you a really good chance to get on with your studies.” He replied, “I can turn to my books at any time. They're never busy. But it's a real prize to catch you free, especially with the country in such turmoil.” Scipio said, “You've caught me all right. But by Hercules, I'm less occupied with work than I am in my mind.” He replied, “But you need to let your mind relax too. As we agreed, several of us are ready to spend all this free time with you, if it suits you.” Scipio: “I'd be glad to. That way, we'll be reminded of our interest in learning for once.”

SECTION 15

Chapter 10

He then said, “You're inviting me, in a way, and giving me hope you'll join in. So, Africanus, before the others arrive, shall we first look into that second sun reported in the senate? What exactly is it? Quite a few people say they've seen two suns, and they're not unreliable people. So it's less a question of refusing to believe them than of finding an explanation.” Scipio said, “If only we had our friend Panaetius with us! He's always keen to investigate things, and especially things in the sky. Still, Tubero—I'll tell you openly what I think—I don't quite agree with our friend about this whole field. He makes firm claims about things we can barely even guess the nature of. He speaks as if he could see them with his own eyes or actually hold them in his hand. That's another reason I usually think Socrates was wiser. He set aside all concerns like these. He said questions about nature either went beyond human reason or had nothing at all to do with human life.”

SECTION 16

Then Tubero said, “Africanus, I don't know why tradition says Socrates rejected all this kind of discussion. Supposedly, he only asked questions about how we live and behave. But who could we name as a more reliable source about him than Plato? In many passages of Plato’s books, Socrates speaks quite differently. Even when discussing behavior, virtues, or government, he tries to bring in numbers, geometry, and musical harmony, as Pythagoras did.” Then Scipio said, “That's true. But Tubero, I believe you've heard about Plato’s travels after Socrates died. He first went to Egypt to learn, then hurried to Italy and Sicily. He wanted to learn all about Pythagoras’ discoveries. He spent much time with Archytas of Tarentum and Timaeus of Locri, and obtained notebooks from Philolaus. At that time, Pythagoras’ name still carried weight in those places. Plato devoted himself both to Pythagoras’ followers and to their studies. But he loved Socrates above everyone else and wanted to credit him with everything. So he combined Socrates’ charm and subtle conversation with Pythagoras’ hard-to-follow ideas and deep learning across so many fields.”

SECTION 17

Chapter 11

Scipio had just said this when he spotted L. Furius arriving unexpectedly. He greeted him, took his hand very warmly, and seated him on his own couch. P. Rutilius, who told us about this conversation, had arrived at the same time. Scipio greeted him too and asked him to sit beside Tubero. Then Furius said, “What are you all doing? Have we interrupted some conversation of yours by coming in?” “Not at all,” Africanus replied. “You like exploring the very sort of subject Tubero started asking about a little earlier. Our friend Rutilius here sometimes explored questions like this with me even beneath Numantia’s walls.” “What subject had come up?” asked Philus. Scipio replied, “Those two suns. Philus, I'm keen to hear what you think about them.”

SECTION 18

Chapter 12

He had just said this when a boy announced that Laelius was coming to see him and had already left home. Scipio put on his shoes and clothes and left his bedroom. After walking a little in the porch, he greeted Laelius as he arrived, along with his companions. They were Spurius Mummius, whom Scipio especially liked, and Laelius’ sons-in-law, C. Fannius and Quintus Scaevola. These were well-educated young men, now old enough to be quaestors. After greeting them all, he turned back along the porch and put Laelius in the middle of the group. Their friendship had a sort of rule about this. On military service, Laelius honored Africanus like a god because of his outstanding military fame. At home, Scipio in turn treated Laelius like a father because he was older. They exchanged just a few words as they walked back and forth once or twice. Scipio was very pleased and grateful that they had come. Since it was winter, they agreed to sit in the sunniest part of the little lawn. As they were about to do this, M’. Manilius arrived. He was a man of sound judgment whom they all liked and loved. Scipio and the others greeted him very warmly, and he sat beside Laelius.

SECTION 19

Chapter 13

Then Philus said, “I don't think their arrival means we need a different subject. Instead, we should look more closely at this one and say something worth their hearing.” At this Laelius said, “What were you discussing? What conversation have we interrupted?” Philus: “Scipio had asked me what I thought about the fact that two suns had been seen.” Laelius: “Really, Philus? We're asking what happens in the sky. Does that mean we've already settled everything about our homes and our country?” Philus replied, “Doesn’t knowing what goes on at home matter to our households? Home isn't the space our own walls enclose, but this whole universe. The gods gave it to us as a home and country to share with them. Besides, without knowing about these things, we must stay ignorant about many important matters. Learning about things and thinking about them is itself a pleasure to me. By Hercules, Laelius, it's the same for you and everyone eager for wisdom.”

SECTION 20

Then Laelius said, “I won’t stand in the way, especially since we are on holiday. But can we hear something, or have we arrived too late?” Philus: “Nothing has been discussed yet. Since the subject is still untouched, Laelius, I would gladly let you discuss it.” Laelius: “No, let us hear you—unless Manilius thinks we should draw up a court order between the two suns, allowing each to possess the sky on the same terms as before.” Then Manilius said, “Are you still making fun of that profession, Laelius? In the first place, you excel at it yourself. And without it, no one can know what belongs to him and what belongs to someone else. But we can deal with that later. For now, let us hear Philus. I see he is already being consulted on greater matters than I am, or Publius Mucius.”

SECTION 21

Chapter 14

Then Philus said, “I won’t bring you anything new, or anything I have thought up or discovered myself. I remember Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, a very learned man, as you know, being told that this same phenomenon had been seen. He happened to be visiting Marcus Marcellus, who had been consul with him, and asked for a model of the heavens to be brought out. Marcus Marcellus’s grandfather had taken it from the immensely rich and beautifully furnished city of Syracuse after capturing it, though he brought home nothing else from all that plunder. I had very often heard this model mentioned because of Archimedes’ fame, but I was not particularly impressed by its appearance. The other one, also made by Archimedes and placed by the same Marcellus in the Temple of Virtue, was more attractive and better known to the public.

SECTION 22

But once Gallus began explaining how this machine worked, with such expert knowledge, I judged that the Sicilian’s genius went beyond what seemed humanly possible. Gallus said the invention of the other sphere, solid all the way through, was old. Thales of Miletus had first made it on a lathe. Later, Eudoxus of Cnidus, a pupil of Plato according to Gallus, marked that same sphere with constellations and stars fixed in the sky. Many years later, Aratus took all its patterns and markings from Eudoxus and described them in verse. He did this through a gift for poetry, not knowledge of astronomy. But that solid sphere couldn't represent this other kind of model. This one included the movements of the sun, moon, and the five stars called wanderers, or rovers. The amazing thing about Archimedes’ invention was this. He had worked out how one turn could maintain their uneven, varied paths despite their very different movements. As Gallus moved this bronze model, the moon followed the sun. This took as many turns as it takes days in the actual sky. As a result, the same eclipse of the sun occurred in the model. And the moon then reached the point that was Earth’s shadow, when the sun opposite […]

SECTION 23

Chapter 15

“[…] was that I liked the man myself. I also knew my father Paulus had thought very highly of him and loved him. I remember being in camp as a very young man, when my father was consul in Macedonia. Our army was troubled by religious worries and fear. On a clear night, the bright full moon had suddenly gone dark. He was our deputy commander then, about a year before he was elected consul. The next day, he didn't hesitate to explain openly in camp that this wasn't an omen. It had happened then and would always happen at fixed times. This happened whenever the sun was so placed that its light couldn't reach the moon.” “Really?” said Tubero. “Could he teach this to men who were practically peasants? Did he dare say this to people with no education?” Scipio: “He certainly did, and with great […] […]”

SECTION 24

neither an arrogant display nor a speech out of character for so serious a man. He achieved something important: he removed empty religious fear and terror from men who had been deeply troubled.

SECTION 25

Chapter 16

“People say Pericles explained something similar during that great war. The Athenians and Spartans were fighting each other with all their strength. He led his city in influence, speaking skill, and judgment. The sun went dark, darkness fell suddenly, and the Athenians were terribly afraid. He explained to his fellow citizens what he'd learned from Anaxagoras, whose student he'd been. This happens at a set time and must happen when the moon moves fully in front of the sun's disk. So it doesn't happen at every new moon, but it can only happen at a particular time during a new moon. By talking them through his reasons, he freed the people from fear. This explanation was new and unfamiliar then: the sun goes dark when the moon blocks it. They say Thales of Miletus was the first to recognize this. Later, our own Ennius knew it too. He writes that around the three hundred fiftieth year after Rome was founded,On the Nones of June the moon blocked the sun, and night fell.The calculations and skill involved are so great that earlier solar eclipses have been worked out from that date. We find it recorded in Ennius and the Great Annals. Those calculations go back to the eclipse on the Nones of Quinctilis, when Romulus was king. Even if nature carried Romulus off to a human death during that darkness, people say his fine qualities raised him to heaven.”

SECTION 26

Chapter 17

Then Tubero said, “Do you see, Africanus, what seemed otherwise to you a little while ago, […]” […], which others see. And what could someone who has studied these realms of the gods think impressive in human affairs? Or lasting, once he knows what's eternal? Or glorious, once he's seen how small the earth is—first the whole earth, then the part of it people live in—and how we, stuck in a tiny part of it and completely unknown to most peoples, still hope our name will fly and travel far and wide?

SECTION 27

“How lucky we should think a man who doesn't count or describe these things as goods: land, buildings, livestock, and huge amounts of silver and gold! He sees that they offer little enjoyment, little use, and no secure ownership. Often, even the worst people own enormous amounts of them. Only he can truly claim everything as his own. His right isn't that of a Roman citizen, but that of a wise person. It rests not on a civil contract, but on nature's law, which applies to everyone. This law allows nothing to belong to anyone who doesn't know how to handle and use it. He sees our military commands and consulships as necessary jobs, not things to want. They should be taken on to do a duty, not sought for rewards or fame. Finally, he can say about himself what my grandfather Africanus often said, as Cato writes: ‘I never do more than when I'm doing nothing. I'm never less alone than when I'm alone.’”

SECTION 28

“Who can really think that Dionysius did more when he worked in every way to rob his fellow citizens of their freedom than his fellow citizen Archimedes did when, apparently doing nothing, he made that very model? And surely people who have no one they want to talk to in the crowded Forum are more alone than those who, with no one watching, either talk to themselves or seem to attend a gathering of the most learned people as they enjoy their discoveries and writings. Who could think anyone richer than a person who lacks nothing that nature requires, or more powerful than one who obtains everything he wants? Who could be happier than someone free of every emotional disturbance, or more secure in his fortune than someone who owns things he can, as they say, carry away with him even from a shipwreck? What command, office, or kingdom could be better than looking down on all human affairs and regarding them as inferior to wisdom, while thinking about nothing but what is eternal and divine? Such a person is convinced that others are called human, but only those refined by the arts proper to humanity truly are human;

SECTION 29

“So I find that saying especially good, whether Plato said it or someone else did. They say a storm carried him from the open sea to an unfamiliar land and a deserted shore. The others were afraid because they didn't know the place. He noticed some geometric shapes drawn in the sand. When he saw them, he called out for them to cheer up: he could see traces of human beings. Clearly, he judged that by the signs of learning, not the planted fields he saw. That's why, Tubero, I've always liked learning, educated people, and these studies of yours.”

SECTION 30

Chapter 18

Then Laelius said, “I certainly don't dare answer those points, Scipio, and not so much you or Philus or Manilius. […]

“[…] In his own father's family there was that friend of ours, someone for him to take as a model,‘A remarkably wise man, sharp Sextus Aelius,’who was ‘remarkably wise’ and ‘sharp,’ as Ennius called him, not because he investigated things he would never find out, but because his answers freed the people who asked him from worry and trouble. Whenever he argued against Gallus's studies, he always had these words of Achilles from Iphigenia on the tip of his tongue:‘What good is watching the astronomers' signs in the sky,

When a goat or a scorpion or some other beast's name rises!

Nobody looks at what's in front of their feet; they scan the reaches of the sky.’And he also used to say—I listened to him a lot, and gladly—that Pacuvius's Zethus was much too hostile to learning. He preferred Ennius's Neoptolemus, who says he ‘wants to do philosophy, but in small doses; he doesn't like doing it extensively.’ But if you're so delighted with Greek studies, there are other fields more worthy of free citizens and wider in their reach, which we can apply to everyday life or even to government itself. Those subjects you've mentioned, if they're worth anything at all, are worth this: they sharpen young people's minds a little and, so to speak, prod them, so they can learn more important things more easily.”

SECTION 31

Chapter 19

Then Tubero said, “I don't disagree with you, Laelius, but I'd like to know what you mean by more important things.” Laelius: “I'll tell you, by Hercules, though you may look down on me for it. You've asked Scipio about those things in the sky, while I think we should look more closely into what's right in front of our eyes. Why, I ask, does someone who is Lucius Paulus's grandson, with this man as his uncle, born into a family of the highest standing and a state as famous as ours, ask how two suns appeared, but not why one state has two senates and now almost two separate peoples? As you can see, Tiberius Gracchus's death—and, even before that, his whole approach as tribune—split a single people into two sides. Scipio's critics and those who envy him are still keeping one part of the senate at odds with you, under the leadership of Metellus and Publius Mucius. Publius Crassus and Appius Claudius started this, but their deaths haven't changed anything. And they won't let this man, the only one who can help, tackle these grave dangers: the allies and the Latins stirred up, treaties broken, the deeply divisive three-man commission plotting something new every day, and respectable men thrown into turmoil.”

SECTION 32

“So, young men, if you'll listen to me, don't be afraid of a second sun. Either there can't be one, or let it be real, just as it seemed to be, provided it doesn't cause trouble. Either we can know nothing about such things or, even if we know all about them, that knowledge can't make us better or happier. But having a united senate and people is possible, and not having them united causes serious trouble. Here we know and see that the opposite is true: if we achieve that unity, we'll live both better and happier lives.”

SECTION 33

Chapter 20

Then Mucius said, “What do you think we should learn, then, Laelius, so we can achieve exactly what you're asking for?” Laelius: “The skills that let us be useful to our state. I think that's wisdom's finest service and the greatest proof—or duty—of virtue. So, to devote these holidays above all to discussions that will really help our state, let's ask Scipio to explain what he thinks is the best form of government. Then we'll look into other questions. Once we understand those, I hope we'll find our way to these very issues and work out how to deal with the problems facing us now.”

SECTION 34

Chapter 21

When Philus, Manilius, and Mummius had all strongly agreed with this […]

SECTION 34(fr1)

(Diom. GL I, p. 365 Keil) “There's no model we'd rather have our state resemble.”

(Non. p. 85M, p. 289M) “So, if you don't mind, bring your discussion down from the sky to matters closer to home.”

“[…] I wanted this not just because it was right that the state's leading man should be the one to speak about the state, but also because I remembered how often you used to debate with Panaetius in front of Polybius, two Greeks with an exceptional knowledge of politics. You used to bring together many arguments and show that by far the best form of government was the one our ancestors had left us. Since you're better prepared for that discussion, you'll be doing all of us a favor—and let me speak for the others too—if you explain what you think about government.”

SECTION 35

Chapter 22

Then Scipio said, “I really cannot say that I usually think about any subject more intensely or carefully than the very one you are putting to me, Laelius. I see that every craftsman who excels at his own work thinks, plans, and cares about nothing except getting better at his particular craft. My parents and ancestors have left me just one task: looking after and running the state. Wouldn’t I be admitting that I was lazier than any craftsman if I put less effort into the greatest skill than they put into the smallest?”

SECTION 36

“But I'm not satisfied with what Greece's greatest and wisest men left us in writing on this question. Nor do I dare put my own views above theirs. So I ask you to listen to me in this light. I'm not completely unfamiliar with Greek thought. Nor do I put it above our own, especially on this subject. I'm just a toga-wearing Roman, given a decent education through my father's care. I've been eager to learn since childhood. Still, experience and Roman teaching have taught me far more than books.”

SECTION 37

Chapter 23

Here Philus said, “No, by Hercules, Scipio, I don't doubt that no one has surpassed you in ability. And in experience of the greatest affairs of state, you've easily outdone everyone. We also know what studies you've always pursued. So if, as you say, you've also applied your mind to this organized field of study—this art, you might call it—I'm very grateful to Laelius. I expect what you say will be much richer than everything the Greeks have written.” Then Scipio said, “You're certainly setting very high expectations for my speech. That's the heaviest burden anyone about to discuss important subjects can carry.” And Philus said, “However high they are, you'll exceed them, as you always do. There's no danger you'll run out of things to say when you're discussing government.”

SECTION 38

Chapter 24

Here Scipio said, “I'll do what you want as well as I can. I'll begin the discussion by following a rule that I think we should use whenever we discuss anything, if we want to avoid confusion. Once we agree on what to call the subject we're examining, we should explain what that name means. Only when we've agreed on that should we begin the conversation. We can never understand what something is like until we've first understood what it is. So, since we're examining the state, let's first see what this thing we're examining actually is.” Laelius agreed, and Africanus continued, “But in discussing something so clear and familiar, I won't go back to the basic starting points that scholars usually use in these matters. I won't begin with the first union of a man and a woman, then move on to their children and family relationships, repeatedly defining what each thing is and all the ways its name is used. I'm speaking to men with good judgment who've served in the greatest state with the highest distinction, both in war and at home. So I won't let my speech overshadow the subject itself. I haven't taken this on to go through everything like a teacher, and I don't promise that no little detail will be left out of this conversation.” Then Laelius said, “That's exactly the kind of discussion I'm looking forward to.”

SECTION 39

Chapter 25

“So,” Africanus said, “a state is the people's business. But a people isn't just any collection of human beings gathered together in any way. It's a large group joined together by agreement on law and by shared interests. Their first reason for coming together isn't so much weakness as a natural tendency for human beings to gather together. Our species doesn't live alone or wander by itself. It's born in such a way that not even when everything is plentiful […]

SECTION 40fr

(August. epist. 138.10) “In a short time, a scattered and wandering crowd had become a community through harmony.”

SECTION 41

Chapter 26

“[…] certain seeds, so to speak, and no foundation could be found for either the other virtues or the state itself. These groups, then, formed for the reason I've explained, first settled in a particular place to make their homes. After enclosing it with the help of the terrain and their own labor, they called this cluster of buildings a town or city, marked out by shrines and public spaces. So every people—a large group of the kind I've described—every political community, which is a people organized, and every state, which, as I said, is the people's business, needs some guiding judgment if it's going to last. That judgment must always be directed first toward the reason that brought the community into being.

SECTION 42

“Next, it must be assigned either to one person or to certain chosen people, or taken up by the whole population, everyone together. So when supreme control of everything belongs to one person, we call that person a king and that form of government a monarchy. When it belongs to chosen people, we say that the community is ruled by the judgment of its best citizens. A popular government, as it is called, is one in which everything belongs to the people. Any of these three kinds, if it maintains the bond that first joined people together in political association, is not perfect or, in my opinion, the best, but is nevertheless tolerable, though one may be better than another. For a fair and wise king, or chosen leading citizens, or even the people themselves—though that is the least desirable arrangement—can apparently maintain a reasonably stable condition, provided no injustice or selfish desires intervene.

SECTION 43

Chapter 27

“But under kings, everyone else has too little share in the rights and decisions of the community. Under the rule of the best citizens, the population can hardly share in freedom, since it has no part in public decision-making or power. And when everything is managed by the people, however fair and restrained they may be, that very equality is unfair, since it recognizes no differences in standing. So even if Cyrus the Persian was an exceptionally just and wise king, I still don't think his state—the people's business, as I said before—was the most desirable kind, since it was governed by one man's nod and will. Even if the people of Massilia, who are under our protection, are governed with complete justice by chosen, leading citizens, their situation still has something like slavery about it. And if the Athenians at certain times did away with the Areopagus and acted only through the people's votes and decrees, their state didn't retain its proper dignity, since they had no distinct levels of standing.

SECTION 44

Chapter 28

“And I'm talking about these three forms of government when they aren't disrupted or mixed together, but each keeps its own form. Each has the faults I mentioned earlier, and then other destructive faults as well. Every one of these forms of government has a steep, slippery path to a closely related evil. Give that tolerable king—or, if you like, even lovable king—Cyrus, whom I'll single out, the freedom to change his disposition, and the utterly cruel Phalaris is just underneath. Rule by one man easily slides downhill into something like his rule. Close beside the government of Massilia by a few leading citizens lies the united faction of thirty men that once existed at Athens. And then the power of the Athenians themselves over everything, so we needn't look for others, having been turned to the mob's madness and lawlessness […]

SECTION 45

Chapter 29

“[…] the worst, and from this can grow either rule by the best citizens, or that tyrannical rule by a faction, or monarchy, or even, very often, government by the people. And from that, in turn, one of the kinds I mentioned earlier usually grows. There are remarkable cycles—rounds, you might call them—of change and reversal in governments. It takes a wise person to understand them. But to see them coming while steering a state, controlling its course and keeping it in your own hands, takes a truly great citizen, a man who's almost godlike. So I think a fourth kind of government deserves the strongest approval: a balanced blend of the three I described first.”

SECTION 46

Chapter 30

Then Laelius said: “I know that's your view, Africanus. I've often heard you say so. Still, if you don't mind, I'd like to know which of those three forms of government you think best. After all, it might offer some help with […]”

SECTION 47

Chapter 31

“[…] Every state matches either the character or the wishes of its ruler. So freedom has no home except where the people hold the highest power. Nothing could be sweeter than freedom. And unless everyone has it equally, it isn't even freedom. But how can freedom be equal? Never mind a kingdom, where slavery isn't even hidden or in doubt. What about states where everyone is free only in name? People vote, hand out powers and public offices, and get courted and asked for support. But they give what they'd have to give even against their will. Others ask them for things they don't have themselves. They have no share in power, public decision-making, or the decisions of handpicked judges. These depend on ancient family lines or money. But among a free people, as in Rhodes or Athens, there's no citizen who […]”

SECTION 48

Chapter 32

[…] one or more men had become richer and more powerful than the rest of the people. They say it then arose from these men's contempt and arrogance, as the timid and weak gave way and submitted to the arrogance of the rich. But if peoples keep hold of their rights, they say that nothing is better, freer, or happier. The people control laws, trials, war, peace, treaties, every individual's life, and property. They think this alone is properly called a commonwealth, that is, the people's business. That is why the people's business is usually freed from the control of kings and aristocrats. Free peoples, on the other hand, do not ask for kings or for the power and resources of aristocrats.

SECTION 49

“They also say we shouldn't reject this whole form of government by a free people because of the faults of an unruly people. Nothing is more stable or secure than a united people that directs everything toward its own safety and freedom. Agreement comes most easily in a state where the same thing benefits everyone. Conflicts arise from differing interests, when different things suit different people. So when the senators held power, the state was never stable. Still less was it stable under kings, where, as Ennius says, ‘There's no sacred partnership, and no trust.’ Now, law is the bond that holds a society of citizens together, and the rights established by law are equal. So what rights can hold a society of citizens together when its citizens don't have equal standing? Even if we don't want to equalize wealth, and everyone's abilities can't be equal, surely people who are citizens of the same state should have equal rights. After all, what is a state but a partnership in rights? […] […]

SECTION 50

Chapter 33

“[…] They don't even think other states should get the names they want for themselves. Why call a man ‘king,’ using the title of Jupiter the Best? He wants to dominate or hold power alone, ruling over an oppressed people. Why not call him a tyrant instead? A tyrant can be kind just as easily as harsh. So the difference for the people is whether their master is friendly or harsh. Either way, they can't escape slavery. And how could Sparta ensure it had good, fair kings? This was when people thought its system of government was the best. Yet anyone born into the royal family had to be accepted as king. And who could stand the so-called ‘best men’? They gave themselves this name through their own elections, without the people's consent. How is that man judged the best? By learning, skills, interests […] […]”

SECTION 51

Chapter 34

“[…] If it does this randomly, it'll fall as quickly as a ship when a passenger chosen by lot takes the helm. But suppose a free people chooses whom to put in charge. It'll choose the best people, if it wants to survive. Clearly, states depend for their survival on the judgment of the best people. Nature has made people with the best character and courage lead weaker people. It has also made weaker people want to obey the best. But they say people's mistaken views have ruined this best form of government. People don't understand good character: few have it, and few can judge or recognize it. They think men with wealth and plenty of resources, and men of noble birth, are the best. Because of this popular mistake, a few people's wealth, not their character, begins to control the state. Those leaders cling fiercely to the name ‘best men.’ But they don't have the real thing. Without judgment and a proper way of living and leading others, wealth, status, and power are shameful and full of overbearing pride. No state looks uglier than one where the richest people count as the best.”

SECTION 52

“What could be finer than a state governed by excellence? The person who rules others is himself a slave to no desire. He has personally embraced all the things he trains his fellow citizens for and calls on them to do. He doesn't impose laws on the people that he doesn't obey himself. Instead, he holds up his own life as a law for his fellow citizens. If one man could adequately manage everything, there'd be no need for more. If everyone together could see what was best and agree on it, no one would look for specially chosen leaders. The difficulty of working out what to do shifted government from a king to several people; the people's mistakes and recklessness shifted it from the masses to a few. So the best men took the middle position between one man's limitations and the recklessness of the many. Nothing could be more balanced. With them looking after the state, the people must be as happy as can be, free from every worry or concern. They've entrusted their peace and quiet to others, whose job it is to protect it and never let the people think their leaders are neglecting their interests.

SECTION 53

“For the equality of rights that free peoples embrace can't be maintained (however unchecked and unrestrained peoples may be, they themselves single out many individuals for all kinds of favors, and they make sharp distinctions between people and their standing). And what they call equality is deeply unfair. When the same honor goes to the highest and the lowest—and every people is bound to have both—equality itself is deeply unfair. That can't happen in states governed by the best. These, Laelius, and others along the same lines, are roughly the arguments usually offered by those who praise this form of government most.”

SECTION 54

Chapter 35

Then Laelius said, “What about you, Scipio? Which of those three do you like best?” Scipio: “You're right to ask which of the three I like best. I don't approve of any one on its own. I prefer a blend of all three to any single one. But if I had to choose one simple form, I'd choose rule by a king […] […] […] is called here. The word ‘king’ sounds almost like a father's title. He cares for his citizens as his own children, and works harder to keep them safe than […] […] […] […] […] to be supported by the care of one man, the best and greatest.”

SECTION 55

“The best men step forward. They claim that they can do this same thing better: several men will have more good judgment than one, they say, but the same fairness and loyalty. But look! The people shout at the top of their voices that they do not want to obey either one man or a few. Nothing is sweeter than freedom, even for wild animals. Everyone lacks it if they serve either a king or the best men. So kings attract us through affection, the best men through judgment, and peoples through freedom. When we compare them, it is difficult to choose which we want most.” Laelius: “I agree,” he said. “But we can hardly work out the rest if you leave this question unfinished.”

SECTION 56

Chapter 36

Scipio: “Then let's follow Aratus. When he starts speaking about great matters, he thinks he should begin with Jupiter.” Laelius: “Which Jupiter? And what does this discussion have in common with that poem?” Scipio: “Just this,” he said, “that we should properly begin speaking with him. Everyone, educated or not, agrees he alone is king of all gods and humans—†to be polished.” “What?” said Laelius. And he replied, “What do you think, except what's right in front of us? Perhaps heads of states set up these beliefs to help everyday life. People were to believe one king ruled in heaven. As Homer says, he shook all Olympus with a nod. He was also held to be everyone's king and father. If so, this carries great weight, and many people back it up—if ‘many’ is a fair word for everyone. The nations agreed on this, plainly following their leaders' decisions: nothing is better than a king. After all, they think one god's will rules all the gods. Or perhaps we've learned that these beliefs rest on ignorant people's mistakes and are like made-up stories. Then let's listen to the teachers all educated people share, so to speak. It's as if they saw with their own eyes what we barely grasp by hearing about it.” “Who are these men?” said Laelius. And he replied, “The men who studied the nature of everything and understood that this whole universe, by a mind […] […]”

SECTION 58

Chapter 37

[…] “But if you like, Laelius, I'll give you witnesses who aren't too ancient or at all barbarian.” Laelius: “Those are the ones I want,” he said. Scipio: “Then do you see that this city has been without kings for less than four hundred years?” Laelius: “Yes, less.” Scipio: “Well, is four hundred years a very long lifetime for a city and its people?” Laelius: “It's barely grown up,” he said. Scipio: “So Rome had a king four hundred years ago?” Laelius: “Yes, and a proud one at that.” Scipio: “What about before him?” Laelius: “A very fair one, and then back in turn to Romulus. He was king six hundred years before our time.” Scipio: “So even he wasn't all that long ago?” Laelius: “Not at all. And Greece was already nearly old by then.” Scipio: “Tell me, Scipio, was Romulus king of barbarians?” Laelius: “The Greeks say everyone is either Greek or barbarian. If that's right, I'm afraid he was king of barbarians. But suppose that name depends on people's behavior, not their language. Then I think the Greeks are no less barbarian than the Romans.” And Scipio said, “But for our question, we're not asking about their race. We're asking what sort of people they were. Sensible people, not from long ago, wanted kings. So my witnesses are neither very ancient nor uncivilized and savage.”

SECTION 59

Chapter 38

Then Laelius said, “I see you've got plenty of witnesses, Scipio. But like a good judge, I care more about arguments than witnesses.” Then Scipio said, “Then use your own experience as an argument, Laelius.” “What experience?” he asked. Scipio: “Any time you happened to notice you were angry with someone.” Laelius: “Yes, more often than I'd like.” Scipio: “Well, when you're angry, do you let that anger rule your mind?” Laelius: “Certainly not, by Hercules,” he said. “I follow the example of Archytas of Tarentum. He once came to his country house and found everything done differently from his orders. He told his farm manager, ‘You miserable man! I'd have beaten you to death by now if I weren't angry.’” “Very good,” said Scipio.

SECTION 60

“So Archytas clearly saw anger fighting against reason as a kind of rebellion in the mind. He was right, and he wanted judgment to calm it down. Add greed. Add the wish to rule. Add the wish for fame. Add cravings. Then you see this: if the mind has a king, just one thing will rule it—judgment. That's the best part of the mind. When judgment rules, there's no room for cravings, no room for anger, no room for rashness.” Laelius: “That's right,” he said. Scipio: “So you approve of a mind arranged like that?” Laelius: “Yes, more than anything,” he said. Scipio: “Then you wouldn't approve if judgment were driven out and cravings, which are endless, or fits of anger controlled everything?” Laelius: “I'd find nothing more miserable than that mind, and nothing more miserable than a person with a mind like that.” Scipio: “So you want every part of the mind under a king, ruled by judgment?” Laelius: “Yes, that's what I want.” Scipio: “Then why aren't you sure what to think about government? If control is handed to several people, you can already see that there will be no ruling power. That power can only exist if it is one.”

SECTION 61

Chapter 39

Then Laelius said, “What difference is there, please, between one ruler and several, if the several are just?” Scipio replied, “Since I realized that my witnesses made little impression on you, Laelius, I will keep using you as a witness to prove what I say.” “Me? How?” he asked. Scipio: “Because recently, when we were at your place at Formiae, I noticed you giving your household strict orders to obey one person.” Laelius: “The manager, of course.” Scipio: “Well, at home, are several people in charge of your business?” Laelius: “No, just one,” he said. Scipio: “And does anyone else besides you govern the whole household?” Laelius: “Certainly not.” Scipio: “Then why not admit that the same is true in the state, and that government by individuals is best, provided they are just?” Laelius: “You are bringing me close to agreement,” he said.

SECTION 62

Chapter 40

And Scipio said: “You'll agree even more, Laelius, if I move on to bigger matters. I'll leave aside comparisons—for example, that it's better to entrust a ship to one captain and a sick person to one doctor than to several, provided they're qualified in their fields.” Laelius: “What bigger matters?” Scipio: “Well, don't you see that the outrageous behavior and arrogance of just one man, Tarquin, made these people hate the very title of king?” Laelius: “Yes, I do,” he said. Scipio: “Then you also see something I expect to say more about as our discussion goes on. Once Tarquin was driven out, the people exulted in freedom with a remarkable lack of restraint. Then innocent people were driven into exile. Then many people's property was plundered. Then consuls were appointed for a year at a time. Then the rods of office were lowered before the people. Then there were appeals to the people in every kind of case. Then the common people withdrew in protest more than once. In short, most things were done in a way that put everything in the people's hands.” Laelius: “It's as you say,” he said.

SECTION 63

“It certainly is,” said Scipio, “in peaceful, quiet times. You can fool around when you've nothing to fear, as on a ship, or often even during a mild illness. But when the sea suddenly grows rough, someone on board begs one person for help. A sick person does the same when the illness grows worse. It's the same with our people. In peacetime, at home, they give orders and threaten even their own officials. They refuse orders, appeal to other officials, and appeal to the people. But in war they obey as if under a king. Safety matters more than getting their own way. In more serious wars, our people have even wanted one man to hold full power, without a colleague. The very name of these men shows the strength of their power. A dictator gets that name because he is ‘named.’ But in our books, Laelius, you see him called ‘master of the people.’” Laelius: “I do,” he said. And Scipio said, “So, wisely, those people of long ago […]”

[…]

SECTION 64

Chapter 41

[…] “When a people loses a just king, ‘longing stays long in their hearts,’ as Ennius says, ‘after the death of an excellent king’;at the same time, among

Themselves they say, ‘Romulus, godlike Romulus,’

‘What a guardian of your country the gods brought into the world in you!’

‘Father, founder, blood descended from the gods!’They did not call the men they had justly obeyed owners or masters, or even kings. They called them guardians of their country, fathers, gods. And not without reason. What do they add?You brought us into the world of light.They believed that the king's justice had given them life, honor, and distinction. Their descendants would have kept the same feelings if the kings had remained the same kind of men. But you see that one man's injustice brought down that whole form of government.” Laelius: “I certainly do,” he said, “and I am eager to understand these cycles of change, not just in our state but in every state.”

SECTION 65

Chapter 42

And Scipio said, “Once I've explained what I think about the form of government I favor most, I'll certainly need to discuss changes in government more closely, though I think such changes would be very hard to bring about in that state. But the first and surest change in kingship is this. Once a king starts acting unjustly, that form of government immediately disappears, and the very same man is now a tyrant. That's the worst form of government, right next to the best. If the leading men overthrow him, as usually happens, the state takes on the second-best of the three forms. It has something like a royal council—that is, a fatherly council of leaders who look after the people's interests. But if the people themselves kill or drive out the tyrant, they show more restraint, as long as they stay sensible and sane. They're pleased with what they've done and want to protect the state they've set up themselves. But sometimes the people attack a just king or strip him of his kingship, or, as happens more often, get a taste of the leading men's blood and put the whole state at the mercy of their own whims. Don't imagine there's any sea or fire so fierce that it wouldn't be easier to bring under control than a crowd running wild with arrogance. Then what Plato described so vividly happens—if I can manage to put it into Latin. That's hard to do, but I'll try.”

SECTION 66

Chapter 43

“He says, ‘When the people's insatiable throat is parched with thirst for freedom, and using bad servants, it has thirstily drunk freedom not moderately diluted but far too strong, then it pursues, accuses, and denounces its officials and leaders, calling them overbearing men, kings, and tyrants, unless they are very mild and indulgent and provide it with freedom in generous quantities.’ I think you know this passage.” Laelius: “I certainly know it very well,” he said.

SECTION 67

Scipio: “So here's what follows: ‘The people attack those who obey their leaders and call them willing slaves. But officials who want to act like private citizens, and private citizens who make sure there's no difference between a private citizen and an official, get lavish praise and honors. So in a state like this everything has to be full of freedom. Every private home must be free of anyone's control, and this evil must reach even the animals. In short, fathers fear their sons, sons pay no attention to their fathers, and all shame disappears, so that they're completely free. It makes no difference whether someone is a citizen or a foreigner. Teachers fear their students and flatter them, while students look down on their teachers. Young people take on the authority of their elders, and old people lower themselves to the games of the young so as not to seem unpleasant and tiresome to them. As a result, even slaves behave more freely, wives have the same rights as their husbands, and in all this freedom even dogs and horses, and donkeys too, charge about so freely that people have to get out of their way. So,’ he says, ‘this unlimited license leads to a final result: the citizens become so touchy and soft that if the slightest authority is brought to bear on them, they get angry and can't stand it. That's how they start ignoring the laws too, so that they won't have any master at all.’”

SECTION 68

Chapter 44

Then Laelius said, “You've captured exactly what he said.” Scipio: “And now I'll return to the man whose account I'm following. He says this excessive freedom, which they think is the only real freedom, is the root from which a tyrant grows. Too much power brings down the leading citizens. In the same way, freedom itself enslaves a people that's too free. Things that thrive too much usually swing to the opposite extreme. This happens in weather, in crops, and in our bodies. It happens most of all in states. That excessive freedom ends in excessive slavery, both for peoples and for individuals. So this extreme freedom produces a tyrant and the harshest, most unjust slavery. These unruly, or rather savage, people usually choose a leader against the leading citizens, already beaten down and ousted. He's bold and corrupt. He shamelessly hounds men who have often served the state well. He wins the people's favor with other people's property and his own. Because he faces threats as a private citizen, he's given powers, and these are extended. Such leaders are even surrounded by bodyguards, as Pisistratus was at Athens. Finally, they become tyrants over the very people who raised them up. If good men overthrow them, as often happens, the state comes back to life. But if ruthless men do it, they form that clique, another set of tyrants. The same clique often emerges even from that highly praised rule by the best men. This happens when some fault leads those very leaders astray. So they snatch control of the state from each other like a ball. Tyrants take it from kings; leading citizens or the people take it from tyrants. Cliques or tyrants then take it from them. No form of government ever stays the same for long.”

SECTION 69

Chapter 45

“Since that is so, in my opinion kingship is by far the best of the three original forms. But better than kingship itself will be a balanced combination of the three best forms of government. I want the state to have a supreme, royal element; another part assigned and entrusted to the authority of leading men; and certain matters reserved for the people's judgment and wishes. First, this constitution has a substantial measure of equality, which free people can hardly do without for long. Second, it has stability. Those original forms easily change into their opposite faults: the king becomes a master, the best men become a faction, and the people become a confused mob. The forms themselves also often change into new forms. But this hardly happens in a constitution that combines and blends them in proper measure, unless the leading men have serious faults. There is no reason for change when everyone is firmly placed in their proper position and there is nowhere below for them to plunge and fall.

SECTION 70

Chapter 46

“But I'm afraid, Laelius, and all of you, my very dear and wise friends, that if I stay on this subject any longer, I'll sound like someone laying down rules and teaching, rather than thinking things through together with you. So I'll move on to things everyone knows, but that we've been investigating for a long time. This is my judgment, my belief, and my firm claim: no state at all can compare, in its constitution, its organization, or its practices, with the one our fathers handed down to us after receiving it themselves from our ancestors. If you agree, since you wanted to hear from me too what you already knew for yourselves, I'll show both what it's like and why it's the best. Once I've set out our own state as a model, I'll try to apply to it everything I have to say about the best form of government. If I can keep to that and carry it through, I think I'll have more than fulfilled the task Laelius has assigned me.”

SECTION 71

Chapter 47

Then Laelius said, “That's certainly for you, Scipio—you alone. Who could speak better than you about our ancestors' practices? Your own ancestors were so distinguished. Or about the best form of government? If we have that, who could then be more successful than you? No one could, even now. Or about planning for the future? You've removed this city's two terrors and looked ahead for all time to come.”