Marcus Tullius Cicero · Complete work
Chapter 9
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SECTION 29quod si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos numquam vidimus, et, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo.quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus; quod longe secus est.
SECTION 30ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitiis expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? minime hercule! ac ne ego quidem illius, sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non nulla quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo. sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae.
SECTION 31ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam—neque enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus—sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus.
SECTION 32ab his, qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt, longe dissentiunt; nec mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omnis cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis, quam qui appetiverunt, applicant sese et propius admovent, ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus, sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximae capientur, et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab imbecillitate gravior et verior. nam si utilitas conglutinaret amicitias, eadem commutata dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt.ortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte vultis.FANNIUS. Tu vero perge, Laeli! pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.
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SECTION 29But if the power of goodness is so great that we love it even in those whom we have never seen and, what is more, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the hearts of men are moved when they seem to discern virtue and goodness in those with whom they may be joined by familiar association? Yet love is strengthened by a kindness received, by devotion clearly perceived, and by the addition of habitual companionship. When these are added to that first impulse of the heart and of love, an astonishing greatness of goodwill blazes forth.If there are those who think this goodwill arises from weakness, so that each person may have someone through whom he can obtain what he desires, they assign to friendship a thoroughly low and, so to speak, ignoble origin, since they would have it born of poverty and need. If that were so, the less a man believed he possessed within himself, the better fitted he would be for friendship. But the truth is far otherwise.
SECTION 30For the more confidence a man has in himself, and the more thoroughly he is fortified by virtue and wisdom, so that he needs no one and judges all his resources to lie within himself, the more he excels in seeking and cultivating friendships. What, then? Was Africanus in need of me? Not in the least, by Hercules! Nor was I in need of him. But I loved him from a certain admiration for his virtue, and he in turn loved me perhaps because of some opinion he had formed of my character; close companionship increased our goodwill. Yet although many great advantages followed, the causes of our affection did not arise from the hope of obtaining them.
SECTION 31For just as we are kindly and generous not in order to exact gratitude—for we do not put a kindness out at interest, but are inclined by nature toward generosity—so we believe that friendship should be sought not because we are led by the hope of reward, but because the whole fruit of friendship lies in love itself.
SECTION 32We differ widely from those who, in the manner of cattle, refer everything to pleasure; and no wonder. Men who have cast down all their thoughts upon a thing so low and contemptible can look up to nothing lofty, nothing magnificent or divine. Let us therefore remove such men from this discussion, and let us ourselves understand that the feeling of love and the affection of goodwill are engendered by nature when goodness has given some sign of itself. Those who are drawn to goodness attach themselves to it and move nearer, so that they may enjoy the companionship and character of the person whom they have begun to love; so that they may be equal and evenly matched in affection, and more inclined to confer benefits than to demand repayment; and so that this honorable rivalry may exist between them. In this way the greatest advantages will be obtained from friendship, and its origin in nature rather than in weakness will be nobler and truer. For if advantage were what cemented friendships, then a change in that advantage would dissolve them; but because nature cannot be changed, true friendships are therefore everlasting.You now see the origin of friendship, unless perhaps you wish to say something in reply.FANNIUS. No, do go on, Laelius! For in behalf of Scaevola here, who is younger than I, I answer by my senior’s right.
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SECTION 29But if integrity has such great power that we love it even in people we have never seen and, what is still more remarkable, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if people’s hearts are moved when they seem to perceive virtue and goodness in those with whom they can be personally connected? Love is, however, strengthened by receiving a kindness, by recognizing another’s devotion, and by the addition of familiarity. When these things are added to that first impulse of the heart and of love, there blazes up an astonishing intensity of goodwill.
If anyone thinks this goodwill arises from weakness, so that each person may have someone through whom he can obtain what he desires, he leaves friendship with a thoroughly low and, so to speak, ignoble origin by claiming that it was born from poverty and need. If that were so, then the more deficient a person thought himself to be, the better suited he would be for friendship. But the exact opposite is true.
SECTION 30For the more confidence a person has in himself, and the more thoroughly he is fortified by virtue and wisdom, so that he needs no one and judges that all his resources lie within himself, the more he excels in seeking and cultivating friendships. What, then? Did Africanus need me? Not at all, by Hercules! Nor did I need him. But I loved him from a certain admiration for his virtue, and he in turn loved me perhaps because of some favorable opinion he held of my character. Familiarity increased our goodwill. But although many great advantages followed from our friendship, the causes of our affection did not arise from the expectation of those advantages.
SECTION 31For just as we are kind and generous not in order to demand repayment—for we do not lend out a kindness at interest, but are naturally inclined toward generosity—so we believe friendship should be sought not because we are led by hope of reward, but because its entire reward is contained in the love itself.
SECTION 32Such people differ widely from those who, in the manner of cattle, relate everything to pleasure; and no wonder. Those who have cast down all their thoughts upon something so low and contemptible cannot look up to anything lofty, magnificent, or divine. Let us therefore exclude them from this discussion, and let us ourselves understand that the feeling of affection and the loving bond of goodwill are produced by nature when integrity reveals itself. Those who are drawn to integrity attach themselves to it and move nearer, so that they may enjoy the company and character of the person they have begun to love; so that they may be matched and equal in love; so that they may be more inclined to render services than to demand repayment; and so that an honorable rivalry in doing good may exist between them. In this way the greatest benefits will be gained from friendship, and its origin in nature rather than weakness will be more dignified and genuine. For if practical advantage bound friendships together, a change in that advantage would dissolve them. But because nature cannot be changed, true friendships are therefore everlasting.
You now see the origin of friendship, unless by chance you have something to say about it.
FANNIUS. No, please continue, Laelius! I answer on behalf of Scaevola here, since he is younger, as is my right.