Marcus Tullius Cicero · Complete work
Chapter 8
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SECTION 26LAELIUS. Vim hoc quidem est afferre; quid enim refert qua me ratione cogatis? cogitis certe. studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est tum ne aequum quidem obsistere.saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam. nam utilitates quidem etiam ab eis percipiuntur saepe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa; in amicitia autem nihil fictum, nihil simulatum est et, quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium.
SECTION 27quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi, quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest, quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sensus appareat. quod in homine multo est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate quae est inter natos et parentis, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest, deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus, cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur.
SECTION 28nihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil quod magis alliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. quis est qui C. Fabrici, M’. Curi non cum caritate aliqua benevola memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit? quis autem est qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit? cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus; alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections for fidelity, philosophical precision, rhetorical clarity, structure, and cadence.
SECTION 26LAELIUS. This is force indeed. For what difference does it make how you compel me? You certainly do compel me. To resist the earnest wishes of my sons-in-law, especially in a good cause, is not only difficult but unfair.Whenever, then, I reflect upon friendship, this question generally seems to me the one that most deserves consideration: whether friendship has been sought because of weakness and need, so that by giving and receiving services each person might obtain from another whatever he could not accomplish by himself, and repay the favor in turn; or whether this is indeed a property of friendship, while another cause, more ancient, more beautiful, and more directly arising from nature herself, lies beneath it. For love, from which friendship takes its name, is the chief force in binding goodwill together. Advantages, indeed, are often obtained even from men who are cultivated and treated with deference under a pretense of friendship to suit the needs of the moment; but in friendship nothing is false, nothing feigned, and whatever exists in it is genuine and voluntary.
SECTION 27Therefore friendship seems to me to have arisen from nature rather than from need, through an inclination of the soul joined with a certain feeling of love, rather than through calculation of how much advantage the relationship would bring. The character of this feeling may be observed even in certain animals: for a time they so love the offspring born from them, and are so loved in return, that their feelings are readily apparent. In human beings this is far more evident: first, from the affection that exists between children and parents, which cannot be severed except by some abominable crime; and then, when a similar feeling of love arises, if we have found someone whose character and nature accord with our own, because we seem to discern in him something like a light of goodness and virtue.
SECTION 28For nothing is more lovable than virtue, nothing more powerfully attracts us to affection, since it is because of virtue and goodness that we feel in some measure affection even for men whom we have never seen. Who can mention Gaius Fabricius or Manius Curius, though he never saw them, without some benevolent affection for their memory? And who does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, and Spurius Maelius? Against two commanders, Pyrrhus and Hannibal, we fought for supremacy in Italy. Toward the former, because of his uprightness, we bear no great hostility; the latter, because of his cruelty, this state will always hate.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections.
SECTION 26LAELIUS. This really is using force. For what difference does it make how you compel me? You certainly are compelling me. To resist the wishes of my sons-in-law, especially in a good cause, is not only difficult but also unfair.
Therefore, when I have very often thought about friendship, the question that has usually seemed most important to consider is whether friendship is desired because of weakness and need, so that by giving and receiving services each person might obtain from another what he could not accomplish by himself, and repay it in turn; or whether this exchange is indeed a characteristic of friendship, but friendship has another cause, more fundamental, more noble, and arising more directly from nature herself. For love, from which friendship takes its name, is the principal force in joining people together in goodwill. Benefits are often obtained even from those who are courted and treated with deference through a pretense of friendship to suit the needs of the moment; but in friendship nothing is false, nothing is pretended, and whatever exists in it is genuine and voluntary.
SECTION 27For that reason, friendship seems to me to have arisen from nature rather than need, from an inclination of the heart accompanied by a certain feeling of love, rather than from a calculation of how much practical benefit it would provide. The nature of this can be observed even in certain animals. For a time, they love the offspring born from them, and are loved by them in return, in such a way that their feelings are readily apparent. This is much more evident in human beings: first, from the affection that exists between children and parents, which cannot be broken except by a detestable crime; and then, when a similar feeling of love arises because we have found someone whose character and nature harmonize with our own, since we seem to perceive in that person something like a light of integrity and virtue.
SECTION 28Nothing is more lovable than virtue, and nothing does more to attract us to love, since it is because of virtue and integrity that we feel a kind of love even for people we have never seen. Who can mention the memory of Gaius Fabricius or Manius Curius without some affectionate goodwill, though he has never seen them? And who does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, and Spurius Maelius? We fought for supremacy in Italy against two commanders, Pyrrhus and Hannibal. Because of Pyrrhus’ integrity, our feelings toward him are not entirely hostile; because of Hannibal’s cruelty, this state will always hate him.