Chapter 14

SECTION 48Therefore, if sorrow of mind falls upon the wise man—and assuredly it does, unless we suppose that all humanity has been torn from his soul—what reason is there for removing friendship utterly from life, merely to avoid taking upon ourselves some troubles on its account? For if all emotion is taken away, what difference remains—not merely between a beast and a human being, but between a human being and a tree trunk, a stone, or anything else of that kind? Nor should we listen to those who would have virtue be something hard and almost ironlike. In many matters, and especially in friendship, virtue is tender and responsive, so that it expands, as it were, at a friend’s good fortune and contracts at his misfortunes. Therefore, the anguish that must often be borne for a friend is not powerful enough to abolish friendship from life, any more than the cares and troubles brought by the virtues are sufficient reason for rejecting the virtues themselves.

But since friendship is formed, as I said above, when some indication of virtue shines forth and a kindred spirit draws near and attaches itself to it, then, whenever that occurs, love must necessarily arise.

SECTION 49For what could be more absurd than to delight greatly in many empty things—honor, fame, buildings, clothing, and bodily adornment—and yet take little delight in a living being endowed with virtue, one who can love or, so to speak, return love? For nothing is more delightful than goodwill repaid, nothing more pleasing than the mutual exchange of devotion and service.

SECTION 50And what if we also add—and rightly may it be added—that there is nothing which so entices and draws one thing to another as likeness draws men into friendship? It will surely be granted as true that good men love other good men and attach them to themselves as though united by kinship and nature. For nothing is more eager or more grasping in its pursuit of what resembles itself than nature. Therefore, Fannius and Scaevola, this much, I think, must be accepted as certain: among good men there exists an almost necessary goodwill toward other good men, and this goodwill is the fountain of friendship established by nature. But the same goodness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not inhuman, selfish, or arrogant; it is accustomed to protect whole nations and to consult their welfare in the best possible way, which it certainly would not do if it shrank from affection for the common people.

SECTION 51Indeed, those who invent friendships for the sake of advantage seem to me to destroy the most lovable bond of friendship. For it is not so much the advantage obtained through a friend that gives us pleasure as the friend’s love itself; and what comes from a friend becomes delightful only if it has sprung from devotion. So far are friendships from being cultivated because of need that those who, by reason of wealth, resources, and above all virtue—in which lies the greatest protection—have the least need of another are the most generous and beneficent. Indeed, I am inclined to think that it is not even desirable for friends never to lack anything at all. For when would my devotion have had the opportunity to exert itself if Scipio had never needed my advice or assistance, either at home or in war? Friendship, therefore, did not follow advantage; rather, advantage followed friendship.

SECTION 48Therefore, if mental pain can befall a wise person—and it certainly can, unless we suppose that all humanity has been rooted out of his mind—what reason is there to remove friendship entirely from life merely to avoid undergoing certain troubles because of it? If emotional responsiveness is taken away, what difference is there—not merely between a human being and an animal, but between a human being and a tree trunk, a stone, or anything else of that kind? Nor should we listen to those who want virtue to be something hard and almost made of iron. In many matters, and especially in friendship, virtue is tender and responsive: it expands, so to speak, at a friend’s good fortune and contracts at his misfortunes. Therefore, the anguish that must often be endured for a friend is not powerful enough to justify removing friendship from life, any more than the cares and troubles brought by the virtues justify rejecting virtue.Moreover, as I said above, friendship is formed when some evidence of virtue shines forth and a similar mind attaches and unites itself to it. When that happens, affection necessarily arises.

SECTION 49For what could be more absurd than to take pleasure in many empty things—such as public office, fame, buildings, clothing, and bodily adornment—yet take little pleasure in a living being endowed with virtue, someone capable of loving and, so to speak, loving in return? Nothing is more delightful than the repayment of goodwill, nothing more delightful than a mutual exchange of devotion and services.

SECTION 50What if we also add—and we may rightly do so—that nothing attracts and draws anything else to itself as strongly as similarity draws people into friendship? It will surely be admitted as true that good people love other good people and take them into their lives as though united by kinship and nature. For nothing is more eager or more insistent than nature in seeking what resembles itself. Therefore, Fannius and Scaevola, this point, I think, may be regarded as settled: among good people there exists an almost necessary goodwill toward one another, and this is the source of friendship established by nature. Yet that same goodness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not inhuman, selfish, or arrogant; it is accustomed to protect entire peoples and to serve their interests in the best possible way, something it certainly would not do if it recoiled from affection for ordinary people.

SECTION 51Moreover, those who invent friendships for the sake of advantage seem to me to remove the most lovable bond of friendship. For it is not so much the advantage gained through a friend that gives pleasure as the friend’s love itself; and what comes from a friend becomes delightful when it proceeds from devotion. So far is it from being true that friendships are cultivated because of need that those who, because of their resources, wealth, and especially virtue—in which the greatest protection lies—have the least need of another person are the most generous and beneficent. Indeed, I am not sure it is even desirable for friends never to lack anything at all. For when would my devotion have had an opportunity to show its strength if Scipio had never needed my advice or assistance, either at home or in military service? Friendship, therefore, did not follow advantage; advantage followed friendship.