Marcus Tullius Cicero · Complete work
Chapter 13
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SECTION 44haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem dum rogemur, studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit, consilium verum dare audeamus libere, plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur.
SECTION 45nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam—sed nihil est, quod illi non persequantur argutiis—partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum; alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas cum velis vel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus.
SECTION 46alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius, quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi, praesidi adiumentique causa, non benevolentiae neque caritatis amicitias esse expetendas; itaque ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias appetere maxime: ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri, et inopes quam opulenti, et calamitosi quam ei qui putentur beati.
SECTION 47O praeclaram sapientiam! solem enim e mundo tollere videntur ei, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. quae est enim ista securitas? specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo. itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, imbellibus fortis, flagitiosis modestos. ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections for fidelity, philosophical precision, rhetorical clarity, structure, and cadence.
SECTION 44Let this, then, be established as the first law of friendship: that we ask honorable things of our friends and do honorable things for their sake; that we do not even wait until we are asked; that eagerness should always be present and hesitation absent; that we dare freely to give honest counsel; that in friendship the authority of friends who offer sound advice should have the greatest weight; that such authority should be employed in admonition, not only openly but even sternly if the occasion demands; and that, once employed, it should be obeyed.
SECTION 45For certain men whom I hear were regarded as wise in Greece seem to me to have adopted some astonishing opinions—though there is nothing they will not pursue with their subtle arguments. Some held that excessively close friendships should be avoided, lest one man be forced to bear anxiety for many; that each man has enough and more than enough to do with his own concerns; that it is troublesome to become too deeply entangled in those of others; and that the most convenient course is to keep the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so that one may draw them tight or slacken them whenever one wishes. For, they say, the chief requirement for a happy life is freedom from care, which the mind cannot enjoy if one man is, as it were, in labor for many.
SECTION 46Others, they say, speak even more inhumanly, touching upon a point I briefly mentioned a little while ago: that friendships should be sought for the sake of protection and assistance, not from goodwill or affection. Therefore, the less firmness and strength a man possessed, the more eagerly he sought friendships. From this it followed, they said, that weak women seek the protection of friendships more than men do, the poor more than the rich, and the unfortunate more than those who are thought prosperous.
SECTION 47What glorious wisdom! For those who remove friendship from life seem to remove the sun from the world; and from the immortal gods we possess nothing better than friendship, nothing more delightful. For what is this freedom from care? In appearance, indeed, it is alluring, but in reality it must be rejected in many circumstances. It is not reasonable to refuse to undertake any honorable affair or action, or to abandon it once undertaken, merely to avoid anxiety. If we flee from care, we must flee from virtue, for virtue must necessarily reject and hate, with some degree of concern, those things that are opposed to it: goodness, for example, hates malice; temperance, sensuality; and courage, cowardice. Thus you may observe that just men are most distressed by injustice, brave men by cowardice, and modest men by disgraceful conduct. It is therefore the mark of a rightly ordered mind both to rejoice in good things and to grieve at their opposites.
Mouseia
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 27 Latin chapters and 104 sections.
SECTION 44Let this, then, be established as the first law of friendship: we must ask honorable things of our friends and do honorable things for their sake. We should not even wait until we are asked; eagerness should always be present, hesitation absent. We must dare to give true advice freely. In friendship, the authority of friends who give good counsel should carry the greatest weight. That authority should be employed in offering advice not only openly but even sharply, if circumstances require it, and when it is exercised, it should be obeyed.
SECTION 45For I believe that certain men whom I hear were considered wise in Greece adopted some astonishing views—though there is nothing those people will not pursue through clever argument. Some of them held that excessively close friendships should be avoided, so that one person would not have to be anxious on behalf of many; that each person already has more than enough concerns of his own; that it is troublesome to become too deeply involved in those of others; and that the most convenient course is to keep the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so that you may tighten or slacken them whenever you wish. For, they said, the chief requirement for a happy life is freedom from anxiety, which the mind cannot enjoy if one person is, as it were, in labor on behalf of many.
SECTION 46Others, I am told, speak far more inhumanly—a position I touched on briefly a little earlier. They say that friendships should be sought for protection and assistance, not from goodwill or affection. Accordingly, the less firmness and strength a person possesses, the more eagerly he seeks friendships. That is why, they claim, weak women seek the protection of friendships more than men, the poor more than the rich, and the unfortunate more than those who are considered prosperous.
SECTION 47What splendid wisdom! Those who remove friendship from life seem to remove the sun from the world, for the immortal gods have given us nothing better or more delightful than friendship. What, after all, is this freedom from anxiety? It is attractive in appearance, certainly, but in reality it must be rejected in many situations. For it is unreasonable to refuse to undertake any honorable action or enterprise, or to abandon it once undertaken, merely to avoid anxiety. If we flee from concern, we must also flee from virtue, for virtue must necessarily feel some concern when it despises and hates what is opposed to it: goodness hates wickedness, self-control hates lust, and courage hates cowardice. And so you may see that the just are most deeply pained by injustice, the brave by cowardice, and the honorable by disgraceful conduct. It is therefore characteristic of a properly ordered mind both to rejoice in good things and to grieve at their opposites.