Chapter 1
Original Latin
1 […] quia pertinet ad mores, quod ἦθος illi vocant, nos eam partem philosophiae de moribus appellare solemus, sed decet augentem linguam Latinam nominare moralem; explicandaque vis est ratioque enuntiationum, quae Graeci ἀξιώματα vocant; quae de re futura cum aliquid dicunt deque eo, quod possit fieri aut non possit, quam vim habeant, obscura quaestio est, quam περὶ δυνατῶν philosophi appellant, totaque est λογική, quam rationem disserendi voco. Quod autem in aliis libris feci, qui sunt de natura deorum, itemque in iis, quos de divinatione edidi, ut in utramque partem perpetua explicaretur oratio, quo facilius id a quoque probaretur, quod cuique maxime probabile videretur, id in hac disputatione de fato casus quidam ne facerem inpedivit.
2 Nam cum essem in Puteolano Hirtiusque noster, consul designatus, isdem in locis, vir nobis amicissimus et his studiis, in quibus nos a pueritia viximus, deditus, multum una eramus, maxime nos quidem exquirentes ea consilia, quae ad pacem et ad concordiam civium pertinerent. Cum enim omnes post interitum Caesaris novarum perturbationum causae quaeri viderentur iisque esse occurrendum putaremus, omnis fere nostra in his deliberationibus consumebatur oratio, idque et saepe alias et quodam liberiore, quam solebat, et magis vacuo ab interventoribus die, cum ad me ille venisset, primo ea, quae erant cotidiana et quasi legitima nobis, de pace et de otio.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the surviving Latin in separate source-only tasks. Sections 1–48 and five fragments/testimonia follow Müller’s 1915 edition; lost passages remain marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
1 […] because it concerns conduct—“character,” as the Greeks call it—we usually call this branch of philosophy the study of conduct; but anyone enriching the Latin language ought to call it “moral philosophy.” We must also explain the force and nature of statements, which the Greeks call “propositions.” What force these possess when they say something about the future, and about what can or cannot happen, is a difficult question, which philosophers call the question “of possibilities.” The whole subject belongs to logic, which I call the art of reasoning. In my books on the nature of the gods, and likewise in those I published on divination, I presented a sustained argument on each side, so that each reader might more readily accept the view that seemed most probable to him. In this discussion of fate, a particular circumstance prevented me from doing so.
2 I was at my villa near Puteoli, and our friend Hirtius, the consul-elect, was in the same neighborhood. He was a very dear friend of mine, devoted to those studies in which I have lived from boyhood, and we spent much time together, chiefly seeking ways to secure peace and harmony among our fellow citizens. For after Caesar's death, it seemed that every possible ground for fresh disturbances was being sought out, and we thought these must be forestalled. Almost all our conversation was therefore spent in these deliberations. This happened on many occasions; and on one day, freer than usual and less exposed to interruptions, he came to see me, and we began with what had become our daily, almost prescribed business: peace and public quiet.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted direct-Latin Plain English translation. Initial drafts used separate Latin-only tasks; later source-based editorial revisions were made by a reviewer with prior editorial access to Musean, not from its English wording. Includes all 48 sections and five fragments/testimonia, with lost passages marked. Perseus source and these derived editions CC BY-SA 4.0.
1 […] since its subject is conduct, or what the Greeks call “character,” we generally refer to this branch of philosophy as the study of conduct. To expand Latin's vocabulary, though, we should give it the name “moral philosophy.” Statements also need explaining: what they mean and how they work. The Greek name for them is “propositions.” There is a difficult question about their force when they concern future events or things that may or may not happen. Philosophers name that question “possibilities.” The whole inquiry falls within logic, my term for the method of argument. My books On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination set out each side's case at length. That allowed readers to choose the position they found most convincing. Something happened that prevented me from using that approach here, in discussing fate.
2 Hirtius and I were staying near Puteoli, where I have a house. He was consul-elect, a close friend, and keenly interested in the studies that had occupied me from childhood. We saw a great deal of each other. Our main concern was finding ways for our fellow citizens to live peacefully together. Since Caesar's death, everyone seemed to be searching for occasions to cause fresh disturbances. We felt we must head those off. That question took up nearly all our talk. Besides our many other conversations, there was a day when we had unusually little to do and visitors were less likely to interrupt. He called on me. We started with what had become our daily duty, almost a fixed routine: discussing peace and public calm.
About this section
Chapter 1 is part of On Fate by Marcus Tullius Cicero. This page sets the Latin original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 1 of 25 in the work, which is kept in the Roman tradition.
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