Book 2, Chapter 5

12 “If divination has nothing to do with things subject to the senses, or things contained within the arts, or the subjects debated in philosophy, or the business of government, I cannot for the life of me understand what it does concern. It must either embrace everything or be given some subject matter within which to operate. But reason has shown that it does not embrace everything, and we can find no sphere or subject to put under its authority. Consider, then, whether there is no divination at all. There is a familiar Greek verse to this effect:

“‘Who guesses well is the best prophet, I declare.’

“Will a prophet, then, make a better guess at an approaching storm than a helmsman, discern the character of a disease more acutely than a doctor, or judge the conduct of a war more intelligently than a commander?

13 “But I noticed, Quintus, how carefully you separated divination both from conjectures based on skill and practical knowledge and from things apprehended through the senses or technical arts. You defined it as the prediction and foreknowledge of events that depend on chance. First, you are brought back to the same point. Doctors, helmsmen, and commanders also foresee events dependent on chance. Will a haruspex, an augur, a prophet, or a dreamer make a better guess that a sick man will escape his illness, a ship its danger, or an army an ambush, than a doctor, a helmsman, or a commander?

14 “Yet you said that even foreseeing approaching winds or rain from certain signs did not belong to the diviner—and here you recited some of my Aratea from memory—although these events too depend on chance: they happen generally, not always. What, then, is this foreknowledge of chance events that you call divination, and where does it operate? Whatever can be foreseen through skill, reasoning, experience, or conjecture, you assign not to diviners but to experts. It follows that the chance events open to divination are those no skill or wisdom can foresee. If, for example, someone had said many years in advance that the famous Marcus Marcellus, three times consul, would die in a shipwreck, he would certainly have divined the future: no other skill or wisdom could have given him that knowledge. Divination, then, is foreknowledge of events of this kind, which lie in the hands of fortune.

12 “If divination does not deal with things we sense, things covered by trained skills, things discussed in philosophy, or things involved in public affairs, I simply cannot understand what it does deal with. It must either cover everything or be given some subject of its own. But reasoning has shown that it does not cover everything. And no field or subject can be found to put under its control. So consider whether there may be no such thing as divination. A familiar Greek verse makes this point:

“‘The one who guesses well is the best prophet, I say.’

“Will a prophet guess an approaching storm better than a ship’s pilot? Will he make a sharper judgment about the nature of an illness than a doctor? Will he work out how to run a war more wisely than a general?

13 “Quintus, I did see the care you took to exclude two things from divination: judgments made with skill and knowledge, and matters grasped by sense or practical technique. You defined it this way: divination is the prediction and foreknowledge of things that happen by chance. First of all, that takes you back to the same point. A doctor, a pilot, and a general also foresee things that happen by chance. Can a haruspex, augur, prophet, or dreamer judge a sick person’s chances of recovery better than a doctor can? Can any of them judge a ship’s escape from danger better than its pilot, or an army’s escape from ambush better than its general?

14 “You even said it was not the diviner’s business to foresee approaching winds or rain from certain signs. In that connection you recited from memory some of my translation of Aratus. Yet these things too depend on chance: they usually happen, but not always. Then tell me what you mean by divination, this advance awareness of chance events. What does it cover? You think things that can be foreseen through skill, reasoning, experience, or inference should be credited to experts, not diviners. That leaves only chance events which no skill or wisdom can foresee as things that can be divined. For example, if someone had said many years ahead that the Marcus Marcellus who was consul three times would die in a shipwreck, he would certainly have practiced divination. No other skill or wisdom could have told him that. So divination is foreknowledge of events like these, which depend on chance.