The task of dialectic
Original German
Um die Dialektik rein aufzustellen muß man, unbekümmert um die objektive Wahrheit (welche Sache der Logik ist), sie bloß betrachten als die Kunst Recht zu behalten, welches freilich um so leichter seyn wird, wenn man in der Sache selbst Recht hat. Aber die Dialektik als solche muß bloß lehren, wie man sich gegen Angriffe aller Art, besonders gegen unredliche vertheidigt, und eben so wie man selbst angreifen kann, was der Andre behauptet, ohne sich selbst zu widersprechen und überhaupt ohne widerlegt zu werden. Man muß die Auffindung der objektiven Wahrheit rein trennen von der Kunst seine Sätze als wahr geltend zu machen: jenes ist [Sache] einer ganz ander[n] πραγματεια, es ist das Werk der Urtheilskraft, des Nachdenkens, der Erfahrung, und giebt es dazu keine eigne Kunst: das zweite aber ist der Zweck der Dialektik. Man hat sie definirt als die Logik des Scheins: falsch: dann wäre sie bloß brauchbar zur Vertheidigung falscher Sätze: allein auch wenn man Recht hat, braucht man Dialektik es zu verfechten, und muß die unredlichen Kunstgriffe kennen, um ihnen zu begegnen: ja oft selbst welche brauchen, um de[n] Gegner mit gleichen Waffen zu schlagen. Dieserhalb also muß bei der Dialektik die objektive Wahrheit bei Seite gesetzt oder als accidentell betrachtet werden: und bloß darauf geseh[n] werden, wie man seine Behauptung[en] vertheidigt und die des Andern umstößt: bei den Regeln hiezu darf man die objektive Wahrheit nicht berücksichtigen, weil meistens unbekannt ist wo sie liegt:1 oft weiß man selbst nicht ob man Recht hat oder nicht, oft glaubt man es und irrt sich, oft glauben es beide Theile: denn veritas est in puteo (εν βυθω ἡ αληθεια, Democrit): beim Entstehn des Streits glaubt in der Regel Jeder die Wahrheit auf seiner Seite zu haben: beim Fortgang werden beide zweifelhaft: das Ende soll eben erst die Wahrheit ausmachen, bestätigen. Also darauf hat sich die Dialektik nicht einzulassen: so wenig wie der Fechtmeister berücksichtigt wer bei dem Streit, der das Duell herbeiführte, eigentlich Recht hat: treffen und pariren, darauf kommt es an: eben so in der Dialektik: sie ist eine geistige Fechtkunst: nur so rein gefaßt, kann sie als eigne Disciplin aufgestellt werden: denn setzen wir uns zum Zweck die rein[e] objektive Wahrheit, so kommen wir auf bloße Logik zurück: setzen wir hingegen zum Zweck die Durchführung falscher Sätze, so haben wir bloße Sophistik. Und bei beiden würde vorausgesetzt seyn, daß wir schon wüßten, was objektiv wahr und falsch ist: das ist aber selten zum Voraus gewiß. Der wahre Begriff der Dialektik ist also der aufgestellte: geistige Fechtkunst zum Rechtbehalten im Disputiren: obwohl der Name Eristik passender wäre: am richtigsten wohl Eristische Dialektik: Dialectica eristica. Und sie ist sehr nützlich: man hat sie mit Unrecht in neuer[n] Zeiten vernachlässigt.
Da nun in diesem Sinne die Dialektik bloß eine auf System und Regel zurückgeführte Zusammenfassung und Darstellung jener von der Natur eingegebnen Künste seyn soll, deren sich die meisten Menschen bedienen, wenn sie merken daß im Streit die Wahrheit nicht auf ihrer Seite liegt, um dennoch Recht zu behalten; — so würde es auch dieserhalb sehr zweckwidrig seyn wenn man in der wissenschaftlichen Dialektik auf die objektive Wahrheit und deren Zutageförderung Rücksicht nehmen wollte, da es in jener ursprünglichen und natürlichen Dialektik nicht geschieht, sondern das Ziel bloß das Rechthaben ist. Die wissenschaftliche Dialektik in unserm Sinne hat demnach zur Hauptaufgabe, jene Kunstgriffe der Unredlichkeit im Disputiren aufzustellen und zu analysiren: damit man bei wirklichen Debatten sie gleich erkenne und vernichte. Eben daher muß sie in ihrer Darstellung eingeständlich bloß das Rechthaben, nicht die objektive Wahrheit, zum Endzweck nehmen.
Mir ist nicht bekannt daß in diesem Sinne etwas geleistet wäre obwohl ich mich weit und breit umgesehn habe2: es ist also ein noch unbebautes Feld. Um zum Zwecke zu kommen, müßte man aus der Erfahrung schöpfen, beachten, wie, bei den im Umgange häufig vorkommenden Debatten, dieser oder jener Kunstgriff von einem und dem andern Theil angewandt wird, sodann die unter andern Formen wiederkehrenden Kunstgriffe auf ihr Allgemeines zurückführen, und so gewisse allgemeine Stratagemata aufstellen, die dann sowohl zum eignen Gebrauch, als zum Vereiteln derselben, wenn der And[re] sie braucht, nützlich wären.
Folgendes sei als erster Versuch zu betrachten.
1 [Daneben am Rand:] Veritas est in puteo, εν βυθω ἡ αληθεια, Spruch des Demokrit, Diog. Laert. IX, 72. Oft streiten zwei sehr lebhaft; und dann geht Jeder mit der Meinung des Andern nach Hause: sie haben getauscht.
2 [Dazu am Rand:] Nach Diogenes Laertius gab es unter den vielen rhetorischen Schriften des Theophrastos, die sämmtlich verloren gegangen, eine, deren Titel war Αγωνιστικον της περι τους εριστικους λογους θεωριας. Das wäre unsre Sache.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted, directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
To establish dialectic in its purity, we must leave objective truth aside—it is the concern of logic—and regard dialectic solely as the art of remaining in the right. This will of course be easier when one is actually right about the matter. But dialectic as such must teach only how to defend oneself against attacks of every kind, especially dishonest ones, and how in turn to attack another's assertions without contradicting oneself or being refuted at all. The discovery of objective truth must be cleanly separated from the art of securing acceptance for one's propositions as true. The former belongs to an entirely different inquiry: it is the work of judgment, reflection and experience, and there is no special art for it. The latter is the purpose of dialectic. Dialectic has been defined as the logic of appearances: falsely, for then it would serve only to defend false propositions. Yet even when one is right, one needs dialectic to uphold one's position, and must know dishonest stratagems to meet them, indeed often use some oneself to defeat the opponent with equal weapons. Thus objective truth must be set aside in dialectic or treated as incidental. We must consider only how to defend our assertions and overthrow the other's; rules for this must not take objective truth into account, since we generally do not know where it lies.1 Often we ourselves do not know whether we are right; often we believe we are and are mistaken; often both parties believe it. For truth lies in a well—truth is in the depths, Democritus. At the beginning of a dispute each generally believes truth to be on his side; as it proceeds, both become doubtful; the outcome is meant to determine and confirm the truth for the first time. Dialectic must therefore no more concern itself with this than the fencing master concerns himself with who was really right in the quarrel that brought about the duel. Striking and parrying are what matter. So too in dialectic: it is intellectual fencing. Only when conceived so purely can it be established as a separate discipline. For if we make pure objective truth our goal, we return to mere logic; if we make the successful assertion of false propositions our goal, we have mere sophistry. Both would presuppose that we already knew what was objectively true and false, but this is seldom certain beforehand. The true conception of dialectic is therefore the one advanced here: intellectual fencing to remain in the right in disputation. “Eristic” would be a more suitable name; most accurately, “eristic dialectic,” Dialectica eristica. It is very useful; it has been unjustly neglected in more recent times.
Since dialectic in this sense is to be only a systematic, rule-governed collection and presentation of the arts that nature inspires in most people when they notice that truth is not on their side in a dispute and nevertheless wish to remain in the right, it would also be quite contrary to its purpose for scientific dialectic to consider objective truth and the means of bringing it to light. Original, natural dialectic does not do so: its sole aim is being right. Scientific dialectic in our sense therefore has as its principal task to set out and analyze the stratagems of dishonesty in disputation, so that in actual debates they may be recognized and destroyed at once. Precisely for this reason, its presentation must avowedly make being right, not objective truth, its ultimate goal.
I know of nothing that has been accomplished in this sense, although I have looked far and wide.2 It is therefore an untilled field. To achieve the purpose, one would have to draw upon experience, observe how one stratagem or another is employed by either party in the debates that so often occur in conversation, then reduce stratagems recurring in different forms to their general character. In this way one would establish certain general stratagems, useful both for one's own employment and for thwarting them when the other person employs them.
Let the following be regarded as a first attempt.
1 [Beside this in the margin:] Truth lies in a well, truth is in the depths, a saying of Democritus. Diog. Laert. IX, 72.
Two people often dispute very vigorously, and then each goes home with the other's opinion: they have exchanged views.
2 [Added in the margin:] According to Diogenes Laertius, among the many rhetorical writings of Theophrastus, all now lost, there was one entitled The Theory of Eristic Arguments in Contest. That would be our subject.
Plain English translation
Machine-assisted, independently translated directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
To define dialectic on its own, we must set aside objective truth, which belongs to logic. We must treat it simply as the art of winning the argument. Naturally, this is easier when one is actually right. Dialectic itself, though, must only teach us how to defend ourselves against every sort of attack, especially dishonest attacks. It must also teach us how to attack another person's claims without contradicting ourselves or being refuted. Finding objective truth is quite separate from getting our statements accepted as true. The first belongs to a different inquiry. It depends on judgment, thought and experience, and has no special art of its own. The second is dialectic's purpose. People have defined dialectic as the logic of appearances. That is wrong: it would make it useful only for defending false statements. Even when we are right, we need dialectic to defend our position. We must know dishonest tricks so we can counter them. Often we even need to use some ourselves to defeat the opponent with the same weapons. So dialectic must put objective truth aside or treat it as something incidental. It must look only at how we defend our claims and overthrow someone else's. Rules for doing this must not depend on objective truth, since usually we do not know which side has it.1 We often do not know whether we are right. We often think we are and are mistaken. Both sides often think they are right. For truth lies in a well—truth is in the depths, as Democritus says. When a dispute begins, each person usually thinks truth is on their side. As it continues, both become uncertain. The end is supposed to establish and confirm the truth. Dialectic must stay out of that, just as a fencing teacher ignores who was right in the quarrel that caused the duel. What matters is hitting and blocking. Dialectic is fencing with the mind. Only if we understand it this way can we make it a separate discipline. If we aim at pure objective truth, we return to logic alone. If we aim to establish false statements, we have only sophistry. Both aims assume that we already know what is objectively true or false. We seldom know this for certain beforehand. The correct definition of dialectic is therefore the one given here: mental fencing to win arguments. “Eristic” would be a better name, and “eristic dialectic,” Dialectica eristica, probably the most accurate. It is very useful and has been wrongly neglected in recent times.
Dialectic in this sense should collect and explain, in a system of rules, the techniques people naturally use when they see that truth is not on their side but still want to win. It would therefore defeat the purpose to make the systematic study of dialectic concern itself with objective truth and how to discover it. Natural, original dialectic does not do this. It aims only to be right. The main task of dialectic as we understand it is thus to identify and analyze dishonest debating tricks. We can then immediately recognize and defeat them in actual debates. For that very reason, its account must openly take winning the argument, rather than objective truth, as its final aim.
Despite looking far and wide, I know of no work that has achieved this.2 The field is still uncultivated. To achieve the aim, we would have to learn from experience. We would watch the debates that often arise in conversation and notice which tricks each side uses. We would then identify the general patterns in tricks that recur in different forms. From these we would establish general strategies, useful both for our own use and for defeating them when someone else uses them.
Treat what follows as a first attempt.
1 [In the margin beside this:] Truth lies in a well, truth is in the depths, a saying of Democritus. Diog. Laert. IX, 72. Two people often argue very energetically, then each goes home holding the other's opinion. They have swapped.
2 [Added in the margin:] Diogenes Laertius says that among Theophrastus's many writings on rhetoric, all now lost, one was called A Contest in the Theory of Eristic Arguments. That would be our subject.
About this section
The task of dialectic is part of The Art of Being Right by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 4 of 43 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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