Basis of all dialectic
Original German
Zuvörderst ist zu betrachten das Wesentliche jeder Disputation, was eigentlich dabei vorgeht.
Der Gegner hat eine These aufgestellt (oder wir selbst, das ist gleich). Sie zu widerlegen giebts zwei Modi und zwei Wege.
1) Die Modi: a) ad rem, b) ad hominem, oder ex concessis: d. h. wir zeigen entweder daß der Satz nicht übereinstimmt mit der Natur der Dinge, der absoluten objektiven Wahrheit: oder aber nicht mit ander[n] Behauptungen oder Einräumungen des Gegners, d. h. mit der relativen subjektiven Wahrheit: letzteres ist nur eine relative Ueberführung und macht nichts aus über die objektive Wahrheit.
2) Die Wege: a) direkte Widerlegung, b) indirekte. — Die direkte greift die These bei ihren Gründen an, die indirekte bei ihren Folgen: die direkte zeigt, daß die These nicht wahr ist, die indirekte daß sie nicht wahr seyn kann.
1) Bei der direkten können wir zweierlei. Entweder wir zeigen, daß die Gründe seiner Behauptung falsch sind (nego majorem; minorem): — oder wir geben die Gründe zu, zeigen aber daß die Behauptung nicht daraus folgt (nego consequentiam), greifen also die Konsequenz, die Form des Schlusses an.
2) Bei der indirekten Widerlegung gebrauchen wir entweder die Apagoge: oder die Instanz.
a) Apagoge: wir nehmen seinen Satz als wahr an: und nun zeigen wir was daraus folgt, wenn wir in Verbindung mit irgend einem andern als wahr anerkannten Satze selbigen als Prämisse zu einem Schlusse gebrauchen, und nun eine Konklusion entsteht, die offenbar falsch ist, indem sie entweder der Natur der Dinge1, oder den andern Behauptungen des Gegners selbst widerspricht, also ad rem oder ad hominem falsch ist (Socrates in Hippia maj. et alias): folglich auch der Satz falsch war: denn aus wahren Prämissen können nur wahre Sätze folgen: obwohl aus falschen nicht immer falsche.
b) Die Instanz, ενστασις, exemplum in contrarium: Widerlegung des allgemeinen Satzes durch direkte Nachweisung einzelner unter seiner Aussage begriffner Fälle, von denen er doch nicht gilt, also selbst falsch seyn muß.
Dies ist das Grundgerüst, das Skelett jeder Disputation: wir haben also ihre Osteologie. Denn hierauf läuft im Grunde alles Disputiren zurück: aber dies alles kann wirklich oder nur scheinbar, mit ächten oder mit unächten Gründen geschehn: und weil hierüber nicht leicht etwas sicher auszumachen ist, sind die Debatten so lang und hartnäckig. Wir können auch bei der Anweisung das wahre und scheinbare nicht trennen, weil es eben nie zum voraus bei den Streitenden selbst gewiß ist: daher gebe ich die Kunstgriffe ohne Rücksicht ob man objective Recht oder Unrecht hat: denn das kann man selbst nicht sicher wissen: und es soll ja erst durch den Streit ausgemacht werden. Uebrigens muß man, bei jeder Disputation oder Argumentation überhaupt, über irgend etwas einverstanden seyn, daraus man als einem Princip die vorliegende Frage beurtheilen will: Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.
1 [Zusatz zum Zusatz:] widerspricht sie einer ganz unbezweifelbaren Wahrheit gradezu, so haben wir den Gegner ad absurdum geführt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted, directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
First we must consider the essential character of every dispute: what actually happens in it.
The opponent has advanced a thesis—or we have ourselves; it makes no difference. There are two modes and two ways of refuting it.
1) The modes: a) ad rem; b) ad hominem, or ex concessis. We show either that the proposition does not agree with the nature of things, with absolute objective truth, or that it does not agree with the opponent's other assertions or concessions, with relative subjective truth. The latter is only a relative refutation and determines nothing about objective truth.
2) The ways: a) direct refutation; b) indirect. Direct refutation attacks the thesis through its grounds; indirect refutation through its consequences. The former shows that the thesis is not true; the latter that it cannot be true.
1) In direct refutation we can do two things. Either we show that the grounds of the assertion are false—“I deny the major premise; the minor premise”—or we concede the grounds but show that the assertion does not follow from them—“I deny the inference”—thus attacking the consequence, the form of the inference.
2) In indirect refutation we use either apagoge or the counterinstance.
a) Apagoge: we assume his proposition to be true and show what follows when we use it as a premise in an inference, in combination with some other proposition acknowledged to be true. A conclusion then emerges that is plainly false, contradicting either the nature of things1 or the opponent's own other assertions: false ad rem or ad hominem. Socrates in Hippia maj. et alias. Consequently, the proposition too was false, for only true propositions can follow from true premises, although false ones do not always follow from false premises.
b) The counterinstance, enstasis, exemplum in contrarium: the refutation of a general proposition by directly demonstrating particular cases included in its assertion to which it nevertheless does not apply, so that it must itself be false.
This is the framework, the skeleton of every dispute: we have its osteology. For all disputation fundamentally comes back to this. But it can all be real or merely apparent, accomplished with genuine or spurious grounds. Because it is not easy to determine anything certain about this, debates are so long and obstinate. Nor, in giving instruction, can we separate the true from the apparent, since the disputants themselves are never certain of it beforehand. I therefore give the stratagems without regard to whether one is objectively right or wrong: one cannot oneself know this securely; the dispute is meant to settle it for the first time. Besides, in every dispute or argument one must agree upon something from which, as a principle, to judge the question at hand: there is no disputing with someone who denies the principles.
1 [Addition to the addition:] If it directly contradicts an entirely indubitable truth, we have reduced the opponent to absurdity.
Plain English translation
Machine-assisted, independently translated directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
First consider what is essential to every dispute: what actually takes place.
The opponent has put forward a claim. Or we have; that makes no difference. We have two modes and two methods of refuting it.
1) The modes: a) ad rem; b) ad hominem, also called ex concessis. We show either that the claim conflicts with the nature of things, with absolute objective truth, or that it conflicts with something else the opponent has claimed or accepted, with relative subjective truth. The second only disproves the claim relative to that person's position. It settles nothing about objective truth.
2) The methods: a) direct refutation; b) indirect refutation. The direct method attacks the reasons supporting the claim. The indirect method attacks what follows from it. The direct method shows that the claim is not true. The indirect method shows that it cannot be true.
1) With the direct method we can do either of two things. We can show that the reasons for the opponent's claim are false: “I deny the major premise; the minor premise.” Or we can accept the reasons but show that the claim does not follow: “I deny the inference.” In that case we attack the connection, the form of the reasoning.
2) With indirect refutation we use either apagoge or a counterexample.
a) Apagoge: we assume the claim is true. We then use it as a premise together with another statement accepted as true, and show what follows. Suppose the result is clearly false because it conflicts with the nature of things1 or with the opponent's other claims. It is then false ad rem or ad hominem. (Socrates in Hippia maj. et alias.) The original claim was therefore false too. Only true statements can follow from true premises, although false premises do not always produce false statements.
b) A counterexample, enstasis, exemplum in contrarium: we directly identify particular cases covered by a general statement, but to which it does not apply. This refutes the general statement, which must itself be false.
This is the framework, the skeleton, of every dispute. We have studied its bones. All debating comes down to this, but it can happen genuinely or only apparently, with sound reasons or unsound ones. Since it is hard to be certain which is happening, debates are long and stubborn. In teaching this, we cannot separate the genuine from the apparent either. The people arguing are never certain of this in advance. So I give the tricks without considering whether we are objectively right or wrong. We cannot know that for certain ourselves; the dispute is meant to decide it. Besides, any debate or argument requires agreement on something to use as a principle for judging the question. You cannot argue with someone who denies the principles.
1 [Addition to the addition:] If the conclusion directly contradicts a completely certain truth, we have shown the opponent's position to be absurd.
About this section
Basis of all dialectic is part of The Art of Being Right by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 5 of 43 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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