Aristotle’s Topics
Original German
Aristoteles hat in den Topicis die Aufstellung der Dialektik mit seinem eignen wissenschaftlichen Geist äußerst methodisch und systematisch angegriffen und dies verdient Bewunderung, wenn gleich der Zweck, der hier offenbar praktisch ist, nicht sonderlich erreicht worden. Nachdem er in den Analyticis die Begriffe, Urtheile und Schlüsse der reinen Form nach betrachtet hatte, geht er nun zum Inhalt über, wobei er es eigentlich nur mit den Begriffen zu thun hat: denn in diesen liegt ja der Gehalt. Sätze und Schlüsse sind rein für sich bloße Form: die Begriffe sind ihr Gehalt.1 — Sein Gang ist folgender. Jede Disputation hat eine Thesis oder Problem (diese differiren bloß in der Form) und dann Sätze die es zu lösen dienen sollen. Es handelt sich dabei immer um das Verhältniß von Begriffen zu einander. Dieser Verhältnisse sind zunächst vier. Man sucht nämlich von einem Begriff, entweder 1) seine Definition, oder 2) sein Genus, oder 3) sein Eigenthümliches, wesentliches Merkmal, proprium, ιδιον, oder 4) sein accidens d. i. irgend eine Eigenschaft gleichviel ob Eigenthüm[liches] und Ausschließ[liches] oder nicht, kurz ein Prädikat. Auf eins dieser Verhältnisse ist das Problem jeder Disputation zurückzuführen. D[ie]s ist die Basis der ganzen Dialektik. In den 8 Büchern derselben stellt er nun alle Verhältnisse, die Begriffe in jenen vier Rücksichten wechselseitig zu einander haben können, auf und giebt die Regeln für jedes mögliche Verhältniß; wie nämlich ein Begriff sich zum andern verhalten müsse um dessen proprium, dessen accidens, dessen genus, dessen definitum oder Definition zu seyn: welche Fehler bei der Aufstellung leicht gemacht werden, und jedesmal was man demnach zu beobachten habe, wenn man selbst ein solches Verhältniß aufstellt (κατασκευαζειν) und was man, nachdem der andre es aufgestellt, thun könne es umzustoßen (ανασκευαζειν). Die Aufstellung jeder solchen Regel oder jedes solchen allgemeinen Verhältnisses jener Klassen-Begriffe zu einander nennt er τοπος, locus, und giebt 382 solcher τοποι: daher Topica. Diesem fügt er noch einige allgemein[e] Regeln bei, über das Disputiren überhaupt, die jedoch lange nicht erschöpfend sind. Der τοπος ist also kein rein materieller, bezieht sich nicht auf einen bestimmten Gegenstand, oder Begriff; sondern er betrifft immer ein Verhältniß ganzer Klassen von Begriffen, welches unzähligen Begriffen gemein seyn kann, sobald sie zu einander in einer der erwähnten vier Rücksichten betrachtet werden, welches bei jeder Disputation statt hat. Und diese vier Rücksichten haben wieder untergeordnete Klassen. Die Betrachtung ist hier also noch immer gewissermaaßen formal, jedoch nicht so rein formal wie in der Logik, da sie sich mit dem Inhalt der Begriffe beschäftigt, aber auf eine formelle Weise, nämlich sie giebt an wie der Inhalt des Begriffs A sich verhalten müsse zu dem des Begriffs B, damit dieser aufgestellt werden könne als dessen genus oder dessen proprium (Merkmal) oder dessen accidens oder dessen Definition oder nach den diesen untergeordneten Rubriken, von Gegentheil αντικειμενον, Ursach und Wirkung, Eigenschaft und Mangel u. s.w.: und um ein solches Verhältniß soll sich jede Disputation drehen. Die meisten Regeln die er nun eben als τοποι über diese Verhältnisse angiebt, sind solche die in der Natur der Begriffsverhältnisse liegen, deren jeder sich von selbst bewußt ist, und auf deren Befolgung vom Gegner er schon von selbst dringt, eben wie in der Logik, und die es leichter ist im speciellen Fall zu beobachten oder ihre Vernachlässigung zu bemerken, als sich des abstrakten τοπος darüber zu erinnern: daher eben der praktische Nutzen dieser Dialektik nicht groß ist. Er sagt fast lauter Dinge die sich von selbst verstehn und auf deren Beachtung die gesunde Vernunft von selbst geräth. Beispiele: „Wenn von einem Dinge das Genus behauptet wird, so muß ihm auch irgend eine Species dieses genus zukommen: ist dies nicht, so ist die Behauptung falsch: z. B. es wird behauptet, die Seele habe Bewegung; so muß ihr irgend eine bestimmte Art der Bewegung eigen seyn, Flug, Gang, Wachsthum, Abnahme u. s.w. — ist dies nicht, so hat sie auch keine Bewegung. — Also wem keine Species zukommt, dem auch nicht das genus: das ist der τοπος.“ Dieser τοπος gilt zum Aufstellen und zum Umwerfen. Es ist der 9. τοπος. Und umgekehrt: wem das Genus nicht zukommt, kommt auch keine Species zu: z. B. Einer soll (wird behauptet) von einem Andern schlecht geredet haben: — Beweisen wir, daß er gar nicht geredet hat; so ist auch jenes nicht: denn wo das genus nicht ist, kann die Species nicht seyn.
Unter der Rubrik d[a]s Eigenthüml[iche], proprium, lautet der 215. locus so: „Erstlich zum Umstoßen: wenn der Gegner als Eigenthümliches etwas angiebt, das nur sinnlich wahrzunehmen ist; so ists schlecht angegeben: denn alles Sinnliche wird ungewiß sobald es aus dem Bereich der Sinne hinaus kommt: z. B. er setzt als Eigenthümliches der Sonne, sie sei das hellste Gestirn das über die Erde zieht: — das taugt nicht: denn wenn die Sonne untergegangen, wissen wir nicht ob sie über die Erde zieht, weil sie dann außer dem Bereich der Sinne ist. — Zweitens zum Aufstellen: das Eigenthümliche wird richtig angegeben, wenn ein solches aufgestellt wird, das nicht sinnlich erkannt wird, oder wenn sinnlich erkannt, doch nothwendig vorhanden: z. B. als Eigenthümliches der Oberfläche werde angegeben, daß sie zuerst gefärbt wird; so ist dies zwar ein sinnliches Merkmal, aber ein solches, das offenbar allezeit vorhanden, also richtig.“ — Soviel um Ihnen einen Begriff von der Dialektik des Aristoteles zu geben. Sie scheint mir den Zweck nicht zu erreichen: ich habe es also anders versucht. Cicero’s Topica sind eine Nachahmung der Aristotelischen aus dem Gedächtniß: höchst seicht und elend: Cicero hat durchaus keinen deutlichen Begriff von dem was ein topus ist und bezweckt, und so radotirt er ex ingenio allerhand Zeug durcheinander, und staffirt es reichlich mit juristischen Beispielen aus. Eine seiner schlechtesten Schriften.
1 [Dazu am Rand:] Die Begriffe lassen sich aber unter gewisse Klassen bringen, wie Genus und Species, Ursach und Wirkung, Eigenschaft und Gegentheil, Haben und Mangel, u. dgl. m.; und für diese Klasse[n] gelten einige allgemeine Regeln: diese sind die loci, τοποι. — Z. B. ein Locus von Ursach und Wirkung ist: „die Ursach der Ursach ist Ursach der Wirkung“, angewandt: „die Ursach meines Glücks ist mein Reichthum: also ist auch der welcher mir den Reichthum gab Urheber meines Glücks.“ Loci von Gegensätzen: 1) Sie schließen sich aus, z. B. grad und krumm. 2) Sie sind im selben Subjekt: z. B. hat die Liebe ihren Sitz im Willen (επιθυμητικον), so hat der Haß ihn auch. — Ist aber dieser im Sitz des Gefühls (θυμοειδες), dann die Liebe auch. — Kann die Seele nicht weiß seyn, so auch nicht schwarz. — 3) Fehlt der niedrigre Grad, so fehlt auch der höhere: ist ein Mensch nicht gerecht, so ist er auch nicht wohlwollend. — Sie sehn hieraus daß die Loci sind gewisse allgemeine Wahrheiten, die ganze Klassen von Begriffen treffen, auf die man also bei vorkommenden einzelnen Fällen zurückgehn kann, um aus ihnen seine Argumente zu schöpfen, auch um sich auf sie als allgemein einleuchtend zu berufen. Jedoch sind die meisten sehr trüglich und vielen Ausnahmen unterworfen: z. B. es ist ein locus: entgegengesetzte Dinge haben entgegengesetzte Verhältnisse, z. B. die Tugend ist schön, das Laster häßlich. — Freundschaft ist wohlwollend, Feindschaft übelwollend. — Aber nun: Verschwendung ist ein Laster, also Geiz eine Tugend; Narren sagen die Wahrheit: also lügen die Weisen: geht nicht. Tod ist Vergehn, also Leben Entstehn: falsch.
[Zusatz:] Beispiel von der Trüglichkeit solcher topi: Scotus Erigena im Buch de praedestinatione cap. 3, will die Ketzer widerlegen, welche in Gott [zwei] praedestinationes (eine der Erwählten zum Heil, eine der Verworfnen zur Verdammniß) annahmen, und gebraucht dazu diesen (Gott weiß woher genommnen) topus: „Omnium, quae sunt inter se contraria, necesse est eorum causas inter se esse contrarias; unam enim eandemque causam diversa, inter se contraria efficere ratio prohibet.“ So! — aber die experientia docet, daß dieselbe Wärme den Ton hart und das Wachs weich macht, und hundert ähnliche Dinge. Und dennoch klingt der topus plausibel. Er baut seine Demonstration aber ruhig auf dem topus au[f] [Sch.: aus], die geht uns weiter nichts an. —
Eine ganze Sammlung von Locis mit ihren Widerlegungen hat Baco d[e] Ver[ulamio] zusammengestellt unter dem Titel Colores boni et mali. — Sie sind hier als Beispiel[e] zu brauchen. Er nennt sie Sophismata.
[Zusatz, nach Art der Eintragung zeitlich früher als der vorhergehende Zusatz:] Als ein Locus kann auch das Argument betrachtet werden durch welches im Symposium Socrates dem Agathon, der der Liebe alle vortreffliche[n] Eigenschaften, Schönheit, Güte u. s. w. beigelegt hatte, das Gegentheil beweist: „Was Einer sucht, das hat er nicht: nun sucht die Liebe das Schöne und Gute; also hat sie solche nicht.“
[Zusatz:] Es hat etwas Scheinbares, daß es gewisse allgemeingültige Wahrheiten gäbe, die auf Alles anwendbar wären und durch die man also alle vorkommenden einzelnen noch so verschiedenartigen Fälle, ohne näher auf ihr Specielles einzugehn, entscheiden könnte. (Das Gesetz der Kompensation ist ein ganz guter locus.) Allein es geht nicht, eben weil die Begriffe durch Abstraktion von den Differenzen entstanden sind und daher das Verschiedenartigste begreifen, welches sich wieder hervorthut, wenn mittelst der Begriffe die einzelnen Dinge der verschiedensten Arten aneinandergebracht werden und nu[r] nach den obern Begriffen entschieden wird. Es ist sogar dem Menschen natürlich beim Disputiren sich, wenn er bedrängt wird, hinter irgend einen allgemeinen topus zu retten. Loci sind auch die lex parsimoniae naturae; — auch: natura nihil facit frustra. — [Später Zusatz:] Ja, alle Sprichwörter sind loci mit praktischer Tendenz.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted, directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
In the Topics, Aristotle undertook the construction of dialectic with his own scientific spirit, proceeding most methodically and systematically. This deserves admiration, although the purpose, plainly a practical one here, was not particularly well achieved. After considering concepts, judgments and inferences in the Analytics according to their pure form, he now turns to their content. In doing so he is really concerned only with concepts, for it is in these that the content lies. Propositions and inferences, taken by themselves, are bare form; concepts are their content.1 His procedure is as follows. Every dispute has a thesis or problem—these differ only in form—and then propositions intended to help resolve it. The matter at issue is always the relationship of concepts to one another. There are initially four such relationships. Of a concept one seeks either 1) its definition, 2) its genus, 3) its peculiar, essential characteristic, its proprium, idion, or 4) its accidens: some attribute, whether peculiar and exclusive or not—in short, a predicate. The problem of every dispute must be referred to one of these relationships. This is the basis of the whole of dialectic. Throughout its eight books he sets out all the relationships concepts can bear to one another in these four respects, and gives rules for every possible relationship: how one concept must relate to another to be its proprium, accidens, genus, definitum or definition; what errors are easily made in establishing such a relationship; and in each case what one must observe when establishing it oneself—kataskeuazein—and what one can do to overturn it after another has established it—anaskeuazein. He calls the formulation of each such rule, or each such general relationship between those classes of concepts, a topos, locus, and gives 382 such topoi: hence Topica. To these he adds a few general rules about disputation itself, though they are far from exhaustive.
A topos is thus not purely material: it does not refer to a particular object or concept, but always concerns a relationship between whole classes of concepts. This relationship may be shared by countless concepts as soon as they are considered in relation to one another in one of the four respects mentioned, as happens in every dispute. These four respects have subordinate classes in turn. The consideration is therefore still in a sense formal, though not as purely formal as in logic. It concerns the content of concepts, but in a formal way: it states how the content of concept A must relate to that of concept B for the latter to be established as its genus, proprium or characteristic, accidens, or definition, or under the subordinate headings of opposite, antikeimenon, cause and effect, attribute and privation, and so forth. Every dispute is supposed to turn upon such a relationship. Most of the rules he gives as topoi about these relationships are inherent in the nature of conceptual relationships, apparent to everyone without instruction, and such that everyone already insists on the opponent's observing them, just as in logic. It is easier to observe them in a particular case, or notice their neglect, than to recall the abstract topos concerning them. Hence the practical use of this dialectic is slight. He says almost nothing but what is self-evident and what sound reason naturally leads us to observe. Examples: “If a thing is asserted to have a genus, it must also have some species of that genus. Otherwise the assertion is false. For example, it is asserted that the soul has movement: it must therefore possess some particular kind of movement—flight, walking, growth, decline, and so forth. If it does not, it has no movement either. Thus what has no species has no genus either: that is the topos.” This topos serves both to establish and to overthrow. It is the ninth topos. Conversely, what has no genus has no species either. For example, someone is alleged to have spoken ill of another: if we prove that he did not speak at all, neither did he do that, for where there is no genus there can be no species.
Under the heading of the peculiar characteristic, proprium, the 215th locus runs as follows: “First, for overthrowing: if the opponent gives as a peculiar characteristic something perceptible only to the senses, he has given a poor account of it. For everything sensible becomes uncertain as soon as it passes beyond the reach of the senses. Suppose, for example, he assigns to the sun as its peculiar characteristic that it is the brightest star passing over the earth. This will not do: once the sun has set, we do not know whether it is passing over the earth, since it is then outside the reach of the senses. Second, for establishing: a peculiar characteristic is correctly assigned when one is advanced that is not known through the senses, or, if known through the senses, is nevertheless necessarily present. For example, suppose the peculiar characteristic assigned to a surface is that it is the first thing to be colored. This is indeed a sensible characteristic, but one plainly always present, and therefore correct.” So much to give you some idea of Aristotle's dialectic. It seems to me not to achieve its purpose; I have therefore attempted it differently. Cicero's Topica is an imitation of Aristotle's from memory, exceedingly shallow and wretched. Cicero has no clear conception whatever of what a topus is and what it aims at. So he rambles out all manner of things from his own invention and furnishes them lavishly with legal examples. One of his worst writings.
1 [Added in the margin:] Concepts, however, can be brought under certain classes, such as genus and species, cause and effect, attribute and opposite, possession and privation, and the like. Certain general rules hold for these classes: these are the loci, topoi. For example, a locus of cause and effect is: “The cause of the cause is the cause of the effect.” Applied: “The cause of my happiness is my wealth; therefore the person who gave me the wealth is also the author of my happiness.” Loci of opposites: 1) They exclude one another, as straight and curved do. 2) They reside in the same subject. For example, if love has its seat in the will, epithymetikon, so does hatred. But if the latter is seated in feeling, thymoeides, then so is love. If the soul cannot be white, neither can it be black. 3) Where the lower degree is absent, the higher is absent too: if a person is not just, neither is he benevolent. You see from this that loci are certain general truths applying to whole classes of concepts, to which one can turn in particular cases to draw arguments from them, and also appeal to them as generally evident. Most, however, are very deceptive and subject to many exceptions. For example, there is a locus: opposite things have opposite relationships. Virtue is beautiful, vice ugly; friendship benevolent, enmity malevolent. But now: extravagance is a vice, therefore miserliness a virtue; fools tell the truth, therefore the wise lie. That will not do. Death is passing away, therefore life is coming into being: false.
[Addition:] An example of the deceptiveness of such topoi: Scotus Erigena, in the book de praedestinatione cap. 3, seeks to refute the heretics who assumed two predestinations in God, one of the elect to salvation and one of the rejected to damnation. He uses this topos, taken from God knows where: “Of all things contrary to one another, their causes must also be contrary to one another; for reason forbids one and the same cause to produce different things contrary to one another.” Indeed! But experience teaches that the same heat hardens clay and softens wax, and a hundred similar things. Yet the topos sounds plausible. He calmly builds his demonstration upon it; the demonstration concerns us no further.
Bacon of Verulam assembled a whole collection of loci and their refutations under the title Colores boni et mali. These may be used here as examples. He calls them Sophismata.
[Addition, earlier in date than the preceding addition, judging by the manner of its entry:] Another locus may be seen in the argument by which, in the Symposium, Socrates proves to Agathon the opposite of what he had asserted when attributing every excellent quality—beauty, goodness and so forth—to Love: “What a person seeks, he does not have. Now love seeks the beautiful and the good; therefore it does not have them.”
[Addition:] There is something plausible in the idea of certain universally valid truths applicable to everything, by which one could decide every particular case, however different, without examining its particular nature more closely. The law of compensation is quite a good locus. But this will not work, precisely because concepts arise by abstraction from differences and therefore embrace the most diverse things. Their diversity reasserts itself when concepts bring together particular things of the most different kinds and a decision is made solely according to the higher concepts. Indeed, it is natural for a person under pressure in a dispute to take refuge behind some general topus. Loci also include the law of nature's economy, and “nature does nothing in vain.” [Later addition:] Yes, all proverbs are loci with a practical tendency.
Plain English translation
Machine-assisted, independently translated directly from Deussen’s German edition (1923).
In the Topics, Aristotle set about developing dialectic with his own scientific approach, working very methodically and systematically. This deserves admiration, even though he did not do much to achieve the aim, which here is clearly practical. In the Analytics, he had considered concepts, judgments, and inferences purely in terms of their form. Now he turns to their content. Here he is really concerned only with concepts, since they contain the substance. Propositions and inferences, taken by themselves, are mere form: concepts are their substance.1—His procedure is as follows. Every debate has a thesis or problem—these differ only in form—and then propositions intended to resolve it. What is at issue is always the relationship between concepts. To begin with, there are four such relationships. For a given concept, we look for either 1) its definition, 2) its genus, 3) its distinctive, essential feature, its proprium or distinctive property, or 4) its accident, meaning any property at all, whether distinctive and exclusive or not—in short, a predicate. The problem in every debate can be reduced to one of these relationships. This is the basis of the whole of dialectic. In its 8 books, he sets out all the relationships concepts can have to one another in these four respects, and gives rules for every possible relationship. He explains how one concept must relate to another to be its distinctive property, its accident, its genus, the thing it defines, or its definition; what mistakes are easily made in establishing these relationships; and, in each case, what we must therefore watch for when establishing such a relationship ourselves, and what we can do to overturn it once someone else has established it. He calls the statement of each such rule, or each such general relationship between these classes of concepts, a topic or locus, and gives 382 such topics: hence the title Topics. He adds a few general rules about debate as a whole, but these are far from exhaustive. A topic, then, is not purely a matter of content: it does not refer to a particular object or concept. Instead, it always concerns a relationship between whole classes of concepts. Countless concepts can share this relationship as soon as they are considered in relation to one another in one of the four respects mentioned, as happens in every debate. These four respects also have subordinate classes. So the discussion here is still formal to a certain extent, though not as purely formal as in logic. It deals with the content of concepts, but in a formal way: it states how the content of concept A must relate to that of concept B for B to be presented as A’s genus, distinctive property or feature, accident, or definition. It also considers the headings subordinate to these: opposites, cause and effect, possession of a property and its absence, and so on. Every debate is supposed to turn on a relationship of this kind. Most of the rules he gives as topics concerning these relationships are inherent in the nature of conceptual relationships. Everyone is already aware of them and naturally insists that an opponent follow them, just as in logic. It is easier to follow them in a particular case, or notice when they are neglected, than to remember the abstract topic governing them. This is precisely why this dialectic has little practical use. He says almost nothing but things that are obvious, things that sound judgment naturally takes into account. Examples: “If a thing is said to belong to a genus, it must also belong to some species of that genus. If it does not, the claim is false. For example, suppose someone claims that the soul has motion. Then some particular kind of motion must belong to it: flying, walking, growth, decrease, and so on. If none does, it has no motion either. So whatever belongs to no species does not belong to the genus either: that is the topic.” This topic can be used both to establish a claim and to overturn one. It is the 9th topic. Conversely, whatever does not belong to the genus does not belong to any of its species either. For example, someone is alleged to have spoken badly of another person. If we prove that he did not speak at all, he cannot have done that either: where the genus is absent, the species cannot be present.
Under the heading of the distinctive property, or proprium, the 215th locus runs as follows: “First, for overturning a claim: if your opponent presents something that can only be perceived through the senses as a distinctive property, he has chosen badly. Anything perceived through the senses becomes uncertain as soon as it passes beyond their range. For example, he gives as the distinctive property of the sun that it is the brightest heavenly body to travel above the earth. This will not do: once the sun has set, we do not know whether it travels above the earth, because it is then beyond the range of our senses. Second, for establishing a claim: a distinctive property is correctly given if the property proposed is not known through the senses, or, if it is, is nevertheless necessarily present. For example, suppose it is given as the distinctive property of a surface that it is the first thing to receive color. This is indeed a sensory feature, but one that is obviously always present, so it is correct.”—That is enough to give you an idea of Aristotle’s dialectic. It seems to me not to achieve its aim, so I have tried a different approach. Cicero’s Topica is an imitation of Aristotle’s work, written from memory: extremely shallow and poor. Cicero has no clear idea at all of what a topic is or what it is meant to do. So he rambles on with all kinds of things off the top of his head and fills them out with plenty of legal examples. It is one of his worst works.
1 [Added in the margin:] Concepts can, however, be placed under certain classes, such as genus and species, cause and effect, a property and its opposite, possession and absence, and others of that kind. Certain general rules apply to these classes: these are the loci, or topics. For example, a topic of cause and effect is: “The cause of a cause is a cause of the effect.” Applied to a case: “The cause of my happiness is my wealth, so the person who gave me my wealth is also responsible for my happiness.” Topics concerning opposites: 1) They exclude each other, for example straight and curved. 2) They are in the same subject: for example, if love has its seat in the will, the desiring part, hatred does too. But if hatred is seated in feeling, the spirited part, so is love. If the soul cannot be white, it cannot be black either. 3) If the lower degree is absent, the higher degree is absent too: if a person is not just, he is not benevolent either. You can see from this that topics are certain general truths applying to whole classes of concepts. We can therefore turn back to them when particular cases arise, drawing our arguments from them and also appealing to them as generally obvious truths. Yet most are highly misleading and subject to many exceptions. For example, one topic is: opposite things have opposite relationships. For example, virtue is beautiful and vice is ugly. Friendship is benevolent; enmity is malevolent. But now try this: wastefulness is a vice, so stinginess is a virtue; fools tell the truth, so wise people lie. It does not work. Death is passing away, so life is coming into being: false.
[Addition:] An example of how misleading such topics are: in de praedestinatione cap. 3, Scotus Erigena wants to refute the heretics who assumed [two] predestinations in God—one predestining the chosen to salvation, the other predestining the rejected to damnation. To do so, he uses this topic, taken from God knows where: “All things that are contrary to one another must have causes that are contrary to one another; for reason rules out one and the same cause producing different, mutually contrary things.” Really! But experience teaches that the same heat hardens clay and softens wax, and a hundred similar things. Yet the topic sounds plausible. He calmly builds his demonstration on the topic [Sch.: from], however; the demonstration is of no further concern to us.—
Bacon of Verulam put together a whole collection of topics and their refutations under the title Colores boni et mali. They can be used as examples here. He calls them Sophismata.
[Addition, apparently entered earlier than the preceding addition, judging by the way it was written:] Another argument that can be considered a topic is the one Socrates uses in the Symposium against Agathon. Agathon had credited love with every excellent quality—beauty, goodness, and so on—and Socrates proves the opposite: “Whatever someone seeks, he does not have. Now love seeks beauty and goodness, so it does not have them.”
[Addition:] There is something plausible about the idea that certain universally valid truths might apply to everything, allowing us to decide all the particular cases that arise, however different they may be, without looking more closely at their specific features. (The law of compensation is quite a good topic.) But it does not work, precisely because concepts arise by abstracting from differences and therefore cover the most diverse things. This diversity shows itself again when concepts are used to bring individual things of very different kinds together, and a decision is made solely on the basis of the higher concepts. It is even natural for someone under pressure in a debate to take refuge behind some general topic. The law of economy in nature is also a topic, as is: nature does nothing in vain.—[Later addition:] In fact, all proverbs are topics with a practical aim.
About this section
Aristotle’s Topics is part of The Art of Being Right by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 3 of 43 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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