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Book III, Chapter III, 1
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OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF CITIES AND TOWNS, AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.
The inhabitants of cities and towns were, after the fall of the Roman empire, not more favoured than those of the country. They consisted, indeed, of a very different order of people from the first inhabitants of the ancient republics of Greece and Italy. These last were composed chiefly of the proprietors of lands, among whom the public territory was originally divided, and who found it convenient to build their houses in the neighbourhood of one another, and to surround them with a wall, for the sake of common defence. After the fall of the Roman empire, on the contrary, the proprietors of land seem generally to have lived in fortified castles on their own estates, and in the midst of their own tenants and dependants. The towns were chiefly inhabited by tradesmen and mechanics, who seem, in those days, to have been of servile, or very nearly of servile condition. The privileges which we find granted by ancient charters to the inhabitants of some of the principal towns in Europe, sufficiently show what they were before those grants. The people to whom it is granted as a privilege, that they might give away their own daughters in marriage without the consent of their lord, that upon their death their own children, and not their lord, should succeed to their goods, and that they might dispose of their own effects by will, must, before those grants, have been either altogether, or very nearly, in the same state of villanage with the occupiers of land in the country.
They seem, indeed, to have been a very poor, mean set of people, who seemed to travel about with their goods from place to place, and from fair to fair, like the hawkers and pedlars of the present times. In all the different countries of Europe then, in the same manner as in several of the Tartar governments of Asia at present, taxes used to be levied upon the persons and goods of travellers, when they passed through certain manors, when they went over certain bridges, when they carried about their goods from place to place in a fair, when they erected in it a booth or stall to sell them in. These different taxes were known in England by the names of passage, pontage, lastage, and stallage. Sometimes the king, sometimes a great lord, who had, it seems, upon some occasions, authority to do this, would grant to particular traders, to such particularly as lived in their own demesnes, a general exemption from such taxes. Such traders, though in other respects of servile, or very nearly of servile condition, were upon this account called free traders. They, in return, usually paid to their protector a sort of annual poll-tax. In those days protection was seldom granted without a valuable consideration, and this tax might perhaps be considered as compensation for what their patrons might lose by their exemption from other taxes. At first, both those poll-taxes and those exemptions seem to have been altogether personal, and to have affected only particular individuals, during either their lives, or the pleasure of their protectors. In the very imperfect accounts which have been published from Doomsday-book, of several of the towns of England, mention is frequently made, sometimes of the tax which particular burghers paid, each of them, either to the king, or to some other great lord, for this sort of protection, and sometimes of the general amount only of all those taxes. {see Brady’s Historical Treatise of Cities and Boroughs, p. 3. etc.}
But how servile soever may have been originally the condition of the inhabitants of the towns, it appears evidently, that they arrived at liberty and independency much earlier than the occupiers of land in the country. That part of the king’s revenue which arose from such poll-taxes in any particular town, used commonly to be let in farm, during a term of years, for a rent certain, sometimes to the sheriff of the county, and sometimes to other persons. The burghers themselves frequently got credit enough to be admitted to farm the revenues of this sort which arose out of their own town, they becoming jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent. {See Madox, Firma Burgi, p. 18; also History of the Exchequer, chap. 10, sect. v, p. 223, first edition.} To let a farm in this manner, was quite agreeable to the usual economy of, I believe, the sovereigns of all the different countries of Europe, who used frequently to let whole manors to all the tenants of those manors, they becoming jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent; but in return being allowed to collect it in their own way, and to pay it into the king’s exchequer by the hands of their own bailiff, and being thus altogether freed from the insolence of the king’s officers; a circumstance in those days regarded as of the greatest importance.
At first, the farm of the town was probably let to the burghers, in the same manner as it had been to other farmers, for a term of years only. In process of time, however, it seems to have become the general practice to grant it to them in fee, that is for ever, reserving a rent certain, never afterwards to be augmented. The payment having thus become perpetual, the exemptions, in return, for which it was made, naturally became perpetual too. Those exemptions, therefore, ceased to be personal, and could not afterwards be considered as belonging to individuals, as individuals, but as burghers of a particular burgh, which, upon this account, was called a free burgh, for the same reason that they had been called free burghers or free traders.
Along with this grant, the important privileges, above mentioned, that they might give away their own daughters in marriage, that their children should succeed to them, and that they might dispose of their own effects by will, were generally bestowed upon the burghers of the town to whom it was given. Whether such privileges had before been usually granted, along with the freedom of trade, to particular burghers, as individuals, I know not. I reckon it not improbable that they were, though I cannot produce any direct evidence of it. But however this may have been, the principal attributes of villanage and slavery being thus taken away from them, they now at least became really free, in our present sense of the word freedom.
Nor was this all. They were generally at the same time erected into a commonalty or corporation, with the privilege of having magistrates and a town-council of their own, of making bye-laws for their own government, of building walls for their own defence, and of reducing all their inhabitants under a sort of military discipline, by obliging them to watch and ward; that is, as anciently understood, to guard and defend those walls against all attacks and surprises, by night as well as by day. In England they were generally exempted from suit to the hundred and county courts: and all such pleas as should arise among them, the pleas of the crown excepted, were left to the decision of their own magistrates. In other countries, much greater and more extensive jurisdictions were frequently granted to them. {See Madox, Firma Burgi. See also Pfeffel in the Remarkable events under Frederick II. and his Successors of the House of Suabia.}
It might, probably, be necessary to grant to such towns as were admitted to farm their own revenues, some sort of compulsive jurisdiction to oblige their own citizens to make payment. In those disorderly times, it might have been extremely inconvenient to have left them to seek this sort of justice from any other tribunal. But it must seem extraordinary, that the sovereigns of all the different countries of Europe should have exchanged in this manner for a rent certain, never more to be augmented, that branch of their revenue, which was, perhaps, of all others, the most likely to be improved by the natural course of things, without either expense or attention of their own; and that they should, besides, have in this manner voluntarily erected a sort of independent republics in the heart of their own dominions.
In order to understand this, it must be remembered, that, in those days, the sovereign of perhaps no country in Europe was able to protect, through the whole extent of his dominions, the weaker part of his subjects from the oppression of the great lords. Those whom the law could not protect, and who were not strong enough to defend themselves, were obliged either to have recourse to the protection of some great lord, and in order to obtain it, to become either his slaves or vassals; or to enter into a league of mutual defence for the common protection of one another. The inhabitants of cities and burghs, considered as single individuals, had no power to defend themselves; but by entering into a league of mutual defence with their neighbours, they were capable of making no contemptible resistance. The lords despised the burghers, whom they considered not only as a different order, but as a parcel of emancipated slaves, almost of a different species from themselves. The wealth of the burghers never failed to provoke their envy and indignation, and they plundered them upon every occasion without mercy or remorse. The burghers naturally hated and feared the lords. The king hated and feared them too; but though, perhaps, he might despise, he had no reason either to hate or fear the burghers. Mutual interest, therefore, disposed them to support the king, and the king to support them against the lords. They were the enemies of his enemies, and it was his interest to render them as secure and independent of those enemies as he could. By granting them magistrates of their own, the privilege of making bye-laws for their own government, that of building walls for their own defence, and that of reducing all their inhabitants under a sort of military discipline, he gave them all the means of security and independency of the barons which it was in his power to bestow. Without the establishment of some regular government of this kind, without some authority to compel their inhabitants to act according to some certain plan or system, no voluntary league of mutual defence could either have afforded them any permanent security, or have enabled them to give the king any considerable support. By granting them the farm of their own town in fee, he took away from those whom he wished to have for his friends, and, if one may say so, for his allies, all ground of jealousy and suspicion, that he was ever afterwards to oppress them, either by raising the farm-rent of their town, or by granting it to some other farmer.
The princes who lived upon the worst terms with their barons, seem accordingly to have been the most liberal in grants of this kind to their burghs. King John of England, for example, appears to have been a most munificent benefactor to his towns. {See Madox.} Philip I. of France lost all authority over his barons. Towards the end of his reign, his son Lewis, known afterwards by the name of Lewis the Fat, consulted, according to Father Daniel, with the bishops of the royal demesnes, concerning the most proper means of restraining the violence of the great lords. Their advice consisted of two different proposals. One was to erect a new order of jurisdiction, by establishing magistrates and a town-council in every considerable town of his demesnes. The other was to form a new militia, by making the inhabitants of those towns, under the command of their own magistrates, march out upon proper occasions to the assistance of the king. It is from this period, according to the French antiquarians, that we are to date the institution of the magistrates and councils of cities in France. It was during the unprosperous reigns of the princes of the house of Suabia, that the greater part of the free towns of Germany received the first grants of their privileges, and that the famous Hanseatic league first became formidable. {See Pfeffel.}
The militia of the cities seems, in those times, not to have been inferior to that of the country; and as they could be more readily assembled upon any sudden occasion, they frequently had the advantage in their disputes with the neighbouring lords. In countries such as Italy or Switzerland, in which, on account either of their distance from the principal seat of government, of the natural strength of the country itself, or of some other reason, the sovereign came to lose the whole of his authority; the cities generally became independent republics, and conquered all the nobility in their neighbourhood; obliging them to pull down their castles in the country, and to live, like other peaceable inhabitants, in the city. This is the short history of the republic of Berne, as well as of several other cities in Switzerland. If you except Venice, for of that city the history is somewhat different, it is the history of all the considerable Italian republics, of which so great a number arose and perished between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the sixteenth century.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete English text of all five books for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity.
On the Rise and Progress of Cities and Towns After the Fall of the Roman Empire.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, the inhabitants of cities and towns were no more favored than those of the countryside. They were, indeed, a very different class of people from the first inhabitants of the ancient republics of Greece and Italy. The latter were chiefly landowners among whom the public territory had originally been divided; they found it convenient to build their houses near one another and enclose them within a wall for their common defense. After the fall of the Roman Empire, by contrast, landowners seem generally to have lived in fortified castles on their own estates, surrounded by their tenants and dependents. The towns were inhabited chiefly by tradesmen and craftsmen, who seem in those days to have been in a servile condition, or one very near it. The privileges granted to the inhabitants of some of Europe's principal towns by ancient charters show clearly what their condition had been before those grants. People who received, as privileges, the right to give their daughters in marriage without their lord's consent, to have their own children rather than their lord inherit their goods at death, and to dispose of their possessions by will, must previously have been wholly or nearly in the same state of villeinage as the occupiers of land in the countryside.
They seem, indeed, to have been a very poor and humble class, traveling with their goods from place to place and fair to fair, like today's hawkers and peddlers. Throughout the different countries of Europe at that time, just as in several Tartar governments of Asia now, taxes were levied on the persons and goods of travelers when they passed through certain manors, crossed certain bridges, carried their goods from place to place within a fair, or set up a booth or stall there to sell them. In England these different taxes were known as passage, pontage, lastage, and stallage. Sometimes the king, and sometimes a great lord who apparently had authority to do so on certain occasions, granted particular traders—especially those who lived on his own demesnes—a general exemption from such taxes. Though otherwise servile or nearly so, these traders were for that reason called free traders. In return, they usually paid their protector a kind of annual poll tax. Protection was seldom given in those days without valuable consideration, and this tax might be regarded as compensation for what their patrons lost through the exemption from other taxes. At first, both the poll taxes and the exemptions seem to have been entirely personal, applying only to particular individuals for their lifetimes or at their protectors' pleasure. The very incomplete accounts published from Doomsday-book for several English towns frequently mention either the tax paid by individual burghers, each to the king or some other great lord for such protection, or simply the total amount of all those taxes. [see Brady’s Historical Treatise of Cities and Boroughs, p. 3. etc.]
Yet however servile the townspeople's original condition may have been, they evidently gained liberty and independence much earlier than the occupiers of land in the countryside. The portion of the king's revenue arising from these poll taxes in a particular town was commonly farmed out for a fixed rent over a term of years, sometimes to the county sheriff and sometimes to other persons. The burghers themselves often gained enough credit to be allowed to farm this revenue from their own town, becoming jointly and severally liable for the entire rent. [See Madox, Firma Burgi, p. 18; also History of the Exchequer, chap. 10, sect. v, p. 223, first edition.] Farming out revenue in this way was entirely consistent with the usual practice, I believe, of sovereigns throughout Europe. They frequently farmed out whole manors to all their tenants, who became jointly and severally liable for the whole rent, but in return were allowed to collect it in their own way and pay it into the king's exchequer through their own bailiff. Thus they escaped entirely the insolence of the king's officers, a circumstance considered of the utmost importance in those days.
At first, the farm of a town was probably granted to its burghers, as to other farmers of revenue, only for a term of years. In time, however, it seems to have become general practice to grant it to them in fee—that is, forever—while reserving a fixed rent never afterward to be increased. As the payment became perpetual, the exemptions for which it was made naturally became perpetual too. These exemptions thus ceased to be personal. They could no longer be considered as belonging to individuals in their own right, but to them as burghers of a particular burgh. That burgh was accordingly called a free burgh, for the same reason that they had been called free burghers or free traders.
Along with this grant, the burghers of the town generally received the important privileges already mentioned: to give their daughters in marriage, to have their children inherit their goods, and to dispose of their possessions by will. I do not know whether such privileges had previously been granted along with freedom of trade to individual burghers. I consider it likely, although I can produce no direct evidence. In any case, once the chief marks of villeinage and slavery had been removed, they became, at least from this point onward, truly free in the sense in which we now understand freedom.
Nor was that all. They were generally made at the same time into a community or corporation, entitled to have their own magistrates and town council, make bylaws for their government, build walls for their defense, and bring all their inhabitants under a kind of military discipline by requiring them to watch and ward—that is, as the phrase was understood of old, to guard and defend those walls against attack and surprise by night and day. In England they were generally exempted from suit in the hundred and county courts; all disputes arising among them, except pleas of the crown, were left to their own magistrates to decide. In other countries they were often given much broader and more extensive jurisdictions. [See Madox, Firma Burgi. See also Pfeffel in the Remarkable events under Frederick II. and his Successors of the House of Suabia.]
Towns allowed to farm their own revenues may well have needed some power of compulsion to make their own citizens pay. In those disorderly times it might have been extremely inconvenient to require them to seek such justice from another tribunal. Yet it seems extraordinary that the sovereigns of Europe's different countries should have exchanged for a fixed rent, never to be increased, the branch of revenue perhaps most likely of all to grow through the natural course of events, without any expense or attention on their part; and extraordinary, too, that they should in this way have voluntarily established a kind of independent republic in the heart of their own domains.
To understand this, we must remember that in those days perhaps no sovereign in Europe could protect the weaker members of his realm, throughout all his domains, from the oppression of the great lords. Those whom the law could not protect, and who lacked the strength to defend themselves, had either to seek the protection of some great lord and become his slaves or vassals to obtain it, or to form an alliance for mutual defense. Individually the inhabitants of cities and burghs could not defend themselves; united with their neighbors in such an alliance, they could put up a resistance not to be despised. The lords despised the burghers, regarding them not merely as a different class but as a crowd of emancipated slaves, almost another species. The burghers' wealth invariably stirred their envy and indignation, and they plundered them at every opportunity without mercy or remorse. The burghers naturally hated and feared the lords. The king hated and feared them too; but though he might perhaps despise the burghers, he had no reason to hate or fear them. Mutual interest thus inclined the burghers to support the king and the king to support them against the lords. They were the enemies of his enemies, and he had an interest in making them as secure and independent of those enemies as he could. By granting them their own magistrates, the right to make bylaws for their government, to build defensive walls, and to place all their inhabitants under a form of military discipline, he furnished every means of security and independence from the barons that lay in his power. Without some regular government of this kind, without authority to compel the townspeople to act according to a settled plan or system, no voluntary alliance for mutual defense could have given them lasting security or enabled them to lend the king substantial support. By granting them the farm of their town in fee, he removed from those he wanted as friends—and, one might say, allies—every cause to suspect or fear that he would afterward oppress them, either by raising the farm rent of their town or by granting it to another farmer.
Accordingly, the princes on the worst terms with their barons seem to have been the most generous in grants of this kind to their burghs. King John of England, for example, appears to have been a most lavish benefactor to his towns. [See Madox.] Philip I. of France lost all authority over his barons. Toward the end of his reign, according to Father Daniel, his son Lewis, later known as Lewis the Fat, consulted the bishops of the royal demesnes on the best way to curb the violence of the great lords. They proposed two measures. One was to create a new jurisdiction by establishing magistrates and a town council in every sizable town of his demesnes. The other was to form a new militia, sending the people of those towns under their own magistrates' command to assist the king when occasion required. According to French antiquarians, the institution of city magistrates and councils in France dates from this period. During the troubled reigns of the princes of the house of Suabia, most of Germany's free towns first received their privileges, and the famous Hanseatic league first became a formidable power. [See Pfeffel.]
In those days the militia of the cities seems to have been no weaker than that of the countryside; and because it could assemble more readily in a sudden emergency, it often prevailed in disputes with neighboring lords. In countries such as Italy or Switzerland, where the sovereign lost all his authority, whether because of distance from the principal seat of government, the country's natural strength, or some other cause, the cities generally became independent republics. They conquered all the neighboring nobility, forced them to pull down their country castles, and made them live in the city like other peaceable inhabitants. This is the history, in brief, of the republic of Berne and several other Swiss cities. Except for Venice, whose history is somewhat different, it is also the history of all the major Italian republics, so many of which arose and perished between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the sixteenth century.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete English text of all five books.
HOW CITIES AND TOWNS GREW AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.
After the fall of the Roman empire, people in cities and towns had no more advantages than people in the countryside. In fact, they were very different from the first inhabitants of the ancient republics of Greece and Italy. Those early inhabitants were mainly landowners. The public land had originally been divided among them, and they found it useful to build their homes close together and surround them with a wall for shared defense. After the fall of the Roman empire, by contrast, landowners generally seem to have lived in fortified castles on their own estates, among their tenants and dependents. Towns were mainly inhabited by traders and craftspeople, who seem to have been enslaved or nearly so. The privileges that old charters granted to residents of some of Europe's leading towns make their previous condition clear. They were given the right to arrange their daughters' marriages without their lord's consent, to leave their property to their own children rather than to the lord, and to dispose of their possessions by will. Before these grants, they must have been in the same state of villeinage, or very nearly so, as the people working the land in the countryside.
They seem to have been very poor people of low standing, who traveled with their goods from place to place and fair to fair, much like today's hawkers and peddlers. Across Europe at that time, as in several Tartar governments in Asia today, travelers paid taxes on themselves and their goods when they passed through certain manors, crossed certain bridges, moved goods around a fair, or set up a booth or stall to sell them. In England these taxes were called passage, pontage, lastage, and stallage. Sometimes the king, and sometimes a powerful lord who apparently had the authority, gave particular traders a general exemption from these taxes. This especially applied to traders living on the lord's own land. Though still enslaved or nearly so in other respects, they were called free traders because of this exemption. In return, they generally paid their protector a kind of annual tax per person. Protection was seldom given for nothing in those days. This tax may have compensated their patrons for what they lost by exempting the traders from other taxes. At first, the per-person taxes and exemptions seem to have applied only to named individuals, for their lifetimes or as long as their protectors pleased. The very incomplete published accounts of several English towns from Doomsday-book often mention either the tax that individual burghers each paid to the king or another powerful lord for this protection, or only the combined amount of all these taxes. [see Brady’s Historical Treatise of Cities and Boroughs, p. 3. etc.]
However unfree the townspeople were at first, they clearly gained freedom and independence much sooner than people who worked the land in the countryside. The king commonly leased out the revenue from per-person taxes in a particular town for a fixed rent and a set number of years. Sometimes the lease went to the county sheriff and sometimes to other people. The burghers themselves often built up enough credit to be allowed to lease the revenue from their own town. Each of them, and all of them together, became responsible for paying the full rent. [See Madox, Firma Burgi, p. 18; also History of the Exchequer, chap. 10, sect. v, p. 223, first edition.] This kind of lease fitted the usual financial practice of, I believe, the rulers of every European country. They often leased whole manors to all the tenants living on them, making each tenant and all of them together responsible for the entire rent. In return, the tenants could collect it in their own way and pay it into the king's treasury through their own bailiff. This freed them entirely from the abusive behavior of the king's officers, something considered extremely important in those days.
The town's lease was probably first given to the burghers, as it had been to other lessees, for only a set number of years. Over time, though, it seems to have become standard to give it to them in fee—that is, permanently—at a fixed rent that could never be raised. As the payment became permanent, the exemptions given in return naturally became permanent too. Those exemptions were therefore no longer personal privileges belonging to particular individuals as individuals. They belonged to people as burghers of a particular town. For that reason it was called a free burgh, just as they had been called free burghers or free traders.
With this grant, the town's burghers generally also received the important privileges mentioned earlier: they could arrange their own daughters' marriages, their children could inherit from them, and they could leave their possessions by will. I do not know whether individual burghers had already commonly received these privileges along with freedom to trade. I think it likely, though I have no direct evidence. Whatever happened earlier, the main features of villeinage and slavery had now been removed. At least by this point, the burghers were genuinely free in the modern sense of the word.
That was not all. They were generally made into a community or corporation at the same time. They could have their own magistrates and town council, make their own local laws, build walls for defense, and put all residents under a kind of military discipline by requiring them to keep watch and guard duty. In the old sense, this meant guarding and defending the walls against attacks and surprise assaults by day and night. In England, they were usually excused from appearing before the hundred and county courts. Their own magistrates decided all disputes arising among them, except cases belonging to the crown. In other countries, they were often given much wider powers of judgment. [See Madox, Firma Burgi. See also Pfeffel in the Remarkable events under Frederick II. and his Successors of the House of Suabia.]
Towns allowed to collect their own revenue may have needed some legal power to force their citizens to pay. In those lawless times, seeking this kind of justice from another court might have been extremely inconvenient. But something else seems surprising. Why did Europe's rulers trade a source of revenue for a fixed rent that could never be raised? Of all their sources of revenue, this one was perhaps the most likely to grow naturally, without any spending or effort on their part. And why did they voluntarily create what were almost independent republics in the middle of their own territories?
To understand this, remember that in those days perhaps no European ruler could protect weaker subjects across his whole territory from oppression by powerful lords. Anyone whom the law could not protect, and who could not defend himself, had two choices. He could seek a powerful lord's protection by becoming his slave or vassal, or join with others in an alliance for mutual defense. Alone, the people of cities and burghs could not defend themselves. Together with their neighbors, they could put up considerable resistance. The lords despised the burghers. They saw them not just as a different class but as a group of freed slaves, almost another species. The burghers' wealth always stirred the lords' envy and anger, and the lords robbed them whenever they could, without mercy or regret. The burghers naturally hated and feared the lords. So did the king. He might look down on the burghers, but had no reason to hate or fear them. Shared interests therefore led the burghers to support the king and the king to support them against the lords. They were enemies of his enemies, so it served his interests to make them as safe and independent of the lords as possible. By giving them their own magistrates, the right to make local laws, the right to build defensive walls, and the power to organize residents for defense, he gave them every means of security and independence from the barons that he could give. Without a regular government of this kind and an authority that could make residents act according to a shared plan, a voluntary defensive alliance could neither protect them for long nor give the king substantial support. By granting them the permanent lease of their town, he also removed every reason for the people he wanted as friends and, so to speak, allies to suspect he might later oppress them by raising the town's rent or leasing it to someone else.
Accordingly, the rulers who got along worst with their barons seem to have given their towns the most generous grants. King John of England, for example, appears to have been an exceptionally generous benefactor to his towns. [See Madox.] Philip I. of France lost all authority over his barons. According to Father Daniel, near the end of Philip's reign his son Lewis, later known as Lewis the Fat, consulted bishops on the royal estates about the best way to curb the powerful lords' violence. They made two proposals. One was to create a new system of local authority by establishing magistrates and a town council in every substantial town on his estates. The other was to create a new militia: residents of those towns would march out under their own magistrates to help the king when needed. According to French historians of antiquity, the establishment of French city magistrates and councils dates from this period. During the troubled reigns of the princes of the house of Suabia, most of Germany's free towns first received their privileges, and the famous Hanseatic league first became a serious force. [See Pfeffel.]
At that time, city militias seem to have been no weaker than those in the countryside. Since they could assemble faster in an emergency, they often had the advantage in disputes with neighboring lords. In places such as Italy or Switzerland, rulers lost all their authority because of distance from their seat of government, the country's natural strength, or some other reason. The cities there generally became independent republics and defeated all the neighboring nobility. They forced the nobles to tear down their country castles and live in the city like other peaceful residents. This is the brief history of the republic of Berne and several other Swiss cities. Apart from Venice, whose history is somewhat different, it is also the history of all the major Italian republics, so many of which rose and fell between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the sixteenth century.