Book III, Chapter II, 2

Land occupied by such tenants is in effect cultivated at the proprietors’ expense, just as land occupied by slaves is. There is, however, one crucial difference. These tenants are free people who can acquire property; because they receive a fixed share of the land’s produce, they have an obvious interest in making its total produce as great as possible, and thereby increasing their own share. A slave, by contrast, able to gain nothing but his maintenance, serves his own ease by making the land yield as little as possible beyond it. This advantage probably contributed to the gradual disappearance of tenure in villanage throughout most of Europe. So too did the encroachments that sovereigns, ever jealous of great lords, gradually encouraged their villains to make on those lords’ authority, apparently enough to make that form of servitude altogether impractical. Yet when and how so great a change took place remains one of the most obscure questions in modern history. The church of Rome claims much credit for it, and Alexander III. certainly issued a bull for the general emancipation of slaves as early as the twelfth century. But this seems to have been a pious exhortation rather than a law demanding strict obedience from the faithful. Slavery continued almost everywhere for several more centuries, until it was gradually abolished by the combined action of the two interests just mentioned: that of the proprietor and that of the sovereign. A villain freed while remaining on the land, without stock of his own, could cultivate it only with what his landlord supplied and must therefore have become what the French call a metayer.

Yet even such a cultivator could never have an interest in putting any of the little stock saved from his share of the produce toward further improvements to the land: the landlord, contributing nothing to this expenditure, would still receive half of everything it produced. The tithe, amounting to only a tenth of the produce, proves a serious obstacle to improvement; a charge of one half must have barred it altogether. A metayer might have an interest in obtaining the greatest possible yield from the stock provided by the proprietor, but could never have an interest in adding any of his own stock to it. In France, where cultivators of this kind are said still to occupy five parts out of six of the entire kingdom, proprietors complain that their metayers seize every chance to use their masters’ livestock for transport rather than cultivation: in transport they keep all the profits, whereas in cultivation they share them with the landlord. Such tenants still exist in parts of Scotland, where they are called steel-bow tenants. Those early English tenants whom Chief-Baron Gilbert and Dr Blackstone describe as the landlord’s bailiffs rather than farmers in the strict sense were probably of the same kind.

This form of tenancy was followed, though very slowly, by farmers properly so called: people who cultivated land with their own stock and paid the landlord a fixed rent. When they hold a lease for a term of years, such farmers may sometimes find it worthwhile to invest some capital in further improving the farm, since they can sometimes expect to recover it with a substantial profit before their lease expires. Yet even their possession remained extremely insecure for a long time, as it still is in many parts of Europe. Before their term expired, a new buyer could legally dispossess them of their leases, even in England through the legal fiction of a common recovery. If their landlord used violence to evict them unlawfully, the remedy available to them was very inadequate. It did not always restore possession, but awarded damages that never covered the real loss. Even in England, perhaps the European country where the yeomanry have always been most respected, it was only around the 14th of Henry VII. that the action of ejectment was devised. Under that action a tenant recovers possession rather than damages alone, and the claim is not necessarily settled by the uncertain decision of a single assize. This remedy has proved so effective that nowadays, when a landlord needs to sue for possession of land, he seldom employs the actions belonging properly to him as landlord—the writ of right or the writ of entry—but sues in his tenant’s name through the writ of ejectment. Thus an English tenant’s security equals a proprietor’s. Moreover, in England a life lease worth forty shillings a year counts as a freehold and gives the lessee a vote for a member of parliament. Because many yeomen have such freeholds, their political influence makes the whole class respectable in their landlords’ eyes. Nowhere else in Europe, I believe, does a tenant build on land for which he holds no lease, trusting his landlord’s honor not to take advantage of such a significant improvement. Laws and customs so favorable to the yeomanry have perhaps contributed more to England’s present greatness than all its much-vaunted commercial regulations combined.

So far as I know, the law protecting even the longest leases against every kind of successor is peculiar to Great Britain. It was established in Scotland as early as 1449 by a law of James II. Its beneficial effects, however, have been greatly hampered by entails: heirs bound by entail are generally forbidden to grant long leases, often leases longer than one year. A recent act of parliament has loosened these bonds somewhat, but they remain far too tight. Furthermore, since no Scottish leasehold confers a parliamentary vote, landlords respect Scottish yeomen less on this account than English ones.

Elsewhere in Europe, once it was found expedient to protect tenants against heirs and buyers alike, that protection was still restricted to a very short period: in France, for example, to nine years from the start of the lease. There it has recently been extended to twentyseven years, still too short to induce tenants to undertake the most important improvements. Landowners were once the lawmakers throughout Europe. Laws governing land were therefore designed around what they took to be the owner’s interest. They imagined it advantageous to him that no lease granted by a predecessor should keep him from enjoying the full value of his land for many years. Greed and injustice are always shortsighted; they failed to foresee how severely this rule would hinder improvement and thus, in the long run, damage the landlord’s true interest.

In addition to paying rent, farmers were formerly supposed to be bound to render numerous services to their landlords, seldom specified in their leases or governed by any definite rule beyond the customary practice of the manor or barony. Being almost wholly arbitrary, these services exposed tenants to many abuses. Within a few years the abolition in Scotland of all services not expressly stipulated in the lease has greatly improved the condition of that country’s yeomanry.

The public services imposed on yeomen were no less arbitrary than those owed privately. Building and maintaining the highways, a burden that I believe still exists everywhere, though with varying degrees of oppression, was not their only duty. Whenever the king’s troops, household, or officials of any kind passed through the country, yeomen had to furnish horses, vehicles, and provisions at prices fixed by the purveyor. Great Britain is, I believe, the only European monarchy where the oppression of purveyance has been completely abolished. It still persists in France and Germany.

The public taxes levied on yeomen were as irregular and oppressive as these services. The old lords were exceedingly reluctant to grant their sovereign any monetary aid themselves, but readily allowed him to tallage, as they called it, their tenants. They did not understand enough to foresee how greatly this would ultimately diminish their own revenue. The taille, still existing in France, illustrates these ancient tallages. It is a tax on a farmer’s presumed profits, assessed according to the stock on his farm. He therefore has an interest in appearing to own as little as possible and consequently investing as little as possible in cultivation, and nothing in improvement. If a French farmer should accumulate any stock, the taille virtually forbids him to employ it on the land. Moreover, this tax is held to dishonor those subject to it and lower them beneath not only gentlemen but burghers; anyone who rents another person’s land becomes liable to it. No gentleman, nor even a burgher with stock, will submit to that humiliation. Thus the tax not only prevents stock accumulated on the land from improving it but drives all other stock away. The ancient tenths and fifteenths, once so common in England, seem, to the extent that they fell on land, to have been taxes of the same nature as the taille.

With all these discouragements, little improvement could be expected of those who occupied the land. Even enjoying all the freedom and security the law can provide, this class must always improve land at a considerable disadvantage. Compared with an owner, a farmer is like a merchant trading on borrowed money compared with one trading on his own. Both may increase their stock, but with equally good management the first will always do so more slowly, because interest on the loan consumes a large share of his profits. Likewise, land cultivated by a farmer, under equally good management, must improve more slowly than land cultivated by its owner, because rent consumes a large share of the produce that the farmer, if he owned the land, could put toward its further improvement. Besides, the position of a farmer is naturally inferior to that of an owner. Across most of Europe the yeomanry are considered lower in rank even than the better class of tradesmen and mechanics, and everywhere lower than great merchants and master manufacturers. A man with considerable stock will therefore seldom leave a higher station to enter a lower one. Even in Europe today, little stock from other professions is likely to enter land improvement through farming. Perhaps more does so in Great Britain than anywhere else, though even there the large stocks invested in farming in some places have usually been acquired through farming—perhaps the trade in which stock is ordinarily acquired more slowly than in any other. After small owners, however, wealthy farmers with large holdings are the principal improvers in every country. England perhaps has more of them than any other European monarchy. In the republican governments of Holland and of Berne in Switzerland, the farmers are said to be no worse than England’s.

Beyond all this, Europe’s ancient policies discouraged cultivation and improvement by owners and farmers alike. First came the general ban on exporting corn without a special license, apparently an almost universal rule. Second came restrictions on inland trade, not merely in corn but in nearly every other farm product, through the absurd laws against engrossers, regraters, and forestallers, and through the privileges of fairs and markets. We have already seen how the prohibition on exporting corn, combined with some encouragement to import foreign corn, impeded cultivation in ancient Italy, naturally Europe’s most fertile country and then the seat of the world’s greatest empire. It may be difficult even to imagine how much those restrictions on domestic trade in corn, together with the general ban on exports, must have discouraged cultivation in countries less fertile and less favorably situated.

Land worked by these tenants is really farmed at the owner's expense, just as land worked by slaves is. But there is one crucial difference. These tenants are free people who can own property. They get a fixed share of what the land produces. So it is plainly in their interest to make the total harvest as large as possible, to make their share larger too. A slave, on the other hand, can acquire nothing beyond a living and makes life easier by getting as little extra produce from the land as possible. This advantage of free tenants was probably one reason bonded tenure gradually disappeared from most of Europe. Another was that rulers, always wary of the great lords, gradually encouraged the lords' bonded tenants to encroach on their authority. These encroachments seem at least to have made this form of servitude too difficult to maintain. But when and how such a major change took place is one of the least clear matters in modern history. The church of Rome claims much credit for it. It is true that Alexander III. issued a bull calling for the general freeing of slaves as early as the twelfth century. But it seems to have been more an appeal to religious duty than a law demanding strict obedience from believers. Slavery remained almost universal for several more centuries. It was gradually abolished through the combined interests already mentioned: those of the landowner on one side and the ruler on the other. A bonded tenant who gained freedom but remained on the land, with no stock of his own, could farm it only with supplies from the landowner. He must therefore have become what the French call a metayer.

But even these farmers would never have had a reason to invest any of the little stock saved from their own share of the harvest in further improvements. The owner would get one half of whatever those improvements produced without investing anything. A tithe, taking only a tenth of the produce, is known to be a serious obstacle to improvement. A charge of one half must have stopped it effectively. A metayer had reason to get as much as possible from the land with the stock the owner supplied, but none to add any of his own. In France, five parts out of six of the whole kingdom are said still to be farmed by such tenants. Landowners there complain that their metayers use the owners' animals to transport goods instead of farming whenever they can. They keep all the profit from transporting goods, but must share the profit from farming with their landlords. This kind of tenant still exists in parts of Scotland under the name steel-bow tenant. The early English tenants described by Chief-Baron Gilbert and Dr Blackstone as more like their landlords' managers than actual farmers were probably of the same kind.

Very slowly, these tenants were replaced by farmers in the proper sense. These farmers used their own stock to farm and paid the landowner a fixed rent. If they held a lease for a set number of years, they could sometimes profit by investing part of their capital in further improvements. They might recover their investment with a large profit before the lease ran out. Yet their claim to the land remained very insecure for a long time, and still is in many parts of Europe. A new buyer could legally force them off the land before their leases ended, even in England, by means of the fictional legal procedure called a common recovery. If their landlord forced them out unlawfully, the legal action available to them gave very limited relief. It did not always restore their possession of the land, but awarded them damages that never covered their actual loss. Even in England, where tenant farmers have perhaps always received more respect than anywhere else in Europe, the action of ejectment was not introduced until about the 14th of Henry VII. It gave tenants possession back, not just damages, and did not necessarily leave their claim to the uncertain verdict of a single assize court. It worked so well that today, when a landlord needs to sue for possession, he seldom uses the landlord's own remedies, the writ of right or writ of entry. Instead he uses a writ of ejectment in his tenant's name. So in England a tenant's possession is as secure as an owner's. Moreover, a life lease worth forty shillings a-year is a freehold in England, entitling the tenant to vote for a member of parliament. Many tenant farmers hold such freeholds. Their landlords therefore respect this whole class because it has political influence. Nowhere in Europe except England, I believe, is there an example of a tenant building on land without a lease and trusting the landlord's honor not to take advantage of such a major improvement. Laws and customs that favor tenant farmers in these ways may have done more for England's present greatness than all its much-praised trade regulations put together.

As far as I know, only Great Britain has a law protecting the longest leases against every kind of successor to the landlord. A law of James II introduced it in Scotland as early as 1449. Entails have greatly reduced its benefit, however. Heirs holding entailed estates are generally barred from granting long leases, and often from granting leases longer than one year. A recent act of parliament has loosened these restrictions a little, but they are still far too tight. Also, no leasehold in Scotland gives its holder a vote for a member of parliament. Scottish tenant farmers therefore command less respect from their landlords on this account than English ones do.

Elsewhere in Europe, even after people saw the value of protecting tenants against both heirs and buyers, that protection lasted only a short time. In France, for example, it lasted nine years from the start of the lease. It has recently been extended there to twentyseven, still too short a time to encourage tenants to make the most important improvements. Landowners used to make the laws in every part of Europe. Laws about land were therefore designed around what they thought would serve owners' interests. They imagined that owners should not be prevented by leases granted by predecessors from enjoying their land's full value for many years. Greed and injustice do not look far ahead. They failed to see how much this rule would hold back improvements and ultimately hurt landowners' real interests.

In addition to paying rent, farmers were formerly thought obliged to perform many services for their landlords. These were seldom specified in the lease or defined by any precise rule. Instead they depended on the customs of the manor or barony. Because these services were almost completely at the landlord's discretion, they caused tenants much trouble. Within a few years of Scotland's abolition of every service not clearly required by a lease, conditions for its tenant farmers improved greatly.

The public services demanded from tenant farmers were just as arbitrary as those demanded privately. Building and maintaining highways was one duty. I believe it still exists everywhere, though it places a heavier burden on some countries than on others. It was not the only one. When the king's troops, household, or officers of any kind traveled through a district, tenant farmers had to supply horses, vehicles, and food at a price set by the official in charge of supplies. Great Britain is, I believe, the only European monarchy to have entirely abolished this oppressive system of compulsory supplies. It still exists in France and Germany.

The public taxes on these farmers were as unpredictable and oppressive as these duties. The old lords were extremely unwilling to give their sovereigns money themselves, but readily let them impose a charge known as tallage on their tenants. They did not understand how much this would eventually reduce their own revenue. The taille, which still exists in France, is an example of those old tallages. It is a tax on what the farmer is assumed to earn, estimated from the stock on the farm. Farmers therefore benefit from appearing to have as little stock as possible, and so from using as little as possible to farm their land and nothing to improve it. If a French farmer manages to accumulate stock, the taille almost prevents him from ever investing it in the land. This tax also supposedly dishonors and lowers anyone who pays it to a status beneath not only a gentleman but a burgher. Anyone renting someone else's land has to pay it. No gentleman, or even burgher, with stock will accept that loss of status. So the tax not only prevents stock accumulated on the land from improving it, but also drives away stock from elsewhere. The tenths and fifteenths common in England in earlier times seem, where they affected the land, to have been taxes of the same kind as the taille.

With all these obstacles, little improvement could be expected from people who rented land. Even if the law gives them every possible freedom and security, farmers always face a serious disadvantage in improving land. Compared with an owner, a farmer is like a merchant trading with borrowed money compared with one trading with his own. Both can increase their stock. But if they manage it equally well, the borrower will always build stock more slowly, because loan interest takes a large share of the profit. In the same way, if both manage equally well, a tenant farmer's land will improve more slowly than an owner's, because rent takes a large share of the produce. The farmer could have used that share to improve the land further if he owned it. Farmers also naturally hold a lower social position than owners. Across most of Europe, tenant farmers are seen as lower in rank even than the more prosperous tradespeople and mechanics, and everywhere in Europe as lower than major merchants and manufacturing owners. Someone with substantial stock is therefore unlikely to leave a higher-ranking occupation for a lower-ranking one. Even in Europe today, little stock from other professions is likely to be invested in improving land through tenant farming. Perhaps more is invested this way in Great Britain than elsewhere. But even there, large sums invested in farming in some places have usually been earned from farming itself, perhaps the occupation in which stock normally accumulates most slowly. After small landowners, however, wealthy farmers with large operations do more than anyone else to improve land in every country. England may have more of them than any other European monarchy. In the republics of Holland and Berne in Switzerland, farmers are said to be as good as those in England.

Beyond all these obstacles, the old European policy held back the improvement and farming of land whether it was worked by owners or tenants. First, there was the general ban on exporting grain without a special license, apparently a very common rule. Second, there were restrictions on domestic trade in grain and almost every other kind of farm produce. These included absurd laws against people who bought up goods, resold them at markets, or bought them before they reached market, as well as special privileges for fairs and markets. I have already described how the ban on exporting grain, combined with some encouragement to import foreign grain, obstructed farming in ancient Italy. Italy was naturally Europe's most fertile country and, at the time, the center of the world's greatest empire. It may be hard even to imagine how much domestic trade restrictions on grain, added to a general export ban, discouraged farming in countries with poorer soil and less favorable circumstances.